Epistemic Entitlement [electronic resource] : The Right to Believe /
Matthiessen, H.author.
What entitles you to claims about your perceivable environment? Matthiessen suggests that it is neither your experience, nor the reliability of your cognitive processes, but rather your being in the right kind of perceptual situation.
Description based upon print version of record.
Cover; Contents; Introduction; 1 The Right to Believe; 1.1 Personal and doxastic epistemic status; 1.2 Epistemic entitlement: Recent conceptions; 1.3 The standard account of epistemic entitlement; 1.4 Summary; 2 The Social Character of Entitlements; 2.1 Entitlements and accessibility; 2.2 An alternative: The social externalist account; 2.3 Internalism and externalism in the social externalist account; 2.4 Two types of entitlement?; 3 A Default and Challenge Model of Perceptual Entitlement; 3.1 Defeasible inferences, concepts and entitlements
3.2 Entitlements by default and public accessibility3.3 Default conditions for perceptual entitlement; 3.4 Challenge conditions; 4 Perceptual Knowledge; 4.1 Degrees of entitlement; 4.2 Contingency; 4.3 The analysis problem again; 4.4 Externalism and internalism; 4.5 Social externalism; 5 Perceptual Knowledge and the First-Person Perspective; 5.1 Austin's and McDowell's insights; 5.2 The social externalist account and the first-person perspective; 5.3 Austin's and McDowell's insights revisited; 6 Concluding Remarks; Notes and References; Bibliography; Index
Includes bibliographical references and index.
What entitles you to claims about your perceivable environment? Matthiessen suggests that it is neither your experience, nor the reliability of your cognitive processes, but rather your being in the right kind of perceptual situation.
Epistemology.
Cognitive psychology.
Epistemology.
Cognitive Psychology.