Trade in Ideas [electronic resource] : Performance and Behavioral Properties of Markets in Patents /
Ullberg, Eskil.author.
“This is a book for the times. Never have we been more in need of the wealth creation process that can only come from innovations subjected to the trial and error process of selection to decide what among all the experiments can be supported for further trial.” --Vernon L. Smith, Nobel Laureate in Economics 2002, Chapman University   “Eskil Ullberg … departs from the error made by Arrow, an ambitious leap, perhaps, but one that is in this case warranted.  Eskil seeks to explain more of the mechanisms by which property rights, specifically IP, can be sold by inventors to diversify risk and to monetize value.   Using the methodology of experimental economics, he creates a controlled game in which players – rewarded with money returns, to the extent that they follow rules, manage risk, and execute smart trades – reveal how economic agents might generally transact in IP rights traded in organized exchanges. In testing how such trading institutions work, this research seeks to bring Adam Smith’s trade theory up to the modern day work on market design by such scholars as Vernon Smith, David Porter, Steve Rassenti, and Charles Plott.” --Thomas W. Hazlett, George Mason University, USA and Director of the Information Economy Project.
Description based upon print version of record.
Trade in Ideas; Foreword; Series Foreword; Preface; Contents; Chapter 1: From Personal to Impersonal Exchange in Ideas; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 The Economic History of the Patent System: Productivity; 1.3 The Economic Principles of the Patent System: Exchange; 1.3.1 A Market in Technology (Market Exchange); 1.3.2 A Contract with the State (Social Exchange); 1.3.3 The Economic Principle of Trade in Technology; 1.4 The Economic Structure and the Patent System: Specialization; 1.4.1 Economic Organization and the Patent System
1.4.2 Management of Risk and Uncertainty as a Principle of Organizational Limits1.5 Impersonal Exchange Mechanisms for a Market in Patents with Prices: Coordination; 1.5.1 A Linear Contract; 1.5.1.1 The Linear Contract and Patents; 1.5.1.2 The Linear Contract and Risk-Sharing; 1.5.2 A Proposed Informal Theory for Linear Contracts and Prices; 1.5.3 The Design Mechanisms for a Linear Contract; 1.5.3.1 The Mechanism Design Criteria for Transition to Impersonal Exchange; 1.5.3.2 Experimental Economics Needed to Study a Dynamic System of Institutions and People; 1.5.3.3 The Designed Mechanisms
1.5.4 Strength of the Patent System, Legal Uncertainty and Presumed Validity, in the Economic Environment1.5.5 The Role of Intermediaries, the "Dynamic Principle", in the Economic Environment; 1.5.6 The Technology Space - Searchable Technologies - In the Economic Environment; 1.6 Econometrics for the Experiments; 1.7 Experimental Economics: Studying What People Do; 1.7.1 A Study of What People Do; 1.7.2 What Can We Learn from Experimental Data; References; Chapter 2: A Dynamic Microeconomic System Design for Markets in Patents; 2.1 Introduction
2.2 Institutional Learning in History and the Two-Dimensional Nature of the Patent System2.2.1 A Competitive Market in Technology; 2.2.2 Allocation of Risk Bearing and Risk Sharing; 2.2.3 Historic Development; 2.3 The Dynamic Microeconomic System Design; 2.3.1 The Legal Environment; 2.3.2 The Economic Environment; 2.3.2.1 The Economic Agents; 2.3.2.2 The Security Traded; 2.3.2.3 Agent Characteristics; 2.3.3 The Institutions; 2.4 Informal Theory of Prices and Initial Hypotheses; 2.5 Summary; References
Chapter 3: Prices and Dynamic Gains in Markets for Patents: Experimental Study of Impersonal Exchange in Ideas3.1 Intro duction 1; 3.1.1 The Patent System as a Trade System; 3.1.2 Summary of a Price System on Patents; 3.1.3 The Mechanisms Design Criteria; 3.2 The Mechanisms: Details of the Institutions, the Economic and Legal Environments; 3.2.1 The Endogenous Experimental Flow; 3.2.2 The Trading Screens; 3.2.3 Subject Payments, Endowments, and Special "Rules of the Game"; 3.3 Overview of Experimental Design, Design Parameters, Market Performance, and the Sequence of the Experiment
3.3.1 Market Performance and Dynamic Gains Under High Validity
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
“This is a book for the times. Never have we been more in need of the wealth creation process that can only come from innovations subjected to the trial and error process of selection to decide what among all the experiments can be supported for further trial.” --Vernon L. Smith, Nobel Laureate in Economics 2002, Chapman University   “Eskil Ullberg … departs from the error made by Arrow, an ambitious leap, perhaps, but one that is in this case warranted.  Eskil seeks to explain more of the mechanisms by which property rights, specifically IP, can be sold by inventors to diversify risk and to monetize value.   Using the methodology of experimental economics, he creates a controlled game in which players – rewarded with money returns, to the extent that they follow rules, manage risk, and execute smart trades – reveal how economic agents might generally transact in IP rights traded in organized exchanges. In testing how such trading institutions work, this research seeks to bring Adam Smith’s trade theory up to the modern day work on market design by such scholars as Vernon Smith, David Porter, Steve Rassenti, and Charles Plott.” --Thomas W. Hazlett, George Mason University, USA and Director of the Information Economy Project.
Management.
Industrial management.
Economic theory.
Economic policy.
Innovation/Technology Management.
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
R & D/Technology Policy.


Innovation, technology and knowledge management