Epistemic Relativism [electronic resource] : A Constructive Critique /
Seidel, M.author.
Markus Seidel provides a detailed critique of epistemic relativism in the sociology of scientific knowledge. In addition to scrutinizing the main arguments for epistemic relativism he provides an absolutist account that nevertheless aims at integrating the relativist's intuition.
Description based upon print version of record.
Cover; Half-Title ; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1 Setting the Stage: Epistemic Relativism in the Strong Programme and Beyond; 1.1 What is epistemic relativism?; 1.1.1 Difficulties in interpreting the relativism of the Strong Programme: 'switcheroos', the innocent and the not- so-innocent reading of the equivalence postulate, and alethic relativism; 1.1.2 The Strong Programme on 'knowledge' and the definition of epistemic relativism; 1.2 The debate about epistemic relativism in the context of epistemology
1.2.1 Epistemic relativism, epistemic absolutism and epistemic scepticism1.2.1.1 Epistemic relativism and epistemic absolutism; 1.2.1.2 The relation between epistemic scepticism and the discussion about epistemic relativism; 1.2.2 A kind of credo: reliabilism, externalism and naturalism; 2 Realism and the Argument fromUnderdetermination; 2.1 The realism of the Strong Programme; 2.2 The argument from underdetermination; 2.2.1 What is the argument from underdetermination supposed to show?; 2.2.2 Underdetermination - different forms
2.2.2.1 The scope of underdetermination: transient or permanent underdetermination? Global or local underdetermination?2.2.2.2 The practical relevance of underdetermination: philosopher's or scientist's underdetermination?; 2.2.2.3 The practical relevance of underdetermination: what is underdetermined? underdetermination of theory or of theory-construction or of theory-choice?; 2.2.2.4 The relation of underdetermination: logical or epistemic underdetermination?; 2.2.2.5 The consequences of underdetermination: epistemic or social factors?; 2.2.3 Duhemian or Quinean underdetermination?
2.2.4 What form of underdetermination is needed for the relativistic conclusion?2.2.5 Two arguments from underdetermination: the Duhemian-inductive strategy and the Quinean-hypothetico-deductivestrategy; 2.2.5.1 The Duhemian-inductive strategy; 2.2.5.2 The Quinean-hypothetico-deductive strategy; 2.2.6 Are the arguments correct?; 2.2.6.1 The Duhemian-inductive strategy assessed; 2.2.6.2 The Duhemian-inductive strategy reloaded - a proposal along naturalistic lines; 2.2.6.3 The Quinean-hypothetico-deductive strategy assessed; 2.2.7 A short summary and a final objection: what about finitism?
3 Norm-Circularity3.1 What is at stake in the argument?; 3.2 Is the argument the fundamental argument for epistemic relativism?; 3.3 The argument from norm-circularity; 3.4 The argument from norm-circularity assessed; 3.4.1 Are there people using epistemic systems that differ radically from our epistemic system?; 3.4.2 Bellarmine and the Azande-oracle; 3.4.2.1 Bellarmine; 3.4.2.2 The Azande-oracle; 3.5 Summary norm-circularity; 4 Epistemic Absolutism That Can Accommodate the Relativist's Intuition; 4.1 The correct intuition of the epistemic relativist
4.2 Epistemic absolutism and the justification for believing in the absolute correctness of epistemic norms
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Markus Seidel provides a detailed critique of epistemic relativism in the sociology of scientific knowledge. In addition to scrutinizing the main arguments for epistemic relativism he provides an absolutist account that nevertheless aims at integrating the relativist's intuition.
Epistemology.
Philosophy and science.
Social sciences.
Psychology.
Epistemology.
Philosophy of Science.
Social Sciences, general.
Psychology, general.