The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling [electronic resource] : On Affect and Intentionality /
Müller, Jean Moritz.author.
 “The sustained criticisms Müller offers of standard accounts of emotional feeling should be taken seriously, and Müller's positive account is rich and interesting on its own […] The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling amply repays the time invested in reading it.“ — Bennett Helm, Franklin & Marshall College, Pennsylvania, USA “Concerning the widely discussed idea of the specific intentionality of emotions, Müller provides an original account. […] Rigorous, clear and accurate, this is a very fruitful endeavour.” — Eva Weber-Guskar, Guest Professor of Philosophy, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, Müller conceives of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself intentional, he argues against the currently popular view that it is a form of perception-like receptivity to value. Müller instead proposes that emotional feeling is a specific type of response to value, an affective ‘position-taking’. This alternative conceives of emotional feeling as intimately related to our cares and concerns. While situating itself within the analytic-philosophical debate on emotion, the discussion crucially draws on ideas from the early phenomenological tradition and thinks past the theoretical strictures of many contemporary approaches to this subject. The result is an innovative view of emotional feeling as a thoroughly personal form of engagement with value.
 “The sustained criticisms Müller offers of standard accounts of emotional feeling should be taken seriously, and Müller's positive account is rich and interesting on its own […] The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling amply repays the time invested in reading it.“ — Bennett Helm, Franklin & Marshall College, Pennsylvania, USA “Concerning the widely discussed idea of the specific intentionality of emotions, Müller provides an original account. […] Rigorous, clear and accurate, this is a very fruitful endeavour.” — Eva Weber-Guskar, Guest Professor of Philosophy, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, Müller conceives of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself intentional, he argues against the currently popular view that it is a form of perception-like receptivity to value. Müller instead proposes that emotional feeling is a specific type of response to value, an affective ‘position-taking’. This alternative conceives of emotional feeling as intimately related to our cares and concerns. While situating itself within the analytic-philosophical debate on emotion, the discussion crucially draws on ideas from the early phenomenological tradition and thinks past the theoretical strictures of many contemporary approaches to this subject. The result is an innovative view of emotional feeling as a thoroughly personal form of engagement with value.
Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Feelings and Formal Objects -- Chapter 3: Emotional Feeling as Receptivity to Value -- Chapter 4: Emotional Feeling as Position-Taking -- Chapter 5: The Evaluative Foundation of Emotional Feeling -- Chapter 6: Conclusion.
Philosophy of mind.
Emotions.
Phenomenology .
Ethics.
Philosophy of Mind.
Emotion.
Phenomenology.
Ethics.