Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents [electronic resource] : Contributions to Social Ontology /
Konzelmann Ziv, Anita.editor.
Schmid, Hans Bernhard.editor.
The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomenological approaches to social ontology and accounts of sociality that draw on the Hegelian idea of recognition. This volume is organized into three parts. First, the volume discusses themes highlighted in John Searle’s work and addresses questions concerning the relation between intentions and the deontic powers of institutions, the role of disagreement, and the nature of collective intentionality. Next, the book focuses on joint and collective emotions and mutual recognition, and then goes on to explore the scope and limits of group agency, or group personhood, especially the capacity for responsible agency. The variety of philosophical traditions mirrored in this collection provides readers with a rich and multifaceted survey of present research in social ontology. It will help readers deepen their understanding of three interrelated and core topics in social ontology: the constitution and structure of institutions, the role of shared evaluative attitudes, and the nature and role of group agents.
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references.
Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1. Introduction: Contributions to Social Ontology—Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents; Anita Konzelmann Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid -- Part I: Intentionality and Institutions -- Chapter 2. Document Acts; Barry Smith -- Chapter 3. Searlean Reflections on Sacred Mountains; Filip Buekens -- Chapter 4. Social Objects without Intentions; Brian Epstein -- Chapter 5. The Logical Form of Totalitarianism; Jennifer Hudin -- Chapter 6. Groups, Normativity and Disagreement; Rodrigo E. Sànchaz Brigido -- Chapter 7. Joint Actions, Social Institutions and Collective Goods: A Teleological Account; Seumas Miller -- Chapter 8. Three Types of Heterotropic Intentionality: A Taxonomy in Social Ontology; Francesca De Vecchi -- Part II: Shared Emotions and Recognition -- Chapter 9. Emergence and Empathy; Ronald De Sousa -- Chapter 10. The Functions of Collective Emotions in Social Groups; Mikko Salmela -- Chapter 11. Feelings of Being-Together and Caring With; H. Andrés Sànchez Guerrero -- Chapter 12. Joining the Background: Habitual Sentiments behind We-Intentionality; Emanuele Caminada -- Chapter 13. Collective Intentionality and Recognition from Others; Arto Laitinen -- Chapter 14. The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership; Titus Stahl -- Part III: Collective Reasons and Group Agency -- Chapter 15. Acting Over Time, Acting Together; Michael E. Bratman -- Chapter 16. How Where We Stand Constrains Where I Stand: Applying Bratman’s Account of Self-Governance to Collective Action; Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko -- Chapter 17. Team Reasoning and Shared Intention; Abraham Sesshu Roth -- Chapter 18. Collective Intentionality and Practical Reason; Juliette Gloor -- Chapter 19. The SANE Approach to Real Collective Responsibility; Sara Chant -- Chapter 20. Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?; András Szigeti -- Chapter 21. Can Groups Be Autonomous Rational Agents? A Challenge to the List-Pettit-Theory; Vuko Andric -- Chapter 22. Direct and Indirect Common Belief; Emiliano Lorini and Andreas Herzig.
The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomenological approaches to social ontology and accounts of sociality that draw on the Hegelian idea of recognition. This volume is organized into three parts. First, the volume discusses themes highlighted in John Searle’s work and addresses questions concerning the relation between intentions and the deontic powers of institutions, the role of disagreement, and the nature of collective intentionality. Next, the book focuses on joint and collective emotions and mutual recognition, and then goes on to explore the scope and limits of group agency, or group personhood, especially the capacity for responsible agency. The variety of philosophical traditions mirrored in this collection provides readers with a rich and multifaceted survey of present research in social ontology. It will help readers deepen their understanding of three interrelated and core topics in social ontology: the constitution and structure of institutions, the role of shared evaluative attitudes, and the nature and role of group agents.
Philosophy and social sciences.
Personality.
Social psychology.
Sociology.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
Personality and Social Psychology.
Sociological Theory.