Fellow-feeling and the moral life /
Filonowicz, Joseph Duke.
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,
2008.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-245) and index.
Fellow-feeling and ethical theory : the British sentimentalists -- The school of sentiment -- Two conceptions of the moral -- Morality in the open street -- A formidable ghost : the Sage of Malmesbury -- Moral theory and moral advice -- Designs of remaining chapters -- Ethical sentimentalism revisited -- Statement of the argument  -- Ethical rationalism -- Shaftesbury's ethical sentimentalism -- Sentimentalism and rationalism -- Objections to sentimentalism -- Shaftesbury's ethical system -- Shaftesbury as moralist -- The good -- Obligation -- Disinterestedness -- Why should I be moral? -- Shaftesbury's moral sense -- The limits of Shaftesburyan sentimentalism -- Hutcheson's moral sense -- A sad tale? -- Hutcheson's moral sense -- Four naèive questions concerning moral sense -- What do we perceive by moral sense? -- Three received views -- Defining Hutcheson's moral "realism"  -- Charting the return journey -- Hutcheson's "offensive" argument against ethical rationalism  -- C.D. Broad's defense of moral sense theories in ethics -- "Some reflections" -- The subjective theory -- Analysis part 1 : why moral sense theory is sentimentalistic -- Analysis part 2 : subjectivism versus naturalism, or, are ethical propositions statistical? -- Broad's defense, (almost) concluded  -- Broad's offensive argument against ethical rationalism -- What is innate in moral sense? -- Moral sense theory : Hutcheson, Broad and beyond -- James W. Wilson's The moral sense -- How do very young children come to approve (and disapprove)? occultism versus obscurantism -- The "hyperoffensive" argument against ethical rationalism -- Ideas without will -- Postscript : Hume, Smith and the end of the sentimental school.
Hutcheson, Francis, 1694-1746.
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of, 1671-1713.
Ethics