Strategic Social Choice [electronic resource] : Stable Representations of Constitutions /
Peleg, Bezalel.author.
Peters, Hans.author.
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references.
Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting -- to Part II -- Feasible elimination procedures -- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions -- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
Welfare economics.
Game theory.
Economic theory.
Social sciences.
Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy.
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
Methodology of the Social Sciences.
Studies in Choice and Welfare