Being Somewhere [electronic resource] : Egocentric Spatial Representation as Self-Representation /
Pöhlmann, Ferdinand.author.
Ferdinand Pöhlmann argues that a sense of one's own basic abilities to move is a constitutive condition on the ability to perceive the world spatially. This constitutive relation explains why egocentric spatial representation is to be regarded as a kind of self-representation. In arguing for these claims, conceptual as well as empirical questions are discussed and an overview of accounts that take action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation is given. The picture that emerges is linked to the phenomenological (Scheler) as well as to the analytic (Evans) tradition in the Philosophy of Mind. Contents Basic Way of Representing Oneself between mere Reflexivity and Self-Consciousness A Sense of one's Action Possibilities as the Constitutive Basis of Spatial Perception Discussed Approaches: Perry, Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, Evans, Hurley, Noë, and Others Empirical Evidence: Inverted Vision Studies, Sensory Substitution Devices and Others Target Groups Graduate students and researchers in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and psychology The Author Ferdinand Pöhlmann received his doctorate from the Philosophy Department at Eberhard Karls Universität, Tübingen. He is currently working in the editorial office of a global publishing company in Stuttgart.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Basic Way of Representing Oneself between mere Reflexivity and Self-Consciousness -- A Sense of one's Action Possibilities as the Constitutive Basis of Spatial Perception -- Discussed Approaches: Perry, Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, Evans, Hurley, Noë, and Others -- Empirical Evidence: Inverted Vision Studies, Sensory Substitution Devices and Others .
Ferdinand Pöhlmann argues that a sense of one's own basic abilities to move is a constitutive condition on the ability to perceive the world spatially. This constitutive relation explains why egocentric spatial representation is to be regarded as a kind of self-representation. In arguing for these claims, conceptual as well as empirical questions are discussed and an overview of accounts that take action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation is given. The picture that emerges is linked to the phenomenological (Scheler) as well as to the analytic (Evans) tradition in the Philosophy of Mind. Contents Basic Way of Representing Oneself between mere Reflexivity and Self-Consciousness A Sense of one's Action Possibilities as the Constitutive Basis of Spatial Perception Discussed Approaches: Perry, Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, Evans, Hurley, Noë, and Others Empirical Evidence: Inverted Vision Studies, Sensory Substitution Devices and Others Target Groups Graduate students and researchers in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and psychology The Author Ferdinand Pöhlmann received his doctorate from the Philosophy Department at Eberhard Karls Universität, Tübingen. He is currently working in the editorial office of a global publishing company in Stuttgart.
Philosophy of mind.
Philosophy of Mind.