The Problem of Animal Pain [electronic resource] : A Theodicy For All Creatures Great And Small /
Dougherty, T.author.
Nagasawa, Y.editor.
Wielenberg, E.editor.
Animal suffering constitutes perhaps the greatest challenge to rational belief in the existence of God. Considerations that render human suffering theologically intelligible seem inapplicable to animal suffering. In this book, Dougherty defends radical possibilities for animal afterlife that allow a soul-making theodicy to apply to their case.
Description based upon print version of record.
Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Series Editors' Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 The Plan of This Book; 1.1 Background; 1.2 Epistemology; 1.3 Not-so-bare bare theism; 1.4 Two ways of learning what theism entails; 2 The Problem of Animal Pain; 2.1 Stating the problem; 2.1.1 What is the problem?; 2.1.2 Getting more precise; 2.1.3 Theism as "hypothesis"; 2.2 How shall I understand "pain" and "suffering"; 2.3 The amount of suffering; 3 The Bayesian Argument from Animal Pain; 3.1 Formalizing the problem: a Bayesian approach
3.1.1 The formal structure of the argument from animal suffering3.1.2 The simplicity of the hypotheses; 3.1.3 The Bayes factor; 3.1.4 Taking stock thus far; 3.2 A narrative approach to assigning probabilities; 3.3 Criteria for success: between theodicy and defense; 4 Is There Really a Problem?: The Challenge of Neo-Cartesianism; 4.1 A starting point: common sense and scientific consensus; 4.1.1 Common sense epistemology; 4.1.2 Scientific consensus; 4.2 A statement of the objection; 4.2.1 Introduction; 4.2.2 Kinds of neo-Cartesianism and how they function epistemically
4.2.3 Some motivation for neo-Cartesianism4.2.3.1 From philosophy: HOT of consciousness; 4.2.3.2 From neuroanatomy: the lobotomy argument; 5 There Is a Problem: The Defeat of Neo-Cartesianism; 5.1 Initial reply to neo-Cartesianism: moving away from rationalism; 5.1.1 Pain as emotion-like; 5.1.2 Non-conceptual knowledge of pain; 5.1.3 Recap; 5.2 The problem of primate pain or seeing through the mirror test; 5.2.1 A statement of the problem; 5.2.2 Objection from Carruthers; 5.2.3 A final argument; 6 The Saint-Making Theodicy I: Negative Phase; 6.1 Some necessary ground clearing
6.2 Axiology and teleology6.3 The defeat of evil; 7 The Saint-Making Theodicy II: Positive Phase; 7.1 The fine-tuning argument for theism from evil; 7.2 Application to the Bayesian argument from evil; 7.3 Too much suffering? What's the evidence?; 7.4 A narrative approach; 8 Animal Saints; 8.1 Doubt about animal soul-making from within the ranks; 8.1.1 A cause of the lacuna in previous soul-making theodicies; 8.1.2 Some consequences of the lacuna; 8.2 Deification: human and non-human; 8.3 The transcendental argument for animal deification
8.4 Identity issues: objections to the animal deification9 Animal Afterlife; 9.1 Animal souls; 9.1.1 Biblical support for animal souls; 9.1.2 The traditional Christian view about animal souls; 9.1.3 Philosophical support for animal souls; 9.1.3.1 The knowledge argument; 9.1.3.2 Qualia: inverted and absent; 9.1.4 Conclusion; 9.2 Gappy existence; 9.2.1 Introduction; 9.2.2 Natural skepticism about gappy existence; 9.2.3 A description of the model; 9.2.4 Split brains: the terrible tale of twins Ted and Todd; 9.2.5 Objections to the present view of resurrection 173 Concluding Summary; Bibliography
Index
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Animal suffering constitutes perhaps the greatest challenge to rational belief in the existence of God. Considerations that render human suffering theologically intelligible seem inapplicable to animal suffering. In this book, Dougherty defends radical possibilities for animal afterlife that allow a soul-making theodicy to apply to their case.
Religion-Philosophy.
Ethics.
Philosophy of Religion.
Ethics.