Collective Decision Making [electronic resource] : Views from Social Choice and Game Theory /
Van Deemen, Adrian.editor.
Rusinowska, Agnieszka.editor.
This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow's Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to influence processes and information sharing in collective decision making networks; from cardinal utility to restricted domains for social welfare functions; from rights and game forms to responsibility in committee decision making; and from dueling to bargaining. The book reflects the richness and diversity of the field of collective decision making and shows the usefulness and adequacy of social choice and game theory for the study of it. It starts with typical social choice themes like Arrow's Theorem and ends with typical game theoretical topics, like bargaining and interval games. In between there is a mixture of views on collective decision making in which both social choice and game theoretic aspects are brought in. The book is dedicated to Harrie de Swart, who organized the well-known Social Choice Colloquia at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands.
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references.
From Black's Advice and Arrow's Theorem to the Gibbard-Satterthewaite Result -- The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists -- Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models -- Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules -- Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making -- Rights Revisited, and Limited -- Some General Results on Responsibility for Outcomes -- Existence of a Dictatorial Subgroup in Social Choice with Independent Subgroup Utility Scales, an Alternative Proof -- Making (Non-standard) Choices -- Puzzles and Paradoxes Involving Averages: An Intuitive Approach -- Voting Weights, Thresholds and Population Size: Member State Representation in the Council of the European Union -- Stabilizing Power Sharing -- Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games -- Networks, Information and Choice -- Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions by Properties of Their Status Quo Sets -- Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta-Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games.
This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow's Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to influence processes and information sharing in collective decision making networks; from cardinal utility to restricted domains for social welfare functions; from rights and game forms to responsibility in committee decision making; and from dueling to bargaining. The book reflects the richness and diversity of the field of collective decision making and shows the usefulness and adequacy of social choice and game theory for the study of it. It starts with typical social choice themes like Arrow's Theorem and ends with typical game theoretical topics, like bargaining and interval games. In between there is a mixture of views on collective decision making in which both social choice and game theoretic aspects are brought in. The book is dedicated to Harrie de Swart, who organized the well-known Social Choice Colloquia at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands.
Economic theory.
Public finance.
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
Public Economics.
Theory and Decision Library C