Evolutionary Psychology and the Propositional-attitudes [electronic resource] : Two Mechanist Manifestos /
Walter, Alex.author.
The two essays provide a critical examination of theory and research in the field of evolutionary psychology. The view advanced here is that philosophical materialism and minimalist assumptions about adaptation serve Darwinian psychology better than the more popular alternative view that relies on cognitive dualism and propositional-attitude psychology to formulate evolutionary psychology theory. A commitment to cognitive dualism is destined to undermine the physical basis of behavior upon which evolutionary theory depends. Many evolutionary psychologists do not see this but are seduced by the easy way in which hypotheses can be formulated using the ‘propositional-attitude’ model. The challenge is to develop a materialistic and mechanistic approach to understanding human cognition and behavior, including linguistic and social behavior.
Description based upon print version of record.
Evolutionary Psychology and the Propositional-attitudes; Preface; Acknowledgments; Contents; 1 Evolutionary Psychology and the Propositional-Attitudes: Why the Cognitive Turn is a Wrong Turn; Varieties of Propositional Experience; The Intentional Bogeyman; Sociobiology and the Propositional-Attitudes; The Cognitive Turn in Evolutionary Psychology; The 'Intentional Systems' Model of Mental Evolution; The Information Processing Model; Propositional-Attitudes and Mind/Body Dualism; Intrinsic Intentionality and Folk Psychology; Folk Psychology: The Best or Worst of Intensions?
Conclusion: The Mechanist Stance2 Why I am not an Evolutionary Psychologist: On the Imperative Nature of Motivational Endowments; Motivational Endowments; Proximate Mechanisms: The Central Role of Emotion, Drive and Reward; Are Emotions Proximate Mechanisms?; The Ghost in the Reward Mechanism; Why Proximate Mechanisms Matter; Folk Psychology Redux; The 'Psychologic Gambit' Versus the Mechanist Stance; Evo-Devo Versus Evolutionary Psychology?; The Physiologic Gambit in Evolutionary Psychology; Conclusion: The Psychologic Gambit in Decline or Reductionism at Last!
3 Postscript: The Virtues of Weak ModularityPortrait of the Mind--Brain as an Evolved Epigenetic System; Hominid Evolution and Cognitive Fluidity; Weak Versus Massive Modularity; Modularity and the Theory of Multiple Intelligence; Explaining the Evolution of the Pleistocene Mind--Brain; Epilogue; References; Index
Includes bibliographical references and index.
The two essays provide a critical examination of theory and research in the field of evolutionary psychology. The view advanced here is that philosophical materialism and minimalist assumptions about adaptation serve Darwinian psychology better than the more popular alternative view that relies on cognitive dualism and propositional-attitude psychology to formulate evolutionary psychology theory. A commitment to cognitive dualism is destined to undermine the physical basis of behavior upon which evolutionary theory depends. Many evolutionary psychologists do not see this but are seduced by the easy way in which hypotheses can be formulated using the ‘propositional-attitude’ model. The challenge is to develop a materialistic and mechanistic approach to understanding human cognition and behavior, including linguistic and social behavior.
Philosophy of mind.
Biology—Philosophy.
Biological psychology.
Behavioral sciences.
Cognitive psychology.
Philosophy of Mind.
Philosophy of Biology.
Biological Psychology.
Behavioral Sciences.
Cognitive Psychology.
SpringerBriefs in Philosophy