Delegation and agency in international organizations /
Hawkins, Darren G.,1966-
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,
2006.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 369-393) and index.
Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits -- Who delegates? : alternative models of principals in development aid / Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy / J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes -- Why multilateralism? : foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems / Helen V. Milner -- Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations : the case of IMF conditionality / Lisa L. Martin -- Delegation and discretion in the European Union / Mark A. Pollack -- Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability -- How agents matter / Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby -- Screening power : international organizations as informative agents / Alexander Thompson -- Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? : staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO / Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson -- Delegating IMF conditionality : understanding variations in control and conformity / Erica R. Gould -- Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power / Karen J. Alter -- Directions for future research -- The logic of delegation to international organizations / David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins.
International organization.
International agencies.
International relations.
Delegation of authority.