Aristotle's concept of mind /
Jimenez, Erick Raphael,author.
In this book, Erick Raphael Jimenez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jimenez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez argues that, just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Preliminaries to Aristotle's concept of mind -- A dialectical argument in DA III.4 -- The model of explanation in Aristotelian psychology -- Mind in body: Aristotelian arguments for embodiment -- The activity of Aristotelian mind -- Making things intelligible: a commentary on DA III.5 -- The objects of Aristotelian mind -- Aristotelian essences: a commentary on Met. VII.4-12 -- Aristotelian principles: a commentary on APo II.19 -- Aristotle on thinking: the time-perception model of thinking -- Aristotle's concept of time: a commentary on Phys. IV.10-4 -- The role of time in Aristotle's account of perception -- Mind and time in Aristotle's account of meaning.
In this book, Erick Raphael Jimenez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jimenez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez argues that, just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.
Aristotle.
Aristotle.
Aristoteles v384-v322.
Philosophy of mind.
Mind and body.
Thought and thinking.
Philosophy, Ancient.
Mind and body.
Philosophy, Ancient.
Philosophy of mind.
Thought and thinking.