Reason and Explanation [electronic resource] : A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism /
Poston, T.author.
In this new explanationist account of epistemic justification, Poston argues that the explanatory virtues provide all the materials necessary for a plausible account of justified belief. There are no purely autonomous reasons. Rather reasons occur only within an explanatory coherent set of beliefs.
Description based upon print version of record.
Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Series Editors' Preface; Preface; 1 Introduction; 1.1 A brief history of coherentism; 1.2 Two traditional objections to coherentism; 1.2.1 The input objection; 1.2.2 Alternative systems objection; 1.3 Overview; 2 Epistemic Conservatism; 2.1 The anti-conservative probability argument; 2.2 Conservative justification and warranted assertion; 2.3 Conservatism and autobiographical epistemology; 2.4 The extra boost and conversion objections; 2.4.1 The extra boost objection; 2.4.2 Conversion objections
2.5 Conservatism and the perspectival character of justification2.5.1 The argument from perspective; 2.5.2 Two challenges; 2.6 Conclusion; 3 Reasons without First Philosophy; 3.1 The basic reasons dilemma; 3.1.1 The first horn; 3.1.2 The second horn; 3.2 The argument against first philosophy; 3.2.1 The nature of basic reasons; 3.2.2 No first philosophy; 3.3 Framework reasons; 3.4 Weak foundationalism and framework reasons; 3.5 Bergmann on foundationalism and epistemic circularity; 3.6 Conclusion; 4 Explanation and Justification; 4.1 Explanation and its virtues
4.1.1 Three arguments for primitiveness4.1.2 The virtues of explanation; 4.2 An explanationist theory of justification; 4.2.1 The goal; 4.2.2 The Ex-J account; 4.2.3 Ex-J and mentalism; 4.2.4 Ex-J and evidentialism; 4.2.5 Ex-J and propositional and doxastic justification; 4.3 Supporting cases and putative counterexamples; 4.3.1 Case-by-case comparison; 4.3.2 Putative counterexamples; 4.4 Conclusion; 5 BonJour and the Myth of the Given; 5.1 BonJour's anti-foundationalist argument and the Sellarsian dilemma; 5.2 BonJour's new foundationalism; 5.2.1 BonJour's nonconceptualism
5.2.2 Nonconceptualism and justification5.3 The phenomenal concept strategy; 5.4 Conclusion; 6 Is Foundational A Priori Justification Indispensable?; 6.1 BonJour's indispensability arguments; 6.1.1 Observation-transcendent inference; 6.1.2 Putative a priori truths and the parade argument; 6.1.3 Reasoning; 6.1.4 Taking stock; 6.2 BonJour's anti-coherence objection; 6.2.1 Explanationism and noncontradiction; 6.2.2 Coherence and circularity; 6.2.3 Coherence and presupposition; 6.3 Coherence and awareness; 6.4 Conclusion; 7 Bayesian Explanationism; 7.1 Bayesianism
7.1.1 An introduction to Bayesianism7.1.2 Arguments for Bayesianism; 7.1.3 Examples of Bayesian unification; 7.1.4 Summary; 7.2 Are Bayesianism and IBE compatible?; 7.2.1 Van Fraassen's incompatibility argument; 7.2.2 The Heuristic view; 7.3 Bayesian explanationism; 7.4 Explaining or representing?; Bibliography; Index
Includes bibliographical references and index.
In this new explanationist account of epistemic justification, Poston argues that the explanatory virtues provide all the materials necessary for a plausible account of justified belief. There are no purely autonomous reasons. Rather reasons occur only within an explanatory coherent set of beliefs.
Epistemology.
Epistemology.