Knowing What is Good For You [electronic resource] : A Theory of Prudential Value and Well-Being /
Taylor, T.author.
An examination of the philosophical issues surrounding prudential value: what it is for something to be good for a person; and well-being: what it is for someone's life to go well. It critically analyses competing approaches, and proposes a new subjective account that addresses key weaknesses of existing theories.
Description based upon print version of record.
Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 1 Setting the Scene; A. Aims; The enumerative question and the explanatory questions; Functional and descriptive adequacy; B. Well-being and prudential value; Definition and use; Where to start?; The nature of prudential value; C. Criteria; 2 The Main Contenders; A. The subjective/objective distinction; B. Subjective theories; Hedonism/mental-state theories; Happiness/life-satisfaction accounts; Desire-satisfaction accounts; C. Objective theories; Aristotelian theories; Objective-list accounts; D. Other theories
Hybrid or intermediate accountsFunctionings and capabilities; 3 Objective or Subjective?; A. Arguments in favour of the objective approach; The horizon problem; Conflicts with value intuitions; B. Arguments in favour of the subjective approach; The subjective intuition; Sumner's arguments; C. The possibility of a hybrid approach; D. Conclusions; 4 What Sort of Subjective Account?; A. Hedonism?; B. Desire-satisfaction?; The attitudinal model; Desire and the future: the disappointment problem; The pleasant surprise problem; Desire and the present/past; Direction of fit
Broader notions of desireC. A third way; Subjective valuings; Subjective valuings and other states; Why value does not 'fall through' to the reasons why we value things; 5 Developing a New Subjective Account; A. How states of the world can have value; Does subjective valuing always confer value?; Idealised or filtered actual valuings?; A variant: valuing plus desire; B. How states of mind can have value; What kinds of states of mind?; Two part or unified account?; Unity at a deeper level?; Variation between individuals and cases; Conclusion; 6 Modifications to the Basic Approach
A. The rationale for conditionsB. Scope conditions; Remoteness; Intrinsic vs. extrinsic; Subject's indifference; C. Information conditions; D. Authenticity conditions; E. Normative conditions; F. Conclusions; 7 Conflicts and Comparisons of Value; A. Conflicts; Cases where something is valued positively and negatively in different respects; Cases where a higher-order valuing has the opposite polarity to a lower-order one, or to a pleasure or pain; Cases where something is valued positively and negatively at different times; Complicating factors; B. Measurement; Ordinal comparisons
What underlies 'strength'How far can we go in quantifying value?; C. Conclusions; 8 Well-Being; A. An account of well-being; A bottom-up account; The rivals: top-down approaches; B. Comparison and measurement of well-being; Principle; Practice; C. Conclusions; 9 Overview; A. Summary; B. How far have we succeeded?; Notes; Bibliography; Index
Includes bibliographical references and index.
An examination of the philosophical issues surrounding prudential value: what it is for something to be good for a person; and well-being: what it is for someone's life to go well. It critically analyses competing approaches, and proposes a new subjective account that addresses key weaknesses of existing theories.
Ethics.
Social sciences-Philosophy.
Political philosophy.
Philosophy of mind.
Ethics.
Moral Philosophy.
Social Philosophy.
Political Philosophy.
Philosophy of Mind.