The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement [electronic resource] /
Matheson, J.author.
Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.
Description based upon print version of record.
Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Series Editors' Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; 1.1 An early challenge: relativism and anti-realism; 1.2 Terminology and assumptions; 1.2.1 Doxastic attitudes; 1.2.2 Epistemic justification; 1.2.3 Defeaters; 1.3 Overview; 2 Idealized Disagreement; 2.1 Epistemic peers and idealized disagreement; 2.2 Symmetry and idealized disagreements; 2.3 Idealized disagreement and defeat; 2.4 Why care about idealized cases?; 3 Steadfast Views of Disagreement; 3.1 Higher-order evidence and first-order evidence; 3.2 Private evidence
3.3 Self-trust and the first-person perspective3.4 How things seem; 3.5 General outlooks and error theories; 3.6 Evidential underdetermination and denying rational uniqueness; 3.6.1 Reasonable disagreement; 3.6.2 A challenge from vagueness; 3.6.3 Epistemic principles; 3.6.4 Questioning the connection; 3.7 Merely possible disagreements; 3.8 Summary; 4 Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and the Equal Weight View; 4.1 The case for Conciliatory Views; 4.1.1 Theoretical motivation; 4.1.2 Paradigm cases; 4.1.3 An analogy; 4.2 From conciliation to equal weight
4.3 From equal weight to splitting the difference4.3.1 Theoretical motivation; 4.3.2 Paradigm cases; 4.3.3 An analogy; 4.4 The Equal Weight View and defeat; 4.4.1 Uniqueness again; 4.4.2 Relativism again; 4.4.3 Defeat and Independence; 4.5 Summary; 5 Objections to the Equal Weight View; 5.1 First-order evidence and the Total Evidence View; 5.1.1 The canceling-out argument again; 5.1.2 First-order evidence and the Total Evidence View; 5.1.2.1 Interpersonal and intrapersonal conflicts; 5.1.2.2 Implausibly easy bootstrapping; 5.1.2.3 Even easier and more implausible bootstrapping
5.1.2.4 Litmus paper objection5.1.3 Challenges to Independence; 5.2 Extreme disagreements and the Justificationist View; 5.2.1 Why might the content matter?; 5.2.2 Lackey's Justificationist View; 5.2.2.1 Personal information; 5.2.2.2 Demoting peers; 5.2.2.3 Direct acquaintance and 'just seeing'; 5.3 Taking the edge off; 5.4 Summary; 6 Everyday Disagreements; 6.1 Revisiting the idealizations; 6.2 Stripping off the idealizations; 6.2.1 Epistemic peers; 6.2.2 Interpersonal access; 6.2.3 A worry; 6.2.4 Multi-party disagreements; 6.3 The move toward skepticism; 6.3.1 Some initial objections
6.4 An additional skeptical concern6.5 Summary; 7 Objections; 7.1 The problem of easy justification; 7.2 The problem of skepticism; 7.2.1 Spinelessness; 7.2.2 A Moorean objection; 7.2.3 Softening the skepticism; 7.2.4 Philosophy and progress; 7.3 The problem of self-defeat; 7.3.1 Self-defeat and truth; 7.3.2 Self-defeat and incoherence; 7.3.3 What now?; 7.4 Summary; 8 Conclusion; 8.1 Review; 8.2 New directions; 8.3 Non-epistemic applications; 8.4 Summary; Notes; Bibliography; Index
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.
Epistemology.
Epistemology.