Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative [electronic resource] /
Pedrini, Patrizia.editor.
Kirsch, Julie.editor.
This volume answers questions that lead to a clearer picture of third-person self- knowledge, the self-interpretation it embeds, and its narrative structure. Bringing together current research on third-person self-knowledge and self-interpretation, the book focuses on third-person self-knowledge, and the role that narrative and interpretation play in acquiring it. It regards the third-personal epistemic approach to oneself as a problem worthy of investigation in its own right, and makes clear the relation between third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative capacities. In recent years, the idea that each person is in a privileged position to acquire knowledge about her own mental states has come under attack. A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence of what philosophers call 'first person self-knowledge', i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is often thought to be immediate, transparent, and authoritative. This line of thought has led some philosophers to claim that what seems to be 'first-person self-knowledge' is really just 'third-person self-knowledge,' i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is inferential, opaque, and fallible. This book discusses challenges for first-person knowledge and explores the true nature of third-person knowledge.
Introduction, by Patrizia Pedrini and Julie Kirsch -- Chapter 1. "Self-Knowing Interpreters vs. Self-Knowing Subjects," by Annalisa Coliva -- Chapter 2. "Self-Defence and Self-Knowledge: Truth and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis," by Michael Lacewing -- Chapter 3. "Self-Interpretation, Narrative, and Intersubjectivity," by Shaun Gallagher -- Chapter 4. "Knowing Our Minds: What and How?", by Daniel Hutto and Patrick McGivern -- Chapter 5. "Introspection, Introjection and Interpersonal Understanding: The Phenomenological Approach," by Dermot Moran -- Chapter 6. "Hermeneutics, Third-Person Self-Interpretation, and Narrative," by Bruce B. Janz -- Chapter 7. "How do Narratives Spin the Self? Implications for Self-Knowledge," by Serife Tekin -- Chapter 8. "Self-Interpretations as Software: Toward a New Understanding of Why False Self-Conceptions Persist," by Tad Zawidski -- Chapter 9. "Interpreting Intuitions,"; by Neil Van Leeuwen and Marcus McGahhey -- Chapter 10: "Interpreting Things Past," by Julie Kirsch -- Chapter 11: "Close Cover: Practical Knowledge and Retrospective Assessment," by Carla Bagnoli -- Chapter 12: "Self-Knowledge, Mental Time Travel, and Agency," by Luca Malatesti and Filip Cec -- Chapter 13: "Alienation, Identification, and Self-Knowledge," by Matthew Parrott -- Chapter 14: "Conceptualizing of One's Inner Experience," by Patrizia Pedrini -- Chapter 15: "Extended Knowledge and Self-Knowledge," Duncan Prichard and Adam Carter.
This volume answers questions that lead to a clearer picture of third-person self- knowledge, the self-interpretation it embeds, and its narrative structure. Bringing together current research on third-person self-knowledge and self-interpretation, the book focuses on third-person self-knowledge, and the role that narrative and interpretation play in acquiring it. It regards the third-personal epistemic approach to oneself as a problem worthy of investigation in its own right, and makes clear the relation between third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative capacities. In recent years, the idea that each person is in a privileged position to acquire knowledge about her own mental states has come under attack. A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence of what philosophers call 'first person self-knowledge', i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is often thought to be immediate, transparent, and authoritative. This line of thought has led some philosophers to claim that what seems to be 'first-person self-knowledge' is really just 'third-person self-knowledge,' i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is inferential, opaque, and fallible. This book discusses challenges for first-person knowledge and explores the true nature of third-person knowledge.
Philosophy of mind.
Philosophy (General).
Genetic epistemology.
Philosophy of Mind.
General Psychology.
Epistemology.