Inferentialism [electronic resource] : Why Rules Matter /
Peregrin, J.author.
In this study two strands of inferentialism are brought together: the philosophical doctrine of Brandom, according to which meanings are generally inferential roles, and the logical doctrine prioritizing proof-theory over model theory and approaching meaning in logical, especially proof-theoretical terms.
Description based upon print version of record.
Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgments; 1 Inferentialism: State of Play; 1.1 What is meaning?; 1.2 Inferentialism and logic; 1.3 Brandom's inferentialism; 1.4 'Normative' inferentialism vs. 'causal' inferentialism; 1.5 Is inferentialism circular?; 1.6 Plan of the rest of the book; 1.7 Summary of Chapter 1; Part I Language, Meaning, and Norms; 2 Words as Governed by Rules; 2.1 Ross's 'Noît-cif tribe'; 2.2 Tû-tû vs. ownership vs. fun; 2.3 Material inference; 2.4 Empirical vocabulary; 2.5 Inferences into and out of language?; 2.6 Spinning in the void?
2.7 Is language dispensable?2.8 Summary of Chapter 2; 3 Meanings as Inferential Roles; 3.1 Use theories of meaning; 3.2 Dispositions vs. proprieties; 3.3 Inferential potential and inferential significance of a sentence; 3.4 Inferential roles; 3.5 A toy language; 3.6 Which inferences determine meaning?; 3.7 Are inferential roles compositional?; 3.8 Are there inferential roles, really?; 3.9 Summary of Chapter 3; 4 The Rules of Language; 4.1 Implicit rules?; 4.2 Following rules vs. bouncing off them; 4.3 Rule following as a behavioral pattern; 4.4 Normative attitudes; 4.5 Is meaning normative?
4.6 Normativity and human practices4.7 Inside and outside of the rules of language; 4.8 Summary of Chapter 4; 5 Our Language Games; 5.1 From meaning to linguistic practices; 5.2 Game-theoretical perspectives; 5.3 The builders' game; 5.4 The space of reasons and the game of giving and asking for reasons; 5.5 The 'embodiment' of the game of giving and asking for reasons; 5.6 Meaning and truth; 5.7 Summary of Chapter 5; 6 Rules and Evolution; 6.1 Rules and cooperation; 6.2 Why rules?; 6.3 Sellars on rules and pattern-governed behavior; 6.4 Integrative vs. standalone rules
6.5 Virtual spaces again6.6 Evolution and language; 6.7 Summary of Chapter 6; Part  IILogic, Inference, and Reasoning; 7 Inference in logic; 7.1 A disambiguation and first steps to explication; 7.2 Going substructural; 7.3 Inference vs. consequence; 7.4 What is consequence?; 7.5 Bridging the gap; 7.6 Omega rule; 7.7 What makes inferences reliable?; 7.8 Summary of Chapter 7; 8 Logical Constants; 8.1 Tonk; 8.2 'Reasonable' and 'unreasonable' inferential patterns; 8.3 Inference and truth-valuations; 8.4 Inference structures and semantic systems; 8.5 Inferentialism and classical logic
8.6 Varieties of inference8.7 Structured systems of sentences; 8.8 Summary of Chapter 8; 9 Logic as Making Inference Explicit; 9.1 Inferentially native operators; 9.2 Anti-deductor?; 9.3 Multi-conclusion inference?; 9.4 Necessity; 9.5 Incompatibility; 9.6 Logical operators as structural markers and substructural logics; 9.7 Summary of Chapter 9; 10 Rules of Logic; 10.1 Substantiation of logical rules; 10.2 How do we know that the rules of logic hold?; 10.3 What is MP?; 10.4 The dilemma of triviality and contingency; 10.5 To accept MP is to have implication
10.6 What is it we study when we study logical rules?
Includes bibliographical references and index.
In this study two strands of inferentialism are brought together: the philosophical doctrine of Brandom, according to which meanings are generally inferential roles, and the logical doctrine prioritizing proof-theory over model theory and approaching meaning in logical, especially proof-theoretical terms.
Language and languages—Philosophy.
Linguistics.
Logic.
Philology.
Philosophy of Language.
Linguistics, general.
Logic.
Language and Literature.