Connectedness and contagion : protecting the financial system from panics /
Scott, Hal S.,author.
"The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was intended to reform financial policies in order to prevent another massive crisis such as the financial meltdown of 2008. Dodd-Frank is largely premised on the diagnosis that connectedness was the major problem in that crisis -- that is, that financial institutions were overexposed to one another, resulting in a possible chain reaction of failures. In this book, Hal Scott argues that it is not connectedness but contagion that is the most significant element of systemic risk facing the financial system. Contagion is an indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of financial institutions that can render otherwise solvent institutions insolvent. It poses a serious risk because, as Scott explains, our financial system still depends on approximately $7.4 to $8.2 trillion of runnable and uninsured short-term liabilities, 60 percent of which are held by nonbanks. Scott argues that efforts by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Treasury to stop the contagion that exploded after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers lessened the economic damage. And yet Congress, spurred by the public's aversion to bailouts, has dramatically weakened the power of the government to respond to contagion, including limitations on the Fed's powers as a lender of last resort. Offering uniquely detailed forensic analyses of the Lehman Brothers and AIG failures, and suggesting alternative regulatory approaches, Scott makes the case that we need to restore and strengthen our weapons for fighting contagion"--Provided by publisher.
Specialized.
Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. The concept of connectedness -- 2. The concept and history of contagion -- 3. The concept of correlation -- 4. Asset connectedness : Lehman and AIG -- 5. Liability connectedness : money market funds and tri-party repo market -- 6. The Dodd-Frank Act policies to address connectedness -- 7. Contagion in the 2008 crisis : the run on the non-bank sector, "shadow banks" -- 8. History of lender of last resort in the United States -- 9. Dodd-Frank restrictions on the lender of last resort power -- 10. Comparison of LLR powers of fed with Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Bank of Japan -- 11. Strengthening the LLR powers of the fed -- 12. Liability insurance and guarantees -- 13. Insuring money market funds -- 14. Capital requirements : Basel III framework -- 15. Liquidity requirements -- 16. Bank resolution procedures, contingent capital (CoCos), and bail-ins -- 17. Dodd-Frank orderly liquidation for non-bank SIFIs (including bank holding companies) -- 18. Living wills -- 19. Money market mutual fund reform -- 20. Dependence of the financial system on short-term funding -- 21. Government crowding out of private issuance of short-term debt -- 22. Capital purchase program and other TARP support programs -- 23. Criticisms of bailouts generally -- 24. Specific criticism of TARP -- 25. Standing bailout programs -- 26. Conclusion -- Notes -- Index.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Specialized.
"The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was intended to reform financial policies in order to prevent another massive crisis such as the financial meltdown of 2008. Dodd-Frank is largely premised on the diagnosis that connectedness was the major problem in that crisis -- that is, that financial institutions were overexposed to one another, resulting in a possible chain reaction of failures. In this book, Hal Scott argues that it is not connectedness but contagion that is the most significant element of systemic risk facing the financial system. Contagion is an indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of financial institutions that can render otherwise solvent institutions insolvent. It poses a serious risk because, as Scott explains, our financial system still depends on approximately $7.4 to $8.2 trillion of runnable and uninsured short-term liabilities, 60 percent of which are held by nonbanks. Scott argues that efforts by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Treasury to stop the contagion that exploded after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers lessened the economic damage. And yet Congress, spurred by the public's aversion to bailouts, has dramatically weakened the power of the government to respond to contagion, including limitations on the Fed's powers as a lender of last resort. Offering uniquely detailed forensic analyses of the Lehman Brothers and AIG failures, and suggesting alternative regulatory approaches, Scott makes the case that we need to restore and strengthen our weapons for fighting contagion"--Provided by publisher.
OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
Financial crises
Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009
Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.
ECONOMICS/Finance