Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations [electronic resource] /
Plasmans, Joseph E.J.K.author.
Engwerda, Jacob.author.
van Aarle, Bas.author.
di Bartolomeo, Giovanni.author.(orcid)0000-0001-5016-8483https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5016-8483aut
Michalak, Tomasz.author.
Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations analyzes coordination of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies between countries and currency areas using a dynamic game approach. The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions.
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references.
International Policy Coordination -- Mathematical Background -- The Basic Symmetric Two-Country Model -- An MU Model with Active Monetary Policy -- Endogenous Coalition Formation Concepts -- A Multi-Country Closed-Economy MU Model -- Accession to a Monetary Union -- World-wide Regional Policy Coordination -- Concluding Remarks.
Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations analyzes coordination of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies between countries and currency areas using a dynamic game approach. The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions.
European Economic Community literature.
Macroeconomics.
Economic policy.
Economics.
Economic theory.
Operations research.
Decision making.
European Integration.
Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics.
Political Economy/Economic Systems.
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
Operations Research/Decision Theory.
Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance