Scientific Objectivity and Its Contexts [electronic resource] /
Agazzi, Evandro.author.
The first part of this book is of an epistemological nature and develops an original theory of scientific objectivity, understood in a weak sense (as intersubjective agreement among the specialists) and a strong sense (as having precise concrete referents). In both cases it relies upon the adoption of operational criteria designed within the particular perspective under which any single science considers reality. The “object” so attained has a proper ontological status, dependent on the specific character of the criteria of reference (regional ontologies). This justifies a form of scientific realism. Such perspectives are also the result of a complex cultural-historical situation. The awareness of such a “historical determinacy” of science justifies including in the philosophy of science the problems of ethics of science, relations of science with metaphysics, and social dimensions of science that overstep the traditional restriction of the philosophy of science to an epistemology of science. It is to this “context” that the second part of the book is devoted.
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Historical and Philosophical Background -- The Characterisation of Objectivity -- First Corollaries in the Philosophy of Science -- The Ontological Commitment of Science -- Scientific Realism -- The Contexts of Objectivity -- Corollaries in the Philosophy of Science -- Scientific Truth Revisited -- The Context of Making Science -- Science and Metaphysics -- Appendix -- References -- Indexes.
The first part of this book is of an epistemological nature and develops an original theory of scientific objectivity, understood in a weak sense (as intersubjective agreement among the specialists) and a strong sense (as having precise concrete referents). In both cases it relies upon the adoption of operational criteria designed within the particular perspective under which any single science considers reality. The “object” so attained has a proper ontological status, dependent on the specific character of the criteria of reference (regional ontologies). This justifies a form of scientific realism. Such perspectives are also the result of a complex cultural-historical situation. The awareness of such a “historical determinacy” of science justifies including in the philosophy of science the problems of ethics of science, relations of science with metaphysics, and social dimensions of science that overstep the traditional restriction of the philosophy of science to an epistemology of science. It is to this “context” that the second part of the book is devoted.
Philosophy and science.
Physics.
Mathematical logic.
Ethics.
Philosophy of nature.
Philosophy of Science.
History and Philosophical Foundations of Physics.
Mathematical Logic and Foundations.
Ethics.
Philosophy of Nature.