Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit /
Calomiris, Charles W.,author.
Haber, Stephen H.,1957-author.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 507-548) and index.
1. No banks without states, and no states without banks -- If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? -- The game of bank bargains -- Tools of conquest and survival: why states need banks -- Privileges with burdens: war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking -- Banks and democracy: Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- 2. The cost of banker-populist alliances: the United States versus Canada -- Crippled by populism: U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990 -- The new U.S. bank bargain: megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards -- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis -- Durable partners: politics and banking in Canada -- 3. Authoritarianism, democratic transitions, and the game of bank bargains -- Mexico: chaos makes cronyism look good -- When autocracy fails: banking and politics in Mexico since 1982 -- Inflation machines: banking and state finance in imperial Brazil -- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil -- 4. Going beyond structural narratives -- Traveling to other places: is our sample representative? -- Reality is a plague on many houses.
Banks and banking
Bank failures
Credit