Full node "tip" function

Full node "tip" function
2017-05-03 21:43 ` Ben Thompson
                   ` (2 more replies)
  
From: Erik Aronesty @ 2017-05-03 21:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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IDEA:

- Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address.   Users that need to download the
block chain from that node can be encouraged to send a tip to the peers
that served them (by % served).   Recommended tip of 10mbit should be fine.

- A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the blockchain.  If they do,
users that don't specify a tip cannot use them.

CONS:

For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting their own full
node.   After all, if you have to pay $15 just to get a copy of the
blockchain, that just adds to the already expensive prospect of hosting a
full node.

PROS:

As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your money back and
more.   This is the an incentive for quality, long term hosting.

In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick around longer.
It also discourages "installation spam" attacks on the network.

Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is successful.

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-05-03 21:43 ` 
                   ` 
  
From: Erik Aronesty @ 2017-05-03 21:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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IDEA:

- Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address.   Users that need to download the
block chain from that node can be encouraged to send a tip to the peers
that served them (by % served).   Recommended tip of 10mbit should be fine.

- A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the blockchain.  If they do,
users that don't specify a tip cannot use them.

CONS:

For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting their own full
node.   After all, if you have to pay $15 just to get a copy of the
blockchain, that just adds to the already expensive prospect of hosting a
full node.

PROS:

As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your money back and
more.   This is the an incentive for quality, long term hosting.

In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick around longer.
It also discourages "installation spam" attacks on the network.

Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is successful.

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-05-03 21:08 [bitcoin-dev] Full node "tip" function Erik Aronesty
  2017-05-03 21:43 ` Ben Thompson

  2017-05-03 22:03   ` Matt Corallo
  2017-05-04 13:15   ` Erik Aronesty
  2017-05-03 23:21 ` Luke Dashjr
  
From: Gregory Maxwell @ 2017-05-03 21:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Erik Aronesty;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 9:08 PM, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> CONS:

The primary result would be paying people to sybil attack the network.
It's far cheaper to run one node behind thousands of IPs than it is to
run many nodes.

Suggestions like this have come up many times before.


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-05-03 21:53 ` Gregory Maxwell

  2017-05-04 13:15   ` Erik Aronesty
  
From: Matt Corallo @ 2017-05-03 22:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Maxwell, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev, Erik Aronesty
  Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

If we ever have a problem getting blocks, we could consider adding something to pay to receive historical blocks but luckily that isn't a problem we have today - the available connection slots and bandwidth on the network today appears to be more than sufficient to saturate nearly any fully-validating node.

On May 3, 2017 5:53:07 PM EDT, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 9:08 PM, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
><bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> CONS:
>
>The primary result would be paying people to sybil attack the network.
>It's far cheaper to run one node behind thousands of IPs than it is to
>run many nodes.
>
>Suggestions like this have come up many times before.
>_______________________________________________
>bitcoin-dev mailing list
>bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-05-03 21:08 [bitcoin-dev] Full node "tip" function Erik Aronesty
  2017-05-03 21:43 ` Ben Thompson
  2017-05-03 21:53 ` Gregory Maxwell

       [not found]   ` <9335E0E0-F9D6-41AD-9FF9-5CDF2B1AF1F7@gmail.com>
  
From: Luke Dashjr @ 2017-05-03 23:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev, Erik Aronesty

I think paying for services is in general a great idea, but one that Bitcoin 
can much better serve once Lightning is in production. Not only does it enable 
cost-effective micro-transactions, it also should allow nodes to initiate 
payments before they have a synced node (which is something impractical at 
present).

On Wednesday 03 May 2017 9:08:35 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> IDEA:
> 
> - Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address.   Users that need to download the
> block chain from that node can be encouraged to send a tip to the peers
> that served them (by % served).   Recommended tip of 10mbit should be fine.
> 
> - A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the blockchain.  If they do,
> users that don't specify a tip cannot use them.
> 
> CONS:
> 
> For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting their own full
> node.   After all, if you have to pay $15 just to get a copy of the
> blockchain, that just adds to the already expensive prospect of hosting a
> full node.
> 
> PROS:
> 
> As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your money back and
> more.   This is the an incentive for quality, long term hosting.
> 
> In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick around longer.
> It also discourages "installation spam" attacks on the network.
> 
> Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is successful.


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-05-03 21:43 ` Ben Thompson

  2017-05-04 13:37     ` Aymeric Vitte
  
From: Tomas @ 2017-05-04 10:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

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The ones that *could* pay non-mining full nodes are miners/pools, by
outsourcing transaction selection using a different PoW.  By doing so
they could buy proof-of-uncensored-selection and proof-of-goodwill for a
small fee.
We would allow full nodes to generate and broadcast a template
block which:
* Does not contain a valid header yet
* Contains the transaction selection
* Contains a  coinbase output with a predetermined part of the block
  reward (say 0.5%) to themselves* Contains a nonce for PoW of a predetermined currently ASIC resistant
  hash function behind a OP_RETURN.
The template with the highest PoW since the last block would be leading.
A miner/pool can then choose to use this instead of their own, adding
the rest of the reward and the SHA nonce themselves. That way they would
set up a competition among full nodes.
This would of course be voluntary but provable, so maybe in a pool's
interest to do this via naming and shaming.
Tomas
bitcrust

On Wed, May 3, 2017, at 23:43, Ben Thompson via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I feel like this would be pointless as the vast majority of users
> would likely download the blockchain from a node that was not
> enforcing a tip requirement as it would seem like unnecessary cost as
> in protocols such as BitTorrent there is no such tips in sharing files
> and the blockchain distribution is in eccense the same thing. However
> perhaps I am underestimating the generosity of node operators but I
> feel that adding a cost to the blockchain (assuming that all users add
> a tip requirement) would lead to centralisation.> 
> On Wed, 3 May 2017, 22:21 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev, <bitcoin-
> dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:>> IDEA:
>> - Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address.   Users that need to
>>   download the block chain from that node can be encouraged to send a
>>   tip to the peers that served them (by % served).   Recommended tip
>>   of 10mbit should be fine.>> 
>> - A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the blockchain.  If
>>   they do, users that don't specify a tip cannot use them.>> 
>> CONS:
>> 
>> For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting their own
>> full node.   After all, if you have to pay $15 just to get a copy of
>> the blockchain, that just adds to the already expensive prospect of
>> hosting a full node.>> PROS: 
>> 
>> As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your money back
>> and more.   This is the an incentive for quality, long term hosting.>> In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick around
>> longer.   It also discourages "installation spam" attacks on the
>> network.>> Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is
>> successful.>> 


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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-05-03 21:53 ` Gregory Maxwell
  2017-05-03 22:03   ` Matt Corallo

  2017-05-04 14:57     ` Tom Zander
  
From: Erik Aronesty @ 2017-05-04 13:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Maxwell;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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> Greg
> The primary result would be paying people to sybil attack the network.

I cannot imagine the benefit to replicating an ip address in this case,
except maybe you think that you would be more likely to be selected as a
peer?   But there would be no actual advantage since download peers are
selected based on throughput and actual blocks served.

Also, since this makes the network far more resistant to DDOS attacks, it
has added benefits.

> Luke:
> paying for services is in general a great idea, but one that Bitcoin
> can much better serve once Lightning is in production.

I agree, if lightning networks were baked in, then the tips could be as
granular as "per block downloaded", or even (outlandish seeming now, but
maybe not in a future where there is a "public rpc api") "per rpc call".
Miners and business users would certainly pay for high quality services.
Spinning up new nodes without a tip and relying on the "free network" would
probably take more time, for example.

I suspect that if income were even a small possibility the number of full
nodes would vastly increase.

Sybil attacks seem irrelevant as long as reasonable QOS metrics are stored
per peer.


On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 5:53 PM, Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph•org> wrote:

> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 9:08 PM, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > CONS:
>
> The primary result would be paying people to sybil attack the network.
> It's far cheaper to run one node behind thousands of IPs than it is to
> run many nodes.
>
> Suggestions like this have come up many times before.
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-05-04 10:38   ` Tomas

  2017-05-04 13:47       ` Erik Aronesty
  
From: Aymeric Vitte @ 2017-05-04 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

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Strange idea, incentiving people to run full nodes should certainly not
depend on miners, should certainly not involve another wasteful pow and
should certainly not encourage any collusion between participants like
miners are doing (ie full nodes pools for example or miners creating
full nodes pools)


Le 04/05/2017 à 12:38, Tomas via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
> The ones that *could* pay non-mining full nodes are miners/pools, by
> outsourcing transaction selection using a different PoW.  By doing so
> they could buy proof-of-uncensored-selection and proof-of-goodwill for
> a small fee.
>
> We would allow full nodes to generate and broadcast a template block
> which:
>
> * Does not contain a valid header yet
> * Contains the transaction selection
> * Contains a coinbase output with a predetermined part of the block
> reward (say 0.5%) to themselves
> * Contains a nonce for PoW of a predetermined currently ASIC resistant
> hash function behind a OP_RETURN.
>
> The template with the highest PoW since the last block would be
> leading. A miner/pool can then choose to use this instead of their
> own, adding the rest of the reward and the SHA nonce themselves. That
> way they would set up a competition among full nodes.
>
> This would of course be voluntary but provable, so maybe in a pool's
> interest to do this via naming and shaming.
>
> Tomas
> bitcrust
>
> On Wed, May 3, 2017, at 23:43, Ben Thompson via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>> I feel like this would be pointless as the vast majority of users
>> would likely download the blockchain from a node that was not
>> enforcing a tip requirement as it would seem like unnecessary cost as
>> in protocols such as BitTorrent there is no such tips in sharing
>> files and the blockchain distribution is in eccense the same thing.
>> However perhaps I am underestimating the generosity of node operators
>> but I feel that adding a cost to the blockchain (assuming that all
>> users add a tip requirement) would lead to centralisation.
>>
>> On Wed, 3 May 2017, 22:21 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev,
>> <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>> wrote:
>>
>>     IDEA:
>>     - Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address.   Users that need to
>>     download the block chain from that node can be encouraged to send
>>     a tip to the peers that served them (by % served).   Recommended
>>     tip of 10mbit should be fine.
>>
>>     - A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the blockchain. 
>>     If they do, users that don't specify a tip cannot use them.
>>
>>     CONS:
>>
>>     For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting their
>>     own full node.   After all, if you have to pay $15 just to get a
>>     copy of the blockchain, that just adds to the already expensive
>>     prospect of hosting a full node.  
>>     PROS:
>>
>>     As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your money
>>     back and more.   This is the an incentive for quality, long term
>>     hosting.
>>     In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick around
>>     longer.   It also discourages "installation spam" attacks on the
>>     network.
>>     Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is
>>     successful.
>>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

-- 
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Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets
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GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms


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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-05-04 13:37     ` Aymeric Vitte

  2017-05-04 14:31         ` Aymeric Vitte
  
From: Erik Aronesty @ 2017-05-04 13:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Aymeric Vitte;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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 - Full nodes already perform many valuable services, and simply allowing
people to pay for better service is something operators can do now - even
without it being baked into bitcoind.   Paying for access to a higher-speed
relay network, for example, is something that many operators would do.

- Baking in the ability to add service fees could make more people *want*
to run more high quality, highly available full nodes... which is really
one of the most important things developers can be doing.


On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Aymeric Vitte via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Strange idea, incentiving people to run full nodes should certainly not
> depend on miners, should certainly not involve another wasteful pow and
> should certainly not encourage any collusion between participants like
> miners are doing (ie full nodes pools for example or miners creating full
> nodes pools)
>
> Le 04/05/2017 à 12:38, Tomas via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
>
> The ones that *could* pay non-mining full nodes are miners/pools, by
> outsourcing transaction selection using a different PoW.  By doing so they
> could buy proof-of-uncensored-selection and proof-of-goodwill for a small
> fee.
>
> We would allow full nodes to generate and broadcast a template block which:
>
> * Does not contain a valid header yet
> * Contains the transaction selection
> * Contains a coinbase output with a predetermined part of the block reward
> (say 0.5%) to themselves
> * Contains a nonce for PoW of a predetermined currently ASIC resistant
> hash function behind a OP_RETURN.
>
> The template with the highest PoW since the last block would be leading. A
> miner/pool can then choose to use this instead of their own, adding the
> rest of the reward and the SHA nonce themselves. That way they would set up
> a competition among full nodes.
>
> This would of course be voluntary but provable, so maybe in a pool's
> interest to do this via naming and shaming.
>
> Tomas
> bitcrust
>
> On Wed, May 3, 2017, at 23:43, Ben Thompson via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> I feel like this would be pointless as the vast majority of users would
> likely download the blockchain from a node that was not enforcing a tip
> requirement as it would seem like unnecessary cost as in protocols such as
> BitTorrent there is no such tips in sharing files and the blockchain
> distribution is in eccense the same thing. However perhaps I am
> underestimating the generosity of node operators but I feel that adding a
> cost to the blockchain (assuming that all users add a tip requirement)
> would lead to centralisation.
>
> On Wed, 3 May 2017, 22:21 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev, <
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> IDEA:
> - Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address.   Users that need to download
> the block chain from that node can be encouraged to send a tip to the peers
> that served them (by % served).   Recommended tip of 10mbit should be fine.
>
> - A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the blockchain.  If they
> do, users that don't specify a tip cannot use them.
>
> CONS:
>
> For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting their own full
> node.   After all, if you have to pay $15 just to get a copy of the
> blockchain, that just adds to the already expensive prospect of hosting a
> full node.
> PROS:
>
> As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your money back and
> more.   This is the an incentive for quality, long term hosting.
> In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick around longer.
> It also discourages "installation spam" attacks on the network.
> Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is successful.
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing listbitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.orghttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
> --
> Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets
> Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets
> Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist
> Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass
> Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org
> Peersm : http://www.peersm.com
> torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live
> node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
> GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-05-04 13:47       ` Erik Aronesty

  
From: Aymeric Vitte @ 2017-05-04 14:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Erik Aronesty, Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 7417 bytes --]

Yes, as a whole, but I am sorry, your "tip" proposal is very very very
bad as it is, think a little bit more about your latest answer and you
will understand why

I am a bit perplexed sometimes about what is proposed on this list

Adding services paid by the miners is not a bad idea, like some
proposals that were posted here proposing some system to validate/format
the blocks for the miners

But, first, the highest priority is to scale the full nodes and this
cannot depend on miners, then once this is done we can imagine other
services on top of it paid by the miners or others (+lightning & co)

I have already explained many times my thoughts on the subject, I don't
pretend that they represent the perfect solution but at least it's
different from what we can read , so I think that the core dev team
should setup a task force/group to solve this quickly now, the
accumulation of strange proposals/workarounds here does not help

Because it's a real question for everybody in the current context
whether we can trust bitcoin or not, unfortunately the answer currently
tends toward the later, or please explain me why this statement could be
wrong


Le 04/05/2017 à 15:47, Erik Aronesty a écrit :
>  - Full nodes already perform many valuable services, and simply
> allowing people to pay for better service is something operators can
> do now - even without it being baked into bitcoind.   Paying for
> access to a higher-speed relay network, for example, is something that
> many operators would do.
>
> - Baking in the ability to add service fees could make more people
> *want* to run more high quality, highly available full nodes... which
> is really one of the most important things developers can be doing.
>
>
> On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Aymeric Vitte via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>> wrote:
>
>     Strange idea, incentiving people to run full nodes should
>     certainly not depend on miners, should certainly not involve
>     another wasteful pow and should certainly not encourage any
>     collusion between participants like miners are doing (ie full
>     nodes pools for example or miners creating full nodes pools)
>
>
>     Le 04/05/2017 à 12:38, Tomas via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
>>     The ones that *could* pay non-mining full nodes are miners/pools,
>>     by outsourcing transaction selection using a different PoW.  By
>>     doing so they could buy proof-of-uncensored-selection and
>>     proof-of-goodwill for a small fee.
>>
>>     We would allow full nodes to generate and broadcast a template
>>     block which:
>>
>>     * Does not contain a valid header yet
>>     * Contains the transaction selection
>>     * Contains a coinbase output with a predetermined part of the
>>     block reward (say 0.5%) to themselves
>>     * Contains a nonce for PoW of a predetermined currently ASIC
>>     resistant hash function behind a OP_RETURN.
>>
>>     The template with the highest PoW since the last block would be
>>     leading. A miner/pool can then choose to use this instead of
>>     their own, adding the rest of the reward and the SHA nonce
>>     themselves. That way they would set up a competition among full
>>     nodes.
>>
>>     This would of course be voluntary but provable, so maybe in a
>>     pool's interest to do this via naming and shaming.
>>
>>     Tomas
>>     bitcrust
>>
>>     On Wed, May 3, 2017, at 23:43, Ben Thompson via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>>>     I feel like this would be pointless as the vast majority of
>>>     users would likely download the blockchain from a node that was
>>>     not enforcing a tip requirement as it would seem like
>>>     unnecessary cost as in protocols such as BitTorrent there is no
>>>     such tips in sharing files and the blockchain distribution is in
>>>     eccense the same thing. However perhaps I am underestimating the
>>>     generosity of node operators but I feel that adding a cost to
>>>     the blockchain (assuming that all users add a tip requirement)
>>>     would lead to centralisation.
>>>
>>>     On Wed, 3 May 2017, 22:21 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev,
>>>     <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>>>     <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>> wrote:
>>>
>>>         IDEA:
>>>         - Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address.   Users that need
>>>         to download the block chain from that node can be encouraged
>>>         to send a tip to the peers that served them (by % served).  
>>>         Recommended tip of 10mbit should be fine.
>>>
>>>         - A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the
>>>         blockchain.  If they do, users that don't specify a tip
>>>         cannot use them.
>>>
>>>         CONS:
>>>
>>>         For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting
>>>         their own full node.   After all, if you have to pay $15
>>>         just to get a copy of the blockchain, that just adds to the
>>>         already expensive prospect of hosting a full node.  
>>>         PROS:
>>>
>>>         As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your
>>>         money back and more.   This is the an incentive for quality,
>>>         long term hosting.
>>>         In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick
>>>         around longer.   It also discourages "installation spam"
>>>         attacks on the network.
>>>         Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is
>>>         successful.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>     bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>>     <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>>     https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>     <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>
>
>     -- 
>     Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets
>     <https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets>
>     Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets
>     <https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets>
>     Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist
>     Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass
>     Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org
>     Peersm : http://www.peersm.com
>     torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live
>     <https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live>
>     node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
>     <https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor>
>     GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms
>
>     _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev
>     mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>     <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>     https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>     <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev> 
>
-- 
Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets
Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets
Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist
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GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms

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2017-05-04 13:15   ` Erik Aronesty

  
From: Tom Zander @ 2017-05-04 14:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev

I agree with you here, Erik. Greg's standard answer doesn’t apply to your 
suggestion.
I think he was a bit too trigger happy because we have seen a lot of similar 
suggestions that have the Sybill issue he mentioned.


On Thursday, 4 May 2017 15:15:02 CEST Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > Greg
> > The primary result would be paying people to sybil attack the network.
> 
> I cannot imagine the benefit to replicating an ip address in this case,
> except maybe you think that you would be more likely to be selected as a
> peer?   But there would be no actual advantage since download peers are
> selected based on throughput and actual blocks served.

-- 
Tom Zander
Blog: https://zander.github.io
Vlog: https://vimeo.com/channels/tomscryptochannel


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[not found]   ` <9335E0E0-F9D6-41AD-9FF9-5CDF2B1AF1F7@gmail.com>

  2017-05-08 21:00       ` Sergio Demian Lerner
  
From: Erik Aronesty @ 2017-05-04 19:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric Lombrozo;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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>
> This is actually LN’s killer use case - not buying coffees ;)
>

Yes, micro-payments for online network services is precisely what LN is
best at.

Establishing a channel with each peer is too expensive.   But using LN to
micro-pay for high-quality peer services seems like it would aggregate very
well.

It would be great if this protocol was in-place and ready to go in or
around the same time LN is ready.   It would incentivize full nodes even
further than LN does, and allow the network to be strongly DDOS resistant.

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2017-05-04 19:28     ` Erik Aronesty

  2017-05-08 21:44         ` Natanael
  
From: Sergio Demian Lerner @ 2017-05-08 21:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Erik Aronesty;  Eric Lombrozo, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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A full node provides several services to the network:

1•Broadcasts blocks (public service)
2•Broadcasts transactions (public/private service)
3•Increases privacy by hiding other node’s IPs
4•Increases network security by protecting it from global DoS.
5•Provides information filtering services to SPV nodes.
6•Provides historic blockchain and state information to new nodes.

With your tip idea you only encourages 6, and by increasing the number of
nodes, also 3 and 4.
The services 1 and 2 cannot be encouraged by tips.

However, it's a good way to start.

There was a way to encourage 2 I described in 2013. (
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=385528.msg4155300#msg4155300)

I'll soon present a solution to encourage full nodes to store the
blockchain based on Proof-of-Unique-Blockchain-Storage (PoUBS), a feature
that RSK will add to incentivize Bitcoin and RSK full nodes. This solution
encourages 6.



On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 4:28 PM, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> This is actually LN’s killer use case - not buying coffees ;)
>>
>
> Yes, micro-payments for online network services is precisely what LN is
> best at.
>
> Establishing a channel with each peer is too expensive.   But using LN to
> micro-pay for high-quality peer services seems like it would aggregate very
> well.
>
> It would be great if this protocol was in-place and ready to go in or
> around the same time LN is ready.   It would incentivize full nodes even
> further than LN does, and allow the network to be strongly DDOS resistant.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>

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2017-05-08 21:00       ` Sergio Demian Lerner

  2017-05-08 22:15           ` Sergio Demian Lerner
  
From: Natanael @ 2017-05-08 21:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Sergio Demian Lerner;  Bitcoin Dev, Eric Lombrozo

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Den 8 maj 2017 23:01 skrev "Sergio Demian Lerner via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>:

I'll soon present a solution to encourage full nodes to store the
blockchain based on Proof-of-Unique-Blockchain-Storage (PoUBS)


Proving that you're holding your own copy of the blockchain, not shared
with other nodes? I don't think that's possible to do securely. It falls on
that the whole blockchain is both public and static, while any such proof
of independence needs to rely on unique capabilities per node.

All you can do with a challenge-response protocol is to prevent honest
nodes from being unwitting backends to dishonest transparent proxy nodes
(by binding the challenge to cryptographic node identities).

Even latency bounding protocols can't stop you from putting multiple
*seemingly independent* nodes in front of the same backend with one single
copy of the blockchain.

I believe best you can do is to force somebody to hold multiple copies
locally on multiple hardware units to not run out of memory I/O when
creating proofs for multiple remote nodes, through using memory heavy
functions for the proof of storage, forcing quick random access. However
somebody willing to put enough RAM in a server rack to hold the full
blockchain could still easily pretend to be multiple regular nodes with
independent copies.

Any kind of attempt at forcing the full copy of the blockchain to be in
memory close to the CPU will either rule out most nodes from passing or
will be cheatable.

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2017-05-08 21:44         ` Natanael

  
From: Sergio Demian Lerner @ 2017-05-08 22:15 UTC ( / )
  To: Natanael;  Bitcoin Dev, Eric Lombrozo



Yes you practically can. No proxy can defeat the protocol investing less
money than buying storage space to store the blockchain.

Even with challenge-response delays of minutes.  That's why it will be
fully controlled by a RSK smart-contract, with no user intervention.
I'm will post about this soon.




On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 6:44 PM, Natanael <natanael.l@gmail•com> wrote:

>
> Den 8 maj 2017 23:01 skrev "Sergio Demian Lerner via bitcoin-dev" <
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>:
>
> I'll soon present a solution to encourage full nodes to store the
> blockchain based on Proof-of-Unique-Blockchain-Storage (PoUBS)
>
>
> Proving that you're holding your own copy of the blockchain, not shared
> with other nodes? I don't think that's possible to do securely. It falls on
> that the whole blockchain is both public and static, while any such proof
> of independence needs to rely on unique capabilities per node.
>
> All you can do with a challenge-response protocol is to prevent honest
> nodes from being unwitting backends to dishonest transparent proxy nodes
> (by binding the challenge to cryptographic node identities).
>
> Even latency bounding protocols can't stop you from putting multiple
> *seemingly independent* nodes in front of the same backend with one single
> copy of the blockchain.
>
> I believe best you can do is to force somebody to hold multiple copies
> locally on multiple hardware units to not run out of memory I/O when
> creating proofs for multiple remote nodes, through using memory heavy
> functions for the proof of storage, forcing quick random access. However
> somebody willing to put enough RAM in a server rack to hold the full
> blockchain could still easily pretend to be multiple regular nodes with
> independent copies.
>
> Any kind of attempt at forcing the full copy of the blockchain to be in
> memory close to the CPU will either rule out most nodes from passing or
> will be cheatable.
>