Censorship and Privacy in Chaumian ecash implementations

Censorship and Privacy in Chaumian ecash implementations
2024-12-21 21:52 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
  
From: /dev /fd0 @ 2024-12-21 16:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List


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Hi Bitcoin Developers,

This post is about a myth and some misleading things shared about ecash. It 
is possible to censor specific users and none of the ecash implementation 
are censorship resistant.

# Censorship Methods in Cashu

There are 2 ways to censor individual users in cashu:

1. P2PK
2. Authentication

## P2PK

Ecash tokens issued by cashu mints can be locked using public keys so that 
it can only be redeemed by the user who owns the private key for it. This 
links ecash with specific public keys and most implementation use nostr 
keys for it. Most users are doxxed on nostr so they can be censored based 
on their identity. Even if its linked to an anon they can be censored based 
on their posts.

You can find relevant code snippets in [conditions.py][1] if using nutshell 
for mint:

```python
class LedgerSpendingConditions:
    def _verify_p2pk_spending_conditions(self, proof, secret):
        if SecretKind(secret.kind) != SecretKind.P2PK:
            return True
        p2pk_secret = P2PKSecret.from_secret(secret)
        pubkeys = [p2pk_secret.data] + 
p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
        if p2pk_secret.locktime and p2pk_secret.locktime < time.time():
            refund_pubkeys = p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
            if not refund_pubkeys:
                return True
            return self._verify_secret_signatures(
                proof, refund_pubkeys, proof.p2pksigs, 1
            )
        return self._verify_secret_signatures(
            proof, pubkeys, proof.p2pksigs, p2pk_secret.n_sigs
        )

    def _verify_htlc_spending_conditions(self, proof, secret):
        if SecretKind(secret.kind) != SecretKind.HTLC:
            return True
        htlc_secret = HTLCSecret.from_secret(secret)
        if htlc_secret.locktime and htlc_secret.locktime < time.time():
            refund_pubkeys = htlc_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
            if refund_pubkeys:
                return self._verify_secret_signatures(
                    proof, refund_pubkeys, proof.p2pksigs, 1
                )
            return True
        assert proof.htlcpreimage, TransactionError("no HTLC preimage 
provided")
        if not hashlib.sha256(bytes.fromhex(proof.htlcpreimage)).digest() 
== bytes.fromhex(htlc_secret.data):
            raise TransactionError("HTLC preimage does not match.")
        hashlock_pubkeys = htlc_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
        if not hashlock_pubkeys:
            return True
        return self._verify_secret_signatures(
            proof, hashlock_pubkeys, proof.htlcsigs or [], 
htlc_secret.n_sigs
        )

    def _verify_secret_signatures(self, proof, pubkeys, signatures, 
n_sigs_required=1):
        assert len(set(pubkeys)) == len(pubkeys), "pubkeys must be unique."
        if not signatures:
            raise TransactionError("no signatures in proof.")
        if len(set(signatures)) != len(signatures):
            raise TransactionError("signatures must be unique.")
        n_sigs_required = n_sigs_required or 1
        assert n_sigs_required > 0, "n_sigs must be positive."
        assert len(signatures) >= n_sigs_required, f"not enough signatures 
provided: {len(signatures)} < {n_sigs_required}."
        n_valid_sigs_per_output = 0
        for input_sig in signatures:
            for pubkey in pubkeys:
                if verify_schnorr_signature(
                    message=proof.secret.encode("utf-8"),
                    pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
                    signature=bytes.fromhex(input_sig),
                ):
                    n_valid_sigs_per_output += 1
        assert n_valid_sigs_per_output, "no valid signature provided for 
input."
        assert n_valid_sigs_per_output >= n_sigs_required, f"signature 
threshold not met. {n_valid_sigs_per_output} < {n_sigs_required}."
        return True

    def _verify_input_spending_conditions(self, proof):
        try:
            secret = Secret.deserialize(proof.secret)
        except Exception:
            return True
        if SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.P2PK:
            return self._verify_p2pk_spending_conditions(proof, secret)
        if SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.HTLC:
            return self._verify_htlc_spending_conditions(proof, secret)
        return True

    def _verify_output_p2pk_spending_conditions(self, proofs, outputs):
        try:
            secrets_generic = [Secret.deserialize(p.secret) for p in proofs]
            p2pk_secrets = [P2PKSecret.from_secret(secret) for secret in 
secrets_generic]
        except Exception:
            return True
        if not all([SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.P2PK for secret 
in p2pk_secrets]):
            return True
        if not all([secret.sigflag == SigFlags.SIG_ALL for secret in 
p2pk_secrets]):
            return True
        pubkeys_per_proof = [
            [p2pk_secret.data] + p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
            for p2pk_secret in p2pk_secrets
        ]
        n_sigs_per_proof = [p2pk_secret.n_sigs for p2pk_secret in 
p2pk_secrets]
        for p2pk_secret in p2pk_secrets:
            if p2pk_secret.locktime and p2pk_secret.locktime < time.time():
                refund_pubkeys = p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
                if refund_pubkeys:
                    pubkeys_per_proof.append(refund_pubkeys)
                    n_sigs_per_proof.append(1)
        if not pubkeys_per_proof:
            return True
        assert len({tuple(pubs_output) for pubs_output in 
pubkeys_per_proof}) == 1, "pubkeys in all proofs must match."
        assert len(set(n_sigs_per_proof)) == 1, "n_sigs in all proofs must 
match."
        pubkeys = pubkeys_per_proof[0]
        n_sigs = n_sigs_per_proof[0] or 1
        for output in outputs:
            p2pksigs = output.p2pksigs
            assert p2pksigs, "no signatures in output."
            assert len(set(p2pksigs)) == len(p2pksigs), "duplicate 
signatures in output."
            n_valid_sigs_per_output = 0
            for sig in p2pksigs:
                for pubkey in pubkeys:
                    if verify_schnorr_signature(
                        message=bytes.fromhex(output.B_),
                        pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
                        signature=bytes.fromhex(sig),
                    ):
                        n_valid_sigs_per_output += 1
            assert n_valid_sigs_per_output, "no valid signature provided 
for output."
            assert n_valid_sigs_per_output >= n_sigs, f"signature threshold 
not met. {n_valid_sigs_per_output} < {n_sigs}."
        return True

    def _verify_output_spending_conditions(self, proofs, outputs):
        return self._verify_output_p2pk_spending_conditions(proofs, outputs)
```

## Authentication

Mints can enforce authentication at some point and do KYC for mint, melt, 
swap etc. Users who refuse to KYC will not be able to use or redeem their 
ecash tokens. Some of the KYCed users can be censored based on their 
identity. This would also affect privacy.

gandlaf21 agrees this is possible however it is still marketed as 
censorship resistant. 

There was some discussion about it in a pull request and supertestnet also 
shared his thoughts: https://github.com/bitcoinlayers/bitcoinlayers/pull/164

This whole debate started in May 2024 when cashu's twitter account 
[announced][2] that they are considering adding an authentication in the 
protocol as it is requested by regulated entities.

The authentication mechanism is shared in this [pull request][3] which 
links each user with linkingkey and it will compromise privacy:

```
POST https://bob.com/v1/auth

Post Data:
{ 
  action:"mint", 
  k1:"8278e1a48e61c261916791dabb6af760488e4f01932e11fe7054f59754e3de6e"
  signature:c568f78e4b234a5f7d8c3b2a679e48d1234567890abcdef
  linkingKey:7345786068584cd33000582ba87a9ddf77db5377c67910ab59d7e9a5f44
}

Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

{
  "access_token": "9876543210fedcba",
  "token_type": "Bearer",
  "expires_in": 3600
}
```

This pull request was closed last week and a new authentication mechanism 
is proposed: https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/pull/198

It uses clear and blind auth but users can still be censored with KYC based 
on their identity. You can understand the details from this [comment][4].

## Conclusion

The authentication mechanisms shared above are not the only way mints can 
restrict users as there is nothing in the protocol that stops mints from 
using a custom authentication.

Introducing KYC in protocol is against freedom and privacy. These custodial 
solutions might end up being another compliant ecash implementation like 
[GNU Taler][5]. This would also make it easier for government agencies to 
target other mints that do not comply.

[1]: https://github.com/cashubtc/nutshell/blob/main/cashu/mint/conditions.py
[2]: https://x.com/CashuBTC/status/1791001643019809146
[3]: https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/pull/106
[4]: https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/pull/198#issuecomment-2508706328
[5]: https://taler.net/en/index.html

/dev/fd0
floppy disk guy

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2024-12-21 16:58 [bitcoindev] Censorship and Privacy in Chaumian ecash implementations /dev /fd0

  2024-12-21 23:03   ` /dev /fd0
  
From: 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List @ 2024-12-21 21:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: /dev /fd0;  Bitcoin Development Mailing List


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Hi fd0,

For P2PK, the solution there seems deadly obvious: Just don't use raw unobfuscated Nostr keys to receive ecash. Tweak it, or use a new random key. This is a non-issue.

As for authentication systems, yes of course KYC-backed authentication would allow censorship, but that is an optional spec which mints aren't compelled to implement or use, even once the spec is finished. AFAIK no mint implementations have this system in code yet, so it's not even a feature at this point: just a proposed NUT document, sitting in draft status. Your assertion that "none of the ecash implementation are censorship resistant" is a blatantly false statement bereft of fact or depth.

Even if we fast forward several years when perhaps some ecash mint implementations do implement the authentication spec as a fully-formed feature ready to go... If a mint starts enforcing KYC, or any other badness like censoring by IP address, users are free to switch to a different non-KYC mint instance. At worst they might lose the money they already stored with the compromised mint, which is always a risk to keep in mind with ecash.


Your argument seems to be that introducing an opt-in feature spec like external authentication is inherently bad because it encourages/enables KYC in the first place, and that ecash devs should refuse to even standardize any protocol which enables KYC. 

Well I have hard news for you: Governments don't care about whether compliance is "easy" or "standardized". If uncle sam wants your mint to enforce KYC, he won't balk just because the mint's code doesn't provide an easy way to do it. He'll give you a deadline to enforce KYC on your users, and if you can't prove you're compliant by then, you can kiss your business goodbye.

When faced with this choice, the ecash mint runner can either shut down their mint, or add KYC. Without an authentication system in place already, the mint runner would have to implement it all themselves to enforce KYC and stay in business. So ecash devs have proposed standardized auth systems which would give mint runners the option of knuckling under to KYC. I agree it would suck to be put to that choice, but giving them the freedom to choose is important and valid, and in no way compromises the integrity of other non-KYC mints who perhaps operate freely in more enlightened jurisdictions. 

If it's not part of the NUT standards, and mint runners need it, then someone will just fork off and add it themselves. Better to pre-empt that and keep the standards from fragmenting - that's the point of standards. 

-c
On Saturday, December 21st, 2024 at 9:58 AM, /dev /fd0 <alicexbtong@gmail•com> wrote:

> Hi Bitcoin Developers,
> 

> This post is about a myth and some misleading things shared about ecash. It is possible to censor specific users and none of the ecash implementation are censorship resistant.
> 

> # Censorship Methods in Cashu
> 

> There are 2 ways to censor individual users in cashu:
> 

> 1. P2PK
> 2. Authentication
> 

> ## P2PK
> 

> Ecash tokens issued by cashu mints can be locked using public keys so that it can only be redeemed by the user who owns the private key for it. This links ecash with specific public keys and most implementation use nostr keys for it. Most users are doxxed on nostr so they can be censored based on their identity. Even if its linked to an anon they can be censored based on their posts.
> 

> You can find relevant code snippets in [conditions.py][1] if using nutshell for mint:
> 

> ```python
> class LedgerSpendingConditions:
> def _verify_p2pk_spending_conditions(self, proof, secret):
> if SecretKind(secret.kind) != SecretKind.P2PK:
> return True
> p2pk_secret = P2PKSecret.from_secret(secret)
> pubkeys = [p2pk_secret.data] + p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
> if p2pk_secret.locktime and p2pk_secret.locktime < time.time():
> refund_pubkeys = p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
> if not refund_pubkeys:
> return True
> return self._verify_secret_signatures(
> proof, refund_pubkeys, proof.p2pksigs, 1
> )
> return self._verify_secret_signatures(
> proof, pubkeys, proof.p2pksigs, p2pk_secret.n_sigs
> )
> 

> def _verify_htlc_spending_conditions(self, proof, secret):
> if SecretKind(secret.kind) != SecretKind.HTLC:
> return True
> htlc_secret = HTLCSecret.from_secret(secret)
> if htlc_secret.locktime and htlc_secret.locktime < time.time():
> refund_pubkeys = htlc_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
> if refund_pubkeys:
> return self._verify_secret_signatures(
> proof, refund_pubkeys, proof.p2pksigs, 1
> )
> return True
> assert proof.htlcpreimage, TransactionError("no HTLC preimage provided")
> if not hashlib.sha256(bytes.fromhex(proof.htlcpreimage)).digest() == bytes.fromhex(htlc_secret.data):
> raise TransactionError("HTLC preimage does not match.")
> hashlock_pubkeys = htlc_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
> if not hashlock_pubkeys:
> return True
> return self._verify_secret_signatures(
> proof, hashlock_pubkeys, proof.htlcsigs or [], htlc_secret.n_sigs
> )
> 

> def _verify_secret_signatures(self, proof, pubkeys, signatures, n_sigs_required=1):
> assert len(set(pubkeys)) == len(pubkeys), "pubkeys must be unique."
> if not signatures:
> raise TransactionError("no signatures in proof.")
> if len(set(signatures)) != len(signatures):
> raise TransactionError("signatures must be unique.")
> n_sigs_required = n_sigs_required or 1
> assert n_sigs_required > 0, "n_sigs must be positive."
> assert len(signatures) >= n_sigs_required, f"not enough signatures provided: {len(signatures)} < {n_sigs_required}."
> n_valid_sigs_per_output = 0
> for input_sig in signatures:
> for pubkey in pubkeys:
> if verify_schnorr_signature(
> message=proof.secret.encode("utf-8"),
> pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
> signature=bytes.fromhex(input_sig),
> ):
> n_valid_sigs_per_output += 1
> assert n_valid_sigs_per_output, "no valid signature provided for input."
> assert n_valid_sigs_per_output >= n_sigs_required, f"signature threshold not met. {n_valid_sigs_per_output} < {n_sigs_required}."
> return True
> 

> def _verify_input_spending_conditions(self, proof):
> try:
> secret = Secret.deserialize(proof.secret)
> except Exception:
> return True
> if SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.P2PK:
> return self._verify_p2pk_spending_conditions(proof, secret)
> if SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.HTLC:
> return self._verify_htlc_spending_conditions(proof, secret)
> return True
> 

> def _verify_output_p2pk_spending_conditions(self, proofs, outputs):
> try:
> secrets_generic = [Secret.deserialize(p.secret) for p in proofs]
> p2pk_secrets = [P2PKSecret.from_secret(secret) for secret in secrets_generic]
> except Exception:
> return True
> if not all([SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.P2PK for secret in p2pk_secrets]):
> return True
> if not all([secret.sigflag == SigFlags.SIG_ALL for secret in p2pk_secrets]):
> return True
> pubkeys_per_proof = [
> [p2pk_secret.data] + p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
> for p2pk_secret in p2pk_secrets
> ]
> n_sigs_per_proof = [p2pk_secret.n_sigs for p2pk_secret in p2pk_secrets]
> for p2pk_secret in p2pk_secrets:
> if p2pk_secret.locktime and p2pk_secret.locktime < time.time():
> refund_pubkeys = p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
> if refund_pubkeys:
> pubkeys_per_proof.append(refund_pubkeys)
> n_sigs_per_proof.append(1)
> if not pubkeys_per_proof:
> return True
> assert len({tuple(pubs_output) for pubs_output in pubkeys_per_proof}) == 1, "pubkeys in all proofs must match."
> assert len(set(n_sigs_per_proof)) == 1, "n_sigs in all proofs must match."
> pubkeys = pubkeys_per_proof[0]
> n_sigs = n_sigs_per_proof[0] or 1
> for output in outputs:
> p2pksigs = output.p2pksigs
> assert p2pksigs, "no signatures in output."
> assert len(set(p2pksigs)) == len(p2pksigs), "duplicate signatures in output."
> n_valid_sigs_per_output = 0
> for sig in p2pksigs:
> for pubkey in pubkeys:
> if verify_schnorr_signature(
> message=bytes.fromhex(output.B_),
> pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
> signature=bytes.fromhex(sig),
> ):
> n_valid_sigs_per_output += 1
> assert n_valid_sigs_per_output, "no valid signature provided for output."
> assert n_valid_sigs_per_output >= n_sigs, f"signature threshold not met. {n_valid_sigs_per_output} < {n_sigs}."
> return True
> 

> def _verify_output_spending_conditions(self, proofs, outputs):
> return self._verify_output_p2pk_spending_conditions(proofs, outputs)
> ```
> 

> ## Authentication
> 

> Mints can enforce authentication at some point and do KYC for mint, melt, swap etc. Users who refuse to KYC will not be able to use or redeem their ecash tokens. Some of the KYCed users can be censored based on their identity. This would also affect privacy.
> 

> gandlaf21 agrees this is possible however it is still marketed as censorship resistant.
> 

> There was some discussion about it in a pull request and supertestnet also shared his thoughts: https://github.com/bitcoinlayers/bitcoinlayers/pull/164
> 

> This whole debate started in May 2024 when cashu's twitter account [announced][2] that they are considering adding an authentication in the protocol as it is requested by regulated entities.
> 

> The authentication mechanism is shared in this [pull request][3] which links each user with linkingkey and it will compromise privacy:
> 

> ```
> POST https://bob.com/v1/auth
> 

> Post Data:
> {
> action:"mint",
> k1:"8278e1a48e61c261916791dabb6af760488e4f01932e11fe7054f59754e3de6e"
> signature:c568f78e4b234a5f7d8c3b2a679e48d1234567890abcdef
> linkingKey:7345786068584cd33000582ba87a9ddf77db5377c67910ab59d7e9a5f44
> }
> 

> Response:
> 

> HTTP/1.1 200 OK
> 

> {
> "access_token": "9876543210fedcba",
> "token_type": "Bearer",
> "expires_in": 3600
> }
> ```
> 

> This pull request was closed last week and a new authentication mechanism is proposed: https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/pull/198
> 

> It uses clear and blind auth but users can still be censored with KYC based on their identity. You can understand the details from this [comment][4].
> 

> ## Conclusion
> 

> The authentication mechanisms shared above are not the only way mints can restrict users as there is nothing in the protocol that stops mints from using a custom authentication.
> 

> Introducing KYC in protocol is against freedom and privacy. These custodial solutions might end up being another compliant ecash implementation like [GNU Taler][5]. This would also make it easier for government agencies to target other mints that do not comply.
> 

> [1]: https://github.com/cashubtc/nutshell/blob/main/cashu/mint/conditions.py
> [2]: https://x.com/CashuBTC/status/1791001643019809146
> [3]: https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/pull/106
> [4]: https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/pull/198#issuecomment-2508706328
> [5]: https://taler.net/en/index.html
> 

> /dev/fd0
> floppy disk guy
> 

> --
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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2024-12-21 21:52 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List

  
From: /dev /fd0 @ 2024-12-21 23:03 UTC ( / )
  To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List




Hi conduition,

>  For P2PK, the solution there seems deadly obvious: Just don't use raw 
unobfuscated Nostr keys to receive ecash. Tweak it, or use a new random 
key. This is a non-issue

This is an issue at present. I hope you fix it as you seem to be 
[involved][1] in cashu development. The workarounds that you suggested will 
still allow a **specific** key to be censored.

>  As for authentication systems, yes of course KYC-backed authentication 
would allow censorship, but that is an optional spec which mints aren't 
compelled to implement or use, even once the spec is finished. AFAIK no 
mint implementations have this system in code yet, so it's not even a 
feature at this point: just a proposed NUT document, sitting in draft 
status. Your assertion that "none of the ecash implementation are 
censorship resistant" is a blatantly false statement bereft of fact or 
depth.

Being optional does not matter. It is **possible** for a mint to use 
authentication which is the whole point of this mailing list post. It is 
true that none of the ecash implementations are censorship resistant. Just 
because censorship isn't implemented yet by mints does not mean the 
protocol is censorship resistant.

The false statements exist in cashu docs with misleading things about 
censorship resistance.

>  At worst they might lose the money they already stored with the 
compromised mint, which is always a risk to keep in mind with ecash.

This is already described in my post.

>  So ecash devs have proposed standardized auth systems which would give 
mint runners the *option* of knuckling under to KYC. I agree it would suck 
to be put to that choice, but giving them the freedom to choose is 
important and valid, and in no way compromises the integrity of other 
non-KYC mints who perhaps operate freely in more enlightened jurisdictions. 

Standardizing KYC in the protocol is the opposite of freedom and privacy. 
Jurisdictions do not matter if a mint is large enough to be attacked by the 
government agencies. There are enough examples for it.

>  If it's not part of the NUT standards, and mint runners need it, then 
someone will just fork off and add it themselves. Better to pre-empt that 
and keep the standards from fragmenting - that's the point of standards. 

There are ways to avoid any kind of authentication and KYC in the protocol. 
If someone still forks then it won't remain cashu protocol. However, I 
won't waste my time explaining it because the goal seem to be helping 
regulated entities to use cashu.

[1]: https://conduition.io/cryptography/ecash-dlc/

/dev/fd0
floppy disk guy

On Sunday, December 22, 2024 at 3:34:17 AM UTC+5:30 conduition wrote:

> Hi fd0,
>
> For P2PK, the solution there seems deadly obvious: Just don't use raw 
> unobfuscated Nostr keys to receive ecash. Tweak it, or use a new random 
> key. This is a non-issue.
>
> As for authentication systems, yes of course KYC-backed authentication 
> would allow censorship, but that is an optional spec which mints aren't 
> compelled to implement or use, even once the spec is finished. AFAIK no 
> mint implementations have this system in code yet, so it's not even a 
> feature at this point: just a proposed NUT document, sitting in draft 
> status. Your assertion that "none of the ecash implementation are 
> censorship resistant" is a blatantly false statement bereft of fact or 
> depth.
>
> Even if we fast forward several years when perhaps *some* ecash mint 
> implementations do implement the authentication spec as a fully-formed 
> feature ready to go... If a mint starts enforcing KYC, or any other badness 
> like censoring by IP address, users are free to switch to a different 
> non-KYC mint instance. At worst they might lose the money they already 
> stored with the compromised mint, which is always a risk to keep in mind 
> with ecash.
>
> Your argument seems to be that introducing an opt-in feature spec like 
> external authentication is inherently bad because it encourages/enables KYC 
> in the first place, and that ecash devs should refuse to even standardize 
> any protocol which enables KYC. 
>
> Well I have hard news for you: Governments don't care about whether 
> compliance is "easy" or "standardized". If uncle sam wants your mint to 
> enforce KYC, he won't balk just because the mint's code doesn't provide an 
> easy way to do it. He'll give you a deadline to enforce KYC on your users, 
> and if you can't prove you're compliant by then, you can kiss your business 
> goodbye.
>
> When faced with this choice, the ecash mint runner can either shut down 
> their mint, or add KYC. Without an authentication system in place already, 
> the mint runner would have to implement it all themselves to enforce KYC 
> and stay in business. So ecash devs have proposed standardized auth systems 
> which would give mint runners the *option* of knuckling under to KYC. I 
> agree it would suck to be put to that choice, but giving them the freedom 
> to choose is important and valid, and in no way compromises the integrity 
> of other non-KYC mints who perhaps operate freely in more enlightened 
> jurisdictions. 
>
> If it's not part of the NUT standards, and mint runners need it, then 
> someone will just fork off and add it themselves. Better to pre-empt that 
> and keep the standards from fragmenting - that's the point of standards. 
>
> -c
> On Saturday, December 21st, 2024 at 9:58 AM, /dev /fd0 <alice...@gmail•com> 
> wrote:
>
> Hi Bitcoin Developers,
>
> This post is about a myth and some misleading things shared about ecash. 
> It is possible to censor specific users and none of the ecash 
> implementation are censorship resistant.
>
> # Censorship Methods in Cashu
>
> There are 2 ways to censor individual users in cashu:
>
> 1. P2PK
> 2. Authentication
>
> ## P2PK
>
> Ecash tokens issued by cashu mints can be locked using public keys so that 
> it can only be redeemed by the user who owns the private key for it. This 
> links ecash with specific public keys and most implementation use nostr 
> keys for it. Most users are doxxed on nostr so they can be censored based 
> on their identity. Even if its linked to an anon they can be censored based 
> on their posts.
>
> You can find relevant code snippets in [conditions.py][1] if using 
> nutshell for mint:
>
> ```python
> class LedgerSpendingConditions:
> def _verify_p2pk_spending_conditions(self, proof, secret):
> if SecretKind(secret.kind) != SecretKind.P2PK:
> return True
> p2pk_secret = P2PKSecret.from_secret(secret)
> pubkeys = [p2pk_secret.data] + p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
> if p2pk_secret.locktime and p2pk_secret.locktime < time.time():
> refund_pubkeys = p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
> if not refund_pubkeys:
> return True
> return self._verify_secret_signatures(
> proof, refund_pubkeys, proof.p2pksigs, 1
> )
> return self._verify_secret_signatures(
> proof, pubkeys, proof.p2pksigs, p2pk_secret.n_sigs
> )
>
> def _verify_htlc_spending_conditions(self, proof, secret):
> if SecretKind(secret.kind) != SecretKind.HTLC:
> return True
> htlc_secret = HTLCSecret.from_secret(secret)
> if htlc_secret.locktime and htlc_secret.locktime < time.time():
> refund_pubkeys = htlc_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
> if refund_pubkeys:
> return self._verify_secret_signatures(
> proof, refund_pubkeys, proof.p2pksigs, 1
> )
> return True
> assert proof.htlcpreimage, TransactionError("no HTLC preimage provided")
> if not hashlib.sha256(bytes.fromhex(proof.htlcpreimage)).digest() == 
> bytes.fromhex(htlc_secret.data):
> raise TransactionError("HTLC preimage does not match.")
> hashlock_pubkeys = htlc_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
> if not hashlock_pubkeys:
> return True
> return self._verify_secret_signatures(
> proof, hashlock_pubkeys, proof.htlcsigs or [], htlc_secret.n_sigs
> )
>
> def _verify_secret_signatures(self, proof, pubkeys, signatures, 
> n_sigs_required=1):
> assert len(set(pubkeys)) == len(pubkeys), "pubkeys must be unique."
> if not signatures:
> raise TransactionError("no signatures in proof.")
> if len(set(signatures)) != len(signatures):
> raise TransactionError("signatures must be unique.")
> n_sigs_required = n_sigs_required or 1
> assert n_sigs_required > 0, "n_sigs must be positive."
> assert len(signatures) >= n_sigs_required, f"not enough signatures 
> provided: {len(signatures)} < {n_sigs_required}."
> n_valid_sigs_per_output = 0
> for input_sig in signatures:
> for pubkey in pubkeys:
> if verify_schnorr_signature(
> message=proof.secret.encode("utf-8"),
> pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
> signature=bytes.fromhex(input_sig),
> ):
> n_valid_sigs_per_output += 1
> assert n_valid_sigs_per_output, "no valid signature provided for input."
> assert n_valid_sigs_per_output >= n_sigs_required, f"signature threshold 
> not met. {n_valid_sigs_per_output} < {n_sigs_required}."
> return True
>
> def _verify_input_spending_conditions(self, proof):
> try:
> secret = Secret.deserialize(proof.secret)
> except Exception:
> return True
> if SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.P2PK:
> return self._verify_p2pk_spending_conditions(proof, secret)
> if SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.HTLC:
> return self._verify_htlc_spending_conditions(proof, secret)
> return True
>
> def _verify_output_p2pk_spending_conditions(self, proofs, outputs):
> try:
> secrets_generic = [Secret.deserialize(p.secret) for p in proofs]
> p2pk_secrets = [P2PKSecret.from_secret(secret) for secret in 
> secrets_generic]
> except Exception:
> return True
> if not all([SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.P2PK for secret in 
> p2pk_secrets]):
> return True
> if not all([secret.sigflag == SigFlags.SIG_ALL for secret in 
> p2pk_secrets]):
> return True
> pubkeys_per_proof = [
> [p2pk_secret.data] + p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
> for p2pk_secret in p2pk_secrets
> ]
> n_sigs_per_proof = [p2pk_secret.n_sigs for p2pk_secret in p2pk_secrets]
> for p2pk_secret in p2pk_secrets:
> if p2pk_secret.locktime and p2pk_secret.locktime < time.time():
> refund_pubkeys = p2pk_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
> if refund_pubkeys:
> pubkeys_per_proof.append(refund_pubkeys)
> n_sigs_per_proof.append(1)
> if not pubkeys_per_proof:
> return True
> assert len({tuple(pubs_output) for pubs_output in pubkeys_per_proof}) == 
> 1, "pubkeys in all proofs must match."
> assert len(set(n_sigs_per_proof)) == 1, "n_sigs in all proofs must match."
> pubkeys = pubkeys_per_proof[0]
> n_sigs = n_sigs_per_proof[0] or 1
> for output in outputs:
> p2pksigs = output.p2pksigs
> assert p2pksigs, "no signatures in output."
> assert len(set(p2pksigs)) == len(p2pksigs), "duplicate signatures in 
> output."
> n_valid_sigs_per_output = 0
> for sig in p2pksigs:
> for pubkey in pubkeys:
> if verify_schnorr_signature(
> message=bytes.fromhex(output.B_),
> pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
> signature=bytes.fromhex(sig),
> ):
> n_valid_sigs_per_output += 1
> assert n_valid_sigs_per_output, "no valid signature provided for output."
> assert n_valid_sigs_per_output >= n_sigs, f"signature threshold not met. 
> {n_valid_sigs_per_output} < {n_sigs}."
> return True
>
> def _verify_output_spending_conditions(self, proofs, outputs):
> return self._verify_output_p2pk_spending_conditions(proofs, outputs)
> ```
>
> ## Authentication
>
> Mints can enforce authentication at some point and do KYC for mint, melt, 
> swap etc. Users who refuse to KYC will not be able to use or redeem their 
> ecash tokens. Some of the KYCed users can be censored based on their 
> identity. This would also affect privacy.
>
> gandlaf21 agrees this is possible however it is still marketed as 
> censorship resistant. 
>
> There was some discussion about it in a pull request and supertestnet also 
> shared his thoughts: 
> https://github.com/bitcoinlayers/bitcoinlayers/pull/164
>
> This whole debate started in May 2024 when cashu's twitter account 
> [announced][2] that they are considering adding an authentication in the 
> protocol as it is requested by regulated entities.
>
> The authentication mechanism is shared in this [pull request][3] which 
> links each user with linkingkey and it will compromise privacy:
>
> ```
> POST https://bob.com/v1/auth
>
> Post Data:
> { 
> action:"mint", 
> k1:"8278e1a48e61c261916791dabb6af760488e4f01932e11fe7054f59754e3de6e"
> signature:c568f78e4b234a5f7d8c3b2a679e48d1234567890abcdef
> linkingKey:7345786068584cd33000582ba87a9ddf77db5377c67910ab59d7e9a5f44
> }
>
> Response:
>
> HTTP/1.1 200 OK
>
> {
> "access_token": "9876543210fedcba",
> "token_type": "Bearer",
> "expires_in": 3600
> }
> ```
>
> This pull request was closed last week and a new authentication mechanism 
> is proposed: https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/pull/198
>
> It uses clear and blind auth but users can still be censored with KYC 
> based on their identity. You can understand the details from this 
> [comment][4].
>
> ## Conclusion
>
> The authentication mechanisms shared above are not the only way mints can 
> restrict users as there is nothing in the protocol that stops mints from 
> using a custom authentication.
>
> Introducing KYC in protocol is against freedom and privacy. These 
> custodial solutions might end up being another compliant ecash 
> implementation like [GNU Taler][5]. This would also make it easier for 
> government agencies to target other mints that do not comply.
>
> [1]: 
> https://github.com/cashubtc/nutshell/blob/main/cashu/mint/conditions.py
> [2]: https://x.com/CashuBTC/status/1791001643019809146
> [3]: https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/pull/106
> [4]: https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/pull/198#issuecomment-2508706328
> [5]: https://taler.net/en/index.html
>
> /dev/fd0
> floppy disk guy
>
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> .
>
>
>

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