Version bits proposal

Version bits proposal
2015-05-27  2:31 ` Douglas Roark
                   ` (2 more replies)
  
From: Pieter Wuille @ 2015-05-27  1:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 485 bytes --]

Hello everyone,

here is a proposal for how to coordinate future soft-forking consensus
changes: https://gist.github.com/sipa/bf69659f43e763540550

It supports multiple parallel changes, as well as changes that get
permanently rejected without obstructing the rollout of others.

Feel free to comment. As the gist does not support notifying participants
of new comments, I would suggest using the mailing list instead.

This is joint work with Peter Todd and Greg Maxwell.

-- 
Pieter

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 655 bytes --]

 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-27  2:31 ` 
                   ` 
  
From: Pieter Wuille @ 2015-05-27  1:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 485 bytes --]

Hello everyone,

here is a proposal for how to coordinate future soft-forking consensus
changes: https://gist.github.com/sipa/bf69659f43e763540550

It supports multiple parallel changes, as well as changes that get
permanently rejected without obstructing the rollout of others.

Feel free to comment. As the gist does not support notifying participants
of new comments, I would suggest using the mailing list instead.

This is joint work with Peter Todd and Greg Maxwell.

-- 
Pieter

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 655 bytes --]

 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-27  1:48 [Bitcoin-development] Version bits proposal Pieter Wuille
  2015-05-27  2:31 ` Douglas Roark

  2015-05-27  3:51   ` Jorge Timón
  2015-06-03 20:42 ` Pieter Wuille
  
From: Luke Dashjr @ 2015-05-27  3:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-development

On Wednesday, May 27, 2015 1:48:05 AM Pieter Wuille wrote:
> Feel free to comment. As the gist does not support notifying participants
> of new comments, I would suggest using the mailing list instead.

I suggest adding a section describing how this interacts with and changes GBT.

Currently, the client tells the server what the highest block version it 
supports is, and the server indicates a block version to use in its template, 
as well as optional instructions for the client to forcefully use this version 
despite its own maximum version number. Making the version a bitfield 
contradicts the increment-only assumption of this design, and since GBT 
clients are not aware of overall network consensus state, reused bits can 
easily become confused. I suggest, therefore, that GBT clients should indicate 
(instead of a maximum supported version number) a list of softforks by 
identifier keyword, and the GBT server respond with a template indicating:
- An object of softfork keywords to bit values, that the server will accept.
- The version number, as presently conveyed, indicating the preferred softfork 
flags.

Does this sound reasonable, and/or am I missing anything else?

Luke



 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-27  3:46 ` Luke Dashjr

  2015-05-27  9:35     ` Tier Nolan
  
From: Jorge Timón @ 2015-05-27  3:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Luke-Jr;  Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1712 bytes --]

It would also help to see the actual code changes required, which I'm sure
will be much shorter than the explanation itself.
On May 27, 2015 5:47 AM, "Luke Dashjr" <luke@dashjr•org> wrote:

> On Wednesday, May 27, 2015 1:48:05 AM Pieter Wuille wrote:
> > Feel free to comment. As the gist does not support notifying participants
> > of new comments, I would suggest using the mailing list instead.
>
> I suggest adding a section describing how this interacts with and changes
> GBT.
>
> Currently, the client tells the server what the highest block version it
> supports is, and the server indicates a block version to use in its
> template,
> as well as optional instructions for the client to forcefully use this
> version
> despite its own maximum version number. Making the version a bitfield
> contradicts the increment-only assumption of this design, and since GBT
> clients are not aware of overall network consensus state, reused bits can
> easily become confused. I suggest, therefore, that GBT clients should
> indicate
> (instead of a maximum supported version number) a list of softforks by
> identifier keyword, and the GBT server respond with a template indicating:
> - An object of softfork keywords to bit values, that the server will
> accept.
> - The version number, as presently conveyed, indicating the preferred
> softfork
> flags.
>
> Does this sound reasonable, and/or am I missing anything else?
>
> Luke
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 2193 bytes --]

 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-27  3:51   ` Jorge Timón

  2015-05-27 10:15       ` Peter Todd
  2015-05-27 10:15       ` Jorge Timón
  
From: Tier Nolan @ 2015-05-27  9:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2911 bytes --]

I think it would be better to have the deadlines set as block counts.  That
eliminates the need to use the median time mechanism.

The deadline could be matched to a "start-line".  The definition would then
be something like

BIP 105
Start block: 325000
End block: 350000
Activation: 750 of 1000
Implication: 950 of 1000
Bit: 9

This would allow creation of a simple table of known BIPs.  It also keeps
multiple users of the bit as strictly separate.

The alternative to the start time is that it is set equal to the deadline
or implication time of the previous user of the bit.

Was the intention to change the 95% rule.  You need 750 of the last 1000 to
activate and then must wait at least 1000 for implication?


On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 4:51 AM, Jorge Timón <jtimon@jtimon•cc> wrote:

> It would also help to see the actual code changes required, which I'm sure
> will be much shorter than the explanation itself.
> On May 27, 2015 5:47 AM, "Luke Dashjr" <luke@dashjr•org> wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, May 27, 2015 1:48:05 AM Pieter Wuille wrote:
>> > Feel free to comment. As the gist does not support notifying
>> participants
>> > of new comments, I would suggest using the mailing list instead.
>>
>> I suggest adding a section describing how this interacts with and changes
>> GBT.
>>
>> Currently, the client tells the server what the highest block version it
>> supports is, and the server indicates a block version to use in its
>> template,
>> as well as optional instructions for the client to forcefully use this
>> version
>> despite its own maximum version number. Making the version a bitfield
>> contradicts the increment-only assumption of this design, and since GBT
>> clients are not aware of overall network consensus state, reused bits can
>> easily become confused. I suggest, therefore, that GBT clients should
>> indicate
>> (instead of a maximum supported version number) a list of softforks by
>> identifier keyword, and the GBT server respond with a template indicating:
>> - An object of softfork keywords to bit values, that the server will
>> accept.
>> - The version number, as presently conveyed, indicating the preferred
>> softfork
>> flags.
>>
>> Does this sound reasonable, and/or am I missing anything else?
>>
>> Luke
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 4025 bytes --]

 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-27  9:35     ` Tier Nolan

  2015-05-27 11:26         ` Tier Nolan
  2015-05-27 10:15       ` Jorge Timón
  
From: Peter Todd @ 2015-05-27 10:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tier Nolan;  Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1445 bytes --]

On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 10:35:03AM +0100, Tier Nolan wrote:
> I think it would be better to have the deadlines set as block counts.  That
> eliminates the need to use the median time mechanism.

The median time mechanism is basically a way for hashing power to show
what time they think it is. Equally, the nVersion soft-fork mechanism is
a way for hashing power to show what features they want to support.

Block counts are inconvenient for planning, as there's no guarantee
they'll actually happen in any particular time frame, forward and back.
There's no particular incentive problems here - the median time clearly
shows support by a majority of hashing power - so I don't see any reason
to make planning more difficult.

> The deadline could be matched to a "start-line".  The definition would then
> be something like
> 
> BIP 105
> Start block: 325000
> End block: 350000
> Activation: 750 of 1000
> Implication: 950 of 1000
> Bit: 9
> 
> This would allow creation of a simple table of known BIPs.  It also keeps
> multiple users of the bit as strictly separate.

If you assume no large reorganizations, your table of known BIPs can
just as easily be a list of block heights even if the median time
mechanism is used.

If you do assume there may be large reorganizations you can't have a
"simple table"

-- 
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
000000000000000001643f7706f3dcbc3a386e4c1bfba852ff628d8024f875b6

[-- Attachment #2: Digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 650 bytes --]

 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-27  9:35     ` Tier Nolan
  2015-05-27 10:15       ` Peter Todd

  
From: Jorge Timón @ 2015-05-27 10:15 UTC ( / )
  To: Tier Nolan;  Bitcoin Development



On May 27, 2015 11:35 AM, "Tier Nolan" <tier.nolan@gmail•com> wrote:

> Was the intention to change the 95% rule.  You need 750 of the last 1000
to activate and then must wait at least 1000 for implication?

You need 75% to start applying it, 95% to start rejecting blocks that don't
apply it.
2015-05-27 10:15       ` Peter Todd

  2015-05-27 22:52           ` Sergio Lerner
  2015-06-01 14:50           ` Potter QQ
  
From: Tier Nolan @ 2015-05-27 11:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3979 bytes --]

On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 11:15 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org> wrote:

> The median time mechanism is basically a way for hashing power to show
> what time they think it is. Equally, the nVersion soft-fork mechanism is
> a way for hashing power to show what features they want to support.
>
>
Fair enough.  It means slightly more processing, but the median time could
be cached in the header index, so no big deal.

Block counts are inconvenient for planning, as there's no guarantee
> they'll actually happen in any particular time frame, forward and back.
>

I don't think the deadline needs to be set that accurately.  A roughly 6
month deadline should be fine, but as you say a majority of miners is
needed to abuse the median time and it is already a miner poll.

Perhaps the number of blocks used in the median could be increased to
reduce "noise".

The median time could be median of the last 144 blocks plus 12 hours.


> If you assume no large reorganizations, your table of known BIPs can
> just as easily be a list of block heights even if the median time
> mechanism is used.
>

I think it makes it easier to write the code.  It reduced the state that
needs to be stored per BIP.  You don't need to check if the previous bips
were all accepted.

Each bit is assigned to a particular BIP for a particular range of times
(or blocks).

If block numbers were used for the deadline, you just need to check the
block index for the deadline block.

enum {
    BIP_INACTIVE = 0,
    BIP_ACTIVE,
    BIP_LOCKED
    BIP_INVALID_BLOCK,
}

int GetBIPState(block, bip)
{
    if (block.height == bip.deadline)  // Bit must be set to match
locked/unlocked at deadline
    {
        int bipState = check_supermajority(...);
        if (bipState == BIP_LOCKED && (block.nVersion & bip.bit)
            return BIP_LOCKED;

        if (bipState != BIP_LOCKED && (block.nVersion & (~bip.bit)))
            return BIP_INACTIVE;

        return BIP_INVALID_BLOCK;
    }

    if (block.height > deadline) // Look at the deadline block to determine
if the BIP is locked
        return (block_index[deadline].nVersion & bip_bit) != 0 ? BIP_LOCKED
: BIP_INACTIVE;

    if (block.height < startline + I) // BIP cannot activate/lock until
startline + implicit window size
        return INACTIVE;

    return check_supermajority(....) // Check supermajority of bit
}

The block at height deadline would indicate if the BIP was locked in.

Block time could still be used as long as the block height was set after
that.  The deadline_time could be in six months.  The startline height
could be the current block height and the deadline_height could be
startline + 35000.

The gives roughly

start time = now
deadline time = now + six months
deadline height = now + eight months

The deadline height is the block height when the bit is returned to the
pool but the deadline time is when the BIP has to be accepted.

It also helps with the warning system.  For each block height, there is a
set of known BIP bits that are allowed.  Once the final deadline is passed,
the expected mask is zeros.

On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 11:15 AM, Jorge Timón <jtimon@jtimon•cc> wrote:

> On May 27, 2015 11:35 AM, "Tier Nolan" <tier.nolan@gmail•com> wrote:
>
> > Was the intention to change the 95% rule.  You need 750 of the last 1000
> to activate and then must wait at least 1000 for implication?
>
> You need 75% to start applying it, 95% to start rejecting blocks that
> don't apply it.
>

I think the phrasing is ambiguous.  I was just asking for clarification.

"Whenever I out of any W *subsequent* blocks (regardless of the block
itself) have bit B set,"

That suggests that the I of W blocks for the 95% rule must happen after
activation.  This makes the rule checking harder.  Easier to use the
current system, where blocks that were part of the 750 rule also count
towards the 95% rule.

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 5768 bytes --]

 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-27 11:26         ` Tier Nolan

  2015-05-28  1:05             ` Patrick Strateman
  2015-06-01 14:50           ` Potter QQ
  
From: Sergio Lerner @ 2015-05-27 22:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-development

I like the idea but I think we should leave at least 16 bits of the
version fixed as an extra-nonce.
If we don't then miners may use them as a nonce anyway, and mess with
the soft-fork voting system.
My original proposal was this: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/5102

Best regards




 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-27 22:52           ` Sergio Lerner

  2015-05-28  7:51               ` Christian Decker
  
From: Patrick Strateman @ 2015-05-28  1:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-development

There is absolutely no reason to do this.

Any reasonable micro-controller can build merkle tree roots
significantly faster than is necessary.

1 Th/s walks the nonce range once every 4.3ms.

The largest valid merkle trees are 14 nodes high.

That translates to 28 SHA256 ops per 4.3ms or 6511 SHA256 ops/second.

For reference an RPi 1 model B does 2451050 SHA256 ops/second.

On 05/27/2015 03:52 PM, Sergio Lerner wrote:
> I like the idea but I think we should leave at least 16 bits of the
> version fixed as an extra-nonce.
> If we don't then miners may use them as a nonce anyway, and mess with
> the soft-fork voting system.
> My original proposal was this: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/5102
>
> Best regards
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development





 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-28  1:05             ` Patrick Strateman

  2015-05-28  8:11                 ` Adam Back
  
From: Christian Decker @ 2015-05-28  7:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Patrick Strateman, bitcoin-development

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2071 bytes --]

Agreed, there is no need to misuse the version field as well. There is more
than enough variability you could roll in the merkle tree including and
excluding transactions, and the scriptSig of the coinbase transaction,
which also influences the merkle root.

I have a fundamental dislike of retroactively changing semantics, and the
version field should be used just for that: a version. I don't even
particularly like flagging support for a fork in the version field, but
since I have no better solution, count me as supporting Sipa's proposal. We
definitely need a more comfortable way of rolling out new features.

Regards,
Chris

On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 3:08 AM Patrick Strateman <
patrick.strateman@gmail•com> wrote:

> There is absolutely no reason to do this.
>
> Any reasonable micro-controller can build merkle tree roots
> significantly faster than is necessary.
>
> 1 Th/s walks the nonce range once every 4.3ms.
>
> The largest valid merkle trees are 14 nodes high.
>
> That translates to 28 SHA256 ops per 4.3ms or 6511 SHA256 ops/second.
>
> For reference an RPi 1 model B does 2451050 SHA256 ops/second.
>
> On 05/27/2015 03:52 PM, Sergio Lerner wrote:
> > I like the idea but I think we should leave at least 16 bits of the
> > version fixed as an extra-nonce.
> > If we don't then miners may use them as a nonce anyway, and mess with
> > the soft-fork voting system.
> > My original proposal was this:
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/5102
> >
> > Best regards
> >
> >
> >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > _______________________________________________
> > Bitcoin-development mailing list
> > Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
> > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 2967 bytes --]

 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-28  7:51               ` Christian Decker

  
From: Adam Back @ 2015-05-28  8:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Christian Decker;  Bitcoin Dev

Or as far as that goes, permuting (the non-dependent) transactions in
the block by permuting the internal merkle tree nodes at increasing
depths.  (Dependent because transactions that depend on each other
have to come in-order; but one could eg put the n-1 of each n sequence
of in-order transactions in the left-half and unordered in the right
half.)

That makes the tree manipulations maximum depth independent, and even
transaction independent possibly - just need to know enough depth in
the tree of hashes that are permutation safe.

Adam

On 28 May 2015 at 08:51, Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail•com> wrote:
> Agreed, there is no need to misuse the version field as well. There is more
> than enough variability you could roll in the merkle tree including and
> excluding transactions, and the scriptSig of the coinbase transaction, which
> also influences the merkle root.
>
> I have a fundamental dislike of retroactively changing semantics, and the
> version field should be used just for that: a version. I don't even
> particularly like flagging support for a fork in the version field, but
> since I have no better solution, count me as supporting Sipa's proposal. We
> definitely need a more comfortable way of rolling out new features.
>
> Regards,
> Chris
>
> On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 3:08 AM Patrick Strateman
> <patrick.strateman@gmail•com> wrote:
>>
>> There is absolutely no reason to do this.
>>
>> Any reasonable micro-controller can build merkle tree roots
>> significantly faster than is necessary.
>>
>> 1 Th/s walks the nonce range once every 4.3ms.
>>
>> The largest valid merkle trees are 14 nodes high.
>>
>> That translates to 28 SHA256 ops per 4.3ms or 6511 SHA256 ops/second.
>>
>> For reference an RPi 1 model B does 2451050 SHA256 ops/second.
>>
>> On 05/27/2015 03:52 PM, Sergio Lerner wrote:
>> > I like the idea but I think we should leave at least 16 bits of the
>> > version fixed as an extra-nonce.
>> > If we don't then miners may use them as a nonce anyway, and mess with
>> > the soft-fork voting system.
>> > My original proposal was this:
>> > https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/5102
>> >
>> > Best regards
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> > Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
>> > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>



 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-27 11:26         ` Tier Nolan
  2015-05-27 22:52           ` Sergio Lerner

  
From: Potter QQ @ 2015-06-01 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tier Nolan;  Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4498 bytes --]

oh my God ...

发自我的 iPhone

> 在 2015年5月27日，19:26，Tier Nolan <tier.nolan@gmail•com> 写道：
> 
> 
> 
>> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 11:15 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org> wrote:
>> The median time mechanism is basically a way for hashing power to show
>> what time they think it is. Equally, the nVersion soft-fork mechanism is
>> a way for hashing power to show what features they want to support.
> 
> Fair enough.  It means slightly more processing, but the median time could be cached in the header index, so no big deal.
> 
>> Block counts are inconvenient for planning, as there's no guarantee
>> they'll actually happen in any particular time frame, forward and back.
> 
> I don't think the deadline needs to be set that accurately.  A roughly 6 month deadline should be fine, but as you say a majority of miners is needed to abuse the median time and it is already a miner poll.
> 
> Perhaps the number of blocks used in the median could be increased to reduce "noise".
> 
> The median time could be median of the last 144 blocks plus 12 hours.
>  
>> If you assume no large reorganizations, your table of known BIPs can
>> just as easily be a list of block heights even if the median time
>> mechanism is used.
> 
> I think it makes it easier to write the code.  It reduced the state that needs to be stored per BIP.  You don't need to check if the previous bips were all accepted.
> 
> Each bit is assigned to a particular BIP for a particular range of times (or blocks).
> 
> If block numbers were used for the deadline, you just need to check the block index for the deadline block.
> 
> enum {
>     BIP_INACTIVE = 0,
>     BIP_ACTIVE,
>     BIP_LOCKED
>     BIP_INVALID_BLOCK,
> }
> 
> int GetBIPState(block, bip) 
> {
>     if (block.height == bip.deadline)  // Bit must be set to match locked/unlocked at deadline
>     {
>         int bipState = check_supermajority(...);
>         if (bipState == BIP_LOCKED && (block.nVersion & bip.bit)
>             return BIP_LOCKED;
> 
>         if (bipState != BIP_LOCKED && (block.nVersion & (~bip.bit)))
>             return BIP_INACTIVE;
> 
>         return BIP_INVALID_BLOCK;
>     }
> 
>     if (block.height > deadline) // Look at the deadline block to determine if the BIP is locked
>         return (block_index[deadline].nVersion & bip_bit) != 0 ? BIP_LOCKED : BIP_INACTIVE;
> 
>     if (block.height < startline + I) // BIP cannot activate/lock until startline + implicit window size
>         return INACTIVE;
> 
>     return check_supermajority(....) // Check supermajority of bit
> }
> 
> The block at height deadline would indicate if the BIP was locked in.
> 
> Block time could still be used as long as the block height was set after that.  The deadline_time could be in six months.  The startline height could be the current block height and the deadline_height could be startline + 35000.  
> 
> The gives roughly
> 
> start time = now
> deadline time = now + six months
> deadline height = now + eight months
> 
> The deadline height is the block height when the bit is returned to the pool but the deadline time is when the BIP has to be accepted.
> 
> It also helps with the warning system.  For each block height, there is a set of known BIP bits that are allowed.  Once the final deadline is passed, the expected mask is zeros.
> 
>> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 11:15 AM, Jorge Timón <jtimon@jtimon•cc> wrote:
>> On May 27, 2015 11:35 AM, "Tier Nolan" <tier.nolan@gmail•com> wrote:
>> 
>> > Was the intention to change the 95% rule.  You need 750 of the last 1000 to activate and then must wait at least 1000 for implication?
>> 
>> You need 75% to start applying it, 95% to start rejecting blocks that don't apply it.
> 
> I think the phrasing is ambiguous.  I was just asking for clarification.
> 
> "Whenever I out of any W subsequent blocks (regardless of the block itself) have bit B set,"
> 
> That suggests that the I of W blocks for the 95% rule must happen after activation.  This makes the rule checking harder.  Easier to use the current system, where blocks that were part of the 750 rule also count towards the 95% rule.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> 

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 7340 bytes --]

 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-05-27  1:48 [Bitcoin-development] Version bits proposal Pieter Wuille
  2015-05-27  2:31 ` Douglas Roark
  2015-05-27  3:46 ` Luke Dashjr

  
From: Pieter Wuille @ 2015-06-03 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 695 bytes --]

Thanks for all the comments.

I plan to address the feedback and work on an implementation next week.

On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 6:48 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail•com>
wrote:

> Hello everyone,
>
> here is a proposal for how to coordinate future soft-forking consensus
> changes: https://gist.github.com/sipa/bf69659f43e763540550
>
> It supports multiple parallel changes, as well as changes that get
> permanently rejected without obstructing the rollout of others.
>
> Feel free to comment. As the gist does not support notifying participants
> of new comments, I would suggest using the mailing list instead.
>
> This is joint work with Peter Todd and Greg Maxwell.
>
> --
> Pieter
>

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 1239 bytes --]

 permalink raw reply	[|nested]