Re: Concern about "Inscriptions"

Re: Concern about "Inscriptions"
From: leohaf @ 2023-07-25 14:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

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Hello,

I am writing to you today because I am concerned about a significant bug that seems to be overlooked in recent versions of the software. The bug in question concerns the "inscriptions" developed by @rodarmor, and it worries me because, in just a few months, they have already reached a size of 11.8GB on the blockchain, causing issues with the UTXO set, which appears to be growing by about 25MB per day.

I understand that there may be discussions about the nature of these inscriptions, but personally, I find it hard not to consider them as spam. Their recurring nature and their impact on the size of the UTXO set and the blockchain itself seem concerning, and I would like to understand why this problem has not been addressed more seriously.

I would also like to point out that there are options in Bitcoin Core to choose the mempool policy, such as datacarrier or permitbaremultisig. However, when it comes to inscriptions, there are no available options except for a patch produced by Luke Dashjr. Unfortunately, this patch is unusable for most people as it requires compiling Bitcoin Core.

So, I wonder why there are no options to reject inscriptions in the mempool of a node. Such a feature could give users the ability to customize their approach in managing these particular cases and help mitigate the negative impact of inscriptions on the network.

In addition to the technical issues, I also find that this situation raises ethical questions. Inscriptions are primarily used to sell NFTs or Tokens, concepts that the Bitcoin community has consistently rejected.

Therefore, I kindly request you, as Bitcoin developers, to take this concern into consideration and seriously consider implementing a feature that would allow users to reject inscriptions in the mempool. Such a measure would contribute to protecting the integrity of the network.

Thank you sincerely for your attention to this matter.

Léo.

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-07-26  9:46 ` leohaf
  
From: vjudeu @ 2023-07-26  5:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: leohaf, bitcoin-dev

> and I would like to understand why this problem has not been addressed more seriously

Because if nobody has any good solution, then status quo is preserved. If tomorrow ECDSA would be broken, the default state of the network would be "just do nothing", and every solution would be backward-compatible with that approach. Burn old coins, and people will call it "Tether", redistribute them, and people will call it "BSV". Leave everything untouched, and the network will split into N parts, and then you pick the strongest chain to decide, what should be done.

> However, when it comes to inscriptions, there are no available options except for a patch produced by Luke Dashjr.

Because the real solution should address some different problem, that was always there, and nobody knows, how to deal with it: the problem of forever-growing initial blockchain download time, and forever-growing UTXO set. Some changes with "assume UTXO" are trying to address just that, but this code is not yet completed.

> So, I wonder why there are no options to reject inscriptions in the mempool of a node.

Because it will lead you to never ending chase. You will block one inscriptions, and different ones will be created. Now, they are present even on chains, where there is no Taproot, or even Segwit. That means, if you try to kill them, then they will be replaced by N regular indistinguishable transactions, and then you will go back to those more serious problems under the hood: IBD time, and UTXO size.

> Inscriptions are primarily used to sell NFTs or Tokens, concepts that the Bitcoin community has consistently rejected.

The community also rejected things like sidechains, and they are still present, just in a more centralized form. There are some unstoppable concepts, for example soft-forks. You cannot stop a soft-fork. What inscription creators did, is just non-enforced soft-fork. They believe their rules are followed to the letter, but this is not the case, as you can create a valid Bitcoin transaction, that will be some invalid Ordinals transaction (because their additional rules are not enforced by miners and nodes).





 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-07-26  5:30 vjudeu

  
From: leohaf @ 2023-07-26  9:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vjudeu;  bitcoin-dev

I understand your point of view. However, inscription represent by far the largest spam attack due to their ability to embed themselves in the witness with a fee reduction.

Unlike other methods, such as using the op_return field which could also be used to spam the chain, the associated fees and the standardization rule limiting op_return to 80 bytes have so far prevented similar abuses.

Although attempting to stop inscription could lead to more serious issues, not taking action against these inscription could be interpreted by spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice. This could encourage more similar spam attacks in the future, as spammers might perceive that the Bitcoin network tolerates this kind of behavior.

I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve implementing a soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is simply to consider adding a standardization option. This option would allow the community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.


> Le 26 juil. 2023 à 07:30, vjudeu@gazeta•pl a écrit :
> 
>> and I would like to understand why this problem has not been addressed more seriously
> 
> Because if nobody has any good solution, then status quo is preserved. If tomorrow ECDSA would be broken, the default state of the network would be "just do nothing", and every solution would be backward-compatible with that approach. Burn old coins, and people will call it "Tether", redistribute them, and people will call it "BSV". Leave everything untouched, and the network will split into N parts, and then you pick the strongest chain to decide, what should be done.
> 
>> However, when it comes to inscriptions, there are no available options except for a patch produced by Luke Dashjr.
> 
> Because the real solution should address some different problem, that was always there, and nobody knows, how to deal with it: the problem of forever-growing initial blockchain download time, and forever-growing UTXO set. Some changes with "assume UTXO" are trying to address just that, but this code is not yet completed.
> 
>> So, I wonder why there are no options to reject inscriptions in the mempool of a node.
> 
> Because it will lead you to never ending chase. You will block one inscriptions, and different ones will be created. Now, they are present even on chains, where there is no Taproot, or even Segwit. That means, if you try to kill them, then they will be replaced by N regular indistinguishable transactions, and then you will go back to those more serious problems under the hood: IBD time, and UTXO size.
> 
>> Inscriptions are primarily used to sell NFTs or Tokens, concepts that the Bitcoin community has consistently rejected.
> 
> The community also rejected things like sidechains, and they are still present, just in a more centralized form. There are some unstoppable concepts, for example soft-forks. You cannot stop a soft-fork. What inscription creators did, is just non-enforced soft-fork. They believe their rules are followed to the letter, but this is not the case, as you can create a valid Bitcoin transaction, that will be some invalid Ordinals transaction (because their additional rules are not enforced by miners and nodes).
> 
> 
> 



 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
From: vjudeu @ 2023-07-27  5:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: leohaf;  bitcoin-dev

> not taking action against these inscription could be interpreted by spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice.

Note that some people, even on this mailing list, do not consider Ordinals as spam: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021464.html

See? It was discussed when it started. Some people believe that blocking Ordinals is censorship, and could lead to blocking regular transactions in the future, just based on other criteria. That means, even if developers would create some official version with that option, then some people would not follow them, or even block Ordinals-filtering nodes, exactly as described in the linked thread: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021487.html

> as spammers might perceive that the Bitcoin network tolerates this kind of behavior

But it is true, you have the whole pages, where you can find images, files, or other data, that was pushed on-chain long before Ordinals. The whole whitepaper was uploaded just on 1-of-3 multisig outputs, see transaction 54e48e5f5c656b26c3bca14a8c95aa583d07ebe84dde3b7dd4a78f4e4186e713. You have the whole altcoins that are connected to Bitcoin by using part of the Bitcoin's UTXO set as their database.

That means, as long as you won't solve IBD problem and UTXO set growing problem, you will go nowhere, because if you block Ordinals specifically, people won't learn "this is bad, don't do that", they could read it as "use the old way instead", as long as you won't block all possible ways. And doing that, requires for example creating new nodes, without synchronizing non-consensus data, like it could be done in "assume UTXO" model.

Also note that as long as people use Taproot to upload a lot of data, you can still turn off the witness, and become a pre-Segwit node. But if you block those ways, then people will push data into legacy parts, and then you will need more code to strip it correctly. The block 774628 maybe contains almost 4 MB of data from the perspective of Segwit node, but the legacy part is actually very small, so by turning witness off, you can strip it to maybe just a few kilobytes.

> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve implementing a soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is simply to consider adding a standardization option. This option would allow the community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.

1. Without a soft-fork, those data will be pushed by mining pools anyway, as it happened in the block 774628.
2. Adding some settings won't help, as most people use the default configuration. For example, people can configure their nodes to allow free transactions, without recompiling anything. The same with disabling dust amounts. But good luck finding a node in the wild that does anything unusual.
3. This patch produced by Luke Dashjr does not address all cases. You could use "OP_TRUE OP_NOTIF" instead of "OP_FALSE OP_IF" used by Ordinals, and easily bypass those restrictions. This will be just a cat and mouse game, where spammers will even use P2PK, if they will be forced to. The Pandora's box is already opened, that fix could be good for February or March, but not now.



On 2023-07-26 11:47:09 user leohaf@orangepill•ovh wrote:
> I understand your point of view. However, inscription represent by far the largest spam attack due to their ability to embed themselves in the witness with a fee reduction.

Unlike other methods, such as using the op_return field which could also be used to spam the chain, the associated fees and the standardization rule limiting op_return to 80 bytes have so far prevented similar abuses.

Although attempting to stop inscription could lead to more serious issues, not taking action against these inscription could be interpreted by spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice. This could encourage more similar spam attacks in the future, as spammers might perceive that the Bitcoin network tolerates this kind of behavior.

I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve implementing a soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is simply to consider adding a standardization option. This option would allow the community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.


> Le 26 juil. 2023 à 07:30, vjudeu@gazeta•pl a écrit :
> 
>> and I would like to understand why this problem has not been addressed more seriously
> 
> Because if nobody has any good solution, then status quo is preserved. If tomorrow ECDSA would be broken, the default state of the network would be "just do nothing", and every solution would be backward-compatible with that approach. Burn old coins, and people will call it "Tether", redistribute them, and people will call it "BSV". Leave everything untouched, and the network will split into N parts, and then you pick the strongest chain to decide, what should be done.
> 
>> However, when it comes to inscriptions, there are no available options except for a patch produced by Luke Dashjr.
> 
> Because the real solution should address some different problem, that was always there, and nobody knows, how to deal with it: the problem of forever-growing initial blockchain download time, and forever-growing UTXO set. Some changes with "assume UTXO" are trying to address just that, but this code is not yet completed.
> 
>> So, I wonder why there are no options to reject inscriptions in the mempool of a node.
> 
> Because it will lead you to never ending chase. You will block one inscriptions, and different ones will be created. Now, they are present even on chains, where there is no Taproot, or even Segwit. That means, if you try to kill them, then they will be replaced by N regular indistinguishable transactions, and then you will go back to those more serious problems under the hood: IBD time, and UTXO size.
> 
>> Inscriptions are primarily used to sell NFTs or Tokens, concepts that the Bitcoin community has consistently rejected.
> 
> The community also rejected things like sidechains, and they are still present, just in a more centralized form. There are some unstoppable concepts, for example soft-forks. You cannot stop a soft-fork. What inscription creators did, is just non-enforced soft-fork. They believe their rules are followed to the letter, but this is not the case, as you can create a valid Bitcoin transaction, that will be some invalid Ordinals transaction (because their additional rules are not enforced by miners and nodes).
> 
> 
> 





 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-07-30 18:34 ` rot13maxi
  
From: Léo Haf @ 2023-07-27 19:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vjudeu;  bitcoin-dev

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﻿According to you, the rules of standardization are useless but in this case why were they introduced? The opreturn limit can be circumvented by miners, yet it is rare to see any, the same for maxancestorcount, minrelayfee or even the dust limit.

This cat and mouse game can be won by bitcoin defenders. Why ? Because it is easier to detect these transactions and make them a standardization rule than to create new types of spam transactions.

As for the default policy, it can be a weakness but also a strength because if the patch is integrated into Bitcoin Core by being activated by default, the patch will become more and more effective as the nodes update.

Also, when it came to using a pre-segwit node, it is not a solution because this type of node cannot initiate new ones, which is obviously a big problem.

Finally, I would like to quote satoshi himself who wrote about spam here is the link: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1617#msg1617

> Le 27 juil. 2023 à 07:10, vjudeu@gazeta•pl a écrit :
> 
> ﻿
>> not taking action against these inscription could be interpreted by spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice.
> 
> Note that some people, even on this mailing list, do not consider Ordinals as spam: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021464.html
> 
> See? It was discussed when it started. Some people believe that blocking Ordinals is censorship, and could lead to blocking regular transactions in the future, just based on other criteria. That means, even if developers would create some official version with that option, then some people would not follow them, or even block Ordinals-filtering nodes, exactly as described in the linked thread: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021487.html
> 
>> as spammers might perceive that the Bitcoin network tolerates this kind of behavior
> 
> But it is true, you have the whole pages, where you can find images, files, or other data, that was pushed on-chain long before Ordinals. The whole whitepaper was uploaded just on 1-of-3 multisig outputs, see transaction 54e48e5f5c656b26c3bca14a8c95aa583d07ebe84dde3b7dd4a78f4e4186e713. You have the whole altcoins that are connected to Bitcoin by using part of the Bitcoin's UTXO set as their database.
> 
> That means, as long as you won't solve IBD problem and UTXO set growing problem, you will go nowhere, because if you block Ordinals specifically, people won't learn "this is bad, don't do that", they could read it as "use the old way instead", as long as you won't block all possible ways. And doing that, requires for example creating new nodes, without synchronizing non-consensus data, like it could be done in "assume UTXO" model.
> 
> Also note that as long as people use Taproot to upload a lot of data, you can still turn off the witness, and become a pre-Segwit node. But if you block those ways, then people will push data into legacy parts, and then you will need more code to strip it correctly. The block 774628 maybe contains almost 4 MB of data from the perspective of Segwit node, but the legacy part is actually very small, so by turning witness off, you can strip it to maybe just a few kilobytes.
> 
>> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve implementing a soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is simply to consider adding a standardization option. This option would allow the community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.
> 
> 1. Without a soft-fork, those data will be pushed by mining pools anyway, as it happened in the block 774628.
> 2. Adding some settings won't help, as most people use the default configuration. For example, people can configure their nodes to allow free transactions, without recompiling anything. The same with disabling dust amounts. But good luck finding a node in the wild that does anything unusual.
> 3. This patch produced by Luke Dashjr does not address all cases. You could use "OP_TRUE OP_NOTIF" instead of "OP_FALSE OP_IF" used by Ordinals, and easily bypass those restrictions. This will be just a cat and mouse game, where spammers will even use P2PK, if they will be forced to. The Pandora's box is already opened, that fix could be good for February or March, but not now.
> 
> 
> 
>> On 2023-07-26 11:47:09 user leohaf@orangepill•ovh wrote:
>> I understand your point of view. However, inscription represent by far the largest spam attack due to their ability to embed themselves in the witness with a fee reduction.
> 
> Unlike other methods, such as using the op_return field which could also be used to spam the chain, the associated fees and the standardization rule limiting op_return to 80 bytes have so far prevented similar abuses.
> 
> Although attempting to stop inscription could lead to more serious issues, not taking action against these inscription could be interpreted by spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice. This could encourage more similar spam attacks in the future, as spammers might perceive that the Bitcoin network tolerates this kind of behavior.
> 
> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve implementing a soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is simply to consider adding a standardization option. This option would allow the community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.
> 
> 
>>> Le 26 juil. 2023 à 07:30, vjudeu@gazeta•pl a écrit :
>>> and I would like to understand why this problem has not been addressed more seriously
>> Because if nobody has any good solution, then status quo is preserved. If tomorrow ECDSA would be broken, the default state of the network would be "just do nothing", and every solution would be backward-compatible with that approach. Burn old coins, and people will call it "Tether", redistribute them, and people will call it "BSV". Leave everything untouched, and the network will split into N parts, and then you pick the strongest chain to decide, what should be done.
>>> However, when it comes to inscriptions, there are no available options except for a patch produced by Luke Dashjr.
>> Because the real solution should address some different problem, that was always there, and nobody knows, how to deal with it: the problem of forever-growing initial blockchain download time, and forever-growing UTXO set. Some changes with "assume UTXO" are trying to address just that, but this code is not yet completed.
>>> So, I wonder why there are no options to reject inscriptions in the mempool of a node.
>> Because it will lead you to never ending chase. You will block one inscriptions, and different ones will be created. Now, they are present even on chains, where there is no Taproot, or even Segwit. That means, if you try to kill them, then they will be replaced by N regular indistinguishable transactions, and then you will go back to those more serious problems under the hood: IBD time, and UTXO size.
>>> Inscriptions are primarily used to sell NFTs or Tokens, concepts that the Bitcoin community has consistently rejected.
>> The community also rejected things like sidechains, and they are still present, just in a more centralized form. There are some unstoppable concepts, for example soft-forks. You cannot stop a soft-fork. What inscription creators did, is just non-enforced soft-fork. They believe their rules are followed to the letter, but this is not the case, as you can create a valid Bitcoin transaction, that will be some invalid Ordinals transaction (because their additional rules are not enforced by miners and nodes).

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-07-27 19:03 Léo Haf

  
From: rot13maxi @ 2023-07-30 18:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Léo Haf, vjudeu;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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Hello,

> This cat and mouse game can be won by bitcoin defenders. Why ? Because it is easier to detect these transactions and make them a standardization rule than to create new types of spam transactions.

One of the things discussed during the mempoolfullrbf discussion is that a small (~10%) of nodes willing to relay a class of transaction is enough for that class of transaction to consistently reach miners. That means you would need to get nearly the entire network to run updated relay policy to prevent inscriptions from trivially reaching miners and being included in blocks. Inscription users have shown that they are willing and able to send non-standard transactions to miners out of band (https://mempool.space/tx/0301e0480b374b32851a9462db29dc19fe830a7f7d7a88b81612b9d42099c0ae), so even if you managed to get enough of the network running the new rule to prevent propagation to miners, those users can just go out of band. Or, they can simply change the script that is used to embed an inscription in the transaction witness. For example, instead of 0 OP_IF…, maybe they do 0 OP_DUP OP_DROP OP_IF. When the anti-inscription people detect this, they have to update the rule and wait for 90%+ of the network to upgrade. When the pro-inscription people see this, they only have to convince other inscription enthusiasts and businesses to update.

The anti-inscription patch has to be run by many more participants (most of whom don’t care), while the pro-inscription update has to be run by a small number of people who care a lot. It’s a losing battle for the anti-inscription people.

If you want to prevent inscriptions, the best answer we know of today is economic: the cost of the blockspace needs to be more expensive than inscribers are willing to pay, either because its too expensive or because there’s no market demand for inscriptions. The former relies on Bitcoin becoming more useful to more people, the latter is the natural course of collectibles.

> Finally, I would like to quote satoshi himself who wrote about spam here is the link: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1617#msg1617

Appeals to Satoshi are not compelling arguments.

Cheers,
Rijndael

On Sun, Jul 30, 2023 at 2:04 PM, Léo Haf via bitcoin-dev <[bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org](mailto:On Sun, Jul 30, 2023 at 2:04 PM, Léo Haf via bitcoin-dev <<a href=)> wrote:

> ﻿According to you, the rules of standardization are useless but in this case why were they introduced? The opreturn limit can be circumvented by miners, yet it is rare to see any, the same for maxancestorcount, minrelayfee or even the dust limit.
>
> This cat and mouse game can be won by bitcoin defenders. Why ? Because it is easier to detect these transactions and make them a standardization rule than to create new types of spam transactions.
>
> As for the default policy, it can be a weakness but also a strength because if the patch is integrated into Bitcoin Core by being activated by default, the patch will become more and more effective as the nodes update.
>
> Also, when it came to using a pre-segwit node, it is not a solution because this type of node cannot initiate new ones, which is obviously a big problem.
>
> Finally, I would like to quote satoshi himself who wrote about spam here is the link: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1617#msg1617
>
>> Le 27 juil. 2023 à 07:10, vjudeu@gazeta•pl a écrit :
>
>>
>
>> ﻿
>
>>> not taking action against these inscription could be interpreted by spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice.
>
>>
>
>> Note that some people, even on this mailing list, do not consider Ordinals as spam: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021464.html
>
>>
>
>> See? It was discussed when it started. Some people believe that blocking Ordinals is censorship, and could lead to blocking regular transactions in the future, just based on other criteria. That means, even if developers would create some official version with that option, then some people would not follow them, or even block Ordinals-filtering nodes, exactly as described in the linked thread: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021487.html
>
>>
>
>>> as spammers might perceive that the Bitcoin network tolerates this kind of behavior
>
>>
>
>> But it is true, you have the whole pages, where you can find images, files, or other data, that was pushed on-chain long before Ordinals. The whole whitepaper was uploaded just on 1-of-3 multisig outputs, see transaction 54e48e5f5c656b26c3bca14a8c95aa583d07ebe84dde3b7dd4a78f4e4186e713. You have the whole altcoins that are connected to Bitcoin by using part of the Bitcoin's UTXO set as their database.
>
>>
>
>> That means, as long as you won't solve IBD problem and UTXO set growing problem, you will go nowhere, because if you block Ordinals specifically, people won't learn "this is bad, don't do that", they could read it as "use the old way instead", as long as you won't block all possible ways. And doing that, requires for example creating new nodes, without synchronizing non-consensus data, like it could be done in "assume UTXO" model.
>
>>
>
>> Also note that as long as people use Taproot to upload a lot of data, you can still turn off the witness, and become a pre-Segwit node. But if you block those ways, then people will push data into legacy parts, and then you will need more code to strip it correctly. The block 774628 maybe contains almost 4 MB of data from the perspective of Segwit node, but the legacy part is actually very small, so by turning witness off, you can strip it to maybe just a few kilobytes.
>
>>
>
>>> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve implementing a soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is simply to consider adding a standardization option. This option would allow the community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.
>
>>
>
>> 1. Without a soft-fork, those data will be pushed by mining pools anyway, as it happened in the block 774628.
>
>> 2. Adding some settings won't help, as most people use the default configuration. For example, people can configure their nodes to allow free transactions, without recompiling anything. The same with disabling dust amounts. But good luck finding a node in the wild that does anything unusual.
>
>> 3. This patch produced by Luke Dashjr does not address all cases. You could use "OP_TRUE OP_NOTIF" instead of "OP_FALSE OP_IF" used by Ordinals, and easily bypass those restrictions. This will be just a cat and mouse game, where spammers will even use P2PK, if they will be forced to. The Pandora's box is already opened, that fix could be good for February or March, but not now.
>
>>
>
>>
>
>>
>
>>> On 2023-07-26 11:47:09 user leohaf@orangepill•ovh wrote:
>
>>> I understand your point of view. However, inscription represent by far the largest spam attack due to their ability to embed themselves in the witness with a fee reduction.
>
>>
>
>> Unlike other methods, such as using the op_return field which could also be used to spam the chain, the associated fees and the standardization rule limiting op_return to 80 bytes have so far prevented similar abuses.
>
>>
>
>> Although attempting to stop inscription could lead to more serious issues, not taking action against these inscription could be interpreted by spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice. This could encourage more similar spam attacks in the future, as spammers might perceive that the Bitcoin network tolerates this kind of behavior.
>
>>
>
>> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve implementing a soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is simply to consider adding a standardization option. This option would allow the community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.
>
>>
>
>>
>
>>>> Le 26 juil. 2023 à 07:30, vjudeu@gazeta•pl a écrit :
>
>>>> and I would like to understand why this problem has not been addressed more seriously
>
>>> Because if nobody has any good solution, then status quo is preserved. If tomorrow ECDSA would be broken, the default state of the network would be "just do nothing", and every solution would be backward-compatible with that approach. Burn old coins, and people will call it "Tether", redistribute them, and people will call it "BSV". Leave everything untouched, and the network will split into N parts, and then you pick the strongest chain to decide, what should be done.
>
>>>> However, when it comes to inscriptions, there are no available options except for a patch produced by Luke Dashjr.
>
>>> Because the real solution should address some different problem, that was always there, and nobody knows, how to deal with it: the problem of forever-growing initial blockchain download time, and forever-growing UTXO set. Some changes with "assume UTXO" are trying to address just that, but this code is not yet completed.
>
>>>> So, I wonder why there are no options to reject inscriptions in the mempool of a node.
>
>>> Because it will lead you to never ending chase. You will block one inscriptions, and different ones will be created. Now, they are present even on chains, where there is no Taproot, or even Segwit. That means, if you try to kill them, then they will be replaced by N regular indistinguishable transactions, and then you will go back to those more serious problems under the hood: IBD time, and UTXO size.
>
>>>> Inscriptions are primarily used to sell NFTs or Tokens, concepts that the Bitcoin community has consistently rejected.
>
>>> The community also rejected things like sidechains, and they are still present, just in a more centralized form. There are some unstoppable concepts, for example soft-forks. You cannot stop a soft-fork. What inscription creators did, is just non-enforced soft-fork. They believe their rules are followed to the letter, but this is not the case, as you can create a valid Bitcoin transaction, that will be some invalid Ordinals transaction (because their additional rules are not enforced by miners and nodes).

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-08-02 15:46 ` Luke Dashjr
  
From: GamedevAlice @ 2023-08-02 11:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

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> If the rate of growth of the blockchain is too high, Ordinals aren't the
> cause, it's rather that the theoretical limit of the amount of storage
that
> can be added per block isn't sufficiently limited. (Whether they are used
> to produce Ordinals or something else)


True, the real question is whether the storage is in fact sufficiently
limited. And I believe the answer to be 'yes'.

Why? Consider a worst case scenario using the maximum block size of 4MB and
a block time of 10min, that's a growth of 210.24GB per year. Some of that
can be pruned, but let's just assume that you don't want to. And currently
the entire blockchain is roughly 500GB.

Now that looks like a lot of growth potential based on where we are at now.
However, with the current cost of hardware, you can get a 5 TB hard drive
for less than $150. That will last you 21 years before you run out of
space. That's less than $0.02 per day.

That is a worst case scenario.

Consider that since cost of hardware drops over time, it will become less
of a burden over time.

Also, keep in mind there are efforts to optimize how much of that actually
needs to be stored by nodes. For example, the aforementioned topic
announcing Floresta which seems to be a node implementation that uses
utreexo to allow nodes to run without needing to maintain the full UTXO
set. Other initiatives exist as well.

There is definitely a lot of optimization potential for drastically
reducing how much space is actually needed by individual nodes.



On Wed, Aug 2, 2023, 5:40 AM , <
bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
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>
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> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: Pull-req to enable Full-RBF by default (Peter Todd)
>    2. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions". (ashneverdawn)
>       (Keagan McClelland)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2023 01:28:06 +0000
> From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
> To: Daniel Lipshitz <daniel@gap600•com>
> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
>         <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Pull-req to enable Full-RBF by default
> Message-ID: <ZMmxJoL1ZH4//8Fg@petertodd•org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> On Wed, Aug 02, 2023 at 01:27:24AM +0300, Daniel Lipshitz wrote:
> > Your research is not thorough and reaches an incorrect conclusion.
> >
> > As stated many times - we service payment processors and some merchants
> > directly  - Coinspaid services multiple merchants and process a
> > significant amount of BTC they are a well known and active in the space -
> > as I provided back in December 2022 a email from Max the CEO of Coinspaid
> > confirming their use of 0-conf as well as providing there cluster
> addresses
> > to validate there deposit flows see here again -
> >
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-December/021239.html
> > - if this is not sufficient then please email support@coinspaid•com and
> ask
> > to be connected to Max or someone from the team who can confirm Conspaid
> is
> > clients of GAP600. Max also at the time was open to do a call, I can
> check
> > again now and see if this is still the case and connect you.
> >
> > That on its own is enough of a sample to validate our statistics.
>
> Why don't you just give me an example of some merchants using Coinspaid,
> and
> another example using Coinpayments, who rely on unconfirmed transactions?
> If
> those merchants actually exist it should be very easy to give me some
> names of
> them.
>
> Without actual concrete examples for everyone to see for themselves, why
> should
> we believe you?
>
> > I have also spoken to Changelly earlier today and they offered to email
> pro
> > @ changelly.com and they will be able to confirm GAP600 as a service
>
> Emailed; waiting on a reply.
>
> > provider. Also please send me the 1 trx hash you tested and I can see if
> it
> > was queried to our system and if so offer some info as to why it wasnt
> > approved. Also if you can elaborate how you integrated with Changelly - I
> > can check with them if that area is not integrated with GAP600.
>
> Why don't you just tell me exactly what service Changelly offers that
> relies on
> unconfirmed transactions, and what characteristics would meet GAP600's risk
> criteria? I and others on this mailing list could easily do test
> transactions
> if you told us what we can actually test. If your service actually works,
> then
> you can safely provide that information.
>
> I'm not going to give you any exact tx hashes of transactions I've already
> done, as I don't want to cause any problems for the owners of the accounts
> I
> borrowed for testing. Given your lack of honesty so far I have every
> reason to
> believe they might be retalliated against in some way.
>
> > As the architect of such a major change to the status of 0-conf
> > transactions I would think you would welcome the opportunity to speak to
> > business and users who actual activities will be impacted by full RBF
> > becoming dominant.
>
> Funny how you say this, without actually giving any concrete examples of
> businesses that will be affected. Who exactly are these businesses? Payment
> processors obviously don't count.
>
> > Are you able to provide the same i.e emails and contacts of people at
> > the mining pools who can confirm they have adopted FULL RBF ?
>
> I've already had multiple mining pools complain to me that they and their
> employees have been harassed over full-rbf, so obviously I'm not going to
> provide you with any private contact information I have. There's no need to
> expose them to further harassment.
>
> If you actually offered an unconfirmed transaction guarantee service, with
> real
> customers getting an actual benefit, you'd be doing test transactions
> frequently and would already have a very good idea of what pools do
> full-rbf.
> Why don't you already have this data?
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 22:58:53 -0700
> From: Keagan McClelland <keagan.mcclelland@gmail•com>
> To: Hugo L <ashneverdawn@gmail•com>,  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
>         <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions".
>         (ashneverdawn)
> Message-ID:
>         <
> CALeFGL2Z3q90Esnu0qV0mqpHZaCnOV-5aks2TKGOjY4L+14d3w@mail•gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> There is an open question as to whether or not we should figure out a way
> to price space in the UTXO set. I think it is fair to say that given the
> fact that the UTXO set space remains unpriced that we actually have no way
> to determine whether some of these transactions are spam or not. The UTXO
> set must be maintained by all nodes including pruned nodes, whereas main
> block and witness data do not have the same type of indefinite footprint,
> so in some sense it is an even more significant resource than chain space.
> We may very well discover that if we price UTXOs in a way that reflect the
> resource costs that usage of inscriptions would vanish. The trouble though
> is that such a mechanism would imply having to pay "rent" for an "account"
> with Bitcoin, a proposition that would likely be offensive to a significant
> portion of the Bitcoin user base.
>
> Cheers,
> Keags
>
> On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 4:55?AM Hugo L via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> > I don't think it's anyone's place to judge which types of transactions
> > should be allowed or not on the network, in fact, when it comes to
> privacy
> > and censorship resistance, it would be better if we were not even able to
> > distinguish different types of transactions from one another in the first
> > place.
> >
> > We have limited resources on the blockchain and so they should go to the
> > highest bidder. This is already how the network functions and how it
> > ensures it's security.
> >
> > Rather than thinking about this as "spam", I think it's useful to
> > objectively think about it in terms of value to the marketplace (fees
> > they're willing to pay) against cost to the network (storage consumed).
> It
> > comes down to supply and demand.
> >
> > If the rate of growth of the blockchain is too high, Ordinals aren't the
> > cause, it's rather that the theoretical limit of the amount of storage
> that
> > can be added per block isn't sufficiently limited. (Whether they are used
> > to produce Ordinals or something else)
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Jul 30, 2023, 5:51 PM , <
> > bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> >> Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
> >>         bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> >>
> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> >>         https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> >>         bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> >>
> >> You can reach the person managing the list at
> >>         bitcoin-dev-owner@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> >>
> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> >> than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..."
> >>
> >>
> >> Today's Topics:
> >>
> >>    1. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions". (rot13maxi)
> >>
> >>
> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> Message: 1
> >> Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 18:34:12 +0000
> >> From: rot13maxi <rot13maxi@protonmail•com>
> >> To: L?o Haf <leohaf@orangepill•ovh>, "vjudeu@gazeta•pl"
> >>         <vjudeu@gazeta•pl>
> >> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
> >>         <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
> >> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions".
> >> Message-ID:
> >>
> >>
> <RIqguuebFmAhEDqCY_0T8KRqHBXEfcvPw6-MbDIyWsAWpLenFFeOVx88-068QFZr7xowg-6Zg988HsRCKdswtZC6QUKPXnrTyTAc_l5jphg=@
> >> protonmail.com>
> >>
> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> >>
> >> Hello,
> >>
> >> > This cat and mouse game can be won by bitcoin defenders. Why ? Because
> >> it is easier to detect these transactions and make them a
> standardization
> >> rule than to create new types of spam transactions.
> >>
> >> One of the things discussed during the mempoolfullrbf discussion is that
> >> a small (~10%) of nodes willing to relay a class of transaction is
> enough
> >> for that class of transaction to consistently reach miners. That means
> you
> >> would need to get nearly the entire network to run updated relay policy
> to
> >> prevent inscriptions from trivially reaching miners and being included
> in
> >> blocks. Inscription users have shown that they are willing and able to
> send
> >> non-standard transactions to miners out of band (
> >>
> https://mempool.space/tx/0301e0480b374b32851a9462db29dc19fe830a7f7d7a88b81612b9d42099c0ae
> ),
> >> so even if you managed to get enough of the network running the new
> rule to
> >> prevent propagation to miners, those users can just go out of band. Or,
> >> they can simply change the script that is used to embed an inscription
> in
> >> the transaction witness. For example, instead of 0 OP_IF?, maybe they
> do 0
> >> OP_DUP OP_DROP OP_IF. When the anti-inscription people detect this, they
> >> have to update the rule and wait for 90%
> >>  + of the network to upgrade. When the pro-inscription people see this,
> >> they only have to convince other inscription enthusiasts and businesses
> to
> >> update.
> >>
> >> The anti-inscription patch has to be run by many more participants (most
> >> of whom don?t care), while the pro-inscription update has to be run by a
> >> small number of people who care a lot. It?s a losing battle for the
> >> anti-inscription people.
> >>
> >> If you want to prevent inscriptions, the best answer we know of today is
> >> economic: the cost of the blockspace needs to be more expensive than
> >> inscribers are willing to pay, either because its too expensive or
> because
> >> there?s no market demand for inscriptions. The former relies on Bitcoin
> >> becoming more useful to more people, the latter is the natural course of
> >> collectibles.
> >>
> >> > Finally, I would like to quote satoshi himself who wrote about spam
> >> here is the link:
> >> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1617#msg1617
> >>
> >> Appeals to Satoshi are not compelling arguments.
> >>
> >> Cheers,
> >> Rijndael
> >>
> >> On Sun, Jul 30, 2023 at 2:04 PM, L?o Haf via bitcoin-dev <[
> >> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org](mailto:On Sun, Jul 30, 2023 at
> >> 2:04 PM, L?o Haf via bitcoin-dev <<a href=)> wrote:
> >>
> >> > ?According to you, the rules of standardization are useless but in
> this
> >> case why were they introduced? The opreturn limit can be circumvented by
> >> miners, yet it is rare to see any, the same for maxancestorcount,
> >> minrelayfee or even the dust limit.
> >> >
> >> > This cat and mouse game can be won by bitcoin defenders. Why ? Because
> >> it is easier to detect these transactions and make them a
> standardization
> >> rule than to create new types of spam transactions.
> >> >
> >> > As for the default policy, it can be a weakness but also a strength
> >> because if the patch is integrated into Bitcoin Core by being activated
> by
> >> default, the patch will become more and more effective as the nodes
> update.
> >> >
> >> > Also, when it came to using a pre-segwit node, it is not a solution
> >> because this type of node cannot initiate new ones, which is obviously a
> >> big problem.
> >> >
> >> > Finally, I would like to quote satoshi himself who wrote about spam
> >> here is the link:
> >> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1617#msg1617
> >> >
> >> >> Le 27 juil. 2023 ? 07:10, vjudeu@gazeta•pl a ?crit :
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> ?
> >> >
> >> >>> not taking action against these inscription could be interpreted by
> >> spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> Note that some people, even on this mailing list, do not consider
> >> Ordinals as spam:
> >>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021464.html
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> See? It was discussed when it started. Some people believe that
> >> blocking Ordinals is censorship, and could lead to blocking regular
> >> transactions in the future, just based on other criteria. That means,
> even
> >> if developers would create some official version with that option, then
> >> some people would not follow them, or even block Ordinals-filtering
> nodes,
> >> exactly as described in the linked thread:
> >>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021487.html
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>> as spammers might perceive that the Bitcoin network tolerates this
> >> kind of behavior
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> But it is true, you have the whole pages, where you can find images,
> >> files, or other data, that was pushed on-chain long before Ordinals. The
> >> whole whitepaper was uploaded just on 1-of-3 multisig outputs, see
> >> transaction
> >> 54e48e5f5c656b26c3bca14a8c95aa583d07ebe84dde3b7dd4a78f4e4186e713. You
> have
> >> the whole altcoins that are connected to Bitcoin by using part of the
> >> Bitcoin's UTXO set as their database.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> That means, as long as you won't solve IBD problem and UTXO set
> >> growing problem, you will go nowhere, because if you block Ordinals
> >> specifically, people won't learn "this is bad, don't do that", they
> could
> >> read it as "use the old way instead", as long as you won't block all
> >> possible ways. And doing that, requires for example creating new nodes,
> >> without synchronizing non-consensus data, like it could be done in
> "assume
> >> UTXO" model.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> Also note that as long as people use Taproot to upload a lot of data,
> >> you can still turn off the witness, and become a pre-Segwit node. But if
> >> you block those ways, then people will push data into legacy parts, and
> >> then you will need more code to strip it correctly. The block 774628
> maybe
> >> contains almost 4 MB of data from the perspective of Segwit node, but
> the
> >> legacy part is actually very small, so by turning witness off, you can
> >> strip it to maybe just a few kilobytes.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve implementing a
> >> soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is simply to
> >> consider adding a standardization option. This option would allow the
> >> community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> 1. Without a soft-fork, those data will be pushed by mining pools
> >> anyway, as it happened in the block 774628.
> >> >
> >> >> 2. Adding some settings won't help, as most people use the default
> >> configuration. For example, people can configure their nodes to allow
> free
> >> transactions, without recompiling anything. The same with disabling dust
> >> amounts. But good luck finding a node in the wild that does anything
> >> unusual.
> >> >
> >> >> 3. This patch produced by Luke Dashjr does not address all cases. You
> >> could use "OP_TRUE OP_NOTIF" instead of "OP_FALSE OP_IF" used by
> Ordinals,
> >> and easily bypass those restrictions. This will be just a cat and mouse
> >> game, where spammers will even use P2PK, if they will be forced to. The
> >> Pandora's box is already opened, that fix could be good for February or
> >> March, but not now.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>> On 2023-07-26 11:47:09 user leohaf@orangepill•ovh wrote:
> >> >
> >> >>> I understand your point of view. However, inscription represent by
> >> far the largest spam attack due to their ability to embed themselves in
> the
> >> witness with a fee reduction.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> Unlike other methods, such as using the op_return field which could
> >> also be used to spam the chain, the associated fees and the
> standardization
> >> rule limiting op_return to 80 bytes have so far prevented similar
> abuses.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> Although attempting to stop inscription could lead to more serious
> >> issues, not taking action against these inscription could be
> interpreted by
> >> spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice. This could encourage
> more
> >> similar spam attacks in the future, as spammers might perceive that the
> >> Bitcoin network tolerates this kind of behavior.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve implementing a
> >> soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is simply to
> >> consider adding a standardization option. This option would allow the
> >> community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>>> Le 26 juil. 2023 ? 07:30, vjudeu@gazeta•pl a ?crit :
> >> >
> >> >>>> and I would like to understand why this problem has not been
> >> addressed more seriously
> >> >
> >> >>> Because if nobody has any good solution, then status quo is
> >> preserved. If tomorrow ECDSA would be broken, the default state of the
> >> network would be "just do nothing", and every solution would be
> >> backward-compatible with that approach. Burn old coins, and people will
> >> call it "Tether", redistribute them, and people will call it "BSV".
> Leave
> >> everything untouched, and the network will split into N parts, and then
> you
> >> pick the strongest chain to decide, what should be done.
> >> >
> >> >>>> However, when it comes to inscriptions, there are no available
> >> options except for a patch produced by Luke Dashjr.
> >> >
> >> >>> Because the real solution should address some different problem,
> that
> >> was always there, and nobody knows, how to deal with it: the problem of
> >> forever-growing initial blockchain download time, and forever-growing
> UTXO
> >> set. Some changes with "assume UTXO" are trying to address just that,
> but
> >> this code is not yet completed.
> >> >
> >> >>>> So, I wonder why there are no options to reject inscriptions in the
> >> mempool of a node.
> >> >
> >> >>> Because it will lead you to never ending chase. You will block one
> >> inscriptions, and different ones will be created. Now, they are present
> >> even on chains, where there is no Taproot, or even Segwit. That means,
> if
> >> you try to kill them, then they will be replaced by N regular
> >> indistinguishable transactions, and then you will go back to those more
> >> serious problems under the hood: IBD time, and UTXO size.
> >> >
> >> >>>> Inscriptions are primarily used to sell NFTs or Tokens, concepts
> >> that the Bitcoin community has consistently rejected.
> >> >
> >> >>> The community also rejected things like sidechains, and they are
> >> still present, just in a more centralized form. There are some
> unstoppable
> >> concepts, for example soft-forks. You cannot stop a soft-fork. What
> >> inscription creators did, is just non-enforced soft-fork. They believe
> >> their rules are followed to the letter, but this is not the case, as you
> >> can create a valid Bitcoin transaction, that will be some invalid
> Ordinals
> >> transaction (because their additional rules are not enforced by miners
> and
> >> nodes).
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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-08-02 11:07 GamedevAlice

  
From: Luke Dashjr @ 2023-08-02 15:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: GamedevAlice, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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Storage is not and never has been the trouble with block sizes. Please, 
before participating in discussions of this topic, at least get a basic 
understanding of it. Here's a talk I did a few years ago to get you 
started: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqNEQS80-h4&t=7s

Luke


On 8/2/23 07:07, GamedevAlice via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > If the rate of growth of the blockchain is too high, Ordinals aren't the
> > cause, it's rather that the theoretical limit of the amount of 
> storage that
> > can be added per block isn't sufficiently limited. (Whether they are 
> used
> > to produce Ordinals or something else)
>
>
> True, the real question is whether the storage is in fact sufficiently 
> limited. And I believe the answer to be 'yes'.
>
> Why? Consider a worst case scenario using the maximum block size of 
> 4MB and a block time of 10min, that's a growth of 210.24GB per year. 
> Some of that can be pruned, but let's just assume that you don't want 
> to. And currently the entire blockchain is roughly 500GB.
>
> Now that looks like a lot of growth potential based on where we are at 
> now. However, with the current cost of hardware, you can get a 5 TB 
> hard drive for less than $150. That will last you 21 years before you 
> run out of space. That's less than $0.02 per day.
>
> That is a worst case scenario.
>
> Consider that since cost of hardware drops over time, it will become 
> less of a burden over time.
>
> Also, keep in mind there are efforts to optimize how much of that 
> actually needs to be stored by nodes. For example, the aforementioned 
> topic announcing Floresta which seems to be a node implementation that 
> uses utreexo to allow nodes to run without needing to maintain the 
> full UTXO set. Other initiatives exist as well.
>
> There is definitely a lot of optimization potential for drastically 
> reducing how much space is actually needed by individual nodes.
>
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 2, 2023, 5:40 AM , 
> <bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>     Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
>     bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>
>     To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>     https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>     or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>     bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>
>     You can reach the person managing the list at
>     bitcoin-dev-owner@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>
>     When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>     than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..."
>
>
>     Today's Topics:
>
>        1. Re: Pull-req to enable Full-RBF by default (Peter Todd)
>        2. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions". (ashneverdawn)
>           (Keagan McClelland)
>
>
>     ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>     Message: 1
>     Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2023 01:28:06 +0000
>     From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
>     To: Daniel Lipshitz <daniel@gap600•com>
>     Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
>             <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>     Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Pull-req to enable Full-RBF by default
>     Message-ID: <ZMmxJoL1ZH4//8Fg@petertodd•org>
>     Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
>     On Wed, Aug 02, 2023 at 01:27:24AM +0300, Daniel Lipshitz wrote:
>     > Your research is not thorough and reaches an incorrect conclusion.
>     >
>     > As stated many times - we service payment processors and some
>     merchants
>     > directly  - Coinspaid services multiple merchants and process a
>     > significant amount of BTC they are a well known and active in
>     the space -
>     > as I provided back in December 2022 a email from Max the CEO of
>     Coinspaid
>     > confirming their use of 0-conf as well as providing there
>     cluster addresses
>     > to validate there deposit flows see here again -
>     >
>     https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-December/021239.html
>     > - if this is not sufficient then please email
>     support@coinspaid•com and ask
>     > to be connected to Max or someone from the team who can confirm
>     Conspaid is
>     > clients of GAP600. Max also at the time was open to do a call, I
>     can check
>     > again now and see if this is still the case and connect you.
>     >
>     > That on its own is enough of a sample to validate our statistics.
>
>     Why don't you just give me an example of some merchants using
>     Coinspaid, and
>     another example using Coinpayments, who rely on unconfirmed
>     transactions? If
>     those merchants actually exist it should be very easy to give me
>     some names of
>     them.
>
>     Without actual concrete examples for everyone to see for
>     themselves, why should
>     we believe you?
>
>     > I have also spoken to Changelly earlier today and they offered
>     to email pro
>     > @ changelly.com <http://changelly.com> and they will be able to
>     confirm GAP600 as a service
>
>     Emailed; waiting on a reply.
>
>     > provider. Also please send me the 1 trx hash you tested and I
>     can see if it
>     > was queried to our system and if so offer some info as to why it
>     wasnt
>     > approved. Also if you can elaborate how you integrated with
>     Changelly - I
>     > can check with them if that area is not integrated with GAP600.
>
>     Why don't you just tell me exactly what service Changelly offers
>     that relies on
>     unconfirmed transactions, and what characteristics would meet
>     GAP600's risk
>     criteria? I and others on this mailing list could easily do test
>     transactions
>     if you told us what we can actually test. If your service actually
>     works, then
>     you can safely provide that information.
>
>     I'm not going to give you any exact tx hashes of transactions I've
>     already
>     done, as I don't want to cause any problems for the owners of the
>     accounts I
>     borrowed for testing. Given your lack of honesty so far I have
>     every reason to
>     believe they might be retalliated against in some way.
>
>     > As the architect of such a major change to the status of 0-conf
>     > transactions I would think you would welcome the opportunity to
>     speak to
>     > business and users who actual activities will be impacted by
>     full RBF
>     > becoming dominant.
>
>     Funny how you say this, without actually giving any concrete
>     examples of
>     businesses that will be affected. Who exactly are these
>     businesses? Payment
>     processors obviously don't count.
>
>     > Are you able to provide the same i.e emails and contacts of
>     people at
>     > the mining pools who can confirm they have adopted FULL RBF ?
>
>     I've already had multiple mining pools complain to me that they
>     and their
>     employees have been harassed over full-rbf, so obviously I'm not
>     going to
>     provide you with any private contact information I have. There's
>     no need to
>     expose them to further harassment.
>
>     If you actually offered an unconfirmed transaction guarantee
>     service, with real
>     customers getting an actual benefit, you'd be doing test transactions
>     frequently and would already have a very good idea of what pools
>     do full-rbf.
>     Why don't you already have this data?
>
>     -- 
>     https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>     <http://petertodd.org>
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>
>     ------------------------------
>
>     Message: 2
>     Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 22:58:53 -0700
>     From: Keagan McClelland <keagan.mcclelland@gmail•com>
>     To: Hugo L <ashneverdawn@gmail•com>, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
>             <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>     Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions".
>             (ashneverdawn)
>     Message-ID:
>            
>     <CALeFGL2Z3q90Esnu0qV0mqpHZaCnOV-5aks2TKGOjY4L+14d3w@mail•gmail.com
>     <mailto:CALeFGL2Z3q90Esnu0qV0mqpHZaCnOV-5aks2TKGOjY4L%2B14d3w@mail•gmail.com>>
>     Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
>     There is an open question as to whether or not we should figure
>     out a way
>     to price space in the UTXO set. I think it is fair to say that
>     given the
>     fact that the UTXO set space remains unpriced that we actually
>     have no way
>     to determine whether some of these transactions are spam or not.
>     The UTXO
>     set must be maintained by all nodes including pruned nodes,
>     whereas main
>     block and witness data do not have the same type of indefinite
>     footprint,
>     so in some sense it is an even more significant resource than
>     chain space.
>     We may very well discover that if we price UTXOs in a way that
>     reflect the
>     resource costs that usage of inscriptions would vanish. The
>     trouble though
>     is that such a mechanism would imply having to pay "rent" for an
>     "account"
>     with Bitcoin, a proposition that would likely be offensive to a
>     significant
>     portion of the Bitcoin user base.
>
>     Cheers,
>     Keags
>
>     On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 4:55?AM Hugo L via bitcoin-dev <
>     bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>     > I don't think it's anyone's place to judge which types of
>     transactions
>     > should be allowed or not on the network, in fact, when it comes
>     to privacy
>     > and censorship resistance, it would be better if we were not
>     even able to
>     > distinguish different types of transactions from one another in
>     the first
>     > place.
>     >
>     > We have limited resources on the blockchain and so they should
>     go to the
>     > highest bidder. This is already how the network functions and how it
>     > ensures it's security.
>     >
>     > Rather than thinking about this as "spam", I think it's useful to
>     > objectively think about it in terms of value to the marketplace
>     (fees
>     > they're willing to pay) against cost to the network (storage
>     consumed). It
>     > comes down to supply and demand.
>     >
>     > If the rate of growth of the blockchain is too high, Ordinals
>     aren't the
>     > cause, it's rather that the theoretical limit of the amount of
>     storage that
>     > can be added per block isn't sufficiently limited. (Whether they
>     are used
>     > to produce Ordinals or something else)
>     >
>     >
>     >
>     > On Sun, Jul 30, 2023, 5:51 PM , <
>     > bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>     >
>     >> Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
>     >> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>     >>
>     >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>     >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>     >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>     >> bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>     >>
>     >> You can reach the person managing the list at
>     >> bitcoin-dev-owner@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>     >>
>     >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>     >> than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..."
>     >>
>     >>
>     >> Today's Topics:
>     >>
>     >>    1. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions". (rot13maxi)
>     >>
>     >>
>     >>
>     ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>     >>
>     >> Message: 1
>     >> Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 18:34:12 +0000
>     >> From: rot13maxi <rot13maxi@protonmail•com>
>     >> To: L?o Haf <leohaf@orangepill•ovh>, "vjudeu@gazeta•pl"
>     >>         <vjudeu@gazeta•pl>
>     >> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
>     >>         <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>     >> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions".
>     >> Message-ID:
>     >>
>     >>
>     <RIqguuebFmAhEDqCY_0T8KRqHBXEfcvPw6-MbDIyWsAWpLenFFeOVx88-068QFZr7xowg-6Zg988HsRCKdswtZC6QUKPXnrTyTAc_l5jphg=@
>     >> protonmail.com <http://protonmail.com>>
>     >>
>     >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>     >>
>     >> Hello,
>     >>
>     >> > This cat and mouse game can be won by bitcoin defenders. Why
>     ? Because
>     >> it is easier to detect these transactions and make them a
>     standardization
>     >> rule than to create new types of spam transactions.
>     >>
>     >> One of the things discussed during the mempoolfullrbf
>     discussion is that
>     >> a small (~10%) of nodes willing to relay a class of transaction
>     is enough
>     >> for that class of transaction to consistently reach miners.
>     That means you
>     >> would need to get nearly the entire network to run updated
>     relay policy to
>     >> prevent inscriptions from trivially reaching miners and being
>     included in
>     >> blocks. Inscription users have shown that they are willing and
>     able to send
>     >> non-standard transactions to miners out of band (
>     >>
>     https://mempool.space/tx/0301e0480b374b32851a9462db29dc19fe830a7f7d7a88b81612b9d42099c0ae),
>     >> so even if you managed to get enough of the network running the
>     new rule to
>     >> prevent propagation to miners, those users can just go out of
>     band. Or,
>     >> they can simply change the script that is used to embed an
>     inscription in
>     >> the transaction witness. For example, instead of 0 OP_IF?,
>     maybe they do 0
>     >> OP_DUP OP_DROP OP_IF. When the anti-inscription people detect
>     this, they
>     >> have to update the rule and wait for 90%
>     >>  + of the network to upgrade. When the pro-inscription people
>     see this,
>     >> they only have to convince other inscription enthusiasts and
>     businesses to
>     >> update.
>     >>
>     >> The anti-inscription patch has to be run by many more
>     participants (most
>     >> of whom don?t care), while the pro-inscription update has to be
>     run by a
>     >> small number of people who care a lot. It?s a losing battle for the
>     >> anti-inscription people.
>     >>
>     >> If you want to prevent inscriptions, the best answer we know of
>     today is
>     >> economic: the cost of the blockspace needs to be more expensive
>     than
>     >> inscribers are willing to pay, either because its too expensive
>     or because
>     >> there?s no market demand for inscriptions. The former relies on
>     Bitcoin
>     >> becoming more useful to more people, the latter is the natural
>     course of
>     >> collectibles.
>     >>
>     >> > Finally, I would like to quote satoshi himself who wrote
>     about spam
>     >> here is the link:
>     >> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1617#msg1617
>     >>
>     >> Appeals to Satoshi are not compelling arguments.
>     >>
>     >> Cheers,
>     >> Rijndael
>     >>
>     >> On Sun, Jul 30, 2023 at 2:04 PM, L?o Haf via bitcoin-dev <[
>     >> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org](mailto:On Sun, Jul 30,
>     2023 at
>     >> 2:04 PM, L?o Haf via bitcoin-dev <<a href=)> wrote:
>     >>
>     >> > ?According to you, the rules of standardization are useless
>     but in this
>     >> case why were they introduced? The opreturn limit can be
>     circumvented by
>     >> miners, yet it is rare to see any, the same for maxancestorcount,
>     >> minrelayfee or even the dust limit.
>     >> >
>     >> > This cat and mouse game can be won by bitcoin defenders. Why
>     ? Because
>     >> it is easier to detect these transactions and make them a
>     standardization
>     >> rule than to create new types of spam transactions.
>     >> >
>     >> > As for the default policy, it can be a weakness but also a
>     strength
>     >> because if the patch is integrated into Bitcoin Core by being
>     activated by
>     >> default, the patch will become more and more effective as the
>     nodes update.
>     >> >
>     >> > Also, when it came to using a pre-segwit node, it is not a
>     solution
>     >> because this type of node cannot initiate new ones, which is
>     obviously a
>     >> big problem.
>     >> >
>     >> > Finally, I would like to quote satoshi himself who wrote
>     about spam
>     >> here is the link:
>     >> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1617#msg1617
>     >> >
>     >> >> Le 27 juil. 2023 ? 07:10, vjudeu@gazeta•pl a ?crit :
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >> ?
>     >> >
>     >> >>> not taking action against these inscription could be
>     interpreted by
>     >> spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice.
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >> Note that some people, even on this mailing list, do not
>     consider
>     >> Ordinals as spam:
>     >>
>     https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021464.html
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >> See? It was discussed when it started. Some people believe that
>     >> blocking Ordinals is censorship, and could lead to blocking regular
>     >> transactions in the future, just based on other criteria. That
>     means, even
>     >> if developers would create some official version with that
>     option, then
>     >> some people would not follow them, or even block
>     Ordinals-filtering nodes,
>     >> exactly as described in the linked thread:
>     >>
>     https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021487.html
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >>> as spammers might perceive that the Bitcoin network
>     tolerates this
>     >> kind of behavior
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >> But it is true, you have the whole pages, where you can find
>     images,
>     >> files, or other data, that was pushed on-chain long before
>     Ordinals. The
>     >> whole whitepaper was uploaded just on 1-of-3 multisig outputs, see
>     >> transaction
>     >>
>     54e48e5f5c656b26c3bca14a8c95aa583d07ebe84dde3b7dd4a78f4e4186e713.
>     You have
>     >> the whole altcoins that are connected to Bitcoin by using part
>     of the
>     >> Bitcoin's UTXO set as their database.
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >> That means, as long as you won't solve IBD problem and UTXO set
>     >> growing problem, you will go nowhere, because if you block Ordinals
>     >> specifically, people won't learn "this is bad, don't do that",
>     they could
>     >> read it as "use the old way instead", as long as you won't
>     block all
>     >> possible ways. And doing that, requires for example creating
>     new nodes,
>     >> without synchronizing non-consensus data, like it could be done
>     in "assume
>     >> UTXO" model.
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >> Also note that as long as people use Taproot to upload a lot
>     of data,
>     >> you can still turn off the witness, and become a pre-Segwit
>     node. But if
>     >> you block those ways, then people will push data into legacy
>     parts, and
>     >> then you will need more code to strip it correctly. The block
>     774628 maybe
>     >> contains almost 4 MB of data from the perspective of Segwit
>     node, but the
>     >> legacy part is actually very small, so by turning witness off,
>     you can
>     >> strip it to maybe just a few kilobytes.
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >>> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve
>     implementing a
>     >> soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is
>     simply to
>     >> consider adding a standardization option. This option would
>     allow the
>     >> community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >> 1. Without a soft-fork, those data will be pushed by mining
>     pools
>     >> anyway, as it happened in the block 774628.
>     >> >
>     >> >> 2. Adding some settings won't help, as most people use the
>     default
>     >> configuration. For example, people can configure their nodes to
>     allow free
>     >> transactions, without recompiling anything. The same with
>     disabling dust
>     >> amounts. But good luck finding a node in the wild that does
>     anything
>     >> unusual.
>     >> >
>     >> >> 3. This patch produced by Luke Dashjr does not address all
>     cases. You
>     >> could use "OP_TRUE OP_NOTIF" instead of "OP_FALSE OP_IF" used
>     by Ordinals,
>     >> and easily bypass those restrictions. This will be just a cat
>     and mouse
>     >> game, where spammers will even use P2PK, if they will be forced
>     to. The
>     >> Pandora's box is already opened, that fix could be good for
>     February or
>     >> March, but not now.
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >>> On 2023-07-26 11:47:09 user leohaf@orangepill•ovh wrote:
>     >> >
>     >> >>> I understand your point of view. However, inscription
>     represent by
>     >> far the largest spam attack due to their ability to embed
>     themselves in the
>     >> witness with a fee reduction.
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >> Unlike other methods, such as using the op_return field
>     which could
>     >> also be used to spam the chain, the associated fees and the
>     standardization
>     >> rule limiting op_return to 80 bytes have so far prevented
>     similar abuses.
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >> Although attempting to stop inscription could lead to more
>     serious
>     >> issues, not taking action against these inscription could be
>     interpreted by
>     >> spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice. This could
>     encourage more
>     >> similar spam attacks in the future, as spammers might perceive
>     that the
>     >> Bitcoin network tolerates this kind of behavior.
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve
>     implementing a
>     >> soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is
>     simply to
>     >> consider adding a standardization option. This option would
>     allow the
>     >> community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >>
>     >> >
>     >> >>>> Le 26 juil. 2023 ? 07:30, vjudeu@gazeta•pl a ?crit :
>     >> >
>     >> >>>> and I would like to understand why this problem has not been
>     >> addressed more seriously
>     >> >
>     >> >>> Because if nobody has any good solution, then status quo is
>     >> preserved. If tomorrow ECDSA would be broken, the default state
>     of the
>     >> network would be "just do nothing", and every solution would be
>     >> backward-compatible with that approach. Burn old coins, and
>     people will
>     >> call it "Tether", redistribute them, and people will call it
>     "BSV". Leave
>     >> everything untouched, and the network will split into N parts,
>     and then you
>     >> pick the strongest chain to decide, what should be done.
>     >> >
>     >> >>>> However, when it comes to inscriptions, there are no available
>     >> options except for a patch produced by Luke Dashjr.
>     >> >
>     >> >>> Because the real solution should address some different
>     problem, that
>     >> was always there, and nobody knows, how to deal with it: the
>     problem of
>     >> forever-growing initial blockchain download time, and
>     forever-growing UTXO
>     >> set. Some changes with "assume UTXO" are trying to address just
>     that, but
>     >> this code is not yet completed.
>     >> >
>     >> >>>> So, I wonder why there are no options to reject
>     inscriptions in the
>     >> mempool of a node.
>     >> >
>     >> >>> Because it will lead you to never ending chase. You will
>     block one
>     >> inscriptions, and different ones will be created. Now, they are
>     present
>     >> even on chains, where there is no Taproot, or even Segwit. That
>     means, if
>     >> you try to kill them, then they will be replaced by N regular
>     >> indistinguishable transactions, and then you will go back to
>     those more
>     >> serious problems under the hood: IBD time, and UTXO size.
>     >> >
>     >> >>>> Inscriptions are primarily used to sell NFTs or Tokens,
>     concepts
>     >> that the Bitcoin community has consistently rejected.
>     >> >
>     >> >>> The community also rejected things like sidechains, and
>     they are
>     >> still present, just in a more centralized form. There are some
>     unstoppable
>     >> concepts, for example soft-forks. You cannot stop a soft-fork. What
>     >> inscription creators did, is just non-enforced soft-fork. They
>     believe
>     >> their rules are followed to the letter, but this is not the
>     case, as you
>     >> can create a valid Bitcoin transaction, that will be some
>     invalid Ordinals
>     >> transaction (because their additional rules are not enforced by
>     miners and
>     >> nodes).
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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-08-03 16:03 ` leohaf
  
From: GamedevAlice @ 2023-08-03 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

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After looking into this more deeply (thanks to Luke Dashjr for pointing me
in the right direction) it is now clear to me that storage isn't the real
issue, but rather the "initial blockchain sync" time - in which storage
certainly has a significant role to play, at least currently.

At the moment, UTreeXO seems like a promising first step. Perhaps there is
a more efficient way to sync the chain without having to download
everything and while still verifying it trustlessly.



On Thu, Aug 3, 2023, 7:43 AM , <
bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
>         bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
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>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions". (Keagan McClelland) (Einherjar)
>    2. Re: Pull-req to enable Full-RBF by default (Daniel Lipshitz)
>    3. Pull-req to remove the arbitrary limits on OP_Return      outputs
>       (Peter Todd)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 02 Aug 2023 13:50:30 +0000
> From: Einherjar <realeinherjar@proton•me>
> To: bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org, Keagan McClelland
>         <keagan.mcclelland@gmail•com>
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions". (Keagan
>         McClelland)
> Message-ID:
>
> <EGcuw9I68gwGmFMMw_OstpvAHQ0sWleUi3Jfa8t9A14fa5PGYR2EAxJIjwKd8jo5JtUfmyw9taF1qEsQlVoXBpLUxixdlBpIOEhuXzTUSEc=@
> proton.me>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> About price space in the UTXO set:
>
> I am highly concerned with that proposal.
> The reason is this could restrict users to do proper UTXO management and
> lead to doxing and privacy issues. Now there are few costs associated to
> having lots of UTXOs, mainly fees associated with spending low-valued UTXOs.
>
> > There is an open question as to whether or not we should figure out a way
> > to price space in the UTXO set. I think it is fair to say that given the
> > fact that the UTXO set space remains unpriced that we actually have no
> way
> > to determine whether some of these transactions are spam or not. The UTXO
> > set must be maintained by all nodes including pruned nodes, whereas main
> > block and witness data do not have the same type of indefinite footprint,
> > so in some sense it is an even more significant resource than chain
> space.
> > We may very well discover that if we price UTXOs in a way that reflect
> the
> > resource costs that usage of inscriptions would vanish. The trouble
> though
> > is that such a mechanism would imply having to pay "rent" for an
> "account"
> > with Bitcoin, a proposition that would likely be offensive to a
> significant
> > portion of the Bitcoin user base.
> >
>
> > Cheers,
> > Keags
>
>
> Einherjar - E7ED 7E35 F072 CA83
>
> Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
> -------------- next part --------------
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> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2023 18:29:54 +0300
> From: Daniel Lipshitz <daniel@gap600•com>
> To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
>         <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Pull-req to enable Full-RBF by default
> Message-ID:
>         <
> CACkWPs_jKUCBPhvj3mGYQu6erLE5qKxXorXAtJpuGCKSaSjVwQ@mail•gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> For clarity purposes.
>
>    1. Our research is based on monitoring main net transactions and network
>    activity - as too is our risk engine. We do not engage in specific
> hashing
>    pool assessments or research.
>    2. It is not easily possible or comfortable to engage with our clients
>    to offer up their client names and applications - the competition is
> fierce
>    and like other industries it is not an acceptable approach to ask.
>    3. The information offered by Coinpaid and posted on this list, provides
>    root addresses which using tools like Chainanlysis, or
>    similar service providers can confirm these addresses are associated
> with
>    Coinspaid. This can validate a significant amount of our traffic.
>    4. Based on the information provided it will be very possible to reach
>    out to Max at Coinpaid - and will be able to confirm GAP600 use with
>    Coinspaid. This is in addition to me posting an email from Max back in
> Dec
>    2022 to this list confirming all of this information.
>    5.  It is more than likely that Changelly has not implemented our
>    service across all irts offerings, a large section of their business is
>    servicing partners.
>
> ________________________________
>
> Daniel Lipshitz
> GAP600| www.gap600.com
> Phone: +44 113 4900 117
> Skype: daniellipshitz123
> Twitter: @daniellipshitz
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 2, 2023 at 1:38?PM Daniel Lipshitz <daniel@gap600•com> wrote:
>
> > Your assessment of my dishonesty is based on your assumption of how I
> > should be running GAP600, your assumptions are baseless and lack
> commercial
> > experience and likewise your conclusions are false.
> >
> > I have provided already back in December clear access to clarify opposite
> > our clients corroborated with easily verifiable trxs activity of a major
> > client of ours. This is more than enough to corroborate our statistics.
> >
> > As far as validating real RBF adoption I have offered a clear option here
> > https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28132#issuecomment-1661960440
> > something like this or similar would offer a clear assessment of
> adoption.
> > Since you are not able to provide documents or public emails of hashing
> > pools confirming there adoption of Full RBF.
> > ________________________________
> >
> > Daniel Lipshitz
> > GAP600| www.gap600.com
> > Phone: +44 113 4900 117
> > Skype: daniellipshitz123
> > Twitter: @daniellipshitz
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 2, 2023 at 4:28?AM Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org> wrote:
> >
> >> On Wed, Aug 02, 2023 at 01:27:24AM +0300, Daniel Lipshitz wrote:
> >> > Your research is not thorough and reaches an incorrect conclusion.
> >> >
> >> > As stated many times - we service payment processors and some
> merchants
> >> > directly  - Coinspaid services multiple merchants and process a
> >> > significant amount of BTC they are a well known and active in the
> space
> >> -
> >> > as I provided back in December 2022 a email from Max the CEO of
> >> Coinspaid
> >> > confirming their use of 0-conf as well as providing there cluster
> >> addresses
> >> > to validate there deposit flows see here again -
> >> >
> >>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-December/021239.html
> >> > - if this is not sufficient then please email support@coinspaid•com
> >> and ask
> >> > to be connected to Max or someone from the team who can confirm
> >> Conspaid is
> >> > clients of GAP600. Max also at the time was open to do a call, I can
> >> check
> >> > again now and see if this is still the case and connect you.
> >> >
> >> > That on its own is enough of a sample to validate our statistics.
> >>
> >> Why don't you just give me an example of some merchants using Coinspaid,
> >> and
> >> another example using Coinpayments, who rely on unconfirmed
> transactions?
> >> If
> >> those merchants actually exist it should be very easy to give me some
> >> names of
> >> them.
> >>
> >> Without actual concrete examples for everyone to see for themselves, why
> >> should
> >> we believe you?
> >>
> >> > I have also spoken to Changelly earlier today and they offered to
> email
> >> pro
> >> > @ changelly.com and they will be able to confirm GAP600 as a service
> >>
> >> Emailed; waiting on a reply.
> >>
> >> > provider. Also please send me the 1 trx hash you tested and I can see
> >> if it
> >> > was queried to our system and if so offer some info as to why it wasnt
> >> > approved. Also if you can elaborate how you integrated with Changelly
> -
> >> I
> >> > can check with them if that area is not integrated with GAP600.
> >>
> >> Why don't you just tell me exactly what service Changelly offers that
> >> relies on
> >> unconfirmed transactions, and what characteristics would meet GAP600's
> >> risk
> >> criteria? I and others on this mailing list could easily do test
> >> transactions
> >> if you told us what we can actually test. If your service actually
> works,
> >> then
> >> you can safely provide that information.
> >>
> >> I'm not going to give you any exact tx hashes of transactions I've
> already
> >> done, as I don't want to cause any problems for the owners of the
> >> accounts I
> >> borrowed for testing. Given your lack of honesty so far I have every
> >> reason to
> >> believe they might be retalliated against in some way.
> >>
> >> > As the architect of such a major change to the status of 0-conf
> >> > transactions I would think you would welcome the opportunity to speak
> to
> >> > business and users who actual activities will be impacted by full RBF
> >> > becoming dominant.
> >>
> >> Funny how you say this, without actually giving any concrete examples of
> >> businesses that will be affected. Who exactly are these businesses?
> >> Payment
> >> processors obviously don't count.
> >>
> >> > Are you able to provide the same i.e emails and contacts of people at
> >> > the mining pools who can confirm they have adopted FULL RBF ?
> >>
> >> I've already had multiple mining pools complain to me that they and
> their
> >> employees have been harassed over full-rbf, so obviously I'm not going
> to
> >> provide you with any private contact information I have. There's no need
> >> to
> >> expose them to further harassment.
> >>
> >> If you actually offered an unconfirmed transaction guarantee service,
> >> with real
> >> customers getting an actual benefit, you'd be doing test transactions
> >> frequently and would already have a very good idea of what pools do
> >> full-rbf.
> >> Why don't you already have this data?
> >>
> >> --
> >> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> >>
> >
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <
> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20230802/06762493/attachment-0001.html
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2023 11:42:40 +0000
> From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
> To: bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Pull-req to remove the arbitrary limits on
>         OP_Return       outputs
> Message-ID: <ZMuSsBkWqVXO9qoN@petertodd•org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28130
>
> Sjors Provoost suggested that I email this mailing list as notice of my
> intent
> to get a pull-req merged that would remove the arbitrary 80-byte, 1 output
> /
> tx, standardness restrictions on OP_Return outputs. His rationale was that
> removing these standardness restrictions could potentially open up
> additional
> transaction pinning(1) vectors. Since this is a potential problem with any
> relaxation of standardness rules, I don't consider this to be an important
> concern. But consider this email your notice.
>
> At least some miners appear to be mining non-bitcoin-core-standard
> transactions. So with respect to the hash power of those miners these
> pinning
> vectors may in fact exist already.
>
>
> # References
>
> 1) https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/transaction-pinning/
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> -------------- next part --------------
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> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Subject: Digest Footer
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> End of bitcoin-dev Digest, Vol 99, Issue 6
> ******************************************
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-08-03 13:33 GamedevAlice

  
From: leohaf @ 2023-08-03 16:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: GamedevAlice, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 15321 bytes --]

Utreexo only seems to save us time if it is used in "bridge" mode otherwise it takes soft fork for all nodes to use Utreexo at the price of larger transaction.

The problem is not here for the moment, it is imperative to solve the problem of inscription that quickly brings us closer to the need for Utreexo.

> Le 3 août 2023 à 15:33, GamedevAlice via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> a écrit :
> 
> After looking into this more deeply (thanks to Luke Dashjr for pointing me in the right direction) it is now clear to me that storage isn't the real issue, but rather the "initial blockchain sync" time - in which storage certainly has a significant role to play, at least currently. 
> 
> At the moment, UTreeXO seems like a promising first step. Perhaps there is a more efficient way to sync the chain without having to download everything and while still verifying it trustlessly. 
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Aug 3, 2023, 7:43 AM , <bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org>> wrote:
>> Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
>>         bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>> 
>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>>         https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>>         bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>> 
>> You can reach the person managing the list at
>>         bitcoin-dev-owner@lists•linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev-owner@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>> 
>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>> than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..."
>> 
>> 
>> Today's Topics:
>> 
>>    1. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions". (Keagan McClelland) (Einherjar)
>>    2. Re: Pull-req to enable Full-RBF by default (Daniel Lipshitz)
>>    3. Pull-req to remove the arbitrary limits on OP_Return      outputs
>>       (Peter Todd)
>> 
>> 
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> 
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Wed, 02 Aug 2023 13:50:30 +0000
>> From: Einherjar <realeinherjar@proton•me <mailto:realeinherjar@proton•me>>
>> To: bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>, Keagan McClelland
>>         <keagan.mcclelland@gmail•com <mailto:keagan.mcclelland@gmail•com>>
>> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions". (Keagan
>>         McClelland)
>> Message-ID:
>>         <EGcuw9I68gwGmFMMw_OstpvAHQ0sWleUi3Jfa8t9A14fa5PGYR2EAxJIjwKd8jo5JtUfmyw9taF1qEsQlVoXBpLUxixdlBpIOEhuXzTUSEc=@proton•me <http://proton.me/>>
>> 
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>> 
>> About price space in the UTXO set:
>> 
>> I am highly concerned with that proposal.
>> The reason is this could restrict users to do proper UTXO management and lead to doxing and privacy issues. Now there are few costs associated to having lots of UTXOs, mainly fees associated with spending low-valued UTXOs.
>> 
>> > There is an open question as to whether or not we should figure out a way
>> > to price space in the UTXO set. I think it is fair to say that given the
>> > fact that the UTXO set space remains unpriced that we actually have no way
>> > to determine whether some of these transactions are spam or not. The UTXO
>> > set must be maintained by all nodes including pruned nodes, whereas main
>> > block and witness data do not have the same type of indefinite footprint,
>> > so in some sense it is an even more significant resource than chain space.
>> > We may very well discover that if we price UTXOs in a way that reflect the
>> > resource costs that usage of inscriptions would vanish. The trouble though
>> > is that such a mechanism would imply having to pay "rent" for an "account"
>> > with Bitcoin, a proposition that would likely be offensive to a significant
>> > portion of the Bitcoin user base.
>> > 
>> 
>> > Cheers,
>> > Keags
>> 
>> 
>> Einherjar - E7ED 7E35 F072 CA83
>> 
>> Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
>> -------------- next part --------------
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>> Name: publickey - realeinherjar@proton•me <mailto:realeinherjar@proton•me> - 0xBF60A699.asc
>> Type: application/pgp-keys
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>> Desc: not available
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>> 
>> ------------------------------
>> 
>> Message: 2
>> Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2023 18:29:54 +0300
>> From: Daniel Lipshitz <daniel@gap600•com <mailto:daniel@gap600•com>>
>> To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org <mailto:pete@petertodd•org>>
>> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
>>         <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>>
>> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Pull-req to enable Full-RBF by default
>> Message-ID:
>>         <CACkWPs_jKUCBPhvj3mGYQu6erLE5qKxXorXAtJpuGCKSaSjVwQ@mail•gmail.com <mailto:CACkWPs_jKUCBPhvj3mGYQu6erLE5qKxXorXAtJpuGCKSaSjVwQ@mail•gmail.com>>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>> 
>> For clarity purposes.
>> 
>>    1. Our research is based on monitoring main net transactions and network
>>    activity - as too is our risk engine. We do not engage in specific hashing
>>    pool assessments or research.
>>    2. It is not easily possible or comfortable to engage with our clients
>>    to offer up their client names and applications - the competition is fierce
>>    and like other industries it is not an acceptable approach to ask.
>>    3. The information offered by Coinpaid and posted on this list, provides
>>    root addresses which using tools like Chainanlysis, or
>>    similar service providers can confirm these addresses are associated with
>>    Coinspaid. This can validate a significant amount of our traffic.
>>    4. Based on the information provided it will be very possible to reach
>>    out to Max at Coinpaid - and will be able to confirm GAP600 use with
>>    Coinspaid. This is in addition to me posting an email from Max back in Dec
>>    2022 to this list confirming all of this information.
>>    5.  It is more than likely that Changelly has not implemented our
>>    service across all irts offerings, a large section of their business is
>>    servicing partners.
>> 
>> ________________________________
>> 
>> Daniel Lipshitz
>> GAP600| www.gap600.com <http://www.gap600.com/>
>> Phone: +44 113 4900 117
>> Skype: daniellipshitz123
>> Twitter: @daniellipshitz
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, Aug 2, 2023 at 1:38?PM Daniel Lipshitz <daniel@gap600•com <mailto:daniel@gap600•com>> wrote:
>> 
>> > Your assessment of my dishonesty is based on your assumption of how I
>> > should be running GAP600, your assumptions are baseless and lack commercial
>> > experience and likewise your conclusions are false.
>> >
>> > I have provided already back in December clear access to clarify opposite
>> > our clients corroborated with easily verifiable trxs activity of a major
>> > client of ours. This is more than enough to corroborate our statistics.
>> >
>> > As far as validating real RBF adoption I have offered a clear option here
>> > https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28132#issuecomment-1661960440
>> > something like this or similar would offer a clear assessment of adoption.
>> > Since you are not able to provide documents or public emails of hashing
>> > pools confirming there adoption of Full RBF.
>> > ________________________________
>> >
>> > Daniel Lipshitz
>> > GAP600| www.gap600.com <http://www.gap600.com/>
>> > Phone: +44 113 4900 117
>> > Skype: daniellipshitz123
>> > Twitter: @daniellipshitz
>> >
>> >
>> > On Wed, Aug 2, 2023 at 4:28?AM Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org <mailto:pete@petertodd•org>> wrote:
>> >
>> >> On Wed, Aug 02, 2023 at 01:27:24AM +0300, Daniel Lipshitz wrote:
>> >> > Your research is not thorough and reaches an incorrect conclusion.
>> >> >
>> >> > As stated many times - we service payment processors and some merchants
>> >> > directly  - Coinspaid services multiple merchants and process a
>> >> > significant amount of BTC they are a well known and active in the space
>> >> -
>> >> > as I provided back in December 2022 a email from Max the CEO of
>> >> Coinspaid
>> >> > confirming their use of 0-conf as well as providing there cluster
>> >> addresses
>> >> > to validate there deposit flows see here again -
>> >> >
>> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-December/021239.html
>> >> > - if this is not sufficient then please email support@coinspaid•com <mailto:support@coinspaid•com>
>> >> and ask
>> >> > to be connected to Max or someone from the team who can confirm
>> >> Conspaid is
>> >> > clients of GAP600. Max also at the time was open to do a call, I can
>> >> check
>> >> > again now and see if this is still the case and connect you.
>> >> >
>> >> > That on its own is enough of a sample to validate our statistics.
>> >>
>> >> Why don't you just give me an example of some merchants using Coinspaid,
>> >> and
>> >> another example using Coinpayments, who rely on unconfirmed transactions?
>> >> If
>> >> those merchants actually exist it should be very easy to give me some
>> >> names of
>> >> them.
>> >>
>> >> Without actual concrete examples for everyone to see for themselves, why
>> >> should
>> >> we believe you?
>> >>
>> >> > I have also spoken to Changelly earlier today and they offered to email
>> >> pro
>> >> > @ changelly.com <http://changelly.com/> and they will be able to confirm GAP600 as a service
>> >>
>> >> Emailed; waiting on a reply.
>> >>
>> >> > provider. Also please send me the 1 trx hash you tested and I can see
>> >> if it
>> >> > was queried to our system and if so offer some info as to why it wasnt
>> >> > approved. Also if you can elaborate how you integrated with Changelly -
>> >> I
>> >> > can check with them if that area is not integrated with GAP600.
>> >>
>> >> Why don't you just tell me exactly what service Changelly offers that
>> >> relies on
>> >> unconfirmed transactions, and what characteristics would meet GAP600's
>> >> risk
>> >> criteria? I and others on this mailing list could easily do test
>> >> transactions
>> >> if you told us what we can actually test. If your service actually works,
>> >> then
>> >> you can safely provide that information.
>> >>
>> >> I'm not going to give you any exact tx hashes of transactions I've already
>> >> done, as I don't want to cause any problems for the owners of the
>> >> accounts I
>> >> borrowed for testing. Given your lack of honesty so far I have every
>> >> reason to
>> >> believe they might be retalliated against in some way.
>> >>
>> >> > As the architect of such a major change to the status of 0-conf
>> >> > transactions I would think you would welcome the opportunity to speak to
>> >> > business and users who actual activities will be impacted by full RBF
>> >> > becoming dominant.
>> >>
>> >> Funny how you say this, without actually giving any concrete examples of
>> >> businesses that will be affected. Who exactly are these businesses?
>> >> Payment
>> >> processors obviously don't count.
>> >>
>> >> > Are you able to provide the same i.e emails and contacts of people at
>> >> > the mining pools who can confirm they have adopted FULL RBF ?
>> >>
>> >> I've already had multiple mining pools complain to me that they and their
>> >> employees have been harassed over full-rbf, so obviously I'm not going to
>> >> provide you with any private contact information I have. There's no need
>> >> to
>> >> expose them to further harassment.
>> >>
>> >> If you actually offered an unconfirmed transaction guarantee service,
>> >> with real
>> >> customers getting an actual benefit, you'd be doing test transactions
>> >> frequently and would already have a very good idea of what pools do
>> >> full-rbf.
>> >> Why don't you already have this data?
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> https://petertodd.org <https://petertodd.org/> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org <http://petertodd.org/>
>> >>
>> >
>> -------------- next part --------------
>> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
>> URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20230802/06762493/attachment-0001.html>
>> 
>> ------------------------------
>> 
>> Message: 3
>> Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2023 11:42:40 +0000
>> From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org <mailto:pete@petertodd•org>>
>> To: bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>> Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Pull-req to remove the arbitrary limits on
>>         OP_Return       outputs
>> Message-ID: <ZMuSsBkWqVXO9qoN@petertodd•org <mailto:ZMuSsBkWqVXO9qoN@petertodd•org>>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>> 
>> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28130
>> 
>> Sjors Provoost suggested that I email this mailing list as notice of my intent
>> to get a pull-req merged that would remove the arbitrary 80-byte, 1 output /
>> tx, standardness restrictions on OP_Return outputs. His rationale was that
>> removing these standardness restrictions could potentially open up additional
>> transaction pinning(1) vectors. Since this is a potential problem with any
>> relaxation of standardness rules, I don't consider this to be an important
>> concern. But consider this email your notice.
>> 
>> At least some miners appear to be mining non-bitcoin-core-standard
>> transactions. So with respect to the hash power of those miners these pinning
>> vectors may in fact exist already.
>> 
>> 
>> # References
>> 
>> 1) https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/transaction-pinning/
>> 
>> -- 
>> https://petertodd.org <https://petertodd.org/> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org <http://petertodd.org/>
>> -------------- next part --------------
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>> URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20230803/33786fbc/attachment.sig>
>> 
>> ------------------------------
>> 
>> Subject: Digest Footer
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>> 
>> 
>> ------------------------------
>> 
>> End of bitcoin-dev Digest, Vol 99, Issue 6
>> ******************************************
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-08-21 14:47 ` Russell O'Connor
  
From: martl.chris @ 2023-08-18 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

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It is already more than a half year since the probably mayor Bitcoin script exploit started.

These exploits are nothing new in the Bitcoin history and mostly are due to the loose flexibility of the system in regards of processing predicatives (Bitcoin script). The very first mayor bug; if you wish, vulnerability, was the CVE-2010-5141, which still engages us without end even after 14 years.

Subsequent Bitcoin historical events let to build more “improvements” upon this wobbly basis exposing even more ground for exploits.

As long as this loose flexibility is not modified in a way its exposure for exploits is eliminated remains nothing else than to pursue other strategies; and ones which are compatible with the current status quo and furthermore, with a permission-less system.

Here a strategy proposal:

Let’s name it: #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow.

Why #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow are compatible with a permission-less system.

#Ordisrespector gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her integrity); by giving a signal of dissatisfaction with the current affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This dissatisfaction signal is manifested by not taking into the mempool and relaying transactions with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.

#Ordislow gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her integrity); by increasing the coercion cost of mining-entities relative to the cooperation cost of mining-entities due to the current affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This coercion cost increment is manifested by not propagating a found block, unless a configurable or maximum delay has elapsed, which contains at least a transaction with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.

Chris

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-08-18 20:43 martl.chris

  2023-08-21 14:58   ` rot13maxi
  2023-08-22  5:15   ` martl.chris
  
From: Russell O'Connor @ 2023-08-21 14:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: martl.chris, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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It's been said before, but I'll say it again:

If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors will
simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys.  Public
key data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are willing
to pad the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there will be
no way to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public key
or whether it is encoding an inscription or some other data.

When certain governments try to censor certain internet protocols, users
respond by tunnelling their protocol through something that appears to be
innocent HTTPS (see Tor bridge nodes).  This works because, after a
handshake, the remaining HTTPS stream, like public keys, is
indistinguishable from random data, and can be used as a communications
channel for arbitrary data.  If we attempt to ban "arbitrary data", those
users will simply respond by "tunneling" their data over innocent-looking
public key data instead.

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe Counterparty has, in the
past, encoded their data within public key data, so this concern is not
hypothetical.

On Sat, Aug 19, 2023 at 10:29 AM Chris Martl via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> It is already more than a half year since the probably mayor Bitcoin
> script exploit started.
>
>
> These exploits are nothing new in the Bitcoin history and mostly are due
> to the loose flexibility of the system in regards of processing
> predicatives (Bitcoin script). The very first mayor bug; if you wish,
> vulnerability, was the CVE-2010-5141, which still engages us without end
> even after 14 years.
>
>
> Subsequent Bitcoin historical events let to build more “improvements” upon
> this wobbly basis exposing even more ground for exploits.
>
>
> As long as this loose flexibility is not modified in a way its exposure
> for exploits is eliminated remains nothing else than to pursue other
> strategies; and ones which are compatible with the current status quo and
> furthermore, with a permission-less system.
>
>
> Here a strategy proposal:
>
>
> Let’s name it: #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow.
>
>
> Why #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow are compatible with a permission-less
> system.
>
>
> #Ordisrespector gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to
> opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of
> his/her integrity); by giving a signal of dissatisfaction with the current
> affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness
> structure. This dissatisfaction signal is manifested by not taking into the
> mempool and relaying transactions with inserted arbitrary data in the
> witness structure.
>
>
> #Ordislow gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or
> not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her
> integrity); by increasing the coercion cost of mining-entities relative to
> the cooperation cost of mining-entities due to the current affairs of
> aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This
> coercion cost increment is manifested by not propagating a found block,
> unless a configurable or maximum delay has elapsed, which contains at least
> a transaction with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.
>
>
> Chris_______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-08-21 14:47 ` Russell O'Connor

  2023-08-22  5:15   ` martl.chris
  
From: rot13maxi @ 2023-08-21 14:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Russell O'Connor;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion, martl.chris

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Good morning Russel and List,

That is correct. There is a counterparty-compatible project called STAMPS that breaks up image data into chunks and then embeds the chunks in bare multisig outputs. here is an example on one: https://mempool.space/tx/ee9ed76fa2318deb63a24082a8edc73e4ea39a5252bfb1c1e1c02bd02c52f95f
This consumes more space and bloats the UTXO set compared to stuffing data in a witness.

There are schemes like Pay-to-Contact ([https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/pay-to-contract-outputs/](https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/pay-to-contract-outputs/#:~:text=Pay%2Dto%2Dcontract%20protocols%20allow,that%20commits%20to%20that%20text)) that could be used to tweak a pubkey with a small blob of data, in which case someone could​ produce a signature proving knowledge of the private key.

------- Original Message -------
On Monday, August 21st, 2023 at 10:47 AM, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> It's been said before, but I'll say it again:
>
> If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors will simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys. Public key data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are willing to pad the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there will be no way to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public key or whether it is encoding an inscription or some other data.
>
> When certain governments try to censor certain internet protocols, users respond by tunnelling their protocol through something that appears to be innocent HTTPS (see Tor bridge nodes). This works because, after a handshake, the remaining HTTPS stream, like public keys, is indistinguishable from random data, and can be used as a communications channel for arbitrary data. If we attempt to ban "arbitrary data", those users will simply respond by "tunneling" their data over innocent-looking public key data instead.
>
> Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe Counterparty has, in the past, encoded their data within public key data, so this concern is not hypothetical.
>
> On Sat, Aug 19, 2023 at 10:29 AM Chris Martl via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> It is already more than a half year since the probably mayor Bitcoin script exploit started.
>>
>> These exploits are nothing new in the Bitcoin history and mostly are due to the loose flexibility of the system in regards of processing predicatives (Bitcoin script). The very first mayor bug; if you wish, vulnerability, was the CVE-2010-5141, which still engages us without end even after 14 years.
>>
>> Subsequent Bitcoin historical events let to build more “improvements” upon this wobbly basis exposing even more ground for exploits.
>>
>> As long as this loose flexibility is not modified in a way its exposure for exploits is eliminated remains nothing else than to pursue other strategies; and ones which are compatible with the current status quo and furthermore, with a permission-less system.
>>
>> Here a strategy proposal:
>>
>> Let’s name it: #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow.
>>
>> Why #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow are compatible with a permission-less system.
>>
>> #Ordisrespector gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her integrity); by giving a signal of dissatisfaction with the current affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This dissatisfaction signal is manifested by not taking into the mempool and relaying transactions with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.
>>
>> #Ordislow gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her integrity); by increasing the coercion cost of mining-entities relative to the cooperation cost of mining-entities due to the current affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This coercion cost increment is manifested by not propagating a found block, unless a configurable or maximum delay has elapsed, which contains at least a transaction with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.
>>
>> Chris_______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]


  2023-08-21 22:34   ` symphonicbtc
  
From: John Tromp @ 2023-08-21 16:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

> If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors will
> simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys.  Public
> key data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are willing
> to pad the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there will be
> no way to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public key
> or whether it is encoding an inscription or some other data.

Note that in the Mimblewimble protocol, range proofs already prove
knowledge of blinding factor in Pedersen commitments, and thus no
additional padding is needed there to prevent the encoding of spam
into cryptographic material. This makes pure MW blockchains the most
inscription/spam resistant [1].

[1] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5437464.msg61980991#msg61980991


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-08-21 16:28 ` John Tromp

  2023-08-23 17:34     ` Erik Aronesty
  
From: symphonicbtc @ 2023-08-21 22:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: John Tromp;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

It is important to also note that proof of secret key schemes are highly data inefficient and likely would have a higher cost for users than simply allowing arbitrary data to continue. In ECDSA, purposely re-using k values allows you to encode data in both k and the entire secret key, as both become computable. Or, one could bruteforce a k value to encode data in a sig, as is done in some compromised hardware key exfiltration attacks. Additionally, one can bruteforce keys in order to encode data in the public key.

It is very difficult and expensive to attempt to limit the storage of arbitrary data in a system where the security comes from secret keys being arbitrary data.

Symphonic

------- Original Message -------
On Monday, August 21st, 2023 at 4:28 PM, John Tromp via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:


> > If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors will
> > simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys. Public
> > key data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are willing
> > to pad the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there will be
> > no way to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public key
> > or whether it is encoding an inscription or some other data.
> 
> 
> Note that in the Mimblewimble protocol, range proofs already prove
> knowledge of blinding factor in Pedersen commitments, and thus no
> additional padding is needed there to prevent the encoding of spam
> into cryptographic material. This makes pure MW blockchains the most
> inscription/spam resistant [1].
> 
> [1] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5437464.msg61980991#msg61980991
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-08-21 14:47 ` Russell O'Connor
  2023-08-21 14:58   ` rot13maxi

  
From: martl.chris @ 2023-08-22  5:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

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Good Morning List,

understanding the strategy wrongly or purposelydriving the interaction into a false framing doesn’t benefit Bitcoin. Mentioning <ban"arbitrary data"> or <governments try tocensor> distracts from the proposed strategy.

The strategy aims to increment the coercion cost of mining-entities relative to the cooperation cost of mining-entities in regards of arbitrary data insertion; it is not about banning or censoring.

Mentioning other ways or methods to insert arbitrary data should not be understood as a threat or menace, but much more as topics which each Bitcoin developer should have in mind to solve.

It is healthy to assume that arbitrary data insertions are nothing but innocent or negligible. The Bitcoin system is still in the struggle of two visions:

- One controlled by every node operator and highly decentralized. (Nobody alone controls)

or

- One controlled by a few very highly capitalized entity node operators and highly centralized. (A committee controls).

The best tactical way to reach the latter is via prohibitive cost increment for operating a regular Bitcoin node (aka. archival full node). That will reduce the network decentralization making it susceptible for central entity elimination or control acquisition; and not necessary by a national-state government.

Chris

------- Forwarded Message -------
Von: Russell O'Connor <roconnor@blockstream•com>
Datum: Am Montag, 21. August 2023 um 16:47
Betreff: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions"
An: martl.chris@proton•me <martl.chris@proton•me>, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>

> It's been said before, but I'll say it again:
>
> If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors will simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys. Public key data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are willing to pad the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there will be no way to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public key or whether it is encoding an inscription or some other data.
>
> When certain governments try to censor certain internet protocols, users respond by tunnelling their protocol through something that appears to be innocent HTTPS (see Tor bridge nodes). This works because, after a handshake, the remaining HTTPS stream, like public keys, is indistinguishable from random data, and can be used as a communications channel for arbitrary data. If we attempt to ban "arbitrary data", those users will simply respond by "tunneling" their data over innocent-looking public key data instead.
>
> Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe Counterparty has, in the past, encoded their data within public key data, so this concern is not hypothetical.
>
> On Sat, Aug 19, 2023 at 10:29 AM Chris Martl via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> It is already more than a half year since the probably mayor Bitcoin script exploit started.
>>
>> These exploits are nothing new in the Bitcoin history and mostly are due to the loose flexibility of the system in regards of processing predicatives (Bitcoin script). The very first mayor bug; if you wish, vulnerability, was the CVE-2010-5141, which still engages us without end even after 14 years.
>>
>> Subsequent Bitcoin historical events let to build more “improvements” upon this wobbly basis exposing even more ground for exploits.
>>
>> As long as this loose flexibility is not modified in a way its exposure for exploits is eliminated remains nothing else than to pursue other strategies; and ones which are compatible with the current status quo and furthermore, with a permission-less system.
>>
>> Here a strategy proposal:
>>
>> Let’s name it: #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow.
>>
>> Why #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow are compatible with a permission-less system.
>>
>> #Ordisrespector gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her integrity); by giving a signal of dissatisfaction with the current affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This dissatisfaction signal is manifested by not taking into the mempool and relaying transactions with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.
>>
>> #Ordislow gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her integrity); by increasing the coercion cost of mining-entities relative to the cooperation cost of mining-entities due to the current affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This coercion cost increment is manifested by not propagating a found block, unless a configurable or maximum delay has elapsed, which contains at least a transaction with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.
>>
>> Chris_______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]


  
From: GamedevAlice @ 2023-08-22 14:18 UTC ( / )
  To: bitcoin-dev



As I understand it, protecting against this is exactly the reason why a
blocksize limit exists. Perhaps it should never have been increased in the
first place.

Given the current concerns with blockchain size increases due to
inscriptions, and now that the lightning network is starting to gain more
traction, perhaps people are now more willing to consider a smaller
blocksize in favor of pushing more activity to lightning?




On Tue, Aug 22, 2023, 8:00 AM , <
bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
>         bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
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> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>         bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>         bitcoin-dev-owner@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions" (symphonicbtc)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 22:34:03 +0000
> From: symphonicbtc <symphonicbtc@proton•me>
> To: John Tromp <john.tromp@gmail•com>
> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
>         <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions"
> Message-ID:
>
> <UMOgM6dqQHqgxIoeyCE1ZzBDbU1c2H6oyUCVs4eTgUwozDphZwFdfO4qvnXUMZwYhfShzcaYqmLGN-XrfzyhYKWD8Q8IOD7EJAtdgbqMLe8=@
> proton.me>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
>
> It is important to also note that proof of secret key schemes are highly
> data inefficient and likely would have a higher cost for users than simply
> allowing arbitrary data to continue. In ECDSA, purposely re-using k values
> allows you to encode data in both k and the entire secret key, as both
> become computable. Or, one could bruteforce a k value to encode data in a
> sig, as is done in some compromised hardware key exfiltration attacks.
> Additionally, one can bruteforce keys in order to encode data in the public
> key.
>
> It is very difficult and expensive to attempt to limit the storage of
> arbitrary data in a system where the security comes from secret keys being
> arbitrary data.
>
> Symphonic
>
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Monday, August 21st, 2023 at 4:28 PM, John Tromp via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>
> > > If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors
> will
> > > simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys.
> Public
> > > key data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are
> willing
> > > to pad the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there
> will be
> > > no way to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public
> key
> > > or whether it is encoding an inscription or some other data.
> >
> >
> > Note that in the Mimblewimble protocol, range proofs already prove
> > knowledge of blinding factor in Pedersen commitments, and thus no
> > additional padding is needed there to prevent the encoding of spam
> > into cryptographic material. This makes pure MW blockchains the most
> > inscription/spam resistant [1].
> >
> > [1]
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5437464.msg61980991#msg61980991
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Subject: Digest Footer
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> End of bitcoin-dev Digest, Vol 99, Issue 43
> *******************************************
>
2023-08-21 22:34   ` symphonicbtc

  
From: Erik Aronesty @ 2023-08-23 17:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: symphonicbtc, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion;  John Tromp

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2701 bytes --]

indeed, i once added a proof-of work requirement to public keys on an open
relay server protocol, in additon to posk, in order to make it harder to
roll new keys and access the network as a spammer/scammer.   not hard to
embed anything in a public key, but you can't embed too much, especially if
you want mobile devices to be able to generate a new key in under a few
minutes.

On Mon, Aug 21, 2023 at 6:46 PM symphonicbtc via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> It is important to also note that proof of secret key schemes are highly
> data inefficient and likely would have a higher cost for users than simply
> allowing arbitrary data to continue. In ECDSA, purposely re-using k values
> allows you to encode data in both k and the entire secret key, as both
> become computable. Or, one could bruteforce a k value to encode data in a
> sig, as is done in some compromised hardware key exfiltration attacks.
> Additionally, one can bruteforce keys in order to encode data in the public
> key.
>
> It is very difficult and expensive to attempt to limit the storage of
> arbitrary data in a system where the security comes from secret keys being
> arbitrary data.
>
> Symphonic
>
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Monday, August 21st, 2023 at 4:28 PM, John Tromp via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>
> > > If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors
> will
> > > simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys.
> Public
> > > key data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are
> willing
> > > to pad the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there
> will be
> > > no way to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public
> key
> > > or whether it is encoding an inscription or some other data.
> >
> >
> > Note that in the Mimblewimble protocol, range proofs already prove
> > knowledge of blinding factor in Pedersen commitments, and thus no
> > additional padding is needed there to prevent the encoding of spam
> > into cryptographic material. This makes pure MW blockchains the most
> > inscription/spam resistant [1].
> >
> > [1]
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5437464.msg61980991#msg61980991
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-09-05 17:49 ` Peter Todd
  
From: vjudeu @ 2023-09-03 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: GamedevAlice, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion, bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4949 bytes --]

> Given the current concerns with blockchain size increases due to inscriptions, and now that the lightning network is starting to gain more traction, perhaps people are now more willing to consider a smaller blocksize in favor of pushing more activity to lightning?
 
People will not agree to shrink the maximum block size. However, if you want to kill inscriptions, there is another approach, that could be used to force them into second layers: it is called cut-through, and was described in this topic: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=281848.0
 
Then, if you have "Alice -> Bob -> ... -> Zack" transaction chain, and for example some inscriptions were created in "Alice -> Bob" transaction, then cut-through could remove those inscriptions, while leaving the payment unaffected, because the proper amount of coins will be received by Zack, as it should be.
 
On 2023-08-25 10:44:41 user GamedevAlice via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
As I understand it, protecting against this is exactly the reason why a blocksize limit exists. Perhaps it should never have been increased in the first place.
Given the current concerns with blockchain size increases due to inscriptions, and now that the lightning network is starting to gain more traction, perhaps people are now more willing to consider a smaller blocksize in favor of pushing more activity to lightning?
 
 
 
On Tue, Aug 22, 2023, 8:00 AM , <bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
        bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
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Today's Topics:
   1. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions" (symphonicbtc)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 22:34:03 +0000
From: symphonicbtc <symphonicbtc@proton•me>
To: John Tromp <john.tromp@gmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
        <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions"
Message-ID:
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It is important to also note that proof of secret key schemes are highly data inefficient and likely would have a higher cost for users than simply allowing arbitrary data to continue. In ECDSA, purposely re-using k values allows you to encode data in both k and the entire secret key, as both become computable. Or, one could bruteforce a k value to encode data in a sig, as is done in some compromised hardware key exfiltration attacks. Additionally, one can bruteforce keys in order to encode data in the public key.
It is very difficult and expensive to attempt to limit the storage of arbitrary data in a system where the security comes from secret keys being arbitrary data.
Symphonic
------- Original Message -------
On Monday, August 21st, 2023 at 4:28 PM, John Tromp via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors will
> > simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys. Public
> > key data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are willing
> > to pad the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there will be
> > no way to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public key
> > or whether it is encoding an inscription or some other data.
>
>
> Note that in the Mimblewimble protocol, range proofs already prove
> knowledge of blinding factor in Pedersen commitments, and thus no
> additional padding is needed there to prevent the encoding of spam
> into cryptographic material. This makes pure MW blockchains the most
> inscription/spam resistant [1].
>
> [1] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5437464.msg61980991#msg61980991
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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2023-09-03 16:01 vjudeu

  
From: Peter Todd @ 2023-09-05 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vjudeu, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion;  GamedevAlice

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On Sun, Sep 03, 2023 at 06:01:02PM +0200, vjudeu via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > Given the current concerns with blockchain size increases due to inscriptions, and now that the lightning network is starting to gain more traction, perhaps people are now more willing to consider a smaller blocksize in favor of pushing more activity to lightning?
>  
> People will not agree to shrink the maximum block size. However, if you want to kill inscriptions, there is another approach, that could be used to force them into second layers: it is called cut-through, and was described in this topic: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=281848.0
>  
> Then, if you have "Alice -> Bob -> ... -> Zack" transaction chain, and for example some inscriptions were created in "Alice -> Bob" transaction, then cut-through could remove those inscriptions, while leaving the payment unaffected, because the proper amount of coins will be received by Zack, as it should be.

You are incorrect: cut-through transactions will not meaningfully affect
inscriptions. While it is true that with fancy cryptography we can prove the
Alice -> ... -> Zack chain, that does not change the fact that Alice -> Bob ->
Zack was mined in the blockchain, and those transactions exist. Anyone running
a full archival node will still have those transactions, and can provide them
(and all their inscription data) to anyone who needs it.

This is not unlike how in Bitcoin right now many people run pruned nodes that
do not have any archival inscription data. Them running those nodes does not
prevent others from running full archival nodes that do make that data
available.

-- 
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org

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From: vjudeu @ 2023-09-06  8:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Peter Todd, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion;  GamedevAlice

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> that does not change the fact that Alice -> Bob -> Zack was mined in the blockchain, and those transactions exist
 
If you use it in that way, then cut-through is pointless. The whole point of using it is scaling. If you have only "Alice -> Zack" transaction, that is included in some block, then cut-through is really useful. In other cases, if you include all transactions anyway, and create only a proof for some nodes, then it doesn't scale, because you have to always process those transactions in the middle, while there is no need to do so. It is needed only during batching, to prevent double-spending, but if it is deeply confirmed, then who needs something that doesn't scale?
 
Also, going in that direction is a natural consequence of enabling full-RBF: transactions will be replaced, which means mempool-level-batching (ideally non-interactive, done automatically by nodes) will be next, sooner or later.
 
On 2023-09-05 19:49:51 user Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org> wrote:
On Sun, Sep 03, 2023 at 06:01:02PM +0200, vjudeu via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > Given the current concerns with blockchain size increases due to inscriptions, and now that the lightning network is starting to gain more traction, perhaps people are now more willing to consider a smaller blocksize in favor of pushing more activity to lightning? >   > People will not agree to shrink the maximum block size. However, if you want to kill inscriptions, there is another approach, that could be used to force them into second layers: it is called cut-through, and was described in this topic: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=281848.0 >   > Then, if you have "Alice -> Bob -> ... -> Zack" transaction chain, and for example some inscriptions were created in "Alice -> Bob" transaction, then cut-through could remove those inscriptions, while leaving the payment unaffected, because the proper amount of coins will be received by Zack, as it should be. You are incorrect: cut-through transactions will not meaningfully affect inscriptions. While it is true that with fancy cryptography we can prove the Alice -> ... -> Zack chain, that does not change the fact that Alice -> Bob -> Zack was mined in the blockchain, and those transactions exist. Anyone running a full archival node will still have those transactions, and can provide them (and all their inscription data) to anyone who needs it. This is not unlike how in Bitcoin right now many people run pruned nodes that do not have any archival inscription data. Them running those nodes does not prevent others from running full archival nodes that do make that data available. -- https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org

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