Responsible disclosures and Bitcoin development

Responsible disclosures and Bitcoin development
2023-05-11 19:44 ` Michael Folkson
  
From: alicexbt @ 2023-05-09  2:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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Hi Bitcoin Developers,

There is an open issue in bitcoin core repository which was created last week: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27586

I think this should have been reported privately as vulnerability instead of creating a GitHub issue even if it worked only in debug mode. Some users in the comments have also experienced similar issues without debug build used for bitcoind. I have not noticed any decline in the number of listening nodes on bitnodes.io in last 24 hours so I am assuming this is not an issue with majority of bitcoin core nodes. However, things could have been worse and there is nothing wrong in reporting something privately if there is even 1% possibility of it being a vulnerability. I had recently reported something to LND security team based on a closed issue on GitHub which eventually was not considered a vulnerability: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7449

In the CPU usage issue, maybe the users can run bitcoind with bigger mempool or try other things shared in the issue by everyone.

This isn't the first time either when vulnerability was reported publicly: https://gist.github.com/chjj/4ff628f3a0d42823a90edf47340f0db9 and this was even exploited on mainnet which affected some projects.

This email is just a request to consider the impact of any vulnerability if gets exploited could affect lot of things. Even the projects with no financial activity involved follow better practices.

/dev/fd0
floppy disk guy

Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-05-09  2:47 [bitcoin-dev] Responsible disclosures and Bitcoin development alicexbt

  2023-05-16 22:39   ` alicexbt
  
From: Michael Folkson @ 2023-05-11 19:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: alicexbt, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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Hi alicexbt

The vulnerability reporting process requires communication and resolution via a small group of individuals [0] rather than through open collaboration between any contributors on the repo. There are clearly examples where the process is critically needed, the most obvious past example being the 2018 inflation bug [1]. However, it doesn't scale for all bug reports and investigations to go through this tiny funnel. For an issue that isn't going to result in loss of onchain funds and doesn't seem to present a systemic issue (e.g. network DoS attack, inflation bug) I'm of the view that opening a public issue was appropriate in this case especially as the issue initially assumed it was only impacting nodes running in debug mode (not a mode a node in production is likely to be running in).

An interesting question though and I'm certainly happy to be corrected by those who have been investigating the issue. Some delicate trade-offs involved including understanding and resolving the issue faster through wider collaboration versus keeping knowledge of the issue within a smaller group.

Thanks
Michael

[0]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/SECURITY.md
[1]: https://bitcoincore.org/en/2018/09/20/notice/

--
Michael Folkson
Email: michaelfolkson at [protonmail.com](http://protonmail.com/)
GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F

Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin

------- Original Message -------
On Tuesday, May 9th, 2023 at 03:47, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hi Bitcoin Developers,
>
> There is an open issue in bitcoin core repository which was created last week: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27586
>
> I think this should have been reported privately as vulnerability instead of creating a GitHub issue even if it worked only in debug mode. Some users in the comments have also experienced similar issues without debug build used for bitcoind. I have not noticed any decline in the number of listening nodes on bitnodes.io in last 24 hours so I am assuming this is not an issue with majority of bitcoin core nodes. However, things could have been worse and there is nothing wrong in reporting something privately if there is even 1% possibility of it being a vulnerability. I had recently reported something to LND security team based on a closed issue on GitHub which eventually was not considered a vulnerability: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7449
>
> In the CPU usage issue, maybe the users can run bitcoind with bigger mempool or try other things shared in the issue by everyone.
>
> This isn't the first time either when vulnerability was reported publicly: https://gist.github.com/chjj/4ff628f3a0d42823a90edf47340f0db9 and this was even exploited on mainnet which affected some projects.
>
> This email is just a request to consider the impact of any vulnerability if gets exploited could affect lot of things. Even the projects with no financial activity involved follow better practices.
>
> /dev/fd0
> floppy disk guy
>
> Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-05-11 19:44 ` Michael Folkson

  2023-05-17 12:44     ` Michael Folkson
  
From: alicexbt @ 2023-05-16 22:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Michael Folkson;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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Hi Michael,

A disagreement and some thoughts already shared in an email although its not clear to some "open source" devs:

Impact of this vulnerability:

- Denial of Service
- Stale blocks affecting mining pool revenue
Why it should have been reported privately to security@bitcoincore•org, even if initially found affecting only debug build?

Example: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3129

CVE is a different process and I am aware of it. It would be good for certain developers in the core team to reflect on their own approach to security, regardless of whether their work receives CVE recognition or not.

/dev/fd0
floppy disk guy

Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

------- Original Message -------
On Friday, May 12th, 2023 at 1:14 AM, Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail•com> wrote:

> Hi alicexbt
>
> The vulnerability reporting process requires communication and resolution via a small group of individuals [0] rather than through open collaboration between any contributors on the repo. There are clearly examples where the process is critically needed, the most obvious past example being the 2018 inflation bug [1]. However, it doesn't scale for all bug reports and investigations to go through this tiny funnel. For an issue that isn't going to result in loss of onchain funds and doesn't seem to present a systemic issue (e.g. network DoS attack, inflation bug) I'm of the view that opening a public issue was appropriate in this case especially as the issue initially assumed it was only impacting nodes running in debug mode (not a mode a node in production is likely to be running in).
>
> An interesting question though and I'm certainly happy to be corrected by those who have been investigating the issue. Some delicate trade-offs involved including understanding and resolving the issue faster through wider collaboration versus keeping knowledge of the issue within a smaller group.
>
> Thanks
> Michael
>
> [0]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/SECURITY.md
> [1]: https://bitcoincore.org/en/2018/09/20/notice/
>
> --
> Michael Folkson
> Email: michaelfolkson at [protonmail.com](http://protonmail.com/)
> GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
>
> Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
>
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Tuesday, May 9th, 2023 at 03:47, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Bitcoin Developers,
>>
>> There is an open issue in bitcoin core repository which was created last week: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27586
>>
>> I think this should have been reported privately as vulnerability instead of creating a GitHub issue even if it worked only in debug mode. Some users in the comments have also experienced similar issues without debug build used for bitcoind. I have not noticed any decline in the number of listening nodes on bitnodes.io in last 24 hours so I am assuming this is not an issue with majority of bitcoin core nodes. However, things could have been worse and there is nothing wrong in reporting something privately if there is even 1% possibility of it being a vulnerability. I had recently reported something to LND security team based on a closed issue on GitHub which eventually was not considered a vulnerability: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7449
>>
>> In the CPU usage issue, maybe the users can run bitcoind with bigger mempool or try other things shared in the issue by everyone.
>>
>> This isn't the first time either when vulnerability was reported publicly: https://gist.github.com/chjj/4ff628f3a0d42823a90edf47340f0db9 and this was even exploited on mainnet which affected some projects.
>>
>> This email is just a request to consider the impact of any vulnerability if gets exploited could affect lot of things. Even the projects with no financial activity involved follow better practices.
>>
>> /dev/fd0
>> floppy disk guy
>>
>> Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-05-16 22:39   ` alicexbt

  2023-05-22 12:56       ` alicexbt
  
From: Michael Folkson @ 2023-05-17 12:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: alicexbt;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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Hi alicexbt

"Open source" has the word "open" in it. Pushing everything into closed, private channels of communication and select groups of individuals is what I've been trying to push back upon. As I said in my initial response "it doesn't scale for all bug reports and investigations to go through this tiny funnel" though "there are clearly examples where the process is critically needed".

Now that's not to say you may not have a point about better documentation and guidance on what should go through the vulnerability reporting process and what shouldn't. Or even that this particular issue could ultimately end up being classed a CVE. But rather than merely complaining and putting "open source" into quote marks perhaps suggest what class of bug reports should go through the tiny funnel and what shouldn't. Unless you think everything should go through the funnel in which case you are advocating for less openness whilst simultaneously complaining it isn't "open source". Square that circle.

Thanks
Michael

--
Michael Folkson
Email: michaelfolkson at [protonmail.com](http://protonmail.com/)
GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F

Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin

------- Original Message -------
On Tuesday, May 16th, 2023 at 23:39, alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail•com> wrote:

> Hi Michael,
>
> A disagreement and some thoughts already shared in an email although its not clear to some "open source" devs:
>
> Impact of this vulnerability:
>
> - Denial of Service
> - Stale blocks affecting mining pool revenue
> Why it should have been reported privately to security@bitcoincore•org, even if initially found affecting only debug build?
>
> Example: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3129
>
> CVE is a different process and I am aware of it. It would be good for certain developers in the core team to reflect on their own approach to security, regardless of whether their work receives CVE recognition or not.
>
> /dev/fd0
> floppy disk guy
>
> Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.
>
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Friday, May 12th, 2023 at 1:14 AM, Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail•com> wrote:
>
>> Hi alicexbt
>>
>> The vulnerability reporting process requires communication and resolution via a small group of individuals [0] rather than through open collaboration between any contributors on the repo. There are clearly examples where the process is critically needed, the most obvious past example being the 2018 inflation bug [1]. However, it doesn't scale for all bug reports and investigations to go through this tiny funnel. For an issue that isn't going to result in loss of onchain funds and doesn't seem to present a systemic issue (e.g. network DoS attack, inflation bug) I'm of the view that opening a public issue was appropriate in this case especially as the issue initially assumed it was only impacting nodes running in debug mode (not a mode a node in production is likely to be running in).
>>
>> An interesting question though and I'm certainly happy to be corrected by those who have been investigating the issue. Some delicate trade-offs involved including understanding and resolving the issue faster through wider collaboration versus keeping knowledge of the issue within a smaller group.
>>
>> Thanks
>> Michael
>>
>> [0]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/SECURITY.md
>> [1]: https://bitcoincore.org/en/2018/09/20/notice/
>>
>> --
>> Michael Folkson
>> Email: michaelfolkson at [protonmail.com](http://protonmail.com/)
>> GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
>>
>> Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
>>
>> ------- Original Message -------
>> On Tuesday, May 9th, 2023 at 03:47, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Bitcoin Developers,
>>>
>>> There is an open issue in bitcoin core repository which was created last week: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27586
>>>
>>> I think this should have been reported privately as vulnerability instead of creating a GitHub issue even if it worked only in debug mode. Some users in the comments have also experienced similar issues without debug build used for bitcoind. I have not noticed any decline in the number of listening nodes on bitnodes.io in last 24 hours so I am assuming this is not an issue with majority of bitcoin core nodes. However, things could have been worse and there is nothing wrong in reporting something privately if there is even 1% possibility of it being a vulnerability. I had recently reported something to LND security team based on a closed issue on GitHub which eventually was not considered a vulnerability: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7449
>>>
>>> In the CPU usage issue, maybe the users can run bitcoind with bigger mempool or try other things shared in the issue by everyone.
>>>
>>> This isn't the first time either when vulnerability was reported publicly: https://gist.github.com/chjj/4ff628f3a0d42823a90edf47340f0db9 and this was even exploited on mainnet which affected some projects.
>>>
>>> This email is just a request to consider the impact of any vulnerability if gets exploited could affect lot of things. Even the projects with no financial activity involved follow better practices.
>>>
>>> /dev/fd0
>>> floppy disk guy
>>>
>>> Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-05-17 12:44     ` Michael Folkson

  2023-05-23 16:17         ` Michael Folkson
  
From: alicexbt @ 2023-05-22 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Michael Folkson;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

Hi Michael,

> Now that's not to say you may not have a point about better documentation and guidance on what should go through the vulnerability reporting process and what shouldn't.

Yes, this can be improved.

> Or even that this particular issue could ultimately end up being classed a CVE.

It has been assigned CVE-2023-33297


/dev/fd0
floppy disk guy

Sent with Proton Mail secure email.

------- Original Message -------
On Wednesday, May 17th, 2023 at 6:14 PM, Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail•com> wrote:


> Hi alicexbt
> 
> "Open source" has the word "open" in it. Pushing everything into closed, private channels of communication and select groups of individuals is what I've been trying to push back upon. As I said in my initial response "it doesn't scale for all bug reports and investigations to go through this tiny funnel" though "there are clearly examples where the process is critically needed".
> 
> 
> Now that's not to say you may not have a point about better documentation and guidance on what should go through the vulnerability reporting process and what shouldn't. Or even that this particular issue could ultimately end up being classed a CVE. But rather than merely complaining and putting "open source" into quote marks perhaps suggest what class of bug reports should go through the tiny funnel and what shouldn't. Unless you think everything should go through the funnel in which case you are advocating for less openness whilst simultaneously complaining it isn't "open source". Square that circle.
> 
> 
> Thanks
> Michael
> 
> --
> Michael Folkson
> Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
> GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
> 
> 
> Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
> 
> 
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Tuesday, May 16th, 2023 at 23:39, alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail•com> wrote:
> 
> 
> > Hi Michael,
> > 
> > A disagreement and some thoughts already shared in an email although its not clear to some "open source" devs:
> > 
> > Impact of this vulnerability:
> > 
> > - Denial of Service
> > - Stale blocks affecting mining pool revenue
> > 
> > Why it should have been reported privately to security@bitcoincore•org, even if initially found affecting only debug build?
> > 
> > 
> > Example: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3129
> > 
> > 
> > CVE is a different process and I am aware of it. It would be good for certain developers in the core team to reflect on their own approach to security, regardless of whether their work receives CVE recognition or not.
> > 
> > /dev/fd0
> > floppy disk guy
> > 
> > 
> > Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
> > 
> > ------- Original Message -------
> > On Friday, May 12th, 2023 at 1:14 AM, Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail•com> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > > Hi alicexbt
> > > 
> > > The vulnerability reporting process requires communication and resolution via a small group of individuals [0] rather than through open collaboration between any contributors on the repo. There are clearly examples where the process is critically needed, the most obvious past example being the 2018 inflation bug [1]. However, it doesn't scale for all bug reports and investigations to go through this tiny funnel. For an issue that isn't going to result in loss of onchain funds and doesn't seem to present a systemic issue (e.g. network DoS attack, inflation bug) I'm of the view that opening a public issue was appropriate in this case especially as the issue initially assumed it was only impacting nodes running in debug mode (not a mode a node in production is likely to be running in).
> > > 
> > > An interesting question though and I'm certainly happy to be corrected by those who have been investigating the issue. Some delicate trade-offs involved including understanding and resolving the issue faster through wider collaboration versus keeping knowledge of the issue within a smaller group.
> > > 
> > > Thanks
> > > Michael
> > > 
> > > [0]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/SECURITY.md
> > > [1]: https://bitcoincore.org/en/2018/09/20/notice/
> > > 
> > > --
> > > Michael Folkson
> > > Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
> > > GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
> > > 
> > > 
> > > ------- Original Message -------
> > > On Tuesday, May 9th, 2023 at 03:47, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > Hi Bitcoin Developers,
> > > > 
> > > > There is an open issue in bitcoin core repository which was created last week: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27586
> > > > 
> > > > I think this should have been reported privately as vulnerability instead of creating a GitHub issue even if it worked only in debug mode. Some users in the comments have also experienced similar issues without debug build used for bitcoind. I have not noticed any decline in the number of listening nodes on bitnodes.io in last 24 hours so I am assuming this is not an issue with majority of bitcoin core nodes. However, things could have been worse and there is nothing wrong in reporting something privately if there is even 1% possibility of it being a vulnerability. I had recently reported something to LND security team based on a closed issue on GitHub which eventually was not considered a vulnerability: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7449 
> > > > 
> > > > In the CPU usage issue, maybe the users can run bitcoind with bigger mempool or try other things shared in the issue by everyone.
> > > > 
> > > > This isn't the first time either when vulnerability was reported publicly: https://gist.github.com/chjj/4ff628f3a0d42823a90edf47340f0db9 and this was even exploited on mainnet which affected some projects.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > This email is just a request to consider the impact of any vulnerability if gets exploited could affect lot of things. Even the projects with no financial activity involved follow better practices.
> > > > 
> > > > /dev/fd0
> > > > floppy disk guy 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Sent with Proton Mail secure email.


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-05-22 12:56       ` alicexbt

  2023-05-23 16:45           ` alicexbt
  
From: Michael Folkson @ 2023-05-23 16:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: alicexbt;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

Hi alicexbt

> It has been assigned CVE-2023-33297

Did you personally request the CVE ID? Say via here [0]? Did you confirm with someone listed on the vulnerability reporting process [1] for Bitcoin Core that it made sense to do that at this time? I'm not sure whether completely bypassing that list and requesting CVE IDs for the project as an individual is the way to go. If you have already contacted one of them and they've given you the go ahead to start the CVE process then fine. You weren't particularly clear with what has occurred.

Thanks
Michael

[0]: https://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html
[1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/SECURITY.md

--
Michael Folkson
Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F


Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin


------- Original Message -------
On Monday, May 22nd, 2023 at 13:56, alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail•com> wrote:


> Hi Michael,
> 
> > Now that's not to say you may not have a point about better documentation and guidance on what should go through the vulnerability reporting process and what shouldn't.
> 
> 
> Yes, this can be improved.
> 
> > Or even that this particular issue could ultimately end up being classed a CVE.
> 
> 
> It has been assigned CVE-2023-33297
> 
> 
> /dev/fd0
> floppy disk guy
> 
> Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
> 
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Wednesday, May 17th, 2023 at 6:14 PM, Michael Folkson michaelfolkson@protonmail•com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> > Hi alicexbt
> > 
> > "Open source" has the word "open" in it. Pushing everything into closed, private channels of communication and select groups of individuals is what I've been trying to push back upon. As I said in my initial response "it doesn't scale for all bug reports and investigations to go through this tiny funnel" though "there are clearly examples where the process is critically needed".
> > 
> > Now that's not to say you may not have a point about better documentation and guidance on what should go through the vulnerability reporting process and what shouldn't. Or even that this particular issue could ultimately end up being classed a CVE. But rather than merely complaining and putting "open source" into quote marks perhaps suggest what class of bug reports should go through the tiny funnel and what shouldn't. Unless you think everything should go through the funnel in which case you are advocating for less openness whilst simultaneously complaining it isn't "open source". Square that circle.
> > 
> > Thanks
> > Michael
> > 
> > --
> > Michael Folkson
> > Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
> > GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
> > 
> > Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
> > 
> > ------- Original Message -------
> > On Tuesday, May 16th, 2023 at 23:39, alicexbt alicexbt@protonmail•com wrote:
> > 
> > > Hi Michael,
> > > 
> > > A disagreement and some thoughts already shared in an email although its not clear to some "open source" devs:
> > > 
> > > Impact of this vulnerability:
> > > 
> > > - Denial of Service
> > > - Stale blocks affecting mining pool revenue
> > > 
> > > Why it should have been reported privately to security@bitcoincore•org, even if initially found affecting only debug build?
> > > 
> > > Example: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3129
> > > 
> > > CVE is a different process and I am aware of it. It would be good for certain developers in the core team to reflect on their own approach to security, regardless of whether their work receives CVE recognition or not.
> > > 
> > > /dev/fd0
> > > floppy disk guy
> > > 
> > > Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
> > > 
> > > ------- Original Message -------
> > > On Friday, May 12th, 2023 at 1:14 AM, Michael Folkson michaelfolkson@protonmail•com wrote:
> > > 
> > > > Hi alicexbt
> > > > 
> > > > The vulnerability reporting process requires communication and resolution via a small group of individuals 0 rather than through open collaboration between any contributors on the repo. There are clearly examples where the process is critically needed, the most obvious past example being the 2018 inflation bug 1. However, it doesn't scale for all bug reports and investigations to go through this tiny funnel. For an issue that isn't going to result in loss of onchain funds and doesn't seem to present a systemic issue (e.g. network DoS attack, inflation bug) I'm of the view that opening a public issue was appropriate in this case especially as the issue initially assumed it was only impacting nodes running in debug mode (not a mode a node in production is likely to be running in).
> > > > 
> > > > An interesting question though and I'm certainly happy to be corrected by those who have been investigating the issue. Some delicate trade-offs involved including understanding and resolving the issue faster through wider collaboration versus keeping knowledge of the issue within a smaller group.
> > > > 
> > > > Thanks
> > > > Michael
> > > > 
> > > > --
> > > > Michael Folkson
> > > > Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
> > > > GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
> > > > 
> > > > Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
> > > > 
> > > > ------- Original Message -------
> > > > On Tuesday, May 9th, 2023 at 03:47, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > > Hi Bitcoin Developers,
> > > > > 
> > > > > There is an open issue in bitcoin core repository which was created last week: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27586
> > > > > 
> > > > > I think this should have been reported privately as vulnerability instead of creating a GitHub issue even if it worked only in debug mode. Some users in the comments have also experienced similar issues without debug build used for bitcoind. I have not noticed any decline in the number of listening nodes on bitnodes.io in last 24 hours so I am assuming this is not an issue with majority of bitcoin core nodes. However, things could have been worse and there is nothing wrong in reporting something privately if there is even 1% possibility of it being a vulnerability. I had recently reported something to LND security team based on a closed issue on GitHub which eventually was not considered a vulnerability: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7449
> > > > > 
> > > > > In the CPU usage issue, maybe the users can run bitcoind with bigger mempool or try other things shared in the issue by everyone.
> > > > > 
> > > > > This isn't the first time either when vulnerability was reported publicly: https://gist.github.com/chjj/4ff628f3a0d42823a90edf47340f0db9 and this was even exploited on mainnet which affected some projects.
> > > > > 
> > > > > This email is just a request to consider the impact of any vulnerability if gets exploited could affect lot of things. Even the projects with no financial activity involved follow better practices.
> > > > > 
> > > > > /dev/fd0
> > > > > floppy disk guy
> > > > > 
> > > > > Sent with Proton Mail secure email.


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2023-05-23 16:17         ` Michael Folkson

  
From: alicexbt @ 2023-05-23 16:45 UTC ( / )
  To: Michael Folkson;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

Hi Michael,

Yes, I had requested CVE ID after v24.1 was released as Anthony Towns being the discoverer.

I would follow the process shared here: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/SECURITY.md when bitcoin core developers do not disclose vulnerabilities publicly as GitHub issues which are read by everyone including 3 letter agencies. I don't think there was anything left in the issue after discussing it for days for me to add anything new. I was clear about some things the moment I read the issue and its one of the reasons I created this thread on May 9 (public) about a public GitHub issue after following it for a few days.

It would still qualify as a vulnerability if it only affected debug builds.

> You weren't particularly clear with what has occurred.

It would be better we have less assumptions about such things.

/dev/fd0
floppy disk guy

Sent with Proton Mail secure email.

------- Original Message -------
On Tuesday, May 23rd, 2023 at 9:47 PM, Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail•com> wrote:


> Hi alicexbt
> 
> > It has been assigned CVE-2023-33297
> 
> 
> Did you personally request the CVE ID? Say via here [0]? Did you confirm with someone listed on the vulnerability reporting process [1] for Bitcoin Core that it made sense to do that at this time? I'm not sure whether completely bypassing that list and requesting CVE IDs for the project as an individual is the way to go. If you have already contacted one of them and they've given you the go ahead to start the CVE process then fine. You weren't particularly clear with what has occurred.
> 
> Thanks
> Michael
> 
> [0]: https://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html
> [1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/SECURITY.md
> 
> --
> Michael Folkson
> Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
> GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
> 
> 
> Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
> 
> 
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Monday, May 22nd, 2023 at 13:56, alicexbt alicexbt@protonmail•com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> > Hi Michael,
> > 
> > > Now that's not to say you may not have a point about better documentation and guidance on what should go through the vulnerability reporting process and what shouldn't.
> > 
> > Yes, this can be improved.
> > 
> > > Or even that this particular issue could ultimately end up being classed a CVE.
> > 
> > It has been assigned CVE-2023-33297
> > 
> > /dev/fd0
> > floppy disk guy
> > 
> > Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
> > 
> > ------- Original Message -------
> > On Wednesday, May 17th, 2023 at 6:14 PM, Michael Folkson michaelfolkson@protonmail•com wrote:
> > 
> > > Hi alicexbt
> > > 
> > > "Open source" has the word "open" in it. Pushing everything into closed, private channels of communication and select groups of individuals is what I've been trying to push back upon. As I said in my initial response "it doesn't scale for all bug reports and investigations to go through this tiny funnel" though "there are clearly examples where the process is critically needed".
> > > 
> > > Now that's not to say you may not have a point about better documentation and guidance on what should go through the vulnerability reporting process and what shouldn't. Or even that this particular issue could ultimately end up being classed a CVE. But rather than merely complaining and putting "open source" into quote marks perhaps suggest what class of bug reports should go through the tiny funnel and what shouldn't. Unless you think everything should go through the funnel in which case you are advocating for less openness whilst simultaneously complaining it isn't "open source". Square that circle.
> > > 
> > > Thanks
> > > Michael
> > > 
> > > --
> > > Michael Folkson
> > > Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
> > > GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
> > > 
> > > Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
> > > 
> > > ------- Original Message -------
> > > On Tuesday, May 16th, 2023 at 23:39, alicexbt alicexbt@protonmail•com wrote:
> > > 
> > > > Hi Michael,
> > > > 
> > > > A disagreement and some thoughts already shared in an email although its not clear to some "open source" devs:
> > > > 
> > > > Impact of this vulnerability:
> > > > 
> > > > - Denial of Service
> > > > - Stale blocks affecting mining pool revenue
> > > > 
> > > > Why it should have been reported privately to security@bitcoincore•org, even if initially found affecting only debug build?
> > > > 
> > > > Example: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3129
> > > > 
> > > > CVE is a different process and I am aware of it. It would be good for certain developers in the core team to reflect on their own approach to security, regardless of whether their work receives CVE recognition or not.
> > > > 
> > > > /dev/fd0
> > > > floppy disk guy
> > > > 
> > > > Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
> > > > 
> > > > ------- Original Message -------
> > > > On Friday, May 12th, 2023 at 1:14 AM, Michael Folkson michaelfolkson@protonmail•com wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > > Hi alicexbt
> > > > > 
> > > > > The vulnerability reporting process requires communication and resolution via a small group of individuals 0 rather than through open collaboration between any contributors on the repo. There are clearly examples where the process is critically needed, the most obvious past example being the 2018 inflation bug 1. However, it doesn't scale for all bug reports and investigations to go through this tiny funnel. For an issue that isn't going to result in loss of onchain funds and doesn't seem to present a systemic issue (e.g. network DoS attack, inflation bug) I'm of the view that opening a public issue was appropriate in this case especially as the issue initially assumed it was only impacting nodes running in debug mode (not a mode a node in production is likely to be running in).
> > > > > 
> > > > > An interesting question though and I'm certainly happy to be corrected by those who have been investigating the issue. Some delicate trade-offs involved including understanding and resolving the issue faster through wider collaboration versus keeping knowledge of the issue within a smaller group.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Thanks
> > > > > Michael
> > > > > 
> > > > > --
> > > > > Michael Folkson
> > > > > Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
> > > > > GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
> > > > > 
> > > > > Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
> > > > > 
> > > > > ------- Original Message -------
> > > > > On Tuesday, May 9th, 2023 at 03:47, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> > > > > 
> > > > > > Hi Bitcoin Developers,
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > There is an open issue in bitcoin core repository which was created last week: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27586
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > I think this should have been reported privately as vulnerability instead of creating a GitHub issue even if it worked only in debug mode. Some users in the comments have also experienced similar issues without debug build used for bitcoind. I have not noticed any decline in the number of listening nodes on bitnodes.io in last 24 hours so I am assuming this is not an issue with majority of bitcoin core nodes. However, things could have been worse and there is nothing wrong in reporting something privately if there is even 1% possibility of it being a vulnerability. I had recently reported something to LND security team based on a closed issue on GitHub which eventually was not considered a vulnerability: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7449
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > In the CPU usage issue, maybe the users can run bitcoind with bigger mempool or try other things shared in the issue by everyone.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > This isn't the first time either when vulnerability was reported publicly: https://gist.github.com/chjj/4ff628f3a0d42823a90edf47340f0db9 and this was even exploited on mainnet which affected some projects.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > This email is just a request to consider the impact of any vulnerability if gets exploited could affect lot of things. Even the projects with no financial activity involved follow better practices.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > /dev/fd0
> > > > > > floppy disk guy
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Sent with Proton Mail secure email.