Original Vision

Original Vision
2015-06-28  1:52 ` Aaron Voisine
  2015-06-28  2:13 ` Patrick Strateman
  
From: Santino Napolitano @ 2015-06-28  0:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev


There is much heated debate going on right now and I know it can be very stressful but I'd like to point out that it is really amazing how passionately so many feel about this once very small project. Let's not forget there is something really special going on here and we're all part of it.

The current debate has little to do with block size or hard-forks, IMO. It's about the nature of Bitcoin and what it means to people and how it will grow. I would like to take a moment to share my interpretation of the original author's intent based on everything I could find and read from this person. This is not to say their original vision is paramount-- or even that I got it completely correct but I think it might do us some good to think about.

It seems as though the incentive conceived of for running a full network node was that it would enable mining. The proceeds from mining (new coins and transaction fees) would be the reward and provide a reason to continue operating these nodes. If fees are ever to be a sufficient reward and still allow for a practical and useful system the size of the blocks must grow significantly as must the user base. I'm not sure that this is really contested but I haven't exhaustively reviewed everyone's opinion so please excuse me if I have marginalized you. If you do contest that I would be interested in hearing it.

Further, it appears clear that the original author intended organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the user base. This is completely consistent with current trends in Internet consumption, e.g. tablets and phones are becoming more preferred to even owning a traditional computer. Having the system be entirely decentralized and trustless for every client does not appear to me to be the original design goal. Yes, the whitepaper speaks of the design goal as not having a need for a trusted third party but it does not say that some amount of trust won't be preferred by a majority of users. In fact, in the SPV section it implies some amount of localized trust is perhaps a necessary trade-off and maybe businesses should still run their own full network node if they want the stronger completely trustless guarantee. The global decentralized consensus appears meant to make the network resilient to a single government or other adversary's ability to shut the network down. If you really want to trust no one it is your option at a cost and should be possible by design. The author further gives evidence that they believe Moore's observation would keep the idea of running a full network node a practical one at global scale for perpetuity. It does not appear as if they intended for every individual to run one at home nor in their pocket.

If my interpretation seems incorrect please do point it out. I hope this hasn't been too off-topic and distracting. The original author's engineering ingenuity is what gave me any interest in this project so re-visiting their design and scaling intentions might be helpful for us to move forward-- together.


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-06-28  0:14 [bitcoin-dev] Original Vision Santino Napolitano

  2015-06-28  2:13 ` Patrick Strateman
  
From: Aaron Voisine @ 2015-06-28  1:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Santino Napolitano;  bitcoin-dev

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This is a reasonable vision, but I think we can do better. We can easily
achieve the goal of letting hobbyists with very limited resources and
connectivity run full nodes. The way to do this is to limit growth of the
blockchain, and the right way to do that is to have fees that reflect the
costs of having large numbers of people validating, storing, and serving
transactions.

I think we're all agreed that decentralization is priority #1. It's what
makes bitcoin unique from everything else. So what then is the best way to
have fees reflect the costs? Having a fixed blocksize (fixed production
quotas) is one very disruptive option that would be a significant departure
from what we have today. The way the network today discourages spam and
other low value uses of the blockchain is with minimum relay fees and
transaction selection rules for blocks. This technique is proven, safe, and
can easily be tuned and experimented with. It's also what all bitcoin
software today is designed to work with.



Aaron Voisine
co-founder and CEO
breadwallet.com

On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 5:14 PM, Santino Napolitano <
santino.napolitano@yandex•com> wrote:

>
> There is much heated debate going on right now and I know it can be very
> stressful but I'd like to point out that it is really amazing how
> passionately so many feel about this once very small project. Let's not
> forget there is something really special going on here and we're all part
> of it.
>
> The current debate has little to do with block size or hard-forks, IMO.
> It's about the nature of Bitcoin and what it means to people and how it
> will grow. I would like to take a moment to share my interpretation of the
> original author's intent based on everything I could find and read from
> this person. This is not to say their original vision is paramount-- or
> even that I got it completely correct but I think it might do us some good
> to think about.
>
> It seems as though the incentive conceived of for running a full network
> node was that it would enable mining. The proceeds from mining (new coins
> and transaction fees) would be the reward and provide a reason to continue
> operating these nodes. If fees are ever to be a sufficient reward and still
> allow for a practical and useful system the size of the blocks must grow
> significantly as must the user base. I'm not sure that this is really
> contested but I haven't exhaustively reviewed everyone's opinion so please
> excuse me if I have marginalized you. If you do contest that I would be
> interested in hearing it.
>
> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended organizations
> operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to light clients
> and these light clients would make up the majority of the user base. This
> is completely consistent with current trends in Internet consumption, e.g.
> tablets and phones are becoming more preferred to even owning a traditional
> computer. Having the system be entirely decentralized and trustless for
> every client does not appear to me to be the original design goal. Yes, the
> whitepaper speaks of the design goal as not having a need for a trusted
> third party but it does not say that some amount of trust won't be
> preferred by a majority of users. In fact, in the SPV section it implies
> some amount of localized trust is perhaps a necessary trade-off and maybe
> businesses should still run their own full network node if they want the
> stronger completely trustless guarantee. The global decentralized consensus
> appears meant to make the network r
>  esilient to a single government or other adversary's ability to shut the
> network down. If you really want to trust no one it is your option at a
> cost and should be possible by design. The author further gives evidence
> that they believe Moore's observation would keep the idea of running a full
> network node a practical one at global scale for perpetuity. It does not
> appear as if they intended for every individual to run one at home nor in
> their pocket.
>
> If my interpretation seems incorrect please do point it out. I hope this
> hasn't been too off-topic and distracting. The original author's
> engineering ingenuity is what gave me any interest in this project so
> re-visiting their design and scaling intentions might be helpful for us to
> move forward-- together.
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-06-28  0:14 [bitcoin-dev] Original Vision Santino Napolitano
  2015-06-28  1:52 ` Aaron Voisine

  2015-06-28  4:54   ` Eric Lombrozo
  2015-06-28 21:53   ` Santino Napolitano
  
From: Patrick Strateman @ 2015-06-28  2:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended
organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to
light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the
user base.

Satoshi also believed that fraud proofs would be widely available and
practical.

If fraud proofs were practical SPV client security would be much closer
to full node security than it is today.

Unfortunately no design for fraud proofs which is both efficient and
secure has been proposed; much less implemented and deployed.

In building a system as new and innovative as bitcoin certain things
will be wrong.

The perception that SPV clients could be made nearly as secure as full
nodes is one example of something that was wrong.

On 06/27/2015 05:14 PM, Santino Napolitano wrote:
> There is much heated debate going on right now and I know it can be very stressful but I'd like to point out that it is really amazing how passionately so many feel about this once very small project. Let's not forget there is something really special going on here and we're all part of it.
>
> The current debate has little to do with block size or hard-forks, IMO. It's about the nature of Bitcoin and what it means to people and how it will grow. I would like to take a moment to share my interpretation of the original author's intent based on everything I could find and read from this person. This is not to say their original vision is paramount-- or even that I got it completely correct but I think it might do us some good to think about.
>
> It seems as though the incentive conceived of for running a full network node was that it would enable mining. The proceeds from mining (new coins and transaction fees) would be the reward and provide a reason to continue operating these nodes. If fees are ever to be a sufficient reward and still allow for a practical and useful system the size of the blocks must grow significantly as must the user base. I'm not sure that this is really contested but I haven't exhaustively reviewed everyone's opinion so please excuse me if I have marginalized you. If you do contest that I would be interested in hearing it.
>
> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the user base. This is completely consistent with current trends in Internet consumption, e.g. tablets and phones are becoming more preferred to even owning a traditional computer. Having the system be entirely decentralized and trustless for every client does not appear to me to be the original design goal. Yes, the whitepaper speaks of the design goal as not having a need for a trusted third party but it does not say that some amount of trust won't be preferred by a majority of users. In fact, in the SPV section it implies some amount of localized trust is perhaps a necessary trade-off and maybe businesses should still run their own full network node if they want the stronger completely trustless guarantee. The global decentralized consensus appears meant to make the network r
>  esilient to a single government or other adversary's ability to shut the network down. If you really want to trust no one it is your option at a cost and should be possible by design. The author further gives evidence that they believe Moore's observation would keep the idea of running a full network node a practical one at global scale for perpetuity. It does not appear as if they intended for every individual to run one at home nor in their pocket.
>
> If my interpretation seems incorrect please do point it out. I hope this hasn't been too off-topic and distracting. The original author's engineering ingenuity is what gave me any interest in this project so re-visiting their design and scaling intentions might be helpful for us to move forward-- together.
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev




 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-06-28  2:13 ` Patrick Strateman

  2015-06-28  5:29     ` Patrick Strateman
  2015-06-28 21:53   ` Santino Napolitano
  
From: Eric Lombrozo @ 2015-06-28  4:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Patrick Strateman;  bitcoin-dev

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Fraud proofs actually don’t need to be made super efficient…but they do need to be secure, of course.

The trick is aligning incentives. In order for fraud proofs to be widely available there needs to be a market for them - there must be a way to buy one (because producing one is not free). What makes such a scheme actually practical is that very few of these fraud proofs ever need to actually be executed - it’s a classical Nimzowischian case of the threat being much stronger than the execution.

- Eric Lombrozo

> On Jun 27, 2015, at 7:13 PM, Patrick Strateman <patrick.strateman@gmail•com> wrote:
> 
>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended
> organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to
> light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the
> user base.
> 
> Satoshi also believed that fraud proofs would be widely available and
> practical.
> 
> If fraud proofs were practical SPV client security would be much closer
> to full node security than it is today.
> 
> Unfortunately no design for fraud proofs which is both efficient and
> secure has been proposed; much less implemented and deployed.
> 
> In building a system as new and innovative as bitcoin certain things
> will be wrong.
> 
> The perception that SPV clients could be made nearly as secure as full
> nodes is one example of something that was wrong.
> 
> On 06/27/2015 05:14 PM, Santino Napolitano wrote:
>> There is much heated debate going on right now and I know it can be very stressful but I'd like to point out that it is really amazing how passionately so many feel about this once very small project. Let's not forget there is something really special going on here and we're all part of it.
>> 
>> The current debate has little to do with block size or hard-forks, IMO. It's about the nature of Bitcoin and what it means to people and how it will grow. I would like to take a moment to share my interpretation of the original author's intent based on everything I could find and read from this person. This is not to say their original vision is paramount-- or even that I got it completely correct but I think it might do us some good to think about.
>> 
>> It seems as though the incentive conceived of for running a full network node was that it would enable mining. The proceeds from mining (new coins and transaction fees) would be the reward and provide a reason to continue operating these nodes. If fees are ever to be a sufficient reward and still allow for a practical and useful system the size of the blocks must grow significantly as must the user base. I'm not sure that this is really contested but I haven't exhaustively reviewed everyone's opinion so please excuse me if I have marginalized you. If you do contest that I would be interested in hearing it.
>> 
>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the user base. This is completely consistent with current trends in Internet consumption, e.g. tablets and phones are becoming more preferred to even owning a traditional computer. Having the system be entirely decentralized and trustless for every client does not appear to me to be the original design goal. Yes, the whitepaper speaks of the design goal as not having a need for a trusted third party but it does not say that some amount of trust won't be preferred by a majority of users. In fact, in the SPV section it implies some amount of localized trust is perhaps a necessary trade-off and maybe businesses should still run their own full network node if they want the stronger completely trustless guarantee. The global decentralized consensus appears meant to make the network
>  r
>> esilient to a single government or other adversary's ability to shut the network down. If you really want to trust no one it is your option at a cost and should be possible by design. The author further gives evidence that they believe Moore's observation would keep the idea of running a full network node a practical one at global scale for perpetuity. It does not appear as if they intended for every individual to run one at home nor in their pocket.
>> 
>> If my interpretation seems incorrect please do point it out. I hope this hasn't been too off-topic and distracting. The original author's engineering ingenuity is what gave me any interest in this project so re-visiting their design and scaling intentions might be helpful for us to move forward-- together.
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-06-28  4:54   ` Eric Lombrozo

  2015-06-28  5:32       ` Eric Lombrozo
  
From: Patrick Strateman @ 2015-06-28  5:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: bitcoin-dev

Fraud proofs need to be at least more efficient than full node validation.

Currently they are not.

On 06/27/2015 09:54 PM, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
> Fraud proofs actually don’t need to be made super efficient…but they do need to be secure, of course.
>
> The trick is aligning incentives. In order for fraud proofs to be widely available there needs to be a market for them - there must be a way to buy one (because producing one is not free). What makes such a scheme actually practical is that very few of these fraud proofs ever need to actually be executed - it’s a classical Nimzowischian case of the threat being much stronger than the execution.
>
> - Eric Lombrozo
>
>> On Jun 27, 2015, at 7:13 PM, Patrick Strateman <patrick.strateman@gmail•com> wrote:
>>
>>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended
>> organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to
>> light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the
>> user base.
>>
>> Satoshi also believed that fraud proofs would be widely available and
>> practical.
>>
>> If fraud proofs were practical SPV client security would be much closer
>> to full node security than it is today.
>>
>> Unfortunately no design for fraud proofs which is both efficient and
>> secure has been proposed; much less implemented and deployed.
>>
>> In building a system as new and innovative as bitcoin certain things
>> will be wrong.
>>
>> The perception that SPV clients could be made nearly as secure as full
>> nodes is one example of something that was wrong.
>>
>> On 06/27/2015 05:14 PM, Santino Napolitano wrote:
>>> There is much heated debate going on right now and I know it can be very stressful but I'd like to point out that it is really amazing how passionately so many feel about this once very small project. Let's not forget there is something really special going on here and we're all part of it.
>>>
>>> The current debate has little to do with block size or hard-forks, IMO. It's about the nature of Bitcoin and what it means to people and how it will grow. I would like to take a moment to share my interpretation of the original author's intent based on everything I could find and read from this person. This is not to say their original vision is paramount-- or even that I got it completely correct but I think it might do us some good to think about.
>>>
>>> It seems as though the incentive conceived of for running a full network node was that it would enable mining. The proceeds from mining (new coins and transaction fees) would be the reward and provide a reason to continue operating these nodes. If fees are ever to be a sufficient reward and still allow for a practical and useful system the size of the blocks must grow significantly as must the user base. I'm not sure that this is really contested but I haven't exhaustively reviewed everyone's opinion so please excuse me if I have marginalized you. If you do contest that I would be interested in hearing it.
>>>
>>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the user base. This is completely consistent with current trends in Internet consumption, e.g. tablets and phones are becoming more preferred to even owning a traditional computer. Having the system be entirely decentralized and trustless for every client does not appear to me to be the original design goal. Yes, the whitepaper speaks of the design goal as not having a need for a trusted third party but it does not say that some amount of trust won't be preferred by a majority of users. In fact, in the SPV section it implies some amount of localized trust is perhaps a necessary trade-off and maybe businesses should still run their own full network node if they want the stronger completely trustless guarantee. The global decentralized consensus appears meant to make the network
>>  r
>>> esilient to a single government or other adversary's ability to shut the network down. If you really want to trust no one it is your option at a cost and should be possible by design. The author further gives evidence that they believe Moore's observation would keep the idea of running a full network node a practical one at global scale for perpetuity. It does not appear as if they intended for every individual to run one at home nor in their pocket.
>>>
>>> If my interpretation seems incorrect please do point it out. I hope this hasn't been too off-topic and distracting. The original author's engineering ingenuity is what gave me any interest in this project so re-visiting their design and scaling intentions might be helpful for us to move forward-- together.
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev




 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-06-28  5:29     ` Patrick Strateman

  2015-06-28  5:48         ` Eric Lombrozo
  2015-06-28 15:23         ` Mark Friedenbach
  
From: Eric Lombrozo @ 2015-06-28  5:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Patrick Strateman;  bitcoin-dev

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Just to clarify, SPV is fundamentally busted as it currently exists. I’m talking about potential optimizations for future protocols.

- Eric Lombrozo

> On Jun 27, 2015, at 10:29 PM, Patrick Strateman <patrick.strateman@gmail•com> wrote:
> 
> Fraud proofs need to be at least more efficient than full node validation.
> 
> Currently they are not.
> 
> On 06/27/2015 09:54 PM, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
>> Fraud proofs actually don’t need to be made super efficient…but they do need to be secure, of course.
>> 
>> The trick is aligning incentives. In order for fraud proofs to be widely available there needs to be a market for them - there must be a way to buy one (because producing one is not free). What makes such a scheme actually practical is that very few of these fraud proofs ever need to actually be executed - it’s a classical Nimzowischian case of the threat being much stronger than the execution.
>> 
>> - Eric Lombrozo
>> 
>>> On Jun 27, 2015, at 7:13 PM, Patrick Strateman <patrick.strateman@gmail•com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended
>>> organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to
>>> light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the
>>> user base.
>>> 
>>> Satoshi also believed that fraud proofs would be widely available and
>>> practical.
>>> 
>>> If fraud proofs were practical SPV client security would be much closer
>>> to full node security than it is today.
>>> 
>>> Unfortunately no design for fraud proofs which is both efficient and
>>> secure has been proposed; much less implemented and deployed.
>>> 
>>> In building a system as new and innovative as bitcoin certain things
>>> will be wrong.
>>> 
>>> The perception that SPV clients could be made nearly as secure as full
>>> nodes is one example of something that was wrong.
>>> 
>>> On 06/27/2015 05:14 PM, Santino Napolitano wrote:
>>>> There is much heated debate going on right now and I know it can be very stressful but I'd like to point out that it is really amazing how passionately so many feel about this once very small project. Let's not forget there is something really special going on here and we're all part of it.
>>>> 
>>>> The current debate has little to do with block size or hard-forks, IMO. It's about the nature of Bitcoin and what it means to people and how it will grow. I would like to take a moment to share my interpretation of the original author's intent based on everything I could find and read from this person. This is not to say their original vision is paramount-- or even that I got it completely correct but I think it might do us some good to think about.
>>>> 
>>>> It seems as though the incentive conceived of for running a full network node was that it would enable mining. The proceeds from mining (new coins and transaction fees) would be the reward and provide a reason to continue operating these nodes. If fees are ever to be a sufficient reward and still allow for a practical and useful system the size of the blocks must grow significantly as must the user base. I'm not sure that this is really contested but I haven't exhaustively reviewed everyone's opinion so please excuse me if I have marginalized you. If you do contest that I would be interested in hearing it.
>>>> 
>>>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the user base. This is completely consistent with current trends in Internet consumption, e.g. tablets and phones are becoming more preferred to even owning a traditional computer. Having the system be entirely decentralized and trustless for every client does not appear to me to be the original design goal. Yes, the whitepaper speaks of the design goal as not having a need for a trusted third party but it does not say that some amount of trust won't be preferred by a majority of users. In fact, in the SPV section it implies some amount of localized trust is perhaps a necessary trade-off and maybe businesses should still run their own full network node if they want the stronger completely trustless guarantee. The global decentralized consensus appears meant to make the network
>>> r
>>>> esilient to a single government or other adversary's ability to shut the network down. If you really want to trust no one it is your option at a cost and should be possible by design. The author further gives evidence that they believe Moore's observation would keep the idea of running a full network node a practical one at global scale for perpetuity. It does not appear as if they intended for every individual to run one at home nor in their pocket.
>>>> 
>>>> If my interpretation seems incorrect please do point it out. I hope this hasn't been too off-topic and distracting. The original author's engineering ingenuity is what gave me any interest in this project so re-visiting their design and scaling intentions might be helpful for us to move forward-- together.
>>>> 
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-06-28  5:32       ` Eric Lombrozo

  2015-06-28 15:23         ` Mark Friedenbach
  
From: Eric Lombrozo @ 2015-06-28  5:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Patrick Strateman;  bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6065 bytes --]

"Unfortunately no design for fraud proofs which is both efficient and
secure has been proposed”

Also to clarify, there’s no disagreement here, Patrick.


> On Jun 27, 2015, at 10:32 PM, Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo@gmail•com> wrote:
> 
> Just to clarify, SPV is fundamentally busted as it currently exists. I’m talking about potential optimizations for future protocols.
> 
> - Eric Lombrozo
> 
>> On Jun 27, 2015, at 10:29 PM, Patrick Strateman <patrick.strateman@gmail•com> wrote:
>> 
>> Fraud proofs need to be at least more efficient than full node validation.
>> 
>> Currently they are not.
>> 
>> On 06/27/2015 09:54 PM, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
>>> Fraud proofs actually don’t need to be made super efficient…but they do need to be secure, of course.
>>> 
>>> The trick is aligning incentives. In order for fraud proofs to be widely available there needs to be a market for them - there must be a way to buy one (because producing one is not free). What makes such a scheme actually practical is that very few of these fraud proofs ever need to actually be executed - it’s a classical Nimzowischian case of the threat being much stronger than the execution.
>>> 
>>> - Eric Lombrozo
>>> 
>>>> On Jun 27, 2015, at 7:13 PM, Patrick Strateman <patrick.strateman@gmail•com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended
>>>> organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to
>>>> light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the
>>>> user base.
>>>> 
>>>> Satoshi also believed that fraud proofs would be widely available and
>>>> practical.
>>>> 
>>>> If fraud proofs were practical SPV client security would be much closer
>>>> to full node security than it is today.
>>>> 
>>>> Unfortunately no design for fraud proofs which is both efficient and
>>>> secure has been proposed; much less implemented and deployed.
>>>> 
>>>> In building a system as new and innovative as bitcoin certain things
>>>> will be wrong.
>>>> 
>>>> The perception that SPV clients could be made nearly as secure as full
>>>> nodes is one example of something that was wrong.
>>>> 
>>>> On 06/27/2015 05:14 PM, Santino Napolitano wrote:
>>>>> There is much heated debate going on right now and I know it can be very stressful but I'd like to point out that it is really amazing how passionately so many feel about this once very small project. Let's not forget there is something really special going on here and we're all part of it.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The current debate has little to do with block size or hard-forks, IMO. It's about the nature of Bitcoin and what it means to people and how it will grow. I would like to take a moment to share my interpretation of the original author's intent based on everything I could find and read from this person. This is not to say their original vision is paramount-- or even that I got it completely correct but I think it might do us some good to think about.
>>>>> 
>>>>> It seems as though the incentive conceived of for running a full network node was that it would enable mining. The proceeds from mining (new coins and transaction fees) would be the reward and provide a reason to continue operating these nodes. If fees are ever to be a sufficient reward and still allow for a practical and useful system the size of the blocks must grow significantly as must the user base. I'm not sure that this is really contested but I haven't exhaustively reviewed everyone's opinion so please excuse me if I have marginalized you. If you do contest that I would be interested in hearing it.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the user base. This is completely consistent with current trends in Internet consumption, e.g. tablets and phones are becoming more preferred to even owning a traditional computer. Having the system be entirely decentralized and trustless for every client does not appear to me to be the original design goal. Yes, the whitepaper speaks of the design goal as not having a need for a trusted third party but it does not say that some amount of trust won't be preferred by a majority of users. In fact, in the SPV section it implies some amount of localized trust is perhaps a necessary trade-off and maybe businesses should still run their own full network node if they want the stronger completely trustless guarantee. The global decentralized consensus appears meant to make the network
>>>> r
>>>>> esilient to a single government or other adversary's ability to shut the network down. If you really want to trust no one it is your option at a cost and should be possible by design. The author further gives evidence that they believe Moore's observation would keep the idea of running a full network node a practical one at global scale for perpetuity. It does not appear as if they intended for every individual to run one at home nor in their pocket.
>>>>> 
>>>>> If my interpretation seems incorrect please do point it out. I hope this hasn't been too off-topic and distracting. The original author's engineering ingenuity is what gave me any interest in this project so re-visiting their design and scaling intentions might be helpful for us to move forward-- together.
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>>> 
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> 


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2015-06-28  5:32       ` Eric Lombrozo
  2015-06-28  5:48         ` Eric Lombrozo

  2015-06-28 15:51           ` Jorge Timón
  
From: Mark Friedenbach @ 2015-06-28 15:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric Lombrozo;  bitcoin-dev

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There's a couple of things that Patrick could have been referring to when
he said "Fraud proofs need to be at least more efficient than full node
validation. Currently they are not."

One of the issues is that you cannot efficiently encode or validate a proof
of a negative. If a transaction input is a double-spend, you can build a
semi-reasonable sized proof of the prior spend (or very reasonably sized
with block header commitments). However if a transaction spends an output
which never existed in the first place, there is no reasonable way to
assert this other than witnessing the entire block history, as a full node
does.

UTXO commitments are the nominal solution here. You commit the validator
state in each block, and then you can prove things like a negative by
referencing that state commitment. The trouble is this requires maintaining
a hash tree commitment over validator state, which turns out to be insanely
expensive. With the UTXO commitment scheme (the others are not better) that
ends up requiring 15 - 22x more I/O during block validation. And I/O is
presently a limiter to block validation speed. So if you thought 8MB was
what bitcoin today could handle, and you also want this commitment scheme
for fraud proofs, then you should be arguing for a block size limit
decrease (to 500kB), not increase.

On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 10:32 PM, Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo@gmail•com> wrote:

> Just to clarify, SPV is fundamentally busted as it currently exists. I’m
> talking about potential optimizations for future protocols.
>
> - Eric Lombrozo
>
> > On Jun 27, 2015, at 10:29 PM, Patrick Strateman <
> patrick.strateman@gmail•com> wrote:
> >
> > Fraud proofs need to be at least more efficient than full node
> validation.
> >
> > Currently they are not.
> >
> > On 06/27/2015 09:54 PM, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
> >> Fraud proofs actually don’t need to be made super efficient…but they do
> need to be secure, of course.
> >>
> >> The trick is aligning incentives. In order for fraud proofs to be
> widely available there needs to be a market for them - there must be a way
> to buy one (because producing one is not free). What makes such a scheme
> actually practical is that very few of these fraud proofs ever need to
> actually be executed - it’s a classical Nimzowischian case of the threat
> being much stronger than the execution.
> >>
> >> - Eric Lombrozo
> >>
> >>> On Jun 27, 2015, at 7:13 PM, Patrick Strateman <
> patrick.strateman@gmail•com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended
> >>> organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity
> to
> >>> light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the
> >>> user base.
> >>>
> >>> Satoshi also believed that fraud proofs would be widely available and
> >>> practical.
> >>>
> >>> If fraud proofs were practical SPV client security would be much closer
> >>> to full node security than it is today.
> >>>
> >>> Unfortunately no design for fraud proofs which is both efficient and
> >>> secure has been proposed; much less implemented and deployed.
> >>>
> >>> In building a system as new and innovative as bitcoin certain things
> >>> will be wrong.
> >>>
> >>> The perception that SPV clients could be made nearly as secure as full
> >>> nodes is one example of something that was wrong.
> >>>
> >>> On 06/27/2015 05:14 PM, Santino Napolitano wrote:
> >>>> There is much heated debate going on right now and I know it can be
> very stressful but I'd like to point out that it is really amazing how
> passionately so many feel about this once very small project. Let's not
> forget there is something really special going on here and we're all part
> of it.
> >>>>
> >>>> The current debate has little to do with block size or hard-forks,
> IMO. It's about the nature of Bitcoin and what it means to people and how
> it will grow. I would like to take a moment to share my interpretation of
> the original author's intent based on everything I could find and read from
> this person. This is not to say their original vision is paramount-- or
> even that I got it completely correct but I think it might do us some good
> to think about.
> >>>>
> >>>> It seems as though the incentive conceived of for running a full
> network node was that it would enable mining. The proceeds from mining (new
> coins and transaction fees) would be the reward and provide a reason to
> continue operating these nodes. If fees are ever to be a sufficient reward
> and still allow for a practical and useful system the size of the blocks
> must grow significantly as must the user base. I'm not sure that this is
> really contested but I haven't exhaustively reviewed everyone's opinion so
> please excuse me if I have marginalized you. If you do contest that I would
> be interested in hearing it.
> >>>>
> >>>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended
> organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to
> light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the
> user base. This is completely consistent with current trends in Internet
> consumption, e.g. tablets and phones are becoming more preferred to even
> owning a traditional computer. Having the system be entirely decentralized
> and trustless for every client does not appear to me to be the original
> design goal. Yes, the whitepaper speaks of the design goal as not having a
> need for a trusted third party but it does not say that some amount of
> trust won't be preferred by a majority of users. In fact, in the SPV
> section it implies some amount of localized trust is perhaps a necessary
> trade-off and maybe businesses should still run their own full network node
> if they want the stronger completely trustless guarantee. The global
> decentralized consensus appears meant to make the network
> >>> r
> >>>> esilient to a single government or other adversary's ability to shut
> the network down. If you really want to trust no one it is your option at a
> cost and should be possible by design. The author further gives evidence
> that they believe Moore's observation would keep the idea of running a full
> network node a practical one at global scale for perpetuity. It does not
> appear as if they intended for every individual to run one at home nor in
> their pocket.
> >>>>
> >>>> If my interpretation seems incorrect please do point it out. I hope
> this hasn't been too off-topic and distracting. The original author's
> engineering ingenuity is what gave me any interest in this project so
> re-visiting their design and scaling intentions might be helpful for us to
> move forward-- together.
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >>>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> >>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>

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2015-06-28 15:23         ` Mark Friedenbach

  2015-06-28 16:15             ` Mark Friedenbach
  
From: Jorge Timón @ 2015-06-28 15:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mark Friedenbach;  bitcoin-dev

On Sun, Jun 28, 2015 at 5:23 PM, Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach•org> wrote:
> UTXO commitments are the nominal solution here. You commit the validator state in each block, and then you can prove things like a negative by referencing that state commitment. The trouble is this requires maintaining a hash tree commitment over validator state, which turns out to be insanely expensive. With the UTXO commitment scheme (the others are not better) that ends up requiring 15 - 22x more I/O during block validation. And I/O is presently a limiter to block validation speed. So if you thought 8MB was what bitcoin today could handle, and you also want this commitment scheme for fraud proofs, then you should be arguing for a block size limit decrease (to 500kB), not increase.

What about a TXO and a STXO O(1)-append commitment? That shouldn't
cause that much overhead and you can build UTXO from TXO - STXO.
I know it's not so efficient in some respects but it scales better I think.


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-06-28 15:51           ` Jorge Timón

  
From: Mark Friedenbach @ 2015-06-28 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jorge Timón;  bitcoin-dev

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Assuming randomly-picked outputs, it's actually worse. The slowdown factor
has to do with the depth of the tree, and TXO and STXO trees are always
growing. It's still complexity O(log N), but with TXO/STXO N is the size of
the entire block chain history, whereas with UTXO it's just the set of
unspent transaction outputs.

Of course that's not a fair assumption since in an insertion-ordered tree
using the Merkle mountain range data structure would have significantly
shorter paths for recent outputs. But the average case might be about the
same, and it comes with a slew of other tradeoffs that make it hard to
compare head-to-head in the abstract. Ultimately both need to be written
and benchmarked.

But it is not the case that TXO/STXO gives you constant time updates. The
append-only TXO tree might be close to that, but you'd still need the spent
or unspent tree which is not insertion ordered. There are alternatives like
updating the TXO tree and requiring blocks and transactions to carry proofs
with them (so validators can be stateless), but that pushes the same
(worse, actually) problem to whoever generated or assembled the proof. It
may be a tradeoff worth making, but it's not an easy answer...

On Sun, Jun 28, 2015 at 8:51 AM, Jorge Timón <jtimon@jtimon•cc> wrote:

> On Sun, Jun 28, 2015 at 5:23 PM, Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach•org>
> wrote:
> > UTXO commitments are the nominal solution here. You commit the validator
> state in each block, and then you can prove things like a negative by
> referencing that state commitment. The trouble is this requires maintaining
> a hash tree commitment over validator state, which turns out to be insanely
> expensive. With the UTXO commitment scheme (the others are not better) that
> ends up requiring 15 - 22x more I/O during block validation. And I/O is
> presently a limiter to block validation speed. So if you thought 8MB was
> what bitcoin today could handle, and you also want this commitment scheme
> for fraud proofs, then you should be arguing for a block size limit
> decrease (to 500kB), not increase.
>
> What about a TXO and a STXO O(1)-append commitment? That shouldn't
> cause that much overhead and you can build UTXO from TXO - STXO.
> I know it's not so efficient in some respects but it scales better I think.
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2015-06-28  2:13 ` Patrick Strateman
  2015-06-28  4:54   ` Eric Lombrozo

  
From: Santino Napolitano @ 2015-06-28 21:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Patrick Strateman, bitcoin-dev

Is the security concern that a newly announced block may not actually reflect a valid block (but valid enough to trick the client; i.e. it appears to link to the best-work chain) in an attempt to defraud the light client?

Like I pointed out, I'm not sure the goal was _perfect_ decentralization. The author seemed primarily keen to avoid having a single organization with direct control over the ledger. I think your specific fear could be mitigated by the light client peering with a node the light client somewhat trusts -- or at least one which has no incentive to cooperate in some attack against it which requires non-trivial mining expenditure. The IP would be logged and the fraud could be taken to a court if the light client chooses a node in the proper jurisdiction. I think for many use cases that might be sufficient. If it's a more serious transaction other nodes could be consulted.

If my reasoning is in error please correct. I'm sure many of you are much better at game theory than I.

28.06.2015, 05:13, "Patrick Strateman" <patrick.strateman@gmail•com>:
>>  Further, it appears clear that the original author intended
>
> organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to
> light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the
> user base.
>
> Satoshi also believed that fraud proofs would be widely available and
> practical.
>
> If fraud proofs were practical SPV client security would be much closer
> to full node security than it is today.
>
> Unfortunately no design for fraud proofs which is both efficient and
> secure has been proposed; much less implemented and deployed.
>
> In building a system as new and innovative as bitcoin certain things
> will be wrong.
>
> The perception that SPV clients could be made nearly as secure as full
> nodes is one example of something that was wrong.
>
> On 06/27/2015 05:14 PM, Santino Napolitano wrote:
>>  There is much heated debate going on right now and I know it can be very stressful but I'd like to point out that it is really amazing how passionately so many feel about this once very small project. Let's not forget there is something really special going on here and we're all part of it.
>>
>>  The current debate has little to do with block size or hard-forks, IMO. It's about the nature of Bitcoin and what it means to people and how it will grow. I would like to take a moment to share my interpretation of the original author's intent based on everything I could find and read from this person. This is not to say their original vision is paramount-- or even that I got it completely correct but I think it might do us some good to think about.
>>
>>  It seems as though the incentive conceived of for running a full network node was that it would enable mining. The proceeds from mining (new coins and transaction fees) would be the reward and provide a reason to continue operating these nodes. If fees are ever to be a sufficient reward and still allow for a practical and useful system the size of the blocks must grow significantly as must the user base. I'm not sure that this is really contested but I haven't exhaustively reviewed everyone's opinion so please excuse me if I have marginalized you. If you do contest that I would be interested in hearing it.
>>
>>  Further, it appears clear that the original author intended organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the user base. This is completely consistent with current trends in Internet consumption, e.g. tablets and phones are becoming more preferred to even owning a traditional computer. Having the system be entirely decentralized and trustless for every client does not appear to me to be the original design goal. Yes, the whitepaper speaks of the design goal as not having a need for a trusted third party but it does not say that some amount of trust won't be preferred by a majority of users. In fact, in the SPV section it implies some amount of localized trust is perhaps a necessary trade-off and maybe businesses should still run their own full network node if they want the stronger completely trustless guarantee. The global decentralized consensus appears meant to make the netwo
 rk
>
>   r
>>   esilient to a single government or other adversary's ability to shut the network down. If you really want to trust no one it is your option at a cost and should be possible by design. The author further gives evidence that they believe Moore's observation would keep the idea of running a full network node a practical one at global scale for perpetuity. It does not appear as if they intended for every individual to run one at home nor in their pocket.
>>
>>  If my interpretation seems incorrect please do point it out. I hope this hasn't been too off-topic and distracting. The original author's engineering ingenuity is what gave me any interest in this project so re-visiting their design and scaling intentions might be helpful for us to move forward-- together.
>>
>>  _______________________________________________
>>  bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>  bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>>  https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]