BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients

BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients
2017-06-01 21:00 ` Eric Lombrozo
                   ` (6 more replies)
  
From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun @ 2017-06-01 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5087 bytes --]

Hi y'all,

Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
consideration:
   * https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki

This BIP proposal describes a concrete specification (along with a
reference implementations[1][2][3]) for the much discussed client-side
filtering reversal of BIP-37. The precise details are described in the
BIP, but as a summary: we've implemented a new light-client mode that uses
client-side filtering based off of Golomb-Rice coded sets. Full-nodes
maintain an additional index of the chain, and serve this compact filter
(the index) to light clients which request them. Light clients then fetch
these filters, query the locally and _maybe_ fetch the block if a relevant
item matches. The cool part is that blocks can be fetched from _any_
source, once the light client deems it necessary. Our primary motivation
for this work was enabling a light client mode for lnd[4] in order to
support a more light-weight back end paving the way for the usage of
Lightning on mobile phones and other devices. We've integrated neutrino
as a back end for lnd, and will be making the updated code public very
soon.

One specific area we'd like feedback on is the parameter selection. Unlike
BIP-37 which allows clients to dynamically tune their false positive rate,
our proposal uses a _fixed_ false-positive. Within the document, it's
currently specified as P = 1/2^20. We've done a bit of analysis and
optimization attempting to optimize the following sum:
filter_download_bandwidth + expected_block_false_positive_bandwidth. Alex
has made a JS calculator that allows y'all to explore the affect of
tweaking the false positive rate in addition to the following variables:
the number of items the wallet is scanning for, the size of the blocks,
number of blocks fetched, and the size of the filters themselves. The
calculator calculates the expected bandwidth utilization using the CDF of
the Geometric Distribution. The calculator can be found here:
https://aakselrod.github.io/gcs_calc.html. Alex also has an empirical
script he's been running on actual data, and the results seem to match up
rather nicely.

We we're excited to see that Karl Johan Alm (kallewoof) has done some
(rather extensive!) analysis of his own, focusing on a distinct encoding
type [5]. I haven't had the time yet to dig into his report yet, but I
think I've read enough to extract the key difference in our encodings: his
filters use a binomial encoding _directly_ on the filter contents, will we
instead create a Golomb-Coded set with the contents being _hashes_ (we use
siphash) of the filter items.

Using a fixed fp=20, I have some stats detailing the total index size, as
well as averages for both mainnet and testnet. For mainnet, using the
filter contents as currently described in the BIP (basic + extended), the
total size of the index comes out to 6.9GB. The break down is as follows:

    * total size:  6976047156
    * total avg:  14997.220622758816
    * total median:  3801
    * total max:  79155
    * regular size:  3117183743
    * regular avg:  6701.372750217131
    * regular median:  1734
    * regular max:  67533
    * extended size:  3858863413
    * extended avg:  8295.847872541684
    * extended median:  2041
    * extended max:  52508

In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
larger blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:

    * total size:  2753238530
    * total avg:  5918.95736054141
    * total median:  60202
    * total max:  74983
    * regular size:  1165148878
    * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
    * regular median:  24812
    * regular max:  64554
    * extended size:  1588089652
    * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
    * extended median:  35260
    * extended max:  41731

Finally, here are the testnet stats which take into account the increase
in the maximum filter size due to segwit's block-size increase. The max
filter sizes are a bit larger due to some of the habitual blocks I
created last year when testing segwit (transactions with 30k inputs, 30k
outputs, etc).

     * total size:  585087597
     * total avg:  520.8839608674402
     * total median:  20
     * total max:  164598
     * regular size:  299325029
     * regular avg:  266.4790836307566
     * regular median:  13
     * regular max:  164583
     * extended size:  285762568
     * extended avg:  254.4048772366836
     * extended median:  7
     * extended max:  127631

For those that are interested in the raw data, I've uploaded a CSV file
of raw data for each block (mainnet + testnet), which can be found here:
     * mainnet: (14MB):
https://www.dropbox.com/s/4yk2u8dj06njbuv/mainnet-gcs-stats.csv?dl=0
     * testnet: (25MB):
https://www.dropbox.com/s/w7dmmcbocnmjfbo/gcs-stats-testnet.csv?dl=0


We look forward to getting feedback from all of y'all!

-- Laolu


[1]: https://github.com/lightninglabs/neutrino
[2]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/tree/segwit-cbf
[3]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcutil/tree/gcs/gcs
[4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/

-- Laolu

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2017-06-01 21:00 ` 
                   ` 
  
From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun @ 2017-06-01 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5087 bytes --]

Hi y'all,

Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
consideration:
   * https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki

This BIP proposal describes a concrete specification (along with a
reference implementations[1][2][3]) for the much discussed client-side
filtering reversal of BIP-37. The precise details are described in the
BIP, but as a summary: we've implemented a new light-client mode that uses
client-side filtering based off of Golomb-Rice coded sets. Full-nodes
maintain an additional index of the chain, and serve this compact filter
(the index) to light clients which request them. Light clients then fetch
these filters, query the locally and _maybe_ fetch the block if a relevant
item matches. The cool part is that blocks can be fetched from _any_
source, once the light client deems it necessary. Our primary motivation
for this work was enabling a light client mode for lnd[4] in order to
support a more light-weight back end paving the way for the usage of
Lightning on mobile phones and other devices. We've integrated neutrino
as a back end for lnd, and will be making the updated code public very
soon.

One specific area we'd like feedback on is the parameter selection. Unlike
BIP-37 which allows clients to dynamically tune their false positive rate,
our proposal uses a _fixed_ false-positive. Within the document, it's
currently specified as P = 1/2^20. We've done a bit of analysis and
optimization attempting to optimize the following sum:
filter_download_bandwidth + expected_block_false_positive_bandwidth. Alex
has made a JS calculator that allows y'all to explore the affect of
tweaking the false positive rate in addition to the following variables:
the number of items the wallet is scanning for, the size of the blocks,
number of blocks fetched, and the size of the filters themselves. The
calculator calculates the expected bandwidth utilization using the CDF of
the Geometric Distribution. The calculator can be found here:
https://aakselrod.github.io/gcs_calc.html. Alex also has an empirical
script he's been running on actual data, and the results seem to match up
rather nicely.

We we're excited to see that Karl Johan Alm (kallewoof) has done some
(rather extensive!) analysis of his own, focusing on a distinct encoding
type [5]. I haven't had the time yet to dig into his report yet, but I
think I've read enough to extract the key difference in our encodings: his
filters use a binomial encoding _directly_ on the filter contents, will we
instead create a Golomb-Coded set with the contents being _hashes_ (we use
siphash) of the filter items.

Using a fixed fp=20, I have some stats detailing the total index size, as
well as averages for both mainnet and testnet. For mainnet, using the
filter contents as currently described in the BIP (basic + extended), the
total size of the index comes out to 6.9GB. The break down is as follows:

    * total size:  6976047156
    * total avg:  14997.220622758816
    * total median:  3801
    * total max:  79155
    * regular size:  3117183743
    * regular avg:  6701.372750217131
    * regular median:  1734
    * regular max:  67533
    * extended size:  3858863413
    * extended avg:  8295.847872541684
    * extended median:  2041
    * extended max:  52508

In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
larger blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:

    * total size:  2753238530
    * total avg:  5918.95736054141
    * total median:  60202
    * total max:  74983
    * regular size:  1165148878
    * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
    * regular median:  24812
    * regular max:  64554
    * extended size:  1588089652
    * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
    * extended median:  35260
    * extended max:  41731

Finally, here are the testnet stats which take into account the increase
in the maximum filter size due to segwit's block-size increase. The max
filter sizes are a bit larger due to some of the habitual blocks I
created last year when testing segwit (transactions with 30k inputs, 30k
outputs, etc).

     * total size:  585087597
     * total avg:  520.8839608674402
     * total median:  20
     * total max:  164598
     * regular size:  299325029
     * regular avg:  266.4790836307566
     * regular median:  13
     * regular max:  164583
     * extended size:  285762568
     * extended avg:  254.4048772366836
     * extended median:  7
     * extended max:  127631

For those that are interested in the raw data, I've uploaded a CSV file
of raw data for each block (mainnet + testnet), which can be found here:
     * mainnet: (14MB):
https://www.dropbox.com/s/4yk2u8dj06njbuv/mainnet-gcs-stats.csv?dl=0
     * testnet: (25MB):
https://www.dropbox.com/s/w7dmmcbocnmjfbo/gcs-stats-testnet.csv?dl=0


We look forward to getting feedback from all of y'all!

-- Laolu


[1]: https://github.com/lightninglabs/neutrino
[2]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/tree/segwit-cbf
[3]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcutil/tree/gcs/gcs
[4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/

-- Laolu

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* 
  2017-06-01 19:01 [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients Olaoluwa Osuntokun

  2017-06-01 21:33 ` 
                   ` 
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Eric Lombrozo @ 2017-06-01 21:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Olaoluwa Osuntokun;  Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5526 bytes --]

Thanks for sending this proposal! I look forward to having a great
discussion around this.

- Eric

On Thursday, June 1, 2017, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hi y'all,
>
> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
> consideration:
>    * https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_
> client.mediawiki
>
> This BIP proposal describes a concrete specification (along with a
> reference implementations[1][2][3]) for the much discussed client-side
> filtering reversal of BIP-37. The precise details are described in the
> BIP, but as a summary: we've implemented a new light-client mode that uses
> client-side filtering based off of Golomb-Rice coded sets. Full-nodes
> maintain an additional index of the chain, and serve this compact filter
> (the index) to light clients which request them. Light clients then fetch
> these filters, query the locally and _maybe_ fetch the block if a relevant
> item matches. The cool part is that blocks can be fetched from _any_
> source, once the light client deems it necessary. Our primary motivation
> for this work was enabling a light client mode for lnd[4] in order to
> support a more light-weight back end paving the way for the usage of
> Lightning on mobile phones and other devices. We've integrated neutrino
> as a back end for lnd, and will be making the updated code public very
> soon.
>
> One specific area we'd like feedback on is the parameter selection. Unlike
> BIP-37 which allows clients to dynamically tune their false positive rate,
> our proposal uses a _fixed_ false-positive. Within the document, it's
> currently specified as P = 1/2^20. We've done a bit of analysis and
> optimization attempting to optimize the following sum:
> filter_download_bandwidth + expected_block_false_positive_bandwidth. Alex
> has made a JS calculator that allows y'all to explore the affect of
> tweaking the false positive rate in addition to the following variables:
> the number of items the wallet is scanning for, the size of the blocks,
> number of blocks fetched, and the size of the filters themselves. The
> calculator calculates the expected bandwidth utilization using the CDF of
> the Geometric Distribution. The calculator can be found here:
> https://aakselrod.github.io/gcs_calc.html. Alex also has an empirical
> script he's been running on actual data, and the results seem to match up
> rather nicely.
>
> We we're excited to see that Karl Johan Alm (kallewoof) has done some
> (rather extensive!) analysis of his own, focusing on a distinct encoding
> type [5]. I haven't had the time yet to dig into his report yet, but I
> think I've read enough to extract the key difference in our encodings: his
> filters use a binomial encoding _directly_ on the filter contents, will we
> instead create a Golomb-Coded set with the contents being _hashes_ (we use
> siphash) of the filter items.
>
> Using a fixed fp=20, I have some stats detailing the total index size, as
> well as averages for both mainnet and testnet. For mainnet, using the
> filter contents as currently described in the BIP (basic + extended), the
> total size of the index comes out to 6.9GB. The break down is as follows:
>
>     * total size:  6976047156
>     * total avg:  14997.220622758816
>     * total median:  3801
>     * total max:  79155
>     * regular size:  3117183743
>     * regular avg:  6701.372750217131
>     * regular median:  1734
>     * regular max:  67533
>     * extended size:  3858863413
>     * extended avg:  8295.847872541684
>     * extended median:  2041
>     * extended max:  52508
>
> In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
> larger blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:
>
>     * total size:  2753238530
>     * total avg:  5918.95736054141
>     * total median:  60202
>     * total max:  74983
>     * regular size:  1165148878
>     * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
>     * regular median:  24812
>     * regular max:  64554
>     * extended size:  1588089652
>     * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
>     * extended median:  35260
>     * extended max:  41731
>
> Finally, here are the testnet stats which take into account the increase
> in the maximum filter size due to segwit's block-size increase. The max
> filter sizes are a bit larger due to some of the habitual blocks I
> created last year when testing segwit (transactions with 30k inputs, 30k
> outputs, etc).
>
>      * total size:  585087597
>      * total avg:  520.8839608674402
>      * total median:  20
>      * total max:  164598
>      * regular size:  299325029
>      * regular avg:  266.4790836307566
>      * regular median:  13
>      * regular max:  164583
>      * extended size:  285762568
>      * extended avg:  254.4048772366836
>      * extended median:  7
>      * extended max:  127631
>
> For those that are interested in the raw data, I've uploaded a CSV file
> of raw data for each block (mainnet + testnet), which can be found here:
>      * mainnet: (14MB): https://www.dropbox.com/s/
> 4yk2u8dj06njbuv/mainnet-gcs-stats.csv?dl=0
>      * testnet: (25MB): https://www.dropbox.com/s/
> w7dmmcbocnmjfbo/gcs-stats-testnet.csv?dl=0
>
>
> We look forward to getting feedback from all of y'all!
>
> -- Laolu
>
>
> [1]: https://github.com/lightninglabs/neutrino
> [2]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/tree/segwit-cbf
> [3]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcutil/tree/gcs/gcs
> [4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/
>
> -- Laolu
>
>

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^ permalink raw reply	[|nested] 39+ messages in thread
2017-06-01 21:33 ` Matt Corallo

  2017-06-02  2:15     ` Chris
  
From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun @ 2017-06-01 22:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Matt Corallo, Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 7552 bytes --]

Eric wrote:
> Thanks for sending this proposal! I look forward to having a great
> discussion around this.

Thanks Eric! We really appreciated the early feedback you gave on the
initial design.

One aspect which isn't in this BIP draft is direct support for unconfirmed
transactions. I consider such a feature an important UX feature for mobile
phones, and something which I've personally seen as an important
UX-experience when on-boarding new users to Bitcoin. This was brought up
in the original "bfd" mailing list chain [1]. Possible solutions are: a
new beefier INV message which contains enough information to be able to
identify relevant outputs created in a transaction, or a "streaming" p2p
extension that allows light clients to receive notifications of mempool
inclusion based on only (pkScript, amount) pairs.

Matt wrote:
> looks like you have no way to match the input prevouts being spent, which
> is rather nice from a "watch for this output being spent" pov.

Perhaps we didn't make this clear enough, but it _is_ indeed possible to
watch an output for spentness. Or maybe you mean matching on the
_script_ being spent?

From the BIP draft:
> for each transaction, normal filters contain:
>  * The outpoints of each input within a transaction.
>  ...

Within the integration for lnd, we specifically use this feature to be
able to watch for when channels have been closed within the network graph,
or channels _directly_ under our control have been spent (either
unilateral channel closure, or a revocation beach).

-- Laolu

[1]:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-January/013397.html


On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 2:33 PM Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo•com>
wrote:

> Quick comment before I finish reading it completely, looks like you have
> no way to match the input prevouts being spent, which is rather nice from a
> "watch for this output being spent" pov.
>
> On June 1, 2017 3:01:14 PM EDT, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >Hi y'all,
> >
> >Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
> >consideration:
> >*
> >https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
> >
> >This BIP proposal describes a concrete specification (along with a
> >reference implementations[1][2][3]) for the much discussed client-side
> >filtering reversal of BIP-37. The precise details are described in the
> >BIP, but as a summary: we've implemented a new light-client mode that
> >uses
> >client-side filtering based off of Golomb-Rice coded sets. Full-nodes
> >maintain an additional index of the chain, and serve this compact
> >filter
> >(the index) to light clients which request them. Light clients then
> >fetch
> >these filters, query the locally and _maybe_ fetch the block if a
> >relevant
> >item matches. The cool part is that blocks can be fetched from _any_
> >source, once the light client deems it necessary. Our primary
> >motivation
> >for this work was enabling a light client mode for lnd[4] in order to
> >support a more light-weight back end paving the way for the usage of
> >Lightning on mobile phones and other devices. We've integrated neutrino
> >as a back end for lnd, and will be making the updated code public very
> >soon.
> >
> >One specific area we'd like feedback on is the parameter selection.
> >Unlike
> >BIP-37 which allows clients to dynamically tune their false positive
> >rate,
> >our proposal uses a _fixed_ false-positive. Within the document, it's
> >currently specified as P = 1/2^20. We've done a bit of analysis and
> >optimization attempting to optimize the following sum:
> >filter_download_bandwidth + expected_block_false_positive_bandwidth.
> >Alex
> >has made a JS calculator that allows y'all to explore the affect of
> >tweaking the false positive rate in addition to the following
> >variables:
> >the number of items the wallet is scanning for, the size of the blocks,
> >number of blocks fetched, and the size of the filters themselves. The
> >calculator calculates the expected bandwidth utilization using the CDF
> >of
> >the Geometric Distribution. The calculator can be found here:
> >https://aakselrod.github.io/gcs_calc.html. Alex also has an empirical
> >script he's been running on actual data, and the results seem to match
> >up
> >rather nicely.
> >
> >We we're excited to see that Karl Johan Alm (kallewoof) has done some
> >(rather extensive!) analysis of his own, focusing on a distinct
> >encoding
> >type [5]. I haven't had the time yet to dig into his report yet, but I
> >think I've read enough to extract the key difference in our encodings:
> >his
> >filters use a binomial encoding _directly_ on the filter contents, will
> >we
> >instead create a Golomb-Coded set with the contents being _hashes_ (we
> >use
> >siphash) of the filter items.
> >
> >Using a fixed fp=20, I have some stats detailing the total index size,
> >as
> >well as averages for both mainnet and testnet. For mainnet, using the
> >filter contents as currently described in the BIP (basic + extended),
> >the
> >total size of the index comes out to 6.9GB. The break down is as
> >follows:
> >
> >    * total size:  6976047156
> >    * total avg:  14997.220622758816
> >    * total median:  3801
> >    * total max:  79155
> >    * regular size:  3117183743
> >    * regular avg:  6701.372750217131
> >    * regular median:  1734
> >    * regular max:  67533
> >    * extended size:  3858863413 <(385)%20886-3413>
> >    * extended avg:  8295.847872541684
> >    * extended median:  2041
> >    * extended max:  52508
> >
> >In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
> >larger blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:
> >
> >    * total size:  2753238530
> >    * total avg:  5918.95736054141
> >    * total median:  60202
> >    * total max:  74983
> >    * regular size:  1165148878
> >    * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
> >    * regular median:  24812
> >    * regular max:  64554
> >    * extended size:  1588089652
> >    * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
> >    * extended median:  35260
> >    * extended max:  41731
> >
> >Finally, here are the testnet stats which take into account the
> >increase
> >in the maximum filter size due to segwit's block-size increase. The max
> >filter sizes are a bit larger due to some of the habitual blocks I
> >created last year when testing segwit (transactions with 30k inputs,
> >30k
> >outputs, etc).
> >
> >     * total size:  585087597
> >     * total avg:  520.8839608674402
> >     * total median:  20
> >     * total max:  164598
> >     * regular size:  299325029
> >     * regular avg:  266.4790836307566
> >     * regular median:  13
> >     * regular max:  164583
> >     * extended size:  285762568
> >     * extended avg:  254.4048772366836
> >     * extended median:  7
> >     * extended max:  127631
> >
> >For those that are interested in the raw data, I've uploaded a CSV file
> >of raw data for each block (mainnet + testnet), which can be found
> >here:
> >     * mainnet: (14MB):
> >https://www.dropbox.com/s/4yk2u8dj06njbuv/mainnet-gcs-stats.csv?dl=0
> >     * testnet: (25MB):
> >https://www.dropbox.com/s/w7dmmcbocnmjfbo/gcs-stats-testnet.csv?dl=0
> >
> >
> >We look forward to getting feedback from all of y'all!
> >
> >-- Laolu
> >
> >
> >[1]: https://github.com/lightninglabs/neutrino
> >[2]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/tree/segwit-cbf
> >[3]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcutil/tree/gcs/gcs
> >[4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/
> >
> >-- Laolu
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-01 22:10   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun

  2017-06-02  2:28       ` Gregory Maxwell
  
From: Chris @ 2017-06-02  2:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

On 06/01/2017 06:10 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:

> One aspect which isn't in this BIP draft is direct support for unconfirmed
> transactions. I consider such a feature an important UX feature for mobile
> phones, and something which I've personally seen as an important
> UX-experience when on-boarding new users to Bitcoin.

Totally agree. My first thought is maybe you could keep bip37 filtering
as optional for unconfirmed transactions. Since you're only interested
in incoming transactions in this case you can create one big filter with
all your wallet's addresses and reuse that filter. The bip37 privacy
issues mainly come up when trying to get the filter to match both
incoming and outgoing transactions, which is not needed in this case.

Otoh, if you download the block from the same peer that you gave a bip37
filter then they could probably test the txs in the block against both
filters. :/



 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-02  2:15     ` Chris

  2017-06-02  3:35         ` Alex Akselrod
  2017-06-02 16:07         ` Chris Pacia
  
From: Gregory Maxwell @ 2017-06-02  2:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Chris;  Bitcoin Dev

On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:15 AM, Chris via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On 06/01/2017 06:10 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
>> One aspect which isn't in this BIP draft is direct support for unconfirmed
>> transactions. I consider such a feature an important UX feature for mobile
>> phones, and something which I've personally seen as an important
>> UX-experience when on-boarding new users to Bitcoin.
>
> Totally agree. My first thought is maybe you could keep bip37 filtering
> as optional for unconfirmed transactions. Since you're only interested

Really bad for privacy. Data for transactions at the tip is only
14kb/s-- potentially less if segwit is in use and you're not getting
witnesses. Is that really that burdensome?

FWIW, leaving a mobile browser just running while pointed at some
websites seems to use more traffic than that just loading advertising.
:)


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-02  2:28       ` Gregory Maxwell

  2017-06-02 16:07         ` Chris Pacia
  
From: Alex Akselrod @ 2017-06-02  3:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2032 bytes --]

I agree with Greg and Laolu; BIP-37 filtering for transactions is no better
than for blocks and completely destroys privacy.

A constant stream of transactions is OK, but even cheaper for light clients
would be Laolu's proposal of streaming more tx data than existing inv
messages but less than existing tx messages.

We could make a bit field of things to include in every inv-with-metadata
message, such as:
- witness data
- scriptSig data pushes
- scriptPubKey
- hash of scriptPubKey (unnecessary if full scriptPubKey is sent)
- scriptPubKey data pushes
- etc.

This way a full node might be able to tell what application (or type of
application) a light client is running, but not the client's addresses or
outputs, except maybe when the client originates transactions.

On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 10:28 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:15 AM, Chris via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > On 06/01/2017 06:10 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >
> >> One aspect which isn't in this BIP draft is direct support for
> unconfirmed
> >> transactions. I consider such a feature an important UX feature for
> mobile
> >> phones, and something which I've personally seen as an important
> >> UX-experience when on-boarding new users to Bitcoin.
> >
> > Totally agree. My first thought is maybe you could keep bip37 filtering
> > as optional for unconfirmed transactions. Since you're only interested
>
> Really bad for privacy. Data for transactions at the tip is only
> 14kb/s-- potentially less if segwit is in use and you're not getting
> witnesses. Is that really that burdensome?
>
> FWIW, leaving a mobile browser just running while pointed at some
> websites seems to use more traffic than that just loading advertising.
> :)
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
* 
  2017-06-01 19:01 [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients Olaoluwa Osuntokun
  2017-06-01 21:00 ` Eric Lombrozo

  2017-06-01 22:10   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
  2017-06-02  4:49 ` 
                   ` 
  6 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Matt Corallo @ 2017-06-01 21:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Olaoluwa Osuntokun, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev,
	Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev

Quick comment before I finish reading it completely, looks like you have no way to match the input prevouts being spent, which is rather nice from a "watch for this output being spent" pov.

On June 1, 2017 3:01:14 PM EDT, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>Hi y'all,
>
>Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
>consideration:
>*
>https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>
>This BIP proposal describes a concrete specification (along with a
>reference implementations[1][2][3]) for the much discussed client-side
>filtering reversal of BIP-37. The precise details are described in the
>BIP, but as a summary: we've implemented a new light-client mode that
>uses
>client-side filtering based off of Golomb-Rice coded sets. Full-nodes
>maintain an additional index of the chain, and serve this compact
>filter
>(the index) to light clients which request them. Light clients then
>fetch
>these filters, query the locally and _maybe_ fetch the block if a
>relevant
>item matches. The cool part is that blocks can be fetched from _any_
>source, once the light client deems it necessary. Our primary
>motivation
>for this work was enabling a light client mode for lnd[4] in order to
>support a more light-weight back end paving the way for the usage of
>Lightning on mobile phones and other devices. We've integrated neutrino
>as a back end for lnd, and will be making the updated code public very
>soon.
>
>One specific area we'd like feedback on is the parameter selection.
>Unlike
>BIP-37 which allows clients to dynamically tune their false positive
>rate,
>our proposal uses a _fixed_ false-positive. Within the document, it's
>currently specified as P = 1/2^20. We've done a bit of analysis and
>optimization attempting to optimize the following sum:
>filter_download_bandwidth + expected_block_false_positive_bandwidth.
>Alex
>has made a JS calculator that allows y'all to explore the affect of
>tweaking the false positive rate in addition to the following
>variables:
>the number of items the wallet is scanning for, the size of the blocks,
>number of blocks fetched, and the size of the filters themselves. The
>calculator calculates the expected bandwidth utilization using the CDF
>of
>the Geometric Distribution. The calculator can be found here:
>https://aakselrod.github.io/gcs_calc.html. Alex also has an empirical
>script he's been running on actual data, and the results seem to match
>up
>rather nicely.
>
>We we're excited to see that Karl Johan Alm (kallewoof) has done some
>(rather extensive!) analysis of his own, focusing on a distinct
>encoding
>type [5]. I haven't had the time yet to dig into his report yet, but I
>think I've read enough to extract the key difference in our encodings:
>his
>filters use a binomial encoding _directly_ on the filter contents, will
>we
>instead create a Golomb-Coded set with the contents being _hashes_ (we
>use
>siphash) of the filter items.
>
>Using a fixed fp=20, I have some stats detailing the total index size,
>as
>well as averages for both mainnet and testnet. For mainnet, using the
>filter contents as currently described in the BIP (basic + extended),
>the
>total size of the index comes out to 6.9GB. The break down is as
>follows:
>
>    * total size:  6976047156
>    * total avg:  14997.220622758816
>    * total median:  3801
>    * total max:  79155
>    * regular size:  3117183743
>    * regular avg:  6701.372750217131
>    * regular median:  1734
>    * regular max:  67533
>    * extended size:  3858863413
>    * extended avg:  8295.847872541684
>    * extended median:  2041
>    * extended max:  52508
>
>In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
>larger blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:
>
>    * total size:  2753238530
>    * total avg:  5918.95736054141
>    * total median:  60202
>    * total max:  74983
>    * regular size:  1165148878
>    * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
>    * regular median:  24812
>    * regular max:  64554
>    * extended size:  1588089652
>    * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
>    * extended median:  35260
>    * extended max:  41731
>
>Finally, here are the testnet stats which take into account the
>increase
>in the maximum filter size due to segwit's block-size increase. The max
>filter sizes are a bit larger due to some of the habitual blocks I
>created last year when testing segwit (transactions with 30k inputs,
>30k
>outputs, etc).
>
>     * total size:  585087597
>     * total avg:  520.8839608674402
>     * total median:  20
>     * total max:  164598
>     * regular size:  299325029
>     * regular avg:  266.4790836307566
>     * regular median:  13
>     * regular max:  164583
>     * extended size:  285762568
>     * extended avg:  254.4048772366836
>     * extended median:  7
>     * extended max:  127631
>
>For those that are interested in the raw data, I've uploaded a CSV file
>of raw data for each block (mainnet + testnet), which can be found
>here:
>     * mainnet: (14MB):
>https://www.dropbox.com/s/4yk2u8dj06njbuv/mainnet-gcs-stats.csv?dl=0
>     * testnet: (25MB):
>https://www.dropbox.com/s/w7dmmcbocnmjfbo/gcs-stats-testnet.csv?dl=0
>
>
>We look forward to getting feedback from all of y'all!
>
>-- Laolu
>
>
>[1]: https://github.com/lightninglabs/neutrino
>[2]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/tree/segwit-cbf
>[3]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcutil/tree/gcs/gcs
>[4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/
>
>-- Laolu


^ permalink raw reply	[|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* 
  2017-06-01 19:01 [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients Olaoluwa Osuntokun
  2017-06-01 21:00 ` Eric Lombrozo
  2017-06-01 21:33 ` Matt Corallo

  2017-06-09  3:59   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
  2017-06-02  6:00 ` 
                   ` 
  6 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun @ 2017-06-02  4:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6061 bytes --]

> In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
larger
> blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:
>
>     * total size:  2753238530
>     * total avg:  5918.95736054141
>     * total median:  60202
>     * total max:  74983
>     * regular size:  1165148878
>     * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
>     * regular median:  24812
>     * regular max:  64554
>     * extended size:  1588089652
>     * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
>     * extended median:  35260
>     * extended max:  41731
>

Oops, realized I made a mistake. These are the stats for Feb 2016 until
about a
month ago (since height 400k iirc).

-- Laolu


On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 12:01 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail•com>
wrote:

> Hi y'all,
>
> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
> consideration:
>    *
> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>
> This BIP proposal describes a concrete specification (along with a
> reference implementations[1][2][3]) for the much discussed client-side
> filtering reversal of BIP-37. The precise details are described in the
> BIP, but as a summary: we've implemented a new light-client mode that uses
> client-side filtering based off of Golomb-Rice coded sets. Full-nodes
> maintain an additional index of the chain, and serve this compact filter
> (the index) to light clients which request them. Light clients then fetch
> these filters, query the locally and _maybe_ fetch the block if a relevant
> item matches. The cool part is that blocks can be fetched from _any_
> source, once the light client deems it necessary. Our primary motivation
> for this work was enabling a light client mode for lnd[4] in order to
> support a more light-weight back end paving the way for the usage of
> Lightning on mobile phones and other devices. We've integrated neutrino
> as a back end for lnd, and will be making the updated code public very
> soon.
>
> One specific area we'd like feedback on is the parameter selection. Unlike
> BIP-37 which allows clients to dynamically tune their false positive rate,
> our proposal uses a _fixed_ false-positive. Within the document, it's
> currently specified as P = 1/2^20. We've done a bit of analysis and
> optimization attempting to optimize the following sum:
> filter_download_bandwidth + expected_block_false_positive_bandwidth. Alex
> has made a JS calculator that allows y'all to explore the affect of
> tweaking the false positive rate in addition to the following variables:
> the number of items the wallet is scanning for, the size of the blocks,
> number of blocks fetched, and the size of the filters themselves. The
> calculator calculates the expected bandwidth utilization using the CDF of
> the Geometric Distribution. The calculator can be found here:
> https://aakselrod.github.io/gcs_calc.html. Alex also has an empirical
> script he's been running on actual data, and the results seem to match up
> rather nicely.
>
> We we're excited to see that Karl Johan Alm (kallewoof) has done some
> (rather extensive!) analysis of his own, focusing on a distinct encoding
> type [5]. I haven't had the time yet to dig into his report yet, but I
> think I've read enough to extract the key difference in our encodings: his
> filters use a binomial encoding _directly_ on the filter contents, will we
> instead create a Golomb-Coded set with the contents being _hashes_ (we use
> siphash) of the filter items.
>
> Using a fixed fp=20, I have some stats detailing the total index size, as
> well as averages for both mainnet and testnet. For mainnet, using the
> filter contents as currently described in the BIP (basic + extended), the
> total size of the index comes out to 6.9GB. The break down is as follows:
>
>     * total size:  6976047156
>     * total avg:  14997.220622758816
>     * total median:  3801
>     * total max:  79155
>     * regular size:  3117183743
>     * regular avg:  6701.372750217131
>     * regular median:  1734
>     * regular max:  67533
>     * extended size:  3858863413 <(385)%20886-3413>
>     * extended avg:  8295.847872541684
>     * extended median:  2041
>     * extended max:  52508
>
> In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
> larger blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:
>
>     * total size:  2753238530
>     * total avg:  5918.95736054141
>     * total median:  60202
>     * total max:  74983
>     * regular size:  1165148878
>     * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
>     * regular median:  24812
>     * regular max:  64554
>     * extended size:  1588089652
>     * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
>     * extended median:  35260
>     * extended max:  41731
>
> Finally, here are the testnet stats which take into account the increase
> in the maximum filter size due to segwit's block-size increase. The max
> filter sizes are a bit larger due to some of the habitual blocks I
> created last year when testing segwit (transactions with 30k inputs, 30k
> outputs, etc).
>
>      * total size:  585087597
>      * total avg:  520.8839608674402
>      * total median:  20
>      * total max:  164598
>      * regular size:  299325029
>      * regular avg:  266.4790836307566
>      * regular median:  13
>      * regular max:  164583
>      * extended size:  285762568
>      * extended avg:  254.4048772366836
>      * extended median:  7
>      * extended max:  127631
>
> For those that are interested in the raw data, I've uploaded a CSV file
> of raw data for each block (mainnet + testnet), which can be found here:
>      * mainnet: (14MB):
> https://www.dropbox.com/s/4yk2u8dj06njbuv/mainnet-gcs-stats.csv?dl=0
>      * testnet: (25MB):
> https://www.dropbox.com/s/w7dmmcbocnmjfbo/gcs-stats-testnet.csv?dl=0
>
>
> We look forward to getting feedback from all of y'all!
>
> -- Laolu
>
>
> [1]: https://github.com/lightninglabs/neutrino
> [2]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/tree/segwit-cbf
> [3]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcutil/tree/gcs/gcs
> [4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/
>
> -- Laolu
>
>

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^ permalink raw reply	[|nested] 39+ messages in thread
2017-06-02  2:28       ` Gregory Maxwell
  2017-06-02  3:35         ` Alex Akselrod

  
From: Chris Pacia @ 2017-06-02 16:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Maxwell;  Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 598 bytes --]

On Jun 1, 2017 10:28 PM, "Gregory Maxwell" <greg@xiph•org> wrote:


Really bad for privacy.


As I mentioned the issue is the potential collision with the block filter,
but bloom filters by themselves aren't inherently bad for privacy. They
just reduce the anonymity set. The reason bip37 doesn't work for privacy is
how the filters have to be used/abused to make it work. That's not what I
mentioned above.

Data for transactions at the tip is only

14kb/s-- potentially less if segwit is in use and you're not getting
witnesses. Is that really that burdensome?


Your not running that on mobile.

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
[not found]       ` <CAE0pnxJxHYQ4+2pt3tt=1WZ0-K0vDxGB4KBXY+R=WfktMmATwA@mail.gmail.com>

  2017-06-05  2:06           ` Karl Johan Alm
  
From: Alex Akselrod @ 2017-06-02 17:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5037 bytes --]

On Jun 2, 2017 8:09 AM, "Karl Johan Alm via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

Hello,

Really wish I'd known you were working on this a few weeks ago, but
such is life. Hopefully I can provide some useful feedback.


Your feedback is greatly appreciated!


On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 4:01 AM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Full-nodes
> maintain an additional index of the chain, and serve this compact filter
> (the index) to light clients which request them. Light clients then fetch
> these filters, query the locally and _maybe_ fetch the block if a relevant
> item matches.

Is it necessary to maintain the index all the way to the beginning of
the chain? When would clients request "really old digests" and why?


Without a soft fork, this is the only way for light clients to verify that
peers aren't lying to them. Clients can request headers (just hashes of the
filters and the previous headers, creating a chain) and look for conflicts
between peers. If a conflict is found at a certain block, the client can
download the block, generate a filter, calculate the header by hashing
together the previous header and the generated filter, and banning any
peers that don't match. A full node could prune old filters if you wanted
and recalculate them as necessary if you just keep the filter header chain
info as really old filters are unlikely to be requested by correctly
written software but you can't guarantee every client will follow best
practices either.


> The calculator can be found here:
> https://aakselrod.github.io/gcs_calc.html. Alex also has an empirical
> script he's been running on actual data, and the results seem to match up
> rather nicely.

I haven't tried the tool yet, and maybe it will answer some of my questions.

On what data were the simulated wallets on actual data based? How did
false positive rates for wallets with lots of items (pubkeys etc) play
out? Is there a maximum number of items for a wallet before it becomes
too bandwidth costly to use digests?


The simulations are based on completely random data within given
parameters. For example, it will generate a wallet of a specified size and
generate blocks of specified size with specified number of transactions of
specified format, all guaranteed to not match the wallet. It then tries to
match the wallet and tracks the filter size and the bandwidth used by block
downloads which are all due to false positives. The maximum wallet size can
be millions or more of addresses and outpoints before the filter isn't
worth it.

I published the simulation code at
https://gist.github.com/aakselrod/0ee665205f7c9538c2339876b0424b26 but the
calculation code gives you the same results (on average but very close with
a big enough sample size) much faster.

I will definitely try to reproduce my experiments with Golomb-Coded
sets and see what I come up with. It seems like you've got a little
less than half the size of my digests for 1-block digests but I
haven't tried making digests for all blocks (and lots of early blocks
are empty).


Filters for empty blocks only take a few bytes and sometimes zero when the
coinbase output is a burn that doesn't push any data (example will be in
the test vectors that I'll have ready shortly).

On the BIP proposal itself:

In Compact Filter Header Chain, you mention that clients should
download filters from nodes if filter_headers is not identical, and
ban offending nodes. What about temporary forks in the chain? What
about longer forks? In general, I am curious how you will deal with
reorgs and temporary non-consensus related chain splits.


The cfheaders messages give you the hash of the final block for which
there's a header in the message. This means you can ignore the message as
necessary rather than ban the peer, or track cfheaders for multiple forks
if desired.


I am also curious if you have considered digests containing multiple
blocks. Retaining a permanent binsearchable record of the entire chain
is obviously too space costly, but keeping the last X blocks as
binsearchable could speed up syncing for clients tremendously, I feel.


We hadn't (or I hadn't) until we read your recent post/paper and are
considering it now.


It may also be space efficient to ONLY store older digests in chunks
of e.g. 8 blocks. A client syncing up finding a match in an 8-block
chunk would have to grab those 8 blocks, but if it's not recent, that
may be acceptable. It may even be possible to make 4-, 2-, 1-block
digests on demand.


This is also something we (or at least I) hadn't considered before your
recent post. We have been working on this for a few months now so didn't
have time to work on trying out and possibly incorporating the idea before
release.

How fast are these to create? Would it make sense to provide digests
on demand in some cases, rather than keeping them around indefinitely?


They're pretty fast and can be pruned if desired, as mentioned above, as
long as the header chain is kept.

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-02 17:55         ` Alex Akselrod

  2017-06-09  3:03             ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
  
From: Karl Johan Alm @ 2017-06-05  2:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Akselrod;  Bitcoin Dev

On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 at 2:55 AM, Alex Akselrod via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Without a soft fork, this is the only way for light clients to verify that
> peers aren't lying to them. Clients can request headers (just hashes of the
> filters and the previous headers, creating a chain) and look for conflicts
> between peers. If a conflict is found at a certain block, the client can
> download the block, generate a filter, calculate the header by hashing
> together the previous header and the generated filter, and banning any peers
> that don't match. A full node could prune old filters if you wanted and
> recalculate them as necessary if you just keep the filter header chain info
> as really old filters are unlikely to be requested by correctly written
> software but you can't guarantee every client will follow best practices
> either.

Ahh, so you actually make a separate digest chain with prev hashes and
everything. Once/if committed digests are soft forked in, it seems a
bit overkill but maybe it's worth it. (I was always assuming committed
digests in coinbase would come after people started using this, and
that people could just ask a couple of random peers for the digest
hash and ensure everyone gave the same answer as the hash of the
downloaded digest..).

> The simulations are based on completely random data within given parameters.

I noticed an increase in FP hits when using real data sampled from
real scriptPubKeys and such. Address reuse and other weird stuff. See
"lies.h" in github repo for experiments and chainsim.c initial part of
main where wallets get random stuff from the chain.

> I will definitely try to reproduce my experiments with Golomb-Coded
> sets and see what I come up with. It seems like you've got a little
> less than half the size of my digests for 1-block digests but I
> haven't tried making digests for all blocks (and lots of early blocks
> are empty).
>
>
> Filters for empty blocks only take a few bytes and sometimes zero when the
> coinbase output is a burn that doesn't push any data (example will be in the
> test vectors that I'll have ready shortly).

I created digests for all blocks up until block #469805 and actually
ended up with 5.8 GB, which is 1.1 GB lower than what you have, but
may be worse perf-wise on false positive rates and such.

> How fast are these to create? Would it make sense to provide digests
> on demand in some cases, rather than keeping them around indefinitely?
>
>
> They're pretty fast and can be pruned if desired, as mentioned above, as
> long as the header chain is kept.

For comparison, creating the digests above (469805 of them) took
roughly 30 mins on my end, but using the kstats format so probably
higher on an actual node (should get around to profiling that...).


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
* 
  2017-06-01 19:01 [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients Olaoluwa Osuntokun
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2017-06-02  4:49 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun

       [not found]   ` <CAE0pnx+RRAP269VeWAcxKbrcS9qX4LS8_6nY_js8X5NtQ22t_A@mail.gmail.com>
  2017-06-07 21:41 ` 
                   ` 
  6 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Karl Johan Alm @ 2017-06-02  6:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Olaoluwa Osuntokun;  Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev

Hello,

Really wish I'd known you were working on this a few weeks ago, but
such is life. Hopefully I can provide some useful feedback.

On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 4:01 AM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Full-nodes
> maintain an additional index of the chain, and serve this compact filter
> (the index) to light clients which request them. Light clients then fetch
> these filters, query the locally and _maybe_ fetch the block if a relevant
> item matches.

Is it necessary to maintain the index all the way to the beginning of
the chain? When would clients request "really old digests" and why?

> One specific area we'd like feedback on is the parameter selection. Unlike
> BIP-37 which allows clients to dynamically tune their false positive rate,
> our proposal uses a _fixed_ false-positive. Within the document, it's
> currently specified as P = 1/2^20. We've done a bit of analysis and
> optimization attempting to optimize the following sum:
> filter_download_bandwidth + expected_block_false_positive_bandwidth. Alex
> has made a JS calculator that allows y'all to explore the affect of
> tweaking the false positive rate in addition to the following variables:
> the number of items the wallet is scanning for, the size of the blocks,
> number of blocks fetched, and the size of the filters themselves. The
> calculator calculates the expected bandwidth utilization using the CDF of
> the Geometric Distribution. The calculator can be found here:
> https://aakselrod.github.io/gcs_calc.html. Alex also has an empirical
> script he's been running on actual data, and the results seem to match up
> rather nicely.

I haven't tried the tool yet, and maybe it will answer some of my questions.

On what data were the simulated wallets on actual data based? How did
false positive rates for wallets with lots of items (pubkeys etc) play
out? Is there a maximum number of items for a wallet before it becomes
too bandwidth costly to use digests?

> We we're excited to see that Karl Johan Alm (kallewoof) has done some
> (rather extensive!) analysis of his own, focusing on a distinct encoding
> type [5]. I haven't had the time yet to dig into his report yet, but I
> think I've read enough to extract the key difference in our encodings: his
> filters use a binomial encoding _directly_ on the filter contents, will we
> instead create a Golomb-Coded set with the contents being _hashes_ (we use
> siphash) of the filter items.

I will definitely try to reproduce my experiments with Golomb-Coded
sets and see what I come up with. It seems like you've got a little
less than half the size of my digests for 1-block digests but I
haven't tried making digests for all blocks (and lots of early blocks
are empty).

On the BIP proposal itself:

In Compact Filter Header Chain, you mention that clients should
download filters from nodes if filter_headers is not identical, and
ban offending nodes. What about temporary forks in the chain? What
about longer forks? In general, I am curious how you will deal with
reorgs and temporary non-consensus related chain splits.

I am also curious if you have considered digests containing multiple
blocks. Retaining a permanent binsearchable record of the entire chain
is obviously too space costly, but keeping the last X blocks as
binsearchable could speed up syncing for clients tremendously, I feel.

It may also be space efficient to ONLY store older digests in chunks
of e.g. 8 blocks. A client syncing up finding a match in an 8-block
chunk would have to grab those 8 blocks, but if it's not recent, that
may be acceptable. It may even be possible to make 4-, 2-, 1-block
digests on demand.

How fast are these to create? Would it make sense to provide digests
on demand in some cases, rather than keeping them around indefinitely?


^ permalink raw reply	[|nested] 39+ messages in thread
2017-06-01 19:01 [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients Olaoluwa Osuntokun
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2017-06-07 21:41 ` Gregory Maxwell

  2017-06-09  3:50   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
  2017-06-19 11:58 ` Andreas Schildbach
  
From: Tomas @ 2017-06-08  9:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1856 bytes --]

On Thu, Jun 1, 2017, at 21:01, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:> Hi y'all, 
> 
> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
> consideration: 
>    * https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki> 
> 

Very interesting. 

I would like to consider how this compares to another light client type
with rather different security characteristics where each client would
receive for each transaction in each block,
* The TXID (uncompressed)
* The spent outpoints (with TXIDs compressed)
* The pubkey hash (compressed to reasonable amount of false positives)

A rough estimate would indicate this to be about 2-2.5x as big per block
as your proposal, but comes with rather different security
characteristics, and would not require download since genesis.
The client could verify the TXIDs against the merkle root with a much
stronger (PoW) guarantee compared to the guarantee based on the
assumption of peers being distinct, which your proposal seems to make.
Like your proposal this removes the privacy and processing  issues from
server-side filtering, but unlike your proposal retrieval of all txids
in each block can also serve for a basis of  fraud proofs and
(disprovable) fraud hints, without resorting to full block downloads.
I don't completely understand the benefit of making the outpoints and
pubkey hashes (weakly) verifiable. These only serve as notifications and
therefore do not seem to introduce an attack vector. Omitting data is
always possible, so receiving data is a prerequisite for verification,
not an assumption that can be made.  How could an attacker benefit from
"hiding notifications"?
I think client-side filtering is definitely an important route to
take, but is it worth compressing away the information to verify the
merkle root?
Regards,
Tomas van der Wansem
bitcrust


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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-05  2:06           ` Karl Johan Alm

  
From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun @ 2017-06-09  3:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Karl Johan Alm, Alex Akselrod;  Bitcoin Dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 7097 bytes --]

Karl wrote:

> I am also curious if you have considered digests containing multiple
> blocks. Retaining a permanent binsearchable record of the entire chain is
> obviously too space costly, but keeping the last X blocks as binsearchable
> could speed up syncing for clients tremendously, I feel.

Originally we hadn't considered such an idea. Grasping the concept a bit
better, I can see how that may result in considerable bandwidth savings
(for purely negative queries) for clients doing a historical sync, or
catching up to the chain after being inactive for months/weeks.

If we were to purse tacking this approach onto the current BIP proposal,
we could do it in the following way:

   * The `getcfilter` message gains an additional "Level" field. Using
     this field, the range of blocks to be included in the returned filter
     would be Level^2. So a level of 0 is just the single filter, 3 is 8
     blocks past the block hash etc.

   * Similarly, the `getcfheaders` message would also gain a similar field
     with identical semantics. In this case each "level" would have a
     distinct header chain for clients to verify.

> How fast are these to create? Would it make sense to provide digests on
> demand in some cases, rather than keeping them around indefinitely?

For larger blocks (like the one referenced at the end of this mail) full
construction of the regular filter takes ~10-20ms (most of this spent
extracting the data pushes). With smaller blocks, it quickly dips down to
the nano to micro second range.

Whether to keep _all_ the filters on disk, or to dynamically re-generate a
particular range (possibly most of the historical data) is an
implementation detail. Nodes that already do block pruning could discard
very old filters once the header chain is constructed allowing them to
save additional space, as it's unlikely most clients would care about the
first 300k or so blocks.

> Ahh, so you actually make a separate digest chain with prev hashes and
> everything. Once/if committed digests are soft forked in, it seems a bit
> overkill but maybe it's worth it.

Yep, this is only a hold-over until when/if a commitment to the filter is
soft-forked in. In that case, there could be some extension message to
fetch the filter hash for a particular block, along with a merkle proof of
the coinbase transaction to the merkle root in the header.

> I created digests for all blocks up until block #469805 and actually ended
> up with 5.8 GB, which is 1.1 GB lower than what you have, but may be worse
> perf-wise on false positive rates and such.

Interesting, are you creating the equivalent of both our "regular" and
"extended" filters? Each of the filter types consume about ~3.5GB in
isolation, with the extended filter type on average consuming more bytes
due to the fact that it includes sigScript/witness data as well.

It's worth noting that those numbers includes the fixed 4-byte value for
"N" that's prepended to each filter once it's serialized (though that
doesn't add a considerable amount of overhead).  Alex and I were
considering instead using Bitcoin's var-int encoding for that number
instead. This would result in using a single byte for empty filters, 1
byte for most filters (< 2^16 items), and 3 bytes for the remainder of the
cases.

> For comparison, creating the digests above (469805 of them) took
> roughly 30 mins on my end, but using the kstats format so probably
> higher on an actual node (should get around to profiling that...).

Does that include the time required to read the blocks from disk? Or just
the CPU computation of constructing the filters? I haven't yet kicked off
a full re-index of the filters, but for reference this block[1] on testnet
takes ~18ms for the _full_ indexing routine with our current code+spec.

[1]: 000000000000052184fbe86eff349e31703e4f109b52c7e6fa105cd1588ab6aa

-- Laolu


On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 7:18 PM Karl Johan Alm via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 at 2:55 AM, Alex Akselrod via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > Without a soft fork, this is the only way for light clients to verify
> that
> > peers aren't lying to them. Clients can request headers (just hashes of
> the
> > filters and the previous headers, creating a chain) and look for
> conflicts
> > between peers. If a conflict is found at a certain block, the client can
> > download the block, generate a filter, calculate the header by hashing
> > together the previous header and the generated filter, and banning any
> peers
> > that don't match. A full node could prune old filters if you wanted and
> > recalculate them as necessary if you just keep the filter header chain
> info
> > as really old filters are unlikely to be requested by correctly written
> > software but you can't guarantee every client will follow best practices
> > either.
>
> Ahh, so you actually make a separate digest chain with prev hashes and
> everything. Once/if committed digests are soft forked in, it seems a
> bit overkill but maybe it's worth it. (I was always assuming committed
> digests in coinbase would come after people started using this, and
> that people could just ask a couple of random peers for the digest
> hash and ensure everyone gave the same answer as the hash of the
> downloaded digest..).
>
> > The simulations are based on completely random data within given
> parameters.
>
> I noticed an increase in FP hits when using real data sampled from
> real scriptPubKeys and such. Address reuse and other weird stuff. See
> "lies.h" in github repo for experiments and chainsim.c initial part of
> main where wallets get random stuff from the chain.
>
> > I will definitely try to reproduce my experiments with Golomb-Coded
> > sets and see what I come up with. It seems like you've got a little
> > less than half the size of my digests for 1-block digests but I
> > haven't tried making digests for all blocks (and lots of early blocks
> > are empty).
> >
> >
> > Filters for empty blocks only take a few bytes and sometimes zero when
> the
> > coinbase output is a burn that doesn't push any data (example will be in
> the
> > test vectors that I'll have ready shortly).
>
> I created digests for all blocks up until block #469805 and actually
> ended up with 5.8 GB, which is 1.1 GB lower than what you have, but
> may be worse perf-wise on false positive rates and such.
>
> > How fast are these to create? Would it make sense to provide digests
> > on demand in some cases, rather than keeping them around indefinitely?
> >
> >
> > They're pretty fast and can be pruned if desired, as mentioned above, as
> > long as the header chain is kept.
>
> For comparison, creating the digests above (469805 of them) took
> roughly 30 mins on my end, but using the kstats format so probably
> higher on an actual node (should get around to profiling that...).
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-07 21:41 ` Gregory Maxwell

  2017-06-09  4:47     ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
  
From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun @ 2017-06-09  3:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Maxwell;  Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3122 bytes --]

Gregory wrote:
> I see the inner loop of construction and lookup are free of
> non-constant divmod. This will result in implementations being
> needlessly slow

Ahh, sipa brought this up other day, but I thought he was referring to the
coding loop (which uses a power of 2 divisor/modulus), not the
siphash-then-reduce loop.

> I believe this can be fixed by using this approach
>
http://lemire.me/blog/2016/06/27/a-fast-alternative-to-the-modulo-reduction/
> which has the same non-uniformity as mod but needs only a multiply and
> shift.

Very cool, I wasn't aware of the existence of such a mapping.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but from my interpretation we can't use that
method as described as we need to output 64-bit integers rather than
32-bit integers. A range of 32-bits would be constrain the number of items
we could encode to be ~4096 to ensure that we don't overflow with fp
values such as 20 (which we currently use in our code).

If filter commitment are to be considered for a soft-fork in the future,
then we should definitely optimize the construction of the filters as much
as possible! I'll look into that paper you referenced to get a feel for
just how complex the optimization would be.

> Shouldn't all cases in your spec where you have N=transactions be
> n=indexed-outputs? Otherwise, I think your golomb parameter and false
> positive rate are wrong.

Yep! Nice catch. Our code is correct, but mistake in the spec was an
oversight on my part. I've pushed a commit[1] to the bip repo referenced
in the OP to fix this error.

I've also pushed another commit to explicitly take advantage of the fact
that P is a power-of-two within the coding loop [2].

-- Laolu

[1]:
https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/commit/bc5c6d6797f3df1c4a44213963ba12e72122163d
[2]:
https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/commit/578a4e3aa8ec04524c83bfc5d14be1b2660e7f7a


On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 2:41 PM Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph•org> wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > Hi y'all,
> >
> > Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
> > consideration:
> >    *
> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>
> I see the inner loop of construction and lookup are free of
> non-constant divmod. This will result in implementations being
> needlessly slow (especially on arm, but even on modern x86_64 a
> division is a 90 cycle-ish affair.)
>
> I believe this can be fixed by using this approach
>
> http://lemire.me/blog/2016/06/27/a-fast-alternative-to-the-modulo-reduction/
>    which has the same non-uniformity as mod but needs only a multiply
> and shift.
>
> Otherwise fast implementations will have to implement the code to
> compute bit twiddling hack exact division code, which is kind of
> complicated. (e.g. via the technique in "{N}-bit Unsigned Division via
> {N}-bit Multiply-Add" by Arch D. Robison).
>
> Shouldn't all cases in your spec where you have N=transactions be
> n=indexed-outputs? Otherwise, I think your golomb parameter and false
> positive rate are wrong.
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-08  9:50 ` Tomas

  2017-06-09  8:26     ` Tomas
  
From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun @ 2017-06-09  3:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tomas, bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3724 bytes --]

Tomas wrote:
> A rough estimate would indicate this to be about 2-2.5x as big per block
> as your proposal, but comes with rather different security
> characteristics, and would not require download since genesis.

Our proposal _doesnt_ require downloading from genesis, if by
"downloading" you mean downloading all the blocks. Clients only need to
sync the block+filter headers, then (if they don't care about historical
blocks), will download filters from their "birthday" onwards.

> The client could verify the TXIDs against the merkle root with a much
> stronger (PoW) guarantee compared to the guarantee based on the assumption
> of peers being distinct, which your proposal seems to make

Our proposal only makes a "one honest peer" assumption, which is the same
as any other operating mode. Also as client still download all the
headers, they're able to verify PoW conformance/work as normal.

> I don't completely understand the benefit of making the outpoints and
> pubkey hashes (weakly) verifiable. These only serve as notifications and
> therefore do not seem to introduce an attack vector.

Not sure what you mean by this. Care to elaborate?

> I think client-side filtering is definitely an important route to take,
> but is it worth compressing away the information to verify the merkle
> root?

That's not the case with our proposal. Clients get the _entire_ block (if
they need it), so they can verify the merkle root as normal. Unless one of
us is misinterpreting the other here.

-- Laolu


On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 6:34 AM Tomas via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017, at 21:01, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> Hi y'all,
>
> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
> consideration:
>    *
> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>
>
>
> Very interesting.
>
> I would like to consider how this compares to another light client type
> with rather different security characteristics where each client would
> receive for each transaction in each block,
>
> * The TXID (uncompressed)
> * The spent outpoints (with TXIDs compressed)
> * The pubkey hash (compressed to reasonable amount of false positives)
>
> A rough estimate would indicate this to be about 2-2.5x as big per block
> as your proposal, but comes with rather different security characteristics,
> and would not require download since genesis.
>
> The client could verify the TXIDs against the merkle root with a much
> stronger (PoW) guarantee compared to the guarantee based on the assumption
> of peers being distinct, which your proposal seems to make. Like your
> proposal this removes the privacy and processing  issues from server-side
> filtering, but unlike your proposal retrieval of all txids in each block
> can also serve for a basis of fraud proofs and (disprovable) fraud hints,
> without resorting to full block downloads.
>
> I don't completely understand the benefit of making the outpoints and
> pubkey hashes (weakly) verifiable. These only serve as notifications and
> therefore do not seem to introduce an attack vector. Omitting data is
> always possible, so receiving data is a prerequisite for verification, not
> an assumption that can be made.  How could an attacker benefit from "hiding
> notifications"?
>
> I think client-side filtering is definitely an important route to take,
> but is it worth compressing away the information to verify the merkle root?
>
> Regards,
> Tomas van der Wansem
> bitcrust
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-02  4:49 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun

  2017-11-09 23:44     ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
  
From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun @ 2017-06-09  3:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 7316 bytes --]

Hi y'all,

Thanks for all the comments so far!

I've pushed a series of updates to the text of the BIP repo linked in the
OP.
The fixes include: typos, components of the specification which were
incorrect
(N is the total number of items, NOT the number of txns in the block), and a
few sections have been clarified.

The latest version also includes a set of test vectors (as CSV files), which
for a series of fp rates (1/2 to 1/2^32) includes (for 6 testnet blocks,
one of
which generates a "null" filter):

   * The block height
   * The block hash
   * The raw block itself
   * The previous basic+extended filter header
   * The basic+extended filter header for the block
   * The basic+extended filter for the block

The size of the test vectors was too large to include in-line within the
document, so we put them temporarily in a distinct folder [1]. The code
used to
generate the test vectors has also been included.

-- Laolu

[1]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/tree/master/gcs_light_client


On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 9:49 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail•com> wrote:

> > In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
> larger
> > blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:
> >
> >     * total size:  2753238530
> >     * total avg:  5918.95736054141
> >     * total median:  60202
> >     * total max:  74983
> >     * regular size:  1165148878
> >     * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
> >     * regular median:  24812
> >     * regular max:  64554
> >     * extended size:  1588089652
> >     * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
> >     * extended median:  35260
> >     * extended max:  41731
> >
>
> Oops, realized I made a mistake. These are the stats for Feb 2016 until
> about a
> month ago (since height 400k iirc).
>
> -- Laolu
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 12:01 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail•com>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi y'all,
>>
>> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
>> consideration:
>>    *
>> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>>
>> This BIP proposal describes a concrete specification (along with a
>> reference implementations[1][2][3]) for the much discussed client-side
>> filtering reversal of BIP-37. The precise details are described in the
>> BIP, but as a summary: we've implemented a new light-client mode that uses
>> client-side filtering based off of Golomb-Rice coded sets. Full-nodes
>> maintain an additional index of the chain, and serve this compact filter
>> (the index) to light clients which request them. Light clients then fetch
>> these filters, query the locally and _maybe_ fetch the block if a relevant
>> item matches. The cool part is that blocks can be fetched from _any_
>> source, once the light client deems it necessary. Our primary motivation
>> for this work was enabling a light client mode for lnd[4] in order to
>> support a more light-weight back end paving the way for the usage of
>> Lightning on mobile phones and other devices. We've integrated neutrino
>> as a back end for lnd, and will be making the updated code public very
>> soon.
>>
>> One specific area we'd like feedback on is the parameter selection. Unlike
>> BIP-37 which allows clients to dynamically tune their false positive rate,
>> our proposal uses a _fixed_ false-positive. Within the document, it's
>> currently specified as P = 1/2^20. We've done a bit of analysis and
>> optimization attempting to optimize the following sum:
>> filter_download_bandwidth + expected_block_false_positive_bandwidth. Alex
>> has made a JS calculator that allows y'all to explore the affect of
>> tweaking the false positive rate in addition to the following variables:
>> the number of items the wallet is scanning for, the size of the blocks,
>> number of blocks fetched, and the size of the filters themselves. The
>> calculator calculates the expected bandwidth utilization using the CDF of
>> the Geometric Distribution. The calculator can be found here:
>> https://aakselrod.github.io/gcs_calc.html. Alex also has an empirical
>> script he's been running on actual data, and the results seem to match up
>> rather nicely.
>>
>> We we're excited to see that Karl Johan Alm (kallewoof) has done some
>> (rather extensive!) analysis of his own, focusing on a distinct encoding
>> type [5]. I haven't had the time yet to dig into his report yet, but I
>> think I've read enough to extract the key difference in our encodings: his
>> filters use a binomial encoding _directly_ on the filter contents, will we
>> instead create a Golomb-Coded set with the contents being _hashes_ (we use
>> siphash) of the filter items.
>>
>> Using a fixed fp=20, I have some stats detailing the total index size, as
>> well as averages for both mainnet and testnet. For mainnet, using the
>> filter contents as currently described in the BIP (basic + extended), the
>> total size of the index comes out to 6.9GB. The break down is as follows:
>>
>>     * total size:  6976047156
>>     * total avg:  14997.220622758816
>>     * total median:  3801
>>     * total max:  79155
>>     * regular size:  3117183743
>>     * regular avg:  6701.372750217131
>>     * regular median:  1734
>>     * regular max:  67533
>>     * extended size:  3858863413 <(385)%20886-3413>
>>     * extended avg:  8295.847872541684
>>     * extended median:  2041
>>     * extended max:  52508
>>
>> In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
>> larger blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:
>>
>>     * total size:  2753238530
>>     * total avg:  5918.95736054141
>>     * total median:  60202
>>     * total max:  74983
>>     * regular size:  1165148878
>>     * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
>>     * regular median:  24812
>>     * regular max:  64554
>>     * extended size:  1588089652
>>     * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
>>     * extended median:  35260
>>     * extended max:  41731
>>
>> Finally, here are the testnet stats which take into account the increase
>> in the maximum filter size due to segwit's block-size increase. The max
>> filter sizes are a bit larger due to some of the habitual blocks I
>> created last year when testing segwit (transactions with 30k inputs, 30k
>> outputs, etc).
>>
>>      * total size:  585087597
>>      * total avg:  520.8839608674402
>>      * total median:  20
>>      * total max:  164598
>>      * regular size:  299325029
>>      * regular avg:  266.4790836307566
>>      * regular median:  13
>>      * regular max:  164583
>>      * extended size:  285762568
>>      * extended avg:  254.4048772366836
>>      * extended median:  7
>>      * extended max:  127631
>>
>> For those that are interested in the raw data, I've uploaded a CSV file
>> of raw data for each block (mainnet + testnet), which can be found here:
>>      * mainnet: (14MB):
>> https://www.dropbox.com/s/4yk2u8dj06njbuv/mainnet-gcs-stats.csv?dl=0
>>      * testnet: (25MB):
>> https://www.dropbox.com/s/w7dmmcbocnmjfbo/gcs-stats-testnet.csv?dl=0
>>
>>
>> We look forward to getting feedback from all of y'all!
>>
>> -- Laolu
>>
>>
>> [1]: https://github.com/lightninglabs/neutrino
>> [2]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/tree/segwit-cbf
>> [3]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcutil/tree/gcs/gcs
>> [4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/
>>
>> -- Laolu
>>
>>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-09  3:42   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun

  
From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun @ 2017-06-09  4:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Maxwell;  Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3776 bytes --]

> Correct me if I'm wrong, but from my interpretation we can't use that
> method as described as we need to output 64-bit integers rather than
> 32-bit integers.

Had a chat with gmax off-list and came to the realization that the method
_should_ indeed generalize to our case of outputting 64-bit integers.
We'll need to do a bit of bit twiddling to make it work properly. I'll
modify our implementation and report back with some basic benchmarks.

-- Laolu


On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 8:42 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail•com> wrote:

> Gregory wrote:
> > I see the inner loop of construction and lookup are free of
> > non-constant divmod. This will result in implementations being
> > needlessly slow
>
> Ahh, sipa brought this up other day, but I thought he was referring to the
> coding loop (which uses a power of 2 divisor/modulus), not the
> siphash-then-reduce loop.
>
> > I believe this can be fixed by using this approach
> >
> http://lemire.me/blog/2016/06/27/a-fast-alternative-to-the-modulo-reduction/
> > which has the same non-uniformity as mod but needs only a multiply and
> > shift.
>
> Very cool, I wasn't aware of the existence of such a mapping.
>
> Correct me if I'm wrong, but from my interpretation we can't use that
> method as described as we need to output 64-bit integers rather than
> 32-bit integers. A range of 32-bits would be constrain the number of items
> we could encode to be ~4096 to ensure that we don't overflow with fp
> values such as 20 (which we currently use in our code).
>
> If filter commitment are to be considered for a soft-fork in the future,
> then we should definitely optimize the construction of the filters as much
> as possible! I'll look into that paper you referenced to get a feel for
> just how complex the optimization would be.
>
> > Shouldn't all cases in your spec where you have N=transactions be
> > n=indexed-outputs? Otherwise, I think your golomb parameter and false
> > positive rate are wrong.
>
> Yep! Nice catch. Our code is correct, but mistake in the spec was an
> oversight on my part. I've pushed a commit[1] to the bip repo referenced
> in the OP to fix this error.
>
> I've also pushed another commit to explicitly take advantage of the fact
> that P is a power-of-two within the coding loop [2].
>
> -- Laolu
>
> [1]:
> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/commit/bc5c6d6797f3df1c4a44213963ba12e72122163d
> [2]:
> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/commit/578a4e3aa8ec04524c83bfc5d14be1b2660e7f7a
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 2:41 PM Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph•org> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev
>> <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> > Hi y'all,
>> >
>> > Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
>> > consideration:
>> >    *
>> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>>
>> I see the inner loop of construction and lookup are free of
>> non-constant divmod. This will result in implementations being
>> needlessly slow (especially on arm, but even on modern x86_64 a
>> division is a 90 cycle-ish affair.)
>>
>> I believe this can be fixed by using this approach
>>
>> http://lemire.me/blog/2016/06/27/a-fast-alternative-to-the-modulo-reduction/
>>    which has the same non-uniformity as mod but needs only a multiply
>> and shift.
>>
>> Otherwise fast implementations will have to implement the code to
>> compute bit twiddling hack exact division code, which is kind of
>> complicated. (e.g. via the technique in "{N}-bit Unsigned Division via
>> {N}-bit Multiply-Add" by Arch D. Robison).
>>
>> Shouldn't all cases in your spec where you have N=transactions be
>> n=indexed-outputs? Otherwise, I think your golomb parameter and false
>> positive rate are wrong.
>>
>

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-09  3:50   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun

  
From: Tomas @ 2017-06-09  8:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Olaoluwa Osuntokun, bitcoin-dev


On Fri, Jun 9, 2017, at 05:50, Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote:
> Tomas wrote:
> > I don't completely understand the benefit of making the outpoints and
> > pubkey hashes (weakly) verifiable. These only serve as notifications and
> > therefore do not seem to introduce an attack vector.
> 
> Not sure what you mean by this. Care to elaborate? 
> 

I will rephrase. The BIP reads:

> Additionally, Full nodes can nearly undetectably lie by omission causing a denial of service which can 
lead to undesirable failure modes in applications whose safety
critically relies on responding to certain
on-chain events.

I understand that the compact  header chain is used to mitigate against
this, but I am unsure about the use 
cases and trade-offs.

For a normal wallet, the only thing I can imagine an attacker could do
is pretending a transaction did not confirm 
yet, causing nuisance.  

An application critically depending on knowing what happens on-chain 
surely is better off  downloading 
the TXIDs, providing PoW security? Gaining knowledge of incoming TXIDs
is nicely solved the payment protocol.

Are there enough use cases that critically depend on pub key hashes
being used on-chain, to make the compact header chain worth its costs? 

Regards,
Tomas


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-01 19:01 [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients Olaoluwa Osuntokun
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2017-06-08  9:50 ` Tomas

  2017-06-19 12:26   ` bfd
  
From: Andreas Schildbach @ 2017-06-19 11:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

I'm not sure if this has been brought up elsewhere in this thread.

This proposal doesn't seem to be a complete replacement of BIP37: It
doesn't provide a filter for unconfirmed transactions like BIP37 does.

That means that most light clients will continue to use BIP37 even if
they may use this BIP as a supplement. Otherwise users would not get
timely notification of incoming payments any more.


On 06/01/2017 09:01 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Hi y'all, 
> 
> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
> consideration: 
>    * https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
> [...]



 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 11:58 ` Andreas Schildbach

  2017-06-19 15:15     ` Tom Zander
                       ` (2 more replies)
  
From: bfd @ 2017-06-19 12:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andreas Schildbach;  bitcoin-dev

Several times. It's been debated if unconfirmed transactions are 
necessary, methods of doing more private filtering have been suggested, 
along with simply not filtering unconfirmed transactions at all. My 
collected data suggests that there is very little use of BIP37 at 
present, based on incoming connections to nodes I know end up in the DNS 
seed responses (no "SPV" clients do their own peer management).


On 2017-06-19 12:58, Andreas Schildbach via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I'm not sure if this has been brought up elsewhere in this thread.
> 
> This proposal doesn't seem to be a complete replacement of BIP37: It
> doesn't provide a filter for unconfirmed transactions like BIP37 does.
> 
> That means that most light clients will continue to use BIP37 even if
> they may use this BIP as a supplement. Otherwise users would not get
> timely notification of incoming payments any more.
> 
> 
> On 06/01/2017 09:01 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>> Hi y'all,
>> 
>> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
>> consideration:
>>    * 
>> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>> [...]
> 
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 11:58 ` Andreas Schildbach

  2017-06-19 15:15     ` 
                       ` 
  
From: bfd @ 2017-06-19 12:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andreas Schildbach;  bitcoin-dev

Several times. It's been debated if unconfirmed transactions are 
necessary, methods of doing more private filtering have been suggested, 
along with simply not filtering unconfirmed transactions at all. My 
collected data suggests that there is very little use of BIP37 at 
present, based on incoming connections to nodes I know end up in the DNS 
seed responses (no "SPV" clients do their own peer management).


On 2017-06-19 12:58, Andreas Schildbach via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I'm not sure if this has been brought up elsewhere in this thread.
> 
> This proposal doesn't seem to be a complete replacement of BIP37: It
> doesn't provide a filter for unconfirmed transactions like BIP37 does.
> 
> That means that most light clients will continue to use BIP37 even if
> they may use this BIP as a supplement. Otherwise users would not get
> timely notification of incoming payments any more.
> 
> 
> On 06/01/2017 09:01 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>> Hi y'all,
>> 
>> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
>> consideration:
>>    * 
>> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>> [...]
> 
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 12:26   ` bfd
  2017-06-19 15:15     ` Tom Zander

  2017-06-19 16:10       ` Jonas Schnelli
  2017-06-19 22:41     ` Gregory Maxwell
  
From: Andreas Schildbach @ 2017-06-19 15:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

Just to give you a number: based on the statistics of the Bitcoin Wallet
app there are at least 2 million wallets depending on BIP37. Not all
would need instant notification but based on the daily support enquiries
instant notificaton is the most asked property of Bitcoin.


On 06/19/2017 02:26 PM, bfd--- via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Several times. It's been debated if unconfirmed transactions are
> necessary, methods of doing more private filtering have been suggested,
> along with simply not filtering unconfirmed transactions at all. My
> collected data suggests that there is very little use of BIP37 at
> present, based on incoming connections to nodes I know end up in the DNS
> seed responses (no "SPV" clients do their own peer management).
> 
> 
> On 2017-06-19 12:58, Andreas Schildbach via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>> I'm not sure if this has been brought up elsewhere in this thread.
>>
>> This proposal doesn't seem to be a complete replacement of BIP37: It
>> doesn't provide a filter for unconfirmed transactions like BIP37 does.
>>
>> That means that most light clients will continue to use BIP37 even if
>> they may use this BIP as a supplement. Otherwise users would not get
>> timely notification of incoming payments any more.
>>
>>
>> On 06/01/2017 09:01 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>>> Hi y'all,
>>>
>>> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
>>> consideration:
>>>    *
>>> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>>> [...]
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev




 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 15:15     ` Tom Zander

  2017-06-19 15:59         ` Andreas Schildbach
  2017-06-19 16:07         ` Tom Zander
  
From: Jonas Schnelli @ 2017-06-19 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tom Zander;  bitcoin-dev

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Hi

> On Monday, 19 June 2017 14:26:46 CEST bfd--- via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>> It's been debated if [filtering of] unconfirmed transactions are
>> necessary,
> 
> Why would it not be needed? Any SPV client (when used as a payment-receiver)
> requires this from a simple usability point of view.


I think many users would be willing ...
a) … to trade higher privacy (using client side filtering) for not having the „incoming transaction“ feature
b) – if they want 0-conf – to fetch all inved transactions
/jonas

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 15:49       ` Jonas Schnelli

  2017-06-19 16:22           ` Jonas Schnelli
  2017-06-19 16:07         ` Tom Zander
  
From: Andreas Schildbach @ 2017-06-19 15:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

On 06/19/2017 05:49 PM, Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote:

>>> It's been debated if [filtering of] unconfirmed transactions are
>>> necessary,
>>
>> Why would it not be needed? Any SPV client (when used as a payment-receiver)
>> requires this from a simple usability point of view.
> 
> 
> I think many users would be willing ...
> a) … to trade higher privacy (using client side filtering) for not having the „incoming transaction“ feature
> b) – if they want 0-conf – to fetch all inved transactions

Another number: I'm answering dozens of support inquiries about
delayed/missing transactions per day. Over the 7 years of Bitcoin
Wallet's existence, I estimate about 50000 inquiries.

On the other hand, I remember only 1 (one) inquiry about the privacy
problems of BIP37 (or privacy at all).

From a regular user's point of view, privacy is non-issue. Sure,
everyone would take it for free, but certainly not if it a) delays
incoming payments or b) quickly eats up your traffic quota.



 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 15:49       ` Jonas Schnelli
  2017-06-19 15:59         ` Andreas Schildbach

  2017-06-19 16:30           ` Jonas Schnelli
  
From: Tom Zander @ 2017-06-19 16:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

On Monday, 19 June 2017 17:49:59 CEST Jonas Schnelli wrote:
> Hi
> 
> > On Monday, 19 June 2017 14:26:46 CEST bfd--- via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >> It's been debated if [filtering of] unconfirmed transactions are
> >> necessary,
> > 
> > Why would it not be needed? Any SPV client (when used as a
> > payment-receiver) requires this from a simple usability point of view.
> 
> I think many users would be willing ...
> a) … to trade higher privacy (using client side filtering) for not having
> the „incoming transaction“ feature b) – if they want 0-conf – to fetch
> all inved transactions

You seem to misunderstand the usecase.
If you send me a transaction, both of use are using our phones, then I need 
to be able to have immediate feedback on the transaction being broadcast on 
the network.
This is not about zero-conf, this is simple seeing what is happening while 
it is happening.

Additionally, when the transaction that is meant for my wallet is broadcast, 
I want my SPV wallet to parse and check the actual transaction.
It is not just to see that *something* was actually send, but also to be 
able to see how much is being paid to me. Maybe If the transaction is marked 
as RBF-able, etc.

Really basic usability: provide information to your users when you can, 
should they want to, and by default on.
-- 
Tom Zander
Blog: https://zander.github.io
Vlog: https://vimeo.com/channels/tomscryptochannel


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 15:43     ` Andreas Schildbach

  
From: Jonas Schnelli @ 2017-06-19 16:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andreas Schildbach;  bitcoin-dev

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> Just to give you a number: based on the statistics of the Bitcoin Wallet
> app there are at least 2 million wallets depending on BIP37. Not all
> would need instant notification but based on the daily support enquiries
> instant notificaton is the most asked property of Bitcoin.

Yes. Users probably like this feature and client side filtering is not a drop-in replacement for BIP37.

We should also consider:
BIP37 works, because node-operators are willing to offer that service for free (which maybe change over time).
BIP37 consumes plenty of horsepower (disk/cpu) from nodes. Filtering a couple of days of blocks (assume 1000+) eats lots of resources for something, that has no direct long-term value for Bitcoin (the filters data is unique and will be "thrown away“ [can’t be used by other peers]). Same applies for mempool (filtering mempool of a couple of hundred of mb each time the HD gap limit has been exceeded or the app gets sent to the foreground again).

Purely relying on the availability of BIP37 seems fragile to me and start to explore other ways is very reasonable.

/jonas

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 15:59         ` Andreas Schildbach

  2017-06-19 16:36             ` adiabat
  2017-06-20  7:03             ` Eric Voskuil
  
From: Jonas Schnelli @ 2017-06-19 16:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andreas Schildbach;  bitcoin-dev

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> 
> On the other hand, I remember only 1 (one) inquiry about the privacy
> problems of BIP37 (or privacy at all).

IMO privacy its something developers should make sure users have it.
Also, I think, todays SPV wallets should make users more aware of the possible privacy implications.

Do users know, if they pay for a good in a shop while consuming the shops WIFI, that the shop-owner as well as the ISP can use that data to combine it with the user profile (and ~ALL FUTURE purchases you do with the same wallet IN ANY LOCATION online or in-person)?

Do users know, that ISPs (cellular; including Google) can completely link the used Bitcoin wallet (again: all purchase including future ones) with the to the ISP well known user profile including credit-card data and may sell the Bitcoin data to any other data mining company?

If you use BIP37, you basically give your transaction history (_ALL TRANSACTIONS_ including transactions in future) to everyone.


> 
> From a regular user's point of view, privacy is non-issue. Sure,
> everyone would take it for free, but certainly not if it a) delays
> incoming payments or b) quickly eats up your traffic quota.

This may be true because they are not aware of the ramification and I don’t think client side filtering is a drop-in replacement for todays, smartphone SPV-model.


/jonas

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 16:07         ` Tom Zander

  2017-06-19 16:38             ` Tom Zander
  
From: Jonas Schnelli @ 2017-06-19 16:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tom Zander;  bitcoin-dev

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>> 
>> I think many users would be willing ...
>> a) … to trade higher privacy (using client side filtering) for not having
>> the „incoming transaction“ feature b) – if they want 0-conf – to fetch
>> all inved transactions
> 
> You seem to misunderstand the usecase.
> If you send me a transaction, both of use are using our phones, then I need
> to be able to have immediate feedback on the transaction being broadcast on
> the network.
> This is not about zero-conf, this is simple seeing what is happening while
> it is happening.
> 
> Additionally, when the transaction that is meant for my wallet is broadcast,
> I want my SPV wallet to parse and check the actual transaction.
> It is not just to see that *something* was actually send, but also to be
> able to see how much is being paid to me. Maybe If the transaction is marked
> as RBF-able, etc.
> 
> Really basic usability: provide information to your users when you can,
> should they want to, and by default on.

I see this use case.
But I did receive bank wire transfers for the last decades without _immediately_ knowing that someone sent funds to me.
I personally would ALWAYS trade the higher bandwidth consumption (300MB mempool filtering) or slower notification time (maybe ~1h) for preserving privacy.
I agree, there are use cases where you want immediate notification, those use cases could probably be solved by not trowing away privacy („parsing“ all transactions and running in the background).

/jonas

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 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 16:22           ` Jonas Schnelli

  2017-06-19 20:49               ` Andreas Schildbach
  2017-06-20  7:03             ` Eric Voskuil
  
From: adiabat @ 2017-06-19 16:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

This has been brought up several times in the past, and I agree with
Jonas' comments about users being unaware of the privacy losses due to
BIP37.  One thing also mentioned before but not int he current thread
is that the entire concept of SPV is not applicable to unconfirmed
transactions.  SPV uses the fact that miners have committed to a
transaction with work to give the user an assurance that the
transaction is valid; if the transaction were invalid, it would be
costly for the miner to include it in a block with valid work.

Transactions in the mempool have no such assurance, and are costlessly
forgeable by anyone, including your ISP.  I wasn't involved in any
debate over BIP37 when it was being written up, so I don't know how
mempool filtering got in, but it never made any sense to me.  The fact
that lots of lite clients are using this is a problem as it gives
false assurance to users that there is a valid but yet-to-be-confirmed
transaction sending them money.

-Tadge


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 16:30           ` Jonas Schnelli

  
From: Tom Zander @ 2017-06-19 16:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

On Monday, 19 June 2017 18:30:18 CEST Jonas Schnelli wrote:
> I personally would ALWAYS [snip]

I mentioned that it was a usability point for a reason, and your personal 
behavior makes me want to quote one of the main UX guidelines; 
  “You are not your user”

http://uxmyths.com/post/715988395/myth-you-are-like-your-users
older;
http://52weeksofux.com/post/385981879/you-are-not-your-user

I think we should defer to actual real numbers and user reseach, as has been 
quoted by Andreas. You disagreeing based on your own experience and behavior 
is worse than useless. As the above links show.

Don’t fall in that trap :)
-- 
Tom Zander
Blog: https://zander.github.io
Vlog: https://vimeo.com/channels/tomscryptochannel


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 16:36             ` adiabat

  
From: Andreas Schildbach @ 2017-06-19 20:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

Most SPV wallets make it quite clear that unconfirmed transactions are
just that.


On 06/19/2017 06:36 PM, adiabat via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> This has been brought up several times in the past, and I agree with
> Jonas' comments about users being unaware of the privacy losses due to
> BIP37.  One thing also mentioned before but not int he current thread
> is that the entire concept of SPV is not applicable to unconfirmed
> transactions.  SPV uses the fact that miners have committed to a
> transaction with work to give the user an assurance that the
> transaction is valid; if the transaction were invalid, it would be
> costly for the miner to include it in a block with valid work.
> 
> Transactions in the mempool have no such assurance, and are costlessly
> forgeable by anyone, including your ISP.  I wasn't involved in any
> debate over BIP37 when it was being written up, so I don't know how
> mempool filtering got in, but it never made any sense to me.  The fact
> that lots of lite clients are using this is a problem as it gives
> false assurance to users that there is a valid but yet-to-be-confirmed
> transaction sending them money.
> 
> -Tadge
> 




 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 12:26   ` bfd
  2017-06-19 15:15     ` Tom Zander
  2017-06-19 15:43     ` Andreas Schildbach

  2017-06-20  9:52       ` Tom Zander
  
From: Gregory Maxwell @ 2017-06-19 22:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Dev

On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:26 PM, bfd--- via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Several times. It's been debated if unconfirmed transactions are necessary,
> methods of doing more private filtering have been suggested, along with
> simply not filtering unconfirmed transactions at all. My collected data
> suggests that there is very little use of BIP37 at present, based on
> incoming connections to nodes I know end up in the DNS seed responses (no
> "SPV" clients do their own peer management).

Sending just the output addresses of each transaction would use about
1 kilobit/s of data. Sending the entire transactions would use
~14kbit/sec data.  These don't seem to be a unsustainable tremendous
amount of data to use while an application is running.

Doubly so for SPV wallets which are highly vulnerable to unconfirmed
transactions, and many which last I heard testing reports on became
pretty severely corrupted once given a fake transaction.

Can someone make a case why saving no more than those figures would
justify the near total loss of privacy that filtering gives?

"Because they already do it" isn't a good argument when talking about
a new protocol feature; things which already do BIP37 will presumably
continue to already do BIP37.


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 16:22           ` Jonas Schnelli
  2017-06-19 16:36             ` adiabat

  
From: Eric Voskuil @ 2017-06-20  7:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jonas Schnelli;  bitcoin-dev, Andreas Schildbach

The reason that BIP37 presents a long list of problems is that it is a client-server scenario wedged into a peer-to-peer network. The only possible excuse for this design was implementation shortcut.

As this thread and others demonstrate, reproducing this design flaw will not eliminate the problems. The fact that there are many wallets dependent upon it is an unfortunate consequence of the original sin, but is not likely to last. There is no rationale for node operators to support wallets apart from their own. As a node implementer interested in privacy, security and scalability, I would never waste the time to code BIP37, or and client-server feature into the P2P protocol, especially one that delegates some aspect of validation.

Other nodes (servers) provide independent, securable, client-server interfaces. Many of these are made available as community servers for use at no charge. They could also provide mechanisms for operator payment without polluting the P2P network.

However as a community we should be working toward full node wallets. A secured personal node/server can support remote mobile wallets with security, privacy and no wasted bandwidth. And if we avoid counterproductive increases in blockchain growth rate, full nodes will eventually be able to run on mobile platforms with no difficulty whatsoever. A wallet that delegates full validation to node operators is just another centralization pressure that we do not need.

e

On Jun 19, 2017, at 6:22 PM, Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

>> 
>> On the other hand, I remember only 1 (one) inquiry about the privacy
>> problems of BIP37 (or privacy at all).
> 
> IMO privacy its something developers should make sure users have it.
> Also, I think, todays SPV wallets should make users more aware of the possible privacy implications.
> 
> Do users know, if they pay for a good in a shop while consuming the shops WIFI, that the shop-owner as well as the ISP can use that data to combine it with the user profile (and ~ALL FUTURE purchases you do with the same wallet IN ANY LOCATION online or in-person)?
> 
> Do users know, that ISPs (cellular; including Google) can completely link the used Bitcoin wallet (again: all purchase including future ones) with the to the ISP well known user profile including credit-card data and may sell the Bitcoin data to any other data mining company?
> 
> If you use BIP37, you basically give your transaction history (_ALL TRANSACTIONS_ including transactions in future) to everyone.
> 
> 
>> 
>> From a regular user's point of view, privacy is non-issue. Sure,
>> everyone would take it for free, but certainly not if it a) delays
>> incoming payments or b) quickly eats up your traffic quota.
> 
> This may be true because they are not aware of the ramification and I don’t think client side filtering is a drop-in replacement for todays, smartphone SPV-model.
> 
> 
> /jonas
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-19 22:41     ` Gregory Maxwell

  2017-06-20 13:08         ` bfd
  
From: Tom Zander @ 2017-06-20  9:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

On Tuesday, 20 June 2017 00:41:49 CEST Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev 
wrote:
> Can someone make a case why saving no more than those figures would
> justify the near total loss of privacy that filtering gives?

First, your figures are wrong and also fall out of the sky with no 
justification. Can’t debunk something that is pure garbage.

Second, stating that a bloom filter is a "total loss of privacy" is equally 
baseless and doesn’t need debunking.

> "Because they already do it" isn't a good argument when talking about
> a new protocol feature; things which already do BIP37 will presumably
> continue to already do BIP37.

I think you just made the case for completely rejecting this proposal based 
on the fact that nobody will use it, BIP37 already exists.

Not sure if I agree with that, improvements are always useful and we should 
be able to come up with replacements.
But arguing against a feature you don’t like, especiallyh one used by 
millions every day, is a sad way to stiffle innovation, Greg.
-- 
Tom Zander
Blog: https://zander.github.io
Vlog: https://vimeo.com/channels/tomscryptochannel


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-20  9:52       ` Tom Zander

  2017-06-20 17:20           ` Adam Back
  
From: bfd @ 2017-06-20 13:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tom Zander;  bitcoin-dev

On 2017-06-20 12:52, Tom Zander via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Second, stating that a bloom filter is a "total loss of privacy" is 
> equally
> baseless and doesn’t need debunking.
> 

"On the Privacy Provisions of Bloom Filters in Lightweight Bitcoin 
Clients"

> We show analytically and empirically that the reliance on Bloom filters 
> within existing SPV clients leaks considerable information about the 
> addresses of Bitcoin users. Our results show that an SPV client who 
> uses a modest number of Bitcoin addresses (e.g., < 20) risks revealing 
> almost all of his addresses.

https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/763.pdf


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-20 13:08         ` bfd

  
From: Adam Back @ 2017-06-20 17:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bfd;  Bitcoin Dev

Also Jonas Nick gave a fairly comprehensive presentation on privacy
leaks in bitcoin protocol including SPV and bloom query problem
specifics:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HScK4pkDNds

Adam


On 20 June 2017 at 14:08, bfd--- via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On 2017-06-20 12:52, Tom Zander via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>>
>> Second, stating that a bloom filter is a "total loss of privacy" is
>> equally
>> baseless and doesn’t need debunking.
>>
>
> "On the Privacy Provisions of Bloom Filters in Lightweight Bitcoin Clients"
>
>> We show analytically and empirically that the reliance on Bloom filters
>> within existing SPV clients leaks considerable information about the
>> addresses of Bitcoin users. Our results show that an SPV client who uses a
>> modest number of Bitcoin addresses (e.g., < 20) risks revealing almost all
>> of his addresses.
>
>
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/763.pdf
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


 permalink raw reply	[|nested]
2017-06-09  3:59   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun

  
From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun @ 2017-11-09 23:44 UTC ( / )
  To: Arnoud Kouwenhoven - Pukaki Corp via bitcoin-dev



Hi y'all,

Since my last email we've made a number of changes to the BIP. The changes
made
were driven by the feedback we've received so far in this thread, and also
as a
result of real-world testing using this new proposal as the basis for our
light
weight LN node which powers the demo Lightning desktop application we
recently
released.

A highlight of the changes made between this version and the last follows:

  * We've removed the modulus operation in the inner loop when constructing
    filters. This has been replaced with an alternative, more efficient
    mapping[1] as suggested by gmaxwell and sipa. In our implementation, we
    perform the operation in a piece-wise fashion by hand. Alternative
    implementations can take advantage of 128-bit arithmetic extensions on
    supporting CPU's.

  * The txid has been moved from the extended filter to the regular filter.
    During out testing of the new light client with our LN node
implementation,
    we found that we were able to reduce network traffic as we only need the
    extended filter for rare on-chain events.

  * We now use the 6th service bit. We realized that the bit we had chosen
    prior was already being used to signal support of x-thin block syncing.
To
    select this bit number, we ran a scanner on the addrman of our nodes and
    also the network to fin da bit that wasn't used widely.

  * An error in the BIP that didn't include the public key script of
coinbase
    transactions in the filter has been fixed.

  * An error in the BIP when constructing the initial "genesis" filter has
been
    fixed.

  * We no longer use the ProtocolVersion field in the getcfheaders message
or
    its response.

  * The specification of several newly defined messages were incorrect and
have
    been fixed.

  * A number of typos spotted by several reviewers have been fixed.

The full commit history of the BIP draft can be found here:
https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/commits/gcs-bip-draft

At this point, we're ready to make a PR against the official BIP repo and to
request a number to be assigned to our proposal. Thanks to all those that
have
reviewed, and contributed to the proposal!

[1]:
https://lemire.me/blog/2016/06/27/a-fast-alternative-to-the-modulo-reduction/

-- Laolu


On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 8:59 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail•com> wrote:

> Hi y'all,
>
> Thanks for all the comments so far!
>
> I've pushed a series of updates to the text of the BIP repo linked in the
> OP.
> The fixes include: typos, components of the specification which were
> incorrect
> (N is the total number of items, NOT the number of txns in the block), and
> a
> few sections have been clarified.
>
> The latest version also includes a set of test vectors (as CSV files),
> which
> for a series of fp rates (1/2 to 1/2^32) includes (for 6 testnet blocks,
> one of
> which generates a "null" filter):
>
>    * The block height
>    * The block hash
>    * The raw block itself
>    * The previous basic+extended filter header
>    * The basic+extended filter header for the block
>    * The basic+extended filter for the block
>
> The size of the test vectors was too large to include in-line within the
> document, so we put them temporarily in a distinct folder [1]. The code
> used to
> generate the test vectors has also been included.
>
> -- Laolu
>
> [1]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/tree/master/gcs_light_client
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 9:49 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail•com>
> wrote:
>
>> > In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
>> larger
>> > blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:
>> >
>> >     * total size:  2753238530
>> >     * total avg:  5918.95736054141
>> >     * total median:  60202
>> >     * total max:  74983
>> >     * regular size:  1165148878
>> >     * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
>> >     * regular median:  24812
>> >     * regular max:  64554
>> >     * extended size:  1588089652
>> >     * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
>> >     * extended median:  35260
>> >     * extended max:  41731
>> >
>>
>> Oops, realized I made a mistake. These are the stats for Feb 2016 until
>> about a
>> month ago (since height 400k iirc).
>>
>> -- Laolu
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 12:01 PM Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail•com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi y'all,
>>>
>>> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
>>> consideration:
>>>    *
>>> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>>>
>>> This BIP proposal describes a concrete specification (along with a
>>> reference implementations[1][2][3]) for the much discussed client-side
>>> filtering reversal of BIP-37. The precise details are described in the
>>> BIP, but as a summary: we've implemented a new light-client mode that
>>> uses
>>> client-side filtering based off of Golomb-Rice coded sets. Full-nodes
>>> maintain an additional index of the chain, and serve this compact filter
>>> (the index) to light clients which request them. Light clients then fetch
>>> these filters, query the locally and _maybe_ fetch the block if a
>>> relevant
>>> item matches. The cool part is that blocks can be fetched from _any_
>>> source, once the light client deems it necessary. Our primary motivation
>>> for this work was enabling a light client mode for lnd[4] in order to
>>> support a more light-weight back end paving the way for the usage of
>>> Lightning on mobile phones and other devices. We've integrated neutrino
>>> as a back end for lnd, and will be making the updated code public very
>>> soon.
>>>
>>> One specific area we'd like feedback on is the parameter selection.
>>> Unlike
>>> BIP-37 which allows clients to dynamically tune their false positive
>>> rate,
>>> our proposal uses a _fixed_ false-positive. Within the document, it's
>>> currently specified as P = 1/2^20. We've done a bit of analysis and
>>> optimization attempting to optimize the following sum:
>>> filter_download_bandwidth + expected_block_false_positive_bandwidth. Alex
>>> has made a JS calculator that allows y'all to explore the affect of
>>> tweaking the false positive rate in addition to the following variables:
>>> the number of items the wallet is scanning for, the size of the blocks,
>>> number of blocks fetched, and the size of the filters themselves. The
>>> calculator calculates the expected bandwidth utilization using the CDF of
>>> the Geometric Distribution. The calculator can be found here:
>>> https://aakselrod.github.io/gcs_calc.html. Alex also has an empirical
>>> script he's been running on actual data, and the results seem to match up
>>> rather nicely.
>>>
>>> We we're excited to see that Karl Johan Alm (kallewoof) has done some
>>> (rather extensive!) analysis of his own, focusing on a distinct encoding
>>> type [5]. I haven't had the time yet to dig into his report yet, but I
>>> think I've read enough to extract the key difference in our encodings:
>>> his
>>> filters use a binomial encoding _directly_ on the filter contents, will
>>> we
>>> instead create a Golomb-Coded set with the contents being _hashes_ (we
>>> use
>>> siphash) of the filter items.
>>>
>>> Using a fixed fp=20, I have some stats detailing the total index size, as
>>> well as averages for both mainnet and testnet. For mainnet, using the
>>> filter contents as currently described in the BIP (basic + extended), the
>>> total size of the index comes out to 6.9GB. The break down is as follows:
>>>
>>>     * total size:  6976047156
>>>     * total avg:  14997.220622758816
>>>     * total median:  3801
>>>     * total max:  79155
>>>     * regular size:  3117183743
>>>     * regular avg:  6701.372750217131
>>>     * regular median:  1734
>>>     * regular max:  67533
>>>     * extended size:  3858863413 <(385)%20886-3413>
>>>     * extended avg:  8295.847872541684
>>>     * extended median:  2041
>>>     * extended max:  52508
>>>
>>> In order to consider the average+median filter sizes in a world worth
>>> larger blocks, I also ran the index for testnet:
>>>
>>>     * total size:  2753238530
>>>     * total avg:  5918.95736054141
>>>     * total median:  60202
>>>     * total max:  74983
>>>     * regular size:  1165148878
>>>     * regular avg:  2504.856172982827
>>>     * regular median:  24812
>>>     * regular max:  64554
>>>     * extended size:  1588089652
>>>     * extended avg:  3414.1011875585823
>>>     * extended median:  35260
>>>     * extended max:  41731
>>>
>>> Finally, here are the testnet stats which take into account the increase
>>> in the maximum filter size due to segwit's block-size increase. The max
>>> filter sizes are a bit larger due to some of the habitual blocks I
>>> created last year when testing segwit (transactions with 30k inputs, 30k
>>> outputs, etc).
>>>
>>>      * total size:  585087597
>>>      * total avg:  520.8839608674402
>>>      * total median:  20
>>>      * total max:  164598
>>>      * regular size:  299325029
>>>      * regular avg:  266.4790836307566
>>>      * regular median:  13
>>>      * regular max:  164583
>>>      * extended size:  285762568
>>>      * extended avg:  254.4048772366836
>>>      * extended median:  7
>>>      * extended max:  127631
>>>
>>> For those that are interested in the raw data, I've uploaded a CSV file
>>> of raw data for each block (mainnet + testnet), which can be found here:
>>>      * mainnet: (14MB):
>>> https://www.dropbox.com/s/4yk2u8dj06njbuv/mainnet-gcs-stats.csv?dl=0
>>>      * testnet: (25MB):
>>> https://www.dropbox.com/s/w7dmmcbocnmjfbo/gcs-stats-testnet.csv?dl=0
>>>
>>>
>>> We look forward to getting feedback from all of y'all!
>>>
>>> -- Laolu
>>>
>>>
>>> [1]: https://github.com/lightninglabs/neutrino
>>> [2]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/tree/segwit-cbf
>>> [3]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcutil/tree/gcs/gcs
>>> [4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/
>>>
>>> -- Laolu
>>>
>>>