Métaéthique de la croyance : une défense pragmatiste de la responsabilité et de l’autonomie mentale

This thesis is part of a larger debate within contemporary philosophy called “The Ethics of Belief”, which stands at the intersection of epistemology, ethics and empirical psychology. Specifically, the aim of this thesis is to offer an answer to the question “what should we believe?” by opposing two distinct kinds of reasons for belief: epistemic reasons and pragmatic reasons for belief. While epistemic reasons concern the truth of the proposition that is believed, pragmatic reasons concern the utility, or the moral standing, of the belief itself. Because of the two distinct objects to which these kinds of reasons apply, conflicts between epistemic and pragmatic reasons are common. However, since they are both reasons for believing propositions, we are faced with a riddle concerning what kind of reason we should comply with. Should we believe for epistemic reasons, or for pragmatic ones? In what circumstances are we allowed to follow one kind of reason rather than the other? This cluster of questions is closely linked to a topic specific to the Ethics of Belief, namely, how to understand the agent’s autonomy and responsibility with respect to his or her beliefs. Beliefs are peculiar things: they are the proper object of blame, praise and other normative reactions deeply imbedded within our everyday language. However, we do not have direct voluntary control over them (at least, not like we have direct, voluntary control over our actions). This lack of direct voluntary control allows us to introduce an analysis of the normativity of belief inspired by metaethical debates, notably the possibility of exercising our free will. These metaethical concerns bring us to a close analysis of our initial question “what should we believe?”. The position I defend in this thesis is the following: as long as we consider the question “what should we believe?” as a normative question, the reasons bearing on this question are only pragmatic reasons, reasons bearing on the utility or value of the said belief. However, if we understand this question as a question about what we should predict with respect to belief formation, then epistemic reasons will be allowed in our answer as explanatory reasons for the expected belief formation. This way of answering our initial query rests upon an analysis of epistemic reasons leading us to consider that epistemic reasons are not normative reasons.  This reverence to pragmatic reasons invites us to see the ethics of belief as an ethic focusing on the doxastic consequences of our actions. This allows us to explain conflicting intuitions with respect to normative reactions concerning belief while evading the usual problems to which the more traditional theories in the ethics of belief fall prey. Finally, this pragmatic approach to the normativity of belief allows us to set the groundwork for a theory of responsibility and autonomy concerning beliefs, as well as other mental states.

Keyphrases: Philosophy, Belief, Epistemology, Metaethics, Ethics of Belief, Normativity, Reasons for belief, Responsability, Mental autonomy, Doxastic compatibilism, Ethics for consequences, Free will, Pragmatism, Evidentialism, Ethics