Les capitalismes chinois et japonais en temps de crise

Both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets crashed during the summer of 2015. This occurred at a time when China’s economy was slowing down. The same phenomenon occurred in Japan during the 1990s. What is commonly referred to as the Japanese « Lost Decade », began when stock prices declined in December of 1989, at a time when economic growth was losing strength. We can compare the declining growth in the economies of China and Japan for these respective periods: China’s economic growth diminished from 7.27% to 6.9% between 2014 and 2015; Japan’s economic growth diminished from 7.15% to 5.37% between 1988 and 1989.  Notwithstanding the observed decline in both country’s economy, these growth figures can still be considered exceptionally strong in a capitalistic system. We are therefore confronted to economic slowdowns in fast-growing economies. This begets the question: What reasons explain these two financial crises?  From the perspective of the « Théorie de la Régulation », a French school of political economy, transitions occurred in the growth regimes in both Japan and China. The genesis of the economic crisis observed in Japan was a consequence of contradictions proper to all capitalistic systems, a phenomenon that was observed during the 1970’s and 80’s. Similarly, the most recent turning point in China’s evolving form of capitalism, occurred as of 2008. Each of these countries’ growth regime transitions result from a different application of economic liberalization.   Our working hypothesis is the demonstration that, as a capitalistic economy becomes more liberalized, that is to say, financial markets become less and less regulated, the greater the volatility in the markets. In other words, can it be affirmed that there exists a direct link between a liberalized financial activity and financial crises.   In comparing the Japanese crisis during the ‘90s and the market crash in China during the summer of 2015, we can conclude that the root of Japan’s difficulty was structural in nature, whereas China simply had liquidity difficulties that can be attributed to two causes: innovative financial tools and risk-tolerant market activities. In fact, Chinese market regulators tolerated prohibited practices.  There are also similarities in the liberalization of Japan and China’s financial markets. What we assert to be common to both countries’ pathway to market liberalization is openness to foreign investment and an increased international presence. In addition, both countries deregulated their financial sectors. These commonalities occurred as both countries became important economic players in the global economy.  We also conclude that both crises, occurring, as stated previously, in a climate of increased market liberalization, allowed for the partial expungement of bad loans. However, it is undeniable that the liberalization of financial markets has as an intrinsic quality, that of market instability. Thus, the existence of financial crises.

Keyphrases: Crise, Chine, Finance, Transition, Régulation, Crash, Crisis, China, Japan, Stock Exchange, Finance, Political economy, Transition, Régulation