Citizen Inc. : lobbying et démocratie au Canada

This thesis, consisting of three complementary investigations, studies the practice of lobbying in Canada. The thesis constructs a research agenda focusing on three central themes of the literature on lobbying and democracy: (a) the impact of parliamentary institutions on the relations between lobbies and the government; (b) the exchange of information between lobbies and the Canadian bureaucracy; and (c) lobbyists’ access to central government.  All three investigations use the data of the Canadian registry of lobbyists to test the research hypotheses. These hypotheses, which stem from the literature on lobbies in democratic regimes, are examined using a set of descriptive and statistical analyzes. A database was developed by aggregating the information contained in the communication reports of the registry. All reports filed between the summer of 2008 and the summer of 2013 have been compiled into the database (n: 50862). A set of indicators was then set up to address the questions raised in each of the investigation.  The first inquiry tests the hypothesis that lobbying activities in Canada are primarily aimed at the members of the executive branch. It uses the data of the Canadian lobbying registry to measure the number of contacts between lobbyists and public office holders between the summer of 2008 and the summer of 2013. The results indicate that most of lobbying activities are aimed at the executive branch. However, it appears that the House of Commons is one of the most popular targets of lobbying activities. In fact, empirical evidence shows that numerous lobbying organizations are engaged in integrated strategies that consider both the legislative and executive institutions.  The second inquiry examines the information exchange process between lobbying organizations and the Canadian bureaucracy. A descriptive analysis of the Canadian lobbyists registry shows that a limited number of administrative agencies are actively involved in this exchange process. In addition, statistical analyses confirm that the hierarchical position and institutional status of administrative agencies can have a significant structuring effect on the exchange process. Finally, administrative agencies that face a large volume of lobbying respond to overload problems by granting more attention to their privileged partners. In the end, empirical evidence confirms that lobbying is characterized by the concentration of communications between actors of the central government (ministry and central agencies) and some associations and companies who receive more attention from bureaucrats – especially those who have to manage larger flows of information.  The third inquiry addresses the relationship between lobbying organizations and the central agencies of the Canadian government. First, an overall examination of lobbying activities in Canada shows that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is one the most lobbied institutions of the executive branch. Second, a statistical model evaluates the effect of organizational and strategic factors on lobbyists' access to the PMO. Our inquiry leads us to conclude that strategies related to amount and scope of lobbying activities have the most consistent impact on lobbyist access to top policy-makers. In the end, the results support the claim that lobbying should be understood as a social, self-reinforcing process unfolding over the medium and long term.  In sum, by contributing to the general objective of the thesis, which is to map Canadian lobbying activities, this research investigates the influence that the Canadian political system and other organizational and strategical factors exert on lobbying. To conclude, I discuss the contributions of the thesis and its main limitations. Finally, the research findings are placed in the broader context of the growth of lobbying activities in democratic societies.

Keyphrases: Lobbying, Canadian political institutions, Political access, Information exchange process, Parliamentarism, Public administration, Public policies