On abstraction in a Carnapian system

Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) rejects two philosophical distinctions that have been made and admitted by Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), namely the object-concept and the sense-reference distinctions. In the analytic tradition and upon these distinctions, a family of analytic systems have been constructed and developed (which we call Fregean systems), within which a number of notions have been employed including the notion of abstraction. It has been claimed (by Neo- Fregeans) that the Fregean notion of abstraction has been captured by what is commonly known as the “principle of abstraction”. The goal of this dissertation is to present the notion of Carnapian abstraction, in particular, and the Carnapian system, in general, in distinction to the Fregean counterparts. We will argue that the admission and rejection of these distinctions will entail fundamentally different analytic systems. Hence, we will show how each system undertakes a different notion of abstraction. Abstraction in a Fregean system will be characterized as a mind-independent process subject to its own rules, whereas in a Carnapian system, abstraction will be characterized as a defined process of distancing from meaning in a linguistic framework. We will conclude that the Carnapian system has advantages over the Fregean one (among which is its simplicity), and that its technical aspect is yet to be developed. Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) rejette deux distinctions philosophiques conçues par Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) : la distinction objet-concept et la distinction sens-référence. Dans la tradition analytique et parmi ces distinctions, une famille de systèmes analytiques a été construite et développée (appelée les « systèmes frégéen »), dans lesquels plusieurs notions ont été employées, incluant la notion d’abstraction. En fait, les néo- frégéen ont déclaré que la notion d’abstraction de Frege est capturée par ce qu’on appelle le « principe d’abstraction ». Le but de cette dissertation est de présenter la notion d’abstraction de Carnap en particulier et le système de Carnap en général, en comparaison aux notions de Frege. Nous allons argumenter que l’admission et le rejet de ces distinctions entraîneront des systèmes analytiques fondamentalement différents. Ainsi, nous allons démontrer comment chaque système utilise différentes notions d’abstraction. L’abstraction dans un système frégéen sera caractérisée comme un processus indépendant qui est confiné à ses propres règles, tandis que dans un système carnapien, l’abstraction sera caractérisée comme un processus défini d’éloignement du sens. Nous arriverons à la conclusion que le système carnapien a plus d’avantages que celui de Frege (comme la simplicité du système) et que son aspect technique a besoin d’être développé davantage.

Keyphrases: Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science, Logic, Frege, Carnap, Abstraction, Linguistic Framework, Object-Concept Distinction, Sense-Reference Distinction, Frege, Carnap, Abstraction, Philosophie Analytique, Philosophie de la Langue, Philosophie de la Science, Logique, Distinction Objet-Concept, Distinction Sens-Référence