CELEX: 62008TJ0157
Community trade mark
Application for Community word mark INSULATE FOR LIFE
Absolute ground for refusal
Lack of distinctive character
Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)
Merely confirmatory decision
Partial inadmissibility

Background to the dispute

The first application for registration
On 4 May 2004, the applicant, Paroc Oy AB, had filed a first application for registration of a Community trade mark (‘the
first application for registration’) at the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)
pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1), as amended
(replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1)).
The mark in respect of which registration had been applied for was the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE.
The goods in respect of which registration had been applied for were in Classes 6, 17 and 19 of the Nice Agreement concerning
the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised
and amended, and corresponded, in respect of each of those classes, to the following description:
–        Class 6: ‘Common metals and their alloys; metal building materials; transportable buildings of metal; materials of metal for
railway tracks; non‑electric cables and wires of common metal; ironmongery, small items of metal hardware; pipes and tubes
of metal; safes; goods of common metal not included in other classes; ores’;
–        Class 17: ‘Rubber; gutta-percha; gum, asbestos, mica and goods made from these materials and not included in other classes;
plastics in extruded form for use in manufacture; packing, stopping and insulating materials; flexible pipes, not of metal’;
–        Class 19: ‘Building materials (non-metallic); non-metallic rigid pipes for building; asphalt, pitch and bitumen; non-metallic
transportable buildings; monuments, not of metal’.
By decision of 25 August 2005, the examiner had rejected the application for registration in respect of all of the goods at
issue on the ground that the trade mark applied for was devoid of any distinctive character and was descriptive within the
meaning of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 40/94 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 207/2009).
On 24 October 2005, the applicant had brought an appeal against that decision.
By decision of 3 April 2006 (‘the first decision’), the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM had dismissed the appeal and had confirmed
the refusal to register the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE pursuant to Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 40/94. In essence,
the Board of Appeal had held that the relevant public, whether general or specialist, would understand the combination of
words ‘insulate for life’ immediately and without any special analytical effort as an indication that the applicant supplied
durable insulation which can last a lifetime. In the absence of any unusual juxtaposition of its elements from the syntactic,
grammatical, phonetic and/or semantic points of view, that combination of words is descriptive of the characteristics of the
goods at issue and, therefore, necessarily devoid of any distinctive character (see paragraphs 15 and 18 to 20 of the first
decision).
The applicant did not bring an action against the first decision before the Court.

The second application for registration
On 24 May 2007, the applicant filed a second application for registration of a Community trade mark at OHIM, pursuant to Regulation
No 40/94 (‘the second application for registration’).
The mark in respect of which registration was applied for is the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE.
The goods and services in respect of which registration was applied for are, firstly, in Classes 6, 17 and 19 of the Nice
Agreement, for goods as described in paragraph 3 above, and, secondly, in Class 37 of the Nice Agreement, for services corresponding
to the following description: ‘Building construction; repair; installation services’.
By decision of 23 October 2007, the examiner rejected the application for registration in respect of all of the goods and
services at issue on the ground that the trade mark applied for was devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning
of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.
On 20 December 2007, the applicant appealed against that decision.
By decision of 21 February 2008 (‘the second decision’ or ‘the contested decision’), the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM dismissed
the appeal and confirmed the refusal to register the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE pursuant to Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation
No 40/94.
In essence, the Board of Appeal first of all referred to the reasons set out in paragraphs 15 to 20 of the first decision
and noted, firstly, that the submissions of the applicant in relation to the goods in Classes 6, 17 and 19 of the Nice Agreement
were, fundamentally, the same as those put forward in support of the first application for registration and, secondly, that
the applicant had not ‘put forward any evidence to support a finding that there has been a change in the settled case-law
on the subject or any development in the markets at issue which could lead the Board of Appeal to reconsider the grounds on
which it ha[d] previously rejected the [first] application for registration’. In this regard, the Board of Appeal stated that
the fact that the first decision was based on Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94 was irrelevant, since, firstly, it is
sufficient for just one of the absolute grounds provided for in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 40/94 to be applicable in order
to refuse an application for registration and, secondly, a word sign that is descriptive of the characteristics of the goods
at issue is, accordingly, necessarily devoid of any distinctive character with regard to those goods in accordance with Article
7(1)(b) of that regulation. Therefore, the Board of Appeal stated that it did not need to comment further, except on the arguments
‘that [had] not already been put forward in the [first] application for registration […]’ and on the registrability of the
mark applied for in relation to the services in Class 37 of the Nice Agreement (see paragraphs 12 to 15 of the contested decision).
Furthermore, concerning those services, the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the relevant public, whether general or
specialist, would understand ‘the word sign [in question], as a whole, immediately and without further analytical effort as
a reference to the fact that the applicant provides very long-lasting services related to the use of a particularly durable
insulation material, and not as an indication of the commercial origin of those services’. The message conveyed by the sign
in question is clear, direct and immediate, and is not ambiguous, subject to interpretation, imprecise, allusive or suggestive.
For that reason and taking account of its descriptive character, the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE is devoid of any distinctive
character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94. That assessment is not undermined by the fact that
the word sign has been registered as a trade mark for the same goods, in particular, in Finland and in the United Kingdom.
The Community trade mark regime is an autonomous system with its own rules binding OHIM in its assessment of the registrability
of a sign as a Community trade mark. Moreover, such registration decisions at national level amount only to a fact which may
be taken into account, in this context, by OHIM (see paragraphs 17 to 19 of the contested decision).
Finally, the Board of Appeal held that the mere fact that in previous cases the examiner had displayed a less strict approach
than in this case does not infringe the principle of equality before the law, nor does it provide grounds for annulment of
a decision that is reasonable and in accordance with the provisions of Regulation No 40/94. In any event, the Board stated
that it was doubtful whether the sign in question was truly comparable to the other signs cited by the applicant (paragraphs
21 and 22 of the contested decision).

Arguments of the parties
The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision and remit the case to OHIM for the purposes of registration of the trade mark applied for;
–        order OHIM to pay the costs.
OHIM contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

Arguments of the parties
The applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.
According to the applicant, from the point of view of the relevant public, which consists of average consumers and construction
industry professionals, the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE is not descriptive of the goods and services in respect of which registration
has been applied for. Even though the term ‘insulate’ is descriptive, the word sign, as a whole, is suggestive and its meaning
is ‘imprecise, distant, vague and unspecific’ with regard to the goods and services at issue, and will thus allow the relevant
public to identify their commercial origin.
Furthermore, although the combination of words ‘insulate for life’ does not reflect a significantly high degree of inventiveness,
that is not sufficient to establish that it is devoid of any distinctive character. According to the applicant, if the reasoning
of the Board of Appeal were to be accepted, only marks that meet a specific level of linguistic or artistic creativity or
imaginativeness could be registered, which would amount to the application of a criterion which is stricter for suggestive
slogans than for other marks.
The applicant denies that the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE would be immediately understood by the relevant public as descriptive
of the goods and services at issue. On the contrary, by reason of the second part of that sign (‘for life’), the trade mark
applied for is suggestive, as it is ‘distant, vague and unspecific’ with regard to those goods and services, and is capable
of giving rise to various kinds of connotations and associations. In support of its argument that the word ‘life’ is not purely
descriptive, the applicant states that, in respect of the mark Thomson Life, the German court which referred a question for
a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice in the case that gave rise to its judgment in Case C‑120/04
Medion
[2005] ECR I‑8551 had also held that the word was of an average degree of distinctiveness.
Furthermore, the fact that each of the elements of a mark, examined separately, is devoid of any distinctive character does
not mean that that assessment also applies to the sign as a whole. In respect of suggestive marks, such as the word sign INSULATE
FOR LIFE, the applicant submits that it is enough if they are sufficiently inventive and they readily give rise to multiple
associations or suggestions, without necessarily requiring specific analysing efforts on the part of the relevant public.
In this regard, the Board of Appeal did not take account of the fact that a minimum of distinctiveness was sufficient to permit
the registration of the word sign at issue.
According to the applicant, the Board of Appeal failed to establish that the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE was not capable of
distinguishing its services from those of other undertakings. It rejects the proposition that that word sign must be understood
as meaning ‘high quality insulation that lasts for a life time’. Apart from a mere reference to a dictionary, the Board of
Appeal and OHIM have failed to provide the slightest evidence in support of their assertions.
The applicant adds that the United Kingdom Patent Office registered the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE and therefore obviously
found that that sign had a minimum of distinctiveness. Moreover, OHIM should not apply in this case a stricter criterion than
that which characterised its previous decision-making practice (between 1999 and 2005) in relation to numerous word signs
ending with the combination of words ‘for life’, or which led, more recently, to the registration of Community trade mark
FACTORS FOR LIFE.
Furthermore, in response to a written question from the Court, the applicant claims in essence that its action is admissible
because the contested decision is not a mere confirmation of the first decision. According to the applicant, each application
for registration requires a new assessment by OHIM having regard to the relevant circumstances in each case, which can evolve
over time. The two cases concern two very different trade mark applications, relating to different classes, which require
distinct and independent legal analysis, and which were refused on different grounds.
OHIM contends that the action should be dismissed and refers, in the main, to the reasons set out in the first and second
decisions.

Findings of the Court
Admissibility
It should be recalled that the conditions for the admissibility of an action concern an absolute bar to proceeding with the
action which the Courts of the European Union must consider of their own motion should such an issue arise (see Case T‑209/01
Honeywell
v
Commission
[2005] ECR II‑5527, paragraph 53 and the case‑law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 29 November 2007 in Case C‑176/06 P
Stadtwerke Schwäbisch Hall and Others
v
Commission
, not published in the ECR, paragraph 18).
Furthermore, as is recognised by settled case‑law, a decision which merely confirms an earlier decision not challenged in
due time is not an actionable measure. For the purpose of not allowing the time‑limit for bringing an action against the confirmed
decision to recommence, an action against such a confirmatory decision must be declared inadmissible (see, to that effect,
order of 7 December 2004 in Case C‑521/03 P
Internationaler Hilfsfonds
v
Commission
, not published in the ECR, paragraph 41; Case T‑188/95
Waterleiding Maatschappij
v
Commission
[1998] ECR II‑3713, paragraph 108; and order in Case T‑265/03
Helm Düngemittel
v
Commission
[2005] ECR II‑2009, paragraph 62).
A decision is regarded as a mere confirmation of an earlier decision if it contains no new factors as compared with the earlier
measure and is not preceded by any re-examination of the situation of the addressee of the earlier measure (see order in
Internationaler Hilfsfonds
v
Commission
, cited in paragraph 29 above, paragraph 47 and the case‑law cited; orders in Case T‑84/97
BEUC
v
Commission
[1998] ECR II‑795, paragraph 52, and of 10 October 2006 in Case T‑106/05
Evropaïki Dynamiki
v
Commission
, not published in the ECR, paragraph 46).
In this case, it is undisputed that the time‑limit for bringing an action against the first decision, pursuant to Article
63(5) of Regulation No 40/94 (now Article 65(5) of Regulation No 207/2009), expired without the applicant having brought such
an action. That decision therefore became final and its legality can no longer be challenged before the Court. That finality
applies both to the operative part of that decision and to the grounds constituting the essential basis thereof. It must therefore
be considered that the Board of Appeal definitively ruled, in the first decision, on the subject-matter of the dispute determined
by the first application for registration, which sought to have registered as a Community trade mark the word sign INSULATE
FOR LIFE in respect of goods in Classes 6, 17 and 19 of the Nice Agreement. Since the operative part of that decision is capable
of producing legal effects and, as a consequence, of adversely affecting interests (see, to that effect, order in Case‑164/02
Netherlands
v
Commission
[2004] ECR I‑1177, paragraph 21), the applicant had to challenge it within the prescribed time‑limit or become time‑barred.
It should therefore be determined whether and to what extent the second decision amounts to a mere confirmation of the first
decision, which requires the identification of the respective circumstances of the disputes which gave rise to those decisions.
For that purpose, it must be assessed whether the parties to the proceedings at issue, their submissions, their pleas, their
arguments and the relevant matters of law and fact characterising those proceedings and determining the operative parts of
those decisions were identical or not.
In that regard, it must be noted that the subject‑matter of this dispute is largely the same as that which gave rise to the
first decision, insofar as, by both the first and the second application for registration, the applicant sought to have the
word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE registered as a Community trade mark in respect of goods in Classes 6, 17 and 19 of the Nice Agreement,
the only difference being that the second application also covered services in Class 37. In that regard, it should be noted
that those services, as a group that is homogenous and distinct from that of the goods in Classes 6, 17 and 19, are capable
of being the subject of separate assessment and reasoning with a view to determining the registrability of the word sign at
issue (see, to that effect and by analogy, order in Case C‑282/09 P
CFCMCEE
v
OHIM
[2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 38 to 40; and Joined Cases T‑405/07 and T‑406/07
CFCMCEE
v
OHIM (P@YWEB CARD and PAYWEB CARD
) [2009] ECR II‑1441, paragraphs 54 and 55), and so the fact that the applicant expanded its application for registration
to include those services is not a new factor, within the meaning of the case‑law cited in paragraph 30 above, as compared
with the analogous assessment and reasoning relating to those goods, as set out in the first decision. Further, in the first
decision, the first application for registration was refused on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 40/94,
while the second application for registration was refused solely on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.
It follows that the second decision must be regarded as merely confirmatory of the first decision insofar as it based the
refusal to register the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE, in respect of goods in Classes 6, 17 and 19 of the Nice Agreement, on
Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, provided, however, that it does not contain, on these points, any new factors as compared
with the first decision and that it was not preceded by any re‑examination of the applicant’s situation.
It is therefore appropriate to examine, firstly, whether, having regard to the second application for registration, insofar
as it relates to goods in Classes 6, 17 and 19 of the Nice Agreement, the second decision is based on new factors which may
affect its operative part and the grounds constituting the essential basis thereof and, secondly, whether, in that decision,
the applicant’s situation was re‑examined.
In respect of possible new factors, it must be stated that, in its written submissions before both OHIM and the Court, the
applicant in essence merely reiterated the arguments that it had already advanced in support of its first application for
registration. It added, however, firstly, that the examiner erred in the application of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 40/94
(now Article 7(2) of Regulation No 207/2009), in failing to decide in which Member States the word sign at issue had been
refused registration (see paragraph 16 of the contested decision), and, secondly, that that sign had been registered as a
national trade mark in Finland and in the United Kingdom (see paragraph 17 of the contested decision).
The first argument, based on Article 7(2) of Regulation No 40/94, does not add any new factual element to these proceedings,
and it is, in any event, manifestly unfounded in law, so that it was not capable of affecting the operative part of the contested
decision and the grounds constituting the essential basis thereof. The Board of Appeal was therefore entitled to reject the
argument without re‑examining the applicant’s situation. Article 7(2) of Regulation No 40/94 merely provides that the grounds
of non-registrability set out in Article 7(1) are to apply where they obtain in only part of the Community, with the result
that it does not create any specific obligation to give reasons.
In relation to the second argument, relating to registration at national level of the word sign at issue, it is sufficient
to recall settled case‑law – to which the Board of Appeal referred at paragraph 17 of the contested decision – according to
which the Community trade mark regime is autonomous and the legality of decisions of OHIM is to be assessed solely by reference
to Regulation No 40/94, so that OHIM is neither bound by national registrations (see, to that effect, Case T‑130/01
Sykes Enterprises
v
OHIM (REAL PEOPLE, REAL SOLUTIONS)
[2002] ECR II‑5179, paragraph 31) nor required to come to the same conclusions as those arrived at by national authorities
in similar circumstances (see, to that effect, Case C‑173/04 P
Deutsche SiSi-Werke
v
OHIM
[2006] ECR I‑551, paragraph 49; and judgment of 17 November 2009 in Case T‑473/08
Apollo Group
v
OHIM (THINKING AHEAD)
, not published in the ECR, paragraph 43). Further, in the present case, the applicant did not specify at all the grounds
upon which the national authorities at issue based their decisions to register the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE, which could
have been, if appropriate, taken into account in the application of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94. In those circumstances,
even if it were assumed that the national registrations relied upon amounted to relevant facts which occurred after the adoption
of the first decision, the applicant’s second argument was manifestly ineffective and therefore incapable of affecting the
operative part of the contested decision and the grounds constituting the essential basis thereof, with the result that the
Board of Appeal was required to reject it, without conducting a re‑examination of the applicant’s situation in this regard.
Concerning the question of whether the applicant’s situation was or should have been re‑examined in the second decision, it
follows from the considerations set out at paragraphs 37 and 38 above that that is not the case in this instance, since no
new relevant fact had been put forward by the applicant in support of the second application for registration that could have
altered the assessment in the first decision and therefore required a new assessment by the Board of Appeal as to whether
or not the mark applied for has distinctive character in relation to the goods in Classes 6, 17 and 19 of the Nice Agreement.
Further, in its response to a written question put by the Court, the applicant did not provide any further information in
this regard that could undermine that assessment. The Board of Appeal was therefore fully entitled, with regard to the abovementioned
factors, to limit itself in essence to referring to paragraphs 15 to 20 of the first decision (see paragraph 13 of the contested
decision). Similarly, in response to the applicant’s repeated argument relating to OHIM’s previous decision-making practice
– which already existed when the first decision was adopted – in relation to word signs having similarities with the sign
at issue, the Board of Appeal was also fully entitled merely to reiterate, in essence, in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the second
decision, its reasoning set out in paragraphs 5, 21 and 22 of the first decision. In this regard, the mere fact that paragraph
22 of the contested decision also mentions the refusal to register the word sign BUILT FOR LIFE, which occurred after the
adoption of the first decision, is not capable of undermining that finding, since, as a confirmation of OHIM’s previous decision-making
practice, that refusal did not and could not give rise to a re‑examination of the applicant’s situation in the light of that
practice, within the meaning of the case‑law cited in paragraph 30 above.
It follows from the above that, insofar as the contested decision refuses to register the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE as a
Community trade mark in respect of goods in Classes 6, 17 and 19 of the Nice Agreement, on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) of
Regulation No 40/94, it amounts to a merely confirmatory decision. In this regard, there is no need to examine whether the
confirmatory nature of that decision also extends to the application, in the first decision, of the ground for refusal provided
for in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, since reliance – which has become final – on just one of the grounds listed
in Article 7(1) of that regulation is sufficient to refuse registration (see, to that effect, Case C‑104/00 P
DKV
v
OHIM
[2002] ECR I‑7561, paragraph 28).
It must therefore be held that this action is inadmissible insofar as it is directed against those parts of the contested
decision which merely confirm the first decision (see paragraph 40 above).
Substance
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the substance of this action is limited to the question of whether the Board
of Appeal was justified in holding that the registration of the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE as a Community trade mark in respect
of services in Class 37 of the Nice Agreement had also to be refused on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.
Under Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, ‘trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character’ are not to be registered.
Furthermore, Article 7(2) of the Regulation states that ‘[p]aragraph 1 shall apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability
obtain in only part of the Community’.
The concept of general interest underlying Article 7(1) of Regulation No 40/94 is indissociable from the essential function
of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product or service to the consumer or end‑user.
The absolute ground of non-registrability provided for in Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 thus seeks to enable the
consumer or end-user, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which have another
origin (see, to that effect, Case C‑304/06 P
Eurohypo
v
OHIM
[2008] ECR I‑3297, paragraph 56 and the case‑law cited). Therefore, for a trade mark to possess distinctive character, within
the meaning of those provisions, it must serve to identify the product or service in respect of which registration is applied
for as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that product or service from those of other undertakings
(see Case C‑144/06 P
Henkel
v
OHIM
[2007] ECR I‑8109, paragraph 34, and Case C‑398/08 P
Audi
v
OHIM
[2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 33 and the case‑law cited). It is not necessary, for that purpose, for the mark to convey exact
information about the identity of the manufacturer of the product or the supplier of the services. It is sufficient that the
mark enables members of the public concerned to distinguish the product or service that it designates from those which have
a different trade origin and to conclude that all the goods or services that it designates have been manufactured, marketed
or supplied under the control of the owner of the mark and that the owner is responsible for their quality (see judgment of
10 October 2008 in Joined Cases T‑387/06 to T‑390/06
Inter-IKEA
v
OHIM (Representation of a pallet)
, not published in the ECR, paragraph 27, and
THINKING AHEAD
, cited in paragraph 38 above, paragraph 26).
On the other hand, signs which do not enable the public concerned to repeat a purchasing experience if it proves to be positive,
or to avoid it if it proves to be negative, when acquiring the goods or services in question on a subsequent occasion, are
devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94. That is true, in particular,
of signs commonly used to market the goods or services concerned. Such signs are in fact deemed to be incapable of performing
the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the origin of the product or service in question (see,
to that effect, judgment of 12 March 2008 in Case T‑341/06
Compagnie générale de diététique
v
OHIM (GARUM),
not published in the ECR, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
Moreover, distinctive character must be assessed, first, by reference to the goods or services in respect of which registration
has been applied for and, secondly, by reference to the perception of the mark by the relevant public, which is reasonably
well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see
Audi
v
OHIM
, cited in paragraph 44 above, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited, and
Representation of a pallet
, cited in paragraph 44 above, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
Lastly, as regards marks made up of signs or indications that are also used as advertising slogans, indications of quality
or incitements to purchase the goods or services covered by those marks, registration of such marks is not excluded as such
by virtue of such use. As regards the assessment of the distinctive character of such marks, it is inappropriate to apply
to them criteria which are stricter than those applicable to other types of sign (see
Audi
v
OHIM
, cited in paragraph 44 above, paragraphs 35 and 36 and the case-law cited).
As regards, first of all, the determination of the relevant public, which is not itself in dispute in this case, it should
be stated that the services in Class 37 of the Nice Agreement, in respect of which registration of the word sign INSULATE
FOR LIFE has been applied for, constitute building, repair and installation services in the construction sector, inter alia,
in relation to houses. Therefore, those services are familiar both to a specialist professional public and, admittedly to
a lesser extent, to the average consumer. Given that the word sign at issue is made up of three words found in the English
language, the relevant public is those persons who have a command of that language, which represents a very large part of
the European public.
Moreover, it must be examined whether the Board of Appeal correctly analysed the meaning of the elements and of the whole
of the mark applied for, from the point of view of the relevant public, in finding that the word sign is devoid of any distinctive
character with regard to the services at issue.
As case-law has acknowledged, in the case of compound word signs, the relevant meaning, established on the basis of all their
constituent elements and not only one of them, must be taken into account (Case T‑28/06
RheinfelsQuellen H. Hövelmann
v
OHIM (VOM URSPRUNG HER VOLLKOMMEN)
[2007] ECR II‑4413, paragraph 32). Consequently, the assessment of the distinctive character of such signs cannot be limited
to an evaluation of each of their words or components, considered in isolation, but must, on any view, be based on the overall
perception of those marks by the relevant public and not on the presumption that elements individually devoid of distinctive
character cannot, on being combined, have a distinctive character. The mere fact that each of those elements, considered separately,
is devoid of any distinctive character does not mean that their combination cannot present such character (
Eurohypo
v
OHIM
, cited in paragraph 44 above, paragraph 41). In other words, in order to assess whether or not a trade mark has any distinctive
character, the overall impression given by it must be considered. That does not mean, however, that one may not first examine
each of the individual features which make up that mark. It may be useful, in the course of the overall assessment, to examine
each of the components of which the trade mark concerned is composed (see, to that effect, Case C‑238/06 P
Develey
v
OHIM
[2007] ECR I‑9375, paragraph 82, and
THINKING AHEAD
, cited in paragraph 38 above, paragraph 31).
In that regard, the applicant does not dispute that the word ‘insulate’ has no meaning other than to insulate. Further, while
the applicant submits that the combination of words ‘for life’ – which inextricably links the preposition ‘for’ with the noun
‘life’ – would not be immediately understood by the relevant public as meaning ‘lasts for a lifetime’ or ‘for a lifetime period’,
such an argument must be dismissed. The applicant does not submit any other meaning and merely asserts, vaguely, that that
combination of words has various connotations and gives rise to multiple associations and suggestions. Therefore, if they
are combined in the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE, the two components ‘insulate’ and ‘for life’ will be immediately understood
as meaning that an insulation activity is long lasting or that it lasts for a lifetime. That sign therefore does not have
an unusual or ambiguous character, in the light of the rules of the English language on syntax, grammar, phonetics and/or
semantics, which can lead the relevant public, which is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect,
to make an association of a different kind.
Thus, the Board of Appeal was justified in concluding that, in the light of the services at issue, the relevant public will
understand the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE, immediately and without further analytical effort, as a reference to very long-lasting
services related to the use of a particularly durable insulation material, and not as an indication of the commercial origin
of those services (see paragraph 19 of the contested decision). Contrary to the applicant’s submissions in response to a written
question put by the Court, even as a laudatory or promotional slogan, that word sign is not sufficiently original or resonant
to require at least some interpretation, thought or analysis on the part of the relevant public (see, to that effect,
Audi
v
OHIM
, cited in paragraph 44 above, paragraphs 44, 45 and 56 to 59), as that public is led to associate that sign immediately with
the services at issue, which are capable of being marketed by any undertaking active in the construction and insulation sector.
Consequently, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to find that the word sign INSULATE FOR LIFE
was devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 as regards the services
in Class 37 of the Nice Agreement and to confirm the refusal to register it as a Community trade mark, and there is no need
to decide on whether that sign is also descriptive of those services.
Accordingly, this action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs
Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs
if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought
by OHIM.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby:
1.
Dismisses the action;
2.
Orders Paroc Oy AB to pay the costs.
Azizi
Cremona
Frimodt Nielsen
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 8 February 2011.
[Signatures]
*
Language of the case: English.