CELEX: 62010CJ0384
Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations
Contract of employment
Choice made by the parties
Mandatory rules of the law applicable in the absence of choice
Determination of that law
Employee carrying out his work in more than one Contracting State

This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 6 of the Convention on the law applicable to
contractual obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 (OJ 1980 L 266, p. 1) (‘the Rome Convention’), which
relates to individual employment contracts.
The reference has been made in the course of proceedings between Mr Voogsgeerd, residing at Zandvoort (Netherlands), and Navimer
SA (‘Navimer’), an undertaking established in Mertert (the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), regarding a payment in lieu of notice
to Mr Voogsgeerd for breach of the employment contract which he had entered into with that undertaking.

Legal context

The rules on the law applicable to contractual obligations
Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention provides:
‘The Rome Convention is to apply to contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different
countries.’
Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention is worded as follows:
‘A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable
certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable
to the whole or a part only of the contract.’
Article 4(1) of that convention provides:
‘To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in accordance with Article 3, the contract shall
be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected ...’
Article 6 of the Rome Convention provides:
‘1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, in a contract of employment a choice of law made by the parties shall not
have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded him by the mandatory rules of the law which would be
applicable under paragraph 2 in the absence of choice.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a contract of employment shall, in the absence of choice in accordance with
Article 3, be governed:
(a)      by the law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract, even if he
is temporarily employed in another country; or
(b)      if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any one country, by the law of the country in which the place of
business through which he was engaged is situated;
unless it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country, in which
case the contract shall be governed by the law of that country.’

National law
Article 80(2) of the Luxembourg Law of 9 November 1990 establishing a Luxembourg Public Maritime Register (
Mémorial
A 1990, p. 808), provides:
‘The wrongful termination of a seaman’s contract of employment confers entitlement to damages and to the payment of interest.
A dismissal which is contrary to law or is not based on genuine and serious grounds is wrongful and constitutes a socially
and economically unacceptable measure.
Legal proceedings for compensation in respect of the wrongful termination of a seaman’s contract of employment shall be brought
before the court having jurisdiction in employment matters within three months of notification of dismissal or communication
of the reasons, or else be time-barred.
That period shall be validly interrupted where a written complaint is submitted to the employer by the seaman, his legal representative
or his trade union.’
Article 39 of the Belgian Law of 3 July 1978 on employment contracts (
Belgisch Staasblad
, 22 August 1978), states:
‘In the case of a contract of indefinite duration, the party terminating the contract without urgent cause or without observing
the period of notice laid down by Articles 59, 82, 83, 84 and 115 is required to pay the other party compensation equal to
the current salary for the duration of the period of notice or for the period of notice remaining.’

The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
On 7 August 2001 at the headquarters of Naviglobe NV (‘Naviglobe’), an undertaking established at Antwerp (Belgium), Mr Voogsgeerd
entered into a contract of employment of indefinite duration with Navimer. The parties chose Luxembourg law to be the law
applicable to that contract.
From August 2001 until April 2002, Mr Voogsgeerd served as chief engineer on the ships MS Regina and Prince Henri, which belonged
to Navimer, and whose navigation area extended to the North Sea.
By letter of 8 April 2002, that undertaking served a notice of dismissal on Mr Voogsgeerd. On 4 April 2003, Mr Voogsgeerd
commenced proceedings against Naviglobe and Navimer before the arbeidsrechtbank te Antwerpen (Labour Court, Antwerp), seeking
an order that those undertakings, jointly and severally, make a payment in lieu of notice in accordance with the Belgian Law
of 3 July 1978 on employment contracts, plus interest and costs.
In support of his application, Mr Voogsgeerd claimed that, based on Article 6(1) of the Rome Convention, the mandatory rules
of Belgian employment law were applicable, irrespective of the choice made by the parties regarding the applicable law. In
that respect, Mr Voogsgeerd claimed that he was bound, by his contract of employment, to the Belgian undertaking Naviglobe,
and not to the Luxembourg undertaking Navimer, and that he had principally carried out his work in Belgium where he received
instructions from Naviglobe and to which he returned after each voyage.
By judgment of 12 November 2004, the arbeidsrechtbank te Antwerpen declared that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the action
against Navimer. However, it declared the proceedings brought against Naviglobe admissible, but unfounded.
Mr Voogsgeerd lodged an appeal against that judgment before the arbeidshof te Antwerpen (Higher Labour Court, Antwerp). Having
ruled that it had territorial jurisdiction, that court, firstly, rejected the claim against Naviglobe as unfounded, on the
ground that the applicant in the main proceedings had not adduced evidence to show that he had been seconded to that company.
Secondly, as regards the employment relationship with Navimer, the arbeidshof te Antwerpen found that, having regard to all
the circumstances in issue, Mr Voogsgeerd had not habitually carried out his work in a single Member State, in the present
case Belgium, and that, consequently, Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention was not applicable. In that context, the court
stated, firstly, that Mr Voogsgeerd did not have a contract of employment with Naviglobe, that his salary was paid by Navimer
and that he was affiliated to a Luxembourg sickness insurance fund and, secondly, that he had failed to establish that he
worked mainly in Belgian territorial waters. Therefore, the arbeidshof te Antwerpen found that, since Navimer was the business
which engaged Mr Voogsgeerd, the mandatory provisions of Luxembourg law applied to the contract of employment, in accordance
with Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention.
As is apparent from the order for reference, the arbeidshof te Antwerpen considered that Mr Voogsgeerd had proved in support
of his appeal that Antwerp was the place where he always boarded and from where he received the instructions for each of his
missions.
However, the arbeidshof te Antwerpen found that, on the basis of Article 6(2(b) of the Rome Convention, only Luxembourg law
was applicable to the contract of employment and that the action for damages for the wrongful termination of that contract
must be dismissed insofar as it was brought after the expiry of the 3‑month limitation period prescribed by Article 80 of
the Luxembourg Law of 9 November 1990 establishing a Luxembourg Public Maritime Register.
Mr Voogsgeerd appealed on a point of law against the section of that judgment concerning Navimer, which therefore remains
as the only defendant in the main proceedings. The ground of appeal relied upon alleges an error of law by the arbeidshof
te Antwerpen regarding the determination of the law applicable to the contract of employment.
In support of his appeal, the applicant in the main proceedings claims that the arbeidshof te Antwerpen infringed Articles 1,
3, 4 and 6 of the Rome Convention by finding that the evidence which he had put forward to establish the habitual carrying
out of his work in Belgium under the authority of Naviglobe had no bearing on whether the provisions of the Rome Convention,
and in particular Article 6(2)(b) of that convention, applied.
The referring court observes that, insofar as that evidence is accurate, Naviglobe, which is established in Antwerp, could
be regarded as being the business with which Mr Voogsgeerd is connected for his actual employment, for the purposes of Article 6(2)(b)
of the Rome Convention.
In those circumstances, the Hof van Cassatie decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court
of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)      Must the country in which the place of business is situated through which an employee was engaged, within the meaning of Article 6(2)(b)
of the [Rome Convention], be taken to mean the country in which the place of business of the employer is situated through
which, according to the contract of employment, the employee was engaged, or the country in which the place of business of
the employer is situated with which the employee is connected for his actual employment, even though that employee does not
habitually carry out his work in any one country?
(2)      Must the place to which an employee who does not habitually carry out his work in any one country is obliged to report and
where he receives administrative briefings, as well as instructions for the performance of his work, be deemed to be the place
of actual employment within the meaning of the first question?
(3)      Must the place of business with which the employee is connected for his actual employment within the meaning of the first
question satisfy certain formal requirements such as, inter alia, the possession of legal personality, or does the existence
of a
de facto
place of business suffice for that purpose?
(4)      Can the place of business of another company, with which the corporate employer is connected, serve as the place of business
within the meaning of the third question, even though the authority of the employer has not been transferred to that other
company?’

Consideration of the questions referred

Preliminary observations
The Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to rule on the present reference for a preliminary ruling, which
has been made by one of the two Belgian courts which have the power to do so under Article 2(a) of the First Protocol on the
interpretation of the Rome Convention (OJ 1998 C 27, p. 47), which entered into force on 1 August 2004.
By its questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether factors such as the place where the employee is actually employed,
the place to which that employee is obliged to report and where he receives administrative briefings necessary for the performance
of his work, and the
de facto
place of business of the employer affect the determination of the law applicable to the contract of employment under Article 6(2)
of the Rome Convention.
It should be borne in mind at the outset that Article 6 of the Rome Convention lays down special conflict of laws rules concerning
individual employment contracts which derogate from the general rules contained in Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention,
concerning, respectively, the freedom of choice of the applicable law and the criteria for determining that law in the absence
of such a choice.
Thus, Article 6(1) of the Rome Convention provides that the choice made by the parties regarding the law applicable to the
contract of employment cannot lead to the employee’s being deprived of the guarantees laid down by the mandatory provisions
of the law which would be applicable to the contract in the absence of a choice. Article 6(2) sets out the linking factors
of the employment contract on the basis of which the
lex contractus
must be determined in the absence of a choice by the parties.
Those factors are, first, that of the country in which the employee ‘habitually carries out his work’ (Article 6(2)(a)) or,
alternatively, if there is no such place, ‘the place of business through which he was engaged’ (Article 6(2)(b)).
Furthermore, according to the last sentence of Article 6(2), those two linking factors are not to apply where it appears from
the circumstances as a whole that the contract of employment is more closely connected with another country, in which case
the law of that other country is to apply.
In the case in the main proceedings, it is not disputed that the parties to the contract chose Luxembourg law as the
lex contractus
. However, irrespective of that choice, the question remains as to what is the law applicable to the contract, since the applicant
in the main proceedings invokes the mandatory provisions of Belgian law as the basis of his right to a payment in lieu of
notice. As is apparent from paragraph 19 above, Mr Voogsgeerd claims that the court of appeal, which found, on the basis of
Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention, that Luxembourg law was applicable to the contract in issue, infringed several provisions
of that convention and, in particular, Article 6 thereof. In that regard, Mr Voogsgeerd claims that, in the course of the
carrying out of his work, he had no contact with Navimer, but that he was obliged to report for boarding at Antwerp with Naviglobe,
which gave him instructions.
By its questions, the Hof van Cassatie essentially asks the Court to interpret Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention, and, in
particular, the linking factor of the country in which the place of business which engaged the employee is situated, referred
to in Article 6(2)(b).
Nevertheless, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, in the context of the preliminary ruling
procedure, while it falls to the referring court to apply the rule of European Union law to a dispute before it and, thus,
to characterise a provision of national law by reference to such a rule, it is the Court’s duty to provide that referring
court with an interpretation of European Union law which may be useful to it in assessing the effects of that provision (see,
to that effect, Case C-6/01
Anomar and Others
[2003] ECR I-8621, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited), to extract from all the information provided by the national court,
and, in particular, from the statement of grounds for the reference, the elements of European Union law requiring an interpretation,
having regard to the subject-matter of the dispute (see, to that effect, Case 20/87
Gauchard
[1987] ECR 4879, paragraph 7).
In the present case, although the questions referred concern Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention, it must be noted, as
the Advocate General has pointed out in point 60 of her Opinion and as observed by the Belgian Government and the European
Commission, that the matters characterising the employment relationship in issue in the main proceedings, which were put forward
by the referring court to justify the submission of the reference for a preliminary ruling, seem to correspond more to the
criteria in Article 6(2)(a) than to those in Article 6(2)(b).
Furthermore, it must be observed that, for the purposes of determining the applicable law, the factor linking the employment
contract in issue to the country where the employee habitually carries out his work must be taken into consideration first,
and its application excludes the taking into consideration of the secondary factor of the country in which the place of business
through which he was engaged is situated.
In that regard, it must be recalled that in Case C-29/10
Koelzsch
[2011] ECR I‑1595 the Court, interpreted Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention as meaning that it is first necessary to
examine, on the basis of evidence such as that put forward by Mr Voogsgeerd, whether the employee principally carries out
his work within any one country.
Indeed, it follows from the wording of Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention that it was the legislator’s intention to establish
a hierarchy of the factors to be taken into account in order to determine the law applicable to the contract of employment.
That interpretation is also supported by the analysis of the objective of Article 6 of the Rome Convention, which is to guarantee
adequate protection to the employee. Thus, as the Court has already stated, the factor of the country in which the employee
‘habitually carries out his work’, set out in Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention, must be given a broad interpretation,
while the factor of ‘the place of business through which [the employee] was engaged’, in Article 6(2)(b) thereof, can apply
only if the court seised is not in a position to determine the country in which the work is habitually carried out (see
Koelzsch
, paragraph 43).
Thus, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, which concerns an employee carrying out his work in more than one Contracting
State, the factor in Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention should nonetheless be applied when it is possible for the court
seised to determine the State with which the work has a significant connection (see
Koelzsch
, paragraph 44).
In such a case, the factor of the country in which the work is habitually carried out must be understood as referring to the
place in which or from which the employee actually carries out his working activities and, if there is no centre of activities,
to the place where he carries out the majority of his activities (see
Koelzsch,
paragraph 45).
Therefore, in the light of the nature of work in the maritime sector, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the court
seised must take account of all the factors which characterise the activity of the employee and must, in particular, determine
in which State the place is situated from which the employee carries out his transport tasks, receives instructions concerning
his tasks and organises his work, and the place where his work tools are to be found (see
Koelzsch
, paragraphs 48 and 49).
If it is apparent from these findings that the place from which the employee carries out his transport tasks and also receives
the instructions concerning his tasks is always the same, that place must be considered to be the place where he habitually
carries out his work, within the meaning of Article 6(2)(a). As stated at paragraph 32 above, the factor of the place where
the employee habitually carries out his work is applied in priority.
Consequently, the aspects characterising the employment relationship, as referred to in the order for reference, namely, the
place of actual employment, the place where the employee receives instructions or where he must report before discharging
his tasks, are relevant for the determination of the law applicable to that employment relationship in that, when those places
are situated in the same country, the court seised may take the view that the situation falls within the case provided for
in Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention.
It follows that, on a proper construction of Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention, the national court seised of the case must
first establish whether the employee, in the performance of his contract, habitually carries out his work in any one country,
which is that in which or from which, in the light of all the aspects characterising that activity, the employee performs
the main part of his duties to his employer.
If the national court were to take the view that it cannot rule on the dispute before it under Article 6(2)(a) of that convention,
it would be necessary to answer the questions as set out in the reference for a preliminary ruling.

Questions 1 and 2
By its first and second questions, which should be considered together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the
concept of ‘the place of business through which the employee was engaged’, within the meaning of Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome
Convention, must be understood as referring to the place of business which concluded the contract of employment or as referring
to the place of business of the undertaking to which the employee is connected through his actual employment and, in the latter
case, whether that connection can follow from the fact that the employee must report regularly to and receive instructions
from that undertaking.
As is apparent from paragraphs 39 and 40 above, when the court seised establishes that the employee must always report to
the same place where he receives instructions, that court must regard the employee as habitually carrying out his work in
that place, within the meaning of Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention. Those matters, which characterise the actual employment,
all concern the determination of the law applicable to the contract of employment on the basis of that linking factor and
they cannot also be relevant to the application of Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention.
As stated by the Advocate General in points 65 to 68 of her Opinion, to interpret Article 6(2)(b) in order to determine the
undertaking which engaged the employee by taking into account matters that do not relate purely to the conclusion of the contract,
would be inconsistent both with the language and with the spirit and purpose of that provision.
Indeed, the use of the term ‘engaged’ in Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention, clearly refers purely to the conclusion of
the contract or, in the case of a
de facto
employment relationship, to the creation of the employment relationship and not to the way in which the employee’s actual
employment is carried out.
Furthermore, schematic interpretation of Article 6(2)(b) requires the – subsidiary – factor laid down in that provision to
be applied when it is impossible to situate the employment relationship in a Member State. Consequently, only a strict interpretation
of that subsidiary factor can guarantee the complete foreseeability of the law applicable to the contract of employment.
Since the factor of the place of business of the undertaking which employs the worker is unrelated to the conditions under
which the work is carried out, the fact of the undertaking’s being established in one place or another has no bearing on the
determination of that place of business.
It is only if matters relating to the engagement procedure support the conclusion that the undertaking which concluded the
contract in actual fact acted in the name of and on behalf of another undertaking that the referring court might consider
that the linking factor in Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention makes a
renvoi
to the law of the country in which the latter undertaking’s place of business is situated.
Consequently, for the purposes of that assessment, the referring court should take into consideration not those matters relating
to the performance of the work but only those relating to the procedure for concluding the contract, such as the place of
business which published the recruitment notice and that which carried out the recruitment interview, and it must endeavour
to determine the real location of that place of business.
In any event, as noted by the Advocate General in point 73 of her Opinion, for the purposes of the last subparagraph of Article 6(2),
the referring court can take other elements of the employment relationship into account when it appears that those concerning
the two linking factors in that article relating to the place where the work is carried out and to the place of business of
the undertaking which employs the worker, respectively, suggest that the contract is more closely connected to a State other
than those indicated by those factors.
The answer to Questions 1 and 2 must therefore be that the concept of ‘the place of business through which the employee was
engaged’, within the meaning of Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention, must be understood as referring exclusively to the
place of business which engaged the employee and not to that with which the employee is connected by his actual employment.

Question 3
By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether, for the purposes of applying the linking factor in Article 6(2)(b)
of the Rome Convention, the place of business must meet certain formal requirements, such as the possession of legal personality.
In that context, it must be noted at the outset that it is apparent from the wording of that provision that it does not concern
only those business units of the undertaking that have legal personality, the term ‘place of business’ covering every stable
structure of an undertaking. Consequently, not only the subsidiaries and branches but also other units, such as the offices
of an undertaking, could constitute places of business within the meaning of Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention, even
though they do not have legal personality.
However, as emphasised by the Commission and noted by the Advocate General at point 81 of her Opinion, that provision requires
the undertaking to have a degree of permanence. Indeed, the purely transitory presence in a State of an agent of an undertaking
from another State for the purpose of engaging employees cannot be regarded as constituting a place of business which connects
the contract to that State. That would be contrary to the linking factor provided for by Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention,
which is not the place of the conclusion of the contract.
If, however, the same agent travels to a country in which the employer maintains a permanent establishment of his undertaking,
it would be perfectly reasonable to suppose that that establishment constitutes a ‘place of business’, within the meaning
of Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention.
Moreover, the place of business taken into consideration for the application of the linking factor must, in principle, belong
to the undertaking which engages the employee, that is to say, form an integral part of its structure.
On the basis of those considerations, the answer to Question 3 is that Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention must be interpreted
as meaning that the possession of legal personality does not constitute a requirement that must be met by the place of business
of the employer within the meaning of that provision.

Question 4
By its fourth and last question, the referring court asks whether, for the purposes of applying the linking factor provided
for in Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention, the place of business of an undertaking other than that which is the employer
can be regarded as acting in that capacity even though the authority of the employer has not been transferred to that other
undertaking.
In that context, the order for reference appears to suggest that this question arises because the applicant claims that he
always received instructions from Naviglobe and that, for the period under consideration, the director of that undertaking
was also the director of Navimer, the undertaking which formally engaged the applicant in the main proceedings.
As regards the first element, it must be recalled that, as is clear from paragraphs 39 and 40 above, such a circumstance must
be taken into account in determining the place where the work is habitually carried out, for the purpose of applying Article 6(2)(a)
of the Rome Convention, since it concerns the performance of the work.
As regards the claim of the applicant in the main proceedings as to the same person’s being the director of Naviglobe and
of Navimer, it is for the referring court to assess what the real relationship between the two companies is in order to establish
whether Naviglobe is, indeed, the employer of the personnel engaged by Navimer. The court seised must, in particular, take
into consideration all the objective factors making it possible to establish that there exists a real situation different
from that which appears from the terms of the contract (see, by analogy, Case C-341/04
Eurofood IFSC
[2006] ECR I-3813, paragraph 37).
In making this assessment, the circumstance pleaded by Navimer, namely, that there was no transfer of authority to Naviglobe,
constitutes one of the matters to be taken into consideration, but it is not, in itself, decisive in the determination of
whether the employee was, in reality, engaged by a company other than that referred to as the employer.
It is only if one of the two companies acted for the other that the place of business of the first could be regarded as belonging
to the second, for the purposes of applying the linking factor in Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention.
On the basis of those considerations, the answer to Question 4 is that, on a proper construction of Article 6(2)(b) of the
Rome Convention, the place of business of an undertaking other than that which is formally referred to as the employer, with
which that undertaking has connections, may be classified as a ‘place of business’ if objective factors make it possible to
establish that there exists a real situation different from that which appears from the terms of the contract, even though
the authority of the employer has not been formally transferred to that other undertaking.

Costs
Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court,
the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs
of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules:
1.
On a proper construction of Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, opened for
signature in Rome on 19 June 1980, the national court seised of the case must first establish whether the employee, in the
performance of his contract, habitually carries out his work in any one country, which is that in which or from which, in
the light of all the aspects characterising that activity, the employee performs the main part of his duties to his employer.
2.
If the national court should take the view that it cannot rule under Article 6(2)(a) of that convention on the action before
it, Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention must be interpreted as follows:
–
‘the place of business through which the employee was engaged’ must be understood as referring exclusively to the place of
business which engaged the employee and not to that with which the employee is connected by his actual employment;
–
the possession of legal personality does not constitute a requirement that must be met by the place of business of the employer
within the meaning of that provision;
–
the place of business of an undertaking other than that which is formally referred to as the employer, with which that undertaking
has connections, may be classified as a ‘place of business’ within the meaning of Article 6(2)(b) of that convention if objective
factors make it possible to establish that there exists a real situation different from that which appears from the terms
of the contract, even though the authority of the employer has not been formally transferred to that other undertaking.
[Signatures]
*
Language of the case: Dutch.