CELEX: 62010CJ0110
Appeal
Competition
Market in soda ash in the Community
Concerted practice
Infringement of the rights of the defence
Access to the file
Hearing of the undertaking

By its appeal, Solvay SA (‘Solvay’) seeks to have set aside the judgment in Case T‑58/01
Solvay
v
Commission
[2009] ECR II‑4781 (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court of the European Union dismissed the action brought
by Solvay for annulment of Commission Decision 2003/5/EC of 13 December 2000 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of
the EC Treaty (COMP/33.133-B: Soda-ash – Solvay, CFK) (OJ 2003 L 10, p. 1; ‘the contested decision’) and, in the alternative,
annulment or reduction of the fine imposed on it.

Background to the dispute
Solvay is a large chemical company. Its founder, Ernest Solvay, invented a process permitting the synthetic production of
soda ash, a material principally used in the manufacture of glass. Soda ash is also used in the chemical industry, for the
manufacture of detergents, and in metallurgy.
Around 1870, Solvay granted a manufacturing licence to Brunner, Mond & Co., one of the companies which originally made up
Imperial Chemical Industries (‘ICI’). Solvay and Brunner, Mond & Co split their spheres of influence between themselves (‘Alkali
Cartel’), Solvay being active in continental Europe and Brunner, Mond & Co in the British Isles, the British Commonwealth
and other countries in Africa, Asia and South America. The initial agreement was renewed a number of times, in particular
in 1945.
At the end of the 1980s, Solvay was the main producer of soda ash both in the European Community, where it represented 60%
of the market, and worldwide. ICI was the second largest producer. Next largest were four small producers: Rhône-Poulenc,
Akzo, Matthes & Weber and Chemische Fabrik Kalk (‘CFK’).
Natural soda ash was extracted in the United States. Its production cost was lower than that of synthetic soda ash, but to
that figure transport costs had to be added. The Community undertakings were protected for some years by anti-dumping measures,
but those measures were under review at the time when contentious proceedings were commenced by the Commission of the European
Communities. It was possible that dumping would no longer be found to be established.
Producers in Eastern European countries were also competitors, but the quantities of soda ash involved were small. Imports
from those countries had also been subject to anti-dumping measures.
On the Community market, spheres of influence were divided between Solvay and ICI and national markets were isolated, with
considerable differences in price.
At the beginning of 1989, suspecting the existence of agreements between the various producer undertakings in the Community,
the Commission carried out inspections at the premises of the main soda ash producers and requisitioned copies of numerous
documents. Those inspections were supplemented by requests for information.
On 13 March 1990, the Commission sent a joint statement of objections to Solvay, ICI and CFK. The offences alleged consisted
in the following:
–        infringement of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (later Article 85 of the EC Treaty and now Article 81 EC), by Solvay and by ICI,
–        infringement of Article 85 of the Treaty, by Solvay and by CFK,
–        infringement of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (later Article 86 of the EC Treaty and now Article 82 EC), by Solvay,
–        infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty, by ICI.
The Commission did not send each of the undertakings concerned all the documents, but only the documents relating to the infringement
which the undertaking concerned was alleged to have committed. Furthermore, for reasons of confidentiality, a great number
of documents or extracts were not sent to the undertakings concerned.
Those undertakings were invited to be heard. It appears that Solvay did not wish to participate in the hearings.
On 19 December 1990, the Commission adopted the following four decisions:
–        Decision 91/297/EEC relating to a proceeding under Article [81 EC] (IV/33.133‑A: Soda ash – Solvay, ICI) (OJ 1991 L 152, p.
1), by which (i) the Commission found that Solvay and ICI had, in essence, continued to share the soda ash market between
themselves, despite the assurance given by those undertakings that the agreement concluded in 1945 had fallen into disuse,
and (ii) in order to show that this was not a case of independent lines of conduct (‘parallel conduct’), the Commission relied
inter alia on the fact that, in certain circumstances, it was Solvay which supplied under ICI’s name, and that there was frequent
contact between the two undertakings;
–        Decision 91/298/EEC relating to a proceeding under Article [81 EC] (IV/33.133‑B: Soda ash – Solvay, CFK) (OJ 1991 L 152, p.
16), by which the Commission found that Solvay and CFK had entered into a pricing agreement, with CFK receiving in exchange
a guaranteed minimum sales tonnage, reviewed annually;
–        Decision 91/299/EEC relating to a proceeding under Article [82 EC] (IV/33.133‑C: Soda ash – Solvay) (OJ 1991 L 152, p. 21),
by which the Commission found that Solvay had abused its dominant position by applying a system of loyalty rebates and discounts
by reference to marginal tonnage, with the intention of tying customers to Solvay in respect of all their requirements and
of cutting out competitors;
–        Decision 91/300/EEC relating to a proceeding under Article [82 EC] (IV/33.133‑D: Soda ash – ICI) (OJ 1991 L 152, p. 40), by
which the Commission found that ICI was guilty of similar conduct.
Those four decisions have been challenged before the Court of First Instance (now ‘the General Court’). Solvay sought annulment
of Decision 91/297 (Case T‑30/91), Decision 91/298 (Case T‑31/91) and Decision 91/299 (Case T‑32/91). ICI sought annulment
of Decision 91/297 (Case T‑36/91) and Decision 91/300 (Case T‑37/91). On the other hand, CFK paid the fine imposed on it under
Decision 91/298.
In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, on 27 February 1992, the General Court declared that a Commission decision
relating to a cartel between polyvinylchloride (PVC) manufacturers was non-existent because that decision had not been properly
‘authenticated’ (Joined Cases T‑79/89, T‑84/89, T‑85/89, T‑86/89, T‑89/89, T‑91/89, T‑92/89, T‑94/89, T‑96/89, T‑98/89, T‑102/89
and T‑104/89
BASF and Others
v
Commission
[1992] ECR II‑315). In the cases referred to in paragraph 13 above, in which it was the applicant, Solvay lodged ‘supplementary
applications’ in which it put forward a new plea in law to the effect that the decision, which it had initially sought to
have annulled, should be declared non-existent, referring to two press articles from which it appeared that the Commission
admitted that it had not authenticated a decision for 25 years.
Following the ruling of the Court of Justice in the appeal brought against that judgment in Case C‑137/92 P
Commission
v
BASF and Others
[1994] ECR I‑2555, the General Court ordered other measures of organisation of procedure in the present case; for example,
it called upon the Commission to produce, inter alia, the text of the decision challenged by the applicant, as authenticated
at the time. The Commission stated in reply that, so long as the Court had not ruled on the admissibility of that plea, the
correct course was to postpone consideration of its merits. Since, however, the General Court had directed the Commission,
by order of 25 October 1994, to produce the text in question, the Commission complied and produced the text of that decision.
At the hearing on 6 and 7 December 1994 the parties presented oral argument and replied to the questions put by the General
Court.
The General Court delivered five judgments on 29 June 1995.
By the judgments in Case T‑30/91
Solvay
v
Commission
[1995] ECR II‑1775 and Case T‑36/91
ICI
v
Commission
[1995] ECR II‑1847, Decision 91/297 was annulled for infringement of the rights of the defence on the ground that, during
the administrative proceedings, the Commission had not granted sufficient access to the documents, notably to the documents
which were likely to be helpful to the defence. In reaching the finding that the breach of administrative procedure could
not be cured in the proceedings before the Court, the General Court pointed out in particular, in paragraph 98 of the judgment
in Case T‑30/91
Solvay
v
Commission
, that, ‘if during the administrative procedure the applicant had been able to rely on documents which might exculpate it,
it might have been able to influence the assessment of the college of Commissioners, at least with regard to the conclusiveness
of the evidence of its alleged passive and parallel conduct as regards the beginning and therefore the duration of the infringement’.
Both in Case T‑30/91
Solvay
v
Commission
and in Case T‑36/91
ICI
v
Commission
, the General Court held that, at the very least, the Commission should have supplied a list of documents coming from the
other undertakings, in order to enable their exact content to be ascertained as well as their usefulness to the defence.
By judgment in Case T‑31/91
Solvay
v
Commission
[1995] ECR II‑1821, Decision 91/298 was annulled so far as Solvay was concerned on the ground that that Commission decision
had not been properly authenticated.
By judgment in Case T‑32/91
Solvay
v
Commission
[1995] ECR II‑1825, Decision 91/299 was annulled on the same grounds.
Decision 91/300 was at issue in Case T‑37/91
ICI
v
Commission
[1995] ECR II‑1901. The General Court rejected the pleas and arguments alleging non-disclosure of documents coming from other
undertakings, on the ground that those documents would not have been helpful to the applicant’s defence, and non-disclosure
of a list of the applicant’s own documents. None the less, the General Court annulled the contested decision for lack of proper
authentification.
The above judgments in Case T‑31/91
Solvay
v
Commission
and Case T‑32/91
Solvay
v
Commission
were the subject of appeals by the Commission which gave rise to the judgment in Joined Cases C‑287/95 P and C‑288/95 P
Commission
v
Solvay
[2000] ECR I‑2391. Similarly, the judgment in Case T‑37/91
ICI
v
Commission
was the subject of an appeal which gave rise to the judgment in Case C‑286/95 P
Commission
v
ICI
[2000] ECR I‑2341. Those appeals were dismissed by the Court.
With regard to Solvay, the Commission adopted two new decisions on 13 December 2000:
–        the contested decision, which is the equivalent of Decision 91/298. The terms of those decisions are essentially the same.
In addition, the contested decision contains a description of the proceeding. It is addressed to Solvay, the undertaking on
which the Commission imposed a fine of EUR 3 million.
–        Decision 2003/6/EC relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (COMP/33.133‑C: Soda ash – Solvay) (OJ 2003
L 10, p. 10), which is the equivalent of Decision 91/299 but which also contains a description of the proceeding. By that
decision, the Commission imposed a fine of EUR 20 million on Solvay.
Solvay brought actions contesting those decisions. By judgment in Case T‑57/01
Solvay
v
Commission
[2009] ECR II‑4621 and the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed those actions.

The proceedings before the General Court
On 19 December 2003, in view of the fact that Solvay had raised a plea alleging breach of the right of access to the file,
the General Court asked the Commission to produce, inter alia, a detailed enumerative list of all the documents in the file.
After requesting an extension of the time-limits, the Commission provided a list, and then a second list. Solvay asked to
see certain documents. It was during that period of inquiry that the Commission admitted that it had mislaid some files and
was unable to draw up the list of the documents which they contained, because, according to the Commission, the indexes to
those binders could not be found. On 15 July and 17 November 2005 respectively, Solvay and the Commission lodged their written
observations on the usefulness for Solvay’s defence of the documents which it had consulted. Various further questions were
put to the parties during 2008. The hearing took place on 26 June 2008.

The judgment under appeal

The arguments in support of the claim that the contested decision should be annulled
Solvay raised four pleas in law, divided into parts, which contained a number of lines of argument.
The first plea in law: failure to take into account the time that had elapsed
–       The incorrect application of the rules governing the time-barring of proceedings
Solvay argued that the time-barring of proceedings, calculated in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 of the Council
of 26 November 1974 concerning limitation periods in proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions under the rules of the European
Economic Community relating to transport and competition (OJ 1974 L 319, p. 1), is not suspended during appeal proceedings.
According to Solvay, the Commission could have adopted a new decision immediately after delivery of the judgment in Case T‑31/91
Solvay
v
Commission
. By bringing an appeal, the Commission took a risk, particularly as it was aware of the judgment in
Commission
v
BASF and Others
, in which the Court had adopted a position on the question of failure to authenticate acts.
Referring to Joined Cases C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others
v
Commission
[2002] ECR I‑8375, concerning the ‘PVC II’ decision, the General Court found in the judgment under appeal that the period
during which the appeal remained pending before the Court of Justice constituted a period during which the time-barring of
proceedings is suspended (paragraphs 78 to 90). It pointed out the practical difficulties to which the approach proposed by
Solvay would give rise – the possible co-existence of two decisions – in the event that the Court upheld the Commission’s
appeal.
–       Breach of the principle of a reasonable period
The General Court examined each stage of the procedure, as well as the procedure as a whole. It also noted that, since the
contested decision was identical in substance to Decision 91/298, the rights of the defence had not been infringed despite
the length of time which had elapsed. It noted in particular, in paragraph 122 of the judgment under appeal, that Solvay had
expressly renounced the possibility of a reduction in the fine by way of compensation and also that it was not claiming damages.
The second plea in law: breach of essential procedural requirements for the adoption and authentification of the contested
decision
The General Court rejected the first two parts of this plea: (i) breach of the principle of collegiality and (ii) breach of
the principle of legal certainty. As regards the alleged infringement of the applicant’s right to be heard again, the General
Court noted that the contested decision was framed in terms which were in substance identical to those of Decision 91/298
and that, accordingly, the Commission was not required to hear the applicant again (paragraph 172 of the judgment under appeal).
In addition, the General Court rejected a part of that plea, alleging failure to consult the Advisory Committee on Restrictive
Practices and Monopolies again and irregular composition of that committee.
The General Court also rejected a part of that plea, alleging breach of the principles of impartiality, sound administration
and proportionality.
The third plea in law: trade between Member States was not affected
Solvay challenged the allegation that it had applied a particular commercial strategy. None the less, according to the General
Court, it did not dispute the terms of the agreement concluded with CFK (paragraph 214 of the judgment under appeal). The
General Court noted, in paragraph 215 of the judgment under appeal, that an agreement of that nature, providing a guarantee
with respect to a minimum annual sales tonnage on a national market, was by definition likely to divert trade patterns from
the course which they would otherwise have followed, without it being necessary to establish the existence of a particular
commercial strategy.
The fourth plea in law: breach of the right of access to the file
The General Court determined whether the lack of access to certain documents during the administrative proceeding had prevented
Solvay from perusing documents likely to be useful for its defence. It concluded that this was not the case, after noting
that the agreement concluded with CFK established that trade between Member States was affected and that the argument relating
to the commercial strategy was irrelevant in that regard. The General Court examined the part of the plea alleging lack of
full consultation of the file. After attempting to ascertain the content of the files mislaid by the Commission, the General
Court satisfied itself, in paragraph 262 of the judgment under appeal, that the documents in the existing files contained
proof of Solvay’s alleged misconduct and that ‘there [was] no reason to presume that [Solvay] might have discovered in the
missing “sub-files” documents casting doubt on the Commission’s findings’.

The arguments in support of the claims that the fine should be annulled or reduced
Solvay raised five pleas in law: (i) incorrect assessment of the gravity of the infringements; (ii) incorrect assessment of
the duration of the infringements; (iii) aggravating circumstances incorrectly taken into account by the Commission; (iv)
the existence of attenuating circumstances; and (v) the disproportionate nature of the fine, notably given the time which
had elapsed.
In paragraph 303 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court pointed out that the Commission had not demonstrated that
the infringement in question had continued until the end of 1990. In consequence, the General Court reduced the fine by 25%.
In conclusion, the General Court set the fine at EUR 2.25 million. It ordered Solvay to bear three quarters of its own costs
and to pay three quarters of the costs incurred by the Commission, and ordered the Commission to bear one quarter of its own
costs and to pay one quarter of the costs incurred by Solvay.

The appeal
Solvay relies on three grounds of appeal: (i) infringement of the right to have its case disposed of within a reasonable time;
(ii) infringement of the rights of the defence, arising from the fact that, after refusing Solvay access to the file during
the administrative proceeding, the Commission mislaid part of the file; and (iii) infringement of Solvay’s right to be heard
before the Commission adopted the contested decision.
It is appropriate first to examine together the second and third grounds of appeal, both of which concern infringement of
the rights of the defence.

The second and third grounds of appeal: infringement of the rights of the defence
Arguments of the parties
By the first part of the second ground of appeal, Solvay claims that, by requiring it to show that the lost documents could
have been useful for its defence, the General Court required it to meet a standard of proof which was impossible to satisfy,
since those documents could not be examined.
By the second part of that ground of appeal, Solvay claims that the General Court disregarded the principle that it was sufficient
if those documents represented even a slight chance of influencing the contested decision.
By the third part of that ground of appeal, Solvay claims that the General Court did not confine itself to a preliminary examination
of the file in order to determine whether the missing documents could have influenced that decision, but first ruled on the
merits. As a first step, the General Court found that the substantive pleas raised by Solvay in support of its action for
annulment of the contested decision had to be rejected and, on that basis, it went on to conclude that the documents not disclosed
to Solvay could not have had any influence on that decision.
By the fourth part of that ground of appeal, Solvay takes issue with the finding made by the General Court that Solvay had
not shown that the documents that disappeared might have been useful for its defence, on the grounds that Solvay had not,
at first instance, raised a plea contesting the existence of the agreement with CFK, which it could have done even without
access to the file, whereas it had relied on that plea before the Commission and the content of the lost documents could no
longer be determined by anyone.
By the fifth part of the second ground of appeal, Solvay criticises the General Court for having expressed no interest in
the lost documents on the ground that it had already rejected Solvay’s substantive plea alleging that trade between Member
States had not been affected, even though the General Court was unacquainted with the content of the lost documents and, accordingly,
was not in a position to rule out the possibility that they might have enabled Solvay to present additional arguments, or
even entirely new pleas in law, both going to the merits and relating to the amount of the fine or the regularity of the procedure.
By the first part of the third ground of appeal, Solvay claims that the General Court did not address Solvay’s argument that
it should have been heard before the contested decision was adopted, notwithstanding
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others
v
Commission
, since the administrative proceeding had been affected by irregularities, stemming from the lack of access to the file at
a stage prior to the decision’s adoption, which affected the validity of the preparatory measures for the decision, and since
those irregularities had been established by the General Court before the contested decision was adopted, in Case T‑30/91
Solvay
v
Commission
.
By the second part of that ground of appeal, Solvay claims that the General Court refused to acknowledge that, before adopting
the contested decision, the Commission was under an obligation to hear the undertaking at issue, in view of the fact that
a judgment of the General Court, albeit delivered in separate proceedings, had established the existence of a procedural irregularity
which had affected the preparatory measures for the contested decision. Solvay refers, in that regard, to Case T‑30/91
Solvay
v
Commission
and argues that, in the present case, the proceeding had been affected by the same procedural irregularities as those found
in the case which gave rise to that judgment. Under Article 233 EC, the Commission was required to draw all the appropriate
inferences from a judgment of the General Court. Even though Decision 91/298 had been annulled by the General Court for lack
of authentification, the Commission should also have taken account of the judgment in T‑30/91
Solvay
v
Commission
, which had established beyond doubt another procedural irregularity. According to Solvay, the Commission was therefore required
to rectify that procedural irregularity in order to restore the proceeding to a lawful footing and, accordingly, to make it
possible for Solvay to access the file and to permit it to submit all its written and oral observations, before the adoption
of the contested decision.
The Commission contests both the admissibility and the merits of the grounds of appeal and the arguments thus relied on by
Solvay.
Findings of the Court
Contrary to the arguments put forward by the Commission, by the ground of appeal relating to infringement of the right of
access to the file, Solvay is not criticising the findings of fact made at first instance, but the rules applied by the General
Court as regards the standard of proof relating to the usefulness of the documents, some of which have been mislaid. The question
whether the General Court applied the correct legal standard when determining the usefulness of those documents for Solvay’s
defence is a question of law, which is amenable to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (see, to that effect, Joined Cases
C‑403/04 P and C‑405/04 P
Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel
v
Commission
[2007] ECR I‑729, paragraph 40, and Case C‑413/06 P
Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America
v
Impala
[2008] ECR I‑4951, paragraph 117).
The rights of the defence are fundamental rights forming an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance
the Court ensures (Joined Cases C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P
Aalborg Portland and Others
v
Commission
[2004] ECR I‑123, paragraph 64).
Observance of the rights of the defence in a proceeding before the Commission, the aim of which is to impose a fine on an
undertaking for infringement of the competition rules requires that the undertaking under investigation must have been afforded
the opportunity to make known its views on the truth and relevance of the facts alleged and on the documents used by the Commission
to support its claim that there has been an infringement of the Treaty (
Aalborg Portland and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 66). Those rights are referred to in Article 41(2)(a) and (b) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.
As the General Court rightly pointed out in paragraph 224 of the judgment under appeal, the right of access to the file means
that the Commission must provide the undertaking concerned with the opportunity to examine all the documents in the investigation
that might be relevant for its defence. Those documents comprise both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, with the exception
of business secrets of other undertakings, internal documents of the Commission and other confidential information (
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 315, and
Aalborg Portland and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 68).
Infringement of the right of access to the Commission’s file during the procedure prior to adoption of a decision can, in
principle, cause the decision to be annulled if the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned have been infringed (
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 317).
In such a case, the infringement is not remedied by the mere fact that access was made possible during the judicial proceedings
(
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 318). As the examination undertaken by the General Court is limited to review of the pleas in law put forward,
it has neither the object nor the effect of replacing a full investigation of the case in the context of an administrative
procedure. Moreover, belated disclosure of documents in the file does not return the undertaking which has brought the action
against the Commission decision to the situation in which it would have been if it had been able to rely on those documents
in presenting its written and oral observations to the Commission (see
Aalborg Portland and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited).
Where access to the file, and particularly to exculpatory documents, is granted at the stage of the judicial proceedings,
the undertaking concerned has to show, not that if it had had access to the non-disclosed documents, the Commission decision
would have been different in content, but only that those documents could have been useful for its defence (Case C‑199/99 P
Corus UK
v
Commission
[2003] ECR I‑11177, paragraph 128;
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 318; and
Aalborg Portland and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 131).
Although the General Court rightly referred to those principles, it none the less concluded, in paragraph 263 of the judgment
under appeal, that ‘although [Solvay had] not [had] access to all the documents in the investigation file, in the present
case that [had] not [prevented] it from defending itself against the substantive objections which the Commission raised in
the statement of objections and in the contested decision’.
In order to reach that conclusion, the General Court examined, first of all, the objections raised in that decision and the
material evidence submitted in support of those objections. Such a method of proceeding cannot be criticised since it is in
the light of those elements that the usefulness for the defence of other documents must be assessed.
Nevertheless, the General Court based its conclusion, inter alia, on the finding, in paragraph 262 of the judgment under appeal,
that ‘[a]s [Solvay] has put forward in the application no argument challenging the existence of the agreement referred to
by the Commission in the contested decision, there [was] no reason to presume that it might have discovered in the missing
“sub-files” documents casting doubt on the Commission’s findings’.
It should be borne in mind that, as is apparent from Article 49 of the contested decision, in the administrative proceeding
before the Commission, Solvay and CFK denied entering into any collusive agreement or arrangement. Solvay contends, in particular,
that it had supported CFK’s activities on a unilateral basis at a time when it was considering acquiring CFK’s business.
Furthermore, when Solvay was preparing its action, it had not had access to CFK’s file, which could explain why the application
does not contest the allegation that such an agreement existed.
In any event, a party to the proceedings cannot be criticised for introducing new pleas in law on the basis of matters of
law or of fact which have come to light in the course of the procedure, as provided for in Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure
of the General Court.
In the present case, it was not until 2005 that Solvay was able to take a position on the documents seized during 1989. Nevertheless,
the loss of a certain number of sub-files and the fact that there was no list of the contents of those sub-files meant that
it was unable to ascertain whether the missing documents could have been useful for its defence and whether, in consequence,
it could have relied on them.
The consequences of that loss for the rights of the defence are all the more grave given that, according to the Commission,
the missing sub-files probably contained the replies to the requests for information made under Article 11 of Regulation No 17
of the Council of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles [81] and [82] of the Treaty (OJ, English Special
Edition 1959-1962, p. 87) and, accordingly, CFK’s responses. It cannot therefore be excluded that Solvay could have found
in the sub-files evidence in substantiation of the arguments that it had put forward in the administrative proceeding.
It should be pointed out that the matter at issue in the present case is not that of a few missing documents, the content
of which could have been reconstructed from other sources, but of whole sub-files which have been lost and which, if the suppositions
of the Commission referred to in paragraph 60 above were correct, could have contained essential documents relating to the
procedure before the Commission which might have been relevant to Solvay’s defence.
It follows that, by concluding, in paragraph 263 of the judgment under appeal, that the fact that Solvay had not had access
to all the documents in the investigation file had not prevented it from defending itself, the General Court erred in law
as regards the infringement by the Commission of the rights of the defence and based its findings on a theory regarding the
content of the missing documents which it was itself unable to test.
As regards the hearing of the undertaking concerned before adoption of the contested decision – an argument raised by Solvay
in the third ground of appeal – it should be borne in mind that this forms part of the rights of the defence. An infringement
of the rights of the defence must be examined in relation to the specific circumstances of each particular case.
In paragraph 165 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rightly pointed out that where, following the annulment of
a decision penalising undertakings which have infringed Article 81(1) EC because of a procedural defect concerning exclusively
the procedures governing its final adoption by the College of Commissioners, the Commission is to adopt a fresh decision,
with substantially the same content and based on the same objections, it is not required to conduct a new hearing of the undertakings
concerned (see, to that effect,
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others
v
Commission
, paragraphs 83 to 111).
In the present case, however, the question of the hearing of Solvay cannot be separated from the issue of access to the file.
Although the content of the contested decision is substantially identical to, and based on the same objections as those set
out in, the first decision annulled by the General Court because of a procedural irregularity which occurred at the final
stage in the procedure – lack of proper authentification by the College of Commissioners – the fact remains that the adoption
of that first decision was also affected by a defect which arose well before that procedural irregularity. As is apparent
from paragraph 17 above, it is common ground that, during the administrative proceeding which led to adoption of the first
decision, the Commission had not granted Solvay access to all the documents in its file, in particular, to the exculpatory
documents.
As was recalled in paragraph 17 above, in Cases T‑30/91
Solvay
v
Commission
and T‑36/91
ICI
v
Commission
, the General Court found, with regard to Decision 91/297 (referred in paragraph 12 above), which is linked to the contested
decision and which was the subject of the same statement of objections, that that administrative proceeding was vitiated by
an infringement of the rights of the defence, since the Commission had not given the undertaking concerned sufficient access
to the documents and, in particular, to those likely to be useful to its defence. Accordingly, the General Court annulled
those decisions, stating, in particular, that access to the file in competition cases is one of the procedural safeguards
intended to protect the rights of the defence and that it was necessary to draw up a sufficiently detailed list of the documents
in the file to enable the undertaking concerned to assess whether it was appropriate to request access to particular documents
which might be useful for its defence (Case T‑30/91
Solvay
v
Commission
, paragraphs 59 and 101, and Case T‑36/91
ICI
v
Commission
, paragraphs 69 and 111).
Despite those circumstances and notwithstanding the case-law of the Court confirming the importance of access to the file
and, more specifically, to exculpatory documents (see, inter alia, Case C‑51/92 P
Hercules Chemicals
v
Commission
[1999] ECR I‑4235), the Commission adopted a decision which was the same as the decision which had been annulled owing to
the lack of proper authentification, without opening a new administrative proceeding in which it would have heard Solvay after
granting it access to the file.
It follows that, by failing to take account of the specific circumstances of the case and, in particular, by basing its findings
on the fact that the first decision had been annulled owing to the lack of proper authentification and that the second contained
the same objections, the General Court wrongly found that it was unnecessary to hear Solvay. The General Court accordingly
erred in law in holding that the Commission had not infringed the rights of the defence by failing to hear Solvay before the
adoption of the contested decision.
It follows from those considerations that the second and third grounds of appeal are well founded and that the judgment under
appeal must be set aside in so far as, by that judgment, the General Court failed to annul the contested decision for infringement
of the rights of the defence.
Since the finding that the second and third grounds of appeal are well founded means that the judgment under appeal must be
set aside, it is not necessary to examine the first ground of appeal.

The action challenging the contested decision
In accordance with Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if the appeal is well founded,
the Court must quash the decision of the General Court. The Court may then itself give final judgment in the matter, where
the state of the proceedings so permits. That is the position in the present case.
It follows from paragraphs 47 to 69 above that the appeal is well founded and that the contested decision must be annulled
for infringement of the rights of the defence.

Costs
Under Article 122 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is well founded and the Court itself
gives final judgment in the case, the Court is to make a decision as to costs. Under Article 69(2) of those rules, applicable
to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 118 thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they
have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. As Solvay has applied for costs against the Commission, and the
latter has been unsuccessful, the Commission must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Solvay both
at first instance and on appeal.
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby:
1.
Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 17 December 2009 in Case T‑58/01
Solvay
v
Commission
;
2.
Annuls Commission Decision 2003/5/EC of 13 December 2000 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (COMP/33.133-B:
Soda-ash – Solvay, CFK);
3.
Orders the European Commission to pay the costs at first instance and on appeal.
[Signatures]
*
Language of the case: French.