CELEX: 62009CJ0452
Directive 82/76/EEC
Freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services
Doctors
Acquisition of the title of medical specialist
Remuneration during the period of training
Five-year limitation period in respect of the right to payment of periodic remuneration

The present reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of European Union (‘EU’) law relating to the protection
of rights conferred by a directive which has not been transposed.
The reference has been made in proceedings between Ms Iaia, Mr Moggio and Mr Vassalle (‘the appellants in the main proceedings’)
and the Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, the Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (‘the Italian
State’) and the Università degli studi di Pisa concerning payment of ‘appropriate remuneration’ provided for in Council Directive
82/76/EEC of 26 January 1982 amending Directive 75/362/EEC concerning the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and
other evidence of formal qualifications in medicine, including measures to facilitate effective exercise of the right of establishment
and freedom to provide services and Directive 75/363/EEC concerning the coordination of provisions laid down by law, regulation
or administrative action in respect of activities of doctors (OJ 1982 L 43, p. 21).

Legal context and background to the dispute
Directive 82/76, inter alia by way of an annex concerning ‘characteristics of full-time and part-time training of specialists’
and supplementing Council Directive 75/363/EEC of 16 June 1975 concerning the coordination of provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in respect of activities of doctors (OJ 1975 L 167, p. 14), provided that the full-time
and part-time period of specialisation for doctors had to be subject to ‘appropriate remuneration’ in all the Member States.
By its judgment in Case 49/86
Commission
v
Italy
[1987] ECR 2995, the Court held that the Italian Republic had failed to fulfil its obligations under Community law by not
transposing Directive 82/76 within the prescribed period.
Following that judgment against it, the Italian Republic transposed Directive 82/76 by way of Legislative Decree No 257/91
of 8 August 1991. That decree provided, however, in Article 8(2) thereof, that its provisions were to enter into force only
with effect from the academic year 1991/92, to the exclusion of doctors registered during the academic period covering the
years 1983 to 1991.
As the obligation under Directive 82/76 to provide appropriate remuneration ought to have entered into force in 1983, the
adoption of that decree resulted in a large number of actions between, on the one hand, doctors admitted as specialists during
the academic years 1983 to 1991 and, on the other, the Italian State and certain Italian universities.
In its judgments in Case C‑131/97
Carbonari and Others
[1999] ECR I‑1103, paragraphs 47 and 48, and in Case C‑371/97
Gozza and Others
[2000] ECR I‑7881, paragraphs 36 and 37, the Court held that the obligation to provide appropriate remuneration for periods
of training in specialised medicine did not, in itself, enable national courts to determine which body was liable to pay the
appropriate remuneration or the level thereof. It was, none the less, for those national courts, responsible for applying
national law, and, in particular, legislative provisions which were specially introduced in order to implement Directive 82/76,
to interpret that national law so far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of that directive in order to bring
about the result which it sought to achieve.
If, the Court ruled, the result prescribed by Directive 82/76 could not be achieved by way of an interpretation in conformity
with that directive, the Italian Republic would be required to make reparation for loss or damage caused to individuals by
its failure to transpose that directive within the prescribed period. In that connection, the Court stated that retroactive
and full application of the measures to guarantee correct implementation of Directive 82/76 would suffice, in principle, to
remedy the harmful consequences of the delay in that implementation. However, if the beneficiaries established the existence
of complementary loss sustained by reason of the fact that they had been unable to benefit at the appropriate time from the
financial advantages guaranteed by that directive, such loss would also have to be made good (see
Carbonari and Others
, paragraphs 52 and 53, and
Gozza and Others
, paragraphs 38 and 39).

The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
On 23 November 2001, the appellants in the main proceedings, who are doctors who had followed their specialisation courses
prior to the academic year 1991/92, brought an action against the Italian State and the Università degli studi di Pisa by
which they sought to recover the amount to which they would have been entitled on the basis of Directive 82/76, or, failing
that, compensation for the damage caused by the failure of the Italian State to implement that directive correctly within
the prescribed period.
The Tribunale di Firenze dismissed their application on the basis of the expiry of the five-year limitation period under Article
2948(4) of the Civil Code for the main claim for payment and under Article 2947 of that code for the subsidiary claim for
compensation.
According to the national court, that period had in fact started to run from the day on which the right could have been asserted,
that is to say, from the date of the entry into force of Legislative Decree No 257/91, namely 15 days after its publication
on 16 August 1991. From that time, the appellants in the main proceedings could have known who was required to pay the appropriate
remuneration or the level thereof and could have claimed that that decree was incompatible with Community law in regard to
doctors who had been registered for specialist courses in the years 1983 to 1991.
The appellants in the main proceedings appealed against that decision and requested that the solution adopted in Case C‑208/90
Emmott
[1991] ECR I‑4269 be applied. The Corte d’appello di Firenze takes the view, however, that subsequent case-law has restricted
the applicability of that decision to those cases in which national limitation periods for bringing proceedings have the result
of depriving applicants of any possibility of asserting their rights under Directive 82/76.
Harbouring doubts as to the scope of that restriction, given that the normal effect of the expiry of limitation periods is
to deprive an applicant of any possibility of asserting his rights, the national court is unsure whether this should be regarded
as a genuine reversal which has brought to an end the prohibition of invoking expiry of a limitation period or whether that
restriction relates only to limitation periods which definitively preclude reliance on a right even on a future basis.
In view of the fact that, on appeal, the normal 10-year limitation period under Article 2946 of the Civil Code in respect
of infringement of a right where such infringement does not involve a wrongful act was also considered, the Corte d’appello
di Firenze decided, having taken care to state that the requirement that limitation periods must be equivalent to those generally
provided for under Italian law for similar applications based on national law is satisfied in the present case, to refer the
following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)      Is it compatible with Community law that the Italian State may, in relation to the period preceding the adoption of the first
national legislation implementing Directive 82/76/EEC, lawfully rely on 5-year limitation periods or 10-year ordinary limitation
periods, in respect of a right arising under that directive – without thereby definitively preventing that right, relating
to remuneration, from being exercised, or, failing which, an action for compensation from being brought?
(2)      Is it compatible with Community law, on the other hand, that all preliminary objections of limitation be precluded because
they definitively prevent the above right from being exercised?
(3)      In the alternative, is it compatible with Community law that all preliminary objections of limitation be precluded until such
time as the Court of Justice confirms the infringement of Community law (in the present case, up until 1999)?
(4)      In the further alternative, is it compatible with Community law that all preliminary objections of limitation be precluded
in any event until such time as the directive establishing the right has been correctly and fully transposed into national
law (which, in the present case, never occurred), as laid down in the judgment in
Emmott
?’

Consideration of the questions referred
By its questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the national court asks the Court of Justice, in essence, whether
EU law allows a Member State to invoke the expiry of a limitation period as a defence against the exercise of a right arising
under a directive or against the enforcement of the right to compensation for the damage resulting from the failure to transpose
the directive correctly within the prescribed period, and if relevant, whether that possibility arises only from the point
at which the Court finds that there has been a breach of EU law.
It is settled case-law that, in the absence of EU rules in the matter, it is for the internal legal order of each Member State
to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions
for safeguarding in full rights which individuals derive from EU law, provided that such rules are not less favourable than
those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively
difficult the exercise of the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see Joined Cases C‑114/95 and C‑115/95
Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark
[1997] ECR I‑4263, paragraph 41; Case C‑62/00
Marks & Spencer
[2002] ECR I‑6325, paragraph 34; and Case C‑445/06
Danske Slagterier
[2009] ECR I‑2119, paragraph 31).
As regards that latter principle, the Court has stated that it is compatible with EU law to lay down reasonable periods within
which proceedings must be brought in the interests of legal certainty, which protects both the individual and the authorities
concerned. Such periods are not by their nature liable to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise
the rights conferred by EU law, even if the expiry of those periods necessarily entails the dismissal, in whole or in part,
of the action brought (see Case C‑90/94
Haahr Petroleum
[1997] ECR I‑4085, paragraph 48; Case C‑188/95
Fantask and Others
[1997] ECR I‑6783, paragraph 48; Case C‑231/96
Edis
[1998] ECR I‑4951, paragraph 35; and
Marks & Spencer
, paragraph 35).
With regard to the point at which a limitation period starts to run, it is true that the Court had held that, until such time
as a directive has been properly transposed, a defaulting Member State may not rely on an individual’s delay in initiating
proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon that individual by the provisions of the directive and that
a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time (
Emmott
, paragraph 23).
The Court has, however, subsequently acknowledged that a defaulting Member State may rely on the expiry of a limitation period
as a defence against legal proceedings, even though by the date on which the actions in question were brought that Member
State had not yet correctly transposed the directive in question, ruling that the solution established in
Emmott
had been justified by the circumstances particular to that case, in which a time-bar had had the result of depriving the
applicant in the main proceedings of any opportunity whatever to invoke her right to equal treatment under a directive (see
Case C‑338/91
Steenhorst-Neerings
[1993] ECR I‑5475; Case C‑410/92
Johnson
[1994] ECR I‑5483;
Fantask and Others
, paragraphs 50 to 52; Case C‑30/02
Recheio – Cash & Carry
[2004] ECR I‑6051; and
Danske Slagterier
, paragraphs 53 to 56).
In the case which gave rise to the judgment in
Emmott
, the conduct of the national authorities had, in actual fact, prevented the applicant in the main proceedings from claiming
the benefit of the rights conferred by the directive at issue (paragraphs 10 to 14; see also, to that effect
Steenhorst-Neerings
, paragraph 20, and
Johnson
, paragraph 27).
It follows that EU law does not preclude a national authority from relying on the expiry of a reasonable limitation period
unless, by its conduct, it was responsible for the delay in the application, thereby depriving the applicant in the main proceedings
of the opportunity to enforce his rights under an EU directive before the national courts (see, to that effect,
Edis
, paragraph 48, and Case C‑228/96
April
e [1998] ECR I‑7141, paragraph 43; see also, by analogy, Case C‑327/00
Santex
[2003] ECR I‑1877, paragraphs 57 to 61, and Case C‑542/08
Barth
[2010] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 33 to 36).
It should also be made clear that, in accordance with settled case-law, the fact that the Court may have ruled that the breach
of EU law has occurred generally does not affect the starting point of the limitation period (see, to that effect,
Edis
, paragraph 20;
Recheio – Cash & Carry
, paragraph 23; and
Danske Slagterier
, paragraphs 36 to 39).
This is
a fortiori
the case where, as in the main proceedings, the breach of EU law was not in doubt. In such a situation, a ruling by the Court
that there has been such a breach is not necessary to enable the beneficiaries to ascertain the full extent of their rights.
The fact that the period starts to run before the Court has given its ruling does not therefore render it virtually impossible
or excessively difficult to safeguard the rights derived from EU law.
In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the questions referred is that EU law does not preclude a Member State from relying
on the expiry of a reasonable limitation period as a defence in legal proceedings brought by an individual for the purpose
of safeguarding rights conferred by a directive, even though the Member State did not transpose that directive correctly,
on condition that, by its conduct, that Member State was not responsible for the delay in bringing the action. The finding
by the Court that there has been a breach of EU law does not affect the starting point of the limitation period, in the case
where that breach is not in doubt.

Costs
Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court,
the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs
of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:
European Union law must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from relying on the expiry of a reasonable limitation
period as a defence in legal proceedings brought by an individual for the purpose of safeguarding rights conferred by a directive,
even though the Member State did not transpose that directive correctly, on condition that, by its conduct, that Member State
was not responsible for the delay in bringing the action. The finding by the Court that there has been a breach of European
Union law does not affect the starting point of the limitation period, in the case where that breach is not in doubt.
[Signatures]
*
Language of the case: Italian.