CELEX: 62009CJ0283
Judicial cooperation in civil matters
Taking of evidence
Examination of a witness by the requested court upon application by the requesting court
Payment of witness expenses

This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001
on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters (OJ 2001 L
174, p. 1).
The reference has been made in the course of proceedings between Mr Weryński and his former employer, Mediatel 4B spółka z
o.o., and, in essence, it is designed to ascertain whether the requested court in Ireland may make the examination of a witness
conditional on payment of witness expenses by the requesting court.

Legal context

Regulation No 1206/2001
Regulation No 1206/2001 aims to establish measures on judicial cooperation in civil matters that are applicable, as stated
in Article 1(3) thereof, to all Member States except the Kingdom of Denmark. It replaces, to that extent, the Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters concluded at The Hague on 18 March 1970 (‘the Hague Convention’),
to which recital 6 in the preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001 refers.
Recital 21 in the preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001 states that, in accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol, annexed to
the Treaty on the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the position of the United Kingdom
and Ireland on policies in respect of border controls, asylum and immigration, on judicial cooperation in civil matters and
on police cooperation, Ireland gave notice of its wish to take part in the adoption and application of that regulation.
Recitals 2, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 16 in the preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001 state:
‘(2)      For the purpose of the proper functioning of the internal market, cooperation between courts in the taking of evidence should
be improved, and in particular simplified and accelerated.
…
(7)      As it is often essential for a decision in a civil or commercial matter pending before a court in a Member State to take evidence
in another Member State, the Community’s activity cannot be limited to the field of transmission of judicial and extrajudicial
documents in civil or commercial matters which falls within the scope of Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000
on the serving in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters [OJ 2000 L 160,
p. 37]. It is therefore necessary to continue the improvement of cooperation between courts of Member States in the field
of taking of evidence.
(8)      The efficiency of judicial procedures in civil or commercial matters requires that the transmission and execution of requests
for the performance of taking of evidence is to be made directly and by the most rapid means possible between Member States’
courts.
…
(10)      A request for the performance of the taking of evidence should be executed expeditiously. If it is not possible for the request
to be executed within 90 days of receipt by the requested court, the latter should inform the requesting court accordingly,
stating the reasons which prevent the request from being executed swiftly.
(11)      To secure the effectiveness of this Regulation, the possibility of refusing to execute the request for the performance of
taking of evidence should be confined to strictly limited exceptional situations.
…
(16)      The execution of the request, according to Article 10, should not give rise to a claim for any reimbursement of taxes or costs.
Nevertheless, if the requested court requires reimbursement, the fees paid to experts and interpreters, as well as the costs
occasioned by the application of Article 10(3) and (4), should not be borne by that court. In such a case, the requesting
court is to take the necessary measures to ensure reimbursement without delay. Where the opinion of an expert is required,
the requested court may, before executing the request, ask the requesting court for an adequate deposit or advance towards
the costs.’
Article 10 of Regulation No 1206/2001, which contains general provisions on the execution of a request, provides:
‘1.      The requested court shall execute the request without delay and, at the latest, within 90 days of receipt of the request.
2.      The requested court shall execute the request in accordance with the law of its Member State.
3.      The requesting court may call for the request to be executed in accordance with a special procedure provided for by the law
of its Member State, using form A in the Annex. The requested court shall comply with such a requirement unless this procedure
is incompatible with the law of the Member State of the requested court or by reason of major practical difficulties. If the
requested court does not comply with the requirement for one of these reasons it shall inform the requesting court using form
E in the Annex.
4.      The requesting court may ask the requested court to use communications technology at the performance of the taking of evidence,
in particular by using videoconference and teleconference.
The requested court shall comply with such a requirement unless this is incompatible with the law of the Member State of the
requested court or by reason of major practical difficulties.
If the requested court does not comply with the requirement for one of these reasons, it shall inform the requesting court,
using form E in the Annex.
If there is no access to the technical means referred to above in the requesting or in the requested court, such means may
be made available by the courts by mutual agreement.’
Article 14 of Regulation No 1206/2001 is worded as follows:
‘1.      A request for the hearing of a person shall not be executed when the person concerned claims the right to refuse to give evidence
or to be prohibited from giving evidence,
(a)      under the law of the Member State of the requested court; or
(b)      under the law of the Member State of the requesting court, and such right has been specified in the request, or, if need be,
at the instance of the requested court, has been confirmed by the requesting court.
2.      In addition to the grounds referred to in paragraph 1, the execution of a request may be refused only if:
…
(d)      a deposit or advance asked for in accordance with Article 18(3) is not made within 60 days after the requested court asked
for such a deposit or advance.
…’
Article 18 of Regulation No 1206/2001 is worded as follows:
‘1.      The execution of the request, in accordance with Article 10, shall not give rise to a claim for any reimbursement of taxes
or costs.
2.      Nevertheless, if the requested court so requires, the requesting court shall ensure the reimbursement, without delay, of:
–      the fees paid to experts and interpreters, and
–       the costs occasioned by the application of Article 10(3) and (4).
The duty for the parties to bear these fees or costs shall be governed by the law of the Member State of the requesting court.
3.      Where the opinion of an expert is required, the requested court may, before executing the request, ask the requesting court
for an adequate deposit or advance towards the requested costs. In all other cases, a deposit or advance shall not be a condition
for the execution of a request.
The deposit or advance shall be made by the parties if that is provided for by the law of the Member State of the requesting
court.’

The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention aims to improve mutual judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters.
Article 14 of the Hague Convention states:
‘The execution of the Letter of Request shall not give rise to any reimbursement of taxes or costs of any nature.
Nevertheless, the State of execution has the right to require the State of origin to reimburse the fees paid to experts and
interpreters and the costs occasioned by the use of a special procedure requested by the State of origin under Article 9,
paragraph 2.
The requested authority whose law obliges the parties themselves to secure evidence, and which is not able itself to execute
the Letter, may, after having obtained the consent of the requesting authority, appoint a suitable person to do so. When seeking
this consent the requested authority shall indicate the approximate costs which would result from this procedure. If the requesting
authority gives its consent it shall reimburse any costs incurred; without such consent the requesting authority shall not
be liable for the costs.’

National law
Article 85 of the Law of 28 July 2005 on judicial costs in civil matters (ustawa z dnia 28 lipca 2005 r. o kosztach sądowych
w sprawach cywilnych) (Dz. U. 2005, No 167, heading 1398), as amended, allows a witness to request reimbursement of the costs
connected with a court appearance.
Paragraph 101(4) of the Regulation of the Minister for Justice of 23 February 2007 laying down rules concerning the operation
of the ordinary courts (rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości z dnia 23 lutego 2007 r. Regulamin urzędowania Sądów powszechnych)
(Dz. U. 2007, No 38, heading 249), which sets out principles for the settlement of accounts between the requested court and
the requesting court, is worded as follows:
‘If the requested court has accorded to persons taking part in the proceedings remuneration or the reimbursement of travel
expenses, it must make payment by means of an advance in respect of expenditure or, in the absence of an advance, from the
budgetary resources of the State Treasury, and in that event it must attach to the documents in the case a request that that
expenditure be reimbursed by the requesting court, while observing the requirements concerning the defining of expenditure
that are contained in separate provisions.’
Under Paragraph 53 of the Regulation of the Minister for Justice of 28 January 2002 concerning particular acts of courts in
matters regarding international civil and criminal procedure in international relations (rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości
z dnia 28 stycznia 2002 r. w sprawie szczegółowych czynności sądów w sprawach z zakresu międzynarodowego postępowania cywilnego
oraz karnego w stosunkach międzynarodowych) (Dz. U. 2002, No 17, heading 164), costs connected with legal assistance are to
be fixed in Polish złoty. Those costs are to be met by the State Treasury. After execution of the request, the court is to
ask for reimbursement of the costs in Polish currency or in a convertible currency in a sum equivalent to the amount expressed
in Polish currency. According to the referring court, reimbursement of those costs is not to be demanded if an international
convention guarantees the grant of free legal assistance.

The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling
Mr Weryński brought an action before the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy Śródmieścia (District Court for Warsaw City Centre) (Poland)
against Mediatel 4B spólka z o.o., his former employer, for damages arising from a non‑compete agreement.
In those proceedings, the referring court requested the Dublin Metropolitan District Court (Ireland) on 6 January 2009 to
examine a witness on the basis of Regulation No 1206/2001. However, the requested court made the examination of the witness
conditional on payment, by the requesting court, of witness expenses of EUR 40 under Irish law. By letter of 12 January 2009,
it requested the Polish court to pay that amount.
The referring court contested the legitimacy of that demand.
Recourse to the central bodies in Poland and Ireland, established in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation No 1206/2001
and responsible for seeking solutions to any difficulties which arise in respect of a request to take evidence, did not prove
fruitful.
According to the requested court and the Irish central body, the prohibition on charging payment set out in Article 18(1)
of Regulation No 1206/2001 does not include witness expenses. Under Irish law, witnesses are entitled to reimbursement of
expenses. That law is stated to be applicable in the present case because, in accordance with Article 10(2) of the regulation,
the taking of evidence is governed by the law of the requested court. Since Article 18(2) and (3) of the regulation does not
contain any provision relating to the reimbursement of witness expenses, the requested court may ask the requesting court
to reimburse them. The Irish central body also relies on a similar practice in England and Wales.
The referring court takes the view that the position of the requested court and the Irish central body is unfounded.
According to the referring court, a textual analysis of Article 18(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1206/2001 shows that there
are only three exceptions to the general prohibition on any request for ‘reimbursement of taxes and costs’. Article 10(2)
of the regulation, being a general rule, does not apply to the relations between the requested court and the requesting court.
Given that state of affairs, even if Irish law lays down the obligation to demand the reimbursement of witness expenses from
the requesting court, that provision does not apply in the present case on account of the principle of the primacy of Community
law. Apart from fees payable to experts and interpreters and the costs arising from the use of a special procedure called
for by the requesting court (Article 10(3) of the regulation) or of communications technology (Article 10(4) of the regulation),
it is not possible to ask the requesting court to reimburse taxes or costs.
In those circumstances, the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy Śródmieścia decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following
question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Under [Regulation No 1206/2001], does the requested court have the right to demand from the requesting court an advance for
witness expenses or reimbursement of the expenses paid to the witness heard, or must it cover them out of its own financial
resources?’

The jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the reference for a preliminary ruling
The European Commission expresses doubts as to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the reference for a
preliminary ruling.
First, it draws the Court’s attention to the fact that an appeal lies against judgments given by the referring court and that
under Article 68(1) EC only courts or tribunals of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law are empowered to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling for an interpretation of acts of the
institutions of the Community based on Title IV of the EC Treaty, entitled ‘Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies
related to free movement of persons’.
Second, it takes the view that the question relating to the interpretation of Regulation No 1206/2001 does not appear necessary
for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings and, furthermore, relates to the administrative functioning of the
courts. Therefore, it fails to comply with the requirements laid down in the case-law on the admissibility of references for
a preliminary ruling.
Although they do not constitute actual objections, the Court considers it appropriate to examine those issues of its own motion.
As regards the possibility that the Court lacks jurisdiction, it must be recalled that the reference for a preliminary ruling
concerns Regulation No 1206/2001, adopted on the basis of Articles 61(c) EC and 67(1) EC in Title IV of the EC Treaty.
The reference was lodged on 23 July 2009, that is to say, before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. According to
Article 68 EC, which was in force on that date, it would therefore have been necessary to determine whether the referring
court could be regarded, in the main proceedings, as acting as a court against whose decisions there was no judicial remedy.
However, Article 68 EC was repealed on 1 December 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon thereby rendered inoperative the former limitation
in Article 68(1) EC on the right of referral, a limitation which has not been replaced. Henceforward, it is the general rules
governing references for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU which apply to references for preliminary rulings on
the interpretation of acts adopted in the area of visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement
of persons. Consequently, Article 267 TFEU also applies to references relating to Regulation No 1206/2001.
Therefore, having regard to the extension of the right to refer questions for a preliminary ruling effected by the Treaty
of Lisbon, henceforward courts of first instance also have the right to refer where acts adopted in the field of Title IV
of the EC Treaty are concerned.
The objective pursued by Article 267 TFEU of establishing effective cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national
courts and the principle of procedural economy are arguments in favour of regarding references for a preliminary ruling as
admissible where they were lodged by lower courts during the transitional period that elapsed shortly before the entry into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon and have not been examined by the Court until after its entry into force. Rejection on the ground
of inadmissibility would, in those circumstances, only lead the referring court, which would in the meantime have acquired
the right to make a reference, to refer the same question for a preliminary ruling once more, resulting in excessive procedural
formalities and unnecessary lengthening of the duration of the main proceedings.
Therefore, it must be held that since 1 December 2009 the Court has had jurisdiction to hear and determine a reference for
a preliminary ruling from a court against whose decisions there is a judicial remedy under national law even where the reference
was lodged prior to that date.
Consequently, even if the present reference for a preliminary ruling failed to fulfil the requirements of Article 68(1) EC
at the time when it was lodged, that defect would have been cured by the repeal of that provision and the corresponding extension
of the jurisdiction of the Court.
In those circumstances, the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the reference for a preliminary ruling.
As regards the first issue relating to inadmissibility referred to by the Commission, which is based on the fact that interpretation
of Regulation No 1206/2001 does not appear to be necessary for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings, it must
be recalled that the presumption that questions referred by national courts for a preliminary ruling are relevant may be rebutted
only in exceptional cases, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation which is sought of the provisions of European
Union law referred to in the questions bears no relation to the purpose of the main action (see, inter alia, Case C-105/03
Pupino
[2005] ECR I-5285, paragraph 30, and Case C-467/05
Dell’Orto
[2007] ECR I‑5557, paragraph 40).
Consequently, it must be determined whether the question referred to the Court is necessary to enable the referring court
to ‘give judgment’ within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU.
In that connection it must be observed, first, that the question referred is designed to ascertain whether the requesting
court is obliged to bear certain costs connected with the examination of a witness by the requested court.
Second, at the hearing the Polish Government stated that the witness had been examined in accordance with the requesting court’s
request, but only after the requesting court had paid, on 28 April 2009, the EUR 40 asked for by the requested court. The
payment of that sum was also confirmed by Ireland in its written observations.
Although it is true that, despite that payment and the examination of the witness, the question referred remains relevant
as regards the legal basis of the advance and, in particular, the possible refund of the payment if it should prove not to
have been due, the fact remains that the answer to that question has no direct impact on the outcome of the dispute between
Mr Weryński and Mediatel 4B spółka z o.o., which concerns the payment of compensation under a non-compete clause.
However, as the Advocate General observed in point 36 of her Opinion, most questions as to the interpretation of Regulation
No 1206/2001 regarding the taking of evidence will concern the main proceedings only indirectly. In many cases an interpretation
by means of a request for a preliminary ruling would not be possible if the requirements imposed as to the relevance of the
question to resolution of the dispute were too stringent.
In that connection, it is necessary to take into consideration the need to clarify an issue which has hindered cooperation
between courts and which will remain an obstacle so long as it is not resolved. In the main proceedings neither the courts
of the Member States concerned nor the central bodies in Poland and Ireland have been able to find a solution. In such a situation
only a decision of the Court of Justice will enable Regulation No 1206/2001 to perform effectively its function, which is
that of helping to simplify and speed up judicial proceedings in civil or commercial matters.
It follows that only a broad interpretation of the concept ‘give judgment’ within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article
267 TFEU would make it possible to prevent many procedural questions, in particular those which arise in the application of
Regulation No 1206/2001, from being regarded as inadmissible and from being unable to be the subject of interpretation by
the Court.
That concept must therefore be understood as encompassing the whole of the procedure leading to the judgment of the referring
court, in order that the Court of Justice is able to interpret all procedural provisions of European Union law that the referring
court is required to apply in order to give judgment. In other words, that concept covers the entire process of creating the
judgment, including all issues relating to the responsibility for the costs of proceedings.
As regards the second ground of potential inadmissibility of the reference for a preliminary ruling, the Commission observes
that the question asked by the referring court concerns its administrative functioning, that is to say, the cooperation between
the courts of the Member States with respect to the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters. That question is therefore
said not to relate to the performance by the referring court of its judicial functions. The Commission has dwelt on the fact
that, in the present case, the referring court acts as a public administrative body so far as concerns the issue of the costs
of executing the request for the taking of evidence by the court of another Member State.
It must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there
is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial
nature (see, in particular, the order in Case C-447/00
Holto
[2002] ECR I-735, paragraph 17, and Case C-296/08 PPU
Santesteban Goicoechea
[2008] ECR I‑6307, paragraph 40).
Although it is true that cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence does not necessarily
lead to the elaboration of a judicial decision, the fact remains that examination of a witness by a court, which is at issue
here, is an act undertaken in the context of judicial proceedings that are intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature.
The issue of the responsibility for the costs of examining a witness falls within the framework of those proceedings. Therefore,
there is a direct connection between the question referred for a preliminary ruling and the performance by the referring court
of a judicial function.
Since none of the possible grounds of inadmissibility has been accepted, the reference for a preliminary ruling must be regarded
as admissible.

Consideration of the question referred
The referring court asks in essence whether it was obliged to pay the costs incurred by the witness examined by the requested
court, be it in the form of an advance or a reimbursement of expenses.
Under Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1206/2001, the facts of the main proceedings fall within scope of that regulation where
the court of a Member State requests the competent court of another Member State to take evidence. The examination of a witness
is expressly mentioned as the subject of a request in Article 4(1)(e) of the regulation.
According to Article 10(2) of Regulation No 1206/2001, the requested court is to execute the request in accordance with the
law of its Member State. Under Irish law a witness is obliged to appear before a court only if he has first received payment
for his travel expenses (‘a viaticum’). The question concerns whether the obligation to pay those expenses fell to the responsibility
of the requested court or the requesting court.
First, it is necessary to clarify whether the requesting court was obliged to pay the requested court an advance for witness
expenses and, therefore, whether the requested court was entitled to refuse to proceed with the examination of the witness
until the requesting court had paid that advance.
Article 14 of Regulation No 1206/2001 sets out the grounds for refusal of a request. Article 14(2)(d) concerns the case in
which payment of a deposit or advance asked for in accordance with Article 18(3) has not been made by the requesting court.
According to Article 18(3) the requested court may, before executing the request, require an advance for an expert’s costs.
Article 18(3) does not provide, however, that an advance for examining a witness may be required.
As the Advocate General noted in point 45 of her Opinion, it could be consistent with Article 14 of Regulation No 1206/2001
to make execution of a request conditional on the payment of witness expenses only if the cases referred to in that provision
were not listed exhaustively, but merely by way of example.
The wording of Article 14(2) of Regulation No 1206/2001 militates against such an interpretation. That provision states that,
in addition to the grounds referred to in Article 14(1), the execution of a request for the hearing of a person ‘may be refused
only’ in certain cases. Furthermore, recital 11 in the preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001 states that, to secure the effectiveness
of the regulation, the possibility of refusing to execute the request for the performance of taking of evidence should be
confined to strictly limited exceptional situations. It follows that the grounds on which execution of such a request may
be refused are those exhaustively listed in Article 14 of the regulation.
The requested court was not therefore entitled to make the examination of a witness conditional on prior payment of an advance
covering his witness expenses. Therefore, the requesting court was not obliged to pay such an advance.
Second, it is necessary to ascertain whether the requested court was authorised to require the reimbursement of witness expenses
by the requesting court.
Article 18(1) of Regulation No 1206/2001 provides that the execution of a request to take evidence is not to give rise to
a claim for any reimbursement of taxes or costs. It is therefore decisive whether witness expenses may be classified as taxes
or costs within the meaning of that provision.
The requested court observes that under Irish law witnesses are obliged to attend to testify before a court only if they have
first received payment for their expenses, which are the responsibility of the party which summons the witnesses and not the
court. Therefore, according to the requested court, court costs are not involved. That arrangement is stated to be in keeping
with the adversarial nature of Irish civil proceedings.
However, the concept of costs must be defined autonomously under European Union law and does not depend on the classification
under national law. If the question of costs were to be made dependent on the national definition of that concept, that would
run counter to the spirit and purpose of Regulation No 1206/2001, which is intended to enable requests for the taking of evidence
to be executed quickly and simply.
As regards the terms used in Article 18(1) of the regulation, ‘taxes’ should be understood as meaning sums received by the
court for carrying out its functions, whereas ‘costs’ are to be understood as the sums paid by the court to third parties
in the course of proceedings, in particular to experts or witnesses.
As the Advocate General noted in point 54 of her Opinion, such an interpretation is supported by a systemic argument. If Article
18(1) of Regulation No 1206/2001 concerned only institutional costs it would not then be necessary to provide in Article 18(2),
by way of exception to the prohibition laid down in Article 18(1), for a reimbursement of experts’ costs. Since experts’ costs
cannot be classified as institutional costs they would be excluded from that prohibition from the outset.
It follows that expenses paid to a witness examined by the requested court are costs within the meaning of Article 18(1) of
Regulation No 1206/2001.
As regards the obligation to reimburse those costs, it must be recalled that according to recitals 2, 7, 8, 10 and 11 in the
preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001 the aim of the regulation is to make the taking of evidence in a cross-border context
simple, effective and rapid. The taking, by a court of one Member State, of evidence in another Member State must not lead
to the lengthening of national proceedings. That is why Regulation No 1206/2001 established a regime binding on all the Member
States, with the exception of the Kingdom of Denmark, to remove obstacles which may arise in that field.
Therefore, the requesting court can be obliged to provide reimbursement only if one of the exceptions laid down in Article
18(2) of Regulation No 1206/2001 is applicable.
Article 18(2) of Regulation No 1206/2001 provides for the reimbursement of fees paid to experts and interpreters and of costs
occasioned by the application of Article 10(3) and (4). Article 10(3) concerns the case in which the requesting court asks
for the request to be executed in accordance with a special procedure and Article 10(4) governs the use of modern communications
technology in order to take evidence. However, witness expenses are not mentioned.
Furthermore, as stated by the Commission and by the Advocate General in points 60 and 61 of her Opinion, the origin of Regulation
No 1206/2001 also supports the view that witness expenses are not reimbursable. It is clear from recital 6 in the preamble
to the regulation and Article 21(1) thereof that the regulation replaces the Hague Convention. Consequently, the relevant
provisions of the Hague Convention may be relied on in order to interpret the regulation.
The content of Article 18 of Regulation No 1206/2001 corresponds to that of Article 14 of the Hague Convention, the second
paragraph of which provides that the State of execution has the right to require the State of origin to reimburse the fees
paid to experts and interpreters and the costs occasioned by the use of a special procedure requested by the State of origin
under the second paragraph of Article 9.
In this context, it must be pointed out that the Hague Convention amended the wording of Article 16 of the Hague Convention
of 1 March 1954 on Civil Procedure. That article still explicitly laid down that fees paid to witnesses were in principle
to be reimbursed. It is clear from the explanatory report on the Hague Convention that the number of instances in which costs
were to be reimbursable was to be deliberately reduced compared to the 1954 Convention. For that reason the reimbursement
of fees paid to witnesses, precisely because of the small amount typically involved, was deliberately dropped.
The fact that Regulation No 1206/2001 reproduced the text of Article 14 of the Hague Convention is thus an argument against
regarding witness expenses as reimbursable. Under Article 18(1) of that regulation there is therefore no need to reimburse
those expenses.
In those circumstances, the answer to the question referred is that Articles 14 and 18 of Regulation No 1206/2001 must be
interpreted as meaning that a requesting court is not obliged to pay an advance to the requested court for the expenses of
a witness or to reimburse the expenses paid to the witness examined.

Costs
Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court,
the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs
of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:
Articles 14 and 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member
States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a requesting court is
not obliged to pay an advance to the requested court for the expenses of a witness or to reimburse the expenses paid to the
witness examined.
[Signatures]
*
Language of the case: Polish.