CELEX: 62001TJ0308
Community trade mark
Regulation (EC) No 40/94 and Regulation (EC) No 2868/95
Opposition procedure
Genuine use of earlier mark
Scope of the examination conducted by the Board of Appeal
Assessment of the evidence produced in the proceedings before the Opposition Division

Legal background
Articles 43, 59, 61, 62, 74 and 76 of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ
1994 L 11, p. 1), as amended, provide:
Article 43
Examination of opposition ...
2.
If the applicant so requests, the proprietor of an earlier Community trade mark who has given notice of opposition shall furnish
proof that, during the period of five years preceding the date of publication of the Community trade mark application, the
earlier Community trade mark has been put to genuine use in the Community in connection with the goods or services in respect
of which it is registered and which he cites as justification for his opposition ... In the absence of proof to this effect,
the opposition shall be rejected. ...
3.
Paragraph 2 shall apply to earlier national trade marks ..., by substituting use in the Member State in which the earlier
national trade mark is protected for use in the Community.
...
Article 59
Time-limit and form of appeal ... Within four months after the date of notification of the decision, a written statement setting out the grounds of appeal
must be filed.
Article 61
Examination of appeals
1.
If the appeal is admissible, the Board of Appeal shall examine whether the appeal is allowable.
...
Article 62
Decisions in respect of appeals
1.
Following the examination as to the allowability of the appeal, the Board of Appeal shall decide on the appeal. The Board
of Appeal may either exercise any power within the competence of the department which was responsible for the decision appealed
or remit the case to that department for further prosecution.
...
Article 74
Examination of the facts by the Office of its own motion
1.
In proceedings before it the Office shall examine the facts of its own motion; however, in proceedings relating to relative
grounds for refusal of registration, the Office shall be restricted in this examination to the facts, evidence and arguments
provided by the parties and the relief sought.
2.
The Office may disregard facts or evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned.
Article 76
Taking of evidence
1.
In any proceedings before the Office, the means of giving or obtaining evidence shall include the following:
...
(f)
statements in writing sworn or affirmed or having a similar effect under the law of the State in which the statement is drawn
up.
...
Rules 22 and 48 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94
on the Community trade mark (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1) provide as follows:
Rule 22
Proof of use
1.
Where, pursuant to Article 43(2) or (3) of ... Regulation [No 40/94], the opposing party has to furnish proof of use ...,
the Office shall invite him to provide the proof required within such period as it shall specify. If the opposing party does
not provide such proof before the time-limit expires, the Office shall reject the opposition.
2.
The indications and evidence for the furnishing of proof of use shall consist of indications concerning the place, time, extent
and nature of use of the opposing trade mark for the goods and services in respect of which it is registered and on which
the opposition is based, and evidence in support of these indications in accordance with paragraph 3.
3.
The evidence shall, in principle, be confined to the submission of supporting documents and items such as packages, labels,
price lists, catalogues, invoices, photographs, newspaper advertisements, and statements in writing as referred to in Article
76(1)(f) of [Regulation 40/94].
...
Rule 48
Content of the notice of appeal
1.
The notice of appeal shall contain:
...(c) a statement identifying the decision which is contested and the extent to which amendment or cancellation of the decision
is requested....
Background to the case
On 1 April 1996, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal
Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (hereinafter
the Office), Laporte EDS Ltd as it then was, filed an application for a Community trade mark at the Office.
The trade mark in respect of which registration was sought was the word mark KLEENCARE.
The goods in respect of which registration was sought are in Classes 1 and 3 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International
Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended,
and correspond to the following descriptions:
─
Class 1:
chemicals and chemical preparations and products; detergents, disinfectant and degreasing preparations for use in industry
and manufacturing processes;
Class 1:
chemicals and chemical preparations and products; detergents, disinfectant and degreasing preparations for use in industry
and manufacturing processes;
─
Class 3:
cleaning, scouring, abrasive, polishing and washing preparations; detergents; degreasers; rust removing preparations; soaps
and skin care preparations.
Class 3:
cleaning, scouring, abrasive, polishing and washing preparations; detergents; degreasers; rust removing preparations; soaps
and skin care preparations.
Registration was also sought in respect of certain other goods in Classes 1 and 5 and certain services in Class 42 of the
Nice Agreement.
On 26 October 1998, the application was published in the
Community Trade Marks Bulletin
.
On 26 January 1999, the applicant filed a notice of opposition under Article 42(1) of Regulation No 40/94 in respect of the
categories of goods referred to in paragraph 5 above. The ground relied on in support of the opposition was the existence
of a mark registered in Germany on 11 January 1965. That mark (hereinafter
the earlier mark) consists of the word mark CARCLIN and is registered in respect of certain goods in Classes 1 and 2 of the Nice Agreement.
In support of its opposition, the applicant relied on the ground for refusal laid down in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No
40/94.
On 24 May 1999, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal requested that the applicant furnish proof,
in accordance with Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation No 40/94, that during the period of five years preceding the date of
publication of the Community trade mark application the earlier mark had been put to genuine use in the Member State in which
that earlier mark was protected. On 27 July 1999, the Office's Opposition Division (hereinafter
the Opposition Division) asked the applicant to furnish that proof within two months.
As an annex to a letter of 9 September 1999, received by the Office on 10 September 1999, the applicant sent, first, a declaration
entitled
Eidesstattliche Versicherung (affirmation in lieu of oath) by Mr Blacha, its industrial manager. He stated that the earlier mark had been used by the
applicant for years
for ... cleaning of motor vehicles, that the sales under that mark were DEM 1 200 000 for 1993, DEM 1 400 000 for 1994 and DEM 1 500 000 for 1995 and that he
had been duly cautioned that the making of a false declaration in an affidavit was subject to penalties. Second, the applicant
produced three labels featuring the earlier mark written in stylised bold letters. Third, it produced five instructions for
use, written in German, which refer to various cleaning products for motor vehicles and on which the earlier mark is written
in black letters and dated from 24 October 1995 to 25 September 1998.
By decision of 4 July 2000, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition on the ground that the applicant had not furnished
sufficient proof that the earlier mark had been put to genuine use. The Opposition Division essentially found that statements
from an employee of one of the parties to the proceedings were of less probative value than statements from third parties.
Accordingly, the Opposition Division held that, in the present case, since the applicant had not produced invoices either,
Mr Blacha's statement by itself did not prove the extent of the use to which the earlier mark had been put.
On 7 July 2000, the applicant filed an appeal with the Office, pursuant to Article 59 of Regulation No 40/94. On 30 October
2000, the applicant filed a written statement setting out the grounds of its appeal. That statement read as follows:
As the Opposition Division has rejected our opposition ... due to an insufficient proof of the extent of use of our trade
mark
CARCLIN we hereby submit invoices ... with one of our CARCLIN customers for the relevant period. We are confident that these documents
prove the extent of use and that the proof of use is sufficient to indicate the genuine use of the earlier mark. ... We therefore
request to overturn the Opposition Division's decision. The invoices referred to were attached to the statement.
By decision of 12 September 2001 (hereinafter
the contested decision), notified to the applicant on 15 October 2001, the Third Board of Appeal of the Office (hereinafter
the Board of Appeal) dismissed the appeal. The Board of Appeal found that the applicant had not contested the Opposition Division's finding that
the evidence submitted by the applicant before it was insufficient to establish that the earlier mark had been put to genuine
use (paragraph 12 of the contested decision). As to the new evidence filed by the applicant in its statement setting out the
grounds of appeal, the Board of Appeal held that in
inter partes
proceedings the parties must file all of their arguments and evidence when invited to do so by the department of the Office
hearing the application at first instance. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal found in this case that the new evidence could
not be taken into consideration, since it could have been produced before the Opposition Division (paragraphs 13 to 15 of
the contested decision).
Procedure and forms of order sought
By application, in English, lodged at the Registry of the Court on 10 December 2001, the applicant brought this action. The
other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal did not object, within the time allowed by the Registry of the Court,
to English being the language of the case. The Office lodged its response at the Registry of the Court on 3 April 2002.
The applicant claims that the Court should:
─
annul the contested decision;
annul the contested decision;
─
order the Office to pay the costs.
order the Office to pay the costs.
The Office contends that the Court should:
─
dismiss the action;
dismiss the action;
─
order the applicant to pay the costs.
order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
The applicant raises five pleas in support of its action. The first plea alleges infringement by the Board of Appeal of its
obligation to conduct a full examination of the Opposition Division's decision. The second plea alleges infringement by the
Opposition Division of Article 76(1)(f) of Regulation No 40/94 in conjunction with Rule 22(3) of Regulation No 2868/95. The
third and fourth pleas, raised as alternative pleas, allege infringement by the Opposition Division of the right to effective
legal protection and procedural principles generally accepted in the Member States. The fifth plea, also an alternative plea,
alleges infringement of Article 74(2) of Regulation No 40/94. The Court considers it appropriate to begin by examining the
first plea, alleging infringement by the Board of Appeal of its obligation to conduct a full examination of the Opposition
Division's decision.
Arguments of the parties
The applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for having committed an error of law in finding that it was not required fully
to examine the Opposition Division's decision, particularly its refusal to allow Mr Blacha's declaration in evidence. According
to the applicant, the purpose of the appeal procedure provided for by Article 57 et seq. of Regulation No 40/94 is to guarantee
the legality of decisions by the Office through a review based on a full assessment of the facts relied on by the parties.
The applicant observes that the second sentence of Article 62(1) of Regulation No 40/94 allows the Board of Appeal either
to exercise any power within the competence of the department which was responsible for the decision appealed or to remit
the case to that department for further prosecution.
The applicant adds that, as a rule, the Board of Appeal cannot limit its power or its obligation to conduct a full examination
of the Opposition Division's decision. It refers to Rule 48 of Regulation 2868/95, which states that the notice of appeal
need only contain a statement indicating the extent to which amendment or cancellation of the decision is requested before
the Board of Appeal.
In this case, the applicant states that its appeal before the Office sought to have the Opposition Division's decision annulled,
without in any way limiting the Board of Appeal's power as to the extent of its review. It adds that it was only as a precautionary
measure ─ in the event that the Board of Appeal agreed with the Opposition Division's assessment of the evidence produced
before it ─ that it introduced new evidence at the appeal stage. The applicant maintains that the Board of Appeal was thus
under an obligation to conduct a full examination of the Opposition Division's decision.
The Office contends that in the statement setting out the grounds of its appeal to the Office the applicant merely alleged
that, on the basis of the new evidence produced, the fact that the earlier mark had been put to genuine use had to be considered
as proven. The Office adds that the statement did not contain anything from which the Board of Appeal could have inferred
that the applicant intended to contest the Opposition Division's assessment of Mr Blacha's declaration.
Nor, the Office submits, does it follow from the second sentence of Article 62(1) of Regulation No 40/94 that the Board of
Appeal was required to examine the legality of the Opposition Division's decision on the assessment of Mr Blacha's declaration.
According to the Office, that provision cannot be interpreted as meaning that it requires the Board of Appeal to exercise
the powers of the department which took the decision under appeal in respect of points which were not raised in the statement
setting out the grounds of appeal.
The Office adds that any other interpretation would also be contrary to the principle laid down in Article 74(1)
in fine
of Regulation No 40/94, according to which, in
inter partes
proceedings, its examination is restricted to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties.
Findings of the Court
It is apparent from Article 61(1) of Regulation No 40/94 that the Board of Appeal must conduct an examination of the merits
of the appeal when it is admissible. In addition, Article 62(1) of the same regulation provides that the Board of Appeal may
either exercise any power within the competence of the department which was responsible for the decision appealed or remit
the case to that department for further prosecution. This last provision contains an indication not only as to the possible
content of a decision of the Board of Appeal, but also as to the extent of the examination which it must conduct of the decision
under appeal.
The case-law shows that there is continuity, in terms of their functions, between the examiner and the Boards of Appeal (Case
T-163/98
Procter & Gamble
v
OHIM
(BABY-DRY)
[1999] ECR II-2383, paragraphs 38 to 44; Case T-63/01
Procter & Gamble
v
OHIM (Soap bar shape)
[2002] ECR II-5255, paragraph 21). That case-law may also be applied appropriately to the relationship between the other
departments of the Office deciding on the application at first instance, such as the Opposition Divisions, Cancellation Divisions,
and the Boards of Appeal.
Accordingly, the powers of the Office's Boards of Appeal imply that they are to re-examine the decisions taken by the Office's
departments at first instance. In the context of that re-examination, the outcome of the appeal depends on whether or not
a new decision with the same operative part as the decision under appeal may be lawfully adopted at the time of the appeal
ruling. Thus, the Boards of Appeal may, subject only to Article 74(2) of Regulation No 40/94, allow the appeal on the basis
of new facts relied on by the party who has brought the appeal or on the basis of new evidence adduced by that party.
In this case, the parties have addressed the issue of whether, in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, the applicant
expressly called into question the Opposition Division's assessment of the evidence which the applicant had adduced in the
proceedings before that division, particularly Mr Blacha's declaration. Paragraph 12 of the contested decision shows that
the Board of Appeal found that it did not do so, having regard to the applicant's statement setting out the grounds of its
appeal.
However, even if the applicant did not expressly call into question the Opposition Division's assessment of the evidence which
the applicant had produced in the proceedings before that division, particularly Mr Blacha's affidavit, as the Office submits,
that circumstance is not of such a nature as to relieve the Board of Appeal of its obligation to conduct its own assessment
of the evidence.
In the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 25 and 26 above, the Court finds that, contrary to what the Office
maintains, the extent of the examination which the Board of Appeal must conduct is not, in principle, determined by the grounds
relied on by the party who has brought the appeal. Accordingly, even if the party who has brought the appeal has not raised
a specific ground of appeal, the Board of Appeal is none the less bound to examine whether or not, in the light of all the
relevant matters of fact and of law, a new decision with the same operative part as the decision under appeal may be lawfully
adopted at the time of the appeal ruling.
The Court notes first that, under Rule 48(c) of Regulation No 2868/95, which deals with the admissibility of the notice of
appeal, as is apparent from Rule 49(1) of the same regulation, the notice of appeal need only contain a statement identifying
the decision which is contested and the extent to which amendment or cancellation of the decision is requested. By contrast,
Rule 48(c) does not require that the notice of appeal set out any specific grounds of appeal. Hence it is only the subject
matter and not the extent of the examination which the Board of Appeal must conduct which falls to be determined by the party
bringing the appeal.
Second, the interpretation given in paragraph 29 above can in no way impair the practical effect of the third sentence of
Article 59 of Regulation No 40/94, under which a written statement setting out the grounds of appeal must be filed within
four months after the date of notification of the decision. The party bringing the appeal may put forward items in that statement
from which it is apparent that the decision under appeal must be annulled or rectified on the ground that a new decision with
the same wording as the decision appealed can no longer be lawfully adopted at the time of the appeal ruling. Under Article
74(1)
in fine
of Regulation No 40/94, that party may also, subject only to Article 74(2), rely on new facts or adduce new evidence. The
written statement provided for in the third sentence of Article 59 of Regulation No 40/94 therefore facilitates the smooth
running of the appeal process, and there is no need to find that the extent of the examination which the Board of Appeal is
required to conduct of the decision under appeal is limited or determined by the grounds relied on by the party bringing the
appeal.
Third, contrary to what the Office maintains, the Board of Appeal's obligation to conduct an examination of the decision under
appeal, even if a specific ground has not been raised by the party concerned, is not contrary to the rule laid down in Article
74(1)
in fine
of Regulation No 40/94, according to which, in
inter partes
proceedings, the Office's departments, including Boards of Appeal, are restricted in their examination to the facts, evidence
and arguments provided by the parties. In the light of the different language versions of that provision, the Court finds
that it limits the examination conducted by the Office in two ways. On the one hand, it refers to the factual basis of the
Office's decisions, that is to say, the facts and evidence on the basis of which they may validly be based (Case T-232/00
Chef Revival USA
v
OHIM ─ Massagué Marin
(Chef)
[2002] II-2749, paragraph 45); on the other hand, it refers to the legal basis of those decisions, that is to say, the provisions
which the department hearing the application is bound to apply. Thus, the Board of Appeal, in ruling on an appeal against
a decision to terminate an opposition procedure, can base its decision only on the relative grounds for refusal on which the
party concerned relied and on the related facts and evidence produced by that party. However, such a limitation of the legal
and factual basis of the examination conducted by the Board of Appeal is compatible with the principle that the extent of
the examination which the Board of Appeal is required to conduct in regard to the decision under appeal does not depend upon
whether or not the party bringing the appeal has raised a specific ground of appeal criticising the interpretation or application
of a provision by the department which heard the application at first instance, or upon that department's assessment of a
piece of evidence. It follows from the principle of continuity of functions that, within the scope of Article 74(1)
in fine
of Regulation No 40/94, the Board of Appeal is required to base its decision on all the matters of fact and of law which
the party concerned introduced either in the proceedings before the department which heard the application at first instance
or, subject only to Article 74(2), in the appeal.
Fourth, the interpretation given in paragraph 29 above is supported by the fact that, under Article 88(1) of Regulation No
40/94, and subject only to Article 88(2) concerning natural or legal persons not having either their domicile or their principal
place of business or a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in the Community, parties to proceedings
before the Office may appear without professional representation or, a fortiori, a lawyer.
Lastly, the interpretation given in paragraph 29 above is not invalidated by the fact that the extent of the examination conducted
by the Community courts in the context of direct actions is determined by the grounds of appeal raised in the application,
subject only to grounds involving a question of public policy. First, the proceedings before the Board of Appeal are not judicial
in nature but administrative  (
Soap bar shape
, cited above, paragraphs 21 to 23). Second, as recalled in paragraph 30 above, unlike the situation prevailing in the Community
courts, the notice initiating proceedings before the Board of Appeal need not refer to specific pleas.
It follows that, by failing itself to examine the evidence the applicant had produced in the proceedings before the Opposition
Division, particularly Mr Blacha's declaration, the Board of Appeal failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 61(1) and
Article 62(1) of Regulation No 40/94. Consequently, the first plea must be upheld.
Accordingly, the contested decision must be annulled and it is not necessary to rule on the other pleas raised by the applicant.
Costs
Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been
asked for in the successful party's pleadings. Since the Office has been unsuccessful and the applicant has asked for costs,
the Office must be ordered to pay the costs.
On those grounds,
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Second Chamber)
hereby:
1.
Annuls the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)
of 12 September 2001 (Case R-738/2000-3);
2.
Orders the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) to pay the costs.
Forwood
Pirrung
Meij
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 September 2003.
H. Jung
N.J. Forwood
Registrar
President
–
Language of the case: English.