CELEX: 62007CJ0125
Appeal
Agreements, decisions and concerted practices
Fixing by Austrian banks of credit and debit interest rates
'Lombard Club'
Effect on trade between Member States
Calculation of fines
Takeover of undertakings
Concrete impact on the market
Implementation of the cartel

By their appeals, Erste Group Bank AG, formerly Erste Bank der österreichischen Sparkassen AG (‘Erste’), Raiffeisen Zentralbank
Österreich AG (‘RZB’), Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG (‘BA-CA’) and Österreichische Volksbanken AG (‘ÖVAG’) claim that the
Court of Justice should set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities of 14 December 2006
in Joined Cases T‑259/02 to T‑264/02 and T‑271/02
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich and Others
v
Commission
[2006] ECR II‑5169 (‘the judgment under appeal’), which dismissed their applications for the annulment of Commission Decision
2004/138/EC of 11 June 2002 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/36.571/D-1: Austrian banks
– ‘Lombard Club’ (OJ 2004 L 56, p. 1; ‘the contested decision’); in the alternative, reduce the fines imposed on each of them
in Article 3 of the contested decision, and, in the further alternative, set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance
and refer the case back to that court.
I –
Legal context
A –
Regulation No 17
Article 11(5) of Regulation No 17 of the Council of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles [81] and [82]
of the Treaty (OJ, English Special Edition 1959-1962, p. 87), provides:
‘Where an undertaking or association of undertakings does not supply the information requested within the time-limit fixed
by the Commission, or supplies incomplete information, the Commission shall by decision require the information to be supplied.
The decision shall specify what information is required, fix an appropriate time-limit within which it is to be supplied and
indicate the penalties provided for in Article 15(1)(b) and Article 16(1)(c) and the right to have the decision reviewed by
the Court of Justice.’
Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 provides:
‘The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of undertakings fines of from 1 000 to 1 000 000 units
of account, or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10% of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the
undertakings participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently:
(a)      they infringe Article [81](1) or Article [82] of the Treaty; or
(b)      they commit a breach of any obligation imposed pursuant to Article 8(1).
In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity and to the duration of the infringement.’
B –
The Guidelines
The Commission notice entitled ‘Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation
No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty’ (OJ 1998 C 9, p. 3; ‘the Guidelines’) states in its introductory paragraphs:
‘The principles outlined here should ensure the transparency and impartiality of the Commission’s decisions, in the eyes of
the undertakings and of the Court of Justice alike, whilst upholding the discretion which the Commission is granted under
the relevant legislation to set fines within the limit of 10% of overall turnover. This discretion must, however, follow a
coherent and non-discriminatory policy which is consistent with the objectives pursued in penalising infringements of the
competition rules.
The new method of determining the amount of a fine will adhere to the following rules, which start from a basic amount that
will be increased to take account of aggravating circumstances or reduced to take account of attenuating circumstances.’
Section 1 of the Guidelines provides that, for calculating the amount of fines, the basic amount is to be determined in accordance
with the criteria referred to in Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, namely the gravity and duration of the infringement. It
is also stated in the Guidelines that the assessment of the gravity of the infringement must take account of its nature, its
actual impact on the market, where it can be measured, and the size of the relevant geographic market.
C –
The Leniency Notice
In its Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases, published in the
Official Journal of the European Communities
of 18 July 1996 (OJ 1996 C 207, p. 4; ‘the Leniency Notice’), a draft version of which, entitled ‘Information of the European
Commission concerning its policy of imposing fines for infringements of the competition rules’, had been published on 19 December
1995 (OJ 1995 C 341, p. 13), the Commission sets out the conditions under which undertakings cooperating with it during its
investigation into a cartel may, under Section A.3 of the notice, be exempted from fines or be granted a reduction of the
fine that would otherwise have been imposed upon them.
According to Section A.5 of the Leniency Notice:
‘Cooperation by an [undertaking] is only one of several factors which the Commission takes into account when fixing the amount
of a fine. …’
Section D of the Leniency Notice, entitled ‘Significant reduction in a fine’, is worded as follows:
‘1.      Where an [undertaking] cooperates without having met all the conditions set out in Sections B or C, it will benefit from a
reduction of 10% to 50% of the fine that would have been imposed if it had not cooperated.
2.      Such cases may include the following:
–        before a statement of objections is sent, an [undertaking] provides the Commission with information, documents or other evidence
which contribute to establishing the infringement;
–        after receiving a statement of objections, an [undertaking] informs the Commission that it does not substantially contest
the facts on which the Commission bases its allegations.’
Section E.3 of the Leniency Notice, on procedure, provides, in particular:
‘The Commission is aware that this notice will create legitimate expectations on which [undertakings] may rely when disclosing
the existence of a cartel to the Commission.’
II –
Background to the dispute and to the contested decision
In the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance summarised the factual background to the proceedings before it in
the following terms:
‘1      By [the contested decision] … the Commission found that certain undertakings had participated in a series of agreements and
concerted practices within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC.
2      In particular, the following eight banks were involved, they being the addressees of the contested decision:
–        Erste ...;
–        [RZB];
–        [BA-CA];
–        …
–        [ÖVAG];
–        …
3      In essence, the Commission criticises the addressees of the contested decision for establishing a system of regular meetings
(“the committee meetingsˮ or “the committeesˮ), to which it refers as the “Lombard networkˮ, in which they covered every conceivable
subject and regularly coordinated their conduct with respect to the essential factors of competition in the Austrian market
in banking products and services.
…
15      Having become aware in April 1997 of a document which gave grounds for suspecting the existence in the Austrian banking market
of agreements or concerted practices contrary to Article 81 EC, the Commission opened a formal investigation procedure. On
30 June 1997, pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation No 17 …, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, a political party (“the FPÖˮ),
lodged a complaint against eight Austrian credit establishments suspected of participating in agreements and/or concerted
practices restricting competition.
16      On 23 and 24 June 1998, the Commission carried out unannounced inspections at several banks, including most of the addressees
of the contested decision. On 21 September 1998, the Commission sent a request for information under Article 11(2) of Regulation
No 17 to numerous credit establishments suspected of having participated in those agreements or concerted practices.
17      Immediately after receiving the request for information, the main banks concerned offered the Commission their “cooperationˮ
in the investigation of the case, and went so far as to suggest that they would state the facts “voluntarilyˮ (instead of
answering the request for information) and at the same time waive the right to a hearing; in return, the Commission Directorate-General
for Competition would cancel its request for information and would impose only a “moderateˮ fine. Whilst acknowledging the
banks’ promptness in offering their cooperation, the Commission declined to make any agreement in that regard.
18      All the addressees subsequently responded to the request for information. In doing so, some expressed the view that they were
under no obligation to reply to most of the questions put to them and that they were therefore submitting the relevant documents
and answering the relevant questions voluntarily as part of the abovementioned cooperation. The Commission rejected that interpretation
of the law as being incorrect.
19      Soon afterwards, the largest banks concerned, including the applicants, … transmitted to the Commission a 132-page document
described as a “joint exposition of the factsˮ in which they set out at length the historical background to their cartel and
summarised briefly and assessed from their point of view the content of the individual committee meetings as it appeared from
the documents which had been seized and from those which they had been requested to produce. At the same time, they produced
16 binders containing documents, sorted according to committee, with detailed lists of contents. In order that it might assess
any added value that the documents submitted with the joint exposition of the facts might represent, the Commission asked
the banks to indicate whether any of those documents were not yet known to the Commission, and if so which. The banks, however,
considered this to be neither feasible nor necessary.
20      On 13 September 1999, the Commission sent to eight banks a statement of objections dated 11 September 1999. … On 22 November
2000, the Commission sent to the banks a supplementary statement of objections. …
21      On 11 June 2002, the Commission adopted the contested decision.
...
22      In Article 1 of the contested decision, the Commission states that the eight banks to which the decision is addressed infringed
Article 81(1) EC by taking part in agreements and concerted practices in respect of prices, charges and advertising, with
the object of restricting competition on the market in banking products and services in Austria, from 1 January 1995 to 24
June 1998.
…
24      Article 3 of the contested decision imposes on its addressees the following fines:
–        Erste: EUR 37.69 million;
–        RZB: EUR 30.38 million;
–        BA-CA: EUR 30.38 million;
…
–        ÖVAG: EUR 7.59 million;
…
25      The contested decision states that in Austria there is a long tradition of agreements between banks, mainly about interest
rates and charges and fees, based in some measure, until the 1980s, on a statute law, though the latter had been repealed
by 1 January 1994, when the Republic of Austria joined the European Economic Area (EEA) and the [Law on the banking system
(Bankwesengesetz – BWG)] entered into force.
26      Credit establishments nevertheless continued to conclude agreements, in particular on lending and deposit rates, within the
network.
27      The contested decision states, in Title 5, that the agreements were comprehensive as regards their content, highly institutionalised
and closely interconnected, and covered the entire Austrian territory. For every banking product there was a separate committee
on which the competent employees at the second or third level of management of the banks concerned sat. In practice, this
separation as regards content was not strictly adhered to: sometimes, substantively related topics which were covered by more
than one committee were dealt with in one and the same committee. Finally, the individual committees were part of an organisational
whole.
28      Each month, apart from August, senior representatives of the largest Austrian banks got together as the top-level body (known
as “the Lombard Clubˮ). In addition to matters of general interest that were clearly neutral from a competition point of view,
they discussed changes in interest rates, advertising measures, and so forth. At some of these meetings, representatives of
the Austrian National Bank … were present.
29      One level down were the product-based specialist committees. The most important ones, in that regard, were the lending rates
committees and the deposit rates committees which, as their names suggest, dealt with lending and deposit interest rates and
they were convened either separately or jointly. A constant flow of information took place in particular between those committees
and the Lombard Club.
30      Regional committees, which were diverse and numerous, held regular meetings in every province of Austria. In certain provinces,
even the hierarchical structure of the Lombard Club and the specialist committees was replicated.
31      During the federal committee meetings on lending and/or deposit rates, bank representatives from Vienna met their opposite
numbers from the provinces and their decisions were in principle valid for the whole of Austria.
32      In addition, there were special committees for, inter alia, corporate banking, retail banking business involving the self-employed,
mortgage lending and building loans (named “the Minilombard Committeeˮ, “the Key Account Management Committeeˮ, “the Liberal
Professions Lending Rates Committeeˮ, “the Mortgage Committeeˮ and “the Building Loans Deposit Rates Committeeˮ).
33      Lastly, there were meetings, at regular intervals, of a large number of further committees on matters of relevance from a
competition point of view: in the Treasurer Committee (Treasurerrunde), federal financing and interest rate questions were
discussed; in the various payments transactions committees (in particular the Payment Transactions Committee, the Cross-Border
Transactions Committee and the Organising Committee of Austrian Credit Institution Associations), fees and charges for payment
transactions were among the matters discussed; in the Export Financing Committee, matters of export financing were discussed,
and in the Securities Committee, minimum fees, charges and interest rates were discussed.
34      Of all those special committees, the most noteworthy is the Controller Committee (Controllerrunde), on which the representatives
of the controlling departments of the leading Austrian banks sat. It was at meetings of this committee that, for instance,
uniform calculation bases and joint proposals for improved earnings were drawn up. The banks thereby increased the mutual
transparency of their respective cost and calculation factors.
35      Between all these committees, concerned primarily with lending and deposit rates and with charges and fees, a regular flow
of information took place. Discussions in one committee were often held over pending agreement in another. Lastly, the higher
rank of the Lombard Club meant that, in controversial cases, its guidance was awaited.
36.      With a view to extensive, countrywide implementation of (or for the purpose of coordination with) the agreements concluded
in the abovementioned Vienna committee meetings, there was also a regular flow of information to the various regional committees
in the provinces and from the latter to the central committees in Vienna. From time to time, regional committees sent representatives
to federal committee meetings on lending and/or deposit rates.
37      The Commission states, in the contested decision, that, during the period covered by its investigation (namely from 1 January
1994 to the end of June 1998), at least 300 meetings took place in Vienna alone, quite apart from the numerous regional committee
meetings. …
38      The Commission draws attention to the particular role played by the lead institutions in the Lombard network as coordinators
and representatives of their respective bank groupings, namely, in the case of Erste (previously GiroCredit), the savings
bank sector; in the case of RZB, the Raiffeisen sector; and, in the case of ÖVAG, the credit union sector. According to the
Commission, that role was directly utilised for the smooth functioning of the Lombard network. First, the lead institutions
organised the mutual transfer of information between Vienna and the provinces within the respective bank groupings; second,
they represented the interests of their grouping vis-à-vis the other groupings in the cartel. According to the Commission,
they were thus perceived as representatives of their respective groupings by the other participants. The agreements were therefore
reached not only between the individual institutions themselves but also between the groupings.’
III –
The actions before the Court of First Instance and the judgment under appeal
By applications received at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 30 August and 2 September 2002, the eight undertakings
penalised by the contested decision, including the four appellants herein, Erste, RZB, BA-CA and ÖVAG, brought actions under
Article 230 EC for the annulment of that decision, wholly or in part, and, in the alternative, cancellation of the fines imposed
on each of them or reduction of the amount thereof.
By the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance dismissed the applications of, among others, Erste, BA-CA and ÖVAG
and ordered those applicants to pay the costs.
It also dismissed both RZB’s application and the Commission’s counterclaim, and ordered RZB to pay its own costs and 90% of
those incurred by the Commission.
IV –
Forms of order sought by the parties
Erste claims that the Court should:
–        set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as it dismisses Erste’s claim for annulment;
–        annul the contested decision to the extent to which it imposes a fine on Erste;
–        in the alternative, reduce the amount of the fine imposed on it in Article 3 of the contested decision;
–        in the further alternative, set aside the judgment under appeal and refer the case back to the Court of First Instance;
–        order the Commission to pay the costs in any event.
RZB claims that the Court should:
–        set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as it dismisses RZB’s action for annulment;
–        annul Article 3 of the contested decision in so far as it pertains to RZB;
–        in the alternative, reduce the amount of the fine imposed on it in Article 3 of the contested decision;
–        order the Commission to pay the costs.
BA-CA claims that the Court should:
–        set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as it dismisses BA-CA’s action for annulment;
–        annul Article 3 of the contested decision in so far as it pertains to BA-CA;
–        in the alternative, reduce the amount of the fine imposed on it in Article 3 of the contested decision;
–        order the Commission to pay the costs.
ÖVAG claims that the Court should:
–        set aside paragraphs 2 and 4 of the judgment under appeal;
–        annul the contested decision in so far as it pertains to ÖVAG;
–        in the alternative, reduce the amount of the fine imposed on it in Article 3 of the contested decision;
–        in the further alternative, refer the case back to the Court of First Instance;
–        order the Commission to pay the costs or reserve the costs if the case is referred back to the Court of First Instance.
The Commission contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the appeals;
–        order the appellants to pay the costs.
V –
The grounds of appeal
Erste submits four grounds of appeal:
–        breach of the rights of the defence;
–        infringement of Article 81(1) EC owing to the absence of any appreciable effect on trade between Member States;
–        infringement of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 through the imputation to Erste of the conduct of GiroCredit for the period
prior to its acquisition; and
–        infringement of that article, read in conjunction with the Guidelines for the setting of fines and determination of their
amount.
RZB submits four grounds of appeal:
–        infringement of Article 81 EC, in that the effect on trade between Member States was not established;
–        infringement of the Guidelines, in that the meetings of the banks concerned were characterised as ‘very serious infringements’;
–        infringement of Regulation No 17 and of the Guidelines, in that the shares of the entire ‘Raiffeisen sector’ market were wrongly
attributed to it; and
–        error of law in the assessment of its cooperation with the Commission.
BA-CA submits three grounds of appeal:
–        incorrect finding, in connection with determination of the amount of the fine, that the committee meetings brought about economic
effects;
–        failure to take account of circumstances justifying a reduction of the fine when determining the basic amount; and
–        failure to take account of its cooperation in the form of responses to the requests for information, the joint exposition
of facts, the voluntary disclosure of additional documents and the response to the statement of objections.
ÖVAG submits three grounds of appeal:
–        incorrect finding as to the obstruction of trade between Member States;
–        incorrect attribution of the decentralised sector in connection with the division into categories; and
–        failure to take account of attenuating circumstances.
VI –
The appeals
By order of the President of the Court of Justice of 25 October 2007, after the views of the parties and the Advocate General
had been heard on this point, the four cases were joined for the purposes of the oral procedure and the judgment, pursuant
to Article 43 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
Since the appellants’ submissions largely overlap, it is appropriate to consider them together.
A –
The grounds of appeal alleging infringement of Article 81(1) EC
1.     The ground of appeal alleging an error of law concerning assessment of the requirement that trade between Member States be
affected
Erste, RZB and ÖVAG all put forward this ground of appeal, which comprises essentially three parts.
a)     The first part: the Court of First Instance erred in law in its assessment of the ability of a cartel operating throughout
the national territory to have an appreciable effect on trade between Member States
i)     Arguments of the parties
RZB and ÖVAG maintain that the Court of First Instance erred in law by holding, in paragraph 181 of the judgment under appeal,
that ‘there is, at least, a strong presumption that a practice restrictive of competition applied throughout the territory
of a Member State is liable to contribute to compartmentalisation of the markets and to affect intra-Community trade’.
RZB claims, first, that the Court of First Instance oversimplified the requirement of an effect on trade between Member States
when it took the view that the Commission was not required to prove the existence of compartmentalisation.
In paragraphs 182 to 184 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance did not take due account of the scope of
the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C‑215/96 and C‑216/96
Bagnasco and Others
[1999] ECR I‑135.
Second, RZB considers that, in holding that the mere fact that the committee meetings covered the entire territory of the
Republic of Austria was sufficient to conclude that trade between Member States was affected, the Court of First instance
wrongly interpreted the Court of Justice’s case-law.
In fact, the likelihood of affecting trade between Member States presupposes, in addition to ‘territorial cover’, the presence
of at least one further factor, in this case the effects of compartmentalisation.
In addition, RZB states that, in paragraph 181 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance has reversed the
burden of proof by passing it on to RZB, whereas it is incumbent on the Commission to produce evidence of the infringement
of Article 81(1) EC and the ability of the cartel to affect trade between Member States.
ÖVAG, for its part, alleges that the Court of First Instance understated the scope of the criterion of the effect of market
compartmentalisation.
It adds that the Court of First Instance did not take account, in paragraph 166 of the judgment under appeal, of the particular
features of an assessment,
ex post
facto
, of a past infringement. It wrongly failed to assess the specific impact of the agreements on trade between States.
ÖVAG also claims that the reasoning of the Court of First Instance is contradictory and insufficient. In paragraph 164 of
the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance considered that the effect of partitioning the markets was not a strong
indication that there was an effect on trade between Member States, whereas in paragraph 181 of that judgment it held, on
the contrary, that there was a close link between the effect of a practice of compartmentalisation of the markets and the
liability of that practice to affect cross-border trade.
The Commission contends that the Court of First Instance did not err in law.
ii)  Findings of the Court
First, it must be borne in mind, on the one hand, that the Court of Justice has held that, if an agreement, decision or practice
is to be capable of affecting trade between Member States, it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability,
on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact, that it may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or
potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States in such a way as to cause concern that it might hinder the attainment
of a single market between Member States. Moreover, that effect must not be insignificant (Case C-238/05
Asnef-Equifax
and Administración del Estado
[2006] ECR I‑11125, paragraph 34 and the case-law there cited).
Thus, an effect on intra-Community trade is normally the result of a combination of several factors which, taken separately,
are not necessarily decisive. In order to assess whether a cartel has an appreciable effect on trade between Member States,
it is necessary to examine it in its economic and legal context (
Asnef-Equifax
and Administración del Estado
, paragraph 35 and the case-law there cited).
On the other hand, the Court of Justice has already held that the fact that a cartel relates only to the marketing of products
in a single Member State is not sufficient to preclude the possibility that trade between Member States might be affected.
A cartel extending over the whole of the territory of a Member State has, by its very nature, the effect of reinforcing the
partitioning of markets on a national basis, thus impeding the economic interpenetration which the EC Treaty is designed to
bring about (
Asnef-Equifax
and Administración del Estado
, paragraph 37 and the case-law there cited).
It follows that, contrary to the appellants’ assertion, the Court of First Instance was right, in paragraph 181 of the judgment
under appeal, to take as the starting point of its reasoning of the existence of a strong presumption that trade between Member
States is affected, going on to say that ‘[t]hat presumption can only be rebutted if an analysis of the characteristics of
the agreement and its economic context demonstrates the contrary’.
The Court of First Instance undertook that analysis in paragraphs 182 to 185 of the judgment under appeal. In particular,
in paragraph 183, it found that ‘[t]he concerted practices within the Lombard network involved not only almost all the credit
establishments in Austria but also a wide range of banking products and services, in particular deposits and loans and, therefore,
they were capable of changing the conditions of competition throughout that Member State’. In paragraph 185, it examined the
possibility of an effect of partitioning of the market, taking the view that ‘[t]he Lombard network may have contributed to
maintenance of the barriers to access to the market … in that it facilitated retention of structures in the Austrian banking
market…’.
Thus, after describing in detail, in paragraphs 111 to 121 of the judgment under appeal, the aim pursued by each of the committees,
the Court of First Instance rightly found, in paragraph 185 of that judgment, that the very existence of the ‘Lombard network’
impeded free access to the Austrian market so that the cartel was liable to have a cross-border effect.
It therefore correctly concluded, in paragraph 186 of the judgment under appeal, that the agreement in question may have had
the effect of compartmentalising the market and was liable to affect trade between Member States.
Second, contrary to RZB’s contention, the Court of First Instance did not reverse the burden of proof but, exercising its
power to assess the facts, found, after analysis, that the applicants had not overturned the presumption that the cartel as
a whole, extending as it did to Austria in its entirety, had been capable of affecting trade between States.
Third, it must be stated that the reasoning of the Court of First Instance in paragraph 181 of the judgment under appeal does
not contradict that of paragraph 164 of the same judgment.
In paragraph 164, the Court of First Instance merely rejected the applicants’ argument that proof of the compartmentalising
effects of a cartel was the only basis for establishing the capability of that cartel to affect trade between Member States.
Fourth, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, Article 81(1) EC does not require that the arrangements
referred to in that provision have actually appreciably affected trade between Member States, but requires that it be established
that those arrangements are capable of having that effect (
Asnef-Equifax
and Administración del Estado
, paragraph 43 and the case-law there cited).
Consequently, ÖVAG is wrong to assert that the Court of First Instance should have examined the actual impact of that cartel
on trade between Member States.
Accordingly, the first part of this ground of appeal must be rejected.
b)     The second part: the Court of First Instance erred in law by holding that the Commission was entitled to undertake an overall
examination of the cross-border effects of the committees and by making an incorrect, inadequate and contradictory analysis
of what constitutes the relevant market
i)     Arguments of the parties
ÖVAG maintains, in its first complaint, that the Court of First Instance erred in law by holding, in paragraph 168 et seq.
of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission was entitled to undertake an overall examination of the cross-border effect
of the committees instead of examining separately the extent to which each of them was likely to affect trade between Member
States.
In that regard, the appellant submits, first, that the Court of First Instance erred in law by not examining, in isolation,
the effects on intra-Community trade of the committees that related to a separate activity and that, furthermore, it did not
correctly interpret the case-law of the Court of Justice represented by the judgment in
Bagnasco and Others
.
In its second complaint, ÖVAG criticises the reasoning of the Court of First Instance in paragraph 172 of the judgment under
appeal to the effect that ‘the definition of the relevant market differs according to whether Article 81 EC or Article 82
EC is to be applied’. It maintains that the Court of First Instance should have appraised the effect on trade of the agreements
concluded within the various committees on the basis of a narrower definition of the relevant markets.
ÖVAG also perceives a contradiction between paragraph 174 of the judgment under appeal, in which the Court of First Instance
accepts that ‘the various banking services covered by the agreements cannot be substituted for each other’, and paragraph
175 of that judgment, in which it states that ‘the Commission was not required to examine separately the markets for the various
banking products covered by the committees’.
The Commission contends that the Court of First Instance did not err in law.
ii)  Findings of the Court
–       The complaint that the Court of First Instance misinterpreted the case-law
When appraising the effects of agreements in the light of Article 81 EC it is necessary to take into consideration the actual
context in which they are situated, in particular the economic and legal context in which the undertakings concerned operate,
the nature of the goods or services affected, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and the structure of the market
or markets in question (
Asnef-Equifax and Administración del Estado
, paragraph 49 and the case-law there cited).
In paragraphs 111 to 126 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance confirmed the Commission’s conclusion that
there was an agreement in principle between all the banks participating in the cartel to eliminate price competition for a
wide range of retail and corporate banking services, including the ‘key accounts’. It also confirmed the classification of
the committees as a single overall cartel.
Since, as found by the Court of First Instance, there was an overall cartel involving most of those operating in the financial
sector of a Member State and a wide range of financial services and products, the Court of First Instance was right to consider
that the agreements in question, based on an overall plan and implemented in the context of separate committee meetings, constituted
a single infringement which justified and necessitated an examination of the extent to which that generalised cartel as a
whole was likely to affect intra-Community trade.
As far as the
Bagnasco and Others
judgment referred to by the appellant is concerned, it must be observed, as the Court of First Instance observed in paragraph
171 of the judgment under appeal, that in that case the Court of Justice did not undertake an overall examination of the effect
on trade between Member States of the two clauses in question in the main proceedings, since one of the agreements did not
have the object or effect of restricting competition and the other was not liable to affect trade between Member States.
Consequently, in contrast to the cartels at issue in the present cases, in that judgment no question arose of an overall examination
of the agreements in relation to the requirement of an effect on trade between Member States. It follows that the appellants
have no basis for relying on that judgment to challenge the findings in paragraph 56 of the present judgment.
In those circumstances, ÖVAG’s complaint that a separate examination of the agreements in question was required of the Court
of First Instance when it appraised the condition of an effect on trade between Member States must be rejected.
–       The complaint that the Court of First Instance’s analysis concerning definition of the relevant market was incorrect, inadequate
and contradictory
As regards, first, paragraph 172 of the judgment under appeal, after pointing out that the definition of the market plays
a different role according to whether Article 81 EC or Article 82 EC is to be applied, the Court of First Instance held that
the definition of the relevant market was of no consequence provided that the Commission had concluded that the agreement
in question distorted competition and was liable appreciably to affect trade between Member States.
ÖVAG’s objection to that analysis is ineffective, since the Court of First Instance examined, in paragraphs 172 to 174 of
the judgment under appeal, the complaint which ÖVAG had raised, challenging the method adopted by the Commission to evaluate
the effects on intra-Community trade, and drew no conclusions from its analysis.
As regards, second, the reasons given by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 174 of the judgment under appeal, in which
it considered that the various banking services covered by the agreements could not be substituted for each other, and in
paragraph 175, in which it explained that the Commission was not required to examine separately the markets for those various
banking products, ÖVAG’s complaint must be rejected since the Court of First Instance duly stated the reasons for which a
narrow definition of the market would be artificial, taking the view that most customers of universal banks call for a set
of banking services and, moreover, the effect on trade may be indirect and the relevant market may differ from the market
for the products and services covered by the cartel.
It follows that ÖVAG’s complaint that the Court of First Instance’s analysis regarding definition of the relevant market was
incorrect, inadequate and contradictory must be rejected, and the same applies therefore to the second part of the ground
of appeal under review here.
c)     The third part: failure to demonstrate that the cartel had an appreciable effect on intra-Community trade
i)     Arguments of the parties
Erste maintains that the Court of First Instance should have found, in paragraphs 153 to 187 of the judgment under appeal,
that Article 81 EC was inapplicable since the Commission had not established that the cartel in question had had an appreciable
effect on trade. According to that appellant, if the agreement concluded between the banks had cross-border effects, they
were limited.
The Commission contends that Erste’s assertions are incorrect.
ii)  Findings of the Court
According to settled case-law, Article 81(1) EC does not require that the collusive arrangements governed by that provision
should have appreciably affected intra-Community trade but requires that it be established that such arrangements were capable
of having such an effect (see
Asnef-Equifax
and Administración del Estado
, paragraph 43).
In that connection, the Court of First Instance observed, in paragraphs 111 to 121, 179 and 183 to 185 of the judgment under
appeal, that the agreement brought together almost all Austrian credit establishments, that it covered a wide range of bank
products and services and that it covered the whole of Austria, with the concomitant risk of affecting trading conditions
throughout that Member State.
Therefore, although it did not expressly adjudicate as to whether the effect on intra-Community trade was appreciable, the
Court of First Instance nevertheless identified the evidence supporting the conclusion that the cartel was liable to have
an effect on intra-Community trade and did not fail to apply the analysis of the condition set out in paragraph 36 of the
present judgment.
It follows that the third part of this ground of appeal must be rejected.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the ground of appeal alleging an error of law concerning assessment of the requirement
that trade between Member States be affected must be rejected in its entirety.
2.     The ground of appeal alleging an error of law regarding the attribution of responsibility for the infringement
a)     Arguments of the parties
Erste submits that the Court of First Instance was wrong to hold, in paragraph 323 et seq. of the judgment under appeal, that
it should be answerable for the infringement committed by GiroCredit before it was acquired by Erste (formerly Österreichische
Spar-Casse-Bank AG – EÖ) and that the Commission did not act illegally by attributing that conduct to Erste as the successor
in title to GiroCredit.
First, Erste complains that the Court of First Instance did not properly assess the economic and legal links between GiroCredit
and the BA group. In that regard, Erste recalls that, until a majority holding of its capital was acquired on 20 May 1997,
GiroCredit was mainly owned by the BA group, which itself participated in the ‘Lombard Club’. That group controlled GiroCredit
not only through its majority holding in GiroCredit’s capital but also through the appointment of members of the supervisory
board and the management board and the fact that the senior management posts were occupied by employees from the BA group.
Consequently, GiroCredit’s conduct ought to have been imputed for that period to BA-CA.
Furthermore, the Court of First Instance’s finding that the legal person responsible for the operation of GiroCredit’s banking
business before its transfer was ‘GiroCredit Bank der österreichischen Sparkassen AG’ is wrong in law, since that company
was also controlled and directed by the BA group.
Second, Erste maintains that the Court of First Instance also erred in law, in paragraphs 328 to 336 of the judgment under
appeal, by taking the view that the Commission had the option of penalising either the subsidiary that participated in the
infringement or the parent company that controlled it during that period, even in a case where there had been successive changes
in economic control, and consequently of attributing to it responsibility for GiroCredit’s conduct instead of attributing
it to the former parent company.
The Commission contends that a clear distinction must be drawn between the determination of the legal person responsible for
the undertaking that participated in the infringement and the conditions under which the conduct of a subsidiary with separate
legal personality may be attributed to the parent company. The Commission submits that its approach does not entail any injustice
in so far as Erste itself participated in the cartel.
b)     Findings of the Court
By its two complaints, which it is appropriate to consider together, Erste objects to the fact that the contested decision
attributed to it the conduct of GiroCredit before 1 October 1997, the date of its merger with GiroCredit.
When an entity infringes competition rules, it falls to that entity, by virtue of the principle of personal responsibility,
to answer for that infringement (see, to that effect, Case C‑49/92 P
Commission
v
Anic Partecipazioni
[1999] ECR I‑4125, paragraph 145, and Case C‑279/98 P
Cascades
v
Commission
[2000] ECR I‑9693, paragraph 78).
As to the circumstances in which an entity that is not the author of an infringement can nevertheless be penalised for that
infringement, this situation arises if the entity that has committed the infringement has ceased to exist in law (see, to
that effect,
Commission
v
Anic Partecipazioni
, paragraph 145).
As the Court of Justice has already held, when an entity that has committed an infringement of the competition rules is subject
to a legal or organisational change, that change does not necessarily create a new undertaking free of liability for its predecessor’s
infringements of the competition rules, when, from an economic point of view, the two are identical (see, to that effect,
Joined Cases 29/83 and 30/83
CRAM and Rheinzink
v
Commission
[1984] ECR 1679, paragraph 9, and Joined Cases C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P
Aalborg Portland and Others
v
Commission
[2004] ECR I‑123, paragraph 59).
Moreover, an undertaking’s anti-competitive conduct can be attributed to another undertaking where it has not decided independently
upon its own conduct on the market, but carried out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by that other
undertaking, having regard in particular to the economic and legal links between them (Case C‑294/98 P
Metsä‑Serla and Others
v
Commission
[2000] ECR I‑10065, paragraph 27, and Case C‑196/99 P
Aristrain
v
Commission
[2003] ECR I‑11005, paragraph 96). The fact that a subsidiary has separate legal personality does not therefore exclude the
possibility that its conduct may be attributed to the parent company.
Erste argues that, at the time of the infringements with which the contested decision is concerned, GiroCredit’s conduct was
determined by its parent company, namely the BA group, and that consequently it is the latter company which should have been
held responsible for the infringements committed in the past by GiroCredit. Erste thus challenges the finding of the Court
of First Instance in paragraph 331 of the judgment under appeal, namely that the Commission is entitled to choose to penalise
either the subsidiary that participated in the infringement or the parent company which controlled it during the period covered
by the contested decision.
In that regard, the Court of First Instance was right to hold that the Commission was not obliged first to verify whether
the conditions were fulfilled for attribution of the infringement to the parent company of the undertaking that committed
the infringement. The Commission cannot be required, as a matter of principle, first to carry out such verification before
being entitled to consider taking action against the undertaking that committed the infringement, even if the latter has undergone
changes regarding its status as a legal entity. The principle of personal responsibility, referred to in paragraph 77 of the
present judgment, certainly does not prevent the Commission from considering the possibility of penalising the latter undertaking
before investigating whether the infringement might be possibly attributed to the parent company. Moreover, as the Court of
First Instance observed in paragraph 335 of the judgment under appeal, if the position were otherwise, the Commission’s inquiries
would be made considerably more laborious by the need to verify, in each case where there were successive controllers of an
undertaking, to what extent the latter’s acts could be imputed to the former parent company.
Moreover, it must be emphasised that Erste, having itself participated in the cartel covered by the contested decision, knew
when it took over the business of GiroCredit that the latter might be the subject of proceedings under Article 81 EC and that,
as the holder of rights in respect of that company, it thereby exposed itself to the consequences of such proceedings in terms
of fines.
Consequently, the second complaint made by Erste in support of the present ground of appeal must be rejected.
As regards the first complaint concerning the Court of First Instance’s examination of the economic and legal links between
GiroCredit and the BA group, it need merely be pointed out that, since the Commission was entitled validly to impose a penalty
for infringement of Article 81 EC by the GiroCredit subsidiary and, consequently, attribute that company’s liability to Erste
as the company which took it over, the Court of First Instance was right to hold, in paragraph 336 of the judgment under appeal,
that it was not necessary to verify whether GiroCredit’s conduct could be attributed to the BA group. Accordingly, Erste’s
argument concerning actual control of GiroCredit by the BA group is ineffective.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the ground of appeal alleging an error of law regarding the attribution of responsibility
for the infringement must be rejected in its entirety.
B –
The grounds of appeal alleging infringement of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17
1.     The ground of appeal alleging errors of law in the assessment of the gravity of the infringement
BA‑CA, Erste and RZB dispute the Court of First Instance’s findings concerning the gravity of the infringement. This ground
of appeal comprises essentially seven parts.
a)     The first part: the assessment was not in conformity with the Guidelines
i)     Arguments of the parties
RZB claims that the Court of First Instance contradicted itself by not examining, in particular, in paragraphs 237 and 254
of the judgment under appeal the question whether the infringement must be regarded as ‘very serious’ in accordance with the
rules which it had set out in paragraph 226 of that judgment.
The Commission contends that, while the Commission is indeed limited by the Guidelines which it has set for itself, the same
does not apply to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is clear from
the case-law that the Guidelines establish only a ‘minimum programme’ which does not give rise to an exhaustive list of the
factors to be taken into account. It is even possible to depart from that programme where the circumstances justify such a
departure.
ii)  Findings of the Court
As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, in fixing the amount
of the fines, regard must be had to duration and to all the factors capable of affecting the assessment of the gravity of
the infringements (Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
[2005] ECR I-5425, paragraph 240).
The gravity of an infringement must be assessed in the light of numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of
the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of fines, although no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria to be applied
has been drawn up (
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 241 and the case-law there cited).
It is therefore incumbent on the Court of First Instance to review the manner in which the Commission exercised its discretion
in relation to those factors.
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance did not contradict itself by holding, in paragraph of 237 of the judgment under appeal,
that the Commission was entitled to assess overall the gravity of the infringement in relation to all the relevant circumstances,
including factors not expressly mentioned in the Guidelines, or by holding, in paragraph 254 of the judgment, that a horizontal
price cartel in an economic sector of such importance could not escape the classification of ‘very serious’ infringement.
Therefore, the first part of the ground of appeal must be rejected.
b)     The second part: errors of law regarding the ‘true nature’ of the infringement
The second part comprises essentially four complaints.
i)     Arguments of the parties
First, RZB maintains that the Court of First Instance erred in law by holding, in paragraph 240 of the judgment under appeal,
that the nature of the infringement plays a major role in characterising very serious infringements, whereas the other criteria,
namely the actual impact of the infringement on the market and the geographic scope of the relevant market, are less important
Second, the appellant considers that the Court of First Instance also erred in law, in paragraphs 249 to 264 of the judgment
under appeal, by basing its assessment on matters not appearing in the Guidelines, namely the importance of the banking sector
for the economy, the wide rage of banking products affected by the cartel and the participation of the great majority of the
Austrian banks in the meetings.
Third, RZB criticises the Court of First Instance for not having taken account of the government’s policy of protecting the
banking sector from the free play of the market. That court also wrongly considered that the intervention of the State authorities
in the conduct caught by Article 81 EC is an aggravating circumstance with respect to calculation of the fine.
Fourth, and finally, RZB argues that the Court of First Instance erred, in paragraph 256 of the judgment under appeal, in
holding that the deterrent effect of fines should not be taken into account when the intrinsic gravity of an infringement
is examined.
The Commission contends that RZB’s assertions are either inadmissible or unfounded.
ii)  Findings of the Court
As regards the first complaint, by taking the view, in paragraph 240 of the judgment under appeal, that the three aspects
of assessment of the gravity of the infringement do not carry the same weight in the overall examination of an infringement
and that the nature of the infringement plays a major role, the Court of First Instance did not err in law by relying on the
Guidelines, according to which horizontal restrictions of the ‘price cartel’ type, the sharing of markets and other practices
affecting the proper functioning of the internal market are placed within the category of ‘very serious’ infringements.
In that regard, it held in particular, in paragraph 121 of the judgment under appeal, that there was an agreement in principle
between all the banks participating in the cartel to eliminate price competition in relation to a wide range of retail and
corporate banking services, including ‘key accounts’, typifying a restriction of the kind referred to in the Guidelines.
Moreover, it is apparent from the Guidelines that the very nature of the infringement may suffice for it to be classified
as ‘very serious’, regardless of its actual impact on the market and its geographic extent.
Finally, in paragraph 241 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance rightly held that those three criteria
were interdependent.
Accordingly, the first complaint in the second part of this ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
For the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 93 of the present judgment, the second complaint must also be rejected.
As regards the third complaint, it must be pointed out that, in paragraph 260 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First
Instance did not state that the intervention of the State authorities had been an aggravating circumstance liable to affect
the amount of the fines imposed, to the detriment of the undertakings concerned.
The third complaint must therefore also be rejected.
As regards the fourth complaint, it must be noted that, concluding an analysis of which paragraph 256 of the judgment under
appeal forms part, the Court of First Instance came to the view, in paragraph 264 of that judgment, that the circumstances
invoked by the applicants were not such as to call in question the validity of the finding in the contested judgment that
the Lombard network agreements by their very nature constituted a very serious infringement. RZB has not shown in what way
consideration of the deterrent effect of fines when the intrinsic gravity of an infringement is examined, assuming that such
consideration was necessary, could have changed the conclusion reached by the Court of First Instance. The fourth complaint
is therefore ineffective.
The fourth complaint must therefore be rejected.
Therefore, the second part of the present ground of appeal is in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.
c)     The third part: error of law regarding the ‘actual market impact’ of the infringement
i)     Arguments of the parties
RZB maintains that the Court of First Instance erred in law by allowing the Commission to deduce from the mere ‘implementation’
of the cartel that the infringement had an actual market impact. That assessment runs counter to the wording of the Guidelines
and shows that the Court of First Instance is confusing the ‘implementation’ of the agreements, a precondition for the application
of Article 81 EC, with the stricter criterion of the ‘actual market impact’ of the infringement, which is relevant in explaining
the gravity of the infringement. The judgment in
Cascades
v
Commission
goes against that reasoning and the economic report produced by the applicants shows that the agreements concerning essential
products had no impact on the conditions actually applied.
BA-CA considers that the specific repercussions of the infringement on the market were incorrectly assessed. The abovementioned
economic report shows that the meetings did not have such effects on the market.
BA-CA also claims that the Court of First Instance breached the rules of evidence in relation to the economic report. By saying
that such a report should deal with ‘all the potential effects of the agreements on the market’, the Court of First Instance
exceeded the requirements that it is permissible to impose for an economic report designed to show non-implementation of the
agreements and the lack of any causal link between the banks’ committee meetings and the free play of competition in the market.
The Commission observes that the economic report produced by the banks related to only two banking products and not to the
potential effects of the agreement on the market. In any event, the implementation, even if partial, of an agreement whose
object is anti-competitive is sufficient to preclude any finding that that agreement had no impact on the market.
ii)  Findings of the Court
It must be noted that the Court of First Instance did not confine itself, in assessing the gravity of the infringement, to
a finding that the cartel had been implemented.
In paragraph 285 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance duly found that the price cartel had an actual
impact on the market, observing that the cartel members had taken measures to announce the agreed prices to customers, instructing
their employees to use them as a basis for negotiation and monitoring the application of them by their competitors and their
own sales departments.
Next, concluding an examination carried out in paragraphs 289 to 294 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance
came to the view, without erring in law, in paragraph 295 of that judgment, that, ‘[i]n view of the numerous uncontested examples
of implementation of the agreements mentioned in the contested decision, the fact that in certain cases the agreements were
not respected by one or more banks, that the banks did not succeed in maintaining the agreed level of rates or increase their
profitability or that there was competition between them regarding certain products is not sufficient to undermine the finding
that the agreements were implemented and had effects on the market’.
It follows that the third part of the present ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.
d)     The fourth part: error of law in relation to the assessment of the ‘extent of the relevant geographic market’
i)     Arguments of the parties
RZB criticises the Court of First Instance for failing to examine, in paragraphs 308 to 313 of the judgment under appeal,
the argument that the manifestly and unquestionably limited size of the Republic of Austria precluded classification of the
infringement as ‘very serious’. Moreover, the reasoning set out in paragraphs 308 to 313 is contrary to the terms of the Guidelines
and to the Commission’s decision-making policy.
The Commission contests RZB’s assertions.
ii)  Findings of the Court
Contrary to RZB’s contention, the Court of First Instance did not fail to give its views on the argument concerning the limited
extent of the relevant geographic market. It expressly stated, in paragraphs 308 to 313 of the judgment under appeal, the
reasons for which the limited size of the territory of the Republic of Austria did not preclude classification of the infringement
as ‘very serious’.
Moreover, according to settled case-law, the Commission enjoys a wide discretion in setting the amount of fines and is not
bound by assessments made by it in the past (see
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraphs 209 to 213, and Case C-510/06 P
Archer Daniels Midland
v
Commission
[2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 82). It follows that the appellant cannot invoke the Commission’s decision-making policy before
the Community judicature.
Finally, there is no rule either in the Guidelines or in Regulation No 17 whereby, when assessing the examination of an infringement,
the Court of First Instance may not limit its examination of the relevant geographic market to all or part of the territory
of a Member State.
Consequently, the fourth part of this ground of appeal must be rejected.
e)     The fifth part: error of law concerning assessment of the effects on the classification of the infringement of the selective
nature of the proceedings taken and a breach of the obligation to state reasons
i)     Arguments of the parties
RZB puts forward two complaints
The first complaint is that the Court of First Instance wrongly rejected its argument that the classification of the infringement
as ‘very serious’ was incompatible with the fact that the Commission chose to institute proceedings against only some of the
undertakings that took part in the infringement.
The second complaint is that the Court of First Instance failed in its obligation to give reasons by not replying to the arguments
that the high level of the fines was inconsistent with the symbolic nature of the proceedings ultimately brought against the
entire Austrian banking sector and, since a fine was imposed on only 10% of the banks, also led to distortions of competition.
The Commission considers that the appellant’s arguments merely repeat those expounded before the Court of First Instance.
ii)  Findings of the Court
By its first complaint, RZB merely reproduces the arguments it relied on before the Court of First Instance, without indicating
precisely what error of law it considers to have been committed by the Court of First Instance.
It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, it is clear from Article 225 EC, from the first paragraph of
Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and from Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure that an appeal must
indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments
specifically advanced in support of the appeal. Thus, an appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas and
arguments relied on before the Court of First Instance does not satisfy the requirement to state reasons under those provisions
(see Case C-499/03 P
Biegi Nahrungsmittel and Commonfood
v
Commission
[2005] ECR I-1751, paragraphs 37 and 38 and the case-law there cited).
The first complaint must therefore be rejected.
As regards the second complaint, alleging the lack of a statement of reasons, it must be borne in mind that the Court of First
Instance’s obligation to give reasons for its decisions cannot be interpreted as meaning that it is required to reply in detail
to every argument put forward by an applicant (see Case C‑274/99 P
Connolly
v
Commission
[2001] ECR I-1611, paragraph 121, and Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P
FIAMM and Others
v
Council and
Commission
[2008] ECR I-6513, paragraph 91).
However, by finding, in paragraph 315 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had legitimately adopted as a criterion,
in order to decide to whom the contested decision should be addressed, their frequent participation in the most important
committee meetings – an approach which did not preclude the classification of the infringement as ‘very serious’ – the Court
of First Instance was not required to examine the other arguments, which had as a result become ineffective, and satisfied
its obligation to state reasons.
Consequently, the second complaint must be rejected.
Therefore, the fifth part of the present ground of appeal is in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.
f)     The sixth part: there was no overall assessment of the gravity of the infringement
i)     Arguments of the parties
RZB takes issue with the Court of First Instance for not having carried out an overall assessment of the gravity of the infringement,
extending to all the aspects mentioned in the Guidelines and of the exogenous factors, namely the economic importance of the
Austrian banking sector, the absence of any need for deterrence and the selective nature of the proceedings. If the Court
of First Instance had carried out such an analysis, it would then have found that the infringement at issue could not be characterised
as ‘very serious’.
The Commission considers those allegations to be unfounded.
ii)  Findings of the Court
Contrary to RZB’s contention, the Court of First Instance did not disregard either the importance of the criteria expressly
mentioned in the Guidelines or that of the elements not expressly contained in the Guidelines.
In its assessment of the gravity of the infringement, the Commission must take account not only of the particular circumstances
of the case but also of the context in which the infringement occurs and, with a view to determining the amount of the fine,
ensure that its action has a deterrent effect, above all in relation to types of infringement that particularly undermine
the attainment of the Community’s objectives (see, to that effect,
Archer Daniels Midland
v
Commission
, paragraph 63).
In the judgment under appeal, in particular in paragraphs 249, 250 and 254, the Court of First Instance noted in particular,
and correctly, that a horizontal price cartel ranks as a very serious infringement, even in the absence of other restrictions
on competition such as partitioning of the markets, and that a cartel of that kind in a sector as important as the banking
sector, covering a wide range of banking products and involving the great majority of economic operators, cannot, in principle,
escape classification as a very serious infringement, whatever its context (see, to that effect, the judgment of 22 May 2008
in Case C-266/06 P
Evonik Degussa
v
Commission
, paragraph 104).
Moreover, the Court of First Instance also examined the applicants’ other arguments, notably in paragraphs 254 to 264 of the
judgment under appeal. It nevertheless concluded, in paragraph 264, that they were not such as to call in question the finding
that the Lombard network agreements constituted by their nature a very serious infringement.
By so doing, and as has been stated in paragraph 93 of the present judgment, the Court of First Instance certainly did not
err in law in that regard. Moreover, it is important to note that, contrary to RZB’s contention, in its examination the Court
of First Instance did not disregard the abovementioned criteria in the Guidelines, which also classify as very serious horizontal
price cartels of the kind set up in this case.
Consequently, the sixth part of the present ground of appeal is unfounded.
g)     The seventh part: error of law regarding the allocation of the appellants to the categories of infringement adopted by the
Commission
In support of the seventh part of this ground of appeal, the appellants essentially put forward five complaints.
i)     Arguments of the parties
By a first complaint, alleging the lack of a legal basis, breach of the principles of personal responsibility, proportionality
of penalties and equal treatment by reason of the attribution to the central establishments of the market shares of the banks
in decentralised sectors, Erste, RZB and ÖVAG call in question, in essence, the way in which the market shares of their respective
decentralised sectors were attributed for the purposes of classification into categories.
In that regard, they maintain, first, that the Court of First Instance erred in law, in paragraphs 356 and 373 of the judgment
under appeal, by taking the view that, by attributing those market shares to them for the purpose of calculating the fine,
the Commission did not impute to them the illegal conduct of the banks in decentralised sectors and penalised them only ‘for
their own conduct’.
That attribution is in practice tantamount to imputing to them responsibility for the infringements committed by the banks
in their decentralised sectors since the market position of those sectors was entirely taken into account for calculation
of the fine.
Erste, RZB and ÖVAG therefore consider that that attribution should have been appraised in the light of the criteria laid
down by the Court of Justice regarding the attributability of infringements within a group of companies, namely the possibility
of control over the undertaking and the existence of an economic unit.
The Commission contends that the decisive criterion for division into categories is comparison of real strength in the market,
which is based on the stable relationships between the decentralised banks and the lead institutions.
Second, Erste maintains that the attribution to the lead institutions of the market shares of some 70 Austrian savings banks
infringes Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, read in conjunction with the sixth paragraph of Section 1A of the Guidelines.
Those provisions do not allow the attribution to an undertaking of the market share of third companies operating in the same
business sector.
Erste and RZB also claim that such attribution infringes the principle of personal responsibility for breaches of competition
law and the principle of proportionality of penalties.
Finally, RZB and ÖVAG contend that the Court of First Instance also breached the principle of equal treatment. In that regard,
RZB criticises the Court of First Instance for having assimilated the central establishments of the decentralised sectors
to the large centralised banks for the purpose of placing them in categories. The Court of First Instance should have considered
whether it might not be appropriate to use only a part of the market shares of each sector concerned in order to take account
of the fact that, when it participates in committee meetings, a central establishment does no more than transmit information,
not being entitled to take action on behalf of the banks or to give instructions for the implementation of any agreements.
The Commission states that the allocation of market shares in the contested decision is based not on specific findings concerning
the actual participation of the decentralised banks in the infringement but only on the fact that the Commission penalised
the lead institutions for their own conduct. It adds that there was no imputation in this case of the conduct of third parties.
As regards RZB, the Commission states that the fines imposed on the lead institutions did not exceed the ceiling of 10% of
the undertaking’s turnover, in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation No 17.
The position is thus different from one where it would have been necessary to take account of the entire turnover of the group
if the lead institution and the decentralised banks had been regarded as one economic unit.
Finally, the Commission submits that the argument that the proportionality of the fine should be reviewed is inadmissible,
since the Court of Justice cannot, on grounds of fairness, substitute its assessment for that of the Court of First Instance.
By a second complaint, Erste and ÖVAG maintain that the Court of First Instance breached their rights of defence by holding,
in paragraph 369 of the judgment under appeal, that the indication in the statement of objections that they were the lead
institutions of the savings banks sector and of that of all the credit unions was sufficient to respect their rights of defence.
They also maintain that the Commission should not have confined itself to a simple general statement and should have informed
the undertaking of the conclusions which it intended drawing from all the factual evidence concerning the infringements and,
in particular, its intention to attribute to them the market shares of their decentralised sector.
By a third complaint, Erste, RZB and ÖVAG criticise the Court of First Instance for not having correctly appraised their roles
and their functions within the bank groupings.
Erste contests the Court of First Instance’s view, expressed in paragraph 401 of the judgment under appeal, that its task
was to ‘represent’ the savings banks sector at the banking committee meetings.
ÖVAG observes that, contrary to the Court of First Instance’s finding, it had no way of binding the independent credit unions
and does not form an economic entity with them.
RZB contends that it did not have ‘greater expertise and better information’ than the other banks in its decentralised sector,
contrary to the statement made in paragraph 405 of the judgment under appeal. In any event, it maintains that the Court of
First Instance’s findings concerning its links with the decentralised sector precluded the attribution to it, in their entirety,
of the market shares of that sector.
Finally, it observes that it does not possesses a capability comparable to that of the hierarchically organised big banks
to cause harm to individuals and that it is likewise not in a position to take advantage of the practices at issue in the
absence of a significant individual market share or participation in the profits of the banks in the sector.
By a fourth complaint, Erste maintains that the Court of First Instance was wrong to confirm, in paragraphs 455 and 458 of
the judgment under appeal, the Commission’s assessment concerning the market shares held before or after its merger with GiroCredit.
It considers that it should have been placed in a lower category.
The Court of First Instance thus erred in law in paragraph 457 of the judgment under appeal by holding that Erste remained
in the first category. The Court of First Instance also breached the principles of equal treatment and proportionality by
not making a distinction, for the purpose of categorisation, between holdings of market shares of 30% and 17%.
The Commission contends that it was entitled to place Erste in the first category after its merger with GiroCredit, regardless
of the precise market share involved. Moreover, it considers the argument that the Commission double-counted market shares
and the conduct of EÖ to be inadmissible, in that Erste is in fact merely seeking a review of the facts.
By a fifth complaint, ÖVAG maintains that, by holding, in paragraph 401 of the judgment under appeal, that the applicant played
‘at the most important committee meetings’ a role as a representative of the independent credit unions, the Court of First
Instance distorted the facts. As far as it is concerned, no exchanges of information or activities as coordinator and representative
of decentralised credit unions have ever been proved.
Moreover, the Court of First Instance wrongly invoked a judgment of the Austrian Constitutional Court of 23 June 1993, produced
by the Commission, to justify the attribution to ÖVAG of the market shares of the banks in the sector (paragraphs 392 to 401
of the judgment under appeal). It thus either made a finding of fact whose inaccuracy is apparent from the file or else distorted
the evidence. In any event, it exceeded the discretion available to it. In its reply, ÖVAG specifically alleges distortion
of evidence by the Court of First Instance, claiming that such distortion is reviewable by the Court of Justice.
Finally, ÖVAG maintains that the Court of First Instance did not expressly examine its situation, in contrast to its approach
regarding Erste and RZB and their respective sectors.
The Commission observes that the appellant has given no support for that view and contends that the complaint should be rejected.
As regards the reference to the judgment of the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Commission denies any distortion.
ii)  Findings of the Court
As far as the first complaint is concerned, and as found by the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 355 to 357 of the judgment
under appeal, the Commission’s attribution of the market shares of the banks in the decentralised sectors does not constitute
imputation of the unlawful conduct of the latter to the lead institutions.
The first step must be distinguished from the second, in so far as it is designed to ensure – the view taken by the Court
of First Instance – that the level of the fines imposed on the lead institutions should adequately reflect the gravity of
their unlawful conduct, in this case the essential role that they played within the various units as representatives of the
banks in the decentralised sectors, including action to defend the interests of those banks, and as centres for reciprocal
exchange of information, a role which is indicative of their de facto influence on the conduct of the decentralised banks.
In order to assess the gravity of that conduct, it is necessary, in accordance with the fourth and sixth paragraphs of Section
1A of the Guidelines, to take account of the actual economic capacity of undertakings to distort competition and their specific
weight and therefore the real impact of their unlawful conduct on competition.
The Court of First Instance did not err in law by considering that it was necessary for the stable structural links between
the lead institutions and the banks in the decentralised sectors, in terms, in particular, of representation and exchange
of information, also to be taken into account because, by virtue of those links, the effective economic strength of those
companies, and therefore their capacity to harm competition, was likely to be greater than their own turnover would indicate.
If the market shares of the decentralised entities had not been taken into account, the deterrent effect of the fine – a general
requirement which, as is apparent from the fourth paragraph of Section 1A of the Guidelines, must guide the Commission in
its calculation of the fine – would be likely to be absent.
It follows that, in addressing the issue of categorisation, the Court of First Instance did not commit any error of law by
holding, in paragraph 357 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had relied on the personal conduct of the lead
institutions and had not imputed to them the unlawful conduct of the banks in their sectors.
Consequently, the appellants have no basis for alleging breach of the principles of personal responsibility, proportionality
of penalties and equal treatment, or infringement of the sixth paragraph of Section 1A of the Guidelines.
Therefore, the first complaint in the seventh part of the ground of appeal under review must be rejected.
As regards the second complaint, it must be rejected outright.
The Court of Justice has already held that, where the Commission makes it clear in its statement of objections that it will
consider whether it is appropriate to impose fines on the undertakings concerned and it indicates the main factual and legal
criteria capable of giving rise to a fine, such as the gravity and the duration of the alleged infringement and whether that
infringement was committed intentionally or negligently, it fulfils its obligation to respect the undertakings’ right to be
heard. In doing so, it provides them with the necessary means to defend themselves not only against the finding of an infringement
but also against the imposition of fines (see
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 428 and the case-law there cited).
As regards the level of the envisaged fines, it is settled case-law that to give indications of the level of the contemplated
fines, when the undertakings have not been in a position to put forward their observations on the objections held against
them, would be tantamount to anticipating inappropriately the Commission’s decision (see
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 434 and the case-law there cited).
Therefore, the Court of First Instance was right to consider, in paragraph 369 of the judgment under appeal, that those conditions
were satisfied in this case since the Commission had indicated in the statements of objections that Erste, RZB and ÖVAG were
lead institutions in their respective sectors and that, as a result, such an indication was sufficient to respect the applicants’
rights of defence.
As regards the third complaint, it must be pointed out that, in paragraphs 389 to 408 of the judgment under appeal, the Court
of First Instance examined the Commission’s assessment of the facts in the contested decision regarding the role of the applicant
companies’ central establishments.
The appellants seek in reality merely a re-examination of the facts, which are not open to discussion in an appeal.
Consequently, the third complaint must be rejected.
As regards the fourth complaint, whereby Erste maintains that the Court of First Instance was wrong to maintain its classification
in the first category and thus breached the principles of equal treatment and proportionality, it must be borne in mind that
while, in an appeal, the Court cannot substitute, on grounds of fairness, its assessment for that of the Court of First Instance
giving judgment in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction as to the amount of the fines imposed on undertakings by reason
of their infringement of Community law, the exercise of that power cannot give rise, upon determination of the amount of those
fines, to discrimination between the undertakings which participated in an agreement or concerted practice contrary to Article
81(1) EC (Case C-411/04 P
Salzgitter Mannesmann
v
Commission
[2007] ECR I-959, paragraph 68 and the case-law there cited).
In paragraph 457 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance examined Erste’s complaint in the following terms:
‘As regards the complaint that [the] BA [group]’s market share, which was close to 12 to 13%, was mistakenly included in the
figure of 30% attributed by the contested decision to the entity made up of the lead institution and the savings banks, it
must be stated that, after deduction of [the] BA [group]’s market share, the remaining market share of 17 to 18% still justified
classification in the first category, given that it is much closer to the guide value of 22% than to that of 11%, which related
to the second category. That complaint must therefore be rejected in the context of the examination of the legality of the
Commission decision, given that, even if it were upheld, it could not call in question the operative part of the contested
decision. Moreover, the Court considers, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, that the placing of Erste in the first
category is justified with a view to arriving at a fine of an appropriate amount.’
In that regard, it must be pointed out that, in relation to the division of the cartel members into various categories, with
uniform starting amounts for undertakings in the same category, the Court of First Instance held as follows in paragraph 424
of the judgment under appeal:
‘In this case, the Commission did not set precise thresholds for the five categories which it identified but indicated, in
its defence, “guide values” for the market shares of undertakings placed in the same category. The differences between those
guide values are coherent and objectively justified as regards the first to fourth categories. The guide value for the second
to fourth categories corresponds, in each instance, to one half of that of the category above, and the same applies to the
corresponding starting amount.’.
It is apparent from the file that, in this case, the categories were determined by reference to the market shares held by
each company and the guide values were set respectively at about 22%, about 11%, about 5.5%, about 2.75% and less than 1%
for the last category.
Consequently, the Court of First Instance was right to hold that, regardless of the market share actually held by Erste, namely
17-18% or 30%, it was in the region of the guide value of 22%, as a result of which the undertaking was placed in the first
category.
Moreover, the part of the Guidelines concerning the amount of the fines that may be imposed on members of a cartel does not
lay down an arithmetical calculation method for such fines (see, to that effect,
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 266 and the case-law there cited).
It follows that the Court of First Instance did not err in law when, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, it maintained
the classification of Erste in the first category.
Therefore, the fourth complaint in the seventh part of the ground of appeal under review must be rejected.
As regards the fifth complaint, it is necessary, first, to reject ÖVAG’s complaint that the Court of First Instance did not
examine its situation.
In paragraphs 389 to 408 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance examined in their entirety the relations
between the lead institutions and their decentralised sectors and in particular found in ÖVAG’s case, in paragraph 400 of
that judgment, that the latter had confirmed providing the banks in its sector with services relating to functions that those
establishments could not undertake alone because of their smallness and their scant resources.
As far as the judgment of the Austrian Constitutional Court is concerned, the Court of First Instance, in paragraph 393 of
the judgment under appeal, set out the circumstances in which proceedings were commenced before that court and analysed the
latter’s description of the role of the central establishments and their relations with the decentralised banks. It pointed
out in particular that, according to the Constitutional Court, a closely woven network of rights and obligations had developed
over numerous decades; that applied both to the Raiffeisen sector, to which the judgment referred, and to the credit unions
and the savings banks.
In that context, it must be observed that ÖVAG’s allegations of incorrect findings of fact, distortion of evidence and overstepping
of the bounds of discretion are tantamount to a challenge of the assessment by the Court of First Instance of facts set out
in evidence produced by a party.
It is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it, that
appraisal not constituting a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice, save where such evidence
has been distorted (see Case C-113/04 P
Technische Unie
v
Commission
[2006] ECR I-8831, paragraph 83 and the case-law there cited).
In that regard, it need merely be stated that ÖVAG has produced no evidence to prove its specific allegation of distortion.
The same applies to the distortion which, according to the appellant, was committed by the Court of First Instance in paragraph
401 of the judgment under appeal.
Therefore, the fifth complaint in the seventh part of the ground of appeal under review must be rejected in its entirety.
Consequently, the seventh part of the ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety and the same applies, as a result,
to the ground of appeal alleging errors of law in the assessment of the gravity of the infringement.
2.     The ground of appeal alleging errors of law, failure to state reasons and distortion of evidence in relation to the existence
of attenuating circumstances
This ground of appeal comprises essentially three parts.
a) The first part: errors of law, distortion  of evidence and contradictory reasoning relating to the passive conduct of ÖVAG
i) Arguments of the parties
ÖVAG criticises the judgment under appeal on the ground that the Court of First Instance rejected all its complaints concerning
the failure to take account of attenuating circumstances.
By a first complaint, ÖVAG criticises the Court of First Instance for merely reproducing the text of the Guidelines without
examining the circumstances of the case and in particular its specific role within the Lombard Club.
By a second complaint, ÖVAG submits that the Court of First Instance erred in law, in paragraph 483 of the judgment under
appeal, by basing its assessment on the criterion of the banks’ participation in the committees, on which it also relied in
connection with the division of the banks into categories. By so doing, the Court of First Instance coupled the question of
the division of banks into categories according to their strength in the market with that of the recognition of an attenuating
circumstance. According to the appellant, the recognition of an attenuating circumstance cannot depend on the ‘sporadic’ nature
of an undertaking’s participation in the meetings. The Guidelines require the Commission to undertake a differentiated assessment
of the roles and not adopt a Manichaeistic ‘all or nothing’ approach.
By a third complaint, ÖVAG alleges distortion of evidence in the Court of First Instance’s treatment of the exposition of
facts and other information in the file concerning its participation in the cartel. It never claimed that it had distanced
itself from the cartel but consistently emphasised the modest role which it played in the cartel (paragraph 484 of the judgment
under appeal).
By a fourth complaint, alleging contradictory reasoning, ÖVAG submits that the analysis contained in paragraphs 485 and 486
of the judgment under appeal is contradictory, in so far as it is classified as a ‘large bank’ and as a ‘representative of
a sector’, even though the Commission did not undertake any investigation at its premises, the appellant did not form part
of the ‘smaller circle of banks’ and it took part in only a few meetings.
The Commission considers the above complaints to be irrelevant, if only because it is not for the Court of Justice, on grounds
of fairness, to substitute its assessment for that of the Court of First Instance.
ii) Findings of the Court
In its references in paragraphs 482 and 486 of the judgment under appeal to the case-law relating, on the one hand, to evidence
likely to disclose the passive role of an undertaking within a cartel and, on the other, to the participation of an undertaking
in one or more meetings, and in its examination in paragraphs 483 to 485 and 487 to 489 of the judgment under appeal of the
manner in which the Commission took account of the conduct of each of the undertakings, the Court of First Instance did not
confine itself to reproducing the Guidelines but, on the contrary, made a detailed examination of the matters raised by ÖVAG.
Therefore, the first complaint in the first part of the present ground of appeal must be rejected.
As regards the error of law allegedly committed by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 483 of the judgment under appeal,
it must be borne in mind that the Court of Justice has held that the responsibility of a given undertaking in respect of an
infringement of Article 81(1) EC is properly established where it participated in the meetings with knowledge of their object,
even if it did not subsequently implement any measure or measures agreed at the meetings (see Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99
P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others
v
Commission
[2002] ECR I-8375, paragraph 509).
By taking the view, in paragraph 483 of the judgment under appeal, that it was because of the banks’ frequent participation
in the most important committees that the Commission chose to address the contested decision to them, the Court of First Instance
did not err in law.
Similarly, contrary to ÖVAG’s contention, that criterion differs from the one used for the division of the banks into categories.
For that division, the criterion applied was the one mentioned in the sixth paragraph of Section 1A of the Guidelines concerning
the economic strength of the banks.
By holding, in paragraph 487 of the judgment under appeal, that the differences between the banks which might result from
their roles within the committee meetings were ‘already taken into account when the banks were allocated to different categories’,
the Court of First Instance did not err in law. Before making that finding, it undertook a comparative examination of the
banks that played the most important roles in the committees and their position on the market and came to the conclusion that
the same banks were involved.
It follows that the second complaint in the first part of this ground of appeal must be rejected.
As regards the third complaint, it must be pointed out that the appellant has produced no evidence to show that any distortion
of evidence took place.
Accordingly, the third complaint in the first part of this ground of appeal must be rejected.
As regards the fourth complaint, it must be held, as the Commission submits, that the appellant’s allegations in relation
to attenuating circumstances appear for the first time in its appeal.
According to settled case-law, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law
which it has not raised before the Court of First Instance would be to allow it to bring before the Court, whose jurisdiction
in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the Court of First Instance. In an appeal, the Court’s
jurisdiction is confined to a review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the Court of First Instance (see, in
particular,
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 165).
Those allegations are therefore inadmissible in this appeal.
Accordingly, the first part of the ground of appeal under review must be rejected in its entirety.
b) The second part: error of law concerning the public authorities’ participation in the banking committee meetings
i) Arguments of the parties
BA-CA maintains that the Court of First Instance erred in law by omitting, in paragraph 505 of the judgment under appeal,
to take account of the public authorities’ participation in committee meetings as an attenuating circumstance.
It is clear from the Commission’s decision-making practice and from the case-law of the Court of Justice that tolerance of
conduct by a national legislature or by the authorities constitutes an attenuating circumstance, thereby justifying a reduction
of the fine, that being the case regardless of the size of the undertakings concerned.
In particular, BA-CA criticises the Court of First Instance for having held, in paragraph 505 of the judgment under appeal,
that tolerance of the infringement by the public authorities cannot be taken into consideration ‘having regard in particular
to the resources available to the banks to obtain precise and accurate legal information’. First, that condition is not in
conformity with the case-law of the Court of Justice, notably Case C-198/01
CIF
[2003] ECR I-8055, paragraph 57. Second, such a condition would give rise to discrimination against certain undertakings
by reason of their objects.
The Commission considers, principally, those statements to be inadmissible on the ground that they are a repetition of facts
set out before the Court of First Instance. In the alternative, those statements are unfounded.
ii) Findings of the Court
In paragraph 505 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance observed:
‘As regards the participation of certain public authorities ([Austrian National Bank], the Ministry of Finance and the Wirtschaftskammer)
in the meetings, the information produced by the applicants is not sufficient to show reasonable doubt as to the illegality
of the committees under Community competition law. Whilst it is not excluded that, in certain circumstances, a national legal
framework or conduct on the part of national authorities may constitute mitigating circumstances (see, by analogy,
CIF
, … paragraph 57), the approval or tolerance of the infringement by the Austrian authorities cannot be taken into account
under that heading in this case, having regard in particular to the resources available to the banks to obtain precise and
accurate legal information.’
The first sentence of that paragraph is an assessment of fact by the Court of First Instance which cannot be called in question
in an appeal.
As regards the second sentence of that paragraph, it must be stated immediately that the Court of First Instance did not commit
any error of law.
First, contrary to BA-CA’s contention, in the
CIF
judgment, the question on which a ruling was sought concerned, in the context of Article 81 EC, the role of the national
competition authority where a cartel is imposed or encouraged by a national legislative provision that legitimises or strengthens
its effects. The Court held in paragraph 57 of that judgment that ‘when the level of the penalty is set the conduct of the
undertakings concerned may be assessed in the light of the national legal framework, which is a mitigating factor’. It follows
that the
CIF
judgment was in no way concerned with the participation of the public authorities in a cartel.
Moreover, as the Advocate General emphasised in point 404 of his Opinion, the Austrian law allowing banking establishments
to collude with each other was repealed by 1 January 1994 at the latest, that is to say, one year before the infringement
period covered by the contested decision.
Also, BA-CA cannot invoke any breach of the principle of equal treatment. The Court of Justice has repeatedly held that the
Commission’s practice in previous decisions does not itself serve as a legal framework for the fines imposed in competition
matters and that decisions in other cases can give only an indication for the purpose of determining whether there is discrimination
(see Case C-167/04 P
JCB Service
v
Commission
[2006] ECR I-8935, paragraph 205).
It follows that BA-CA’s complaints must be rejected, as must, therefore, the second part of this ground of appeal.
c) The third part: the Court of First Instance erred in law regarding the public nature of the meetings
i) Arguments of the parties
BA-CA maintains that, in paragraph 506 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance erred in law in that it did
not accept that the committee meetings were a matter of public knowledge and therefore did not reduce its fine.
First, the Court of First Instance, it is submitted, breached the rules of evidence by not examining the merits of the documents
produced by BA-CA proving that the aim and subject-matter of the committee meetings were a matter of public knowledge.
Second, the Court of First Instance misrepresented the content of the exposition of the facts given by BA-CA in so far as
the latter had not specifically maintained that the public knowledge of the committee meetings proved their legality.
Third, the Court of First Instance exceeded the bounds of what may be required by taking the view that the public must be
fully apprised of the discussions within the committee meetings for it to be possible to grant a reduction of the fine.
The Commission considers that those allegations are inadmissible or, in the alternative, unfounded. It submits that there
is no case-law to the effect that cartel members may consider that their practices are lawful by reason of the fact that certain
conduct is well known. If that were the case, it would be sufficient to make certain practices public in order to avoid pecuniary
penalties. In that regard, the Court of First Instance made it quite clear that public knowledge is not decisive.
ii) Findings of the Court
As regards the first two allegations, they must be rejected since BA-CA has not produced the information needed for it to
be able to examine whether the evidence relied on by the Court of First Instance for the findings made in paragraph 506 of
the judgment under appeal was distorted.
As regards the third allegation, it must be pointed out that the Court of First Instance did not state that the public must
be fully acquainted with cartels but only that the full extent of the cartel must be known to the public. That allegation
must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
It follows that the third part of this ground of appeal must be rejected, as must, therefore, the entire ground of appeal
alleging errors of law, failure to state reasons and distortion of evidence in relation to the existence of attenuating circumstances.
3.     The ground of appeal alleging breach of the Leniency Notice
This ground of appeal comprises essentially two parts.
a) The first part: the Court of First Instance did not correctly assess the discretion available to the Commission
i) Arguments of the parties
BA-CA claims that the Court of First Instance did not correctly assess the discretion available to the Commission for implementation
of the Leniency Notice or the limits of its judicial review.
Section D of the Leniency Notice does not in fact give the Commission any discretion, first, as to whether the information
provided by the undertaking facilitated the Commission’s task or, second, as to whether an undertaking that has cooperated
must have its fine reduced. The reference to
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
is likewise no basis for unlimited discretion on the part of the Commission. Moreover, contrary to what the Court of First
Instance held in paragraph 532 of the judgment under appeal, appraisal of an undertaking’s cooperation falls within the Court
of First Instance’s unlimited jurisdiction.
The Commission considers that BA-CA’s assertions are incorrect.
ii) Findings of the Court
The first part of the present ground of appeal must be rejected outright.
In paragraph 394 of
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, the Court of Justice held that the Commission enjoys a wide discretion in deciding whether the information or documents
voluntarily provided by undertakings have facilitated its task and whether the undertakings should be granted a reduction
under Section D.2 of the Leniency Notice.
Therefore, the Court of First Instance did not err in law in holding in paragraph 532 of the judgment under appeal that such
an appraisal by the Commission was subject only to limited review.
It follows that the first part of the ground of appeal under review must be rejected as unfounded.
b) The second part: error of law in the application of the Leniency Notice
i) The first complaint: error of law concerning the requirement of ‘added value’ resulting from the cooperation given and
breach of the principle of equal treatment
–       Arguments of the parties
RZB and BA-CA claim, in essence, that the Court of First Instance erred in law by holding, in paragraph 553 of the judgment
under appeal, that the Commission was entitled to require that the cooperation gave rise to ‘added value’ to enable the fine
to be reduced.
BA-CA also claims that the Court of First Instance breached the principle of equal treatment by applying that criterion. Observance
of that principle would necessarily have resulted in a larger reduction of the fine since its cooperation was greater and
qualitatively superior to that of the other banks.
–       Findings of the Court
The first argument merely repeats the one put forward before the Court of First Instance and is thus inadmissible in an appeal.
As regards the second argument, it must be borne in mind that, in an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court of Justice
is, first, to examine to what extent the Court of First Instance took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all
the essential factors needed to assess the gravity of particular conduct in the light of Article 81 EC and Article 15 of Regulation
No 17 and, second, to consider whether the Court of First Instance responded to a sufficient legal standard to all the arguments
raised by the appellant with a view to having the fine cancelled or reduced (
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 244 and the case-law there cited).
However, as far as the extent of the reduction of the fine is concerned, it is not for the Court of Justice to substitute,
on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the Court of First Instance exercising its unlimited jurisdiction (see,
to that effect,
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 245).
In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in paragraphs 553 to 557 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance
examined the added value of the documents produced by the applicants and went on to find that it did not justify a greater
reduction of their fines. Such an assessment of the facts is a matter solely for the Court of First Instance and, according
to case-law already referred to in the present judgment, the Court of Justice cannot substitute its own findings in an appeal.
It follows that the present ground of appeal must be declared inadmissible in so far as it seeks re-examination of the reduction
of the fine.
ii) The second complaint: errors of law in the examination of the extent of the undertakings’ cooperation, breach of the principles
of equal treatment, the protection of legitimate expectations and observance of the rights of the defence, and inadequate
statement of reasons
The second complaint comprises essentially six parts.
–       The first part of the second complaint
Arguments of the parties
By a first argument, alleging contradictory reasoning, RZB maintains that the Court of First Instance failed to draw the appropriate
inferences from the fact that certain answers given to the Commission were not only voluntary (paragraph 542 of the judgment
under appeal) but went beyond the information requested by the Commission (paragraph 552 of the judgment under appeal).
By a second argument, RZB asserts that the position set out in paragraph 541 of the judgment under appeal ultimately allows
the Commission to address to undertakings which it considers to belong to a cartel requests for information that are framed
in very vague terms and give rise to consequences for those undertakings that do not reply. The Commission therefore exerts
an irresistible constraint on those undertakings by sending them simple standard questions which induce them to incriminate
themselves. The reasoning followed infringes the rights of the defence as set out in Case 374/87
Orkem
v
Commission
[1989] ECR 3283, paragraph 32.
RZB states that that case-law is not called in question by the rule laid down by the Court of Justice in Case C-301/04 P
Commission
v
SGL Carbon
[2006] ECR I‑5915, paragraph 48, since the problems raised there were more focused and more specific than in the present
case.
According to the Commission, RZB is disregarding the fact that it cannot take account of information deriving from voluntary
cooperation within the meaning of the Leniency Notice unless such information facilitates its task in finding and penalising
the infringement and represents genuine cooperation. However, the information from RZB amounted only to a description of the
historical context of the Lombard network and the subject-matter of the cartel meetings, which was already in the Commission’s
possession. The essential ‘added value’ was therefore lacking.
Moreover, the Commission emphasises that it had been informed, when it questioned the applicants, that all the banking products
had been dealt with in numerous committee meetings and that the latter fell within the scope of a network, so that the context
of the infringement and thus the subject-matter of the investigation were clearly identified, particularly as regards those
undertakings that took part in the committee meetings, the nature of the infringement and the subject-matter of the agreements.
Finally, the Commission states that the questions related to all the committee meetings held regularly, so that the undertakings
did not have to make a selection or assess which meetings might amount to infringements of Article 81 EC.
Findings of the Court
As regards the first argument, contrary to RZB’s assertion, the Court of First Instance did not contradict itself when it
stated in paragraph 542 of the judgment under appeal that ‘it is apparent from recital 546 to the contested decision that
the Commission acknowledged the voluntary nature of the replies to the questions concerning the subject-matter of the collusive
meetings’ and, in paragraph 552 thereof, that’ [t]he Commission acknowledged, in recital 553 to the contested decision, that
the banks had provided voluntarily, in the joint exposition of the facts, information going beyond what had been asked of
them’.
The first finding relates to the disclosure of documents in the context of the request for information sent by the Commission
to the banks on 21 September 1998 as part of the procedure provided for in Article 11(2) to (4) of Regulation No 17.
On the other hand, the second finding relates to the content of the joint exposition of the facts produced by the banks during
the preliminary procedure, but following their replies to the abovementioned request for information.
Furthermore, the Court of First Instance was right to hold in paragraph 545 of the judgment under appeal that, ‘[i]n any event,
the same would apply in the case of a different assessment as to the voluntary nature of the production of such documents’
since the Commission had already granted a 10% reduction in the fines.
It follows that the first argument in the first part of the second complaint must be rejected.
As regards the second argument, concerning observance of the rights of the defence, it must be pointed out that in all proceedings
in which sanctions, especially fines or penalty payments, may be imposed observance of the rights of the defence is a fundamental
principle of Community law which must be complied with even if the proceedings in question are administrative proceedings
(see Case C-308/04 P
SGL Carbon
v
Commission
[2006] ECR I-5977, paragraph 94).
Although, in order to preserve the useful effect of Article 11(2) and (5) of Regulation No 17, the Commission is entitled
to compel an undertaking to provide all the necessary information concerning such facts as may be known to it and to disclose
to it, if necessary, such documents relating thereto as are in its possession, even if the latter may be used to establish
the existence of anti-competitive conduct by it or another undertaking, it may not, by means of a decision calling for information,
undermine the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned (
Orkem
v
Commission
, paragraph 34).
However, in this case, it need merely be pointed out that the Commission has never taken any ‘decision’ within the meaning
of Article 11(2) and (5) of Regulation No 17. Consequently, the argument in paragraph 541 of the judgment under appeal, that
the Court of First Instance did not comply with the rule in
Orkem
v
Commission
, must be rejected.
Therefore, the second argument must be rejected, as must, therefore, the first part of the second complaint in its entirety.
–       The second part of the second complaint, alleging errors of law in the assessment of the joint exposition of the facts
Arguments of the parties
First, RZB and BA-CA maintain that the Court of First Instance erred in law in considering, in paragraph 556 of the judgment
under appeal, that contextual explanations relating to practices contrary to competition law cannot be regarded as cooperation
in the procedure within the meaning of the Leniency Notice on the ground that they may constitute a means of defence for the
undertakings. According to BA-CA, no rule of law exists whereby a document that the parties use with a view to their defence
cannot at the same time provide the Commission with valuable and useful substantive information that contributes to the finding
of an infringement.
Second, RZB claims that the Court of First Instance’s analysis is incorrect since the Commission’s reasoning is contrary to
its own decision-making practice. The appellant refers, in that regard, to Section IIA(9)(a) and Section IV of the Commission
notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 2006 C 298, p. 17).
Third, BA-CA maintains that the Court of First Instance was wrong to hold that the Commission was entitled to take into account,
when assessing the usefulness of the banks’ voluntary cooperation, the fact that they did not provide, together with the joint
exposition of the facts, ‘all the documents concerning the committees’.
In its view, no rule to that effect exists. Moreover, in view of the extent of the infringement, BA-CA was able to provide
those documents only in successive stages.
Fourth, BA-CA submits that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by a contradiction. Although the joint exposition of the
facts contributed to the finding of an infringement, the Court of First Instance did not grant it a reduction of its fine.
Findings of the Court
Without any error of law or contradictory reasoning, the Court of First Instance was right to hold, in paragraphs 554 to 558
of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission was entitled not to regard the documents produced as annexes to the joint
exposition of the facts as ‘new’, and to take account of the ‘incompleteness of [those] annexes’ and the fact that ‘the banks
had used [the joint exposition of the facts] to present their own view of the committees and therefore as a means of defending
[themselves]’.
It must be borne in mind that the Commission enjoys a discretion in that regard, as is apparent from the very wording of Section
D.2 of the Leniency Notice and in particular the introductory words ‘Such cases may include …’ (
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 394).
Above all, a reduction of the fine under the Leniency Notice can be justified only where the information provided and, more
generally, the conduct of the undertaking concerned might be considered to demonstrate genuine cooperation on its part (
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 395).
As is clear from the very concept of cooperation, as described in the text of the Leniency Notice and in particular in its
introduction and Section D.1, it is only where the conduct of the undertaking concerned reveals such a spirit of cooperation
that a reduction may be granted on the basis of that notice (
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 396).
As the Court of First Instance found, in paragraphs 554 to 557 of the judgment under appeal, RZB and BA-CA, by providing an
incomplete statement of facts, which was merely confirmatory and had no ‘added value’, cannot claim that their conduct was
of such a kind.
Therefore, the second part of the second complaint must be rejected.
–       The third part of the second complaint, alleging an error of law regarding the assessment of RZB’s admission of the anti-competitive
object of the infringement and a breach of the principle of equal treatment
Arguments of the parties
RZB criticises the Court of First Instance for disregarding, in paragraph 559 of the judgment under appeal, the particular
value of its admission, in view of the fact that the Commission expressly relied on that element to argue that it was not
necessary to examine the actual impact of the committee meetings.
The analysis undertaken in paragraph 559 contravenes the principle of equal treatment because, despite its admissions, RZB
was treated in the same way as the other banks. RZB asks the Court of Justice to rectify the Court of First Instance’s error
and considers that a reduction in its fine of at least 10% would be justified.
The Commission contends that it had already, in recital 426 to the contested decision, explained and demonstrated that the
committee meetings were intended to limit competition and that the admission added nothing.
Findings of the Court
By taking the view, in paragraph 559 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘[the Commission] must, in each individual case, consider
whether such an admission actually made its task easier’, the Court of First Instance did not err in law.
As has been stated in paragraph 248 of the present judgment, the Commission enjoys a wide discretion in assessing the extent
to which undertakings have cooperated in the procedure.
Moreover, since the admission did not facilitate the Commission’s task but, as found by the Court of First Instance, merely
confirmed the Commission’s findings, RZB’s argument that there was a breach of the principle of equal treatment cannot prosper.
Therefore, the third part of the second complaint must be rejected.
–       The fourth part of the second complaint, alleging reversal of the burden of proof regarding the value of RZB’s cooperation
and breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations
Arguments of the parties
RZB criticises the Court of First Instance for reversing the burden of proof by holding, in paragraphs 546 to 551 of the judgment
under appeal, that the applicant was required to establish, in order to obtain a reduction of more than 10% of its fine, that
the Commission would not have been in a position to prove the infringement without the evidence submitted.
First, it claims, that analysis is contrary to the second indent of Section D.2 of the Leniency Notice and thus breaches the
principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. Also, that analysis is irreconcilable with the Commission’s obligation
to establish, in administrative procedures, both favourable and unfavourable circumstances.
In the Commission’s view, RZB’s allegations are misconceived. It states that the first indent of Section D.2 of the Leniency
Notice clearly shows that the evidence produced must contribute to confirming the existence of an infringement. Following
investigations, the Commission possessed the documents needed for a finding as to the essential facts and therefore itself
produced the evidence of the infringement. That evidence was not challenged by RZB.
Findings of the Court
In paragraph 551 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance held that ‘the applicants have not established
that the documents produced in response to the requests for information were necessary to enable the Commission to identify
all the essential committees, or that, without them, the evidence obtained through the investigations would have been insufficient
to prove the essential elements of the infringement and to enable a decision imposing fines to be adopted’.
In so far as RZB’s argument seeks to challenge that finding of fact by the Court of First Instance, it is inadmissible in
the present appeal.
As regards the alleged reversal of the burden of proof, it must be pointed out that, whilst the Commission is required to
state the reasons for which it considers that information provided by undertakings under the Leniency Notice constitutes a
contribution which does or does not justify a reduction of the fine, it is incumbent on undertakings wishing to contest the
Commission’s decision in that regard to show that, in the absence of such information provided voluntarily by the undertakings,
the Commission would not have been in a position to prove the essential elements of the infringement and therefore adopt a
decision imposing fines.
In those circumstances, the Court of First Instance was right, in paragraph 551 of the judgment under appeal, to hold implicitly
that the applicants were therefore required to provide such proof.
Therefore, the fourth part of the second complaint must be rejected.
–       The fifth part of the second complaint, alleging errors of law and contradictory reasoning in the Court of First Instance’s
analysis of the value of the additional documents disclosed by BA-CA
Arguments of the parties
BA-CA essentially contests the Court of First Instance’s assessment in paragraphs 560 to 563 of the judgment under appeal
of the value of the 33 binders, containing more than 10 000 pages of documents, which it sent to the Commission.
First, BA-CA maintains that the Court of First Instance devalued its cooperation by constantly increasing the requirements
to be fulfilled to qualify for a reduction of the fine. In particular, it criticises the comparison made by the Court of First
Instance of the value to be attributed to those documents and that to be given to the joint exposition of the facts.
Second, the appellant submits that the Court of First Instance’s reasoning is contradictory, since it refused, in relation
to the joint exposition of the facts, to grant a reduction of the fine in the absence of new documents, although it is established
that it voluntarily disclosed new documents comprising 10 000 pages, some of which were unquestionably used for the purposes
of the contested decision.
The Commission considers that argument to be inadmissible since it was raised before the Court of First Instance. Moreover,
it emphasises that the newness of those documents, in that they had not been produced earlier, does not in itself mean that
they represented useful cooperation.
Findings of the Court
By holding, in paragraph 560 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘the production of additional documents by one of the banks
can only justify a further reduction of its fine on an individual basis if that cooperation actually involved the production
of new and useful information as compared with that provided jointly by all the undertakings’, the Court of First Instance
did not in any way err in law.
As has been pointed out in paragraphs 281 to 283 of the present judgment, a reduction based on the Leniency Notice can be
justified only where the information provided could be regarded as demonstrating genuine cooperation, given that the aim of
reducing a fine is to reward an undertaking for making a contribution in the administrative procedure that enabled the Commission
to establish an infringement with less difficulty.
Since it had found that the documents produced by BA-CA did not amount to new and relevant information, as compared with that
contained in the joint exposition of the facts, the Court of First Instance was right to hold, in paragraph 562 of the judgment
under appeal, that the Commission was not required on that ground to grant BA-CA an additional reduction of its fine.
It follows that the fifth part of the second complaint must be rejected.
–       The sixth part of the second complaint, alleging failure to take account of BA-CA’s responses to the statement of objections
Arguments of the parties
BA-CA contests the Court of First Instance’s assessment in paragraph 564 of the judgment under appeal that the Commission
was not required to take account, as constituting cooperation, of its response to the statement of objections.
The Commission considers that BA-CA’s allegation is misconceived.
Findings of the Court
In that regard, it must be emphasised that the statement of objections is a procedural and preparatory document which, in
order to ensure that the rights of the defence may be exercised effectively, delimits the scope of the administrative procedure
initiated by the Commission, thereby preventing it from relying on other objections in its decision terminating the procedure
in question (see, in particular, the order in Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84
British American Tobacco and Reynolds Industries
v
Commission
[1986] ECR 1899, paragraphs 13 and 14). It is therefore inherent in the nature of that statement that it is provisional and
liable to be changed during the assessment subsequently undertaken by the Commission on the basis of the observations submitted
to it by the parties and other findings of fact (see, to that effect,
SGL Carbon
v
Commission
, paragraph 62).
The Commission must take into account the factors emerging from the whole of the administrative procedure, in order either
to abandon such objections as have been shown to be unfounded or to amend and supplement its arguments, both in fact and in
law, in support of the objections which it maintains. Thus, the statement of objections does not prevent the Commission from
altering its standpoint in favour of the undertakings concerned (see the order in
British American Tobacco and Reynolds Industries
v
Commission
, paragraph 13).
There is no rule that undertakings may not, after receiving the statement of objections and in particular in their responses
thereto, provide the Commission with decisive information enabling the Commission to grant them a reduction of the fine under
the Leniency Notice.
However, in that regard, the Court of First Instance implicitly considered, in paragraph 564 of the judgment under appeal,
that BA-CA’s response to the statement of objections did not do so.
In those circumstances, since BA-CA has not alleged that the Court of First Instance distorted the evidence in that regard,
the sixth part of the second complaint must be rejected, as must, therefore, both the second complaint and the second part
in their entirety.
It follows that the ground of appeal alleging breach of the Leniency Notice is in part unfounded and in part inadmissible
and must therefore be rejected in its entirety.
C –
The ground of appeal alleging breach by the Court of First Instance of the right to be heard
a)     Arguments of the parties
BA-CA submits that the Court of First Instance limited its right to be heard by refusing to take witness evidence.
The Commission contends that the Court of First Instance is not required to take up an offer of evidence if, as in this case,
it is not conducive to clarification of the facts.
b)     Findings of the Court
It must be observed that, in paragraph 563 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance did not accede to a request
that a witness be heard, on the ground that ‘that call for evidence [was] not directly relevant to assessing the usefulness
of [the] documents [produced]’.
It must be pointed out that the Court of First Instance is the sole judge of whether the information available to it concerning
the cases before it needs to be supplemented (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-57/00 P and C-61/00 P
Freistaat Sachsen and Others
v
Commission
[2003] ECR I-9975, paragraph 47, and Case C‑136/02 P
Mag Instrument
v
OHIM
[2004] ECR I-9165, paragraph 76).
Even where a request made in the application for the examination of witnesses sets out the reasons on which it is based, it
falls to the Court of First Instance to assess the relevance of the request to the subject-matter of the dispute and the need
to examine the witnesses named (see
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
, paragraph 68).
In this case, the appellant has not produced evidence to show that, by refusing to hear that witness, even though BA-CA was
able to answer additional questions asked by the Court of First Instance, the latter undermined its right to be heard.
Consequently, this ground of appeal must be rejected.
D –
The ground of appeal alleging breach by the Court of First Instance of its obligation to state reasons regarding the setting
of the fines and the right to be heard
a)     Arguments of the parties
BA-CA alleges that, in paragraph 566 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance exercised its unlimited jurisdiction
without fulfilling its obligation to state reasons and without allowing the undertakings being fined to be heard.
It submits that the conditions on the basis of which the Court of Justice excluded such obligations in its judgment in Case
C-3/06 P
Groupe Danone
v
Commission
[2007] ECR I-1331 are not fulfilled in this case.
BA-CA stresses in particular that the fine imposed on the banks in 2002 was the sixth highest ever imposed by the Commission
and that, when reconsidering it four years later, the Court of First Instance was wrong to take the view that it was ‘relatively
low’.
The Commission observes that the considerations set out in paragraph 566 of the judgment under appeal are merely final and
additional considerations, underpinning the Court of First Instance’s assessment.
b)     Findings of the Court
It should be recalled at the outset that in all proceedings in which sanctions, especially fines or penalty payments, may
be imposed observance of the rights of the defence is a fundamental principle of Community law which has been emphasised on
numerous occasions in the case-law of the Court (
Groupe Danone
v
Commission
, paragraph 68 and the case-law there cited).
In an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, first, to examine to what extent the Court of First Instance
took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the essential factors to assess the gravity of particular conduct
in the light of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC and Article 15 of Regulation No 17 and, second, to ascertain whether the Court of
First Instance responded to the requisite legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant with a view to having
the fine cancelled or reduced (
Groupe Danone
v
Commission
, paragraph 69 and the case-law there cited).
It must be pointed out that BA-CA was given an opportunity to make its views duly known and there is no need to rule as to
whether the Court of First Instance, before exercising its unlimited jurisdiction, was required to invite the applicant to
submit its observations on a possible amendment of the fine.
As the Advocate General made clear in point 519 et seq. of his Opinion, four of the six pleas put forward by BA-CA before
the Court of First Instance sought a reduction of the amount of the fine imposed. Those pleas related in particular to the
Commission’s assessments regarding the classification of the infringement, the existence of attenuating circumstances and
whether the applicant cooperated in the procedure.
Moreover, the Court of First Instance put numerous questions to BA-CA regarding the existence of attenuating circumstances
and the applicant’s cooperation in the procedure.
Finally, it must be observed that the Court of First Instance examined in great detail, in paragraphs 216 to 571 of the judgment
under appeal, all the relevant information as to how the amount of the fine was determined.
This ground of appeal must therefore be rejected.
It follows from the foregoing considerations that the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.

VII – Costs
Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeals by virtue of Article 118 thereof, the unsuccessful
party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Commission
applied for the costs to be borne by Erste, RZB, BA-CA and ÖVAG, they must be ordered to pay the costs.
On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby:
1.
Dismisses the appeals;
2.
Orders Erste Group Bank AG, formerly Erste Bank der österreichischen Sparkassen AG, Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG,
Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG and Österreichische Volksbanken AG to pay the costs.
[Signatures]
*
Language of the case: German.