CELEX: 61999TJ0219
Competition
Abuse of a dominant position
Competence of the Commission
Discrimination between airlines
Relevant product and geographic market
Nexus between the product markets allegedly affected
Legal basis of the contested decision
Existence of a dominant position
Abuse of the dominant position
Proportionality of the amount of the fine

Background to the dispute
According to the first recital in the preamble to Commission Decision 2000/74/EC of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding
under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 ─ Virgin/British Airways) (OJ 2000 L 30, p. 1;
the contested decision), British Airways plc (
BA) is the largest British airline company.  It operates a hub network centred on airports in the London area.  During the relevant
period, its network of scheduled routes served 15 destinations within the United Kingdom and 155 international destinations
in 72 countries.  In 1997, BA ranked first in the world in terms of international scheduled passenger-kilometres flown, and
ninth for combined international and domestic scheduled passenger-kilometres flown.
BA's consolidated turnover in the year to 31 March 1998 was GBP 8 642 million, on which it earned net profits of GBP 460 million.
During the same year, BA employed an average of 60 675 people.
Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited (
Virgin) is a privately owned company incorporated under English law which operates scheduled passenger services on a number of international
routes.  In 1997, it ranked 21st in the world in terms of international scheduled passenger-kilometres flown, and 31st for
combined international and domestic scheduled passenger-kilometres flown.  Virgin's turnover in the year to 30 April 1998
was approximately GBP 942 million.  It employed approximately 4 522 people at the end of 1997.
BA concluded agreements with travel agents established in the United Kingdom and accredited by the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) entitling them to a basic standard commission on their sales of BA air tickets.  Between 1976 and 1997,
that commission amounted to 9% on sales of international tickets and 7.5% for ticket sales on domestic flights.
In addition to that basic commission system, BA concluded agreements with IATA travel agents comprising three distinct systems
of financial incentives:
marketing agreements,
global agreements and, finally, a
performance reward scheme.
Marketing agreements and global agreements
The first system of incentives established by BA consisted of
marketing agreements, which enabled certain IATA travel agents established in the United Kingdom to receive payments in addition to their basic
commission, namely:
─
a performance reward, plus certain special bonuses, based on the volume of sectors flown on BA;
a performance reward, plus certain special bonuses, based on the volume of sectors flown on BA;
─
cash sums from a fund for travel agents to use for staff training;
cash sums from a fund for travel agents to use for staff training;
─
cash sums from a business development fund established by BA with a view to increasing its revenue and the resources of which
were to be used by each agent for financing promotional projects in favour of BA.
cash sums from a business development fund established by BA with a view to increasing its revenue and the resources of which
were to be used by each agent for financing promotional projects in favour of BA.
The marketing agreements also required the United Kingdom travel agents not to accord less favourable treatment to BA than
that which they accorded to any other airline, particularly in relation to the display of their fares, products, brochures
and timetables.
Those marketing agreements, concluded for one year at a time, were in principle reserved for United Kingdom IATA travel agents
with more than GBP 500 000 annual sales of BA tickets (
flown revenue).  Travel agents with annual flown revenue exceeding GBP 500 000 but below GBP 10 million were offered a standard marketing
agreement. Those with a flown revenue exceeding GBP 10 million entered into a marketing agreement individually negotiated
with BA.
The performance reward was calculated on a sliding scale, based on the extent to which a travel agent increased the value
of its sales of BA tickets.  In addition to the general performance reward, certain routes qualified for a special performance
bonus.
Payment of the performance reward or the special bonus was subject to travel agents increasing their sales of BA tickets from
one year to the next.  Although, as a general rule, neither of those two bonuses was paid in respect of sectors flown on BA
domestic services within the United Kingdom, those sectors were counted in determining whether sales objectives were achieved,
since those objectives were calculated in terms of global flown revenue, including longhaul, shorthaul and domestic flights.
In addition to the marketing agreements, BA concluded a second type of incentive agreement (
global agreements) with three IATA travel agents.  For the 1992/1993 winter season, BA set up global incentive programmes with three travel
agents, entitling them to receive additional commissions calculated by reference to the growth of BA's share in their worldwide
sales.
On 9 July 1993, Virgin lodged a complaint with the Commission, directed in particular against the marketing agreements.
The Commission decided to initiate a proceeding in relation to BA's marketing agreements with United Kingdom travel agents
and adopted a statement of objections against BA on 20 December 1996.  BA presented its oral observations at a hearing on
12 November 1997.
New system of performance rewards
On 17 November 1997, BA sent all travel agents established in the United Kingdom a letter in which it explained the detailed
operation of a third type of incentive agreements, consisting of a new system of performance rewards, applicable from 1 January
1998 (
the new system of performance rewards).
In addition to the new basic flat commission rate of 7% to be applied thenceforth to all tickets sold in the United Kingdom,
each travel agent could earn an additional commission of up to 3% for international tickets and up to 1% for domestic tickets.
The size of the additional variable element for domestic and international tickets depended on the travel agents' performance
in selling BA tickets. The agents' performance was measured by comparing the total flown revenue arising from the sales of
BA tickets issued by an agent in a particular calendar month with that achieved during the corresponding month in the previous
year.
Under the new system of performance rewards, every percentage point of improvement in performance level over a benchmark of
95% earned the travel agent an additional variable element of 0.1% by way of extra commission on the sale of international
tickets and in addition to the basic commission of 7%.  For sales of domestic tickets, the variable element was 0.1% for every
3% increase in sales over the 95% benchmark.  The maximum variable element payable to travel agents under the new performance
rewards system was 3% for international tickets and 1% for domestic tickets for a performance level of 125% or above in both
cases.
For example, if an agent's performance level for a particular calendar month was 112%, the variable element for international
tickets was 1.7% [(112 - 95) × 0.1%] of the international reward revenue for that month.  On the other hand, at that level
of performance the variable element for domestic tickets was 0.5% [(112 - 95) ± 3 × 0.1%] of the domestic reward revenue for
that calendar month. Payments of the variable elements under the performance rewards system took place every month.
The new system of performance rewards was initially intended to last until 31 March 1999. For the month of December 1997,
BA established a transitional scheme whereby the new performance reward system was applied on top of the pre-existing standard
commissions of 9% and 7.5% for international and domestic tickets respectively.  On 8 February 1999, BA announced that that
system would not be renewed for the year 1999/2000.
On 9 January 1998, Virgin lodged a supplementary complaint against BA's new system of performance rewards.  On 12 March 1998,
the Commission adopted a supplementary statement of objections in relation to that new system.
The Commission's decision
On 14 July 1999, on the basis of Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962: First Regulation implementing Articles [81]
and [82] of the Treaty (OJ, English Special Edition 1959-1962, p. 87;
Regulation No 17), the Commission adopted the contested decision, holding that each of the air routes served by BA to and from United Kingdom
airports was potentially a separate market for air transport services (recital 80) and that the relevant geographic market
for air transport was the United Kingdom market (recital 83).
According to recital 31 of the contested decision, travel agents supply airlines with services consisting of promoting the
air transport services provided by airlines, helping travellers choose the appropriate services, and undertaking the administrative
work of issuing tickets, collecting money from travellers and remitting it to the airline. In return for those services, the
airlines pay commissions to the agents based on the sales of tickets made through those agents.
The Commission then maintains that BA is a purchaser in a dominant position on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency
services, especially because of the percentage which sales of BA tickets represent in the total of air ticket sales carried
out in United Kingdom territory under the settlement scheme for travel agents operated by IATA (recitals 90 and 91).
In recitals 29 and 30 of the contested decision, the Commission describes the detailed operation of the marketing agreements
and the new system of performance rewards as follows: (29) The commission schemes for travel agents described above all have one notable feature in common. In each case meeting
the targets for sales growth leads to an increase in the commission paid on all tickets sold by the agent, not just on the
tickets sold after the target is reached. In the [marketing agreement] schemes the cash bonus per ticket paid to the travel
agent increases for all tickets sold. In the [performance reward scheme] the percentage commission paid increases for all
ticket sales by the travel agent. This means that when a travel agent is close to one of the thresholds for an increase in
commission rate selling relatively few extra BA tickets can have a large effect on his commission income. Conversely a competitor
of BA who wishes to give a travel agent an incentive to divert some sales from BA to the competing airline will have to pay
a much higher rate of commission than BA on all of the tickets sold by it to overcome this effect.
(30)
An example will illustrate this effect of the BA commission schemes. Assume a travel agent's sales of international air tickets
amounted to [GBP] 100 000 a month in the benchmark year. If the travel agent sells [GBP] 100 000 worth of BA international
air tickets a month it will earn the basic commission of 7% and a
performance reward of 0.5% [(100 - 95) × 0.1%], giving a total commission income on international air ticket sales of [GBP] 7 500 [100 000 ×
(7% + 0.5%)]. If the travel agent diverted 1% of its international ticket sales to a competitor of BA, its
performance reward would decrease to 0.4% [(99 - 95) × 0.1%] and this reduced rate would be applied to all of the agent's sales of BA tickets.
The agent's commission income from the sale of international BA tickets would drop to [GBP] 7 326 [99 000 × (7% + 0.4%)].
A reduction of [GBP] 1 000 in sales of international BA tickets leads to a drop of [GBP] 174 in commission income. The
marginal commission rate can be said to be 17.4%.  In practical terms, this means that a competitor to BA that could offer flights
that would replace [GBP] 1 000 of the travel agent's sales of BA tickets would have to offer a commission of 17.4% on these
tickets to compensate the travel agent for its loss of BA commission revenue. Although BA also has to offer this high marginal
rate of commission to increase its sales of tickets, it is at an advantage over the new entrant which must offer this high
rate of commission on all of its sales ...
This effect increases if the number of tickets in question is a smaller percentage of the travel agent's benchmark sales of
BA tickets.  This effect is also increased if the travel agent in question is not only earning extra commissions under the
performance reward system but can also earn bonuses under a marketing agreement.
The Commission holds in the contested decision that, by applying the marketing agreements and the new system of performance
rewards to air travel agents established in the United Kingdom, BA abused its dominant position on the United Kingdom market
for air travel agency services (recital 96).
The application by BA of its performance reward systems to travel agents established in the United Kingdom constitutes an
abuse of a dominant position in that, first, it has the effect of encouraging those agents to maintain or increase their sales
of BA tickets rather than selling their services to BA's competitors, those financial incentives not depending on the volume
of BA tickets sold by those agents in absolute terms (recital 102), and, secondly, it has the effect of imposing on the agents
in question dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions (recital 109).
Finally, the Commission takes the view that BA's abusive conduct on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services
has the effect of distorting competition between BA and other airlines on the United Kingdom markets for air transport services
(recitals 103 and 111).
Therefore, the operative part of the contested decision is worded as follows: Article 1 [BA] infringed Article 82 [EC] by operating systems of commission and other incentives with the travel agents from whom it
purchases air travel agency services in the United Kingdom, which, by rewarding loyalty from the travel agents and by discriminating
between travel agents, have the object and effect of excluding BA's competitors from the United Kingdom markets for air transport.Article 2 For the infringements referred to in Article 1, a fine of EUR 6.8 million is hereby imposed on [BA].
Procedure
By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 1 October 1999, BA brought an action for the annulment
of the contested decision, which had been notified to it on 27 July 1999.
By document lodged on 10 April 2000, Virgin applied for leave to intervene in these proceedings in support of the Commission.
By document lodged at the Court Registry on 25 April 2000, Air France also applied for leave to intervene in these proceedings
in support of BA's claim for annulment, arguing that the resolution of the present dispute will have an impact on the position
which the Commission will have to adopt in a proceeding against the systems of commercial incentives applied by Air France
to travel agents.
By order of 9 February 2001, Virgin's application to intervene was allowed, as was BA's application that certain documents
should be treated as confidential in relation to Virgin.
Air France's application was dismissed, however, on the ground that it had no interest in the resolution of the current dispute,
since any impact that the judgment might have on a contested decision that the Commission might adopt against Air France was
outside the subject-matter of the present proceedings.
By decision of the Court of First Instance the Judge-Rapporteur was attached to the First Chamber, to which the case was therefore
assigned.
Following the report of the Judge-Rapporteur, the Court of First Instance (First Chamber) decided to open the oral procedure.
By way of measures of organisation of procedure, it asked BA and the Commission to reply to certain questions. BA and the
Commission complied with those requests within the prescribed time-limits.
At the hearing on 26 February 2003, the parties presented oral argument and replied to oral questions put by the Court.
Forms of order sought
The applicant claims that the Court should:
─
annul the contested decision in its entirety;
annul the contested decision in its entirety;
─
order the Commission to pay the costs.
order the Commission to pay the costs.
The Commission, supported by Virgin, contends that the Court should:
─
dismiss the application;
dismiss the application;
─
order the applicant to pay the costs.
order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
In support of its action, BA makes eight pleas in law, in which it argues that the Commission lacked competence, that it infringed
the principle of non-discrimination, that it incorrectly defined the product and geographic markets, that there was no sufficiently
close nexus between the product markets allegedly affected, that the Commission adopted an incorrect legal basis for the contested
decision, that there was no dominant position, that there was no abuse of a dominant position and, finally, that the fine
was excessive.
The first plea in law, alleging that the Commission lacked competence
Arguments of the parties
BA argues that the Commission exceeded its competence by adopting the contested decision on 14 July 1999, since all its members,
who had resigned on 16 March 1999 in order to avoid a motion of censure by the Parliament, had the authority only to deal
with current business within the meaning of Article 201 EC, applicable by analogy, until the appointment of the members of
the new Commission on 15 September 1999.
The reasons for the restrictions imposed on the Commission's activities by Article 201 EC, which include, first and foremost,
the investing in the Parliament of the constitutional authority to withdraw the Commission's political mandate, are, BA submits,
at least as valid where the Commission's resignation as a body is voluntary, as in this case, as where it follows a motion
of censure by the Parliament.
By contrast with the retention of Commissioners in office until their replacement pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Article
215 EC, which envisages vacancies occurring in a Commission continuing to exercise the mandate under which it was appointed,
the
current business which Commissioners continue to carry on by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 201 EC covers only the daily activities
of the Commission.  That excludes fresh political initiatives such as the contested decision, to which the Commission clearly
intended to attribute the force of a precedent applicable to airlines holding a market position similar to that of BA.
Even if Article 215 EC did apply, BA submits, it did not authorise the Commission to adopt the contested decision.  The first
paragraph of that article provides that the duties of a Commissioner are to end when he resigns.  The term
duties covers a decision like this one, enforcing Article 82 EC, as is emphasised by the terms of Article 213(2) EC, which requires
Commissioners to be completely independent in the performance of their duties.
The Commission argues that, in the absence of a motion of censure by the Parliament, Article 201 EC does not apply, even by
analogy, to the voluntary resignation of all Commissioners, even if simultaneous, since such a case is covered by Article
215 EC.
Since Article 215 EC imposes no restriction on their powers, Commissioners are legally entitled, and required, to exercise
the powers conferred upon them by the Treaty until the appointment of their successors.
In any event, the contested decision did not represent a new political initiative and formed part of the Commission's current
business.
Findings of the Court
Article 201 EC is worded as follows: If a motion of censure on the activities of the Commission is tabled before it, the European Parliament shall not vote thereon
until at least three days after the motion has been tabled and only by open vote.If the motion of censure is carried by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of the Members of
the European Parliament, the Members of the Commission shall resign as a body. They shall continue to deal with current business
until they are replaced in accordance with Article 214. In this case, the term of office of the Members of the Commission
appointed to replace them shall expire on the date on which the term of office of the Members of the Commission obliged to
resign as a body would have expired.
In addition Article 215 EC provides: Apart from normal replacement, or death, the duties of a Member of the Commission shall end when he resigns or is compulsorily
retired.The vacancy thus caused shall be filled for the remainder of the Member's term of office by a new Member appointed by common
accord of the governments of the Member States. The Council may, acting unanimously, decide that such a vacancy need not be
filled.In the event of resignation, compulsory retirement or death, the President shall be replaced for the remainder of his term
of office. The procedure laid down in Article 214(2) shall be applicable for the replacement of the President.Save in the case of compulsory retirement under Article 216, Members of the Commission shall remain in office until they have
been replaced.
By letter of 16 March 1999, the Commission President, Mr Santer, informed the president of the conference of the representatives
of the Governments of the Member States of the decision of the Commission's members to resign collectively and to place their
mandate in the hands of the Governments of the Member States.  In that letter, the President and the Members of the Commission
stated that, particularly in view of the fourth paragraph of Article 215 EC, they would carry out their duties until they
were replaced in accordance with the procedures laid down by the Treaties.
In a statement on 22 March 1999, the Council, while considering it necessary to appoint a new Commission as quickly as possible,
expressed the wish that, until that time, the Commissioners would continue to perform their duties in accordance with the
Treaties.
It is clear from Article 201 EC that Commissioners cannot be regarded as having been
obliged to resign as a body, within the meaning of the last sentence of the second paragraph of that article, unless the Parliament has first adopted
a motion of censure under the conditions defined by the same article.
In the absence of such a motion, as in this case, individual resignations, even if simultaneous, of all the Commission's Members
constitute a scenario that falls outside the provisions of Article 201 EC.
The fact that Commissioners may have recognised their political responsibility by resigning as a body is, in law, irrelevant
in that respect.  In the context of the organisation of the Community's powers, the choice of the legal basis for a measure
may not depend simply on an institution's conviction but must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial
review (see, to that effect, Case 45/86
Commission
v
Council
[1987] ECR 1493, paragraph 11).
This Court therefore takes the view that the duties of the Commissioners concerned ended when they resigned, for the purposes
of the first paragraph of Article 215 EC, the simultaneous nature of those individual resignations not being capable of calling
into question the voluntary character of each of them.
Moreover, as is shown by its citations, Decision 1999/627/EC, ECSC, Euratom of the Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States of the European Communities of 15 September 1999 appointing the President and the Members of the Commission
of the European Communities (OJ 1999 L 248, p. 30) is based, in particular, on Article 215 EC.
By stating, in the first paragraph of Article 215 EC, that the duties of a Member of the Commission are to end when he resigns,
the framers of the Treaty merely intended to define the legal causes of the cessation of Commissioners' duties during their
mandate, without thereby wishing to prohibit Commissioners who have resigned from exercising their normal powers until their
resignation takes effect on the date of their actual replacement.
It follows that the persons concerned remained
in office until they [were] replaced on 15 September 1999, in accordance with the provision in the fourth paragraph of Article 215 EC.  They therefore retained
their full powers until that date.
The Commission did not therefore exceed its competence by adopting the contested decision on 14 July 1999.
The first plea in law must therefore be dismissed.
The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of non-discrimination
Arguments of the parties
BA accuses the Commission of disregarding the principle of non-discrimination and placing it in a very unfavourable competitive
position by forbidding it, in the contested decision, from applying its performance reward schemes to travel agents established
in the United Kingdom, without adopting similar decisions against other airlines which held at least as strong a market position
as that attributed by the Commission to BA and used the same financial incentive schemes.
Nor, BA submits, does the fact that the Virgin complaint had been filed previously justify the adoption of a decision to bring
a proceeding for infringement against BA alone.  The Commission's discretion in allocating its resources to ongoing cases
cannot authorise discrimination, particularly discrimination which itself produces anti-competitive effects to the detriment
of the undertaking against which the proceeding is brought.
The Commission sees nothing discriminatory in adopting the contested decision six years after Virgin lodged its complaint.
It argues that it has a discretion in allocating different degrees of priority to the cases before it, by reference to their
Community interest (Case T-24/90
Automec
v
Commission
[1992] ECR II-2223, paragraph 77).
According to the press release on the
Principles concerning travel agents' commissions, issued on the same day that the contested decision was adopted, that decision constituted a first step in dealing with commissions
paid by airlines to travel agents.  The principles established in that press release also gave clear guidance for any other
airline in a situation similar to that of BA, and the Commission stated that it would take all measures necessary to ensure
that those principles were complied with by other airlines in equivalent situations.
The contested decision produced no adverse effect on BA in geographical markets other than the United Kingdom market. Where
it does not occupy a dominant position on those other markets, the Commission argues, BA may apply financial incentive schemes
to counter those applied by a competitor.
In addition, the fact that other air carriers operating in the United Kingdom offered various bonus systems to air travel
agents had no bearing on the contested decision, which concerned BA in its capacity as the dominant undertaking on the United
Kingdom market for air travel agency services, on account of the special responsibility incumbent upon such an undertaking.
Findings of the Court
For the Commission to be accused of discrimination, it must be shown to have treated like cases differently, thereby subjecting
some to disadvantages as opposed to others, without such differentiation being justified by the existence of substantial objective
differences (Case T-106/96
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl
v
Commission
[1999] ECR II-2155, paragraph 103).
The fact that a trader in a position similar to that of an applicant has not been found by the Commission to have committed
any infringement cannot in any event constitute a ground for setting aside the finding of an infringement by that applicant,
provided it was properly established (Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85
Ahlström and Others
v
Commission
[1993] ECR I-1307, paragraph 146).
Moreover, the plea is based on the mere allegation, not supported by any evidence, that financial incentive schemes applied
to travel agents by BA's competitors were illegal under Articles 81 EC and 82 EC.
Furthermore, leaving aside the fact that the contested decision followed the complaint brought by Virgin against BA as early
as 1993, the Commission is entitled, in order effectively to ensure the application of the Community competition rules, and
as it has done in this case, to give differing degrees of priority to the complaints brought before it (Case C-119/97 P
Ufex and Others
v
Commission
[1999] ECR I-1341, paragraph 88) by reference to their Community interest, measured in relation to the circumstances of each
case and, in particular, to the elements of fact and law which are presented to it (
Automec
, cited in paragraph 61 above, at paragraph 86).
In that respect, the Commission is required in each case to assess the seriousness of the alleged restrictions on competition
(Joined Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 and T-123/96
SGA
v
Commission
[1999] ECR II-3587, paragraph 53) and, as in this case, how long ago the complaint was brought before it.  The Commission
is under a duty to conclude its investigation procedures within a reasonable time (see, to that effect, Joined Cases T-213/95
and T-18/96
SCK and FNK
v
Commission
[1997] ECR II-1739, paragraphs 55 and 56).
Where, as in this case, the Commission is faced with a situation where numerous factors give rise to a suspicion of anti-competitive
conduct on the part of several large undertakings in the same economic sector, the Commission is even entitled to concentrate
its efforts on one of the undertakings concerned, while inviting the economic operators which have allegedly suffered damage
as a result of the possibly anti-competitive conduct of the other undertakings to bring the matter before the national authorities
(see, to that effect,
SGA
v
Commission
, cited in paragraph 69 above, paragraph 59).
Finally, the Commission stated at the hearing, without being contradicted on the point by BA, that it commenced investigation
procedures against eight airline companies following complaints lodged by BA in June and September 1998, and that it informed
BA by letter of 6 February 2003 of its intention to terminate those procedures.
The onus is therefore on BA, if it thinks it has grounds for doing so, to submit its observations in that respect to the Commission
and to challenge any decision by the Commission not to take further action on its complaints.
The second plea in law cannot therefore be accepted.
The third plea in law, alleging incorrect definition of the relevant product and geographic market
As the contested decision shows (see paragraph 22 above), the Commission took the view that, for the purposes of establishing
the dominant position of BA, the relevant market was the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services.
Arguments of the parties
BA challenges that analysis by the Commission, arguing that, even if it exists, the market for services supplied by travel
agents to airlines cannot constitute the relevant product market in the circumstances of this case.
BA submits that the Commission imputed restrictions on competition found in the disputed performance reward schemes to the
position held by BA in its capacity of purchaser of the services provided by travel agents established in the United Kingdom.
By so doing, the Commission departed, first, from its normal method of defining the market in question, thereby prejudging
the finding of dominance and ultimately of abuse, and, second, (from the approach set out) in its Notice on the definition
of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law (OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5).
Travel agents represent a distribution channel allowing airlines to sell seats on their flights and providing a retail function.
However, in markets for branded products, the nature of competition is assessed by taking the markets for the products in
question as relevant, rather than those for the purchase of retail services supplied by the points of sale used by manufacturers
to market their products.
BA submits that its position in relation to travel agents is not an appropriate way of assessing its market power.  In defining
the relevant product market for assessing the competitive effects of payments to travel agents, the relevant question is whether
a single supplier of air transportation services on a particular route can profitably increase its prices.
As the Commission recognises in recitals 80 and 81 of the contested decision, whether or not this is the case will depend
on the extent to which passengers wishing to fly a particular route consider flights on other routes to be effective substitutes.
The Commission adopts this approach when considering passenger air transport to and from the United Kingdom, but mistakenly
maintains that a separate market exists for air travel agency services.
BA argues that, following the Commission's approach, if the market in travel agency air ticket distribution services shrank
to a point where it was of trivial significance, it would remain the relevant market.  But, BA submits, the other forms of
distribution preclude a finding that an airline has market power if it holds a preponderant share of ticket distribution through
agencies.
Second, if there were four sets of destinations (USA, Europe, Africa and the Far East) and a single supplier of air transportation
services for each of them, each carrier would be able to exercise substantial power on its own routes, unconstrained by the
other airlines.  On the Commission's analysis, none of those airlines would necessarily be dominant in the purchase of travel
agency services, as each would account for only 25% of the purchase of those services.
Finally, an airline which was not dominant on the market in air travel agency services, and yet was the only airline that
operated on a particular route or small set of routes, might act entirely independently of its competitors and agents so far
as those routes were concerned.  Nevertheless, on the Commission's analysis that situation would not come under Article 82
EC.
BA adds that, even if air travel agency services were the relevant product market, the relevant geographic market is broader
than the United Kingdom.  Many of the larger agents operate in several countries.  Moreover, travel agents are increasingly
doing business with airlines on an international basis, as evidenced by BA's conclusion of global agreements with certain
agencies.
The Commission notes that, as stated in recital 31 of the contested decision, travel agents act as agents for the airlines
in the capacity of independent intermediaries who provide services on an independent basis (Case 311/85
VVR
[1987] ECR 3801, paragraph 20).
The services provided by the travel agents, for which the airlines pay them commission based on sales of their tickets, consist
of advertising in favour of the co-contracting airlines, assisting passengers to select appropriate airlines and flights,
issuing tickets, collecting money from the travellers and remitting it to the airlines.
There is no impediment to finding an abuse of a dominant position committed by a dominant purchaser, who is not exempted from
Community competition law.
The Commission states that it has classified air travel agency services as a distinct market (Commission Decision 91/480/EEC
of 30 July 1991 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article [81] of the Treaty (Case No IV/32.659 ─ IATA Passenger Agency
Programme) (OJ 1991 L 258, p. 18), and has done the same in relation to other markets related to air travel, such as computerised
reservation systems (Commission Decision 88/589/EEC of 4 November 1988 relating to a proceeding under Article [82] of the
Treaty (IV/32.318, London European ─ Sabena) (OJ 1988 L 317, p. 47).
Finally, the Commission argues, the limitation of the relevant geographic market to the United Kingdom is justified by various
factors which localise the activities concerned to United Kingdom territory.  In particular, customers normally book their
tickets in their country of residence and relations between travel agents and airlines are established on a country-by-country
basis.
Findings of the Court
The Commission took the view in the contested decision that the product market to be taken into consideration, for the purposes
of establishing the dominant position of BA, is comprised by the services which airlines purchase from travel agents for the
purposes of marketing and distributing their airline tickets (recital 72).  In the Commission's view, that practice by airlines
has the effect of creating a market for air travel agency services distinct from the air transport markets.
The Commission has also taken the view that the relevant geographic market in this case was the territory of the United Kingdom,
given the national dimension of travel agents' business.
According to settled case-law (Case 322/81
Michelin
v
Commission
[1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 37; Case T-65/96
Kish Glass
v
Commission
[2000] ECR II-1885, paragraph 62, confirmed on appeal by order of the Court of Justice in Case C-241/00 P
Kish Glass
v
Commission
[2001] ECR I-7759), for the purposes of investigating the possibly dominant position of an undertaking on a given product
market, the possibilities of competition must be judged in the context of the market comprising the totality of the products
or services which, with respect to their characteristics, are particularly suitable for satisfying constant needs and are
only to a limited extent interchangeable with other products or services. Moreover, since the determination of the relevant
market is useful in assessing whether the undertaking concerned is in a position to prevent effective competition from being
maintained and behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and, in this case, its service providers,
an examination to that end cannot be limited to the objective characteristics only of the relevant services, but the competitive
conditions and the structure of supply and demand on the market must also be taken into consideration.
It is clear from BA's pleadings that it itself acknowledges the existence of an independent market for air travel agency services,
since it states in paragraph 11.34 of its application that travel agents themselves operate in a competitive market, competing
with each other to provide the best possible service to their customers.
In that regard, although travel agents act on behalf of the airlines, which assume all the risks and advantages connected
with the transport service itself and which conclude contracts for transport directly with travellers, they nevertheless constitute
independent intermediaries carrying on an independent business of providing services (see, to that effect, the judgment in
VVR
, cited in paragraph 84 above, at paragraph 20).
As the Commission states in recital 31 of the contested decision, that specific business of travel agents consists, on the
one hand, in advising potential travellers, reserving and issuing airline tickets, (and) collecting the price of the transport
and remitting it to the airlines, and, on the other hand, in providing those airlines with advertising and commercial promotion
services.
In that regard, BA itself states that travel agents are and will remain, in the short term at least, a vital distribution
channel for airlines, allowing them efficiently to sell seats on the flights they offer, and that there is a mutual dependence
between travel agents and airlines which are not in themselves in a position to market their air transport services effectively.
As BA has also stated, travel agents offer a wider range of air routes, departure times and arrival times than any airline
could.  Travel agents filter information concerning various flights for the benefit of travellers faced with the proliferation
of different air transport fare structures, which arise from the real-time pricing systems operated by airlines.
BA has further recognised that the role which travel agents play in the distribution of airline tickets explains why airlines
seek to offer them advantages so that they sell seats on their flights.  The irreplaceable nature of the services which travel
agents provide to airlines is thus borne out by all the payments which the airlines make to them.
Finally, BA has itself emphasised that major travel agents individually negotiate agreements for the distribution of air tickets
and that they are thus in a position to set the airlines in competition.
That specific nature of the services provided to airlines by travel agents, without any serious possibility of the airlines
substituting themselves for the agents in order to carry out the same services themselves, is corroborated by the fact that,
at the time of the events of which complaint is made, 85% of air tickets sold in the territory of the United Kingdom were
sold through the intermediary of travel agents.
The Court therefore considers that the services of air travel agencies represent an economic activity for which, at the time
of the contested decision, airlines could not substitute another form of distribution of their tickets, and that they therefore
constitute a market for services distinct from the air transport market.
With regard to the fact that the restrictions on competition which the Commission imputes to BA's performance reward schemes
arise from the position which BA holds in its capacity not as supplier but as purchaser of air travel agency services, this
is irrelevant having regard to the definition of the market in question.  Article 82 EC applies both to undertakings whose
possible dominant position is established, as in this case, in relation to their suppliers and to those which are capable
of being in the same position in relation to their customers.
BA itself acknowledged at the hearing, moreover, that it is possible both for a seller and for a purchaser to hold a dominant
position within the meaning of Article 82 EC.
BA cannot therefore validly argue that, in order to define the product market in question, with a view to assessing the effects
on competition of the financial advantages which it allows to travel agents established in the United Kingdom, it is necessary
to determine whether a single supplier of air transportation services on a particular route can profitably increase its prices.
Such a parameter, which might be relevant in relation to each airline, is not of such a kind as to enable measurement of BA's
economic strength in its capacity not as provider of air transport services but as purchaser of travel agency services, on
all routes to and from United Kingdom airports, either in relation to all other airlines regarded in the same capacity as
purchasers of air travel agency services or in relation to travel agents established in the United Kingdom.
BA's objections to the relevance of the product market adopted by the Commission, based on the possible marginalisation of
the distribution of airline tickets through the intermediary of travel agents, on the exclusive specialisation of airlines
by geographical destinations, and on the independent behaviour of an airline in a monopoly situation on certain routes, therefore
have no bearing.
Those arguments are based on situations which are either hypothetical or foreign to the conditions of competition operating
in the product market in question constituted by air travel agency services, both between the agents providing those services
and between the airlines using them.
The Commission did not therefore make any error of assessment in defining the relevant product market as that for services
provided by travel agents in favour of airlines, for the purposes of establishing whether BA holds a dominant position on
that market in its capacity as bidder for those services.
As for the geographic market to be taken into consideration, consistent case-law shows that it may be defined as the territory
in which all traders operate in the same or sufficiently homogeneous conditions of competition in so far as concerns specifically
the relevant products or services, without it being necessary for those conditions to be perfectly homogeneous (Case T-83/91
Tetra Pak
v
Commission
[1994] ECR II-755, paragraph 91, confirmed on appeal by judgment in Case C-333/94 P
Tetra Pak
v
Commission
(
Tetra Pak II
) [1996] ECR I-5951).
It can hardly be denied that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, travellers reserve airline tickets in their country of
residence.  Although BA has argued that not all tickets sold by travel agents in the United Kingdom are necessarily sold to
residents of that country, it has acknowledged that transactions taking place outside the United Kingdom could not be quantified.
Moreover, as the Commission has stated in recital 83 of the contested decision, without challenge from BA, IATA's rules on
the order of using the coupons in airline tickets prevent tickets sold outside the territory of the United Kingdom from being
used for flights departing from United Kingdom airports.
Since the distribution of airline tickets takes place at national level, it follows that airlines normally purchase the services
for distributing those tickets on a national basis, as is shown by the agreements signed to that end by BA with travel agents
established in the United Kingdom.
Nor has any doubt been cast on the fact that airlines structure their commercial services at the national level, that travel
agents' handling of air tickets is carried out in the context of IATA's national plans for bank settlement and, in this case,
through the Billing and Settlement Plan for the United Kingdom (
BSPUK).
Nor has BA challenged the Commission's statement that BA applies its performance reward schemes to travel agents established
in the United Kingdom in a uniform manner over the whole of the territory of that Member State.
Nor has BA denied that the disputed financial incentives apply only to sales of BA tickets carried out in the United Kingdom,
even if those incentives form part of agreements concluded with travel agents whose activities extend to more than one Member
State.
Contrary to what BA maintains, the fact that BA concludes global agreements with certain travel agents is not capable of establishing
that the latter increasingly deal with airlines on the international level.  As is shown in recital 20 of the contested decision,
which BA has not challenged, those global agreements were signed with only three travel agents and only for the winter season
1992/1993.  Moreover, those agreements were merely added to local agreements made in the countries concerned.
It does not therefore appear that the Commission erred in defining the relevant geographic market as the United Kingdom market,
for the purposes of demonstrating that BA held a dominant position on that market in its capacity as the purchaser of air
travel agency services provided by agents established in the United Kingdom.
The plea alleging incorrect definition of the relevant product and geographic market cannot therefore be accepted.
The fourth plea in law, alleging lack of the requisite nexus between the product markets affected
In the contested decision, the Commission found the existence of effects of the disputed practices on several markets.  As
is shown by recitals 111 and 112 of the contested decision in particular, the Commission held that the performance reward
schemes applied by BA gave rise to discrimination between travel agents established in the United Kingdom on the United Kingdom
market for air travel agency services, and tended, first, to reduce the quantity of air travel agency services provided to
other companies, and, secondly, to make the provision of those services subject to less favourable conditions.  That abusive
conduct by BA on the market for air travel agency services further produced serious anti-competitive effects on the United
Kingdom air transport markets, to the detriment of airline companies competing with BA (recitals 103 and 113).
Arguments of the parties
BA argues that the sufficiently close nexus required for Article 82 EC to apply does not exist between, on the one hand, the
United Kingdom market for air travel agency services, allegedly dominated by BA, and, on the other, the United Kingdom air
transport markets, on which BA does not hold a dominant position.
It argues that the Commission's analysis is
circular, in that it considers that BA's success on the United Kingdom air transport markets places it in a dominant position on the
United Kingdom market for air travel agency services, the abuse of which has harmful effects on air transport markets.
BA further argues that its shares of United Kingdom air transport markets are too small to raise concerns, and that its position
as a purchaser of travel agency services in the United Kingdom does not enable it to control the provision of those services.
The Commission states that it has identified the market constituted by the services of the air travel agencies established
in the United Kingdom, on which BA occupies a dominant position and has abused it, by reason of unlawful discrimination between
those operators and the exclusionary effects which its conduct has produced on that same market.  It also took account of
the exclusionary effects of that abuse on competing airlines in the product markets of air travel to and from the United Kingdom.
In its judgement in
Tetra Pak
(cited in paragraph 108 above, at paragraph 113), the Court of First Instance emphasised that Article 82 EC gave no explicit
guidance as to the requirements relating to where on the market for products and services the abuse took place, and the Court
of Justice held (in
Tetra Pak II
, cited in paragraph 108 above, at paragraph 24) that the assessment of the Court of First Instance could not be challenged
on that point.
Although the present case differs from
Tetra Pak
, in that BA's abuse of its dominant position produced effects on both the dominated market and other markets, the Commission
argues that there can be no doubt that the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services maintains close links with
the markets for air transport from, within and to the United Kingdom.
The intervener, Virgin, recalls that BA has queried the independent existence of the market for air travel agency services,
separate from the market for air transportation.  Having made that argument, BA cannot then contend that those two markets
are totally separate and unrelated.
Virgin adds that the capacity of travel agents to exercise a determining influence on a traveller's choice of airline cannot
seriously be challenged.  In addition, the bonuses paid to them by airlines considerably influence their methods of reservation
in relation to travellers who delegate the choice of airline to them.
Findings of the Court
An abuse of a dominant position committed on the dominated product market, but the effects of which are felt in a separate
market on which the undertaking concerned does not hold a dominant position may fall within Article 82 EC provided that separate
market is sufficiently closely connected to the first (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73
Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents
v
Commission
[1974] ECR 223, paragraph 22, and Case 311/84
CBEM
[1985] ECR 3261, paragraph 26).
In this case, the disputed performance reward schemes form part of a series of agreements which BA concluded with travel agents
established in the United Kingdom, for the purposes of the provision of air transport agency services, including the issuing
of its tickets to travellers and the provision of ancillary advertising and commercial promotion services.
As has been pointed out above, it is acknowledged that air travel agents carry out a retail function and that, in the short
term at least, they will maintain that role and hence a vital importance for airlines.
The services which airlines thus sell to travellers through the intermediary of travel agents established in the United Kingdom
are constituted by air transport services on scheduled flights which those airlines provide to and from United Kingdom airports.
The Court notes in that respect that, at the time of BA's disputed practices, 85% of air tickets sold in the United Kingdom
were sold through the intermediary of air travel agents.
There is therefore an undeniable close connection between, on the one hand, the air travel agency services supplied to airlines
by agents established in the United Kingdom, and, on the other, the air transport services provided by those airlines on the
United Kingdom air transport markets constituted by air routes to and from United Kingdom airports.
Furthermore, BA's line of argument rests on the premiss that such a close connection exists between the markets concerned.
BA notes, in point 10.28 of its application, that disinclination by an agent to promote BA's flights is likely to lead to
an absolute loss of business for BA.  Such a loss of revenue can come about only through a reduction in the number of BA tickets
issued.
Conversely, BA notes in point 4.39 of its application that, to the extent that they may lead to higher demand for an airline's
services, advantages granted by airlines to travel agents result in significant cost savings.
The Commission was therefore right to hold that the nexus required by Article 82 EC existed between the United Kingdom market
for the travel agency services which airlines purchase from travel agents and the United Kingdom air transport markets.
In those circumstances, the fourth plea in law cannot succeed.
The fifth plea in law, alleging an incorrect legal basis
Regulation No 17, on the basis of which the contested decision was adopted, constitutes the first regulation implementing
Articles 81 EC and 82 EC and sets out the general legal framework for applying those two provisions.
Under Article 1 of Council Regulation No 141 of 26 November 1962 exempting transport from the application of Regulation No
17 (OJ, English Special Edition 1959-1962, p. 291),
Regulation No 17 shall not apply to agreements, decisions or concerted practices in the transport sector which have as their
object or effect the fixing of transport rates and conditions, the limitation or control of the supply of transport or the
sharing of transport markets; nor shall it apply to the abuse of a dominant position, within the meaning of Article [82 EC],
within the transport market.
According to the third recital in the preamble to Regulation No 141, however, the distinctive features of transport make it
justifiable to exempt from the application of Regulation No 17 only agreements, decisions and concerted practices directly
relating to the provision of transport services.
Finally, on 14 December 1987, the Council adopted Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 laying down the procedure for the application
of the rules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector (OJ 1987 L 374, p. 1).
Arguments of the parties
BA argues that, even if the relevant product market was the market for air travel agency services, the practices of which
BA stands accused fall not within the regulation which the Commission took as the legal basis for the contested decision,
namely Regulation No 17, but within Regulation No 3975/87.
In its judgment in Case C-264/95 P
Commission
v
UIC
[1997] ECR I-1287, paragraph 28, confirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-14/93
Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer
v
Commission
[1995] ECR II-1503, the Court of Justice rejected the argument, relied on in the present case by the Commission, that Council
Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 of 19 July 1968 applying rules of competition to transport by rail, road and inland waterway (OJ,
English Special Edition 1952-1972, p. 28) applied only to agreements and concerted practices directly relating to the supply
of transport, on the ground that the relevant passage of Article 1 of Regulation No 1017/68 was precise and detailed and did
not mention the word
directly.
The Commission attempts to distinguish
UIC
from the present case by arguing that the scope of Regulation No 1017/68 is defined more broadly than that of Regulation
No 3975/87, inasmuch as the former refers to all
agreements, decisions and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the fixing of transport rates and conditions,
the limitation or control of the supply of transport, the sharing of transport markets.  But, as the Court of Justice held in
UIC
, those are precisely the words of Article 1 of Regulation No 141, which removes the whole of the transport sector from the
scope of Regulation No 17.
Moreover, the terms of Regulation No 3975/87 itself demonstrate that it was not intended to have only the restrictive scope
suggested by the Commission.  Article 2 of that regulation provides that the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC is
not to apply to the agreements, decisions and concerted practices listed in the annex to that regulation.  That annex includes
(at letter (k)) agreements, decisions or concerted practices relating to
the clearing and settling of accounts between air carriers and their appointed agents by means of a centralised and automated
settlement plan or system, including such services as may be necessary or incidental thereto.  If the Commission's argument were correct, those matters would not fall within the scope of Regulation No 3975/87 at all.
On the Commission's own analysis, the practices of which BA stands accused produce their effects, or at least their principal
effects, in the air transport sector (recitals 118 and 120 of the contested decision).  In addition, the disputed performance
bonuses constitute one of the direct costs of the sale of an air transport ticket and influence the net price received by
the airline in exchange for the air transport service provided, thus also indirectly fixing
transport rates within the meaning of Regulation No 141.
Because the Commission applied the wrong legal basis, BA was deprived of its procedural safeguards, on account of the differences
in that respect between the system under Regulation No 17 and that under Regulation No 3975/87.
Moreover, the Commission did not have the power to adopt the contested decision in so far as it affected air routes between
the European Union and non-member countries.  The latter do not fall within the scope of Regulation No 3975/87, which is limited
to air transport between Community airports.
The Commission argues that there can be no doubt that, as activities connected with, or indirectly linked to, the market in
air transport in the full sense of the term, air travel agency services do not fall within the scope of the exclusion from
the application of Regulation No 17 enacted by Article 1 of Regulation No 141, and that, on the contrary, they remain subject
to Regulation No 17.
Regulation No 3975/87, the third recital in the preamble to which emphasises the features which are specific to the air transport
industry, applies only to agreements directly related to the provision of air transport services.
By contrast, the contested decision concerned only services purchased by BA from travel agents.  Both the alleged abuse and
its primary effects occurred on the market for air travel agency services (recitals 85 and 112 of the contested decision).
The anti-competitive agreements between BA and United Kingdom travel agents did not relate to
air transport services and were not directly linked to the provision of such services.
The Commission submits that, whatever its scope, Regulation No 1017/68 is not relevant in this case, and that the two
UIC
judgments, cited in paragraph 142 above, concerned that regulation and not Regulation No 3975/87.
Whereas Article 1 of Regulation No 1017/68 gives a broad definition of its scope, Regulation No 3975/87, as amended by Council
Regulation (EEC) No 2410/92 of 23 July 1992 (OJ 1992 L 240, p. 18), refers in Article 1(2) only to
air transport between Community airports.
Furthermore, the present case concerns neither the supply of transport nor the fixing of transport rates, which are explicitly
envisaged by Article 1 of Regulation No 1017/68.
If, as BA implies, air travel agency services were not included within the scope of Regulation No 3975/87, and were excluded
from the scope of Regulation No 17 by Regulation No 141, such services would not be covered by any Community regulation, which
cannot be the case.
Findings of the Court
The performance reward schemes applied by BA form part of agreements concluded between BA and travel agents established in
the United Kingdom for the purposes of supplying BA with travel agency services and, in particular, for the purpose of distributing
BA tickets, thereby excluding the air transport services proper which BA provides to travellers.
Those air transport services form the subject-matter of individual contracts between BA and travellers and do not therefore
form part of the subject-matter of the contested decision.
The performance reward schemes, the application of which to travel agents established in the United Kingdom is criticised
by the Commission, are not therefore to be regarded as directly relating to the air transport service proper agreed between
the traveller and the airline.
As is apparent from the third recital in the preamble to Regulation No 141, the distinctive features of transport make it
justifiable to exempt from the application of Regulation No 17 only agreements, decisions and concerted practices
directly relating to the provision of transport services (Case C-82/01 P
Aéroports de Paris
v
Commission
[2002] ECR I-9297, paragraph 18).
Thus, Article 1 of Regulation No 141 precludes the application of Regulation No 17 only in respect of agreements, decisions
and concerted practices
which have as their object or effect the fixing of transport rates and conditions, the limitation or control of the supply
of transport or the sharing of transport markets (
Aéroports de Paris
, paragraph 18) and
a dominant position, within the meaning of Article [82 EC], within the transport market.
BA cannot usefully rely, with reference to the
UIC
judgment, on the similarity in wording of Article 1 of Regulation No 1017/68 and Article 1 of Regulation No 141, which limits
the scope of Regulation No 17 in relation to the regulations which apply to transport as a whole, in order to maintain that
Regulation No 3975/87 applies to this case.
In the first place, it is clear from the first recital in the preamble to Regulation No 3975/87 that Regulation No 1017/68
applies exclusively to inland transport (rail, road and navigable waterway).  BA cannot therefore usefully argue that Regulation
No 3975/87 is relevant in this case by relying on Regulation No 1017/68, which has a different material scope.
Indeed, it is clear from the first recital in the preamble to Regulation No 3975/87 that, before that regulation entered into
force, the Commission did not have the means of directly investigating cases of suspected infringement of Articles 81 EC and
82 EC in air transport.
Secondly, whilst taking account, according to the fourth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 3975/87, of certain distinctive
features of transport operations viewed as a whole, the framers of that legislation held elsewhere that the air transport
industry had specific features, as is clear from the second recital in the preamble to that regulation.
Thirdly, the general scheme of the legislative provisions applicable to air transport reveals an intention by the Community
legislature, which was absent from Regulation No 1017/68, to limit the scope of Regulation No 3975/87 to activities directly
relating to the provision of air transport services alone, precisely because of the specific nature of that industry.
Thus, the title of Regulation No 3975/87 indicates that that regulation
lay[s] down the procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector, by contrast with Regulation No 1017/68, which
appl[ies] rules of competition to transport by rail, road and inland waterway.  That difference in wording confirms that an activity falls within the scope of Regulation No 3975/87 only if it is directly
linked to the provision of air transport services (see, to that effect,
Aéroports de Paris
, cited in paragraph 158 above, paragraph 22).
Moreover, the first recital in the preamble to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on the application
of Article [81](3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector (OJ
1987 L 374, p. 9), adopted on the same day as Regulation No 3975/87, recalls that Regulation No 17 lays down the procedure
for the application of the competition rules to agreements, decisions and concerted practices
other than those directly relating to the provision of air transport services (
Aéroports de Paris
, paragraph 24).
In addition, Article 1(2) of Regulation No 3975/87, as amended by Regulation No 2410/92, provides that
[t]his regulation shall apply only to ... air transport between Community airports.
Similarly, Article 4a of Regulation No 3975/87, introduced by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1284/91 of 14 May 1991, amending
Regulation No 3975/87 (OJ 1991 L 122, p. 2), applies only to practices having the object or effect of
directly jeopardising the existence of an air service, which presupposes a direct link with the supply of air transport services (
Aéroports de Paris
, paragraph 23).
Therefore, BA's textual argument based on the exemption laid down by the combined provisions of Article 2 of Regulation No
3975/87 and letter (k) in the annex to that regulation in favour of agreements, decisions or concerted practices  relating
to the clearing and settling of accounts between air carriers and their appointed agents is in no way decisive.
Such agreements, decisions or concerted practices, which are purely technical in scope, are to be regarded in the legislative
context described above as detachable from agreements such as those concluded between BA and travel agents established in
the United Kingdom for the purposes of providing travel agency services proper.
Finally, there is no basis for BA's assertion that the practices of which it is accused produce their principal effects on
the air transport market.  The choice of the applicable regulation depends upon what is the nature of the practices in question,
and not upon the prior identification of the market on which those practices produce their effects (see, to that effect,
UIC
, paragraph 42).
In any event, it is clear from recitals 85 and 112 of the contested decision that the Commission localised on the United Kingdom
market for air travel agency services both the abuse of a dominant position ascertained in relation to BA and a number of
its effects, which is enough to justify the application of Regulation No 17 to this case.
The Commission did not therefore make any error of law in taking Regulation No 17 as its basis for adopting the contested
decision.
The plea must therefore be dismissed as unfounded.
The sixth plea in law, alleging that there was no dominant position
Arguments of the parties
BA begins by accusing the Commission of regarding it as an undertaking in a dominant position on the United Kingdom market
for air travel agency services without taking proper account of the intense competition which BA faces on the United Kingdom
air transport markets.
Irrespective of the total number of routes it serves, BA maintains that it does not act with an appreciable degree of independence
either in relation to its competitors on each route or in relation to travellers who have the power to choose their carrier
for each route.
Secondly, BA accuses the Commission of failing to explain how BA's alleged dominance in the United Kingdom market for air
travel agency services
arises from the fact that BA was
extremely successful in the United Kingdom markets for air transport.
Thirdly, BA argues that its shares, cited by the Commission, of the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services in
its capacity as customer of the agents do not establish that it holds a dominant position on that market.  The Commission
simply aggregated all BA ticket sales on all routes to and from United Kingdom airports, even though those routes constitute
separate markets.
Moreover, the Commission failed to calculate correctly BA's shares of the markets.  The percentages used by the Commission
also included sales outside the United Kingdom, thereby overstating BA's share.  The Commission based its calculations on
air ticket sales through BSPUK, to which only some of the travel agents established in the United Kingdom belong. Without
analysing the transactions carried out by the other agents, the Commission simply assumed that the sales through BSPUK amounted
to 80 to 85% of tickets sold through agents.  Finally, sales attributed to BA in BSPUK included sales made by other airlines
which use BA as an agent and which do not participate in the agreements concluded between BA and travel agents established
in the United Kingdom.
BA argues that the Commission failed to consider the impact of sales through channels other than travel agents, such as direct
telephone or internet sales. As the Commission expressly recognised in recital 72 of the contested decision, those sales affect
the power of airlines on the market in air travel agency services.
In stressing BA's particularly powerful position in relation to the leading travel agents, the Commission ignored the net
decline in the percentage of their total sales represented by BA tickets and BA's relatively low share of the business of
certain of the largest agents.
If one were to apply the test of stability of market share or susceptibility to competition, adopted in the judgment in Case
85/76
Hoffmann-La Roche
v
Commission
[1979] ECR 461, BA's share of the United Kingdom
market in air travel agency services would not permit the conclusion of dominance at any time.
A proper analysis of the market share data contradicts rather than supports a finding of dominance.  Indeed, BA's market share
fell from 47.7% at the beginning of the 1990s to 39.7%.  By contrast, the shares of other carriers, notably Virgin and British
Midland, have grown rapidly.
Contrary to what the Commission maintains in recital 92 of the contested decision, the fact that a single airline accounts
for a large proportion of the tickets sold by a travel agency does not mean that that airline is
an obligatory business partner for that agency.  In practice, BA argues, every agency needs to offer the tickets of a broad range of airlines.  In fact,
agencies have substantial bargaining power and the final choice of agent is a matter for the customer.
Unlike distributors in the markets concerned by
Hoffmann-La Roche
and
Michelin
,  travel agents do not normally hold stocks of tickets or need actually to sell BA's tickets.  Since the routes served by
BA are also served by other airlines, agents are able to offer the choice that passengers demand as long as they are in a
position to sell BA tickets.
Finally, if BA had occupied a dominant position, it would have had no incentive to commit substantial sums to improving its
services in order to compete more effectively with other airlines.
The Commission maintains that, in order to establish BA's dominant position on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency
services, it took account of the percentages of sales of BA tickets by IATA-accredited travel agents and a series of related
factors, such as the size of BA, the range of its air transport services and its network.
BA was obviously in a position to act independently of travel agents established in the United Kingdom and, in particular,
unilaterally to substitute the basic commission of 7% for that of 7.5% in respect of domestic flights and 9% in respect of
international flights.
Findings of the Court
The dominant position referred to in Article 82 EC relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, of its customers and ultimately of its consumers (Case T-128/98
Aéroports de Paris
v
Commission
[2000] ECR II-3929, paragraph 147).
As the examination of the third plea has shown, it is on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services, consisting
in particular in the distribution of air tickets, supplied to airlines by travel agents established in the United Kingdom,
that the Commission has chosen to establish the existence of a dominant position on the part of BA.
As has been pointed out in paragraph 101 above, the fact that BA is to be regarded as an undertaking in a dominant position
in its capacity as a purchaser of services, rather than as a provider of services, is irrelevant.
It follows that the number of seats offered on the services provided by BA on all routes to and from United Kingdom airports,
which represent so many BA air tickets capable of being sold through the intermediary of travel agents established in the
United Kingdom, is the appropriate criterion for measuring the economic strength which BA is capable of exercising in relation
to those agents and the other companies which purchase the distribution services in question.
BA itself has stated that the operation of its hub network in the territory of the United Kingdom allows it to offer many
more flights to and from its hub airports, and therefore to carry a larger number of passengers than other airlines operating
point-to-point services.
The Commission was therefore right, for the purposes of calculating BA's shares on the United Kingdom market for air travel
agency services, to aggregate all BA tickets sold through travel agents established in the United Kingdom over all routes
to and from United Kingdom airports.
In those circumstances, BA cannot profitably disregard the total number of air routes it operates in order to deny its capacity
to act with an appreciable degree of independence in relation to its competitors on each of those routes, to travel agents,
and to travellers, who have the ability to choose their airline.
Nor can BA validly accuse the Commission of failing to explain how its dominant position in the United Kingdom market for
air travel agency services arises from its successes in air transport.
For the purposes of establishing whether BA holds a dominant position on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services,
there is no need to assess its economic strength on that market by reference to the competition between airlines providing
services on each of the routes served by BA and its competitors to and from United Kingdom airports.
As has been shown by the examination of the third plea, those various United Kingdom markets in air transport services are
distinct from air travel agency services, including the distribution of air tickets in particular.
Concerning the alleged factual errors, BA cannot accuse the Commission of failing to take account of the impact of air ticket
sales by telephone or internet, having regard to the specificity, as regards marketing procedures, of the services supplied
by travel agents.
That specificity has, moreover, caused BA to state that travel agents are of vital importance, as intermediaries, for airlines.
That specificity is, in addition, borne out by the fact that sales of air tickets handled by travel agents established in
the United Kingdom represent 85% of all air tickets sold in that Member State.
Nor can BA validly blame the Commission for taking account of sales of BA tickets outside the United Kingdom in determining
its shares of the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services.
BA acknowledged, in reply to a question put by the Court, that it was impossible to quantify the transactions which took place
outside the United Kingdom.  The Commission was not therefore in a position to make a distinction according to whether or
not the tickets were sold inside the United Kingdom.  As examination of the third plea has shown, travellers normally reserve
air tickets in their country of residence.  Therefore, the applicant has not shown that the Commission's assessment related
to a number of tickets capable of distorting its estimate of the market share held by BA on the United Kingdom market for
air travel agency services.
BA's argument that BSPUK is unrepresentative is not convincing.  Even if BSPUK covers only 4 634 of the 7 000 travel agents
established in the United Kingdom, it is undisputed that it is the largest among them that are members of that national settlement
plan.
Considering the preponderant share of air ticket sales through BSPUK in the total of ticket sales through travel agents established
in the United Kingdom, it appears that the Commission was right to hold that the shares of the six main airlines in those
total sales of airline tickets could not be very different from those accounted for through BSPUK.
Moreover, as is shown by recital 34 of the contested decision, BA itself indicated during the administrative procedure that,
between January and November 1998, it had sold 85% of its air tickets issued in the United Kingdom through IATA travel agents
and BSPUK.  Recital 33 of the contested decision, not challenged on this point by the applicant, shows that 4 108 of the 4
634 agents participating in BSPUK, namely some 89%, are accredited by IATA.
Nor is it disputed that BA ticket sales by IATA travel agents established in the United Kingdom represented 66% of the sales
of the top 10 airlines handled by BSPUK in the same financial year.
In those circumstances, the fact that 2 366 travel agents do not participate in BSPUK does not appear likely significantly
to reduce BA's share in United Kingdom air ticket sales through travel agents.
The same applies to ticket sales by other companies using BA as an agent and not participating in the performance reward schemes
at issue.  As the Commission has stated, without being contradicted by BA, the latter merely stated that the amount of those
sales might represent a percentage of 5% or less.
The Court still needs to examine whether the reasoning followed by the Commission in order to establish BA's dominant position,
on the basis of the evidence which it thus lawfully used, might not be vitiated by errors of assessment.
In that respect, account must be taken of the highly significant indicator which is the fact that the undertaking in question
holds large shares of the market and of the ratio between the market share held by the undertaking concerned and that of its
nearest rivals (
Hoffmann-La Roche
, cited in paragraph 182 above, at paragraphs 39 and 48), particularly since the nearest rivals hold only marginal market
shares (see, to that effect, Case 27/76
United Brands
v
Commission
[1978] ECR 207, paragraph 111).
As is shown by the table reproduced below, which is taken from recital 41 of the contested decision and the factual accuracy
which BA has not been able to disprove (see paragraphs 199 to 208 above), not only is BA's market share in the total of air
ticket sales handled by BSPUK to be regarded as large, but it invariably constitutes a multiple of the market shares of each
of its five main competitors on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services.
British Airways
46.3
45.6
43.5
42.7
40.3
42.0
39.7
American Airlines
─
5.4
7.3
7.7
7.6
3.6
3.8
Virgin
2.8
3.0
3.7
4.0
4.0
5.8
5.5
British Midland
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.0
2.7
─
─
Qantas
3.0
2.7
3.0
2.6
6.4
3.0
3.3
KLM
2.5
─
─
─
─
3.8
5.3
The economic strength which BA derives from its market share is further reinforced by the world rank it occupies in terms
of international scheduled passenger-kilometres flown, the extent of the range of its transport services and its hub network.
According to BA's own statements, its network operations allow it, in comparison with its five competitors, to offer a wider
choice of routes and more frequent flights.
It is further shown by recital 38 of the contested decision, not challenged by BA, that, in 1995, it operated 92 of the 151
international routes from Heathrow Airport and 43 of the 92 routes in service at Gatwick, that is to say several times the
number of routes served by each of its three or four nearest rivals (operating) from those two airports.
As a whole, the services operated by BA on routes to and from United Kingdom airports have the cumulative effect of generating
the purchase by travellers of a preponderant number of BA air tickets through travel agents established in the United Kingdom,
and, correspondingly, at least as many transactions between BA and those agents for the purposes of supplying air travel agency
services, particularly in the distribution of BA air tickets.
It necessarily follows that those agents substantially depend on the income they receive from BA in consideration for their
air travel agency services.
BA is therefore wrong to deny that it is an obligatory business partner of travel agents established in the United Kingdom
and to maintain that those agents have no actual need to sell BA tickets.  BA's arguments are not capable of calling into
question the finding, in recital 93 of the contested decision, that BA enjoys a particularly powerful position in relation
to its nearest rivals and the largest travel agents.
The facts of this case therefore show that BA was in a position, unilaterally by circular of 17 November 1997, to impose a
reduction as from 1 January 1998 of its rates of commission in force up to that date and to extend its new performance reward
scheme to all travel agents established in the United Kingdom.
In those circumstances, neither the possibly modest size of the share of BA ticket sales in the business of some of the main
agencies, which has moreover merely been alleged, nor the alleged fluctuations of BA's share in the total figure of air ticket
sales by travel agents established in the United Kingdom can call into question the Commission's finding that BA holds a dominant
position on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services.
Nor are the great dependence of United Kingdom travel agents upon BA and BA's corresponding freedom of manoeuvre in relation
to other companies using the services of air travel agencies capable of being called into question by the fact that those
agents do not normally hold stocks of air tickets.
Such a purely logistical circumstance is not of such a kind as to affect the dominant position which BA derives from its preponderant
weight on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services.
The argument that, as an undertaking in a dominant position, BA would have no interest in spending considerable sums improving
its services so as to compete more effectively with its rivals is irrelevant in that it concerns the United Kingdom air transport
markets and not the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services which the Commission took to establish the dominant
position of BA.
Finally, for the same reason, neither the decline in the percentage of BA air ticket sales nor the advance in market share
of certain rival companies is sufficiently large to call into question the existence of BA's dominant position on the United
Kingdom market for air travel agency services.
In this case, the reduction in BA's market share cannot, in itself, constitute proof that there is no dominant position.
The position which BA still occupies on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services remains very largely preponderant.
As the table in paragraph 211 above shows, a substantial gap remained, during the whole of the period of the infringement
found by the Commission, between, on the one hand, BA's market share and, on the other, both the market share of its closest
rival and the cumulative shares of its five main competitors on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services.
The Commission was therefore right to hold that BA held a dominant position on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency
services.
The sixth plea in law must therefore be dismissed.
The seventh plea in law, alleging that there was no abuse of a dominant position
BA challenges the Commission's assertion that its performance reward schemes engendered discrimination between travel agents
established in the United Kingdom or produced an exclusionary effect in relation to competing airlines.
The discriminatory character of BA's performance reward schemes in relation to travel agents established in the United Kingdom
─ Arguments of the parties
BA accuses the Commission of failing to establish the existence of discrimination between travel agents established in the
United Kingdom arising from the application of unequal criteria or not justified by legitimate commercial considerations.
The fact that two travel agents who sell different numbers of BA tickets may receive the same payments and that two agents
who sell the same number of BA tickets may receive different incentive payments does nothing to establish discrimination within
the meaning of subparagraph (c) of the second paragraph of Article 82 EC.
On the contrary, it reflects the fact that travel agents which differ in size may devote the same amount of effort and resources
to selling BA tickets.  It is a benefit of the calculation of performance rewards on the basis of the agent's sales in the
previous reference period that it takes the agent's size into account.
In the Commission's view, BA's performance reward schemes created unlawful discrimination between travel agents because they
were based on the extent to which a travel agent met, or improved on, its sales of BA tickets in the previous reference period,
and were not based on a different volume of ticket sales by the travel agent or on the level of service provided by it to
BA.
That practice placed certain United Kingdom travel agents at a disadvantage in relation to others in the acute competition
between them. By distorting the level of commission earned by travel agents, the financial incentive schemes applied by BA
affected the agents' ability to compete with each other.
─ Findings of the Court
Subparagraph (c) of the second paragraph of Article 82 EC provides that abuse of a dominant position may consist in applying
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
It is undisputed that, as the Commission points out in recital 29 of the contested decision, attainment by United Kingdom
travel agents of their BA tickets sales growth targets led to an increase in the rate of commission paid to them by BA not
only on BA tickets sold after the target was reached but also on all BA tickets handled by the agents during the reference
period in question.
To that extent, the performance reward schemes at issue could result in different rates of commission being applied to an
identical amount of revenue generated by the sale of BA tickets by two travel agents, since their respective sales figures,
and hence their rates of growth, would have been different during the previous reference period.
By remunerating at different levels services that were nevertheless identical and supplied during the same reference period,
those performance reward schemes distorted the level of remuneration which the parties concerned received in the form of commissions
paid by BA.
As BA has stated itself, United Kingdom travel agents compete intensely with each other, and this ability to compete depends
on their ability to provide seats on flights suited to travellers' wishes, at a reasonable cost.
Being dependent on the financial resources of each agent, that ability of agents to compete in supplying air travel agency
services to travellers and to stimulate the demand of airlines for such services was naturally affected by the discriminatory
conditions of remuneration inherent in BA's performance reward schemes.
BA's arguments based on the importance of the size of the travel agents established in the United Kingdom are irrelevant.
The performance reward schemes in dispute were, in themselves, based on a parameter unrelated to the criterion of the size
of the undertakings, since they were based on the extent to which travel agents increased their sales of BA tickets in relation
to the threshold constituted by the number of BA tickets sold during the previous reference period.
In those circumstances, the Commission was right to hold that BA's performance reward schemes constituted an abuse of BA's
dominant position on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services, in that they produced discriminatory effects
within the network of travel agents established in the United Kingdom, thereby inflicting on some of them a competitive disadvantage
within the meaning of subparagraph (c) of the second paragraph of Article 82 EC.
The exclusionary effect on airlines competing with BA arising from the
fidelity-building nature of BA's performance reward schemes
The Court observes first that consistent case-law shows that an
abuse is an objective concept referring to the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the
structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is
already weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition in products or services
on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition
still existing in the market or the growth of that competition (
Hoffmann-La Roche
, cited in paragraph 182 above, at paragraph 91, and
Michelin
, cited in paragraph 91 above, at paragraph 70; Case C-62/86
AKZO
v
Commission
[1991] ECR I-3359, paragraph 69; Case T-228/97
Irish Sugar
v
Commission
[1999] ECR II-2969, paragraph 111).
Therefore, whilst the finding that a dominant position exists does not in itself imply any reproach to the undertaking concerned,
it has a special responsibility, irrespective of the causes of that position, not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted
competition on the common market (
Michelin
, paragraph 57, and
Irish Sugar
, paragraph 112).
Similarly, whilst the fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position cannot deprive it of its entitlement to protect its
own commercial interests when they are attacked, and whilst such an undertaking must be allowed the right to take such reasonable
steps as it deems appropriate to protect those interests, such behaviour cannot be allowed if its purpose is to strengthen
that dominant position and thereby abuse it (
United Brands
, cited in paragraph 210 above, at paragraph 189; Case T-65/89
BPB Industries and British Gypsum
v
Commission
[1993] ECR II-389, paragraph 69; Joined Cases T-24/93 to T-26/93 and T-28/93
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others
v
Commission
[1996] ECR II-1201, paragraph 107, and
Irish Sugar
, paragraph 112).
Concerning more particularly the granting of a rebate by an undertaking in a dominant position, consistent case-law shows
that a fidelity rebate, granted in consideration of an undertaking by the customer to take supplies exclusively or almost
exclusively from a dominant undertaking, is contrary to Article 82 EC.  Such a rebate has the effect, through the granting
of financial advantages, of preventing customers from obtaining supplies from rival producers (Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73,
50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73
Suiker Unie and Others
v
Commission
[1975] ECR 1663, paragraph 518;
Hoffmann-La Roche
, cited in paragraph 182 above, at paragraphs 89 and 90;
Michelin
, cited in paragraph 91 above, at paragraph 71, and
BPB Industries and British Gypsum
, paragraph 120).
More generally, a system of rebates which has the effect of preventing customers from obtaining supplies from market competitors
will be regarded as contrary to Article 82 EC if it is applied by an undertaking in a dominant position.  For that reason,
the Court of Justice has held that a rebate linked to the attainment of a purchasing objective also infringed Article 82 EC
(
Michelin
, paragraph 86).
Quantitative rebate schemes linked exclusively to the volume of purchases made from a dominant producer are generally regarded
as not having the effect of preventing customers from obtaining supplies from competitors, in breach of Article 82 EC (
Michelin
, paragraph 71, and Case C-163/99
Portugal
v
Commission
[2001] ECR I-2613, paragraph 50).  If the increase in the quantity supplied is translated into a lower cost for the supplier,
the latter is entitled to give the customer the benefit of that reduction by means of a more favourable tariff (Opinion of
Advocate General Mischo in
Portugal
v
Commission
, cited above, at point 106).  Quantity rebates are thus deemed to reflect gains in efficiency and economies of scale achieved
by the dominant undertaking.
It follows that a rebate system in which the amount of the rebate increases in relation to the volume purchased will not infringe
Article 82 EC, unless the criteria and rules for granting that rebate show that the system is not based upon an economically
justified consideration but tends, like a fidelity and objective rebate, to prevent customers obtaining supplies from rival
producers (
Hoffmann-La Roche
, cited in paragraph 182 above, at paragraph 90;
Michelin
, cited in paragraph 91 above, at paragraph 73, and
Irish Sugar
, cited in paragraph 241 above, at paragraph 114).
It can be deduced from that case-law generally that any
fidelity-building rebate system applied by an undertaking in a dominant position tends to prevent customers from obtaining supplies from competitors,
in breach of Article 82 EC, irrespective of whether the rebate system is discriminatory.  The same applies to a
fidelity-building performance reward scheme practised by a purchaser in a dominant position in relation to its suppliers of services (see paragraph
101 above).
In
Michelin
, cited in paragraph 91 above, while not upholding the Commission's complaint that the rebate scheme applied by Michelin was
discriminatory, the Court of Justice nevertheless held that such a scheme infringed Article 82 EC in that it made retailers
dependent upon Michelin.
─ Arguments of the parties
BA argues that the Commission merely presumed that BA's practices had an exclusionary effect, contrary to what is required
by the judgment in
Hoffmann-La Roche
, cited in paragraph 182 above.  The contested decision contained no analysis at all of the air transport markets, or any
empirical evidence that BA's performance reward schemes had an adverse effect on competitors, customers or consumers.
The Commission appears to have assumed, without any supporting evidence, that travel agents can control a significant proportion
of ticket sales to the detriment of consumers, whereas, in fact, agents have little influence over travellers' choice of airlines.
BA argues that its performance reward schemes did not prevent its competitors from concluding similar agreements with travel
agents established in the United Kingdom.  Since BA represented less than 50% of the total of ticket sales on the market defined
by the Commission, there was no reason to conclude that other airlines as a whole should find it uneconomic to match BA's
incentives.  The larger agents, accounting for just under 50% of BA's total ticket sales, had negotiated agreements individually
and were thus able to play airlines off against each other.
In any event, the structure of BA's performance rewards did not encourage agents to favour BA over other airlines.  The advantages
granted to agents depended upon a number of factors, such as in particular the level of the target thresholds and the rate
of success of the parties concerned in relation to those thresholds.
The advantages offered by BA were granted in relation to the number of tickets sold and not on the basis of the percentage
of the agent's transactions made on behalf of BA.  Even where an agent increased its sales of BA tickets, BA's share in its
business might diminish and that of other airlines increase in parallel.
BA argues that fidelity agreements are a means of allowing competition to operate and do not in any way distort it.  The size
of the increase in the market shares of other airlines demonstrates that the fidelity agreements could not have had the exclusionary
effect alleged by the Commission.
The advantages granted to travel agents entailed significant cost savings, for the benefit of consumers, by allowing BA greater
latitude to reduce its fares and/or allowing it to offer a greater number of flights on certain air routes.
BA challenges the Commission's criticisms of the structure of its fidelity agreements.  In the first place, the discontinuous
nature of the increase in the fare advantages granted to agents would have been relevant only if, which BA denies, it had
had an exclusionary effect.  It cannot, in any event, be assumed that the discontinuity worked to BA's advantage.  In practice,
across the air transport industry as a whole, it was impossible to predict that the advantages granted would systematically
favour BA or other carriers.
Secondly, calculation of sales targets by reference to performance in the previous year, criticised by the Commission in recitals
48 and 109 of the contested decision, was, BA submits, both sensible for the parties and beneficial in its effects. In any
event, the incentive effect of the agreements at issue could have been measured only over time.
BA notes that those first two objections of the Commission are irrelevant to the performance reward scheme that it implemented
between December 1997 and March 1999.  That scheme provided for both a continuous increase in, and a monthly, rather than
annual, calculation of, the incentive payments made to travel agents.
Thirdly, BA challenges the validity of the Commission's objection, in recitals 48 and 102 of the contested decision, that
there was no relation between the payments made to agents and the economies made in terms of costs.  It maintains that sound
economic policy encourages discounting irrespective of whether any savings are made.  Fidelity agreements were a practical
means of offering incentives linked to performance without having to make the hard, if not impossible, calculation of the
exact relationship, which is highly variable, between the price of a ticket and its cost.  Given the level of fixed costs
in the air transport business, an improvement in capacity utilisation lowers average unit cost and, therefore, yielded BA
a cost saving that it is entitled to share with agents and customers.
BA argues, fourthly, that by attributing the fidelity effects of the contested performance reward schemes to the fact that
BA operates on a wider range of routes than other airlines (recital 91 of the contested decision), the Commission ignores
the fact that the global discount offered by BA was equivalent to paying differential rates of discounts on different routes.
Even if smaller airlines may have a higher average cost of sale, that did not foreclose them from the various markets in
question or prevent them from providing effective competition.
According to the Commission and Virgin,
Hoffmann-La Roche
and
Michelin
establish the principle that a dominant supplier can give discounts that relate to efficiencies, but cannot give discounts
or incentives to encourage customer loyalty (recital 101 of the contested decision).
A rebate granted by an undertaking in a dominant position by reference to an increase in purchases made over a certain period,
without that rebate being capable of being regarded as a normal quantity discount, constitutes an abuse of that dominant position,
since such a practice can only be intended to tie the customers to which it is granted and place competitors in an unfavourable
competitive position (
Irish Sugar
, paragraph 213).
Article 82 EC does not require it to be demonstrated that the conduct in question had any actual or direct effect on consumers.
Competition law concentrates upon protecting the market structure from artificial distortions because by doing so the interests
of the consumer in the medium to long term are best protected.
Where, as in this case, all the determinative features which led the Court to hold that the discount system in
Michelin
constituted an abuse are present, it is not necessary to show that the characteristics and effects of a scheme such as that
condemned by the Court of Justice in
Hoffmann-La Roche
are also present.
The structure of BA's reward schemes was such that, once the agent approached the benchmark for additional commission, the
marginal commission which it earned on every additional BA sector sold increased exponentially.  It was impossible for smaller,
competitor airlines to offer commission rates of that order.  In addition, due to the levels of marginal commission resulting
from the system in question, BA sold a large number of tickets at a loss.
The abuse was committed since the extra commissions were not related to any cost savings or efficiency gains made by BA in
its dealings with travel agents, but rather depended on the extent to which the latter met or exceeded their previous year's
sales of BA tickets regardless of the size or efficiency of the travel agents or the services provided by them to BA.
Since travel agents remain by far the most significant channel of distribution used by airlines to sell air transport in the
United Kingdom, the Commission maintains that BA's abusive conduct on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services
has also had a serious exclusionary effect on its competitor airlines on the United Kingdom markets for air transport.
The fact that, because of the liberalisation of the United Kingdom's air transport markets, BA's competitors have been able
to take market share from BA does not demonstrate that BA's financial incentive schemes did not have anti-competitive effects.
─ Findings of the Court
In order to determine whether BA abused its dominant position by applying its performance reward schemes to travel agents
established in the United Kingdom, it is necessary to consider the criteria and rules governing the granting of those rewards,
and to investigate whether, in providing an advantage not based on any economic service justifying it, they tended to remove
or restrict the agents' freedom to sell their services to the airlines of their choice and thereby hinder the access of BA's
competitor airlines to the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services (see, to that effect,
Hoffmann-La Roche
, paragraph 90;
Michelin
, paragraph 89, and
Irish Sugar
, paragraphs 114 and 197).
It needs to be determined in this case whether the marketing agreements and the new performance reward scheme had a fidelity-building
effect in relation to travel agents established in the United Kingdom and, if they did, whether those schemes were based on
an economically justified consideration (see, to that effect,
Michelin
, paragraph 73;
Portugal
v
Commission
, cited in paragraph 246 above, paragraph 52, and
Irish Sugar
, paragraph 114).
Concerning, first, the fidelity-building character of the schemes in question, the Court finds that, by reason of their progressive
nature with a very noticeable effect at the margin, the increased commission rates were capable of rising exponentially from
one reference period to another, as the number of BA tickets sold by agents during successive reference periods progressed.
Conversely, the higher revenues from BA ticket sales were, the stronger was the penalty suffered by the persons concerned
in the form of a disproportionate reduction in the rates of performance rewards, even in the case of a slight decrease in
sales of BA tickets compared with the previous reference period.  BA cannot therefore deny the fidelity-building character
of the schemes in question.
Nor, in order to deny the fidelity-building effect of its performance reward schemes on travel agents, can BA successfully
rely on the argument that those agents have only a slight influence on travellers' choice of airlines.  BA has itself argued
that those agents provide a useful service filtering information communicated to passengers who are faced with the proliferation
of different air transport fare structures.
Moreover, even if, as BA maintains, the advantages granted to travel agents depended on the level of the target thresholds
and the rate of success obtained in relation to those thresholds, the fidelity-building effect on travel agents arising from
the performance rewards must nevertheless be regarded as established.
Furthermore, BA's objection that its
fidelity agreements did not prevent its competitors from concluding similar agreements with travel agents established in the United Kingdom does
not carry conviction.  BA's five main competitors on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services cannot be regarded
as having been in a position to grant the same advantages to travel agents.
It should be remembered in that respect that, during the whole of the period during which the disputed performance reward
schemes were applied, the number of BA tickets sold by travel agents established in the United Kingdom in respect of air routes
to and from United Kingdom airports invariably represented a multiple both of the ticket sales achieved by each of those five
main competitors and of the cumulative total of those sales.
In those circumstances, it has been demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that the rival undertakings were not in a
position to attain in the United Kingdom a level of revenue capable of constituting a sufficiently broad financial base to
allow them effectively to establish a reward scheme similar to BA's in order to counteract the exclusionary effect of that
scheme against them on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services.
Concerning, secondly, the question whether the performance reward schemes applied by BA were based on an economically justified
consideration, it is true that the fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position cannot deprive it of its entitlement,
within reason, to perform the actions which it considers appropriate in order to protect its own commercial interests when
they are threatened (
Irish Sugar
, paragraph 112).
However, the protection of the competitive position of an undertaking which, like BA, occupies a dominant position must, at
the very least, in order to be lawful, be based on criteria of economic efficiency (
Irish Sugar
, paragraph 189).
In this case, BA does not appear to have demonstrated that the fidelity-building character of its performance reward schemes
was based on an economically justified consideration.
The achievement of sales growth targets for BA tickets by travel agents established in the United Kingdom resulted in the
application of a higher rate of commission not just on the BA tickets sold once those sales targets had been met but on all
BA tickets handled during the reference period in question.
The additional remuneration of the agents thus appears to bear no objective relation to the consideration arising for BA from
the sale of the additional air tickets.
To that extent, BA's performance reward schemes cannot be regarded as constituting the consideration for efficiency gains
or cost savings resulting from the sale of BA tickets after attainment of the said objectives.  On the contrary, that retrospective
application of increased commission rates to all BA tickets sold by a travel agent during the reference period in question
must even be regarded as likely to entail the sale of certain BA tickets at a price disproportionate to the productivity gain
obtained by BA from the sale of those extra tickets.
Even if, as BA maintains, any airline has an interest in selling extra seats on its flights rather than leaving them unoccupied,
the advantage represented by a better rate of occupancy of the aircraft must, in a case such as the present, normally be considerably
reduced by reason of the extra cost incurred by BA through the increase in the remuneration of the agent arising from that
retrospective application of the increased commission.
Being thus devoid of any economically justified consideration, the disputed performance reward schemes must be regarded as
tending essentially to remunerate sales growth of BA tickets from one reference period to another and thus reinforce the fidelity
to BA of travel agents established in the territory of the United Kingdom.
Agents were thereby deterred from offering their travel agency services to airlines in competition with BA, whose entry into
or progress in the United Kingdom market for travel agency services was thereby necessarily hindered.
BA can have had no interest in applying its reward schemes other than ousting rival airlines and thereby hindering maintenance
of the existing level of competition or the development of that competition on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency
services.
In particular, BA cannot validly argue that, above a certain aircraft occupancy rate, additional ticket sales necessarily
generate profits.  As has just been mentioned, the consideration for ticket sales carried out by an agent once the latter's
sales growth target had been reached represented an additional cost, in the form of retrospective application of the increased
commission to all BA tickets sold during the reference period in question, which was liable to be equal to, or greater than,
that profit.
Moreover, BA itself acknowledged at the hearing that there was no precise relationship between, on the one hand, any economies
of scale achieved by virtue of extra BA tickets being sold after the attainment of the sales objectives and, on the other,
the increases in the rates of remuneration paid by way of consideration to travel agents established in the United Kingdom.
Contrary to what BA maintains, its performance reward schemes could not therefore constitute a mode of exercise of the normal
operation of competition or allow it to reduce its costs.  The opposite arguments by BA in that regard are not capable of
demonstrating that its performance reward schemes had an objective economic justification.
The Commission was therefore right to hold that BA abused its dominant position on the United Kingdom market for air travel
agency services by restricting, through the application of performance reward schemes not based on a justified economic consideration,
the freedom of those agents to supply their services to the airlines of their choice and, in consequence, restricting the
access of those airlines to the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services.
Finally, BA cannot accuse the Commission of failing to demonstrate that its practices produced an exclusionary effect.  In
the first place, for the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article 82 EC, it is not necessary to demonstrate that
the abuse in question had a concrete effect on the markets concerned.  It is sufficient in that respect to demonstrate that
the abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition, or, in other words, that the
conduct is capable of having, or likely to have, such an effect.
Moreover, it appears not only that the disputed practices were indeed likely to have a restrictive effect on the United Kingdom
markets for air travel agency services and air transport, but also that such an effect has been demonstrated in a concrete
way by the Commission.
Since, at the time of the conduct complained of, travel agents established in the United Kingdom carried out 85% of all air
ticket sales in the territory of the United Kingdom, BA's abusive conduct on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency
services cannot fail to have had the effect of excluding competing airlines (to their detriment) from the United Kingdom air
transport markets, by reason of the close nexus existing between the markets in question, as has been established in the examination
of the fourth plea.
By reason of that effect produced by the reward schemes applied by BA on the United Kingdom air transport markets, the Court
cannot accept BA's argument that the contested decision contains no analysis of the air transport markets or empirical proof
of the damage which its financial incentive schemes caused to competitor airlines or to travellers.
Furthermore, where an undertaking in a dominant position actually puts into operation a practice generating the effect of
ousting its competitors, the fact that the hoped-for result is not achieved is not sufficient to prevent a finding of abuse
of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC.
Moreover, the growth in the market shares of some of BA's airline competitors, which was modest in absolute value having regard
to the small size of their original market shares, does not mean that BA's practices had no effect.  In the absence of those
practices, it may legitimately be considered that the market shares of those competitors would have been able to grow more
significantly (see, to that effect,
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports
, paragraph 149).
The Commission did not therefore make any errors of assessment in holding that BA contravened Article 82 EC by applying to
air travel agents in the United Kingdom performance reward schemes that were both discriminatory against some of their beneficiaries
in relation to others and had as their object and effect, without any economically justified consideration, the reward of
the loyalty of those agents to BA and thereby the ousting of rival airlines both from the United Kingdom market for air travel
agency services and, as a necessary consequence, from the United Kingdom air travel markets.
The seventh plea in law must therefore be dismissed.
The eighth plea in law, alleging that the amount of the fine was excessive
Arguments of the parties
BA considers that the EUR 6.8 million fine imposed on it is excessive having regard to the Commission's Guidelines on the
method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (OJ 1998
C 9, p. 3;
the Guidelines).
The fine's basic amount of EUR 4 million, set to reflect the serious nature, extent and impact of the infringement, is excessive
in the light of paragraph 1.A of the Guidelines.  According to that provision, in assessing the gravity of the infringement,
it is necessary to take into account the effective economic capacity of offenders to cause significant damage to other operators,
in particular consumers.   In this case, BA argues, it has not in any way been established that BA's reward schemes have harmed
consumers.
In accordance with the third indent of paragraph 1.B of the Guidelines, infringements of long duration are subject to an increase
of 10% per year in the amount determined for gravity.  The increase in the amount of the fine by 70%, namely 10% per year
since 1992, is disproportionate.  The duration of BA's conduct reflects the slow progress of the Commission's own inquiry.
Throughout the proceeding, BA honestly believed that its financial incentive schemes complied with Community law.
BA argues that its reasonable doubt as to whether its reward schemes constituted an infringement and its full cooperation
with the Commission throughout the administrative proceedings were extenuating circumstances warranting a reduction of the
fine pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Guidelines.
The Commission replies that the abuse of a dominant position which has been established should be regarded as a serious breach
of Community competition law.  Schemes of exclusionary rebates have already been condemned in the past.  The significance
of travel costs to the United Kingdom economy has been stressed and it has been noted that, despite the liberalisation of
air transport, BA had preserved its average market share on the United Kingdom markets for air transport.
The Commission recalls that Article 82 EC is aimed not only at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but
also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competitive structure.
Moreover, abuses of a dominant position consisting, in particular, of discrimination, exclusionary conduct, and loyalty discounts
made by an undertaking in a dominant position in order to shut its competitors out of the market, were categorised as
serious infringements by the Guidelines.
With respect to certain travel agents, the abusive practices at issue started in 1992. From January 1998 to March 1999, the
performance reward scheme extended the abusive conduct to all United Kingdom travel agents and reinforced its effect on agents
party to marketing agreements.  The duration of those practices justified a 70% increase in the fine imposed for the gravity
of the infringement.
The duration of the administrative procedure, the reasonableness of which is to be determined in relation to the particular
circumstances of each case (
Irish Sugar
, paragraph 278), was not excessive and did not explain the duration of the infringements found to exist.
Whereas a mitigating factor, according to the Guidelines, is the termination of the infringement as soon as the Commission
intervenes, it should be noted that after receipt of the first Statement of Objections dated 20 December 1996, BA extended
to all United Kingdom travel agents the performance reward schemes which, until then, had been applied only to those meeting
a specified amount of annual sales of BA tickets.
Findings of the Court
Since Article 82 EC is aimed at penalising even an objective detriment to the structure of competition itself (Case 6/72
Europemballage and Continental Can
v
Commission
[1973] ECR 215, paragraph 26), BA's argument that there is no proof of damage caused to consumers by its reward schemes cannot
be accepted.
Nor can BA criticise the increase in the basic amount of the fine imposed by referring to the delays in the Commission's investigation,
which was undoubtedly prolonged on account of BA's persistence in its unlawful conduct and the aggravation of that conduct.
The very next month after the hearing which followed the first statement of objections, held on 12 November 1997, BA reinforced
the anti-competitive effects of its initial performance reward scheme by extending its new system of incentives to all United
Kingdom air travel agencies.
Having disregarded the Commission's objections to its first performance reward scheme, BA cannot naturally be regarded as
having believed in good faith, throughout the administrative procedure, that its incentive schemes were compatible with Community
competition law.
Nor, finally, having intensified its restrictive practices during the administrative procedure, is BA justified in pleading
its full cooperation with the Commission throughout that procedure.  The Commission was therefore right to refuse BA the benefit
of extenuating circumstances.
The amount of the fine determined by the Commission must therefore be confirmed, since it was fixed at a level which both
corresponded to the Guidelines and constituted an appropriate penalty in all the circumstances of the case.
BA's arguments that the fine imposed on it was excessive must therefore be rejected.
It follows from the whole of the above that the application must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay
the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party's pleadings.
Since BA has failed in all its pleadings, it must be ordered to pay, in addition to its own costs, the costs incurred by the
Commission and the intervener Virgin, as those parties have pleaded.
On those grounds,
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (First Chamber)
hereby:
1.
Dismisses the application;
2.
Orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission and by the intervener.
Vesterdorf
Jaeger
Legal
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 17 December 2003.
H. Jung
B. Vesterdorf
Registrar
President
–
Language of the case: English.