CELEX: 62007CJ0431
Appeals
State aid
Article 88(2) EC
Conditions for initiation of the formal investigation procedure
Serious difficulties
Criteria for establishing the existence of State aid
State resources
Principle of non-discrimination

By their appeal, Bouygues SA (‘Bouygues’) and Bouygues Télécom SA (‘Bouygues Télécom’) (‘Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom’ or
‘the appellants’) are asking the Court to set aside the judgment in Case T‑475/04
Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom
v
Commission
[2007] ECR II‑2097 (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the Court of First Instance dismissed their action for annulment
of the Commission decision of 20 July 2004 (State aid NN 42/2004 – France) regarding the modification of payments due from
Orange and SFR for Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) licences (‘the contested decision’).

Community legal context
Article 8(4) of Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for
general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services (OJ 1997 L 117, p. 15), in force
at the material time, provided as follows:
‘Member States may amend the conditions attached to an individual licence in objectively justified cases and in a proportionate
manner. When doing so, Member States shall give appropriate notice of their intention to do so and enable interested parties
to express their views on the proposed amendments.’
The first indent of Article 9(2) of Directive 97/13 was worded as follows:
‘Where a Member State intends to grant individual licences:
–        it shall grant individual licences through open, non-discriminatory and transparent procedures and, to this end, shall subject
all applicants to the same procedures, unless there is an objective reason for differentiation’.
The first subparagraph of Article 10(3) of Directive 97/13 provided as follows:
‘Member States shall grant such individual licences on the basis of selection criteria which must be objective, non-discriminatory,
detailed, transparent and proportionate. Any such selection must give due weight to the need to facilitate the development
of competition and to maximise benefits for users.’
Article 11 of Directive 97/13 stated the following:
‘1.      Member States shall ensure that any fees imposed on undertakings as part of authorisation procedures seek only to cover the
administrative costs incurred in the issue, management, control and enforcement of the applicable individual licences. The
fees for an individual licence shall be proportionate to the work involved and be published in an appropriate and sufficiently
detailed manner, so as to be readily accessible.
2.      Notwithstanding paragraph 1, Member States may, where scarce resources are to be used, allow their national regulatory authorities
to impose charges which reflect the need to ensure the optimal use of these resources. Those charges shall be non-discriminatory
and take into particular account the need to foster the development of innovative services and competition.’
The aim of Decision No 128/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 1998 on the coordinated introduction
of a third-generation mobile and wireless communications system (UMTS) in the Community (OJ 1999 L 17, p. 1), still in force
at the material time, was, according to Article 1 thereof, ‘… to facilitate the rapid and coordinated introduction of compatible
UMTS networks and services in the Community …’.
Article 3(1) of Decision No 128/1999 provided as follows:
‘Member States shall take all actions necessary in order to allow, in accordance with Article 1 of Directive 97/13/EC, the
coordinated and progressive introduction of the UMTS services on their territory by 1 January 2002 at the latest …’.

Background to the dispute
On 28 July 2000, the French Minister for Industry, Postal Services and Telecommunications launched a call for applications
for the award of four licences for the introduction of UMTS mobile and wireless communications systems in metropolitan France.
The final date for lodging applications was set at 31 January 2001, and applications could be withdrawn until 31 May 2001.
Since only two applications were received – from Société française du radiotéléphone – SFR (‘SFR’) and from France Télécom
mobiles, which a few months later became Orange France SA (‘Orange’) – the French authorities considered that a further call
for applications was necessary in order to ensure genuine competition.
By two identically worded letters dated 22 February 2001, the Minister for the Economy and Finance and the Secretary of State
for Industry assured the managers of SFR and Orange that ‘the terms of the call for further applications … [would] ensure
the equitable treatment of all the operators who [would] ultimately be granted a licence’.
Without waiting for the launch of the supplementary call for applications, two initial UMTS licences were issued to SFR and
Orange by two decrees dated 18 July 2001. Those two licences were granted in return for payment of fees amounting in total
to EUR 4 954 593 000, to be paid in instalments, the first of which was due on 31 September 2001 and the last on 30 June 2016.
Following the launch of the supplementary call for applications, the third UMTS licence was awarded to Bouygues Télécom on
3 December 2002. A fourth licence could not be awarded for lack of an applicant.
The third licence was awarded in return for payment of fees consisting of a fixed component in the amount of EUR 619 209 795.27,
to be paid on 30 September of the year in which the licence was awarded or at the time of the award if that date fell after
30 September, and a variable component to be paid annually before 30 June of each year for the use of the frequencies during
the preceding year and calculated as a percentage of the turnover generated through the use of those frequencies.
Moreover, in two further decrees of 3 December 2002 (JORF of 12 December 2002, p. 20498 and p. 20499) concerning SFR and Orange
respectively, the Minister for Industry amended, inter alia, the provisions regarding fees for the provision and operation
of frequencies by replacing them with provisions identical to those applied to Bouygues Télécom, as described in the preceding
paragraph of the present judgment.
On 31 January 2003, following a complaint from Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom concerning a series of aid measures which the
French authorities had adopted in favour of France Télécom, the Commission of the European Communities initiated the investigation
procedure laid down in Article 88(2) EC with regard to some of those measures, but not the measure aligning the fees due from
SFR and Orange with those fixed for Bouygues Télécom.
By the contested decision, the Commission decided on the basis of Article 88 EC not to raise objections to the measure aligning
the fees, on the ground that it did not entail aid elements for the purposes of Article 87(1) EC.
By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 24 November 2004, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom brought
an action for annulment of the contested decision.

The judgment under appeal
In support of their action at first instance, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom put forward, inter alia, two pleas in law alleging
infringement by the Commission, first, of Article 87(1) EC inasmuch as the amendment of the fees to be paid by Orange and
SFR constituted, in their view, State aid within the meaning of that provision and, secondly, of Article 88(2) EC inasmuch
as the case gave rise to serious difficulties and the Commission should therefore have initiated the formal procedure laid
down in that provision.
The Court of First Instance considered those two pleas together and ruled solely on the existence of serious difficulties.
In paragraph 93 of the judgment under appeal, it stated that if such difficulties existed, the contested decision could be
annulled on that ground alone, because of the failure to initiate the inter partes and detailed examination provided for in
the EC Treaty, even if it were not established that the Commission’s assessments as to substance were wrong in law or in fact.
In the context of that examination, in paragraphs 95 to 126 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance first
rejected the arguments intended to demonstrate the existence of a selective advantage of a temporal nature from which Orange
and SFR had benefited by reason of the fact that the first two UMTS licences had been awarded to those two companies before
Bouygues Télécom obtained the third licence. The Court also held, in paragraph 126 of the judgment, that the making of the
related assessment did not constitute a serious difficulty.
The Court of First Instance noted first, in that regard, in paragraphs 100 and 106 of the judgment under appeal, that the
licences in question had an economic value and that, consequently, it was necessary to concede to Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom
the point that, by reducing the fees to be paid by Orange and SFR, the national authorities had waived their right to a significant
part of State resources.
However, the Court of First Instance went on to point out, in paragraph 107 of the judgment under appeal, that the claims
on Orange and SFR which the French State had waived were not certain. It added: ‘[f]irst, in the context of the procedure
for the first call for applications, these two operators could have withdrawn their applications until 31 May 2001 if they
had not received assurances that they would be treated equally with the other operators … and secondly they could at any time
thereafter relinquish the benefit of the licence and as a result cease to pay the fee, especially if they felt they were being
treated unfairly by comparison with Bouygues Télécom.’
The Court of First Instance also noted, in paragraph 111 of the judgment under appeal, that in any event the waiving of those
claims did not constitute State aid, given the special nature of Community telecommunications law as opposed to the ordinary
law on State aid.
Lastly, in paragraphs 113 and 116 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance held that although there was an
objective difference between the situation of Orange and SFR, on the one hand, and that of Bouygues Télécom, on the other,
as regards the time when they were awarded their respective licences, problems associated with the UMTS technology and an
unfavourable economic climate for its development prevented the first two licensees from entering the market, hence from making
use in practice of the advantage that they could have enjoyed as a result of receiving their licences earlier.
In any event, the Court of First Instance concluded, in paragraph 123 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘the advantage potentially
granted to Orange and SFR was the only way to avoid adopting, in breach of Directive 97/13, a measure which, given the significant
difference between the two successive fee regimes devised by the national authorities, would have discriminated against these
two operators when, first, no operator was present in the market at the date of the disputed amendment owing to the delay
suffered by Orange and SFR in the introduction of their UMTS services … and, secondly, the characteristics of the licences
of the three competing operators were identical’.
Secondly, in paragraphs 127 to 156 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance rejected the arguments by which
Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom sought to show that the amendment of the fees breached the principle of non-discrimination and
held that making the assessment of compliance with that principle did not constitute a serious difficulty necessitating the
initiation of the investigation procedure provided for in Article 88 EC.
On the one hand, in paragraphs 134 and 136 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance held that, despite the
way in which it was actually organised, the procedure for awarding UMTS licences constituted, in reality, a single procedure
aimed at the award of four licences and that, consequently, for the purposes of applying the principle of non-discrimination,
the two calls for applications had to be treated as a single procedure.
On the other hand, in paragraph 148 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance held that since the content
of the three licences was identical and since no operator had entered the market at the date on which the fees due from Orange
and SFR were amended, the solution adopted – retroactive amendment of the fees – enabled the French authorities not only to
ensure equal treatment for the three operators concerned but also to avoid delays in the launch of the UMTS services provided
for in Directive 97/13.
Thirdly, in paragraphs 157 and 158 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance also held that neither the complexity
of the case nor the duration of the procedure before the Commission were such that it could be inferred that examination of
the measure aligning the fees posed serious difficulties.
On the basis of those considerations, the Court of First Instance dismissed the action before it.

Forms of order sought
By their appeal, the appellants claim that the Court should:
–        set aside the judgment under appeal and refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for judgment in the light of the
legal views expressed by the Court of Justice;
–        order the Commission to pay the costs.
The Commission, the French Republic, Orange and SFR contend that the Court should dismiss the appeal and order the appellants
to pay the costs.

The request for the reopening of the oral procedure
By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 17 November 2008, the appellants submitted a request to the
Court for the reopening of the oral procedure, pursuant to Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure.
In support of their request, they argue that certain points raised by the Advocate General in her Opinion are new and are
likely to influence the Court’s decision.
In that regard, it should be noted that the Court may of its own motion, or on a proposal of the Advocate General, or at the
request of the parties order the reopening of the oral procedure, in accordance with Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure,
if it considers that it has insufficient information or that the case should be settled on the basis of an argument that has
not been debated between the parties (see, inter alia, the order in Case C‑17/98
Emesa Sugar
[2000] ECR I-665, paragraph 18; Case C‑181/02 P
Commission
v
Kvaerner Warnow Werft
[2004] ECR I‑5703, paragraph 25; and Case C‑284/06
Burda
[2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37).
However, in the present case, after hearing the Advocate General, the Court considers that it has all the information necessary
to decide the appeal lodged by the appellants and that that information has been the subject of debate before it. Consequently,
the request for the reopening of the oral procedure must be refused.

The appeal
The appellants put forward four grounds of appeal, alleging, respectively: breach of the obligation to state reasons; an error
of law with regard to the absence of serious difficulties; errors in the legal assessment of the facts; and, lastly, a number
of errors of law in the application of Article 87 EC.

The first ground of appeal, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons in relation to the application of the exception
based on the nature and general scheme of the system
Arguments of the parties
By their first ground of appeal, the appellants complain that the Court of First Instance failed to provide a sufficient statement
of reasons as regards the application to the present case of the exception based on the nature and general scheme of the system,
as a rule derogating from the principle that differential treatment in favour of one or more undertakings necessarily constitutes
a selective advantage. More specifically, the judgment under appeal does not contain a sufficiently clear statement of reasons
either as regards the content of that exception or as regards the causal link between the exception and the waiver of a significant
part of State resources.
In particular, the appellants refer to various circumstances which could, in their view, justify reference to the general
scheme of the system in the present case: the special nature of Community telecommunications law as opposed to the ordinary
law on State aid; the need to meet the launch deadline of 1 January 2002, fixed by Article 3(1) of Decision No 128/1999; or
the search for four operators in order to ensure a sufficient degree of competition. Nevertheless, the appellants argue that
none of those circumstances is decisive or, in any event, the subject of a sufficient statement of reasons on the part of
the Court of First Instance.
On the other hand, the Commission, the French Republic, Orange and SFR contend that the judgment under appeal provides sufficient
reasons on that point in so far as it refers extensively to the legal framework and to the relevant case-law in order to assess
the exception.
The Commission and SFR contend that an assessment of the circumstances referred to by the appellants is part of the analysis
of the merits of the judgment under appeal and is separate from the question whether there is a sufficient statement of reasons.
The French Republic contends, in that regard, that, contrary to the appellants’ argument, those sets of circumstances are
perfectly consistent and complementary. SFR adds that, in any event, the first ground of appeal is inadmissible since the
appellants are in fact contesting the assessment of the facts made by the Court of First Instance.
Findings of the Court
It should be noted first of all that the duty incumbent upon the Court of First Instance under Article 36 and the first paragraph
of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice to state reasons for its judgments does not require the Court of First
Instance to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the
case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the measures
in question were taken and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its powers of review
(Case C‑397/03 P
Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients
v
Commission
[2006] ECR I‑4429, paragraph 60, and Case C‑3/06 P
Groupe Danone
v
Commission
[2007] ECR I‑1331, paragraph 46).
It should be noted in the present case, however, that the Court of First Instance indicated the reasons why it considered
that, by reason of the general scheme of the system of Community telecommunications law, the waiver of the claims at issue
was not covered by the concept of State aid incompatible with Community law.
In paragraphs 108 to 110 of the judgment under appeal, in particular, the Court of First Instance explained at length the
Community framework for telecommunications services as set up by Directive 97/13 and Decision No 128/1999. In particular,
it held that although the Member States are free to choose the procedure for the award of UMTS licences, they are required
to comply with equality of treatment between operators, account being taken of the time when each of the operators concerned
entered the market.
In addition, according to paragraph 109 of the judgment under appeal, Article 11(2) of Directive 97/13 has been interpreted
in Community case-law as requiring that the fees charged to different operators be equivalent in economic terms.
It follows, according to the Court of First Instance, that the French authorities had no choice in the circumstances of the
present case but to reduce the fees due from Orange and SFR and, therefore, to waive the claims at issue, so as to make the
amount equivalent to that charged to Bouygues Télécom.
Accordingly, it is apparent from paragraphs 108 to 110 that the circumstances justifying the application in the present case
of the exception based on the general scheme of the system – that is to say, the obligation on the national authorities to
comply with the requirements of equal treatment specifically laid down in Community telecommunications law – were clearly
identified by the Court of First Instance.
Furthermore, the other circumstances referred to by the appellants are based on an erroneous reading of the judgment under
appeal.
First, contrary to the appellants’ argument, the Court of First Instance in no way examined the need to meet the deadline
of 1 January 2002, fixed by Article 3(1) of Decision No 128/1999 as the date on which UMTS had to be introduced in the territory
of the Member States, as a characteristic of the system. In reality, it took account of that factor in paragraph 141 of the
judgment under appeal only to assess the reasons why the French authorities decided not to recommence the entire award procedure
ab initio.
Secondly, it is made expressly clear in paragraphs 11 and 138 of the judgment under appeal that the need to ‘select a sufficient
number of operators to guarantee effective competition in the sector’ was taken into account by the Court of First Instance
not as a characteristic of the system, but solely in order to conclude that the first call for applications had not produced
a satisfactory result, given the need to ensure competition in the sector, and that, consequently, other operators had to
be sought.
Lastly, with regard to the allegedly insufficient nature of the grounds stated for the judgment under appeal as regards the
causal link between the nature of the system and the waiver of the claims at issue against Orange and SFR, it is sufficient
to point out that the Court of First Instance, in paragraph 123 of its judgment, set out the reasons why it concluded that
such a link existed by holding that since the characteristics of the three UMTS licences were identical, maintaining the initial
amount of the fees due from Orange and SFR would inevitably have involved a breach, to their detriment, of the obligations
specifically laid down with regard to equal treatment by Community telecommunications law.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the grounds stated for the judgment under appeal make it
possible, to the requisite legal standard, to understand the reasons for which the Court of First Instance held that, by reason
of the general scheme of the system, the reduction in the fees due from Orange and SFR and, accordingly, the waiver of the
claims against them could not be regarded as State aid.
The first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

The second ground of appeal, alleging an error of law with regard to the absence of serious difficulties
Arguments of the parties
By their second ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance confused the assessment of the existence
of serious difficulties with that of the merits of the contested decision. In particular, in order to establish that the Commission
was not under an obligation to initiate the investigation procedure, the Court of First Instance merely added formally, after
weighing the merits of each of the pleas in law relied upon by the parties, that such an investigation did not constitute
a serious difficulty.
In reality, the existence of serious difficulties was confirmed by the fact that, in the judgment under appeal, the Court
of First Instance replaced the Commission’s assessment of several complex matters with its own, repudiating in part the analysis
contained in the contested decision.
The Commission challenges the admissibility of this ground of appeal inasmuch as it was not raised at first instance. For
its part, the French Republic argues that it was only by way of alternative that Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom raised before
the Court of First Instance the need to initiate the formal aid investigation procedure provided for in Article 88 EC.
With regard to the substance of the case, the Commission, the French Republic, SFR and Orange argue that the approach taken
by the Court of First Instance is correct in law and is not the result of confusion. In addition, in Orange’s view, the Court
carried out precisely the kind of analysis which the appellants required. The Commission adds that the factors on which the
Court of First Instance based its findings are the same as those on which the contested decision is based. That proves that
those factors were sufficient in order to resolve the matters to which the appellants refer.
With regard to the alleged repudiation of the Commission’s analysis, the French Republic contends that the Court of First
Instance did not replace the Commission’s assessment with its own, since the judgment under appeal is largely based on the
analysis contained in the contested decision. In addition, the Commission, SFR and Orange consider that the various assessments
carried out by the Court were intended merely to respond to the arguments put forward by Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom in
their action. In particular, SFR adds that the Court could not have considered the absence of serious difficulty without carrying
out a deeper analysis of the factors at the Commission’s disposal. In any event, in the latter’s view, that argument is not
only inadmissible inasmuch as it relates to an assessment of the facts, but it does not even establish in what way an assessment
on the part of the Court which differed from that of the Commission could affect the existence of serious difficulties and
the validity of the judgment under appeal.
Findings of the Court
It should be pointed out first of all that, contrary to the Commission’s argument, this ground of appeal does not challenge
the validity of the contested decision but alleges that the Court of First Instance erred in law when it examined the contents
of that decision in order to ascertain whether serious difficulties existed.
It follows that the second ground of appeal is admissible.
With regard to the merits of this ground, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the procedure under
Article 88(2) EC is essential whenever the Commission has serious difficulties in determining whether aid is compatible with
the common market. The Commission may therefore restrict itself to the preliminary examination under Article 88(3) EC when
taking a decision in favour of aid only if it is able to satisfy itself after the preliminary examination that the aid is
compatible with the common market. If, on the other hand, the initial examination leads the Commission to the opposite conclusion
or if it does not enable it to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the
common market, the Commission is under a duty to obtain all the requisite opinions and for that purpose to initiate the procedure
provided for in Article 88(2) EC (see, inter alia, Case C‑198/91
Cook
v
Commission
[1993] ECR I‑2487, paragraph 29; Case C‑367/95 P
Commission
v
Sytraval and Brink’s France
[1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 39; and Case C‑521/06 P
Athinaïki Techniki
v
Commission
[2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 34).
In the present case, as is apparent from the very title of the relevant section of the judgment under appeal, which deals
with ‘[t]he second and third pleas, based on infringement of Article 87(1) EC and Article 88(2) EC respectively’, the Court
of First Instance, in paragraphs 95 to 160 of the judgment under appeal, examined the second plea in law, alleging infringement
of Article 87(1) EC and concerning the interpretation of the concept of selective advantage and the principle of non-discrimination,
together with the third plea, alleging infringement of Article 88(2) EC on the ground that the Commission had failed to initiate
the formal investigation phase even though the measure aligning fees raised serious difficulties.
That approach is justified in view of the fact that, as the Advocate General remarked in points 208 and 214 of her Opinion,
the concept of serious difficulties is an objective one and their existence must be sought not only in the circumstances in
which the contested measure was adopted but also in the assessments upon which the Commission relied (see, in that regard,
Cook
v
Commission
, paragraphs 30 and 31).
However, the Court of First Instance carried out precisely such an examination when it analysed the reasons for which the
Commission had considered that the measure aligning fees did not constitute a selective advantage and that it did not infringe
the principle of non-discrimination.
The Court of First Instance thus did not err in law when it examined the Commission’s assessments in order to evaluate whether
they had been established on the basis of sufficient information and whether they were such as to enable the existence of
any serious difficulty to be ruled out.
Moreover, in their appeal, the appellants themselves admit that the Court of First Instance was right, in paragraph 93 of
the judgment under appeal, to conclude from the case-law that ‘[it was] therefore necessary to examine the applicants’ arguments
against the contested decision regarding the existence of serious difficulties. If such difficulties [exist], the decision
could be annulled on that ground alone, because of the failure to initiate the inter partes and detailed examination laid
down in the Treaty, even if it [were] not established that the Commission’s assessments as to substance were wrong in law
or in fact’.
In any event, the fact of dealing with pleas together required the Court of First Instance not to limit itself solely to assessing
the existence of serious difficulties but also to respond to the arguments raised by Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom in support
of their second plea for annulment, concerning the merits of the Commission’s assessments.
However, it must be held, in that regard, that the substitutions of reasoning alleged by the appellants are, in fact, merely
responses to their arguments.
Thus, first of all, the appellants’ argument that the Court of First Instance substituted its own assessment for that contained
in the contested decision when it decided, in paragraphs 105, 109 and 110 of the judgment under appeal, that UMTS services
had a market value is unfounded.
As is apparent from paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal, and as the Advocate General remarked in point 222 of her Opinion,
the Commission did not put forward the contrary argument – that such services had no economic value – until the hearing before
the Court of First Instance, whereas the contested decision was based on other considerations. In those circumstances, there
cannot be any substitution of reasoning on the part of the Court of First Instance.
The same is true, secondly, with regard to the claim that the Court of First Instance substituted its own assessment for that
made in the contested decision when, in paragraphs 113 to 121 of the judgment under appeal, it held that Orange and SFR enjoyed
a potential temporal advantage by reason of having been awarded their licences earlier.
Even supposing that, in responding to one of the arguments put forward by Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom, the Court of First
Instance reached a conclusion different from that adopted by the Commission in the contested decision, the fact remains that,
in paragraphs 123 to 125 of the judgment under appeal, it confirmed, in the alternative and without substituting reasons,
the Commission’s reasoning that the absence of a selective advantage resulted from the application of the Community framework
for telecommunications services.
Thirdly, the Court cannot accept the appellants’ argument that the Court of First Instance substituted its own assessment
for that of the Commission when it held, in paragraphs 131 and 132 of the judgment under appeal, that Orange and SFR, on the
one hand, and Bouygues Télécom, on the other, were not in a comparable situation because the latter undertaking risked being
unable to introduce its UMTS services or being able to do so only after a delay.
It should be noted in that regard that the contested decision had ruled out any discrimination, not because the three operators
were in a comparable situation, but because of the application of the Community framework for telecommunications services,
which made necessary the solution adopted by the French authorities. Consequently, whether those operators were or were not
in a comparable situation with regard to the risks which they undertook was not something which influenced the Commission’s
position.
Fourthly and finally, the Court also considers to be without foundation the claim that the Court of First Instance substituted
its assessment for the Commission’s when, in paragraphs 137 to 153 of the judgment under appeal, it analysed the various options
open to the French authorities and their effect on the equal treatment of the undertakings to which licences were awarded.
In reality, as the Advocate General remarked in point 225 of her Opinion, the Commission had already taken account of these
options in the contested decision, which means that the Court of First Instance did not replace the Commission’s statement
of reasons with its own.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be held that, even if, when it examined some of the arguments raised
at first instance by Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom, the Court of First Instance reached different conclusions from those reached
by the Commission in the contested decision, none of the assessments made by the Court suggest that the Commission’s conclusions
are not well founded or that serious difficulties exist.
The second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

The fourth ground of appeal, alleging errors in the application of Article 87 EC
The fourth ground of appeal, which must be considered before the third, is divided into three branches.
The first and second branches of the fourth ground of appeal
–       Arguments of the parties
By the first branch of this ground, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance erred in law by concluding that
the exception based on the general scheme of the system made it impossible for the French State, in the present case, not
to waive the claims against Orange and SFR. In reality, since the general scheme of the system requires that the maximum number
of operators be sought, the French authorities could either have re-commenced the entire procedure ab initio or, as in the
present case, made a new call for applications.
However, in the latter case, those authorities should have applied different economic conditions. Contrary to what the Court
of First Instance held, such conditions would not have given rise to any discrimination, since the undertakings initially
awarded licences were not in the same situation as those who would have been chosen following a new call for applications
since, on the one hand, the former were certain of retaining their UMTS licences, without the new applicants being able to
challenge that situation, and, on the other, they had prior rights, which in itself was an obvious advantage.
According to Orange and SFR, this branch of the fourth ground of appeal is inadmissible inasmuch as it seeks a new assessment
of pleas put forward at first instance.
In any event, the Commission, the French Republic, SFR and Orange contend that the Court of First Instance examined the other
options which could have been envisaged by the French authorities and concluded, in the light of the need to comply not only
with the principles of equal treatment and free competition but also with the deadline of 1 January 2002, laid down in Article
3(1) of Decision No 128/1999, that the option ultimately chosen by the French authorities was the only one which ensured respect
for those principles and that it was therefore ‘inevitable’.
By the second branch of the fourth ground of appeal, the appellants argue that the Court of First Instance committed several
errors of law when it concluded that Orange and SFR had obtained no selective advantage.
–       Findings of the Court
It should be pointed out first of all that the two arguments put forward by the appellants in support of their claim that
charging Orange and SFR UMTS fees of a different amount than those charged to Bouygues Télécom did not involve discrimination
against the former two undertakings are inadmissible.
It follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c)
of the Court’s Rules of Procedure that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the
appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (order in Case
C‑488/01 P
Martinez
v
Parliament
[2003] ECR I‑13355, paragraph 40, and Case C‑227/04 P
Lindorfer
v
Council
[2007] ECR I‑6767, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited therein).
However, in support of the first of those two arguments – namely, that Orange and SFR were certain of retaining their licences,
without the other applicants being able to challenge that situation – the appellants do not claim that there has been any
error of law in that part of the grounds for the judgment under appeal, in particular paragraph 144 thereof, in which the
Court of First Instance held that the three operators were in a comparable situation.
With regard to the second of those arguments – to the effect that SFR and Orange obtained an advantage by having been awarded
their licences earlier – it must also be stated that the appellants put forward no argument challenging the Court’s assessment
in that regard, which is set out, in particular, in paragraphs 115 to 122 of the judgment under appeal.
It should be pointed out that, contrary to the contentions raised by Orange and SFR, the other arguments relied upon in the
context of the second branch of the fourth ground of appeal do not merely repeat the pleas put forward at first instance but
are in reality directed against an essential part of the grounds for the judgment under appeal, in particular paragraphs 108
to 111 thereof, and are therefore admissible.
With regard to whether those arguments are well founded, it should be recalled that the Court of First Instance held, in paragraph
108 of the judgment under appeal, that Directive 97/13 and Decision No 128/1999 leave the Member States a discretion as to
the choice of procedure for the award of licences provided that the principles of free competition and equal treatment are
respected.
The Court deduced from that finding, and has not been challenged on this point by the appellants, that Member States could
opt for a comparative selection procedure, the essential being that the operators received the same treatment, in particular
with regard to fees.
In the present case, the French authorities, in the exercise of that discretion, decided to award the UMTS licences by way,
precisely, of a comparative selection procedure. As the Court of First Instance points out in paragraph 12 of the judgment
under appeal, it is only because of the partial failure of the first call for applications, which did not enable enough licences
to be awarded to ensure genuine competition in the market for telecommunications services, that the French authorities considered
it necessary to seek further applications.
In such a situation, as the appellants themselves admit, the French authorities had three options open to them: to re-commence
the procedure ab initio; to launch a new call for additional applications without retroactively amending the amount due from
Orange and SFR by way of UMTS licence fees; or to launch a new call but with a retroactive amendment of those fees.
As the Court of First Instance noted in paragraph 141 of the judgment under appeal, in the circumstances of the present case,
the option of re-commencing the procedure ab initio would have made it impossible to meet the 1 January 2002 deadline fixed
by Article 3(1) of Decision No 128/1999 as the date on which Directive 97/13 had to be implemented by the Member States with
regard to the coordinated and progressive introduction of UMTS services in their territory. Similarly, as the Court of First
Instance correctly pointed out in paragraphs 144 and 145 of its judgment, the option of requiring Orange and SFR to pay fees
substantially higher than those charged to Bouygues Télécom, even though none of the three operators, for reasons not entirely
of their own making, had yet entered the market and even though the characteristics of the licences were identical, would
have constituted discrimination against Orange and SFR.
In other words, the application of one of those two options would not have enabled the French authorities to comply with the
requirements of Community law.
In those circumstances, in the context of the option ultimately chosen by the French authorities, waiver of the claims at
issue as a result of the retroactive alignment of the UMTS licence fees due from Orange and SFR with those charged to Bouygues
Télécom was inevitable.
Only that option could, at the material time, reduce the risks, on the one hand, of a late launch of UMTS services, since
it ensured that at least two of the licences had been awarded by the date fixed in Article 3(1) of Decision No 128/1999. On
the other hand, that option also excluded the possibility that the three operators might suffer discrimination, since the
very purpose of the alignment of the fees was to take account of the fact that, at the time that the licence was awarded to
Bouygues Télécom, none of the three operators had entered the market – for reasons not of their own choosing – with the result
that their situation was, for that reason, comparable.
It follows that, in those circumstances, the Court of First Instance did not err in law when it held that the Community framework
for telecommunications services and, in particular, the principle of non-discrimination, required the French authorities to
align the fees due from Orange and SFR with those charged to Bouygues Télécom.
Consequently, the first branch of the fourth ground of appeal must be declared partly inadmissible and partly unfounded.
Since the first branch must be rejected, the second branch of the fourth ground of appeal must be declared nugatory.
It should be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, categorisation as aid requires that all the conditions set out
in Article 87(1) EC be fulfilled (see Case C‑345/02
Pearle and Others
[2004] ECR I‑7139, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited therein).
Article 87(1) EC lays down four cumulative conditions: (i) there must be an intervention by the State or through State resources;
(ii) the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States; (iii) it must confer an advantage on the recipient;
(iv) it must distort or threaten to distort competition (
Pearle and Others
, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited therein).
However, as is apparent from consideration of the first branch of the fourth plea in law, the Court of First Instance did
not err in law when it held, in paragraph 111 of the judgment under appeal, that the waiver of State resources was not sufficient
to prove the existence of State aid inasmuch as the abandonment of the claims against Orange and SFR was inevitable because
of the general scheme of the system.
It follows that, in the present case, the first of the conditions listed in paragraph 102 of the present judgment, necessary
in order to establish the existence of State aid, is not satisfied.
In consequence, the second branch of the fourth ground of appeal, relating to the existence of an advantage in favour of Orange
and SFR, cannot, in any event, affect the validity of the conclusion reached by the Court of First Instance that there is
no State aid in the present case.
The third branch of the fourth ground of appeal
–       Arguments of the parties
By the third branch of their fourth ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance erred in law in
the application of the principle of non-discrimination.
They claim, first, that Orange and SFR, on the one hand, and Bouygues Télécom, on the other, were not in the same situation
at the time that fees were aligned since the UMTS licences had been granted in respect of an activity to be carried on at
different dates. Moreover, the amendment of the criteria for the award of licences would have been legally impossible in the
light both of the principle that such licences are inviolable in the context of a competitive procedure and of Directive 97/13.
Lastly, compliance with the objectives laid down in the Community directives – in particular, Directive 97/13 – is not one
of the exceptions exhaustively listed in Article 87(2) EC.
On the other hand, according to Orange and the Commission, the three undertakings to which UMTS licences were granted were,
in practical terms, in the same situation, since Orange and SFR had obtained no material benefit from the licences. In those
circumstances, the principle of non-discrimination, inevitably, would have required the retroactive alignment of the fees.
In any event, Orange contends that this branch of the fourth ground of appeal is inadmissible inasmuch as the implementation
of the principle of non-discrimination has already been challenged, on the basis of the same arguments, before the Court of
First Instance.
First, with regard to the lawfulness of the amendment of the conditions for the award of licences, the Commission points out
that the Court of First Instance held that the abovementioned principle of inviolability appears neither in Directive 97/13
nor in any other applicable provision of Community law. In any event, according to Orange, that principle does not call into
question the obligation to respect the principle of non-discrimination. Secondly, according to the Commission, SFR and Orange,
the possibility of amending the conditions for the award of licences is expressly provided for in Directive 97/13. The French
Republic contends, in that regard, that such an amendment was not merely possible, it was even obligatory under Article 11(2)
of that directive, which provides that charges are to be non-discriminatory.
Lastly, the Commission, the French Republic, SFR and Orange contend that the Court of First Instance did not regard Directive
97/13 as an exception, additional to those provided for in Article 87(2) EC, to the prohibition under Article 87(1) EC of
aid incompatible with the common market. Rather, the Court referred to Directive 97/13 only as a legal basis for categorising
the alignment of the fees as State aid.
–       Findings of the Court
First of all, it must be held that, contrary to Orange’s contention, the appellants’ argument that the Court of First Instance
erred in regarding Orange and SFR, on the one hand, and Bouygues Télécom, on the other, as being in the same situation is
admissible.
It should be borne in mind that, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law
by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal
(Case C‑210/98 P
Salzgitter
v
Commission
[2000] ECR I‑5843, paragraph 43). Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already
relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see, in particular, the
judgment in Case C‑41/00 P
Interporc
v
Commission
[2003] ECR I‑2125, paragraph 17, and the order in
Martinez
v
Parliament
, paragraph 39).
The argument that the three operators are in an identical situation satisfies those criteria inasmuch as it is intended, precisely,
to challenge the analysis of that situation carried out by the Court of First Instance in regard to the principle of non-discrimination.
With regard to the merits of that argument, it should be pointed out, as the appellants rightly indicate, that it is also
settled law that discrimination can arise only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the
application of the same rule to different situations (Case C‑279/93
Schumacker
[1995] ECR I‑225, paragraph 30, and Case C‑341/05
Laval un Partneri
[2007] ECR I‑11767, paragraph 115).
In the present case, the fact that UMTS licences were awarded to Orange and SFR at an earlier date can justify, or even require,
that the related fees be set higher than the fees charged to Bouygues Télécom only if the economic value of those licences
could be regarded, by dint merely of having been awarded earlier, as being of greater value than the licence awarded to the
latter undertaking.
It is clear that that is not so in the present case.
The Court of First Instance found, in paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal, that Orange and SFR were not able to make
use of the licences which had been awarded to them.
As the Court of First Instance rightly pointed out in paragraphs 100 and 110 of the judgment under appeal, although it is
true that a licence has an economic value, that value depends on the time when each of the operators concerned entered the
market (see also Case C‑462/99
Connect Austria
[2003] ECR I‑5197, paragraph 93).
In other words, the economic value of a licence derives, in particular, from the possibility for the licence holder to make
use of the rights attached to the licence which, in the present case, means the possibility of occupying public wireless space
in order to use UMTS technology.
As the Court of First Instance found in paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal – and it has not been contradicted on this
point by the appellants in the present appeal – it is common ground that, as of 3 December 2002, the date on which the licence
was awarded to Bouygues Télécom, Orange and SFR had not yet been able to launch their UMTS services, hence to make use of
their licences, for reasons beyond their control, namely, problems related to the UMTS technology and an economic context
unfavourable to its development. Consequently, the economic value of the licences granted to Orange and SFR could not, by
dint merely of being awarded earlier, be higher than that of the licence awarded to Bouygues Télécom.
In addition, in paragraphs 119 to 121 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance also rejected the appellants’
argument that the prior award of licences to Orange and SFR had given them advantages in terms of the pre‑emption of sites,
brand image and capture of market share. The appellants have not challenged that assessment in the present appeal.
Accordingly, the fact that the licences were awarded to the three operators concerned at different dates does not lead to
the conclusion that, at the date on which the licence was awarded to Bouygues Télécom, the operators were in a different situation
in relation to the objective of Directive 97/13, namely that of ensuring that operators obtain access to the UMTS market under
the same conditions.
Consequently, the Court of First Instance did not err in law by holding that the three operators concerned were in the same
situation.
With regard, next, to the alleged existence of a principle of inviolability of the criteria for the award of licences, it
should be borne in mind that – contrary to the assertions of the appellants – in paragraph 60 of its judgment in Case C‑324/98
Telaustria and Telefonadress
[2000] ECR I‑10745, the Court of Justice merely confirmed that contracting authorities are required to comply with the principle
of non-discrimination even where they conclude contracts which are outside the scope of Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14
June 1993 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications
sectors (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 84), without in any way establishing the existence of a principle of inviolability.
On the other hand, as the Advocate General remarked in point 192 of her Opinion, it is apparent from Article 11(2) of Directive
97/13 that the amount of the charges must reflect the need to foster the development of innovative services and competition.
It is common ground in the present case that if the French authorities had not aligned the UMTS fees, they would have run
the serious risk of Orange and SFR withdrawing their applications. Thus, it was precisely in order to ensure the development
of competition that the fees due from the first two licence holders were amended to bring them into line with those charged
to Bouygues Télécom.
Lastly, there is no foundation to the argument that the Court of First Instance erred in law by holding that Directive 97/13
introduced an exception to Article 87(1) EC additional to those exhaustively listed in Article 87(2) EC.
As the Advocate General remarked in point 196 of her Opinion, it should be borne in mind that Article 87(2) EC lays down exceptions
to the rule that State aid is incompatible with the Treaty.
By concluding – in the light, in particular, of Directive 97/13 – that the alignment of the fees due from Orange and SFR with
those charged to Bouygues Télécom did not constitute State aid, the Court of First Instance could not have been supplementing
the content of Article 87(2) EC since that provision applies only to measures which constitute State aid.
Since none of the three branches of the fourth ground of appeal can be upheld, that ground must be rejected.

The third ground of appeal, alleging errors in the legal characterisation of the facts
The third ground of appeal, which is based on errors allegedly committed by the Court of First Instance in the legal characterisation
of the facts, is also divided into three branches.
As a preliminary point, the French Republic and SFR challenge the admissibility of this ground inasmuch as, in each of its
branches, it criticises the assessment of the facts carried out by the Court of First Instance.
The first branch of the third ground of appeal
–       Arguments of the parties
By the first branch of their third ground of appeal, the appellants claim that by categorising the two successive procedures
for the award of UMTS licences as a single procedure, the Court of First Instance erred in the legal characterisation of the
facts. In particular, when applying Article 11 of Directive 97/13, the Court of First Instance should have restricted itself
to an analysis of the arrangements for the substantive organisation of the procedure and should therefore have concluded that
there were two distinct procedures. As it is, that error led the Court of First Instance to conclude, wrongly, that there
was no discrimination, by holding that the situation of the three licence holders was similar whereas, in reality, it was
different.
The Commission contends – as do the French Republic, SFR and Orange, in the alternative – that the Court of First Instance
was entitled to consider that the procedure for the award of UMTS licences constituted in reality a single procedure. The
French Republic, SFR and Orange point out in that regard that the reference to Article 11 of Directive 97/13 is not relevant
to the present case.
In any event, in the Commission’s view, this branch is nugatory since the fact that there was a single procedure was not decisive
in the assessment made by the Court of First Instance of compliance with the principle of equal treatment inasmuch as the
latter took account not merely of the arrangements for the organisation of the call for applications but also of the effects
of that call. In addition, the Commission contends that, for the purposes of applying the principle of non-discrimination,
the two calls for applications must be treated as one.
SFR maintains that the Court of First Instance correctly interpreted the principle of equal treatment by basing its findings
on the context of the emerging UMTS market and by noting that none of the operators concerned had entered that market.
Lastly, the Commission argues that, in a new award procedure, the same operators would be awarded UMTS licences on identical
terms.
–       Findings of the Court
It should be recalled that it follows from Article 225 EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court
of Justice that an appeal lies on a point of law only. Accordingly, the Court of First Instance has sole jurisdiction to find
and appraise the facts, except in a case where the factual inaccuracy of its findings arises from evidence adduced before
it. The appraisal of the facts by the Court of First Instance does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence
produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (Case C‑53/92 P
Hilti
v
Commission
[1994] ECR I‑667, paragraph 42; Joined Cases C‑280/99 P to C‑282/99 P
Moccia Irme and Others
v
Commission
[2001] ECR I‑4717, paragraph 78; and Case C‑362/05 P
Wunenburger
v
Commission
[2007] ECR I‑4333, paragraph 66).
In the present case, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the appellants’ argument, the Court of First Instance in no
way applied Article 11 of Directive 97/13 in order to conclude that there had been a single procedure and, moreover, no legal
criterion is to be found in that provision for assessing whether a procedure for the award of licences is a single procedure
or whether it is composed of several successive phases. In reality, the Court merely held, on the one hand, in paragraph 11
of the judgment under appeal, that the objective of the award procedure was to award four licences and, on the other, in paragraphs
12, 14 and 15, that since the French authorities had failed to achieve their initial objective of awarding four licences,
they organised a ‘supplementary call for applications’.
It is in the context of its assessment of those facts that the Court of First Instance deduced, in paragraph 134 of the judgment
under appeal, that ‘[d]espite the way in which it was actually organised, the procedure for awarding UMTS licences initiated
in July 2000 by the French authorities constituted, in reality, a single procedure’.
In those circumstances, the question whether the French authorities organised one or two procedures relates to the assessment
of the facts carried out by the Court of First Instance and is not, as the appellants claim, a question of law relating to
the legal characterisation of those facts in the light of Article 11 of Directive 97/13.
Since the appellants do not claim that the Court of First Instance distorted the facts or the evidence produced before it,
the first branch of the third ground of appeal must therefore be declared inadmissible.
The second branch of the third ground of appeal
–       Arguments of the parties
By the second branch of the third ground of appeal, the appellants complain that the Court of First Instance erred in the
legal characterisation of the facts by considering that the claims at issue, which had been waived by the French authorities,
were uncertain.
The appellants claim in that regard that the UMTS licences were awarded to Orange and SFR by two decrees of 18 July 2001,
that is to say, after the end of the period during which applications could be withdrawn, which expired on 31 May 2001. They
also argue that the mere fact that the operators could abandon their licence does not lead to the conclusion that the claims
were uncertain since, according to settled case-law, a debt is uncertain only when its existence is conditional upon the occurrence
of a future or hypothetical event or the fulfilment of a condition precedent.
In contrast, the Commission, the French Republic, SFR and Orange argue that the claims in question were uncertain.
They contend, in particular, that, but for the assurances in the ministerial letters of 22 February 2001 that Orange and SFR
would be treated equitably, those two undertakings would probably have withdrawn their applications, since the deadline for
the exercise of that right had not yet expired at that date. In addition, according to the Commission, the debts in question
were not due before the grant of the licences by the decrees of 18 July 2001.
Orange adds that since what is involved are authorisations to occupy the public domain, the right to withdraw subsisted after
31 May 2001 because licence holders can abandon their licences at any time and, as a consequence, cease to pay the related
fees.
In any event, according to the Commission, the French Republic and Orange, this second branch of the third ground of appeal
is nugatory inasmuch as it is directed against a ground included in the judgment under appeal purely for the sake of completeness,
since the Court of First Instance also based its assessment that waiver of the claims at issue did not constitute State aid
on the exception concerning the general scheme of the system.
–       Findings of the Court
It should be borne in mind that complaints directed against a ground included in the judgment purely for the sake of completeness
cannot lead to the judgment being set aside and are therefore nugatory (see, in particular, Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P,
C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P
Dansk Rørindustri and Others
v
Commission
[2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 148 and the case-law cited therein).
On the one hand, however, as the Advocate General remarked in point 131 of her Opinion, although the Court of First Instance,
in paragraph 106 of the judgment under appeal, conceded that in the present case the French authorities had waived their right
to a significant part of State resources, while pointing out that those resources were uncertain, it is also true that, in
paragraph 111 of the judgment, the Court held that ‘the fact that the State may have waived resources and that this may have
created an advantage for the beneficiaries of the reduction in the fee is not sufficient to prove the existence of a State
aid incompatible with the common market, given the specific provisions of Community law on telecommunications in the light
of common law on State aid. The abandonment of the claim at issue here was inevitable because of the general scheme of the
system, apart from the fact that the claim was not certain …’.
Moreover, it should be recalled that, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 87 to 95 of the present judgment, the ground of
appeal directed against the grounds for the judgment under appeal concerning the nature and general scheme of the system in
relation to the waiver of State resources is unfounded.
In those circumstances, and even supposing that it would be admissible and well founded for the appellants to argue that the
Court of First Instance erred in law by categorising the claims at issue as uncertain, the fact remains that such an error,
even if it were to be established, could not in any circumstances invalidate the conclusion reached by the Court in paragraph
111 of the judgment under appeal.
The second branch of the third ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as nugatory.
The third branch of the third ground of appeal
–       Arguments of the parties
By the third branch of their third ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance distorted the terms
of the ministerial letters of 22 February 2001 by stating that they contained a promise of ‘equal treatment’ as compared with
the other operators whereas, in reality, they contained a promise of ‘equitable treatment’. The ministerial commitment to
equitable treatment cannot constitute a promise to align, retroactively, the fees due from the first UMTS licence holders
with the fees for the licence awarded later. Such a distortion of the letters in question vitiates the Court’s entire judgment.
In the Commission’s view, that argument is inadmissible by reason of the fact that the question of the semantic equivalence
of the terms ‘equal’ and ‘equitable’ constitutes a new argument. Orange also contends that the argument is inadmissible on
the ground that it challenges an assessment of facts made by the Court of First Instance.
In any event, the Commission agrees with the point raised by Orange in the alternative that this branch of the third ground
of appeal is nugatory, since the ministerial promises did not play an essential role in the findings and assessments of the
Court of First Instance.
In the alternative, the Commission contends that the appellants have not succeeded in refuting the Court of First Instance’s
conclusion that the two initial licence holders did not in fact obtain an advantage. For their part, the French Republic and
SFR contend that there is no possibility that the Court of First Instance could have distorted the content of the letters.
–       Findings of the Court
As the Commission and Orange contend, this branch of the third ground of appeal is nugatory.
It is apparent from paragraphs 153 and 154 of the judgment under appeal that the Court of First Instance based its assessment
of the need of the French authorities to reduce the fees charged to SFR and Orange on the principle of equal treatment, as
is required by Directive 97/13.
In other words, the Court of First Instance never considered that the alignment of the fees was required because of the assurances
of ‘equitable treatment’ provided by the French authorities in the ministerial letters of 22 February 2001.
Consequently, even supposing that the appellants’ argument that the Court of First Instance manifestly distorted the contents
of those letters in relation to those assurances were admissible and well founded, the fact remains that, in any event, such
a distortion would have no bearing on the question whether or not the judgment under appeal is well founded.
Accordingly, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 148 of the present judgment, this branch of the third ground
of appeal must be rejected.
Since none of the four grounds of appeal can be upheld, the appeal must be dismissed as partly inadmissible and partly unfounded.

Costs
Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 118 thereof, the unsuccessful
party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
As the Commission, Orange and SFR have applied for costs to be awarded against the appellants and the latter have been unsuccessful,
they must be ordered to pay the costs of the present proceedings.
In accordance with Article 69(4) of the Rules of Procedure, which is also applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article
118 thereof, the Member States which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The French Republic must
therefore be ordered to bear its own costs.
On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby:
1.
Dismisses the appeal;
2.
Orders Bouygues SA and Bouygues Télécom SA to pay the costs;
3.
Orders the French Republic to bear its own costs.
[Signatures]
*
Language of the case: French.