CELEX: 62018CJ0732
Appeal
Restrictive measures adopted in view of the actions of the Russian Federation destabilising the situation in Ukraine
List of persons, entities and bodies subject to freezing of funds and economic resources
Listing of the appellants in the list of the entities to which restrictive measures apply

By their appeal, Rosneft Oil Company PAO
,
formerly NK  Rosneft OAO, RN-Shelf-Arctic OOO, RN-Shelf-Far East AO, formerly RN-Shelf-Dalniy Vostok ZAO, RN-Exploration OOO,  and Tagulskoe OOO ask the Court to set aside  the judgment  of the  General Court  of the European Union of  13 September 2018,
Rosneft and Others
v
Council
, (T‑715/14, not published, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2018:544), whereby the General Court  dismissed their action  seeking the  annulment of, first,  Article 1(2)(b) to (d) and (3) of, and  Annex III  to,  Council Decision  2014/512/CFSP  of  31 July 2014 concerning  restrictive measures  in view of  Russia’s actions destabilising  the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 13), as amended by Council Decision  (CFSP) 2016/2315 of 19 December 2016 (OJ 2016 L 345, p. 65) (‘the contested decision’), and, second,  Articles 3  and 3a, Article 4(3)  and  (4), Article 5(2)(b) to (d)  and (3), and Article 11 of,  as well as Annexes II  and VI to,  Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014  of  31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1), as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 1290/2014 of  4 December 2014 (OJ 2014 L 349, p. 20,  and corrigendum OJ 2014 L 246,  p. 59) (‘the  contested regulation’) (together ‘the contested acts’).

Legal context

International law

The EU-Russia Partnership Agreement
The  Partnership and  Cooperation Agreement  establishing  a partnership  between the European Communities and their  Member States, on the one part, and  the Russian Federation of the other part, signed  in Corfu on  24 June 1994, was approved on behalf of  the European Communities by  Council and Commission Decision  97/800/ECSC, EC, Euratom of  30 October 1997 (OJ 1997 L 327, p. 1;  ‘the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement’). Within Title XI  of that agreement, entitled  ‘Institutional, general and final provisions’, Article 99  of that agreement provides:
‘Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent a Party from taking any measures:
(1)      which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests:
…
(d)      in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in time of war or serious international tension constituting threat of war or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security;
…’

World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules
Article XXI of the  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides:
‘Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a)      to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b)      to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests:
(i)      relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii)      relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii)      taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c)      to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the Maintenance of international peace and security.’

The contested acts

The contested decision
Recitals 1  to 8 of the contested decision  set out the  circumstances  that preceded  the adoption of the restrictive measures that it imposes.
Article 1(2) and (3) of that decision provide:
‘2.      The direct or indirect purchase or sale of, the direct or indirect provision of investment services for, or assistance in the issuance of, or any other dealing with bonds, equity, or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after 12 September 2014 by
…
(b)      entities established in Russia which are publicly controlled or with over 50% public ownership which have estimated total assets of over 1 trillion Russian Roubles and whose estimated revenues originate for at least 50% from the sale or transportation of crude oil or petroleum products as of 12 September 2014, as listed in Annex III;
(c)      any legal person, entity or body established outside the Union owned for more than 50% by an entity referred to in [point] …(b); or
(d)      any legal person, entity or body acting on behalf, or at the direction, of an entity within the category referred to in point (c) or listed in Annex … III,
shall be prohibited.
3.      It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly make or be part of any arrangement to make new loans or credit with a maturity exceeding 30 days to any legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1 or 2, after 12 September 2014 except for loans or credit that have a specific and documented objective to provide financing for non-prohibited direct or indirect imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the Union and Russia or any other third  State, or for loans that have a specific and documented objective to provide emergency funding to meet the solvency and liquidity criteria for legal persons established in the Union, whose proprietary rights are owned for more than 50% by an entity referred to in Annex I.’
Annex III  to  the contested Decision  contains a list of  legal persons  entities and bodies  referred to in  Article 1(2)(b) of that decision, Rosneft being one of those listed.

The contested regulation
Recital 2  of  the contested regulation  states:
‘On 22 July 2014, the Council [of the European Union] concluded that should Russia fail to respond to the demands formulated in the European Council conclusions of 27 June 2014 and in its own conclusions of 22 July, it would be ready to introduce without delay a package of further significant restrictive measures.  It is therefore considered appropriate to apply additional restrictive measures with a view to increasing the costs of Russia’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and to promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis. …’
Article 1(f)(i) of that regulation defines ‘transferable securities’ as meaning ‘shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in companies, partnerships or other entities and depositary receipts in respect of shares’.
Article 3  of that  regulation provides:
‘1.      A prior authorisation shall be required for the sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, of items as listed in Annex II, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf or in any other State, if such items are for use in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf.
2.      For all sales, supplies, transfers or exports for which an authorisation is required under this Article, such authorisation shall be granted by the competent authorities of the Member State where the exporter is established and shall be in accordance with the detailed rules laid down in Article 11 of [Council] Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 [of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (OJ 2009 L 134, p. 1)]. The authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union.
3.      Annex II shall include certain items suited to the following categories of exploration and production projects in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf:
(a)      oil exploration and production in waters deeper than 150 metres;
(b)      oil exploration and production in the offshore area north of the Arctic Circle; or
(c)      projects that have the potential to produce oil from resources located in shale formations by way of hydraulic fracturing; it does not apply to exploration and production through shale formations to locate or extract oil from non-shale reservoirs.
4.      Exporters shall supply the competent authorities with all relevant information required for their application for an export authorisation.
5.      The competent authorities shall not grant any authorisation for any sale, supply, transfer or export of the items included in Annex II, if they have reasonable grounds to determine that the sale, supply, transfer or export of the items are destined for any of the categories of exploration and production projects referred to in paragraph 3.
The competent authorities may, however, grant an authorisation where the sale, supply, transfer or export concerns the execution of an obligation arising from a contract concluded before 1 August 2014, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract.
The competent authorities may also grant an authorisation where the sale, supply, transfer or export of the items is necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment. In duly justified cases of emergency, the sale, supply, transfer or export may proceed without prior authorisation, provided that the exporter notifies the competent authority within five working days after the sale, supply, transfer or export has taken place, providing detail about the relevant justification for the sale, supply, transfer or export without prior authorisation.
6.      Under the conditions set out in paragraph 5, the competent authorities may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an export authorisation which they have granted.
7.      Where a competent authority refuses to grant an authorisation, or annuls, suspends, substantially limits or revokes an authorisation in accordance with paragraphs 5 or 6, the Member State concerned shall notify the other Member States and the Commission thereof and share the relevant information with them, while complying with the provisions concerning the confidentiality of such information in Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 [of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters (OJ 1997 L 82, p. 1)].
8.      Before a Member State grants an authorisation in accordance with paragraph 5 for a transaction which is essentially identical to a transaction which is the subject of a still valid denial issued by another Member State or by other Member States under paragraphs 6 and 7, it shall first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial. If, following such consultations, the Member State concerned decides to grant an authorisation, it shall inform the other Member States and the Commission thereof, providing all relevant information to explain the decision.’
Article 3a  of that  regulation  provides:
‘1.      It shall be prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, associated services necessary for the following categories of exploration and production projects in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf:
(a)      oil exploration and production in waters deeper than 150 metres;
(b)      oil exploration and production in the offshore area north of the Arctic Circle; or
(c)      projects that have the potential to produce oil from resources located in shale formations by way of hydraulic fracturing; it does not apply to exploration and production through shale formations to locate or extract oil from non-shale reservoirs.
For the purpose of this paragraph, associated services shall mean:
(i)      drilling;
(ii)      well testing;
(iii)      logging and completion services;
(iv)      supply of specialised floating vessels.
2.      The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or a framework agreement concluded before  12 September 2014 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract.
3.      The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall not apply where the services in question are necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment.
The service provider shall notify the competent authority within five working days of any activity undertaken pursuant to this paragraph, providing detail about the relevant justification for the sale, supply, transfer or export.’
Article 4(3)  and  (4)  of the contested regulation  is worded as follows:
‘3.      The provision of the following shall be subject to an authorisation from the competent authority concerned:
(a)      technical assistance or brokering services related to items listed in Annex II and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those items, directly or indirectly, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf or, if such assistance concerns items for use in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, to any person, entity or body in any other State;
(b)      financing or financial assistance related to items referred to in Annex II, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those items, or for any provision of related technical assistance, directly or indirectly, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf or, if such assistance concerns items for use in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, to any person, entity or body in any other State.
In duly justified cases of emergency referred to in Article 3(5), the provision of services referred to in this paragraph may proceed without prior authorisation, on condition that the provider notifies the competent authority within five working days after the provision of services.
4.      Where authorisations are requested pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, Article 3, and in particular paragraphs 2 and 5 thereof, shall apply mutatis mutandis.’
Article 5(2)  and  (3)  of that  regulation provides:
‘2.      It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide investment services for or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise deal with, transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after 12 September 2014 by:
…
(b)      a legal person, entity or body established in Russia, which are publicly controlled or with over 50% public ownership and having estimated total assets of over 1 trillion Russian Roubles and whose estimated revenues originate for at least 50% from the sale or transportation of crude oil or petroleum products, as listed in Annex VI;
(c)      a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50% by an entity listed in point (a) or (b) of this paragraph; or
(d)      a legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.
3.      It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly make or be part of any arrangement to make new loans or credit with a maturity exceeding 30 days to any legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1 or 2, after 12 September 2014.
The prohibition shall not apply to:
(a)      loans or credit that have a specific and documented objective to provide financing for non-prohibited imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the Union and any third State, including the expenditure for goods and services from another third State that is necessary for executing the export or import contracts; or
(b)      loans that have a specific and documented objective to provide emergency funding to meet solvency and liquidity criteria for legal persons established in the Union, whose proprietary rights are owned for more than 50% by any entity referred to in Annex III.’
Annex VI  to the contested regulation  contains a list of legal persons entities and bodies referred to in Article 5(2)(b) of that regulation,  one of those listed being Rosneft.
Article 8(1)  of that regulation  provides:
‘Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.’
Article 11  of that  regulation  provides:
‘1.      No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:
(a)      entities referred to in points (b) and (c) of Article 5(1) and points (c) and (d) of Article 5(2), or listed in Annexes III, IV, V and VI;
(b)      any other Russian person, entity or body;
(c)      any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) and (b) of this paragraph.
2.      In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the person seeking the enforcement of that claim.
3.      This Article is without prejudice to the right of the persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.’
Annex II to the contested regulation lists the items of which sale, supply, transfer or export to Russia is subject to the obtaining of a prior authorisation, in accordance with Article 3 of that regulation.

Background to the dispute
The background to the dispute, as set out in paragraphs 1 to 14 of the judgment under appeal, may be summarised as follows.
On  20 February 2014 the  Council  of the European Union condemned  the use  of violence in Ukraine, called for an immediate end to the violence  and full respect  for human rights and decided to introduce  restrictive measures against those responsible. On 3 March 2014 the  Council  condemned the acts of aggression  by the Russian armed forces  in  Ukrainian territory and called on the Russian Federation  to respect its international obligations, and thereafter adopted, on 5 March 2014, restrictive measures for freezing funds  and the recovery of misappropriated  Ukrainian State funds. At an extraordinary meeting held on 6 March 2014,  the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union condemned the unprovoked violation by the Russian Federation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. They endorsed the measures proposed by the Council to suspend bilateral talks with the Russian Federation on visa matters and on the new comprehensive partnership and cooperation agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part, and stated that any further steps by the Russian Federation to destabilise the situation in Ukraine would lead to far reaching consequences for relations in a broad range of economic areas between the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other.
Thereafter, the Council adopted, within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a set of restrictive measures in response to the actions of the Russian Federation that were regarded as destabilising the situation in Ukraine.
On 31 July 2014, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, despite the adoption in March 2014 of travel restrictions and asset freezes imposed on certain natural and legal persons, the Council adopted Decision 2014/512, in order to introduce targeted restrictive measures in the areas of access to capital markets, defence, dual-use goods, and sensitive technologies, including in the energy sector.
On the same date, the Council adopted Regulation No 833/2014, which contains more detailed provisions to give effect at both EU level and Member State level to the requirements in Decision 2014/512.
The declared objective of those restrictive measures was to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation that were designed to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis. To that end, Decision 2014/512 established, in particular, prohibitions on the export of certain sensitive products and technologies to the oil sector in Russia and restrictions on the access of certain operators in that sector to the EU capital market.
On 8 September 2014 the Council adopted Decision 2014/659/CFSP amending Decision 2014/512 (OJ 2014 L 271, p. 54), and Regulation (EU) No 960/2014 amending Regulation No 833/2014 (OJ 2014 L 271, p. 3), in order to extend the prohibition decided on 31 July 2014 in relation to certain financial instruments and to impose additional restrictions on access to the capital market for certain Russian entities operating in the oil sector.
Since  8 September 2014 the  appellants, Rosneft Oil Company, RN-Shelf-Arctic, RN-Shelf-Far East, RN-Exploration and Tagulskoe, all commercial companies incorporated under Russian law and members of the Rosneft group of companies (‘Rosneft’),  established in  Moscow (Russia) and specialising in the  oil and gas sectors, have been listed as entities  that are subject to  restrictive measures, the lists being annexed to the  contested acts. When various  amendments were made to those acts  between 2014 and 2016, Rosneft continued to be listed.
One of the  appellants, Rosneft Oil Company, brought an action before the  courts  of the United Kingdom, challenging the national measures designed to give effect to  the  restrictive measures  adopted  by the  Council  by  Decision  2014/512, as amended by Council Decision  2014/872/CFSP  of  4 December 2014 (OJ 2014 L 349, p. 58), and  the contested regulation. Rosneft Oil Company claimed in those proceedings that both  the  restrictive measures  adopted by the  Council  and the  national measures were invalid.

The action before the General Court and the judgment under appeal
By application lodged at the Registry of the  General Court  on  9 October 2014, the  appellants  sought the annulment of  Article 1(2)(b) to (d)  and (3) of, and  Annex III  to,  Decision 2014/512, as amended by  Decision 2014/659, and of  Articles 3  and 3a, Article 4(3)  and  (4), Article 5(2)(b) to (d)  and (3) and Article 11 of,  and of  Annexes II  and  VI to,  Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by  Regulation No 960/2014.  When Decision  2014/512 and  Regulation No 833/2014  were amended  by subsequent acts, the  appellants  adapted their initial forms of order, and, in the final form of their pleadings, sought the annulment of the  contested acts.
In support of their action, the appellants relied on nine pleas in law:  (i) infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection;  (ii) the lack of any legitimate aim behind the adoption of the measures at issue;  (iii) infringement of the European Union’s  international obligations under  the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement, and under GATT; (iv)  the lack of any rational connection  between the objective  pursued and the means of giving  effect to it;  (v)  the claim that the provisions of the  contested regulation  on  authorisation were not an appropriate means of giving effect to the contested decision;  (vi)  breach of the principle of equal treatment and non-arbitrariness;  (vii)  the fact that the measures were disproportionate, involving encroachment on EU  legislative competences and infringement of the  appellants’ fundamental rights;  (viii)  misuse of powers, and, last,  (ix)  breach of the constitutional guarantees  of legal certainty.
On  12 February 2015 the  appellants  requested that the case before the  General Court  be stayed  on the ground that a request for a preliminary ruling had been referred to the Court of Justice  by the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Divisional Court),  concerning, inter alia,  the validity  of Decision  2014/512, as amended by  Decision  2014/872,  and of  the contested regulation.
By order of  26 March 2015, the  President of the Ninth Chamber  of the  General Court  decided to stay  Case  T‑715/14 until the decision of the Court  bringing an end to the proceedings in Case  C‑72/15,
Rosneft
.
The proceedings were resumed  after the delivery of the  judgment  of  28 March 2017,
Rosnef
t (C‑72/15,  EU:C:2017:236). By that judgment, the Court  held, inter alia,  that examination of the second question referred had revealed nothing  capable of affecting the validity  of Article 1(2)(b) to (d)  and (3) and Article 7 of,  and of  Annex III  to,  Decision  2014/512, as amended by  Decision  2014/872, or of  Articles 3  and 3a, Article 4(3) and (4), Article 5(2)(b) to (d) and (3) and Article 11 of, and  Annexes II  and VI to,  the contested regulation.
The  General Court, first, in  paragraphs 64  to 93 of the judgment under appeal, rejected the  objections of inadmissibility  submitted by the  Council  and the Commission, to the effect that  the conditions governing the bringing of proceedings  laid down in the fourth paragraph of  Article 263  TFEU  were not satisfied,  on the ground that the  appellants  had no standing to bring proceedings against the  provisions  of the contested acts.
As regards the  provisions  establishing the  restrictive measures provided for in Article 1(2)(b) to (d)  and (3) of, and in  Annex III  to,  the contested decision,  and in  Article 5(2)(b) to (d)  and (3) and Article 11 of, and in  Annex VI  to, the contested regulation (‘the restrictions on access to capital markets’), the  General Court  held, in the first place, that  those provisions were of direct concern to the appellants,  since it was impossible for the appellants to carry out certain prohibited financial transactions with bodies established in the European Union, although they would have been entitled to carry out such transactions in the absence of those provisions,  and that those  provisions  left no discretion  to the addressees entrusted with their implementation. The General Court held, in the second place, that those provisions were also of individual concern to the appellants,  since the appellants were owned, directly or indirectly, by Rosneft, which was listed in  Annex III  to the contested decision  and in  Annex VI  to the  contested regulation.
As regards  the provisions  establishing the  restrictive measures provided for in  Articles 3  and 3a and  Article 4(3) and (4) of, and in  Annex II  to, the contested regulation (‘the export restrictions’), the  General Court  held, in the first place, that even though those provisions were of general application,  they were of direct concern to the  appellants, since the  national authorities  had no discretion  in giving effect to the prohibitions and authorisations prescribed by those  provisions  which were applicable in the  appellants’ area of activity. In the second place, the  General Court  held that those  provisions constituted  regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures, within the meaning of  the last clause of the fourth paragraph of Article 263  TFEU.
Second, before examining the substance of the pleas in law  relied on, the  General Court  rejected, in paragraphs 96  to 99 of  the judgment under appeal, the Council’s  argument that, since the  pleas in law relied on in support of annulment  in the instant case before it  were  identical to those relied on  in the case that gave rise to  the judgment  of  28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), delivered following a reference for a preliminary ruling, the grounds on which the Court  based its answer to those pleas had the authority of
res judicata
,  and those pleas in law  had, consequently, of necessity to be rejected. The  General Court  stated in that regard  that two cases cannot have the same subject matter and the same cause of action when the legal basis of those two cases  is different.
Third, the  General Court, in  paragraphs 102  to 236  of  the judgment under appeal, examined  and rejected each of the nine pleas in law  relied on by  the  appellants  and, consequently, dismissed the action in its entirety.

Forms of order sought by the parties before the Court of Justice
The appellants claim that the Court should:
–        set aside the judgment under appeal;
–        give a final judgment in the matter or refer the case back to the General Court for judgment; and
–        order the Council to pay the costs, including the costs incurred before the General Court.
The Council contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the appeal;
–        in the alternative, if the Court decides to set aside the judgment under appeal and to give final judgment itself, dismiss the application for annulment of the contested acts; and
–        order the appellants to pay the costs relating to the appeal.
The Commission contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the appeal; and
–        order the appellants to pay the costs.

The appeal

Admissibility

Arguments of the parties
The Council argues that  the  admissibility  of the  appeal  and the grounds of appeal  should be assessed  in the light of the matters of  law  already examined  in  the judgment  of  28 March 2017,
Rosneft
, (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), whereby  the Court confirmed  the validity of, first, Article 1(2)(b) to (d) and (3)  and  Article 7  of, and  Annex III  to,  Decision  2014/512, as amended by  Decision  2014/872 and, second, Articles 3  and  3a, Article 4(3) and (4),  Article 5(2)(b) to (d)  and (3),  and  Article 11 of,  and  Annexes II  and VI to,  the contested regulation.
In the first place, the Council accordingly submits  that the grounds of  appeal  concerning the legality  of the  provisions  of the  contested acts  are inadmissible, since only those grounds relating to  any errors in law  committed by the  General Court  in its application of that judgment can be examined.
The Council considers  that, by their  appeal, the  appellants’  aim is that the Court  should revisit that  judgment, which concerned the legality  of the same  acts as those at issue in this instance  and in which the  same  pleas or grounds were relied on  by the same parties. In the view of the  Council, if the present appeal proceedings were to be declared to be admissible that would amount to allowing parties the possibility  of bringing actions  against judgments delivered  by the Court  in response to references for a preliminary ruling  and, therefore,  would circumvent the  restrictive conditions governing revision of  judgments of the Court.
The Council also states that it is clear from the  case-law  deriving from  the judgment  of  9 March 1994,
TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf
(C‑188/92, EU:C:1994:90),  that the legal remedies  provided for by EU law  are subject to specific procedural rules  which must not be interpreted  in such a way that  it becomes possible  to challenge, without any limitation in time, legislative acts.
In the second place, the Council  considers that the  General Court  ought, on the basis of the authority of
res judicata
, to have dismissed the action before it as being inadmissible. The Council  submits that, in circumstances such as the present, where the differences in how the action is brought before the court with jurisdiction (direct,  in the case of an  action for annulment, indirect,  in the case  of a reference for a preliminary ruling) have no bearing on the outcome of the  case, it would be in the interests of the stability  of the law to  accord to  the judgment  of  28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), the authority of
res judicata
. The Council  states that, in  the judgment under appeal, the  General Court  had no precedent available to it  on which it could rely to justify  extending the possibility  of  applying the authority of
res judicata
to proceedings  of different kinds. However, the Court  should  extend that possibility, in order to strengthen the EU system of legal remedies with the objective of achieving stability  of the law  and procedural economy.
The Commission submits that, although  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236),  does not have the authority of
res judicata
for the purposes of the present proceedings, that judgment largely concerns  the validity  of the same acts  as those at issue in the present case  and the same  issues of interpretation of those acts. Consequently, the Commission  considers that the  General Court, in  the judgment under appeal, was correct to rely on the findings made by  the Court  in  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C--72/15, EU:C:2017:236).
In their reply, the  appellants  maintain, first, that the objection  made by the Council to the effect that  their  appeal  and the grounds relied on are inadmissible must be rejected. The appellants  argue, in particular, that  the approach  of  the judgment  of  9 March 1994,
TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf
(C‑188/92, EU:C:1994:90), is of no relevance in this instance,  and that the  consequence of the Council’s position would be to undermine the right to a fair hearing  and the representation of the parties,  since four of the  five  appellants  in the present proceedings  did not participate  in the national proceedings that gave rise to  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236).
Second, the  appellants  maintain that, by their arguments  in relation to  the authority of
res judicata
,  the Council  has in fact brought a cross-appeal, which is  inadmissible.
Third, the appellants  argue that, even if those arguments are  admissible, they should, in any event, be rejected as being unfounded. The appellants  submit that  the Council’s position is contrary to  Article 61  of the  Statute  of the Court  of  Justice of the European Union,  which provides that, where the General Court is seised of a dispute, that court is bound by the  judgments  of the Court  only in situations where the Court refers a  case  back to the  General Court  after  an appeal.  The appellants further claim that  the Council’s position fails to take account of  the fact that preliminary ruling proceedings are very different from direct actions.
In its rejoinder, the Council  argues that  a finding by the Court that an act is valid, made in a judgment entailing a declaration of validity  delivered  on the basis of  Article 267 TFEU, has an
erga omnes
effect with respect to the issues  resolved in that judgment. Accordingly, even if the parties to the present appeal  and to the national proceedings  that gave rise to  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236),  are not entirely the same, the effect of that  judgment  is that the  contested acts  cannot be declared to be invalid  on the basis of  the same arguments as  those examined  in that judgment.
The Council also states that  the exercise of the right to challenge the validity  of an act  by means of a  reference for a preliminary ruling  ought to bring to an end  the possibility  of challenging the validity  of that act in the form of an  action for annulment.

Findings of the Court
By its arguments, the Council claims, in essence, that  the authority of
res judicata
attached  to  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236),  must lead the Court to declare  inadmissible  the grounds of  appeal  relied on by the  appellants  that relate to  matters of law on which the  Court  has already given a ruling in that  judgment.
As stated by the  General Court  in paragraph 98  of  the judgment under appeal, the pleas in law and  arguments relied on by the appellants  before it  broadly overlapped  with those  at issue  in the case that gave rise to the  judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236).
In accordance with settled  case-law, the attachment of the authority of
res judicata
to  a judgment, which is intended to ensure stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, means that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time  limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called into question (judgment  of  2 April 2020,
CRPNPAC and Vueling Airlines
, C‑370/17 and  C‑37/18, EU:C:2020:260, paragraph 88  and the  case-law cited). It is, however,  also clear from the Court’s  case-law  that  the authority of
res judicata
attaches  only to matters of fact and law  that have been actually or necessarily resolved by  the judicial decision  in question (judgment  of  29 March 2011,
ThyssenKrupp Nirosta
v
Commission
, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, paragraph 123  and the case-law cited),  and bars  an action from being admissible only  if the action that gave rise to the  judgment  in question  was between the same parties, had the same subject matter and was based on the same cause of action (see, to that effect, judgments  of  19 September 1985,
Hoogovens Groep
v
Commission
, 172/83 and 226/83, EU:C:1985:355, paragraph 9,  and the order of  3 July 1986,
France
v
Parliament
, 358/85, EU:C:1986:286, paragraph 12).
The  case-law  cited in  the preceding paragraph  of the present judgment  is based on the  premiss that the judicial decision  that is relied on in support of an objection based on  the authority of
res judicata
brings to an end a dispute  between parties. That cannot be said of  a judgment  delivered in preliminary  ruling proceedings.
In any event, even if a  judgment delivered in preliminary ruling proceedings  might be relied on in support of such an objection, it must be stated, as the appellants have correctly pointed out, and as is  acknowledged by the  Council, that four of the appellants  did not participate  in the national court proceedings  that led to  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236). They were therefore not parties to those proceedings.
Case  T‑715/14, which gave rise to  the judgment under appeal, was therefore not between the same parties as those involved in  the case that  gave rise to the judgment of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236).
It cannot therefore be held that  the conditions governing recognition that  the authority of
res judicata
attaches  to  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), are satisfied in this instance.
It follows that the  Council’s arguments  concerning the inadmissibility of  some grounds of  appeal  because of the  authority of
res judicata
attached  to  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236),  must be rejected.

Substance
In support of their appeal, the appellants rely on  seven grounds of appeal.

The first ground of appeal
–
Arguments of the parties
By the  first ground of appeal, the  appellants  claim that  the General Court  erred in law, in  paragraphs 114  and 118 of  the judgment under appeal, in holding that  the Council  had fulfilled its obligation to state reasons  as provided for in  Article 296 TFEU  when it adopted  the  provisions relating to the export restrictions.
In the first place, the appellants  maintain that  the  General Court  held, wrongly, in  paragraph 114  of  the judgment under appeal, that those restrictions were of general application,  and that, consequently, the Council  could confine itself to  indicating, first, the overall situation which led to their adoption  and, second, the general objectives which they are intended to achieve. That finding, according to the appellants,  is contradicted by  the finding  made in  paragraph 157  of  the judgment under appeal, where the  General Court  accepted that those restrictions were intended to ‘[target]  undertakings in the Russian oil sector,  on the basis notably  of their estimated total assets of over  RUB 1 trillion’. That finding is also incompatible with the information submitted by the  appellants  to the  General Court,  from which it is clear that  the Council  had adopted those restrictions with only two undertakings ‘in mind’, namely Rosneft and the Gazprom group. That finding  is claimed, last, to be incompatible with  other information submitted to the  General Court  by the  appellants  concerning the condition that the  contested acts were of individual concern to the appellants, that information neither being examined  nor taken into account by the  General Court  in  the judgment under appeal.
In the second place, the  appellants  claim that, even if the  export restrictions were not strictly ‘individual’  in nature, the  General Court  could not take the view,  relying on  the judgment  of  19 November 1998,
Spain
v
Council
(C‑284/94, EU:C:1998:548), that no actual or specific reasons needed to be stated for them. If the obligation to state reasons  laid down in  Article 296  TFEU is to be satisfied, the appellants  consider that  the Council ought,  at a minimum, to have indicated clearly, unequivocally and specifically the immediate objective  pursued by those  restrictions, which the Council failed to do.
The Council and the Commission contest the appellants’ arguments.
–
Findings of the Court
First, it must be observed that, as the  General Court  stated in  paragraph 114  of  the judgment under appeal, the Court  held,  in  paragraph 119  of  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), that the restrictions,  targeting the oil sector, established by  Articles 3  and  3a and  Article 4(3) and (4) of, and Annex II to,  the contested regulation, namely the  export restrictions, constituted  acts of general application  which are accordingly not targeted at  identified or identifiable natural or legal persons.
None of the arguments relied on by the  appellants  is sufficient to  call into question  that categorisation of those restrictions.
As regards the argument that there is allegedly a  contradiction between the reasons stated  in  paragraphs 114  and 157 of  the judgment under appeal,  suffice it to state that, even if there is such a contradiction, that is not capable of calling into question  the merits of the  finding by  the  General Court  in  paragraph 114, that finding being consistent with the  case-law  of the Court  deriving from the judgment  of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236,   paragraph 119).
Further, since the adoption of  restrictive measures  of general application  targeting a specific sector of the economy  may lead to a situation in which, because of the specific characteristics  of that sector,  where certain natural resources,  particular expertise and  significant investment are required, the number of  actors in that  sector may be quite limited, the  fact that only two groups  were affected by  the export restrictions at issue, and that  the Council  was aware of that,  cannot call into question  the finding by the  General Court  that the export restrictions were of general application.
Last, in so far as the  appellants  claim that  the  General Court  failed to take account of the  information that they submitted to that court  concerning those  restrictions being of individual concern to them, information  which they claim the General Court did not examine or take into account, it must be observed that  the appellants  have failed to specify what that information  was,  and have done no more than  refer to replies to questions that they  had lodged with the  General Court. It is not, however,  for the Court  to seek out and  identify,  in those replies,  what information it was  that was submitted by the  appellants  that would support their arguments.
Second, the Court must reject the argument that, even if the export restrictions were not strictly ‘individual’ in nature, the General Court could not take the view, relying on the judgment of 19 November 1998,
Spain
v
Council
(C‑284/94, EU:C:1998:548), that no actual or specific reasons needed to be stated for those restrictions. In that regard,  it must be observed that  the  General Court  applied the case-law  deriving from  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236
,
paragraph 120
), to the effect that  the extent of the obligation to state reasons depends on the nature of the measure in question, and that in the case of measures intended to have general application, the statement of reasons may be limited to indicating the overall situation which led to its adoption, on the one hand, and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve, on the other.
Since the  General Court  was correct to hold that  the  provisions relating to  the export restrictions were of general application, the General Court  did not err in law in holding, in  paragraph 114  of  the judgment under appeal, that, with respect to those  provisions, the Council  could justifiably maintain that  the statement of reasons could be limited to  indicating the overall situation which led to their adoption, on the one hand, and the general objectives which they were intended to achieve, on the other.
It follows from the foregoing that the first ground of appeal must be rejected.

The second ground of appeal
–
Arguments of the parties
By the  second ground of appeal, the  appellants  submit that  General Court  erred in law, in  paragraphs 119  to 126 of  the judgment under appeal, in holding that the Council had fulfilled its obligation to state reasons as provided for in Article 296 TFEU when it adopted the provisions relating to access to the capital market. That ground of appeal has two parts.
By the first part of this  ground of appeal, the appellants  claim that  the  General Court  erred in law, in paragraph 121  of  the judgment under appeal, in considering that the  ‘actual and specific reasons’ why  the Council held, in the exercise of its discretion, that Rosneft had to be subject to  individual  restrictive measures reflected in that instance  the  criteria  laid down in the  provisions  on  access to the capital market. According to the appellants, those  criteria  set out solely characteristics that apply to Rosneft, but do not explain why  those characteristics were meaningful, in the light of the objectives  of the  CFSP  pursued by the  contested acts.
By the second part of this ground, the  appellants  submit that the Council failed, in any event, to fulfil its obligation to state reasons under  Article 296  TFEU, in that  the objective pursued by the  capital market restrictions is not identified,  in a clear and unequivocal fashion, in the contested acts. The appellants  state that the first  restrictive measures  relating to  the capital market, imposed  on Rosneft by  Regulation  No 960/2014  and  Decision  2014/659,  did not refer to any specific objective of increasing costs for the Russian Federation, but said only that those restrictions had the more general objective of ‘putting pressure on the Russian government’. The appellants  claim that, since that was the  reason stated,  Rosneft was unaware of the rationale for its being  named in the list  of entities subject to such measures. The fact that the Council’s specific reasoning was identified only in the judgment under appeal

demonstrates that the Council failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons.
The Council and the Commission contest the appellants’ arguments.
–
Findings of the Court
By their  ground of appeal, the  appellants  do not call into question  the finding made by the  General Court  in paragraph 115  of  the judgment under appeal, namely that the  restrictive measures laid down  in the provisions  on  access to the capital market constituted, vis-à-vis  the appellants, in so far as those measures concerned them,  measures of individual application.
It must be recalled that the statement of reasons for an act of the Council which imposes a restrictive measure of individual application must identify the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure must be adopted in respect of the person concerned (judgment  of  15 November 2012,
Council
v
Bamba
, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 52).
The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must, however, be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgment of 15 November 2012,
Council
v
Bamba
, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 53).
In particular, the reasons given for a decision adversely affecting a person are sufficient if it was adopted in circumstances known to the party concerned which enable him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him (judgment  of  15 November 2012,
Council
v
Bamba
, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 54).
First, the Court must reject  the  appellants’ argument  concerning  paragraph 121  of  the judgment under appeal, where the  General Court  considered that  the Council  could, in the exercise of its discretion, set out ‘actual and specific reasons’ why the appellants had to be subject to restrictive measures that reflected, in that instance, the criteria laid down in the provisions on access to the capital market.
In that regard, it must be recalled that  Article 1(2)(b) of the contested decision  and  Article 5(2)(b) of the contested regulation  prohibit, inter alia,  all  EU operators  from carrying out certain financial transactions  or from concluding an agreement with entities  which meet certain  criteria, namely entities established in Russia, which are publicly controlled, or with over 50% public ownership, which have estimated total assets of over  1 trillion Russian roubles (RUB), and at least 50% of whose estimated revenues come from the sale or transportation of crude oil or petroleum products as at  12 September 2014, and which are listed in  Annex III  to the contested decision  or in  Annex VI  to the contested regulation. Article 1(2)(c) of the contested decision and Article 5(2)(c) of the contested regulation also prohibit those operators from carrying out those transactions with any legal person, entity or body established outside the European Union whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50% by an entity referred to in Article 1(2)(a) or (b) of the contested decision or Article 5(2)(a) or (b) of the contested regulation. Further, Rosneft was listed in those annexes.
It must also be recalled that  the  appellants  do not dispute that they met those criteria.
It must, last, be recalled that  the Court  held, in  paragraph 124  of the  judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), after finding that  Decision  2014/512, as amended by  Decision  2014/872,  and  the contested regulation  indicated the overall  situation that had led to their adoption and the  general objectives that they were designed to achieve, that Rosneft, a major player in the  Russian oil sector  whose share capital  was, on the date of adoption of  Decision  2014/512, predominantly owned by the Russian State, could not reasonably have been unaware  of the reasons why  the Council has adopted measures targeted against it.  The Court  then held, in  paragraph 125  of that  judgment, that the Council had stated reasons for the adoption of the  restrictive measures at issue that were sufficient.
The  General Court  therefore did not err in law  in holding, in paragraph 121  of  the judgment under appeal, that the  Council’s finding that  the  appellants  met the prescribed criteria  governing the imposition of  restrictive measures relating to  access to the capital market  enabled the appellants  to understand, having regard to  the overall situation that had led to the adoption of the  contested acts  and the objectives  pursued by those acts, the reasons  why the Council had adopted the  restrictive measures with respect to them.
Second, the appellants’  argument that the  objective  of increasing the costs of the Russian Federation, pursued by the  capital market restrictions,  was not identified, in a clear and unequivocal fashion, in the  contested acts,  and was clarified in  the judgment under appeal, must also be rejected.
Suffice it to observe that  the Court  itself stated, in  paragraph 123  of  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), that it is apparent from recital 2  of the contested regulation  that  the declared objective  of the  contested acts  was to increase the costs  of the actions of  the Russian Federation  that were designed to undermine  Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty  and independence and to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis.
It follows from the foregoing that  the second ground of appeal, in both its parts,  must be rejected.

The third ground of appeal
–
Arguments of the parties
By the  third ground of appeal, the  appellants  claim that the  General Court  erred in law, in  paragraphs 157  and 163 of  the judgment under appeal, in holding that there was  a rational connection  between  the export restrictions  and the objective  of increasing the costs of  the Russian Federation’s actions  with respect to Ukraine and,  consequently, in considering that they  were appropriate, as required by the principle of proportionality.
In that regard, the  appellants  argue, first, that, if the  export restrictions  are of general application, the  General Court  could not consider  that they were applicable to specific companies, namely Russian undertakings  operating in the  oil sector, on the basis notably of their estimated total assets of over RUB 1 trillion.  The applicants state that there is a contradiction  in holding that  those measures are general  while  considering, in  paragraph 157  of  the judgment under appeal, that there was  a rational connection between those restrictions,  which targeted  specific companies, including Rosneft, and the  objective  of increasing the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions with respect to Ukraine.
Second, the appellants  maintain that  the  General Court  erred, in  paragraph 163  of  the judgment under appeal, in considering that  the rational connection  between the  export restrictions  and  the identified objective  could not be called into question  by the fact that  the  exploration and production projects in  Russia (‘the non-conventional projects’) targeted by those restrictions did not generate immediate revenue for the  Russian State. The fact that, according to the  General Court, the future  revenue of the Russian Federation  will be undermined  does not, the appellants claim,  permit the conclusion that  there is a  rational connection  between those restrictions and the  objective  of increasing the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions with respect to Ukraine. The General Court also erred in considering,  in  paragraph 163 of that  judgment, that the Council could reasonably expect that the targeting of non-conventional oil projects would help to put pressure on the Russian Government. Putting pressure on the Russian Government  does not correspond to the declared objective, identified  in  paragraph 157  of  the judgment under appeal.
The Council and the Commission contest the appellants’ arguments.
–
Findings of the Court
As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that the Court has held that the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. The Court concluded that the legality of a measure adopted in those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 146  and the  case-law cited).
The imposition of  export restrictions in a significant sector of the  Russian economy,  such as the Russian oil sector,  plainly contributes  to achieving  the objective  of increasing the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and of promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis. That  measure was therefore not manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution was seeking to pursue.
Accordingly, the  General Court  was correct to hold, in  paragraph 157  of  the judgment under appeal, that there was indeed a rational connection  between the export restrictions and  the objective  of the  restrictive measures at issue.
The Court must also reject the  appellants’  argument that there is a contradiction between  paragraph 114  and  paragraph 157  of  the judgment under appeal,  in that the  General Court  considered,  in  paragraph 114  of that  judgment, that  the export restrictions were of general application, whereas  that court then held, in  paragraph 157  of that  judgment, that those restrictions  targeted  specific companies, including those  which  had features characteristic of  Rosneft.
In  paragraph 157  of  the judgment under appeal, the  General Court  held, while giving a ruling on the overall restrictions laid down by the  contested acts,  that ‘there [was] in fact a rational connection between the targeting of undertakings in the Russian oil sector, on the basis notably of their estimated total assets of over RUB 1 trillion, in view of the importance of that sector for the Russian economy, and the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case, which is to increase the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis’.
While the  General Court examined, in  paragraphs 156  to 161 of  the judgment under appeal, all of the restrictions at issue without distinction  and not only the  export restrictions, that court did however refer, in  paragraph 157  of that  judgment, in the clause that includes the word  ‘notably’, to undertakings in the Russian oil sector whose estimated total assets were over RUB 1 trillion. That criterion of  estimated total assets of over  RUB 1 trillion  derives solely from the  provisions relating to  the restrictions on  access to the capital market  and not from the  provisions relative to export restrictions.
As regards  the  appellants’ argument that  the  General Court  was wrong to consider, in  paragraph 163  of  the judgment under appeal, that there was a rational connection between the  export restrictions and  the objective  of the  restrictive measures, when the  non-conventional  projects  targeted by some of the measures at issue  did not generate immediate  revenue for the Russian State,  that argument must also be rejected. As the  General Court  stated in that  paragraph, ‘by undermining investment and future revenues  of  entities active in the  oil sector targeted by those measures, the Council  could reasonably  expect that  this would help to  put pressure on the Russian Government  and  to increase the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence’. Moreover, it is clear from the  case-law cited  in  paragraph 91  of the present judgment  that the legality  of  restrictive measures is not dependent on their being found to have immediate  effects;  all that is required is that  they are not manifestly inappropriate  in regard to  the objective  that the competent institution seeks to pursue.
As regards the appellants’ argument that the  General Court  also erred,  in  paragraph 163  of  the judgment under appeal, in that  ‘[putting] pressure on the Russian Government’  has no relation with the objective  of increasing the costs of the Russian Federation,  as set out in paragraph 157  of that  judgment, suffice it to state that the objective  of increasing the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and of promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis  is connected with the  objective  of putting pressure on the Russian Government, and that, in any event,  that latter objective  is stated in  recital 6  of  Regulation  No 960/2014.
It follows from the foregoing that the third ground of appeal must be rejected.

The fourth, fifth and sixth grounds of appeal
–
Arguments of the parties
By the  fourth, fifth and sixth grounds of appeal, the  appellants  claim that  the General Court  erred in law, in  paragraphs 205, 206, 209 and 210 of  the judgment under appeal, in holding that the export restrictions, and the  restrictions  on  access to the capital market,  were not in breach of their fundamental rights. The  General Court  failed to assess whether there was a fair balance between the protection of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and the promotion of a peaceful settlement of the  crisis  in that country, the achievement of which was part of the wider objective of maintaining peace and international security,  and  the  adverse consequences of the restrictions at issue  on the  fundamental rights of the  appellants. Consequently, the  General Court  failed to carry out a full review. If the General Court had weighed those considerations, that would have demonstrated that the restrictions at  issue  were contrary to the appellants’  fundamental rights.
As regards  the export restrictions, the  appellants  claim, in addition, that there was a breach of their  fundamental rights in that there was no rational connection between  those restrictions and  the objective  of increasing the costs of the actions of  the Russian Federation  in Ukraine. Even if it were to be the case that, due to the wide discretion accorded to the Council, such a connection could not be excluded, the existence of such a connection would not be sufficient ground to hold that those restrictions were proportionate.
As regards, in particular,  Article 11  of the contested regulation,  which provides for restrictions on legal claims, the  appellants  add that  the General Court  erred in law  in determining that  the  contested restrictions on legal claims  were not in breach of their  fundamental right to property. The appellants claim that, in essence, the General Court took the position that any restriction designed to ensure the effectiveness of a sanctions measure is permissible under  EU law.  The appellants had, however, set out before the General Court extensive arguments as to why the scope of the contested restrictions was excessively broad. The General Court addressed none of these arguments and incorrectly held that proportionality is not a relevant legal principle when a measure is capable in theory of ensuring the effectiveness of sanctions.
As regards the restrictions on  access to the capital market, the  appellants  again argue that those restrictions were not shown to have any connection with  increasing the cost of the actions of  the Russian Federation  in Ukraine, but are designed to cut off Rosneft’s financing for other unclear and unspecified reasons, linked to putting pressure on the  Russian Government.
The Council and the Commission contest the appellants’ arguments.
–
Findings of the Court
In  paragraph 204  of  the judgment under appeal, the  General Court, referring to  paragraph 146  of  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), stated that,  in so far as the  appellants  were challenging the proportionality  of the  general rules  on the basis of which  it was decided  that Rosneft should be listed in the annexes to the  contested acts, the Court, with regard to the judicial review  of compliance with the principle of proportionality,  had,  first, ‘held  that the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion  in areas which involve political, economic  and social choices in its part, and in which it is called upon  to  undertake complex  assessments’  and, second,  ‘concluded that  the legality of a measure adopted in those areas could be affected only if  the measure was manifestly inappropriate  having regard to  the objective  which the competent institution was seeking to pursue’.
In  paragraph 205  of  the judgment under appeal, referring to  paragraph 147  of  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), the  General Court  added that, contrary to what was claimed by  the  appellants, there was a reasonable relationship  between the content  of the  contested acts  and  the objective pursued by those acts.  According to the  General Court, ‘in so far as that objective [was], inter alia, to increase the costs to be borne by the Russian Federation for its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, the approach of targeting a major player in the oil sector, which is moreover predominantly owned by the Russian State, [was] consistent with that objective and [could not], in any event, be considered to be manifestly inappropriate with respect to the objective pursued’.
In  paragraph 206  of  the judgment under appeal, the  General Court  stated that, in so far as the applicants also challenged the proportionality of Article 11 of the contested regulation, ‘the provision precluding the satisfaction of claims laid down in that article is intended to prevent an entity targeted by the restrictive measures at issue from being able to procure performance of a prohibited transaction, contract or service or from obtaining a remedy under civil law for non-performance of such transactions, contracts or services’. The General Court  added that  ‘such a provision  thus ensured the effectiveness  of the  restrictive measures at issue, by reflecting in private law  the effects of measures that [had] been properly adopted by the European Union, for so long as those  measures  [were] applicable’  and held that, in that sense, ‘Article 11  of the contested regulation  [had to be] considered  a proportionate  means of achieving the objective  of the contested acts’.
As regards the  fundamental rights relied on by the appellants, namely the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, the  General Court, after noting, inter alia, that  those rights were not absolute, held, in  paragraph 209  of  the judgment under appeal, relying on  paragraphs 149  and 150 of the  judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), that ‘the importance of the objectives  pursued by the  contested acts, namely the protection of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and the promotion of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in that country, the achievement of which was part of the wider objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives  of the Union’s external action  set out in  Article 21 TEU, [was]  such as to justify the  possibility that, for certain operators, which are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the sanctions, the consequences may be negative, even significantly so’.
The General Court held, in  paragraph 210  of  the judgment under appeal, that, ‘in those circumstances, and having regard, in particular, to the fact that the  restrictive measures  adopted  by the Council in reaction to the crisis in Ukraine have become progressively more severe, interference with  [the appellants’] freedom to conduct a business  and their right of property  cannot be considered  to be disproportionate’.
First, contrary to what is claimed by the  appellants, it is clear from the  paragraphs  of  the judgment under appeal  cited above  that  the General Court  weighed  the objective pursued by the  contested acts, which was, inter alia,  to increase the costs of the actions of  the Russian Federation  designed to undermine  Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, against the adverse effect on the  fundamental rights  of the  appellants. Having held that  the  Council’s approach of  targeting a major player in the  oil sector  was consistent with that objective, the  General Court held that, in view of the importance of the objective  and  the  gradual development of the  restrictive measures, the  interference in the appellants’  freedom to conduct a business  and right to property  could not be regarded as being disproportionate.
Second, the Court must reject, for the same reasons as those  set out in  paragraphs 91  to  93  of the present judgment, the appellants’  argument that there was no rational connection  between the  export restrictions and the  objective  of increasing the costs of the actions of  the Russian Federation  in Ukraine.
Further, contrary to what is claimed by the  appellants, the  General Court  did not confine itself to  identifying a connection  between the  export restrictions  and  the objective  of increasing the costs of the actions of  the Russian Federation  in Ukraine. As has been stated above in  paragraph  110  of the present judgment, the General Court  also weighed the consequences of those measures on  the appellants’ fundamental rights  against that objective.
Third, as regards the  appellants’  argument in relation to  Article 11  of  the contested regulation,  which provides for restrictions on legal claims, it must be observed that, in  paragraph 206  of  the judgment under appeal, the content of which was quoted in  paragraph 107  of the present judgment, the  General Court,  having examined the scope and  objective  of the restrictions on legal claims laid down in  Article 11  of the contested regulation, held that, since those restrictions  made it possible to ensure  the effectiveness of the  restrictive measures at issue, validly adopted  by the European Union, those restrictions were proportionate.
Accordingly,  contrary to what is claimed by the appellants, the  General Court  examined whether  that  Article 11 constituted  a proportionate means of  achieving  the objective  set by  the  contested acts.
As regards  the appellants’  argument that  General Court  failed to address  the arguments raised before it, in  paragraphs 144  to 151 of the initiating  application,  that the  contested restrictions on legal claims were excessively broad in scope, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law,  the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one-by-one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case; the General Court’s reasoning may therefore be implicit on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why it has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgment  of  26 March 2020,
Larko
v
Commission
, C‑244/18 P, EU:C:2020:238, paragraph 43  and the  case-law cited).
In  paragraph 199  of  the judgment under appeal, the  General Court  summarised the arguments  set out in  paragraphs 144  to 151 of the initiating application, noting that the  appellants  were claiming that  the provisions  of  the contested regulation  on  export restrictions and  Article 11  of that  regulation, read together, amounted to a far-reaching interference with their  right to property, since those measures applied  wherever acquired rights  relating to the supply of relevant goods  or ancillary services were  subject to the requirement of  prior authorisation.
It must be stated that, in  paragraph 206  of  the judgment under appeal, the  General Court  examined the scope and  objective  of the  restrictive measures laid down in  Article 11  of the contested regulation  and held that those measures served to ensure the effectiveness  of the other  restrictive measures at issue. The General Court  concluded that that  article had to be regarded as  a proportionate  means of achieving the objective  set by the  contested acts. Further, in  paragraphs 209  and 210 of that  judgment, the  General Court  weighed the consequences of the  restrictive measures at issue  for the  appellants’ fundamental rights, including their right to  property, against the objectives  of those measures, and then held that  the interference, in particular in the  appellants’  right to property, could not be regarded as disproportionate. In so deciding,  the  General Court  responded  to the appellants’ arguments, as set out in  paragraphs 144  to 151 of the initiating application.
That statement of reasons is sufficient  in that it allowed  the  appellants  to know why the General Court had not upheld their arguments and enabled the Court to exercise its power of review.
Last, as regards the appellants’ argument that the restrictions  on  access to the capital market  had not been shown to have any connection with  increasing the costs of the  actions of  the Russian Federation  in Ukraine,  it must be recalled that, under the  case-law cited  in  paragraph 91  of the present judgment, the legality of such a restrictive measure can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue.
The imposition of restrictions on  access to the capital market  in an important sector  of the Russian economy,  such as the oil sector, like  the imposition of  export restrictions  described in  paragraph 92  of the present judgment,  clearly contributes to  achieving  the objective  of increasing the costs of the actions of  the Russian Federation  designed to  undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and of promoting  a peaceful settlement of the  crisis.
The  General Court  therefore did not err in holding, in  paragraph 157  of  the judgment under appeal, that a  rational connection  did exist between the restrictions on  access to the capital market  and the  objective  of the  restrictive measures  at issue.
It follows from the foregoing  that  the fourth, fifth and sixth grounds of appeal must therefore be rejected.

The seventh ground of appeal
–
Arguments of the parties
By the  seventh ground of appeal, the  appellants  claim that the  General Court  erred in law, in  paragraphs 178, 179 and 182 of  the judgment under appeal, in holding that any breach of  the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement and of GATT,  as incorporated into the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement,  could be justified by the  security exceptions,  provided under those  agreements.
In that regard, the appellants  argue, first, that  Article 99  of the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement and  Article XXI of GATT are  provisions  of international law, and not  provisions  of EU law. While  as a matter of EU law, the Council in principle has broad discretion to take the measures that it considers necessary, that is, however, a feature of the internal organisation of the European Union and cannot determine the correct interpretation of an international treaty with third countries. The  General Court  therefore erred in referring, with respect to those  two  provisions, to the broad discretion enjoyed by  the Council.
The appellants  claim, second, that the  General Court  did not set out the reasons why  the restrictions at issue  should or could be considered necessary.
The Council and the Commission contest the appellants’ arguments.
–
Findings of the Court
In the first place, as the  General Court  stated  in  paragraph 178  of  the judgment under appeal, the issue  of whether  the  restrictive measures at issue  are compatible with the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement has already been determined by the Court  in  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236).
In  paragraphs 110  to 117 of that  judgment, quoted in  paragraph 178  of  the judgment under appeal, the Court  held as follows:
‘110       … it suffices to state that, even if the  restrictive measures at issue in the main proceedings  were not compatible with  certain provisions [of the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement], Article 99  of that agreement permits  their adoption.
111      Under Article 99(1)(d) of the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement, nothing in that agreement is to prevent a party from taking measures that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, particularly in time of war or serious international tension constituting a threat of war or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security.
112      Further, the wording of that provision does not require that the “war” or “serious international tension constituting a threat of war” refer to a war directly affecting the territory of the European Union. Accordingly, events which take place in a country bordering the European Union, such as those which have occurred in Ukraine and which have given rise to the restrictive measures at issue in the main proceedings, are capable of justifying measures designed to protect essential European Union security interests and to maintain peace and international security, in accordance with the specified objective, under the first subparagraph of Article 21(1) and Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of the Union’s external action, with due regard to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.
113      As regards the question whether the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue in the main proceedings was necessary for the protection of essential European Union security interests and the maintenance of peace and international security, it must be borne in mind that the Council has a broad discretion in areas which involve the making by that institution of political, economic and social choices, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments (judgment of 1 March 2016,
National Iranian Oil Company
v
Council
, C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraph 77 and the case- law cited).
114      As stated by the Advocate General in point 150 of his Opinion, at the time when the restrictive measures at issue in the main proceedings were adopted, the Council stated, in the preambles of the [acts at issue], that the Heads of State or Government of the European Union condemned the unprovoked infringement of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Russian Federation, that the Council urged the Russian Federation actively to use its influence over the illegally armed groups in order, inter alia, to permit full, immediate, safe and secure access to the site of the downing of the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in Donetsk (Ukraine), and that the Union had previously adopted measures in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol (Ukraine). In view of those factors, the Council concluded, in recital 8  of  Decision  2014/512  [as amended by  Decision  2014/872], that the situation remained grave and that  it was appropriate  to adopt  restrictive measures in response to the actions of  the Russian Federation destabilising  the situation in Ukraine.
115      Further, as is stated in recital 2 of [the contested  regulation], it is apparent from those statements that the aim of the restrictive measures prescribed by the [acts at issue] was to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Ukraine. That objective is consistent with the objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s external action set out in Article 21 TEU.
116      In those circumstances, taking into consideration the broad discretion enjoyed by the Council in this area, that institution could take the view that the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue in the main proceedings was necessary for the protection of essential European Union security interests and for the maintenance of peace and international security, within the meaning of Article 99 of the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement.
117      Consequently, an examination of the [acts at issue] in the light of that agreement has disclosed nothing capable of affecting their validity.’
In  paragraph 179  of  the judgment under appeal, the  General Court  held that the  appellants  had put forward before it no new argument that might call into question  the finding made by the Court  as to the compatibility  of the  restrictive measures  laid down by the  contested acts  with the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement.
In the second place, as regards the compatibility  of the restrictions imposed  by the  contested acts  with GATT, the  General Court  stated, in  paragraphs 180  and 181 of  the judgment under appeal,  that, even if GATT were directly applicable and could usefully be relied upon by  the  appellants  in this instance, that agreement also contains, in  Article XXI thereof,  in the same way as  Article 99  of  the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement, a provision relating to  ‘security exceptions’.
Consequently the  General Court  held, in  paragraph 182  of  the judgment under appeal, that, in the light of the broad discretion that the  Council has in this area, that the Council was entitled to  consider that the actions of  the Russian Federation  undermining or threatening  Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence could amount to  an  ‘emergency in international relations’  and that the  restrictive measures at issue were ‘necessary  for the protection of [the] essential  security interests [of the  Member States  of the European Union]’, within the meaning of  Article XXI of GATT.
The  appellants’  claim that the  General Court, in so ruling, committed  an error in law cannot be upheld.
First, as regards the argument that the Council  does not have, with regard to the rules of international law, the broad discretion  that it enjoys under  EU law to take the  restrictive measures that it deems to be necessary,  on the ground that the nature and extent of  that discretion  are specific to the  internal organisation of the European Union and that that discretion cannot, in fact, inform the interpretation of an international treaty, it must be observed, in the first place, that, under  Article 216(2)  TFEU, international agreements concluded by the Union are an integral part of EU law  and are binding on the institutions and the Member States.
In the second place, it is clear both from the wording of  Article 99  of  the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement and that of  Article XXI of GATT, that nothing in those agreements  prevents  any party from taking the action that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests. It is therefore for each party  to determine the measures that it considers necessary  for the protection of its essential security interests  with due regard to its own internal rules. Consequently, the  General Court  did not err in law  in holding that  the Council, as an institution of the European Union, which was a party to those agreements, could exercise its broad discretion  in assessing whether it was necessary to adopt certain measures.
Second, the  General Court  undertook an examination of the  plea in law  that there was a breach of the international obligations of the European Union under the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement in the light of the  criteria  established by the Court  in  paragraphs 113  to 116  of  the judgment  of 28 March 2017,
Rosneft
(C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), from which it is plain that the Council could  consider that  the adoption of the  restrictive measures  at issue  was necessary  for  the protection of the essential security interests of the European Union and for the  maintenance of peace and international security.  Having set out those  criteria  in  paragraph 178  of the judgment under appeal, the  General Court  correctly applied those criteria  in  paragraph 179  of that  judgment, and held that the  appellants  had put forward before it no new argument that might call into question the findings made by the Court.
Consequently,  the  appellants  cannot maintain that  the General Court  failed to  set out the reasons why the restrictive measures at issue should or could have been considered necessary.
It follows from the foregoing that the seventh ground of appeal must be rejected.
Since all the grounds of appeal relied on have been rejected, the appeal must be dismissed.

Costs
In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to costs.
Under Article 138(1) of those rules, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
Since the Council applied for costs and the appellants have been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to pay the costs of the Council and to bear their own costs.
In accordance with  Article 184(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission must bear its own costs.
On those grounds, the Court (Seventh Chamber) hereby:
1.
Dismisses the appeal;
2.
Orders Rosneft Oil Company PAO, RN-Shelf-Arctic OOO, RN-Shelf-Far East AO, RN-Exploration OOO and Tagulskoe OOO to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union;
3.
Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.
Xuereb
von Danwitz
Kumin
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 17 September 2020.
A. Calot Escobar

P. G. Xuereb
Registrar

President of the Seventh Chamber
*
Language of the case: English.