CELEX: 62016TJ0026
EAGF and EAFRD
Expenditure excluded from financing
Irregularities in the determination of amounts owed
Delays in the procedure for recovery of amounts owed
Failure to offset between funds
Determination of the amount of interest
Proportionality
Flat-rate financial correction
Articles 31 to 33 of Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005
Individual situations

)
Background to the dispute
In the context of the financing of the common agricultural policy, the European Commission was required to carry out a number of audits of the expenditure incurred by the applicant, the Hellenic Republic. The Commission first carried out a desk audit (IR/2009/017/GR) on a number of individual cases, following its observation letter of 10 February 2009, before subsequently, from 8 to 10 September 2009, carrying out an on-the-spot audit (IR/2009/004/GR).
By observation letter of 4 January 2010, the Commission informed the Hellenic Republic of the weaknesses and irregularities which it had noted during that on-the-spot audit, concerning (i) delays in the recovery procedure either due to the fact that more than four years had passed between the date of the inspection report and that of the first administrative or judicial finding or due to the fact that more than one year had passed between the first administrative or judicial finding and the issue of an order for recovery; (ii) the failure to offset debts between the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); (iii) an error in the determination of the amount of interest due and, in certain cases, the failure to report interest due when recovery procedures were not carried out; and (iv) individual cases of delays in the recovery procedure. The Commission consequently proposed to exclude the sum of EUR 11 467 310.85 from EU financing and to charge that amount to the Hellenic Republic.
By letter of 3 March 2010, the Hellenic Republic expressed its disagreement with that analysis. A bilateral meeting was held on 1 April 2011, resulting in minutes dated 12 July 2011. The Commission expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the Greek authorities had been unable to provide data on any of the cases in which recovery had been delayed other than on the individual cases which it had already identified. The Hellenic Republic, for its part, pleaded difficulties in offsetting amounts as between funds and stressed that it had not undervalued the amount of interest payable. As regards the individual cases, the Hellenic Republic was of the opinion that their age or the fact that they were the subject of judicial proceedings precluded account from being taken of the expenditure relating to those cases.
By letter of 24 January 2013, the Commission notified the Hellenic Republic, in Greek, of its proposal to exclude from EU financing the sum of EUR 11 467 310.85 (‘the notification’). On 7 March 2013, the Hellenic Republic requested the intervention of the Conciliation Body.
During the conciliation procedure, the Conciliation Body noted, in its opinion of 19 October 2013, in the first place, that the parties were liable to reach an agreement concerning, inter alia, the basis of the calculation of the proposed flat-rate financial correction of 10%; next, as far as the level of that correction was concerned, that it was not able to assist the parties in any way, as the Greek authorities had failed to produce the table of cases in which deadlines had not been respected; and, finally, that it was necessary to draw the Commission’s attention to Article 33(3)(c) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (
OJ 2005 L 209, p. 1
), which ‘appear[ed] to exclude compensation if EAFRD money [was] being recovered’. For the remaining points, the Conciliation Body indicated that it saw no reason to call into question the findings of the Commission’s services.
The Commission, which, meanwhile, had received new information, proceeded, in a letter of 17 July 2015 (‘the letter of 17 July 2015’) to revise upward the basis of calculation of the flat-rate financial correction of 10% and to accept, in one case, not to impose a correction and, in another, to reduce the amount of the correction by half. Those changes led to an increase in the final amount of the sum corresponding to expenditure excluded from EU financing, which amounted as a result to EUR 11 534 827.97.
By its Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/2098 of 13 November 2015, excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the EAGF and under the EAFRD (
OJ 2015 L 303, p. 35
) (‘the contested decision’), the Commission ultimately excluded from EU financing the expenditure incurred by the Organismos Pliromon kai Elegchou Koinotikon Enischyseon Prosanatolismou kai Eggyiseon (Greek Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid; ‘the Opekepe’), totalling EUR 12 647 843.53.
Procedure and forms of order sought
By application lodged at the Court Registry on 22 January 2016, the Hellenic Republic brought the present action.
…
The parties presented oral argument and answered questions put to them by the Court at the hearing on 16 February 2017.
The Hellenic Republic claims that the Court should:
–
annul in part the contested decision, to the extent that the Commission therein applied financial corrections in the amount of EUR 11 534 827.97;
–
order the Commission to pay the costs.
The Commission contends that the Court should:
–
dismiss the action;
–
order the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.
Law
…
The pleas in law set out in the action
In support of its claim for annulment, the Hellenic Republic relies on five pleas in law, alleging, respectively:
–
the absence of a legal basis for the imposition of a flat-rate financial correction in respect of weaknesses established as far as the procedure for recovering improperly paid aid is concerned;
–
that the flat-rate financial correction, applied in 2015 in respect of weaknesses in the control system, has been proposed in respect of events, some of which had taken place prior to 2000, on the basis of findings ostensibly made for the first time in 2011, and therefore in infringement of its rights of defence; it also claims that the Commission has placed a disproportionate burden on it, in disregard of the principles of legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations, and the timely conduct of administrative procedures;
–
a failure to state reasons and a manifest error of assessment concerning the supposed delays in the procedure of recovery by offsetting between funds;
–
misinterpretation and misapplication by the Commission of Article 32(1) and (5) of Regulation No 1290/2005 as far as concerns, first, the calculation of the interest paid pursuant to the rule that the Member State concerned and the EU budget should each bear half of the financial consequences of the failure to recover (‘the 50/50 rule’) and, second, the failure to report that interest in the tables under Annex III to Commission Regulation (EC) No 885/2006 of 21 June 2006 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 as regards the accreditation of paying agencies and other bodies and the clearance of the accounts of the EAGF and of the EAFRD (
OJ 2006 L 171, p. 90
), as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1034/2008 of 21 October 2008 (
OJ 2008 L 279, p. 13
);
–
errors committed with regard to various individual situations.
The first plea in law
The Hellenic Republic claims, in support of its first plea, that the flat-rate financial correction applied in the present case had no basis in law. The irregularities established do not, it argues, concern failures to fulfil obligations relating to controls of the eligibility of expenditure, which may be subject to a flat-rate correction under Article 31(2) of Regulation No 1290/2005, but rather the subsequent management of irregular payments, which may be subject only to specific corrections under Articles 32 and 33 of that regulation. However, Article 31(3) of that regulation alone applies to specific cases of irregularity referred to in Articles 32 and 33 above, as those two articles expressly refer to it. The flat-rate financial correction comes solely under Article 31(2) of Regulation No 1290/2005, which does not apply to the irregularities under Articles 32 and 33 of that regulation. The wording of Article 31(4) and (5) of that regulation supports that analysis. The Hellenic Republic also relies on the interpretation of Article 3(1)(a), in conjunction with Article 8(1)(c)(iii), of Regulation No 1290/2005 and recitals 25 and 26 of that regulation.
Furthermore, Commission document VI/5330/97 of 23 December 1997, entitled ‘Guidelines for the calculation of financial consequences when preparing decisions on the clearance of the EAGGF, Guarantee Section, accounts’ (‘the Guidelines’), concerns exclusively the criteria set out in Article 31(2) of Regulation No 1290/2005, as indicated by case-law, inter alia the judgment of 13 December 2012, Greece v Commission (
T‑588/10
, not published,
EU:T:2012:688
, paragraph
). The Commission, it is argued, therefore limited its own discretion and it would not be possible to apply, in the present case, the flat-rate financial correction implemented in the contested decision, even if the irregularities in question were shown to have occurred.
Stressing the exceptional nature of the recourse to flat-rate financial corrections, the Hellenic Republic claims that, in the present case, it would be entirely possible to determine the actual amount of sums not recovered, inter alia by virtue of the tables provided for under Annex III to Regulation No 885/2006, communicated to the Commission by the Member States, which would render the flat-rate method meaningless.
In its reply, the Hellenic Republic adds that, if the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions by the Commission were correct, the imposition of flat-rate financial corrections would then also be possible with regard to State aid or failures of a State to fulfil obligations, which is the situation contemplated in Article 31(5)(b) of Regulation No 1290/2005.
The Commission takes issue with the arguments put forward by the Hellenic Republic.
In examining the first plea, it is necessary to verify, in the first place, whether there is any legal basis for the Commission’s recourse to a flat-rate financial correction in the event that irregularities are established under Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation No 1290/2005 and, in the second place, if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the application of such a correction was justified in the present case in the light of those infringements.
It should be noted at the outset that, in the present case, the Commission’s action, from the desk and on-the-spot audits which it carried out in 2009 to the analysis which it carried out on the opinion of the Conciliation Body, delivered on 19 October 2013, was governed by Regulation No 1290/2005, which was applicable at that time. In recital 1 of the contested decision, the Commission also referred to Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (
OJ 2013 L 347, p. 549
), applicable as from 1 January 2015 pursuant to Article 121(2)(c) of that regulation. Article 52 of Regulation No 1306/2013 essentially repeats Article 31 of Regulation No 1290/2005 and expands it. Consequently, and in so far as the parties base their arguments on that latter regulation, it suffices, for the purposes of the resolution of the present proceedings, to examine the relevant provisions of Regulation No 1290/2005.
The possibility of having recourse to a flat-rate financial correction is a result of the wide discretion conferred on the Commission under Article 31(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1290/2005. Those provisions recognise that ‘if the Commission finds that expenditure as indicated in Article 3(1) and Article 4 has been incurred in a way that has infringed [EU] rules, it shall decide what amounts are to be excluded from [EU] financing’ and empower it to assess ‘the amounts to be excluded on the basis of the gravity of the non-conformity recorded’, ‘[taking] due account of the nature and gravity of the infringement and of the financial damage caused to the [European Union]’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 May 2013, Greece v Commission,
T‑294/11
, not published,
EU:T:2013:261
, paragraphs
to
and the case-law cited).
It should also be borne in mind that the flat-rate correction mechanism and the criteria contained in the guidelines have been recognised as compliant with EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 September 2004, Greece v Commission,
C‑332/01
,
EU:C:2004:496
, paragraph
; of 7 October 2004, Spain v Commission,
C‑153/01
,
EU:C:2004:589
, paragraph
; and of 17 May 2013, Greece v Commission,
T‑294/11
, not published,
EU:T:2013:261
, paragraph
), given that a correction determined by the Commission under the Guidelines is designed to avoid a situation in which the EAGF and the EAFRD are burdened with amounts that have not served to finance an objective pursued by the EU legislation in question and does not constitute a penalty (judgments of 31 March 2011, Greece v Commission,
T‑214/07
, not published,
EU:T:2011:130
, paragraph
, and of 17 May 2013, Greece v Commission,
T‑294/11
, not published,
EU:T:2013:261
, paragraph
). According to case-law, the flat rates applied in the Guidelines make it possible both to respect EU law and the sound management of EU resources and to prevent the Commission from exercising its discretion in such a way as to impose on the Member States excessive and disproportionate adjustments (judgments of 10 September 2008, Italy v Commission,
T‑181/06
, not published,
EU:T:2008:331
, paragraph
, and of 17 May 2013, Greece v Commission,
T‑294/11
, not published,
EU:T:2013:261
, paragraph
).
With regard to the question whether there is a legal basis for the recourse to a flat-rate financial correction in relation to the irregularities referred to in Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation No 1290/2005, it should be noted that no provision of that regulation, and Articles 31 to 33 of that regulation in particular, excludes the possibility of applying Article 31(2) of that regulation to the irregularities referred to in Articles 32 and 33 thereof.
Admittedly, Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation No 1290/2005 refer to Article 31 of that regulation only in order to mention the Commission’s obligation to follow the ‘procedure laid down in Article 31(3)’ of that regulation when it decides, pursuant to Articles 32 and 33, to ‘charge the sums to be recovered to the Member State’ (Article 32(4) and Article 33(5) of Regulation No 1290/2005) or ‘to exclude from [EU] financing sums charged to the [EU] budget’ (Article 32(8) of Regulation No 1290/2005). It should be noted in this regard that that provision, which is purely procedural in nature, provides that ‘before any decision to refuse financing is taken, the findings from the Commission’s inspection and the Member State’s replies shall be notified in writing, following which the two parties shall attempt to reach agreement on the action to be taken’, and that ‘if agreement is not reached, the Member State may request opening of a procedure aimed at reconciling each party’s position within four months. A report of the outcome of the procedure shall be given to the Commission, which shall examine it before deciding on any refusal of financing’. That procedure was indeed applied in the present case.
However, the fact that Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation No 1290/2005 expressly refer solely to Article 31(3) of that regulation does not mean that recourse to a flat-rate financial correction is excluded in the case of the irregularities referred to in Articles 32 and 33.
Indeed, it is apparent from the wording of Article 31(5)(a) of Regulation No 1290/2005 that Article 31(4) of that regulation ‘shall not apply in the case of … irregularities covered by Articles 32 and 33’, which implies,
a contrario
, that the other paragraphs of Article 31 of Regulation No 1290/2005, including Article 31(2), are intended to apply to the irregularities covered by Articles 32 and 33 of that regulation.
That interpretation is, furthermore, consistent with the objective, referred to in recitals 25 and 26 of Regulation No 1290/2005, of protecting the financial interests of the European Union, which underlies the rules for monitoring the proper implementation of the budget of the agricultural funds set out in Title IV of that regulation, of which Articles 31 to 33 of that regulation are part. Excluding the possibility of recourse to a flat-rate financial correction would amount to, first, depriving the Commission of any means of protecting the financial interests of the European Union when it is not in a position to quantify precisely the sums to be excluded from the financing of the EU budget pursuant to Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation No 1290/2005 due to the failure of the Member State concerned to provide it with the necessary information in that regard, and, secondly, enabling the defaulting Member State to avoid meeting its obligations, thereby taking advantage of its own failures in that regard.
Consequently, contrary to the Hellenic Republic’s claim, recourse to a flat-rate financial correction is not prohibited as such when Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation No 1290/2005 are implemented.
None of the arguments put forward by the Hellenic Republic can cast doubt on that finding.
In the first place, as regards the Hellenic Republic’s argument referred to in paragraph 23 above, alleging that, if it were possible to adopt a flat-rate financial correction with regard to the financial consequences of the irregularities referred to in Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation No 1290/2005, then it would also be possible to do so in the situation referred to in Article 31(5)(b) of that regulation, concerning State aid and failures of a Member State to fulfil obligations, suffice it to note that the purpose of the exclusion set out in that provision is to indicate that the period of 24 months provided for in Article 31(4) of that regulation evidently does not apply in proceedings relating to State aid and failures of a Member State to fulfil obligations, which are not the subject of Regulation No 1290/2005.
In the second place, Article 3(1)(a) and Article 8(1)(c)(iii) of Regulation No 1290/2005 and recitals 25 and 26 of that regulation, on which the Hellenic Republic relies without, however, presenting specific arguments based on those provisions, do not appear to be tangibly linked to the question of whether the flat-rate financial correction adopted in the present case is lawful and are, accordingly, irrelevant to that question.
In the third place, the arguments which the Hellenic Republic derives from the Guidelines also cannot be accepted.
In that regard, first, it should be noted that nothing in the Guidelines excludes the application of Article 31(2) of Regulation No 1290/2005 to the financial consequences of the irregularities referred to in Articles 32 and 33 of that regulation. It follows from the case-law that those guidelines ‘merely clarify the methods and parameters to be used by the Commission in order to calculate the amounts to be excluded from financing on the basis of the criteria set out in Article 31(2) of Regulation No 1290/2005’ (judgment of 13 December 2012, Greece v Commission,
T‑588/10
, not published,
EU:T:2012:688
, paragraph
).
Next, it follows from Annex 2 to the Guidelines that, in the event that it is impossible to determine the actual amount of the irregular payments and, therefore, the amount of the financial losses suffered by the European Union, flat-rate corrections are applied in accordance with the evaluation of the risk incurred by the EU budget by reason of the deficient controls. Such an impossibility of determining the exact amount of the irregular payments may arise at the level of controls of the eligibility of expenditure as well as at the level of controls concerning the recovery of unduly paid sums, on account, as stated in the Guidelines themselves, of ‘the very nature of ex-post auditing’.
Finally, and in any event, even if it were to be assumed that the Guidelines do not apply to the irregularities referred to in Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation No 1290/2005, that circumstance alone could not result in depriving the recourse to such a flat-rate correction of a basis in law, as the interpretation of those irregularities cannot run counter to that of the secondary legislation. It was on the basis of Regulation No 1290/2005 itself and, in particular, on the basis of the wide discretion which it affords the Commission, that the latter was able to adopt the flat-rate correction mechanism set out in the Guidelines (see paragraphs 27 and 28 above).
It must therefore be held that there was a legal basis, namely Article 31(2) of Regulation No 1290/2005, that allowed the Commission to apply a flat-rate financial correction to the financial consequences of the irregularities established under Articles 32 and 33 of that regulation when it was not in a position to determine the exact amount of the sums not recovered. That reasoning may, moreover, be transposed to Article 52 of Regulation No 1306/2013, a fortiori because Article 52(2) of that regulation expressly provides for the possibility of having recourse to flat-rate financial corrections ‘where, due to the nature of the case or because the Member State has not provided the Commission with the necessary information, it is not possible with proportionate effort to identify more precisely the financial damage caused to the Union’.
It is now necessary to verify whether the application of that correction was justified in the present case in the light of the infringements found to have been committed (see paragraph 25 above).
It should first be recalled that Member States are under an obligation to inform the Commission as regards the expenditure incurred in respect of both the EAGF and the EAFRD. The first subparagraph of Article 32(3) and the first subparagraph of Article 33(4) of Regulation No 1290/2005 provide that when ‘the annual accounts are sent, as provided for in Article 8(1)(c)(iii), Member States shall provide the Commission with a summary report on the recovery procedures undertaken in response to irregularities. This shall give a breakdown of the amounts not yet recovered, by administrative and/or judicial procedure and by year of the primary administrative or judicial finding of the irregularity’. Furthermore, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 32(3) of Regulation No 1290/2005 that ‘Member States shall make available to the Commission detailed particulars of the individual recovery procedures and of the individual sums not yet recovered’.
However, as stated by the Conciliation Body in paragraph 6.2 of its opinion of 19 October 2013, ‘the Greek authorities have not produced a table of cases in which deadlines had not been respected’. Thus, contrary to what the Hellenic Republic claims in paragraph 32 of the application, the Commission was not in a position to determine precisely the amounts not recovered, as that Member State had failed properly to complete the tables under Annex III to Regulation No 885/2006, notwithstanding the Commission’s repeated requests for it to do so. The failure in that regard, as is apparent from paragraph 19.6.3 of the summary report, is one of the key controls that ‘[had not been] applied or had been applied so poorly or so infrequently that they were completely ineffective for pursuing irregularities in conformity with the requirements [resulting from the relevant legislation]’. Those key controls consisted in appropriate procedures and checks to ensure (i) that unduly paid amounts would, in good time, be identified, recovered and reimbursed to the funds; (ii) that the accounting documents and data relating to data management were correct; and (iii) that the debtor’s ledger and Annex III to Regulation No 885/2006 were completed.
It should be borne in mind in this regard that, according to the Guidelines, when key controls are not applied, or applied poorly or infrequently, the application of a flat-rate financial correction may be justified.
Consequently, given that, during the checks carried out in 2009, it had found, in the course of the examination of several individual cases, a recurrent failure to recover or delay in the recovery of debts of the funds concerned, the Commission had reason to believe that there would be similar shortcomings in all of the cases and, therefore, in the light of the Guidelines, given that it was not possible to determine precisely the losses suffered by the European Union, to envisage a flat-rate correction (see, to that effect and by analogy, with regard to anomalies in controls carried out by a Member State, judgment of 24 April 2008, Belgium v Commission,
C‑418/06 P
,
EU:C:2008:247
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
The first plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
…
The third and fourth pleas in law
In the context of its third plea, the Hellenic Republic disputes, in essence, the justification for the flat-rate financial correction concerning the supposed failure to offset the debts between agricultural funds and claims, in the context of its fourth plea, that that correction based on the obligation to account for the interest in the tables provided for under Annex III to Regulation No 885/2006 has no basis in law.
It must be noted in this regard that it is expressly stated in the notification that the flat-rate financial correction of 10% proposed in paragraph 1.1 of its annex on account of delays in the recovery procedure ‘also covers the risk for the funds described in paragraph 1.2 (Offsetting) and paragraph 1.3 (Interest reporting in [the tables under Annex III to Regulation No 885/2006])’. It is further indicated, in paragraph 1.2 in fine of the annex to the notification, that ‘no further correction [has therefore been] proposed’ by reason of the lack of a specific procedure for offsetting between funds. The same reasoning was followed in regard to the failure to report interest in the tables under Annex III to Regulation No 885/2006. The Commission stated, in paragraph 1.3, in fine, of the annex to the notification, that the correction relating thereto ‘was covered by the flat-rate correction of 10% proposed in paragraph 1.1 (on account of the delays in the recovery procedure)’.
The letter of 17 July 2015 also includes an annex which summarises the Commission’s position following the intervention of the Conciliation Body. The Commission emphasises, in the second indent of paragraph 2, that ‘the flat-rate financial correction of 10% proposed in Point A (delays in the recovery procedure) also covers Points B and C (offsetting as between funds and interest reporting in the table under Annex III [to Regulation No 885/2006])’. The same terms are used in the summary report, in the second indent of paragraph 19.6.5 in fine.
That approach is, moreover, consistent with the Guidelines, according to which, where several deficiencies are found in the same system, the flat rates are not cumulated, the most serious deficiency being taken as an indication of the risks presented by the control system as a whole.
It is therefore clear from the foregoing considerations that the two deficiencies which are the subject of the third and fourth pleas did not result in any increase in the flat-rate financial correction of 10% imposed on account of the delays in the recovery procedure. It follows that the examination of the third and fourth pleas cannot have any effect on the lawfulness of the contested decision.
It follows from case-law that, where some of the grounds in a decision on their own provide a sufficient legal basis for the decision, any errors in the other grounds of the decision have no effect in any event on its operative part. Moreover, where the enacting terms of a Commission decision are based on several pillars of reasoning, each of which would in itself be sufficient to justify those terms, that decision should, in principle, be annulled only if each of those pillars is vitiated by an illegality. In such a case, an error or other illegality which affects only one of the pillars of reasoning cannot be sufficient to justify annulment of the decision at issue because that error could not have had a decisive effect on the operative part adopted by the institution which adopted that decision (order of 26 February 2013, Castiglioni v Commission,
T‑591/10
, not published,
EU:T:2013:94
, paragraph
; judgments of 15 January 2015, France v Commission,
T‑1/12
,
EU:T:2015:17
, paragraph
; and of 28 September 2016, United Kingdom v Commission,
T‑437/14
,
EU:T:2016:577
, paragraph
).
The third and fourth pleas must consequently be rejected as ineffective.
The fifth plea in law
In the context of its fifth plea, the Hellenic Republic seeks the annulment of the contested decision in so far that it concerns nine individual situations and it is of the opinion that each of those situations is vitiated by a different complaint which will be examined one after the other.
…
Regard being had to all of the foregoing, the fifth plea must be wholly rejected and, therefore, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
Since the Hellenic Republic has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)
hereby:

1.
Dismisses the action;

2.
Orders the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.

Tomljenović
Marcoulli
Kornezov
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 25 October 2017.
[Signatures]
(
*1
)	Language of the case: Greek.
(
)	Only the paragraphs of the present judgment which the Court considers it appropriate to publish are reproduced here.