CELEX: 62019TJ0389
Institutional law
Single statute for Members of the European Parliament
Members of the European Parliament elected in Italian constituencies
Adoption by the Ufficio di Presidenza della Camera dei deputati (Office of the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Italy) of Decision No 14/2018 on pensions
Alteration in the amounts of the pensions of Italian national Members of Parliament
Corresponding alteration, by the European Parliament, in the amounts of the pensions of certain former Members of the European Parliament elected in Italy
Competence of the authority which adopted the measure
Obligation to state reasons
Acquired rights
Legal certainty
Legitimate expectations
Right to property
Proportionality
Equality of treatment

By their action, the applicants, former Members of the European Parliament elected in the Italian Republic or their survivors, request the Court to annul the decisions of the Parliament adjusting the manner in which their retirement or survivors’ pensions are calculated to the manner in which the amounts of the pensions received by members of the lower house of the Italian Republic are calculated and, in some circumstances, reducing the amounts of their retirement or survivors’ pensions.
I.

Legal background
A.

European Union law
Annex III (‘Annex III’) to the Rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances to Members of the European Parliament (‘the PEAM Rules’) provided, in the version in force until 14 July 2009, inter alia:
‘Article 1
1.   All Members of the European Parliament shall be entitled to a retirement pension.
2.   Pending the establishment of a definitive Community pension scheme for all Members of the European Parliament, where no pension is provided under national arrangements or where the level and/or conditions of such pension are not identical to those applicable to Members of the national parliament of the Member State for which the Member was elected, a provisional pension shall, at the request of the Member concerned, be paid from the European Union budget, Parliament Section.
Article 2
1.   The level and conditions of such pension shall be identical to those applicable to the pension for Members of the lower house of the parliament of the Member State for which the Member of the European Parliament was elected.
2.   A Member benefiting under Article 1(2) shall be required, when joining the scheme, to pay to the European Union budget a sum so calculated that he or she pays the same overall contribution as that payable by a Member of his or her parliament under national provisions.
Article 3
1.   Applications to join this provisional pension scheme must be submitted within 12 months of the beginning of the Member’s term of office.
Once that time limit has expired, membership of the pension scheme shall take effect from the first day of the month in which the application was received.
2.   Applications for payment of the pension must be made within six months of the commencement of entitlement.
Once that time limit has expired, the pension shall be payable from the first day of the month in which the application was received.
…’
The Statute for Members of the European Parliament was adopted by Decision 2005/684/EC, Euratom of the European Parliament of 28 September 2005 adopting the Statute for Members of the European Parliament (
OJ 2005 L 262, p. 1
; ‘the Statute for Members’), and entered into force on 14 July 2009, the first day of the seventh parliamentary term.
Article 25 of the Statute for Members provides:
‘1.   Members who belonged to Parliament prior to the entry into force of this Statute and were re-elected may opt for the national system applicable hitherto in respect of the salary, transitional allowance and pensions for the entire duration of their membership of the European Parliament.
2.   These payments shall be made from the budget of the Member State in question.
…’
Article 28 of the Statute for Members provides:
‘1.   Any pension entitlement that a Member has acquired in accordance with national arrangements at the time when this Statute is applied shall be retained in full.
…’
By decisions of 19 May and 9 July 2008, the Bureau of the Parliament adopted Implementing Measures for the Statute for Members (
OJ 2009 C 159, p. 1
; ‘the Implementing Measures’).
Article 49 of the Implementing Measures, concerning entitlement to an retirement pension, provides:
‘1.   After the cessation of their term of office, Members who have exercised their mandate for at least one complete year shall be entitled, for life, to an old-age pension payable from the first day of the month following that in which they reach the age of 63.
Former Members or their legal representatives shall, except in cases of force majeure, submit their application for payment of the old-age pension within six months of the commencement of entitlement. After that deadline the date on which enjoyment of the old-age pension takes effect shall be the first day of the month in which the application is received.
…’
Pursuant to Article 73 of the Implementing Measures, those measures entered into force on the same date as the Statute for Members, that is to say, 14 July 2009.
Article 74 of the Implementing Measures specifies that, subject to the transitional provisions laid down in Title IV thereof – and in particular Article 75 thereof (‘Article 75’) – the PEAM Rules are to cease to be valid on the date on which the Statute for Members enters into force.
Article 75, concerning, inter alia, retirement pensions, provides:
‘1.   The survivor’s pension, the invalidity pension, the additional invalidity pension granted for dependent children and the old-age pension paid pursuant to Annexes I, II and III to the PEAM Rules shall continue to be paid pursuant to those annexes to those persons who were in receipt of the benefits in question prior to the date of entry into force of the Statute.
Where a former Member in receipt of the invalidity pension dies after 14 July 2009, the survivor’s pension shall be paid to his or her spouse, stable non-marital partner or dependent children, subject to the conditions laid down in Annex I to the PEAM Rules.
2.   The old-age pension rights acquired prior to the date of entry into force of the Statute pursuant to the aforementioned Annex III shall be maintained. Persons who have acquired rights under that pension scheme shall receive a pension calculated on the basis of their acquired rights pursuant to the aforementioned Annex III as soon as they meet the relevant conditions laid down by the national law of the Member State concerned and they have submitted the application referred to in Article 3(2) of the aforementioned Annex III.’
Finally, Article 75 must be read in conjunction with recital 7 of the Implementing Measures, which states:
‘Moreover, in the transitional provisions steps should be taken to ensure that persons in receipt of certain benefits under the PEAM Rules continue to receive them after those rules have been repealed, in keeping with the principle of [protection of] legitimate expectations. Steps should also be taken to guarantee maintenance of the pension rights acquired on the basis of the PEAM Rules prior to the entry into force of the Statute. In addition, due account should be taken of the specific arrangements governing Members who, during a transitional period and in respect of the financial rules governing exercise of the mandate, will be covered by national systems in their Member State of election, pursuant to Article 25 or Article 29 of the Statute.’
B.

Italian law
On 12 July 2018, the Ufficio di Presidenza della Camera dei deputati (Office of the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Italy) adopted Decision No 14/2018 reassessing the amount of lifetime annuities and the lifetime annuity proportion of pro-rata pension benefits and survivors’ benefits relating to years of service completed before 31 December 2011 (‘Decision No 14/2018’).
Article 1 of Decision 14/2018 provides:
‘1.   From 1 January 2019, the amounts of direct and survivors’ lifetime annuities and the lifetime annuity proportion of pro-rata direct and survivors’ pension benefits, entitlement to which was acquired pursuant to the rules in force on 31 December 2011, shall be calculated in accordance with the new rules provided for in this decision.
2.   The new calculation referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be carried out by multiplying the amount of the individual contribution by the conversion coefficient relating to the age of the Member of Parliament on the date on which the Member of Parliament became entitled to the lifetime annuity or pro-rata pension benefit.
3.   The conversion coefficients set out in Table 1, annexed to this decision, shall be applied.
4.   The amount of direct and survivors’ lifetime annuities and the lifetime annuity proportion of direct and survivors’ pro-rata pension benefits, recalculated in accordance with this decision, shall under no circumstances exceed the amount of the lifetime annuity, whether paid directly or to survivors, specified for each Member of Parliament by the Regulation in effect on the date of commencement of the term of office of the Member of Parliament.
5.   The amount of direct and survivors’ lifetime annuities, and the life annuity proportion of pro-rata direct and survivors’ pension benefits, recalculated in accordance with this decision, shall under no circumstances be lower than the amount calculated by multiplying the amount of individual contributions paid by a Member of Parliament who held office during the seventeenth parliamentary term, reviewed in accordance with Article 2 below, by the conversion coefficient corresponding to the age of 65 in force on 31 December 2018.
6.   In the event that, as a result of the recalculation carried out pursuant to this decision, the new amount of direct or survivors’ lifetime annuities and of the lifetime annuity proportion pro-rata direct and survivors’ pension benefits is reduced by more than 50% compared with the amount of the direct or survivors’ lifetime annuity or lifetime annuity proportion of the direct or survivors’ pro-rata pension benefit specified for each Member of Parliament by the Regulation in force on the date when he or she commenced his or her parliamentary term of office, the minimum amount determined pursuant to paragraph 5 shall be increased by half.
7.   The Office of the President, on a proposal from the College of Quaestors of the Parliament, may increase by up to a maximum of 50% the amount of direct and survivors’ lifetime annuities and the life annuity proportion of direct and survivors’ pro-rata pension benefits, recalculated pursuant to this decision, for persons who so request and meet the following conditions:
(a)
they do not receive any other annual income exceeding the annual amount of social assistance, with the exception of any income derived, on whatever ground, from the building designated as their principal dwelling;
(b)
they have a serious illness requiring the administration of life-saving therapy, substantiated by appropriate documents issued by public health establishments, or they have a health condition causing a situation of 100% disability recognised by the competent authorities.
8.   The documentation proving that the conditions referred to in paragraph 7 are met must be submitted by the requester with the request and, subsequently, by 31 December of each year.’
II.

Background to the dispute
The applicants, Ms Maria Teresa Coppo Gavazzi and the other individuals whose names are set out in the annex, are either former Members of the European Parliament elected in Italy or, as regards Ms Vanda Novati, Ms Maria Di Meo, Ms Leda Frittelli, Ms Mirella Musoni, Ms Jitka Frantova and Ms Ida Panusa, in Cases T‑397/19, T‑409/19, T‑414/19, T‑426/19, T‑427/19 and T‑453/19, surviving spouses of former Members of the European Parliament elected in that Member State. Each of them receives a retirement pension or survivor’s pension respectively.
Pursuant to the rules laid down in Decision No 14/2018, the amounts of the pensions of a number of former Italian Members of Parliament (or those of their surviving spouses) were reduced with effect from 1 January 2019.
Following the bringing of an action against Decision No 14/2018 by Italian national Members of Parliament concerned by those reductions, the legality of that national decision is currently under review by the Consiglio di giurisdizione della Camera dei deputati (Jurisdiction Council of the Chamber of Deputies, Italy).
By inserting a comment into pension statements for January 2019, the Parliament warned the applicants that the amounts of their pensions could be revised pursuant to Decision No 14/2018 and that that new calculation might give rise to the recovery of overpaid sums.
According to the Parliament, it was required to apply Decision No 14/2018 and, therefore, to recalculate the amounts of the applicants’ pensions, in the light of Article 2(1) of Annex III, which provides that ‘the level and conditions of such pension shall be identical to those applicable to the pension for Members of the lower house of the parliament of the Member State for which the Member of the European Parliament was elected’ (‘the identical pension rule’).
By an undated note from the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s Directorate-General (DG) for Finance, appended to the applicants’ pension statements for February 2019, the Parliament advised the applicants that, by Opinion No SJ‑0836/18 of 11 January 2019, its Legal Service had confirmed that Decision No 14/2018 was automatically applicable to their situation (‘the Opinion of the Legal Service’). That note added that, once the Parliament had received the necessary information from the Camera dei deputati (Chamber of Deputies, Italy), it would notify the applicants of the new amounts of their pensions and would recover any difference over the following 12 months. Finally, that note informed the applicants that the final calculation of the amounts of their pensions would be decided in a formal act against which it would be possible to lodge a complaint pursuant to Article 72 of the Implementing Measures or an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU.
By notes of 11 April 2019 (in the case of Mr Luigi Andrea Florio, in Case T‑465/19; ‘the draft decision’), the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance informed the applicants that, as he had stated in his note of February 2019, the amounts of their pensions would be adjusted, pursuant to Article 2(1) of Annex III, in line with the reduction in similar pensions paid in Italy to former national Members of Parliament by the Chamber of Deputies pursuant to Decision No 14/2018. Those notes also stated that the amounts of the applicants’ pensions would be adjusted as from April 2019 (and with retroactive effect from 1 January 2019) pursuant to the proposed new pension calculations appended to those notes. Lastly, the same notes gave the applicants a period of 30 days, from their receipt, to submit their comments. If they did not do so, the effects of those notes would be considered final and would entail, in particular, recovery of the amounts overpaid for January to March 2019.
With the exception of Mr Florio, in Case T‑465/19, none of the applicants submitted such comments, with the result that the effects of the notes referred to in paragraph 20 above became final in their respect.
By email of 14 May 2019, Mr Florio sent his comments to the relevant department of the Parliament.
By letter of 11 June 2019 (‘the final decision’), the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance stated that Mr Florio’s comments did not contain anything to warrant a reconsideration of the Parliament’s view, as expressed in the draft decision. Consequently, the resulting pension amounts and the recovery plan for sums overpaid, as recalculated and communicated in the annex to that draft decision, had become final on the date of notification of the final decision.
III.

Procedure and forms of order sought
The applicants brought the present actions by applications lodged at the Court Registry on 27 June (Cases T‑389/19 to T‑393/19), 28 June (Cases T‑394/19, T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑409/19 to T‑414/19, T‑416/19 and T‑417/19), 1 July (Cases T‑435/19, T‑436/19, T‑438/19 to T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19), 2 July (Cases T‑421/19, T‑422/19, T‑425/19 to T‑427/19, T‑429/19 to T‑432/19), 3 July (Cases T‑418/19, T‑420/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19 to T‑453/19), 4 July (Cases T‑454/19 and T‑463/19) and 5 July 2019 (Case T‑465/19).
On 10 July (Cases T‑389/19 to T‑393/19, T‑394/19, T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑409/19 to T‑414/19, T‑416/19 and T‑417/19) and 18 July 2019 (Cases T‑418/19, T‑420/19 to T‑422/19, T‑425/19 to T‑427/19, T‑429/19 to T‑432/19, T‑435/19, T‑436/19, T‑438/19 to T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19 to T‑454/19, T‑463/19 and T‑465/19), the Parliament requested that the cases be joined pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
On 19 July (Cases T‑389/19 to T‑393/19, T‑394/19, T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑409/19 and T‑410/19) and 22 July 2019 (Cases T‑411/19 to T‑414/19, T‑416/19 to T‑418/19, T‑420/19 to T‑422/19, T‑425/19 to T‑427/19, T‑429/19 to T‑432/19, T‑435/19, T‑436/19, T‑438/19 to T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19 to T‑454/19, T‑463/19 and T‑465/19), the Parliament requested, pursuant to Article 69(c) of the Rules of Procedure, that the proceedings be stayed pending the decision of the Consiglio di giurisdizione della Camera dei deputati (Jurisdiction Council of the Chamber of Deputies) on the legality of Decision No 14/2018.
On 11 September (Cases T‑391/19 and T‑392/19), 12 September (Case T‑389/19), 13 September (Case T‑393/19), 16 September (Cases T‑394/19, T‑403/19, T‑410/19, T‑412/19 and T‑416/19), 17 September (Cases T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑409/19 and T‑414/19), 18 September (Cases T‑390/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑411/19, T‑413/19, T‑417/19, T‑418/19, T‑420/19 to T‑422/19, T‑425/19, T‑429/19 to T‑431/19, T‑436/19 and T‑438/19), 19 September (Cases T‑426/19, T‑427/19, T‑435/19, T‑439/19, T‑442/19, T‑445/19 and T‑446/19), 20 September (Cases T‑432/19, T‑440/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19, T‑451/19, T‑454/19 and T‑463/19), 23 September (Cases T‑441/19, T‑444/19, T‑452/19 and T‑465/19) and 24 September 2019 (Case T‑453/19), the Parliament lodged the defences.
On 27 September (Cases T‑389/19 and T‑390/19), 30 September (Cases T‑391/19 to T‑394/19, T‑397/19 and T‑398/19), 1 October (Cases T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19 and T‑409/19 to T‑411/19), 2 October (Cases T‑412/19 to T‑414/19, T‑416/19 to T‑418/19, T‑420/19 to T‑422/19 and T‑430/19 to T‑432/19), 3 October (Cases T‑425/19, T‑435/19, T‑436/19, T‑438/19 to T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19, T‑448/19 and T‑450/19 to T‑454/19) and 4 October 2019 (Cases T‑426/19, T‑427/19, T‑429/19, T‑463/19 and T‑465/19), the Court asked the parties whether it would be possible, first, to identify a small number of pilot cases among the 84 similar cases before it at that time and, second, to stay the other cases accordingly until the decision which closes the proceedings in the cases identified as pilot cases became
res judicata
. Furthermore, the Court requested the Parliament to produce the PEAM Rules in their entirety.
On 15 October (Case T‑452/19), 18 October (Cases T‑389/19, T‑390/19, T‑410/19 to T‑414/19, T‑416/19, T‑418/19, T‑420/19 and T‑421/19), 22 October (Cases T‑391/19 to T‑394/19, T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑409/19, T‑417/19, T‑422/19 and T‑430/19 to T‑432/19), 24 October (Cases T‑425/19 to T‑427/19, T‑429/19, T‑435/19, T‑436/19, T‑438/19 to T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19, T‑451/19, T‑453/19 and T‑454/19) and 28 October 2019 (Cases T‑463/19 and T‑465/19), the Parliament replied to the Court’s question and submitted the PEAM Rules in their entirety.
On 21 October 2019, the applicants replied to the Court’s question.
By decisions of 4 November (Cases T‑389/19 to T‑394/19, T‑397/19 and T‑398/19), 5 November (Cases T‑403/19 and T‑404/19), 6 November (Cases T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑409/19, T‑414/19 and T‑416/19), 7 November (Cases T‑410/19 to T‑412/19, T‑417/19, T‑418/19 and T‑420/19), 8 November (Cases T‑413/19, T‑421/19, T‑422/19 and T‑425/19), 11 November (Cases T‑426/19, T‑427/19, T‑429/19 to T‑431/19 and T‑452/19), 12 November (Cases T‑432/19, T‑435/19 and T‑436/19), 13 November (Cases T‑438/19 to T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19 and T‑448/19), 14 November (Cases T‑450/19, T‑451/19, T‑453/19 and T‑454/19) and 15 November 2019 (Cases T‑463/19 and T‑465/19), and following the amendment of the composition of the Chambers of the Court, the cases were reassigned to the Eighth Chamber.
By letters of 5 and 28 November 2019, the Parliament notified the Court that Mr Luigi Caligaris, applicant in Case T‑435/19, had died. In the light of those circumstances, on 2 December 2019 the Court asked counsel for the applicant what action was to be taken in respect of the proceedings. On 20 December 2019, counsel for Mr Caligaris informed the Court that his widow, Ms Paola Chiaramello, intended to continue the proceedings. On 30 September 2020, counsel for Ms Chiaramello notified the Court that his client had died. On 7 October 2020, counsel for Ms Chiaramello notified the Court that Mr Enrico Caligaris and Ms Valentina Caligaris, Ms Chiaramello’s heirs, intended to continue the proceedings.
On 28 November 2019, the Court decided that a second exchange of pleadings was unnecessary.
On 3 December (Case T‑389/19), 4 December (Cases T‑390/19 to T‑394/19), 5 December (Cases T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑409/19 to T‑412/19, T‑418/19, T‑420/19 to T‑422/19, T‑425/19 to T‑427/19, T‑429/19 to T‑432/19, T‑435/19, T‑436/19 and T‑438/19 to T‑441/19), 6 December (Cases T‑413/19, T‑414/19, T‑416/19 and T‑417/19), 9 December (Cases T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19, T‑451/19, T‑454/19, T‑463/19 and T‑465/19) and 10 December 2019 (Cases T‑452/19 and T‑453/19), the Court invited the applicants to express their views on the Parliament’s request for a stay of proceedings.
On 3 December (Case T‑389/19), 4 December (Cases T‑390/19 to T‑394/19), 5 December (Cases T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑409/19 to T‑412/19, T‑418/19, T‑420/19 to T‑422/19, T‑425/19 to T‑427/19, T‑429/19 to T‑432/19, T‑435/19, T‑436/19 and T‑438/19 to T‑441/19), 6 December (Cases T‑413/19, T‑414/19, T‑416/19 and T‑417/19), 9 December (Cases T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19, T‑451/19, T‑454/19, T‑463/19 and T‑465/19) and 10 December 2019 (Cases T‑452/19 and T‑453/19), the Court asked the applicants to express a view on a possible joinder of Cases T‑389/19 to T‑394/19, T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑409/19 to T‑418/19, T‑420/19 to T‑422/19, T‑425/19 to T‑427/19, T‑429/19 to T‑432/19, T‑435/19, T‑436/19, T‑438/19 to T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19 to T‑454/19, T‑463/19 and T‑465/19.
On 16 December (Cases T‑389/19 to T‑394/19, T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19 and T‑409/19 to T‑414/19, T‑416/19 and T‑417/19), 17 December (Cases T‑418/19, T‑420/19 to T‑422/19, T‑425/19 to T‑427/19, T‑429/19 to T‑432/19, T‑435/19, T‑436/19, T‑438/19 to T‑442/19, T‑444/19 and T‑445/19) and 19 December 2019 (Cases T‑446/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19 to T‑454/19, T‑463/19 and T‑465/19), the Parliament lodged its observations on the proposal for joinder.
By letter of 18 December 2019, the applicant in Case T‑389/19 asked the Court to reconsider its decision of 28 November 2019 and to allow her to lodge a reply.
On 8 January 2020, the applicants, with the exception of those at issue in Cases T‑409/19 and T‑446/19, lodged their observations on the Parliament’s application for a stay of proceedings.
On 9 January 2020, the applicants lodged their observations on the proposal for joinder.
On 16 January (Cases T‑389/19 to T‑393/19, T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑410/19 to T‑414/19, T‑418/19 and T‑420/19) and 17 January (Cases T‑394/19, T‑409/19, T‑416/19, T‑417/19, T‑421/19, T‑422/19, T‑425/19 to T‑427/19, T‑429/19 to T‑432/19, T‑435/19, T‑436/19, T‑438/19 to T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19 to T‑454/19, T‑463/19 and T‑465/19), the President of the Eighth Chamber decided not to stay the proceedings.
By decision of the President of the Eighth Chamber of the Court of 21 January 2020, the present cases, and also Case T‑415/19,
Laroni
v
Parliament
, were joined for the purposes of the written and oral parts of the procedure and the decision which closes the proceedings, in accordance with Article 68 of the Rules of Procedure.
On 23 January 2020, the Court requested the Parliament to produce all the preparatory documents for the adoption of Article 75 and Annex III. Furthermore, the Court questioned the Parliament about its administrative practice in the area of salaries and pensions. The Parliament replied to the question and submitted the preparatory documents requested on 11 February 2020.
On 4 March 2020, the applicants requested a hearing under Article 106(2) of the Rules of Procedure.
On 20 April 2020, the President of the Eighth Chamber decided to give the present cases priority over others, in accordance with Article 67(2) of the Rules of Procedure.
By letter of 30 April 2020, the Parliament informed the Court that Mr Giulietto Chiesa, the applicant in Case T‑445/19, had died. In the light of those circumstances, on 8 May 2020 the Tribunal asked counsel for the applicant what action was to be taken in respect of the proceedings. On 8 June 2020, counsel for Mr Chiesa informed the Court that his widow, Ms Fiammetta Cucurnia, intended to continue the proceedings.
On 30 April 2020, the Court invited the parties to express their views on a possible joinder of the present actions and Case T‑415/19,
Laroni
v
Parliament
, to Joined Cases T‑345/19,
Santini
v
Parliament
, T‑346/19,
Ceravolo
v
Parliament
, T‑364/19,
Moretti
v
Parliament
, T‑365/19,
Capraro
v
Parliament
, T‑366/19,
Sboarina
v
Parliament
, T‑372/19,
Cellai
v
Parliament
, T‑373/19,
Gatti
v
Parliament
, T‑374/19,
Wuhrer
v
Parliament
, T‑375/19,
Pisoni
v
Parliament
and T‑385/19,
Mazzone
v
Parliament
, and also to Cases T‑519/19,
Forte
v
Parliament
and T‑695/19,
Falqui
v
Parliament
, for the purposes of the oral part of the procedure.
On a proposal from the Eighth Chamber, on 15 May 2020 the Court decided, pursuant to Article 28 of the Rules of Procedure, to refer the case to a chamber sitting in extended composition.
On 19 May 2020, the Court questioned the parties about various aspects of the present cases.
On 2 and 3 June 2020 respectively, the Parliament and the applicants lodged their observations on the proposal for joinder for the purposes of the oral part of the procedure, as referred to in paragraph 46 above.
On 5 June 2020, the President of the Eighth Chamber decided to join the present cases and Case T‑415/19,
Laroni
v
Parliament
, to Joined Cases T‑345/19,
Santini
v
Parliament
, T‑346/19,
Ceravolo
v
Parliament
, T‑364/19,
Moretti
v
Parliament
, T‑365/19,
Capraro
v
Parliament
, T‑366/19,
Sboarina
v
Parliament
, T‑372/19,
Cellai
v
Parliament
, T‑373/19,
Gatti
v
Parliament
, T‑374/19,
Wuhrer
v
Parliament
, T‑375/19,
Pisoni
v
Parliament
and T‑385/19,
Mazzone
v
Parliament
, and also to Cases T‑519/19,
Forte
v
Parliament
and T‑695/19,
Falqui
v
Parliament
, for the purposes of the oral part of the procedure.
On 17 June 2020, the applicants and the Parliament replied to the questions which the Court had put to them on 19 May 2020.
By letter of 1 July 2020, the applicants requested the Court that their time to present oral arguments be extended. On 3 July 2020, the Court granted that request in part.
By letter of 2 July 2020, the Parliament informed the Court that Ms Frantova, the applicant in Case T‑427/19, had died. By letters of 13 July 2020 and 5 August 2020, counsel for Ms Frantova also informed the Court that his client had died and stated that he would forward to the Court all necessary information concerning the inheritance and action to be taken in the proceedings. On 16 September 2020, counsel for Ms Frantova notified the Court that Ms Daniela Concardia, the applicant’s heir, wished to continue the proceedings.
The parties presented argument and replied to the Court’s written and oral questions at the hearing on 7 July 2020.
By decision of 8 October 2020, after hearing the parties, the President of the Eighth Chamber decided to sever Case T‑415/19,
Laroni
v
Parliament
, from the other cases, pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Rules of Procedure.
With the exception of Mr Florio in Case T‑465/19, the applicants claim that the Court should:
–
declare non-existent or annul the notes of 11 April 2019 referred to in paragraph 20 above;
–
order the Parliament to repay all sums unduly withheld, together with interest at the statutory rate from the date of retention until payment, and order the Parliament to comply with the judgment to be given and to undertake all necessary steps, acts or measures to ensure that the initial amounts of the pensions are restored immediately and in full;
–
order the Parliament to pay the costs.
Mr Florio, in Case T‑465/19, claims that the Court should:
–
declare non-existent or annul the draft decision and any prior, related or ensuing measures;
–
order the Parliament to repay all sums unduly withheld, together with interest at the statutory rate from the date of retention until payment, and order the Parliament to comply with the judgment to be given and to undertake all necessary steps, acts or measures to ensure that the initial amount of the pension is restored immediately and in full;
–
order the Parliament to pay the costs.
The Parliament contends that the Court should:
–
dismiss the actions as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded;
–
order the applicants to pay the costs.
IV.

Law
A.

The subject matter of the actions and the jurisdiction of the Court
At the outset, it should be noted that, in their application, the applicants expressly stated that they did not intend to challenge the legality of Decision No 14/2018 in the present actions.
However, at the hearing, counsel for the applicants stated that he was referring to the pleadings of Mr Maurizio Paniz, the applicants’ lawyer in Joined Cases T‑345/19, T‑346/19, T‑364/19 to T‑366/19, T‑372/19 to T‑375/19 and T‑385/19,
Santini and Others
v
Parliament
.
In so far as Mr Paniz challenged the validity of Decision No 14/2018 in his oral arguments and submitted, during the oral part of the procedure, evidence in support of that plea, it is important to recall the limits on the Court’s jurisdiction in an action under Article 263 TFEU.
In that regard, under Article 263 TFEU, the Courts of the European Union have no jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of a measure adopted by a national authority (see, to that effect, order of 28 February 2017, NF v European Council,
T‑192/16
,
EU:T:2017:128
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
In the light of that case-law, it is outside the Court’s jurisdiction to assess the lawfulness of Decision No 14/2018.
In addition, the Court notes that the evidence submitted by Mr Paniz during the oral part of the procedure, to which reference was made at the hearing, has no bearing on the outcome of the present actions. First, Mr Paniz submitted a copy of Decision No 2/2020 of 22 April 2020 by which the Consiglio di giurisdizione della Camera dei deputati (Jurisdiction Council of the Chamber of Deputies) partially annulled Article 1(7) of Decision No 14/2018. However, that annulment does not have any consequences in the present case, since the Parliament did not receive a request to apply rules identical to those set out in Article 1(7) of Decision No 14/2018 to the applicants and therefore did not do so. Second, Mr Paniz also lodged a copy of the operative part of the judgment of 25 June 2020 of the Commissione contenziosa del Senato (Senate Dispute Commission, Italy). However, that judgment concerned Decision No 6/2018 of the Ufficio di Presidenza del Senato (Office of the President of the Senate, Italy), and not Decision No 14/2018. It is common ground that, in compliance with Article 2(1) of Annex III, the Parliament applied only rules identical to those laid down in Decision No 14/2018. Finally, the Court observes that the Parliament confirmed at the hearing that it will apply, in the future, any amendments to Italian law, and in particular to Decision No 14/2008, which might result from the proceedings pending before the Consiglio di giurisdizione della Camera dei deputati (Jurisdiction Council of the Chamber of Deputies), in compliance with the identical pension rule.
Although the Court cannot therefore review the validity of Decision No 14/2018 under Article 263 TFEU, it does have jurisdiction to examine the legality of acts of the Parliament. Thus, in the present actions for annulment, the Court may verify whether Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III establishing the identical pension rule infringe higher-ranking EU law. Similarly, the Court may consider whether the application by the Parliament, pursuant to the identical pension rule, of the provisions of Decision No 14/2018 is consistent with EU law. Lastly, the Court also has jurisdiction to ensure that the notes of 11 April 2019, referred to in paragraph 20 above, and, as regards Mr Florio, in Case T‑465/19, the final decision, comply with EU law.
B.

Admissibility of the action in Case T‑453/19, Panusa v Parliament
At the hearing, the Parliament argued that the action in Case T‑453/19,
Panusa
v
Parliament
, was inadmissible on the ground that the contested decision in respect of the applicant had not affected her interests as it did not entail any reduction in the amount of the pension she received.
Ms Panusa replied, also at the hearing, that she nevertheless retained an interest in bringing proceedings.
On that point, according to settled case-law, an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as that person has an interest in having the contested act annulled. Such an interest requires that the annulment of that act must be capable, in itself, of having legal consequences and that the action may therefore, through its outcome, procure an advantage to the party which brought it (see judgment of 27 March 2019, Canadian SolarEmea and Others v Council,
C‑237/17 P
,
EU:C:2019:259
, paragraph
and the case-law cited). An interest in bringing proceedings must be vested and present and is evaluated as at the date on which the action is brought. It must, however, continue until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate (judgment of 7 June 2007, Wunenburger v Commission,
C‑362/05 P
,
EU:C:2007:322
, paragraph
).
In the present case, the Parliament has argued, without being contradicted, that the contested decision did not bring about any reduction in the amount of the pension received by the applicant.
As a result, the annulment of the contested decision in her respect could not, in itself, procure an advantage to Ms Panusa. The action in Case T‑453/19,
Panusa
v
Parliament
, must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible.
C.

Merits
The applicants put forward four pleas in law in support of their action for annulment. The first plea alleges lack of competence of the author of the notes of 11 April 2019, referred to in paragraph 20 above, and of the final decision (together, ‘the contested decisions’) and infringement of the obligation to state the reasons on which a decision is based. The second plea alleges lack of a legal basis and misapplication of Article 75. The third plea alleges an error of law in the classification of Decision No 14/2018 and misapplication of the ‘parliamentary reservation of law’ provided for in Article 75(2). The fourth plea alleges breach of the principles of legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations, proportionality and equal treatment and an infringement of the right to property.
Before considering whether those pleas are well founded, the Court considers it appropriate to examine the applicants’ request for a declaration that the contested decisions are non-existent.
In that regard, according to settled case-law, acts of the EU institutions are in principle presumed to be lawful and accordingly produce legal effects, even if they are tainted by irregularities, until such time as they are annulled or withdrawn (see judgments of 15 June 1994, Commission v BASF and Others,
C‑137/92 P
,
EU:C:1994:247
, paragraph
, and of 9 December 2014, Lucchini v Commission,
T‑91/10
,
EU:T:2014:1033
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
However, by way of exception to that principle, acts tainted by an irregularity whose gravity is so obvious that it cannot be tolerated by the legal order of the European Union must be treated as having no legal effect, even provisional, that is to say, they must be regarded as legally non-existent. The purpose of this exception is to maintain a balance between two fundamental, but sometimes conflicting, requirements with which a legal order must comply, namely stability of legal relations and respect for legality (see judgments of 15 June 1994, Commission v BASF and Others,
C‑137/92 P
,
EU:C:1994:247
, paragraph
, and of 9 December 2014, Lucchini v Commission,
T‑91/10
,
EU:T:2014:1033
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
The gravity of the consequences attaching to a finding that an act of an EU institution is non-existent means that, for reasons of legal certainty, such a finding is to be reserved for quite extreme situations (see judgments of 15 June 1994, Commission v BASF and Others,
C‑137/92 P
,
EU:C:1994:247
, paragraph
, and of 9 December 2014, Lucchini v Commission,
T‑91/10
,
EU:T:2014:1033
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
Finally, it should also be borne in mind that irregularities of such a kind as to lead the Courts of the European Union to regard a measure as legally non-existent differ from the illegalities which, in principle, lead to the annulment of measures whose legality is reviewed, as provided for under the Treaty – not on account of their nature, but on account of their gravity and their blatancy. Where measures are tainted by irregularities of such obvious gravity that it affects the conditions essential to their adoption and existence, those measures must be held to be legally non-existent (see judgment of 9 September 2011, dm-drogerie markt v OHIM – Distribuciones Mylar (dm),
T‑36/09
,
EU:T:2011:449
, paragraph
).
However, the irregularities to which the applicants refer do not appear to be of such obvious gravity that the contested decisions must be regarded as legally non-existent. The reasons are as follows.
1.

First plea: lack of competence of the authority which adopted the contested decisions and infringement of the obligation to state reasons for the decision
The first plea comprises two parts. The first part concerns the lack of competence of the authority which adopted the contested decisions. The second part alleges a failure to state reasons.
(a)

First part of the first plea: lack of competence of the authority which adopted the contested decisions
With regard to the first part of the first plea, the applicants submit that the contested decisions should have been adopted by the Bureau of the Parliament and not by the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance. According to the applicants, that conclusion is obvious, in particular in the light of Rule 11a(6) and Rule 25(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, as applicable at the material time, namely during the eighth parliamentary term (‘the Rules of Procedure’). According to the applicants, those two provisions confer a general power on the Bureau of the Parliament as regards Members’ financial entitlements. That is why the Bureau of the Parliament adopted the PEAM Rules. Further confirmation of that general power of the Bureau of the Parliament is found in the first recital of the Implementing Measures, which states that ‘the Bureau is solely responsible for implementing the financial aspects of the Statute [for Members]’. According to the applicants, the Bureau of the Parliament never made a decision to reduce their pension rights. In view of those factors, the applicants’ pension rights were recalculated by an authority, namely the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance, wholly lacking in competence, with the result that the contested decisions are unlawful.
The applicants submit, in the second complaint, that the contested decisions are also unlawful in so far as, contrary to the provisions of Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure, those decisions were not appraised or assessed by the College of Quaestors. On that point, the applicants maintain that the Parliament could not confine itself to applying Decision No 14/2018 and that it necessarily had to carry out additional steps to calculate the new amounts of the pension rights. That adaptation in the implementation of Decision No 14/2018 at EU level ought, according to the applicants, to have been subject to internal appraisals, on the basis of a consultation with the bodies responsible as regards Members’ rights, and should not have been delegated to a unit of the Parliament.
The Parliament contends that the first part of the first plea should be dismissed as unfounded.
As regards the first part, the parties agree that, under Rule 25(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Bureau of the Parliament is to take financial, organisational and administrative decisions on matters concerning Members on a proposal of the Parliament’s Secretary-General or of a political group. However, the Parliament argues that that provision confines the Bureau to adopting general and abstract rules, and not individual decisions. By contrast, the applicants submit that the contested decisions should have been adopted pursuant to Rule 25(3) even though they are acts of individual scope.
On that point, it is clear from settled case-law that Rule 25(3) of the Rules of Procedure confers a general power on the Bureau of the Parliament, inter alia, as regards financial matters concerning Members. That provision thus constitutes the basis on which the Bureau may adopt, on a proposal of the Parliament’s Secretary-General or of a political group, the rules governing those matters (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2011, Purvis v Parliament,
T‑439/09
,
EU:T:2011:600
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
Furthermore, it has also been held that the Implementing Measures, which were adopted by the Bureau of the Parliament, are intended, inter alia, to replace the PEAM Rules concerning the expenses and allowances of Members of the Parliament, as is apparent from recital 3 thereof. To that effect, the Implementing Measures govern financial matters concerning Members within the meaning of Rule 25(3) of the Rules of Procedure (judgment of 29 November 2017, Montel v Parliament,
T‑634/16
, not published,
EU:T:2017:848
, paragraphs
and
).
Although the Bureau of the Parliament therefore has the power to adopt general and abstract rules under Rule 25(3) of the Rules of Procedure and, for similar reasons, under Rule 11a(6) of the Rules of Procedure, that does not mean that it is also competent to adopt individual decisions on financial matters affecting Members.
On the contrary, the Parliament’s administration may, without infringing Rule 25(3) of the Rules of Procedure, be entrusted with such a power, since it is the Bureau of the Parliament which laid down the limits and detailed rules for its exercise (see, to that effect, order of 6 September 2018, Bilde v Parliament,
C‑67/18 P
, not published,
EU:C:2018:692
, paragraphs
and
).
Moreover, in view of that division of power between the Bureau of the Parliament and the Parliament’s administration, it has already been held, in particular, that the individual decision determining pension rights of Members is not only a decision exercised within the limits of a circumscribed competence, in that the administration of the Parliament has no discretion when determining the pension rights, but is in fact exclusively declaratory in nature with regard to the content of those rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2011, Purvis v Parliament,
T‑439/09
,
EU:T:2011:600
, paragraph
).
Consequently, there is nothing to prevent the Parliament from assigning to its administration the power to adopt individual decisions, in particular in the fields of pension rights and the determination of the amounts of pensions. Nevertheless, it still remains to be ascertained whether, in the present case, the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finances had such a power.
In that regard, Article 73(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (
OJ 2018 L 193, p. 1
) provides that each Union institution is, in compliance with the conditions in its rules of procedure, to delegate the duties of authorising officer to staff at an appropriate level. It is, in its internal administrative rules, to indicate the staff to whom it delegates those duties, the scope of the powers delegated and whether the persons to whom those powers are delegated may subdelegate them.
In response to a written question from the Court, the Parliament stated, supported by evidence, that the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance had been appointed authorising officer by subdelegation for budget line 1030 relating to retirement pensions referred to in Annex III to the PEAM Rules, by Decision FINS/2019‑01 of the Director-General for Finance of the Parliament of 23 November 2018. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 73(3) of Regulation 2018/1046, Decision FINS/2019‑01 expressly states that that subdelegation of competence authorises the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance, inter alia, to make legal and budgetary commitments, validate expenditure and authorise payments, and also draw up estimates of amounts receivable, establish entitlements to be recovered and issue recovery orders.
Moreover, it is common ground that the rules laid down by the Implementing Measures and the PEAM Rules, as adopted by the Bureau of the Parliament, were not altered but only implemented by the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance. Moreover, the question of whether, in the present case, the Head of that Unit complied with the provisions of those two instruments will be examined below as part of the consideration of the other pleas.
Contrary to the applicants’ submissions, the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance was therefore competent to adopt the contested decisions.
As regards the second complaint, the applicants’ argument that the Quaestors should have been consulted before the contested decisions were adopted must be dismissed as unfounded.
Admittedly, as the applicants rightly submit, Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure provides that ‘the Quaestors shall be responsible for administrative and financial matters directly concerning Members, in accordance with guidelines laid down by the Bureau, as well as for other tasks entrusted to them’. However, that provision must be read in the light of Rule 25(8) of the Rules of Procedure, which states that ‘the Bureau shall adopt the guidelines for the Quaestors, and may request that they carry out certain tasks’.
The applicants’ written pleadings do not show that the Bureau of the Parliament adopted guidelines or defined specific tasks, within the meaning of Rule 25(8) and Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure, which required the Quaestors to be consulted before the adoption of the contested decisions or, more generally, that it should have been the Quaestors who adopted the contested decisions, which were, however, individual in scope. Thus, the Parliament cannot be criticised for not having consulted the Quaestors when that was not required in those circumstances by any provision.
Lastly, the applicants complain that the Parliament applied Decision No 14/2018 but at the same time adapted it to take account of each applicant’s personal situation for the purpose of calculating the new amounts of the pensions. That adaptation of Decision No 14/2018 ought to have been subject to internal appraisals, on the basis of a consultation with the bodies competent in the area of Members’ rights, and should not have been delegated to a unit of the Parliament.
Even assuming that the Parliament amended Decision No 14/2018 – which will be ascertained in connection with the other pleas below – it is sufficient, in any event, to point out that, as stated in paragraphs 90 to 95 above, the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance was competent to adopt the contested decisions and that there was no obligation to consult the College of Quaestors beforehand.
The first part of the first plea must, therefore, be dismissed as unfounded.
(b)

Second part of the first plea: infringement of the obligation to state reasons
In the second part, the applicants maintain that the contested decisions lack a statement of reasons in so far as the Parliament merely asserts that Decision No 14/2018 applies automatically at European level without clearly setting out the reasoning which led to that conclusion and relying, wrongly, on Article 75. Moreover, the Parliament also failed to comply with the obligation to state reasons in that the adoption of the contested decisions was not preceded by an in-depth internal appraisal or an assessment by the Bureau of the Parliament or the Quaestors. In addition, the applicants submit that the contested decisions appear to be based on the opinion of the Legal Service. However, that opinion was neither referred to in the contested decisions nor appended to them. Lastly, the applicants criticise the Parliament, first, for not having assessed to what extent the retroactive application of a less favourable pension scheme might be compatible with EU law and, second, for confining itself to stating that it is not competent to examine the validity of Decision No 14/2018. In that sense, the Parliament infringed both Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
The Parliament contends that the second part of the first plea should be dismissed as unfounded.
In that regard, it must be recalled that the statement of reasons required by the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(c) of the Charter must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Court to exercise its power of review. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 March 2011, AJD Tuna,
C‑221/09
,
EU:C:2011:153
, paragraph
and the case-law cited). As regards, in particular, the reasons given for individual decisions, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which such a decision is based is, therefore, in addition to permitting review by the Courts, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to know whether the decision may be vitiated by an error enabling its validity to be challenged (see judgment of 10 November 2017, Icap and Others v Commission,
T‑180/15
,
EU:T:2017:795
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
In the present case, it must be determined whether the contested decisions, with the exception of the decision concerning Mr Florio, the legality of which will be examined in paragraphs 108 and 109 below, properly state the reasons on which they are based in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 101 above.
In that regard, the Court notes that the first paragraph of the contested decisions states that the Office of the President of the Chamber of Deputies adopted Decision No 14/2018, which provides for the reduction, with effect from 1 January 2019, of the amounts of pensions in respect of years in office completed up to 31 December 2011.
In the second paragraph, the contested decisions refer not only to Article 75 but also to Article 2(1) of Annex III, which provides that the level and conditions of the provisional pension must be identical to those applicable to the pension for members of the lower house of the parliament of the Member State for which they have been elected. The contested decisions therefore state their legal basis explicitly.
In the third paragraph, the contested decisions state that, in view of the adoption of Decision No 14/2018 and the provisions referred to in paragraph 104 above, the amounts of the applicants’ pensions must be correspondingly adjusted in order to bring them into line with the amounts of the pensions paid to its members by the Chamber of Deputies. In that regard, the contested decisions refer to the note from the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance, as appended to the applicants’ pension statements for February 2019, in which he stated that he would notify the applicants of the new calculation of the amounts of their pensions and would recover any difference over the next 12 months.
In the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the contested decisions, the applicants are informed that the amounts of their pensions will be calculated, from April 2019, in accordance with the proposed new pension calculations appended to those decisions. Furthermore, the amounts unduly received for January, February and March 2019 are set out, and the applicants are told how the Parliament plans to recover them.
Lastly, in the sixth to eighth paragraphs, the contested decisions advise the applicants that they are entitled to submit their comments within 30 days. They are also informed that, unless they submit comments within that period, the contested decisions will become final and that, in that case, they are open to challenge by way of an action for annulment before the General Court pursuant to Article 263 TFEU. Lastly, those paragraphs refer to the option of submitting a written complaint to the Parliament’s Secretary-General under Article 72(1) of the Implementing Measures.
As regards Mr Florio specifically, in Case T‑465/19, the Court notes that the final decision merely points out, first, that the Parliament has no power to challenge the legality of Decision No 14/2018; second, that the Opinion of the Legal Service is a document available to the public on the Parliament’s website; and, third, that the comments submitted by Mr Florio on 14 May 2019 do not contain anything to warrant a reconsideration of the view expressed in the draft decision. The final decision then states that, in consequence, the amount of his retirement pension and the resulting reimbursement plan, as recalculated and stated in the annex to that draft decision, became final on the date on which Mr Florio received notification of the final decision. Lastly, the final decision indicates that it may be contested by way of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, it draws attention to the right to submit a complaint to the European Ombudsman, under Article 228 TFEU, should Mr Florio consider that he has been the subject of an act of maladministration, and it points out that a written complaint may be lodged with the Parliament’s Secretary-General under Article 72(1) of the Implementing Measures.
While it is thus true that the final decision is unsubstantiated, a review of whether the obligation to state reasons has been complied with cannot be limited to that document alone. In accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 101 above, that review must also take into account the factual and legal context in which the final decision was adopted. That approach is all the more relevant given that, first, the final decision expressly refers to the draft decision and, second, Mr Florio refers without distinction to the draft decision and the final decision in his application. Account must therefore also be taken, with regard to Mr Florio, in Case T‑465/19, of the facts set out in paragraphs 103 to 107 above.
It is true, as the applicants maintain, that the reasons which led the Parliament to conclude that the rules of Decision No 14/2018 also apply to them are in fact set out only in the Opinion of the Legal Service. Thus, in paragraphs 9 to 14 and 16 of that opinion, the Parliament explains, in essence, that Annex III does not create a self-standing pension scheme, in the sense that the Parliament is required, under the identical pension rule, to apply the rules laid down in Decision No 14/2018.
Similarly, the applicants are correct in stating that the Opinion of the Legal Service is neither referred to in or appended to the contested decisions or, in the case of Mr Florio, in Case T‑465/19, to the draft decision.
However, those two observations by the applicants do not demonstrate that the Parliament failed to comply with the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter.
The obligation to state reasons does not require all the relevant facts and points of law to be specified, especially where, as in the present case, the contested decisions are adopted in a context familiar to the person to whom they are addressed.
In that regard, the applicants themselves acknowledge that the existence of the Opinion of the Legal Service was referred to in the note from the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance appended to the pension statements for February 2019. First, the applicants were all addressees of that note and, second, the contested decisions – or, in the case of Mr Florio, in Case T‑465/19, the draft decision – make explicit reference to it.
The applicants could have requested access to the Opinion of the Legal Service. Moreover, the final decision contained a direct link to the Parliament’s internet page where that opinion was publicly accessible. In any event, it must be observed that all the applicants have attached that opinion to their applications as an annex.
It may be inferred from the foregoing that the applicants had free access to the Opinion of the Legal Service and were fully aware of its content before they brought their actions. They thus had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with its content with a view to understanding the contested decisions better.
It follows from those considerations that the Parliament set out, clearly and unequivocally, the reasons which led it to apply the rules of Decision No 14/2018 and to adopt the contested decisions. Furthermore, the applicants had the opportunity to assert their rights before the Court, as shown, in particular, by the content of their arguments of fact and law expounded in the present actions. It must thus be held that the contested decisions contain a statement of reasons which meets the requisite legal standard.
Lastly, it must be borne in mind that the obligation to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement, as distinct from the question as to whether the reasons given are correct, which goes to the substantive legality of the contested measure. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. The grounds may be adequate even though they set out reasons which are incorrect (see judgment of 31 May 2018, Korwin-Mikke v Parliament,
T‑352/17
,
EU:T:2018:319
, paragraph
and the case-law cited). Claims and arguments intended to deny that a measure is well founded are thus of no effect in the context of a plea alleging the lack or inadequacy of a statement of reasons (see judgment of 19 December 2019, ZQ v Commission,
T‑647/18
, not published,
EU:T:2019:884
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
Accordingly, the applicants’ argument that the adoption of the contested decisions was not preceded by an in-depth internal assessment or an appraisal by the Bureau of the Parliament or the Quaestors is of no effect since it does not relate to the statement of reasons for the contested decisions. In any event, that argument has been held to be unfounded in the context of the first part of the first plea.
Similarly, the Court cannot accept the applicants’ arguments, first, that the Parliament justified the application of Decision No 14/2018 to them by relying, wrongly, on Article 75, second, that the Parliament, following the Opinion of the Legal Service, stated that it was not competent to review the legality of Decision No 14/2018 and, third, that the Parliament should have ascertained whether the allegedly automatic and retroactive application of Decision No 14/2018 in respect of the applicants was consistent with EU law and, in particular, with the provisions of the Charter, but failed to do so. Those arguments are not related to the obligation to state reasons. However, the merits of those arguments will be considered below in the context of the other pleas.
Consequently, the second part of the first plea must be dismissed and, accordingly, the first plea must be dismissed in its entirety.
2.

Second plea: lack of a valid legal basis and misapplication of Article 75 of the Implementing Measures
In support of the second plea, the applicants assert, in essence, that the contested decisions do not have a valid legal basis. According to them, Annex III is no longer applicable as such. Moreover, Article 75 does not authorise the Parliament to alter the treatment of its former Members unfavourably. On the contrary, that provision seeks to safeguard the acquired rights of those former Members. In their view, it is therefore wrong for the contested decisions to be based on Annex III and Article 75.
In any event, the applicants maintain that the Parliament committed a serious error in the application of Article 75. In their view, that provision prevents the Parliament from being able to reduce the amounts of the pensions of its former Members. Moreover, the reference to national law made in Annex III was applicable only when the former Member had chosen to join the pension scheme established by that annex and not subsequently, in order to alter the rules for calculating those pensions. Finally, account should be taken, by analogy, of Article 29 of the Statute for Members, which limits Member States’ rules derogating from the provisions of that Statute in respect of retirement pensions to a period which may not exceed the length of two European Parliament parliamentary terms.
Finally, in reply to a written question from the Court, the applicants stated that they were raising a plea of illegality in respect of Article 2(1) of Annex III, if that provision were to be interpreted in such a way as to allow the Parliament to review definitively established situations. According to the applicants, such a power infringes Article 28 of the Statute for Members.
The Parliament contends that the second plea should be dismissed as unfounded.
As a preliminary point, the Court notes that, under Article 74 of the Implementing Measures, the PEAM Rules ceased to be valid on the date on which the Statute for Members entered into force, namely 14 July 2009. However, by way of derogation from that rule, Article 74 of the Implementing Measures, as read in conjunction with Article 75 thereof, maintains in force the identical pension rule laid down in Annex III on a transitional basis. Accordingly, it must be held that the provisions of that annex have not been repealed and are still applicable, in the present case in respect of the applicants.
That finding is not affected by the applicants’ argument that Article 29 of the Statute for Members applies by analogy. It is true that Article 29 of the Statute for Members provides that rules adopted by the Member States, in derogation from the provisions of the Statute, in particular as regards retirement pensions, are to apply during a transitional period which may not exceed the length of two European Parliament parliamentary terms. However, it cannot be inferred from that article, which concerns Member States’ rules, that the Parliament is also obliged to limit any derogation from the Statute for Members in the area of retirement pensions for a maximum period of two parliamentary terms. Even if the time limit laid down in Article 29 of the Statute for Members could be applied to Articles 74 and 75, that could not, in any event, invalidate those two articles or, therefore, result in the contested decisions being annulled. A period equivalent to two parliamentary terms, namely 10 years, did not separate the entry into force of the Implementing Measures from the date of adoption of the contested decisions. The Implementing Measures entered into force on 14 July 2009, whereas the contested decisions were adopted on 11 April 2019 and, in the case of Mr Florio, in Case T‑465/19, on 11 June 2019. Therefore, even if the time limit laid down in Article 29 of the Statute for Members could be applied, by analogy, to Articles 74 and 75, that application would, in any event, have no effect in the present case.
Those points made, the Court considers it appropriate to clarify the scope of Article 75 before considering the applicants’ other arguments.
(a)

Scope of Article 75 of the Implementing Measures
The Court notes that Article 75 consists of two paragraphs. Although the first subparagraph of Article 75(1), and Article 75(2), both refer to former Members’ retirement pension rights, their scope covers, respectively, the situation of former Members who began to draw their pension before the Statute for Members entered into force on 14 July 2009 and that of former Members who began to draw their pension after that date.
On the one hand, the first subparagraph of Article 75(1) applies to former Members who began to receive their retirement pension before the Statute for Members entered into force. Under that provision, former Members are to continue to be covered after that date by the pension scheme established by Annex III. The calculation and payment of their retirement pensions are therefore based on the rules in that annex.
On the other hand, the first sentence of Article 75(2) guarantees that pension rights acquired prior to the entry into force of the Statute for Members pursuant to Annex III are to be maintained. However, although those retirement pension rights are maintained after the entry into force of the Statute for Members, the second sentence of Article 75(2) states that actual payment of that pension is subject to two conditions. First, former Members must satisfy the relevant conditions laid down by the national law of the Member State concerned. Second, former Members must have submitted their applications for payment of their pensions within six months of their entitlement commencing, in accordance with Article 3(2) of Annex III. Consequently, the calculation and payment of their retirement pensions are also based on the rules in Annex III, but the actual payment of those retirement pensions is subject to compliance with the requirements laid down in the second sentence of Article 75(2).
A systemic interpretation of Article 75 therefore precludes the application of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 thereof to former Members who began to receive their retirement pension after the Statute for Members entered into force. The very wording of the first subparagraph of Article 75(1) limits its scope solely to former Members who, ‘prior to’ the entry into force of the Statute for Members, were already in receipt of a retirement pension (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2017, Costa v Parliament,
T‑15/15 and T‑197/15
, not published,
EU:T:2017:332
, paragraph
).
That same systemic interpretation leads the Court, entirely consistently, to exclude the application of Article 75(2) to former Members who began to receive their retirement pensions before the entry into force of the Statute for Members. Those former Members cannot fall within the scope of Article 75(2) unless the view is taken that the two paragraphs of that article contain similar, redundant rules. Moreover, it would be illogical to require those former Members once again, on the basis of the second sentence of Article 75(2), to have submitted their applications for payment of retirement pensions within six months of the commencement of their entitlement, whereas that formality must necessarily have been fulfilled before 14 July 2009, since they were already in receipt of such a pension before that date.
Consequently, when considering the applicants’ arguments, a distinction must be made between those applicants who began to draw their retirement pensions before 14 July 2009 and those who began to draw such pensions after that date. Furthermore, in so far as the parties agree that the right to the survivor’s pension at issue constitutes a right dependent on and derived from a deceased former Member’s right to a retirement pension, when determining which paragraph of Article 75 is applicable, it is necessary to refer to the date from which that former Member started to receive his or her retirement pension on the basis of Annex III.
(b)

Situation of applicants falling within the scope of the first subparagraph of Article 75(1) of the Implementing Measures
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the first subparagraph of Article 75(1) applies to the situation of the applicants who started to receive their retirement pensions before 14 July 2009, thus excluding the applicants in Cases T‑390/19, T‑393/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑411/19, T‑413/19, T‑417/19, T‑425/19, T‑430/19, T‑436/19, T‑441/19, T‑442/19, T‑444/19, T‑445/19, T‑452/19 and T‑465/19. The first subparagraph of Article 75(1) is likewise applicable to all the applicants in receipt of a survivor’s pension, namely the applicants in Cases T‑397/19, T‑409/19, T‑414/19, T‑426/19 and T‑427/19. Their deceased spouses had all begun to receive their retirement pensions before 14 July 2009.
In that regard, it should be recalled that the first subparagraph of Article 75(1) provides that ‘old-age pension[s] paid pursuant to Anne[x] III to the PEAM Rules shall continue to be paid pursuant to [that] anne[x] to those persons who were in receipt of the benefits in question prior to the date of entry into force of the Statute’.
Moreover, Article 2(1) of Annex III lays down the identical pension rule – which is central to the present cases – in the following terms:
‘The level and conditions of [the provisional] pension shall be identical to those applicable to the pension for Members of the lower house of the parliament of the Member State for which the Member of the European Parliament was elected.’
The wording of that provision as a requirement – ‘the level and conditions of [the provisional] pension shall be identical’ – leaves the Parliament no leeway to employ an independent method of calculation. Subject to compliance with higher-ranking EU law, including the general principles of law and the Charter, the Parliament is required to determine the level and conditions of the pensions of former Members of the European Parliament who fall within the scope of Annex III on the basis of the level and conditions set out in the applicable national law, that is to say, in the present case, on the basis of the rules laid down in Decision No 14/2018. The Court observes that the parties agree on that interpretation.
Similarly, the use of the modal verb ‘shall’ – ‘shall be identical’ – means that the requirement to apply the same rules in respect of the level and conditions as those laid down by the law of the Member State concerned is not confined to governing the past situation of former Members, that is to say, before the adoption of the Statute for Members, but continues to produce its effects for as long as the retirement pensions are paid.
That twofold interpretation is further supported by the first subparagraph of Article 75(1), which expressly states that retirement pensions ‘shall continue to be paid’ pursuant to Annex III. Here too, the use of wording expressing obligation and the modal verb ‘shall’ confirm, first, the continuity of the rules set out in Article 2(1) of Annex III, even after the entry into force of the Statute for Members, and, second, the Parliament’s lack of leeway as regards their application.
It follows from the foregoing that the first subparagraph of Article 75(1) and Article 2(1) of Annex III, read together, expressly require the Parliament to apply at all times the same rules in respect of the level and conditions of pensions as those laid down in the law of the Member State concerned. As already stated in paragraph 138 above, the Parliament may disregard that obligation only where, having regard to the principle of the hierarchy of norms, the implementation of those rules would result in a breach of higher-ranking EU law.
Even if the application of those rules entails, as in the present case, a reduction in the amounts of the pensions, that cannot be regarded as adversely affecting the acquired retirement pension rights of their recipients.
A combined reading of the first subparagraph of Article 75(1) and Annex III makes plain that the acquired retirement pension rights deriving from contributions paid by former Members constitute only the basis for calculating those retirement pensions. On the other hand, there is no provision in the first subparagraph of Article 75(1) or in Annex III offering the certain prospect that the amounts of those pensions will not be altered. The acquired pension rights referred to in Article 75 must not be confused with an alleged right to draw a fixed amount of pension.
That interpretation of the identical pension rule is not invalidated by recital 7 of the Implementing Measures to which the applicants refer. That recital merely states that pension rights acquired before the Statute for Members entered into force are guaranteed after that date. By contrast, that recital does not state that the amounts of those pensions cannot be revised, whether upwards or downwards. Thus, that recital merely confirms the essence of the first subparagraph of Article 75(1), read in conjunction with Article 2(1) of Annex III.
Nor is that interpretation affected by the first sentence of Article 75(2). It is true that that provision provides that ‘the old-age pension rights acquired prior to the date of entry into force of the Statute pursuant to the aforementioned Annex III shall be maintained’. However, like recital 7 of the Implementing Measures, the first sentence of Article 75(2) does not state that the amounts of retirement pensions cannot be altered, whether to the advantage or detriment of their recipients. Furthermore, and as is apparent from paragraphs 132 and 133 above, a systemic interpretation of Article 75 means, in any event, that the second paragraph thereof does not apply to former Members, such as the applicants listed in paragraph 135 above, who started to receive their retirement pensions before 14 July 2009.
Nor, contrary to the applicants’ submissions regarding their plea of illegality referred to in paragraph 124 above, does that interpretation result in an infringement of Article 28 of the Statute for Members. As the Parliament has rightly pointed out, it is sufficient to note that Article 28 of the Statute for Members applies, according to its own terms, only to pension rights acquired by Members ‘in accordance with national arrangements’. In the present case, the applicants’ retirement pensions were acquired not under national arrangements but under the provisions of Annex III. Moreover, the applicants themselves acknowledge in their written pleadings that the cost of their pensions is not borne by the Italian Republic but by the Parliament. Article 28 of the Statute for Members is therefore inapplicable to the applicants’ pensions, since they form part of an EU, and not a national, pension scheme. The applicants’ plea of illegality must be dismissed.
Finally, the Court observes that practice confirms that the amounts of pensions paid under Article 2(1) of Annex III are subject to change. In reply to the written questions put by the Court, the Parliament stated, supported by evidence, that, prior to the adoption of Decision No 14/2018, the amounts of the retirement pensions of a dozen former Members of the European Parliament elected in Italy had already been reduced in order to take account of Decision No 210/2017 of the Office of the President of the Chamber of Deputies. Conversely, the Parliament stated, likewise supported by evidence, that the level of the retirement pensions of certain former Members of the European Parliament elected in Italy had increased, between 2002 and 2005, pursuant to the increase in the amount of the parliamentary allowance decided on by the Office of the President of the Chamber of Deputies.
(c)

Situation of applicants falling within the scope of Article 75(2) of the Implementing Measures
In view of the considerations set out in paragraphs 129 to 134 above, Article 75(2) is applicable only to the applicants in Cases T‑390/19, T‑393/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑411/19, T‑413/19, T‑417/19, T‑425/19, T‑430/19, T‑436/19, T‑441/19, T‑442/19, T‑444/19, T‑445/19, T‑452/19 and T‑465/19.
In that regard, it should be borne in mind that Article 75(2) provides as follows:
‘The old-age pension rights acquired prior to the date of entry into force of the Statute pursuant to the aforementioned Annex III shall be maintained. Persons who have acquired rights under that pension scheme shall receive a pension calculated on the basis of their acquired rights pursuant to the aforementioned Annex III as soon as they meet the relevant conditions laid down by the national law of the Member State concerned and they have submitted the application referred to in Article 3(2) of the aforementioned Annex III.’
The first sentence of Article 75(2) cannot be interpreted as offering the certain prospect that the amounts of the pensions of the former Members of the European Parliament concerned will not be altered. An acquired right entailing a final, non-revisable amount of the retirement pension is not laid down in Article 75(2).
In fact, in stating that ‘the old-age pension rights acquired prior to the date of entry into force of the Statute pursuant to the aforementioned Annex III shall be maintained’, the Parliament merely confirmed that all acquired retirement pension rights, deriving from contributions paid up to 14 July 2009, were preserved after that date. It is apparent from paragraphs 142 to 144, 146 and 147 above that those acquired rights serve only as a basis for calculating the amounts of pensions. By contrast, the expression ‘acquired rights’ cannot be understood to imply fixed, immutable results of the calculation of the amounts of those pensions.
Moreover, that statement also makes it possible to distinguish between the respective scopes of Article 49 of the Implementing Measures and Article 75(2) as regards former Members who had not yet begun to receive their retirement pensions on 14 July 2009.
As the applicants and the Parliament correctly explain, the retirement pension rights acquired since the entry into force of the Statute for Members fall exclusively within the scope of Article 49 of the Implementing Measures. Retirement pension rights acquired prior to that date are governed exclusively by Article 75(2) and Annex III. Since 14 July 2009, it has therefore no longer been possible to acquire pension rights on the basis of those provisions. It follows that there are two successive pension schemes involving two types of pension rights: retirement pension rights acquired before 14 July 2009 on the basis of Article 75 and Annex III, and retirement pension rights acquired since 14 July 2009 on the basis of Article 49 of the Implementing Measures. On that point, the parties do not dispute that former Members affected by that plurality of schemes receive two separate pensions and that only the amounts of retirement pensions governed by Article 75(2) and Annex III has been reduced.
By stating that retirement pension rights acquired prior to the entry into force of the Statute are to be maintained after that date, the first sentence of Article 75(2) thus implicitly, but consistently with Article 49 of the Implementing Measures, provides that that guarantee cannot apply to new retirement pension rights acquired after that date since it has become legally impossible to acquire precisely those rights. On the other hand, for all the reasons set out above, the first sentence of Article 75(2) cannot be interpreted as confirming that the amounts of retirement pensions cannot be altered.
It must next be observed that the second sentence of Article 75(2) states, in the first part, that the amounts of retirement pensions are to be calculated pursuant to the rules laid down in Annex III. The second part of that sentence requires, in addition, that two conditions be met: compliance with the relevant provisions of the national law applicable to the award of the pension and submission of the application for payment of that pension.
The Court notes that the second sentence of Article 75(2) clearly distinguishes ‘acquired retirement pension rights’ from ‘pensions’. First, it is obvious that the adjective ‘acquired’ is not linked with the word ‘pensions’, which tends to confirm that it is not impossible to revise their amounts. Second, it is true that those pensions are determined on the basis of those ‘acquired retirement pension rights’, but they are determined ‘pursuant to’ the calculation rules laid down in Annex III. On that point, the second sentence of Article 75(2) refers to Annex III, and therefore by implication to Article 2(1) of that annex. Reference is therefore made to the considerations set out in paragraphs 138 to 141 above, according to which the Parliament is required, subject to compliance with higher-ranking EU law, to apply the rules relating to the level and conditions of pensions laid down by the law of the Member State concerned.
As regards the two additional requirements referred to in the second sentence of Article 75(2), it is sufficient to note that they are not intended, as the applicants assert, to set conditions for the alleged protection of their ‘acquired rights’ in the sense that the amounts of the pensions cannot be revised, but that they set conditions for actual payment of those pensions. It is only if former Members satisfy the relevant conditions laid down by the national law of the Member States concerned and if, in addition, they have submitted the application for payment referred to in Article 3(2) of Annex III that they will be able to claim their pensions. Those requirements are therefore unrelated to any guarantee that the amounts of retirement pensions cannot be altered.
Finally, the Court finds that only the Parliament is bound by the obligation imposed by Annex III to apply the rules on the level and conditions of retirement pensions laid down by the law of the Member State. By contrast, the obligation to comply with the two requirements described in paragraph 157 above applies solely to the recipients of those pensions.
(d)

Finding
In the present case, the Parliament did not amend either Article 75 or Article 2(1) of Annex III. Those provisions remained unchanged. Similarly, the Parliament did not review the pension rights acquired by the applicants prior to 14 July 2009.
Specifically, pursuant to Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III, the Parliament merely adjusted the level and conditions of the applicants’ retirement or survivors’ pensions in order to take account of the new calculation rules laid down in Decision No 14/2018. Thus, only the rules for calculating the amounts of those retirement or survivors’ pensions were amended, pursuant to the new requirements of Decision No 14/2018. Moreover, the applicants have not claimed that the Parliament misapplied the rules of Decision No 14/2018.
Furthermore, and by way of comparison, the Court notes that case-law in European civil service disputes has already accepted that it is possible to revise the amounts of pensions. Under that case-law, a clear distinction must be drawn between the determination of pension rights and the payment of the resulting benefits. Thus, according to case-law, acquired pension rights are not infringed where the changes in the amounts actually paid are the result of legislative or regulatory changes which do not adversely affect the entitlement to a pension in the strict sense (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 November 2006, Campoli v Commission,
T‑135/05
,
EU:T:2006:366
, paragraphs
and
and the case-law cited).
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Parliament fulfilled its obligation under Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III by applying Decision No 14/2018 and, consequently, by adopting the contested decisions. The question of whether or not that application by the Parliament of the rules set out in Decision No 14/2018 infringes higher-ranking rules of EU law other than Article 75 or Annex III will be examined in the context of the fourth plea.
It is apparent from all these considerations that the Parliament was entitled to rely on Article 75 and the rules of Annex III, without infringing the provisions thereof, to adopt the contested decisions.
Consequently, the second plea must be dismissed.
3.

Third plea: error of law in the classification of Decision No 14/2018 and misapplication of the ‘parliamentary reservation of law’ provided for in Article 75(2) of the Implementing Measures
In support of the third plea, the applicants submit that Article 75(2) refers only to national law adopted in the form of a ‘law’. That area reserved to the legislature seeks to protect the legislative function, ahead of even protecting individual Members of the Parliament. Decision No 14/2018 is merely an internal decision of the Chamber of Deputies, which does not have the force of law. In that respect, Decision No 14/2018 is applicable only to persons with respect to whom the Chamber of Deputies exercises its regulatory powers, namely its staff and serving members of that chamber until the end of their term of office.
The applicants also submit that the reference in Article 75(2) to ‘national law’ refers only to the conditions laid down by the Member State concerned for a former Member of the European Parliament to be entitled to a retirement pension. By contrast, according to the applicants, that reference cannot allow the Parliament to alter the methods for calculating those retirement pensions.
Finally, the contested decisions infringe Article 17 of the Charter and Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’). Those provisions ensure that no one may be deprived of his or her possessions except subject to the conditions provided for by ‘law’.
The Parliament contends that the third plea should be dismissed as unfounded.
As a preliminary point, in so far as the applicants complain that the Parliament infringed their right to property, since the reduction in the amounts of their pensions was not provided for by a ‘law’, it must be observed that that line of argument overlaps with the arguments put forward in the context of the fourth plea. Reference is therefore made to that plea.
Next, the third plea must be dismissed as irrelevant as regards the applicants referred to in paragraph 135 above. As stated in connection with the second plea, and in particular in paragraph 135 above, those applicants are not covered by Article 75(2) but under the first subparagraph of Article 75(1), since they began to draw their pensions before the Statute for Members entered into force. Therefore, any failure by the Parliament to comply with Article 75(2) cannot, in any event, entail the annulment of the contested decisions which concern those applicants.
Consideration of the third plea is therefore confined solely to the applicants referred to in paragraph 148 above, that is to say, those in Cases T‑390/19, T‑393/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑411/19, T‑413/19, T‑417/19, T‑425/19, T‑430/19, T‑436/19, T‑441/19, T‑442/19, T‑444/19, T‑445/19, T‑452/19 and T‑465/19.
The second sentence of Article 75(2) provides:
‘Persons who have acquired rights under that pension scheme shall receive a pension calculated on the basis of their acquired rights pursuant to the aforementioned Annex III as soon as they meet the relevant conditions laid down by the national law of the Member State concerned and they have submitted the application referred to in Article 3(2) of the aforementioned Annex III.’
As has been pointed out in paragraphs 155 to 157 above, the second sentence of Article 75(2) distinguishes between, on the one hand, the rules for calculating the amount of retirement pensions, which are governed exclusively by Article 2(1) of Annex III, and, on the other hand, the requirements to be satisfied in order to receive actual payment of those pensions, which involve, in particular, fulfilling the ‘relevant conditions laid down by the national law of the Member State concerned’. Furthermore, it is apparent from paragraph 158 above that the obligation to comply with those requirements applies to the recipients of the retirement pensions, and not to the Parliament.
First, even if the term ‘national law’ used in the second sentence of Article 75(2) refers solely to national legislative acts, it is, in any event, irrelevant in the present case that Decision No 14/2018 does not take the form of a ‘law’ from the perspective of Italian law. By the applicants’ own admission, Decision No 14/2018 is not intended to alter the requirements governing actual payment of retirement pensions, such as, for example, having reached the legal age from which a former Member is authorised to draw a retirement pension, or not carrying out certain duties considered incompatible by the Italian legislature. As the applicants themselves state and, as its title shows – ‘Reassessment of the amount of lifetime annuities and the lifetime annuity proportion of pro-rata pension benefits and survivors’ benefits …’ – Decision No 14/2018 merely amended the rules for calculating retirement pensions.
Second, Article 2(1) of Annex III, which specifically governs the calculation of the amounts of those pensions by referring to the law of the Member State concerned, does not state that that national law must take the form of a ‘law’. More broadly still, no provision in Annex III refers to the ‘law’ of the Member State concerned.
The present plea is therefore based on a patently incorrect reading of Article 75(2), since that provision, like Article 75(1), does not require the rules for calculating pensions to be laid down, in the law of the Member State concerned, by a ‘law’. It is therefore irrelevant that Decision No 14/2018 was not adopted in the form of a law.
Consequently, the third plea must be dismissed.
4.

Fourth plea: breach of several general principles of EU law
The fourth plea is in three parts. The first concerns a breach of the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, and infringement of the right to property. The second alleges breach of the principle of proportionality. The third alleges breach of the principle of equal treatment.
As a preliminary point, the Court notes that – as the Parliament, in essence, maintains – the Parliament is required, under Article 75 and Annex III to calculate and, where appropriate, update the amounts of the pensions paid to former Members of the European Parliament elected in Italy who are covered by those provisions, by drawing the appropriate conclusions from Decision No 14/2018 while that national decision is in force, which is currently the case as it has not been repealed or withdrawn by the Consiglio di giurisdizione della Camera dei deputati (Jurisdiction Council of the Chamber of Deputies).
However, when implementing Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III, the Parliament, as an institution of the European Union, is required, under Article 51(1) of the Charter, to comply with the provisions thereof. That applies, first, despite the fact that, in adopting Decision No 14/2018, the Chamber of Deputies was not implementing EU law and was therefore not required to comply with the provisions of the Charter and, second, as the Court has pointed out in connection with contracts (judgment of 16 July 2020, ADR Center v Commission,
C‑584/17 P
,
EU:C:2020:576
, paragraph
), even though Italian law does not provide the same guarantees as those conferred by the Charter and the general principles of EU law.
Consequently, in order to assess the amounts of the applicants’ pensions, the Parliament could have disregarded the new rules for calculating the pensions of former Members of the Chamber of Deputies, as laid down in Decision No 14/2018, only if the application of Decision No 14/2018 had led to an infringement by the Parliament of the Charter or the general principles of EU law (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru,
C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU
,
EU:C:2016:198
, paragraph
; of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice),
C‑216/18 PPU
,
EU:C:2018:586
, paragraphs
,
and
; and of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary),
C‑220/18 PPU
,
EU:C:2018:589
, paragraph
).
In those circumstances, given that the Court does not have jurisdiction to assess directly the legality of Decision No 14/2018, or, in particular, its compliance with the Charter, the Court is required only to consider, in the present case, in the light of the applicants’ submissions, whether the Parliament’s application of the calculation rules recently laid down in that national decision led the Parliament to infringe the provisions of the Charter and the general principles of law as those applicants allege.
(a)

First part of the fourth plea: breach of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, and of the right to property
In the first part, the applicants submit that the contested decisions undermine the inalterable nature of their acquired rights and the legitimate expectations created by the applicable legal provisions during their term of office. More specifically, the Parliament breached the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations in considering that Decision No 14/2018 applied automatically to the applicants’ pension schemes. According to the applicants, to the contrary, it is apparent from the case-law, in particular the judgment of18 October 2011, Purvis v Parliament (
T‑439/09
,
EU:T:2011:600
), that measures amending the system of pension rights in an unfavourable manner cannot affect acquired rights. Moreover, the Parliament altered those acquired rights retroactively and in a completely unforeseeable fashion. Furthermore, since the applicants acquired their pension rights under the PEAM Rules, they are now third parties and thus fall outside the regulatory competence of the Parliament and the Chamber of Deputies. Furthermore, since the pension scheme, as established by Annex III, required Members to make a voluntary choice to join it, the infringement of pension rights by the contested decisions renders the breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations even more serious.
In reply to a written question from the Court, the applicants also raised a plea of illegality in respect of Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III, should those two provisions be interpreted as authorising the Parliament, contrary to the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, to adopt measures with retroactive effect on definitively acquired pension rights.
The applicants further maintain that the contested decisions, by entailing a reduction in the amounts of the pensions, adversely affect their right to property without there being any public interest justifying this in the present case or even being mentioned by the Parliament. Moreover, the contested decisions do not assess the financial burden placed on the applicants and do not balance the interests at issue. The contested decisions therefore infringe Article 17 of the Charter by providing for a retroactive amendment of the applicants’ pension schemes, without this being justified by a legitimate objective.
The Parliament contends that the first part of the fourth plea should be dismissed as unfounded.
(1)

Complaint of breach of the principle of legal certainty
The principle of legal certainty, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that legal rules be clear and precise and aims to ensure that situations and legal relationships governed by EU law remain foreseeable (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2011, Purvis v Parliament,
T‑439/09
,
EU:T:2011:600
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
In considering the plea of illegality raised by the applicants, it should be determined whether, as they claim, Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III authorise the Parliament to adopt measures with a retroactive effect on definitively acquired pension rights, even though such an interpretation would breach the principle of legal certainty.
That plea of illegality must be dismissed, since it starts from the incorrect premiss that the Parliament is authorised to alter acquired pension rights. However, neither Article 75 nor Article 2(1) of Annex III confer such a power. On the contrary, those provisions require the Parliament to observe acquired retirement pension rights.
However, that does not imply that the amounts of those pensions were definitively fixed before the entry into force of the Statute for Members or that they are inalterable.
As is apparent from the considerations set out in the examination of the second plea, in paragraphs 126 to 161 above, ‘acquired pension rights’ and ‘pensions’ must be distinguished from ‘the amounts of pensions’. Although ‘pension rights’ are acquired definitively and cannot be altered, and even though pensions continue to be paid, there is nothing to prevent the amounts of the pensions from being adjusted upwards or downwards. On the contrary, having regard to the provisions of Article 75 and the identical pension rule, the Parliament is obliged to calculate the amounts of those retirement pensions by applying the same rules relating to the level and conditions of the pensions as those laid down by the law of the Member State concerned.
The applicants have not therefore shown that Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III breach the principle of legal certainty. The plea of illegality is therefore unfounded.
Next, it must be ascertained whether the adoption of the contested decisions on the basis of those provisions breached the principle of legal certainty.
It is apparent from the consideration of the second plea that Article 75 provides, clearly and precisely, that the amounts of retirement pensions are to be calculated in accordance with the requirements of Article 2(1) of Annex III, which lays down the identical pension rule and provides that the ‘level and conditions [of retirement pensions] shall be identical’ to those which, in the present case, Members of the Chamber of Deputies receive.
Those rules, which have not been amended since the entry into force of the Statute for Members, therefore expressly envisage the possibility of an upward or downward revision of the amounts of retirement pensions to take account of relevant changes in the law of the Member State concerned. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that, in connection with the consideration of the second plea, it has been found that the adoption of the contested decisions complied with the provisions of Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III.
For a measure to be applied retroactively without the principle of legal certainty being breached, it is necessary that a sufficiently clear indication can be found, either in the terms of the measure or its stated objectives, which allows the conclusion to be drawn that the measure was not merely providing for the future (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2014, Panasonic Italia and Others,
C‑472/12
,
EU:C:2014:2082
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
It is true that the contested decisions were adopted on 11 April 2019 and, in the case of Mr Florio, in Case T‑465/19, on 11 June 2019, and that they produced their effects before those dates, that is to say, on 1 January 2019. However, those facts are not in themselves sufficient to establish that the Parliament breached the principle of legal certainty by applying the new amounts of the pensions as from that date.
The fact that the amounts of the applicants’ pensions were altered as from 1 January 2019 is explained by the Parliament’s obligation under Article 2(1) of Annex III to apply the same conditions to the pensions as those laid down by the law of the Member State concerned. The determination of the starting point for applying the new rules for calculating those pensions unquestionably forms part of those ‘conditions’.
In that regard, Article 1(1) of Decision No 14/2018 expressly states that ‘from 1 January 2019, the amounts of the [pensions] … shall be calculated in accordance with the new rules provided for in this decision’.
Consequently, under Article 2(1) of Annex III, the applicants were no longer entitled to claim, as from 1 January 2019, their pension as calculated before that date. On the contrary, since 1 January 2019, only pensions, the amounts of which have been adjusted in accordance with the rules laid down by Decision No 14/2018, have been due and payable.
Admittedly, it would have been preferable for the contested decisions to have been adopted before 1 January 2019 and not after that date. However, that is irrelevant in the present case. The obligation to apply, with effect from that date, the new rules for calculating the applicants’ pensions derives not from the contested decisions but from Article 2(1) of Annex III. To that effect, the contested decisions merely draw the conclusions arising directly from Article 2(1) of Annex III and therefore require the sums overpaid between 1 January 2019 and the date of their adoption, 11 April 2019 and 11 June 2019 respectively, to be repaid.
It follows from the foregoing that the applicants have not shown that the principle of legal certainty was breached in the present case. The rules set out in Annex III meant that the new amounts of the applicants’ pensions would enter into force on 1 January 2019. Those rules largely predate, and do not post-date, 1 January 2019. Moreover, the applicants have not claimed, and there is no evidence in the documents before the Court, that the Parliament applied those new amounts before 1 January 2019, that is to say before the relevant date established by Decision No 14/2018. Finally, as stated in paragraph 17 above, in January 2019, the Parliament had informed the applicants that the rules laid down in Decision No 14/2018 might apply to them. Similarly, as indicated in paragraph 19 above, the Parliament had, in February 2019, confirmed to the applicants that that decision was automatically applicable to their situation. The applicants had thus been informed of the amendment of the rules applicable to the calculation of their pension before the contested decisions were adopted.
That finding is not affected by the judgment of 18 October 2011, Purvis v Parliament (
T‑439/09
,
EU:T:2011:600
), to which the applicants refer. On that point, it should be noted, first, that the applicant in that case had not yet acquired his right to a pension. Second, the applicant did not complain that the amount of his pension had been reduced, but that his application to receive part of his additional pension in the form of a lump sum had been dismissed. Thus, the circumstances of the judgment of 18 October 2011, Purvis v Parliament (
T‑439/09
,
EU:T:2011:600
), bear no relation to the situation of the applicants in the present actions. Moreover, in so far as they infer from that judgment that acquired pension rights cannot be impaired, it is sufficient to point out that, as stated in particular in paragraph 191 above, their acquired pension rights were observed by the Parliament and that only the amounts of their pensions have been altered.
The first complaint, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty, must therefore be dismissed.
(2)

Complaint of breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations
According to well-established case-law, the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any individual in a situation where the EU authorities have caused him to entertain legitimate expectations. Information which is precise, unconditional and consistent and comes from authorised and reliable sources constitutes assurances capable of giving rise to such expectations. However, a person may not plead breach of the principle unless he or she has been given precise assurances by the administration. Finally, the assurances given must comply with the applicable rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 December 2019, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council,
C‑482/17
,
EU:C:2019:1035
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
At the outset, the Court will reject, for reasons similar to those set out in paragraphs 189 to 191 above, the applicants’ plea of illegality by which they submit that if Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III were to be interpreted as authorising the Parliament to adopt measures with a retroactive effect on definitively acquired pension rights, such an interpretation would breach the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
That plea of illegality is based on the incorrect premiss that the Parliament is authorised to alter acquired retirement pension rights, whereas it is not. Pursuant to Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III, it is permitted only to alter the amounts of those pensions.
Moreover, the applicants have neither demonstrated nor claimed that the Parliament gave them assurances other than that set out in Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III. Those two articles plainly do not provide that the amounts of the applicants’ pensions cannot be adjusted.
The examination of the second plea, in particular in paragraphs 138 to 141 above, has shown that the only precise and unconditional assurance given to the applicants by the Parliament was to guarantee them entitlement to a pension the level and conditions of which are identical to those of the pension received by members of the lower house of the Member State for which they were elected, in the present case the Members of the Chamber of Deputies.
By faithfully applying the rules of Decision No 14/2018 for the purpose of adopting the contested decisions, the Parliament did not therefore deviate from the assurance which it had given to the applicants when they joined the pension scheme established by Annex III.
The second complaint, alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, must therefore be dismissed.
(3)

Complaint of infringement of the right to property
According to the case-law, the right to property, as guaranteed in Article 17(1) of the Charter, constitutes a fundamental right of EU law, compliance with which is a condition of the legality of European Union acts. In addition, that provision, which states that everyone has the right to own his or her lawfully acquired possessions, is a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 May 2019, Steinhoff and Others v ECB,
T‑107/17
,
EU:T:2019:353
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
However, it must be borne in mind that the right to property guaranteed by Article 17(1) of the Charter is not absolute and that its exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union. Consequently, as is apparent from Article 52(1) of the Charter, restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of the right to property, provided that the restrictions are provided for by law, genuinely meet objectives of general interest and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the right guaranteed (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others,
C‑258/14
,
EU:C:2017:448
, paragraphs
and
and the case-law cited).
Finally, in order to determine the scope of the fundamental right to peaceful enjoyment of property, it is necessary, having regard to Article 52(3) of the Charter, to take account of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which enshrines that right (see judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others,
C‑258/14
,
EU:C:2017:448
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
In the present case, it must be borne in mind that, pursuant to the identical pension rule, the contested decisions apply the new method of calculation as established by Decision No 14/2008 to the applicants’ retirement or survivors’ pensions. The legality of Decision No 14/2018 in the light of Italian law can be reviewed solely by the competent Italian authorities, whereas it is for the Courts of the European Union to determine whether, by applying the rules of that decision in the contested decisions, the Parliament infringed the provisions of the Charter (see paragraphs 62 to 65 and 182 above). As regards, more specifically, the present complaint of an infringement of the right to property, as guaranteed in Article 17(1) of the Charter, it must be observed that the applicants do not put forward any specific evidence that that right secures a level of protection that differs from, or is even higher than, the safeguards provided by Italian law. The Court notes that the legality of Decision No 14/2018 is currently under consideration by the Consiglio di giurisdizione della Camera dei deputati (Jurisdiction Council of the Chamber of Deputies) and that the Parliament stated at the hearing that, in future, it will apply, in accordance with the identical pension rule, any amendment to Decision No 14/2018 adopted by the competent Italian authorities to the applicants’ pensions.
In the present case, it is common ground that the Parliament did not deprive the applicants of part of their pension rights, but merely applied the reduction in the amounts of those pensions stipulated by the relevant provisions. Moreover, in reply to a written question put by the Court, the Parliament provided a table setting out, for each applicant, the extent of that reduction. According to the data forwarded by the Parliament, the percentage reductions vary between 9% and 65%, depending on each applicant’s personal situation. A reduction of 50% or more was applied to four applicants, and the new amounts of their pensions in question range between EUR 1 569.14 and EUR 1 985.42. It should be noted that the pensions of those four applicants relate to terms of office of the former Members concerned lasting 5 or 10 years respectively, and that the new method of calculation is performed on the basis of individual contributions, in accordance with Article 1(2) of Decision No 14/2008. In any event, the applicants do not put forward any detailed, individual arguments based on the extent of the reduction in the amounts of the pensions in their specific cases. They confine themselves to more general arguments to the effect that the right to property precludes reductions in the amounts of the pensions in the present case because of their alleged retroactivity and the alleged lack of any overriding public interest. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the assessment of the legality of an EU act in the light of fundamental rights cannot, in any event, be based on claims relating to the consequences of that act in a specific case (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others,
C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P
,
EU:C:2020:676
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
In that regard, the following should be added.
It has already been held that, where legislation provides for the automatic payment of a social benefit, such as a retirement or survivor’s pension, it generates a proprietary interest for persons meeting the requirements thereof falling within the ambit of Article 17 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others,
C‑258/14
,
EU:C:2017:448
, paragraph
and the case-law cited). The applicants’ pensions therefore fall within the material scope of Article 17 of the Charter.
Moreover, although the contested decisions do not entail an outright deprivation of the applicants’ pensions, the fact remains that they reduce their amounts. In that sense, the contested decisions restrict the applicants’ right to property (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 1 September 2015,
Da Silva Carvalho Rico v. Portugal
, CE:ECHR:2015:0901DEC001334114, §§ 31 to 33 and the case-law cited). Moreover, the Parliament acknowledged the existence of such a restriction during the hearing.
The Court must therefore verify whether that restriction observes the substance of the applicants’ right to property, whether it is provided for by law, whether it meets an objective of general interest and whether it is necessary for that purpose.
In that regard, the fact that the Parliament did not carry out that verification has no bearing on the present cases. Such a verification does not constitute a mandatory procedural formality with which the Parliament was obliged to comply before adopting the contested decisions. All that matters is that the specific effects of those decisions should not adversely affect the essence of the applicants’ right to property.
First, the right to property, as enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter, cannot be interpreted as entitling a person to a pension of a particular amount (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others,
C‑258/14
,
EU:C:2017:448
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
Second, the restriction on the applicants’ right to property at issue in the present case is provided for by law.
In the first place, the contested decisions are based on Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III. In that regard, it has been pointed out in paragraph 195 above that the rules set out in Annex III have not been altered since the Statute for Members entered into force. In addition, Article 2(1) of Annex III requires that the amounts of pensions be adjusted downwards or upwards to take account of the relevant legislative or regulatory changes in the Member State concerned. Thus, the contested decisions, while adjusting the amounts of the applicants’ pensions, did not alter the essence of the right to a pension as defined by EU law.
In the second place, the Court finds that the new rules for calculating those pensions are set out with sufficient clarity and precision by the provisions of Decision No 14/2018, which, moreover, the applicants do not dispute. Moreover, the fact, put forward by the applicants, that the decision is not in the form of a ‘law’ under Italian law is irrelevant. According to settled case-law, the concept of ‘law’ must be understood in its ‘substantive’ sense, and not its ‘formal’ one. It therefore includes everything that goes to make up the written law, including enactments of lower rank than statutes, and the relevant case-law authority (see ECtHR, 18 January 2018,
Fédération nationale des associations et syndicats de sportés (FNASS) and Others v. France
, CE:ECHR:2018:0118JUD004815111, § 160 and the case-law cited).
Third, the Parliament asserts that the justification for the restriction on the applicants’ right to property is indicated in Decision No 14/2018, since it was the Office of President of the Chamber of Deputies that chose to adjust the method for calculating the pensions paid to the members of that chamber. More specifically, Decision No 14/2018 is justified by the objective of adapting the amounts of pensions paid to all Members of the Parliament to the contribution-based calculation system. Furthermore, according to the Parliament, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights makes it clear that States have a wide margin of appreciation, in particular as regards the adoption of policies to protect the public purse or laws introducing austerity measures prompted by a major economic crisis.
On that point, the Court notes that, having regard to Article 2(1) of Annex III, the adoption of the contested decisions is necessarily determined by the choices made by the competent Italian authorities. Thus, the appraisal of the public interest objective pursued cannot disregard the objectives underlying the adoption of Decision No 14/2018.
In that regard, it should be noted that the objective referred to by the Parliament is expressly mentioned in the preamble to Decision No 14/2018. That decision states that it seeks to ‘carry out a recalculation using the contributions-based method of the amount of lifetime annuities and the lifetime annuity proportion of pro-rata pension benefits and survivors’ benefits, entitlement to which was acquired pursuant to the rules in force on 31 December 2011’ and ‘the recalculation of the pension benefit in force [may not] result in an amount greater than that currently paid’.
Moreover, the applicants themselves acknowledge in the applications that ‘at national level, the application of Decision No 14/2018 forms part of a more general intervention and is intended to reduce the expenditure borne by the [Italian] State’. That statement is confirmed by one of their answers to the written questions put by the Court. They state that ‘the
ratio legis
of the reduction effected by Decision No 14/2018 is to generate a saving in expenditure for the [Italian] State treasury’.
It follows from the foregoing that Decision No 14/2018 aims to rationalise public expenditure in the context of budgetary constraints. The Courts of the European Union have already accepted that such an objective constitutes an objective in the public interest capable of justifying an infringement of fundamental rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others,
C‑258/14
,
EU:C:2017:448
, paragraph
and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 14 December 2018, FV v Council,
T‑750/16
,
EU:T:2018:972
, paragraph
).
That legitimate objective must also be accepted in the case of the contested decisions, since their adoption was not based on any independent rationale but, on the contrary, as stated in paragraph 227 above, was determined by the choices made by the competent Italian authorities. Moreover, the contested decisions pursue simultaneously the legitimate objective, expressly stated in Article 2(1) of Annex III, of granting the applicants pensions the level and conditions of which are identical to those of the pension received by the Members of the Chamber of Deputies.
Fourth, as regards the need for Decision No 14/2018 and, consequently, the need for the contested decisions, the Court has already held that, given the particular economic context, which has lasted for several years, the Member States have broad discretion when adopting economic decisions and are in the best position to determine the measures likely to achieve the objective pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others,
C‑258/14
,
EU:C:2017:448
, paragraph
). Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has already held that the decision to legislate in the field of social insurance benefits normally involves a consideration of political, economic and social matters. It follows that States are allowed broad discretion, in particular to adopt policies to protect the public purse or laws introducing austerity measures prompted by a major economic crisis (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 10 July 2018,
Achille Claudio Aielli and Others v. Italy
and
Giovanni Arboit and Others v. Italy
, CE:ECHR:2018:0710DEC002716618, § 26 and the case-law cited).
The applicants have not shown that the rules laid down by Decision No 14/2018 were not necessary to attain the objectives pursued, as described in paragraphs 230 and 231 above. Nor have the applicants put forward the existence of other, less restrictive, measures which would have made it possible to achieve those objectives.
Furthermore, it is apparent from paragraphs 13 and 16 of the Opinion of the Legal Service that Decision No 14/2018 contains a number of provisions ensuring that it is proportionate, in particular Article 1(6) and (7) of that decision. In that regard, in reply to a written question put by the Court, the Parliament provided a table which shows that the Parliament applied the rules of Article 1(6) of Decision No 14/2018 to the advantage of 12 of the applicants. In accordance with those rules, the new amounts of their pensions, as recalculated, were increased by half. Similarly, at the hearing, the Parliament submitted, without contradiction by the applicants, that none of them had requested that it apply the rules set out in Article 1(7) of Decision No 14/2018. Those rules make it possible to increase the amounts of the pensions of persons who do not receive other annual income in an amount exceeding the annual amount of social assistance, who have a serious illness requiring the administration of life-saving therapy or who have a health condition causing a situation of 100% disability.
As regards the consequences of the contested decisions for the applicants, it is true that the Court does not rule out the possibility that they may reach a certain degree of seriousness. However, in itself, that degree of seriousness does not support a finding that the contested decisions give rise to disadvantages which are disproportionate to the aims pursued, in particular considering the extent of the reductions in the amounts of the pensions in question, the new absolute amounts of the pensions assessed in relation to the length of the term of office of the former Members concerned and the fact that the new method of calculation takes into account their individual contributions. Moreover, none of the consequences listed by the applicants in their pleadings is substantiated or proved. In the absence of tangible evidence, it cannot therefore be found that the applicants each bear an unreasonable individual burden in the light of the objectives pursued. The assessment of the legality of an EU act in the light of fundamental rights cannot, in any event, be based on claims relating to the consequences of that act in a specific case (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others,
C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P
,
EU:C:2020:676
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
The third complaint, alleging infringement of the right to property, must therefore be dismissed, as must, in consequence, the first part of the fourth plea in its entirety.
(b)

Second part of the fourth plea: breach of the principle of proportionality
In the second part, the applicants submit that the contested decisions constitute a disproportionate interference with their right to property, as guaranteed by Article 17 of the Charter. Each applicant unfairly bears an unreasonable individual burden, with no reason to justify it.
The Parliament contends that the second part of the fourth plea should be dismissed as unfounded.
In that regard, in so far as the applicants merely reiterate that the contested decisions constitute a disproportionate and unjustified interference with their right to property, the second part of the fourth plea must be dismissed on the same grounds as those set out in paragraphs 222 to 235 above.
(c)

Third part of the fourth plea: breach of the principle of equal treatment
In the third part, the applicants submit that the contested decisions breach the principle of equal treatment. They treat former Members of the Parliament falling within the scope of Annex III in the same way as the Italian Members of Parliament directly covered by Decision No 14/2018. However, there are major differences between the pension schemes of those two categories of Members. First, the scheme provided for in Annex III to the PEAM Rules is a pension scheme based on voluntary membership, whereas the Italian Members of Parliament concerned automatically join the national pension scheme. Second, Decision No 14/2018 is intended to reduce the expenditure borne by the Italian Republic, whereas the applicants’ pensions receive the necessary funding from the Parliament’s budget.
The contested decisions also treat former Members of the European Parliament elected in Italy differently from former Members of the European Parliament elected in France or Luxembourg, all of whom, however, are covered by Annex III.
Finally, in reply to a written question put by the Court, the applicants also raised a plea of illegality in respect of Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III. According to the applicants, if the PEAM Rules were to be regarded as allowing the Parliament to review definitively acquired pension rights, the result would be that different situations would be artificially treated in the same way.
The Parliament contends that the third part of the fourth plea should be dismissed as unfounded.
In that regard, according to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 26 November 2013, Kendrion v Commission,
C‑50/12 P
,
EU:C:2013:771
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
It should be noted that, in essence, the applicants criticise the Parliament for having treated them in the same way as Members of the Chamber of Deputies, whereas their respective situations are different. Moreover, the Parliament likewise breached the principle of equal treatment in treating the applicants differently from other former Members of the European Parliament who, however, come under the same legal regime, namely Annex III.
Those complaints directed, in the applications, against the contested decisions do not, however, arise from those decisions, but from the rules laid down in Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III. It is therefore only with regard to those two articles – which, moreover, are challenged by way of the applicants’ plea of illegality – that their arguments must be assessed.
The applicants submit, in their plea of illegality, that if the PEAM Rules were to be regarded as allowing the Parliament to review their definitively acquired pension rights, then Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III would breach the principle of equal treatment.
In that regard, the plea of illegality must be dismissed for reasons similar to those set out in paragraphs 189 to 191 above. That plea of illegality is based on the incorrect premiss that the Parliament is authorised to alter acquired retirement pension rights, whereas it is not. Pursuant to Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III, it is permitted only to alter the amounts of those pensions.
Moreover, none of the arguments raised by the applicants is capable of establishing the illegality of Article 75 or Article 2(1) of Annex III.
First, the applicants complain that the Parliament does not treat them in the same way as former Members of the European Parliament, elected in France or Luxembourg, who also chose to join the pension scheme in Annex III. The applicants have thus been treated differently, whereas they are in the same situation as those other former Members, since they all performed the same duties over the same period.
According to settled case-law, the elements which characterise different situations, and hence their comparability, must in particular be determined and assessed in the light of the subject matter and purpose of the EU act which makes the distinction in question (see judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others,
C‑127/07
,
EU:C:2008:728
, paragraph
and the case-law cited).
In that regard, it is common ground that the pension scheme in Annex III was designed to ensure identical treatment, inter alia, for former Members of the European Parliament elected in Italy and the Members of the Chamber of Deputies. That objective is expressly stated in Article 1(2) and Article 2(1) of Annex III. Identical treatment thus constitutes the central feature of the scheme established by Annex III. Moreover, as stated in paragraph 209 above, that identity of treatment was the only precise and unconditional assurance given by the Parliament to the applicants when they joined the pension scheme set out in Annex III.
The subject matter and purpose of Annex III are therefore, in the present case, to ensure that former Members of the European Parliament elected in Italy and the Members of the Chamber of Deputies are treated in the same way.
Accordingly, the applicants are not in the same situation as former Members of the European Parliament elected in France or Luxembourg who have also chosen to join that pension scheme. The pensions of former Members of the European Parliament who are elected in those two Member States are not intended to be governed by the rules laid down by Italian law, but by other national rules which are specifically applicable to them.
Second, the applicants assert that the Parliament treated them in the same way as former Members of the Chamber of Deputies, although their respective situations differ in three respects. First of all, membership of the pension scheme established by Annex III is voluntary, whereas membership of the Italian pension scheme is automatic in the case of Members of the Chamber of Deputies. Next, Decision No 14/2018 seeks to reduce the expenditure borne by the Italian Republic, whereas such an objective does not apply to the applicants. Lastly, a problem of effective judicial protection arises, since a former Member of the European Parliament, elected in Italy, who has not also been a Member of the Chamber of Deputies, is unable to plead, before the Consiglio di giurisdizione della Camera dei deputati (Jurisdiction Council of the Chamber of Deputies), that Decision No 14/2018 and its extension to former Members of the European Parliament are illegal.
In the light of the subject matter and purpose of Annex III, as described in paragraphs 252 and 253 above, the applicants’ arguments have no bearing on the validity of Article 75 and Article 2(1) of Annex III in view of the principle of equal treatment.
According to the case-law referred to in paragraph 244 above, the principle of equal treatment does not require the situations to be exactly identical for the same treatment to be capable of being applied. It is only necessary for those situations to be comparable. However, none of the three arguments put forward by the applicants supports a finding that their situation is fundamentally different from that of former Members of the Chamber of Deputies.
For the sake of completeness, the Court notes that the applicants’ argument amounts, in essence, to refusing any identity of treatment between them and the members of that chamber. However, to accept that argument would deprive Annex III of any practical effect by undermining the very essence of that pension scheme. It would mean, paradoxically, that it was no longer possible to calculate and pay the applicants’ pensions since the level and conditions for the award of those pensions depend specifically on rules provided for by Italian law.
Lastly, with regard specifically to the fact that it is impossible for some applicants to challenge the legality of Decision No 14/2018 before the Consiglio di giurisdizione della Camera dei deputati (Jurisdiction Council of the Chamber of Deputies), the Court finds that that procedural obstacle does not arise from EU law but relates to Italian law. In any event, the Court has no jurisdiction, in an action brought pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, to review directly the compliance of Italian law with fundamental rights, and in particular with the right to effective judicial protection.
Consequently, the third part of the fourth plea, and the fourth plea in its entirety, must be dismissed and, accordingly, the actions must be dismissed in their entirety, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the first head of claim in Case T‑465/19 or that of the second heads of claim (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2002, Council v Boehringer,
C‑23/00 P
,
EU:C:2002:118
, paragraph
).
Costs
Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and pay those of the Parliament, as applied for by the latter.

On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition)
hereby:

1.
Dismisses the action in Case T‑453/19,
Panusa
v
Parliament
, as inadmissible;

2.
Dismisses the other applications;

3.
Orders Ms Maria Teresa Coppo Gavazzi and the other applicants whose names appear in the annex to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament.

Svenningsen
Barents
Mac Eochaidh
Pynnä
Laitenberger
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 15 October 2020.
[Signatures]
(
*1
)	Language of the case: Italian.
(
)	The list of the other applicants is annexed only to the version sent to the parties.