by mutant | 2025-11-23 01:02:09+00:00
might be good to get your hands around this early.

reading up on how crush, goose, and opencode handle this may be a good idea.

i've been trying to build a web native terminal assistant for a while (just a side project) and this is easily the thing that keeps me up at night.

### Primary Sources: - *Anthropic Engineering Blog: "Making Claude Code more secure and autonomous with sandboxing"* Detailed article on Claude Code's sandboxing features, including OS-level primitives (e.g., Linux Bubblewrap, macOS Seatbelt) for filesystem and network isolation. [Read here](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/claude-code-sandboxing) (Published Oct 20, 2025).

- *Claude Code Documentation: Sandboxing* Official docs covering setup, configuration, security benefits (e.g., prompt injection protection), and limitations of filesystem/network isolation in Claude Code. [Read here](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing).

- *Claude Blog: "Beyond permission prompts: making Claude Code more secure and autonomous"* Overview of sandboxing in Claude Code, emphasizing boundaries for safer agent execution. [Read here](https://claude.com/blog/beyond-permission-prompts-making-cla...) (Published Oct 31, 2025).

### Additional Resources: For broader context on sandboxing agentic AI: - *arXiv Paper: "Securing AI Agent Execution"* Research on isolation techniques for AI agents, including risk assessment. [Read here](https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.21236) (Published Oct 24, 2025). - *HopX Documentation* Practical guide to sandboxing for AI agents (e.g., using Firecracker micro-VMs). [Read here](https://hopx.ai/) (Open-source SDK available at [GitHub](https://github.com/hopx-ai/sdk)).

### Cursor Cursor uses local-first editing with optional sandboxing via Docker containers for isolated execution (no default vendor-owned sandboxes). It respects user-defined rules without overriding them.

- *Skywork AI Blog: Security in Cursor 2.0* Details Cursor's sandboxing for code execution, network protection, and isolation. [Read here](https://skywork.ai/blog/vibecoding/cursor-2-0-security-priva...) (Published Nov 1, 2025).

- *Skywork AI Blog: Cursor 2.0 vs Claude Code SDK* Compares isolation techniques, noting Cursor's local sandboxes vs. Claude's cloud-based ones. [Read here](https://skywork.ai/blog/vibecoding/cursor-2-0-vs-claude-code...) (Published Nov 1, 2025).

### OpenAI Codex Codex primarily relies on API-based execution with optional user-managed sandboxes (e.g., via Firecracker or custom proxies). It emphasizes provider retention policies but lacks built-in native sandboxing like Claude Code.

- *Render Blog: Testing AI Coding Agents (2025)* Benchmarks Codex's handling of isolation in production tasks, including Docker-based sandboxes. [Read here](https://render.com/blog/ai-coding-agents-benchmark) (Published Aug 12, 2025).

- *Medium: Claude Code vs Cursor* Indirect comparison noting Codex's API retention and sandbox limitations vs. Cursor/Claude. [Read here](https://open-data-analytics.medium.com/claude-code-vs-cursor...) (Published Aug 6, 2025).

### Goose AI (Codename Goose) Goose uses container-based isolation via tools like Container Use (built on Dagger) for git-branch-isolated environments, emphasizing safe experimentation without affecting the host.

- *Goose Blog: Isolated Dev Environments* Explains Goose's container-use for sandboxes, including lifecycle management and rollback. [Read here](https://block.github.io/goose/blog/2025/06/19/isolated-devel...) (Published Jun 19, 2025).

- *GitHub Discussion: Goose vs Claude Code* Community analysis comparing Goose's local isolation to Claude Code's cloud sandboxes. [Read here](https://github.com/block/goose/discussions/3133) (Ongoing, started Jun 27, 2025).

- *Slashdot: Compare Claude vs. Goose* High-level comparison including deployment isolation. [Read here](https://slashdot.org/software/comparison/Claude-vs-codename-...).

also: check out the open-source sandbox runtime from Anthropic: [GitHub Repo](https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime).

clearly i have a bias on this topic, lol