by lo_zamoyski | 2025-04-08 15:14:25+00:00
Neuroscience suffers from a rigor problem[0] Sure, you can make observations, even good observations, but these can be lodged within a mushy, interpretive bed of sloppy speculation, bad philosophy, and unexamined assumptions.

For starters, what is intelligence? Because defined one way, you could attribute it to virtually anything that responds to the environment in some way. Against mechanistic presuppositions, you'll be stuck with the impossible Sisyphean task of defining it at all (good luck weaving intentionality into mechanistic metaphysics; it is no accident that Descartes believed that non-human animals lack consciousness - he viewed them in mechanistic terms!).

Or consider...

'they could help us step “away from the idea that we are the best creatures in the world"'

'“We are not this optimal solution to intelligence.”'

What is meant by "best" and "optimal"? Without telos, you cannot speak about anything being best or optimal. There is no ordering measure. These are defined with respect to how well something attains an end. Is pencil A better than pencil B? You can answer that once you define what it means to be a pencil, because then you can define what it means to be a good pencil. But is a pencil better than an eraser? Meaningless question w.r.t. what is intrinsic and essential to each, as they are two different kinds of things with two different ends. Measured against human purposes, i.e., purposes extrinsic to the things themselves? You could say that the pencil is superior, as it more directly and fully contributes to the human end of communication or drawing or whatever, while the eraser plays a supportive role. Or consider perhaps some kind of absolute ontic hierarchy (at the very least, human beings can do whatever any other animal can through technology, something that permits the extension and determination of the human power to act).

"What are the building blocks of a brain that can think critically, use tools or form abstract ideas?"

What is an "abstract idea"? How does it differ from a concrete image? For example, let's say that after a squirrel perceives a tree in its senses, it remembers this perception. Is this an abstract idea? What if this squirrel sees another tree and, through its squirrel brain, is moved to behave with respect to it in a manner similar to the first tree. Does that involve abstraction? Does similarity of image entail abstract ideas? If the abstract idea of "Tree" is not an image, not a similarity between images, and therefore not particular but a universal predicate, for instance, and the brain itself is concrete, then how can brains entertain abstract ideas that escape concreteness and particularity?

Some will no doubt claim that answering these questions is precisely what neuroscience seeks to do, but this is confused. Yes, neuroscience can shed light on certain neurological phenomena, and that's great. But neuroscience also operates within "meta-neuroscientific" parameters and makes use of its (often hazy) notions in a way that undermine its coherence. These require philosophical chops to untangle and analyze.

[0] https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/01/against-neurobabble...