by 0xbadcafebee | 2025-04-21 21:37:20+00:00
Registrars are less secure because CAs have to follow a strict guideline for security. We could just apply that same standard to the registrars. It would be easier for them to follow since it would be far simpler to use 1 validation method, and using cryptographic verification it's easier to automate validating that it was done successfully.

The 12x multiplier comes from the number of attack vectors to validation methods. The whole system is public knowledge; if you know how each part works, and you know about all the possible security exploits out there, you can just count them.

Here's a brief list off the top of my head, it's not exhaustive:

- DNS validation. The CA looks up TXT records of a given subdomain. Attack 1. DNS cache poisoning Attack 2. Compromise the credentials of a DNS admin Attack 3. Zero-day exploit in the DNS server Attack 4. Zero-day exploit in the DNS web management interface Attack 5. Incorrectly configured DNS zone transfer settings. Attack 6. BGP spoofing attack on the target DNS nameserver. Attack 7. BGP spoofing attack on the CA's DNS resolver. - HTTP validation. The CA requests a specific URL over HTTP and verifies the contents. Attack 1. MITM the HTTP request/response. (Can be done anywhere across the network, from the CA internal network to the target internal/external network) Attack 2-8. Every single DNS attack. You just replace the A/AAAA record when looking up the target HTTP host, with an attacker-controlled http host. Attack 9. BGP spoofing attack on the IP of the target HTTP host. Attack 10. Zero-day exploit in the target HTTP server. Attack 11. Stealing credentials to remotely login to the target HTTP server. - Email validation. The CA sends an e-mail to the domain and confirms the reply. Attack 1-7. Every DNS attack. Attack 8. BGP spoofing attack on the IP of the target MX host. Attack 9. MITM the e-mail. This one is extra easy as intermediate unencrypted relays are common/expected. Attack 10. Steal the credentials of the mail server admin to remotely log in and intercept/fake emails. Attack 11. If it's a site that allows users to register an email address, there are six different email addresses they can try to register; if one works, they can use that to validate certs for that domain. Attack 12. Zero-day exploit in the mail server software. Attack 13. Zero-day exploit in the mail server's web management interface.

And this is just the run-of-the-mill exploits most experienced hackers can pull off remotely. Haven't gotten into more advanced things like supply-chain attacks, timing attacks, protocol/algorithm flaws, espionage, social engineering, etc.

The big problem is that since validation uses no cryptography whatsoever, all the attacks are fairly trivial. A BGP attack is so easy that it happens by accident on a monthly basis. MITM is easy. Stealing credentials is easy (ask any botnet admin). Attacking DNS is easy (most people don't uses DNSSEC and even if they do their clients/resolvers aren't enforcing validation).

Do an end-run around all this bullshit by asking the people who actually know who owns the domain (the Registrar) to validate it cryptographically.