Distributed radio resource allocation in wireless heterogeneous networks

This dissertation studies the problem of resource allocation in the radio access network of heterogeneous small-cell networks (HetSNets). A HetSNet is constructed by introducing smallcells(SCs) to a geographical area that is served by a well-structured macrocell network. These SCs reuse the frequency bands of the macro-network and operate in the interference-limited region. Thus, complex radio resource allocation schemes are required to manage interference and improve spectral efficiency. Both centralized and distributed approaches have been suggested by researchers to solve this problem. This dissertation follows the distributed approach under the self-organizing networks (SONs) paradigm. In particular, it develops game-theoretic and learning-theoretic modeling, analysis, and algorithms. Even though SONs may perform subpar to a centralized optimal controller, they are highly scalable and fault-tolerant. There are many facets to the problem of wireless resource allocation. They vary by the application, solution, methodology, and resource type. Therefore, this thesis restricts the treatment to four subproblems that were chosen due to their significant impact on network performance and suitability to our interests and expertise. Game theory and mechanism design are the main tools used since they provide a sufficiently rich environment to model the SON problem. Firstly, this thesis takes into consideration the problem of uplink orthogonal channel access in a dense cluster of SCs that is deployed in a macrocell service area. Two variations of this problem are modeled as noncooperative Bayesian games and the existence of pure-Bayesian Nash symmetric equilibria are demonstrated. Secondly, this thesis presents the generalized satisfaction equilibrium (GSE) for games in satisfaction-form. Each wireless agent has a constraint to satisfy and the GSE is a mixed-strategy profile from which no unsatisfied agent can unilaterally deviate to satisfaction. The objective of the GSE is to propose an alternative equilibrium that is designed specifically to model wireless users. The existence of the GSE, its computational complexity, and its performance compared to the Nash equilibrium are discussed. Thirdly, this thesis introduces verification mechanisms for dynamic self-organization of Wireless access networks. The main focus of verification mechanisms is to replace monetary transfers that are prevalent in current research. In the wireless environment particular private information of the wireless agents, such as block error rate and application class, can be verified at the access points. This verification capability can be used to threaten false reports with backhaul throttling. The agents then learn the truthful equilibrium over time by observing the rewards and punishments. Finally, the problem of admission control in the interfering-multiple access channel with rate constraints is addressed. In the incomplete information setting, with compact convex channel power gains, the resulting Bayesian game possesses at least one pureBayesian Nash equilibrium in on-off threshold strategies. The above-summarized results of this thesis demonstrate that the HetSNets are amenable to self-organization, albeit with adapted incentives and equilibria to fit the wireless environment. Further research problems to expand these results are identified at the end of this document.