Insecurity and Politics : A Framework 1

This article explores the role of political leaders in the social construction of collective insecurity. Two parts comprise the article. The first part introduces the concepts of collective insecurity, state protection, and “threat infrastructure”; the second part takes a critical look at the literature on moral panic and formulates an integrated framework for the analysis of the politics of insecurity. Starting from the assumption that political leaders help shape the perception of collective threats despite the existence of enduring structural constraints, this framework comprises five main theoretical claims. Taken individually, several of these claims are present in existing sociology and political science literatures. Yet, this contribution articulates such claims in order to formulate an integrated framework that bridges streams of scholarship that are too rarely discussed together in current debates on the politics of insecurity. Résumé. Cet article explore le rôle des acteurs politiques dans la construction sociale de l’insécurité collective. L’article se divise en deux parties. La première partie introduit les concepts d’insécurité collective, de protection étatique et d’«infrastructure du risque»; la deuxième partie formule un cadre d’analyse intégré pour l’étude de la politique de l’insécurité. Partant du principe que les leaders politiques affectent la perception des dangers collectifs malgré l’existence de contraintes structurelles, ce cadre d’analyse articule cinq grandes propositions théoriques. Prises individuellement, certaines de ces propositions sont déjà présentes dans certains travaux de sociologie et de science politique. Toutefois, la présente contribution articule ces propositions dans le but de créer un cadre d’analyse cohérent qui intègre des perspectives théoriques trop rarement discutées conjointement dans les débats contemporains sur la politique de l’insécurité. During the 2004 US presidential campaign, the Republican Party ran a television ad showing menacing wolves roaming a dark forest. Simultaneously, a female voice warned potential voters that “weakness attracts those who are waiting to do America harm” (Associated Press 2004). During a campaign that focused on national security, this ad clearly suggested that only George W. Bush and his fellow Republicans could protect the United States against the growing army of terrorist wolves. Earlier that year, a young sociologist 1 Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Kevin Haggerty, Angela Kempf, Nico Stehr, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on previous drafts of this article. Special thanks to Ariel Ducey, Sean Hier, Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, William Leiss, John Myles, George Ritzer, and Charles Tilly for their insight on the politics of insecurity. 318 Canadian Journal of Sociology published an article demonstrating, with quantitative analyses, that the federal terror warnings issued in the aftermath of the events of September 11 consistently increased popular support for the Republican President (Willer 2004). This example raises a crucial question: what is the concrete role of political leaders and strategies in the social construction of collective insecurity? In part because most of the recent books devoted to collective insecurity focus less on political leaders than on culture and the mass media (Altheide 2002; Furedi 2002; Glassner 1999), no compelling framework is currently available to explore the politics of insecurity in advanced industrial societies. A major aspect of the existing literature on the social construction of insecurity is to argue that citizens are “afraid of the wrong things” (Glassner 1999; Furedi 2002). 2 Although it is grounded in the same assumption, Corey Robin’s book Fear: The History of a Political Idea, (2004) is more relevant for the analysis of the politics of insecurity. Robin explores the history of the idea of fear in modern political theory. Through an analysis of McCarthyism and contemporary labour relations, his book also argues that “repressive fear” is an enduring tool of economic and political domination in the United States. For Robin, US civil society and political institutions are instrumental in creating and reproducing such “repressive fear. ” As opposed to the idea that the fragmentation of political power is always a source of freedom, he shows that institutional fragmentation and autonomous civic organizations can work together to bring “repressive fear” upon society. Unfortunately, Robin reduces the politics of collective insecurity to “repressive fear,” as if the state could not effectively reduce collective insecurity through the implementation of effective public policies ranging from policing to social welfare and environmental protection. Arguing that politicians systematically attempt to increase collective insecurity in order to boost their power does not tell the whole story about the politics of insecurity. For example, during the early days of the British debate over BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), conservative officials attempted to reduce the level of environmental insecurity by stating that BSE did not constitute a public health threat (Leiss and Powell 2004; Smith 2004). More importantly, Robin’s account does not say much about the relationship between fear and electoral politics. Even during historical repressive moments like McCarthyism, politicians seek election and re-election. What is the relationship between fear and electoral politics? How do politicians use and respond to fear and insecurity in order to increase their popular support? The main objective of this article is to help answer these questions by formulating a theoretical framework for the analysis of the politics of insecurity.3 Explora2 On the construction of fear see also, Altheide (2002). 3 Other scholars have stressed the relevance of fear and insecurity for political decision-makers and public policy: Altheide (2002; 2006); Ericson and Haggerty (1997). Insecurity and Politics: A Framework 319 tory in nature, this article does not provide final answers to such questions but offers a set of theoretical remarks that may guide future scholarship about this major issue. Two parts comprise this article. The first part defines the concept of collective insecurity. The second part is much longer, and it formulates an integrated framework for the analysis of the political construction of collective insecurity in advanced industrial societies. Starting from the assumption that political leaders help shape the perception of collective threats despite the existence of enduring structural constraints, this discussion articulates five main claims. First, although interesting, the concept of moral panic is problematic, because it applies only to a limited range of insecurity episodes. The “threat infrastructure” of a particular policy helps explain if an episode takes the form of a genuine panic, and if this episode possesses a clear moral overtone. Second, citizens of contemporary societies exhibit acute risk awareness and, when new collective threats emerge, the logic of “organized irresponsibility” (Beck 1992) leads citizens and interest groups to blame elected officials for “bad news. ” Third, political leaders mobilize credit claiming and blame avoidance strategies to respond to—and affect the perception of—collective threats in a way that enhances their position within the political field. Fourth, powerful interests and institutional forces as well as the “threat infrastructure” specific to a policy area create constraints and opportunities for these strategic actors involved in the construction of insecurity. Finally, behaviour is proactive or reactive: political leaders can either help push a threat onto the agenda early, or, at a later stage, simply attempt to shape public perception after other forces have transformed the threat into a major social and political issue. Overall, the article stresses that political leaders are often instrumental in shaping the perception of collective threats. Taken individually, several of the above claims can be found in existing sociology and political science literatures. This contribution combines them in an integrated framework, bridging streams of scholarship that are too rarely discussed together in current debates on the politics of insecurity. For example, students of risk society and “organized irresponsibility” rarely draw upon the literature on blame avoidance.4 This is unfortunate, as Ulrich Beck’s concept of “organized irresponsibility” takes a much broader meaning when discussed in relationship with blame avoidance strategies. The present article, following the syncretic example of books like Dynamics of Contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), breaks boundaries between existing sub-fields and scholarly literatures to create a framework for the systematic analysis of a major type of politics (i.e., contentious politics, the politics of insecurity). Introducing the concept of “threat infrastructure” to the political sociology literature makes this framework more than an “original synthesis. ” It enriches the constructivist 4 For notable exceptions see Altheide (2002) and Hier (2002). 320 Canadian Journal of Sociology perspective on collective insecurity by emphasizing the analytical distinction between the structural and the constructed aspects of the collective threats at the centre of the politics of insecurity. The article offers original definitions of major central concepts like collective insecurity and state protection and represents a step forward in the elaboration of a political sociology of collective insecurity in advanced industrial societies.