2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies Measuring Common Intent during Effects Based Planning

Common Intent (CI) describes a socio-psychological phenomenon that seems to be evident amongst a team that achieves a common objective. In the context of Effects Based Planning, a team of planners generate a plan that encapsulates Commander’s intention to achieve various strategic objectives and desired effects. The hypothesis is that high CI will lead to an effective plan while low or no CI will lead to an ineffective plan. The Multi-National Experiment 3 (MNE 3) provided an opportunity to measure CI in a Joint Interagency Multi-National (Public) environment, and to compare the independent measure of CI to other key dimensions including EBP process, organization, technology, Sleep Deprivation, and Workload. During this event CI was measured between medium and low, and recommendations were made to improve CI for the next event. The key result is that CI is a robust method for measuring team effectiveness in complex environments. Common Intent Common Intent (CI) describes a socio-psychological phenomenon that seems to be evident amongst a team that has a singular purpose. A sports team may have a common aim of winning the game. A business company may have a common objective of increasing returns. A military unit may have a common goal of capturing territory and maintaining civil order as a desired effect. The aim, objective, goal, or desired effect should be more than a written statement or a Commander’s order, but it should find its way into the hearts, minds, and souls of each team member so that consistency of thought and behaviour prevails and the team performs effectively. Pigeau and McCann (2000) define Command and Control as follows: “Command and Control: The establishment of common intent to achieve coordinated action”, where Common Intent is the combination of the explicit awareness or perception of Commander’s Intent plus the implicit or internal expectation of Commander’s Intent. Explicit Intent and Implicit Intent, together, may lead to a shared understanding of Commander’s Intent. Common Intent also implies that team members understand each other’s roles and responsibilities. Thus members can properly interpret the intent with respect to their roles. An outside observer may see different behaviours, but these actions would be coordinated and consistent with respect to the intent. In the context of a military planning staff, Explicit Intent is Commander’s Intent. It is publicly stated for all the Headquarters (HQ) staff members to perceive, think about, and act upon. The HQ staff should be able to reiterate Commander’s Intent at any point during their activities. The first part towards having Common Intent is being aware of Commander’s Intent. Secondly, Implicit Intent is an internal expectation of Commander’s Intent. For example, if Explicit Intent is “to capture the hill”, then Implicit Intent might be “to capture the hill with minimal battle damage” or “to capture the hill with Air Force assets only. ” These implicit expectations depend on the staff position (e.g., planner, operator, commander, etc.). The members interpret Commander’s Intent from personal expectations based on style and experience, military expectations based on training, doctrine, tradition, and ethos, and cultural expectations based on societal values, cultural morals, and national pride as proposed by Pigeau and McCann (2000). One might argue that Common Intent is closely related to Shared Situational Awareness (SA). Endsley (1995) proposes three aspects of individual Situation Awareness – perception, comprehension, and projection. Staff members need to perceive (Explicit Intent) and comprehend (Implicit Intent) Commander’s Intent, as well as understand how Commander’s Intent will impact future events in order to generate an effective campaign plan. Shared SA implies that team members with similar awareness of the environment and Commander’s Intent will produce effective team performance. On the other hand, CI emphasises that team members with similar expectations and values will shape their individual awareness in a way that leads to coordinated action and goal achievement. Effects Based Planning Effects Based Planning (EBP) is a new concept being explored by US Joint Forces Command and partner nations. Traditional planning starts with strategic objectives and ends with several plans of action from which the Commander chooses one. Once executed, the chosen actions yield both desired and unintended effects. EBP aims to generate a single plan that considers desired effects and potential unintended effects during the planning stage. Desired effects are generated from strategic objectives and the Operational Net Assessment (ONA). The ONA is a database that contains political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) descriptions of the adverse system. A person, place, or thing in the database is called a node. The ONA contains nodes and links, where the links describe the relationships between nodes. Potential effects are also associated with the nodes and links. Needless to say, the ONA is complex. In light of the strategic directives and Commander’s Intent, the HQ staff assesses the desired effects and the actions required to modify the nodes and links in order to produce the desired effects. The actions may produce unintended or side effects, and so the staff must reassess the effects and actions until they converge to a reasonable solution. Resources are assigned to the actions, and further iterations may occur if the resources are not available. Once the desired effects, nodes, actions, and resources (ENAR) are identified, the staff prioritizes and sequences the effects and actions, and then produces an Effects Tasking Order (ETO) for the tactical components to execute. Commander’s Intent and guidance are interwoven throughout Effects Based Planning (MNE, 2003). The Commander formulates her intention from the strategic aim and objectives, and provides guidance throughout each step of the process. There needs to be a high degree of CI for EBP to produce an effective ETO, since the ETO is an expression of Commander’s Intent. Stated negatively, if the HQ staff does not internalize Commander’s Intent then the ETO will be sub-optimal and potentially diverge from the strategic aim. There is no doubt that Commander’s Intent is central to EBP. Multi-National Experiment 3 Multi-national Experiment 3 (MNE 3) examines how an ad hoc coalition would conduct an Effects Based Planning. US Joint Forces Command led the experiment and invited partner nations Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and United Kingdom to participate in the experiment from their own country. They formed the Coalition Task Force Headquarters (CTFHQ), which is based on the US Standing Joint Force Headquarters structure with Boards, Centers, and Cells (BCC). NATO conducted the same experiment at the same time over the same secure computer network, except that the NATO planning staff was co-located in a single facility. They formed the NATO Response Force Headquarters (NRFHQ). This allowed the analysts to examine differences between distributed and co-located planning, keeping in mind that there were at least 18 confounding variables as given in Table 1. Table 1. Confounding variables for MNE 3. Potential Confound CTFHQ (Distributed) NRFHQ (Co-located) Concept familiarity US good partners minimal Minimal EBP experience US good partners moderate Minimal SJFHQ/BCC experience US good partners minimal Minimal Experience in collaborative tools US good partners minimal Minimal Familiarity with co-workers US good partners minimal Moderate to good Familiarity with command group US moderate partners minimal Moderate to good Leadership style Varies with individual Varies with individual Staffing level More Less Staff skill sets Varies with individual Varies with individual Non-native English speakers More Less Training US good partners moderate Moderate Adherence to EBP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Both process and organization deviated significantly from originally planned. Some different process steps and performed in different sequence. Different mission/objectives Yes Yes Different area of operations Yes Yes Different organizational agendas Yes Yes Different work hours Mixed Same Inter-agency, medical, ISR support Played Not Played Use of Collaboration Tools High High plus face-to-face Experiment Purpose The MNE 3 objectives were to (in order of priority): a. Develop and assess the EBP process b. Develop and assess the EBP organization c. Identify technology requirements to support EBP. Figure 1 is a simplified depiction of the EBP process. Note well that: 1. Commander’s Intent surrounds the entire process. 2. MNE 3 analysis focused on four priority steps: Effects Assessment, Action Assessment, COA/Wargaming, and Effects Synchronization. 3. The process is not serial but has parallel process steps and feedback loops. 4. About 64 people in the CTF HQ, and about 48 people in the NRF HQ performed this process over a two-week period, 5 days a week, 12 hours a day. CI Hypothesis EBP process should improve the ability to broaden the range of effects and actions considered leading to an ETO. The effects and actions and subsequent unwanted effects can explode exponentially during the planning process. Commander’s guidance and intent narrows the ENAR branches to a manageable set. And so, if Common Intent is high then the staff’s will have Commander’s intent internalized while assessing, prioritizing, and synchronizing the effects, which should lead not only to a manageable plan but also the plan that the Commander intended. High Priority for MNE3 Medium Priority for MNE3 Products Baseline ONA Commander’s Decision Effects Tasking Order Commander’s Initial Guidance Mission Analysis Effects Assessment Action Assessment Effects Matrix Priority Effects List Effects Synchronization Focused ONA STRATEGIC AIM Diplomatic Information Military Economic Objectiv