“I will open my mouth in a parable”: “History” and “metaphor” in the Psalms

Metaphorical expression is profoundly transformative, both cognitively and theologically. However, not all metaphors are created equal, nor simplistically metaphorical in the strictest sense. Wheelwright (1962) identified two distinctive semantic movements in metaphor: epiphor and diaphor. Epiphor is the transference of a name to some other object, while diaphor works differently, creating meaning by juxtaposing the particulars of an old experience with new experiences, in order to transform despair to hope, lament to praise, complaint to trust. This article explores the semantic depth of the two ways in which metaphor functions, by investigating several historical references in the psalms with a view to understanding when history is history, when history is plainly metaphorical, and when history is best understood diaphorically. 1. “ALL SLANG IS A METAPHOR, AND ALL METAPHOR IS POETRY” (CHESTERTON 2018:61) It has become, as Derrida (1974:30) noted, conventional in reflection on metaphor to begin with Aristotle: There is a code, a program, a rhetoric . in any discourse about metaphor: in the first place, by custom, Aristotle’s definition is to be recalled. Jacobson “I will open my mouth in a parable” 294 A summary of Aristotle’s definition, as it is drawn from both The poetics and The rhetoric, still seems apropos and perhaps rises to the “plea of necessity”. Metaphor [according to Aristotle] consists in giving [a] thing a name that belongs to something else; . this is transference of a nominal label from one thing to another. Aristotle (1922:356) goes further and not only describes the basic function of metaphor, but also praises its ability to communicate: “Metaphor, more than anything, has clarity and sweetness and strangeness” of expression.1 There are two critical elements, in this instance, which have continued to influence discourse on metaphor. First, of course, is the idea of transference: metaphor is calling one thing by another name that properly belongs to something else, i.e. that is not native to it. There are a number of ways of characterising this technical exchange of meaning, for the present I will be using the fairly standard labels “source domain” and “target domain”. The “target domain” is the thing or idea that is being described; the “source domain” is the thing or field that is borrowed to describe it.2 Example: “The Lord is my rock, my fortress, and my deliverer” (Ps. 18:2). The second element is Aristotle’s characterisation of this transference as being defined by, and powerful because of its “strangeness”: it is another name that is borrowed to describe something else, and this other name is not natural or native to it. Example: “The Lord lives! Blessed be my rock” (Ps. 18:46). Metaphor, then, is about transference (quite literally . or literarily, μετὰ + φέρω) of meaning from one thing to another. For Aristotle, this was at least partially limited to the realm of the noun. The Lord is a “rock”. 3 But is this all that metaphor does, and is the “simple” metaphor the only thing that does this? Is metaphor a form of expression, or is it also a way of thinking, of knowing? I will not rehearse the entire argument in this instance, but will summarise what I take as my own position. Kövecses (2005:2, 11) puts it this way: 1 This is my translation, based on the Greek presented in the Loeb Classical Library edition of Aristotle’s Rhētorikḗ. 2 Another standard is the “tenor and vehicle” where tenor = target and vehicle = source. 3 “True metaphor therefore is confined to the limits of the Aristotelian onoma . It seems, [however], that the field of the onoma – and consequently that of metaphor, as the transfer of a noun – is less that of the noun in the strict sense (a sense which it acquired very late in the development of rhetoric) than that of the nominalizable” (Derida 1974:30, 33). Acta Theologica Supplementum 32 2021 295 we actually understand the world with metaphors and do not just speak them . It is complex metaphors . with which people actually engage in their thought in real cultural contexts; each source domain contributes predetermined conceptual materials to the range of target domains to which it applies. Metaphor is one way – one essential way – in which we think and communicate our thinking, part and parcel not only of how we communicate, but of how we conceive and how conception is transformed. Similarly, in her construction of theological reflection grounded in parable, Teselle (1974:632) mentions that [i]n metaphor knowledge and its expression are one and the same, there is no way around the metaphor, it is not expendable. In other words, metaphor is not reducible, in a simplistic way, to a grammatical function. Furthermore, an essential quality of the metaphor is that it need not be bound by any rule of grammar, or into a particular grammatical form; it is free to transfer meaning and understanding, and thus bring about transformation in meaning and understanding.4 This is true not only of the potential source and target domains – in metaphor one may think of God as rock (Ps. 19:14; Isa. 26:4), an “eagle” (Ps. 91:4), and even “maggots” (Hos. 5:12), or of the human being as “tree” (Ps. 1:3; 52:8 [10]), a “horse or a mule” (Ps. 32:9), or even a “worm” (22:6) – but of the form which metaphorical reflection and articulation may also take. Metaphor, and the form in which it is borne, cannot be limited either grammatically or rhetorically. A related and often noted issue has to do with the relationship of metaphor with simile. The argument is, usually, that a simile is essentially the same thing as a metaphor. Wheelwright (1962:71) also addressed this similarity, concluding that “the grammarian’s familiar distinction between metaphor and simile is to be largely ignored”. To a certain degree, it must be acknowledged that metaphor and simile perform, essentially, the same function. But, as Brown (2002:7) suggested, while the distinction in grammatical function may be relatively close, “rhetorically speaking . the difference may be anything but negligible”. To quote Aristotle (Rhētorikḗ III.1406b) again: “A simile is also a metaphor . differing in the form of expression. ” This captures well the 4 “The test of essential metaphor is not any rule of grammatical form, but rather the quality of semantic transformation that is brought about” (Derida 1974:30, 33). Jacobson “I will open my mouth in a parable” 296 both/and; metaphor and simile do the same thing, but differently. In other words, the relationship of the comparative functions of metaphor and simile may not be one of “apples to oranges”, but it is certainly one of “Fuji to Granny Smith”. The differences matter. At this point, I want to suggest that there is also a good deal more subtlety both in the way in which metaphor functions, and in what serves – in different ways – the rhetorical function of the metaphorical. There is more to the idea of “metaphor” than meets the eye, and more that is “metaphorical” than the simplest form of transference. Coming to grips with the complexity of the metaphorical will mean that there is more to metaphor than identifying the “target” and “source” domains. These are, in a sense, only two legs of the epistemological stool – and, in another sense, only one side of what is happening in metaphor. Wheelwright (1962:26-31) identified three essential elements of metaphorical reflection: