Embodied Language in Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis on Behalf Of: American Psychoanalytic Association

information) relative to sentences that did not. Abstract language and metaphor. Investigating the embodiment of patently abstract sentences, Ghio and Tettamanti (in press) used fMRI to examine patterns of dynamic interaction among brain regions during processing of concrete action sentences (e.g., Now I press the button) and abstract sentences with no metaphoric connotation (e.g., Now I appreciate the loyalty). Activity in traditional language areas (e.g., Broca’s) was more integrated with activity of the left motor and premotor cortexes for concrete action sentences and with activity of the retrosplenial cingulate cortex, involved in processing one’s internal state and representations of external context, for abstract sentences. The researchers concluded that findings for both types of sentences “are consistent with top-down mechanisms by which linguistic areas promote a semantic content-specific reactivation of modal simulations” (p. 9). Yet other studies that compared brain activations during processing of concrete vs. abstract language yielded less convincing evidence of embodiment in abstract language and metaphors. Ruschemeyer, Brass, and Friederici (2007) found that both the premotor cortex and the primary motor and somatosensory cortexes were activated more strongly when participants read simple action verbs (e.g., grasp) than simple abstract verbs (e.g., think) or complex verbs with an action stem (e.g., begreifen, to comprehend, comprising greifen, to grasp). Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2006) reported that activity of the premotor cortex during silent reading of verbal metaphors (e.g., She grasped the idea) was not organized somatotypically, as it did not match premotor activity during observation of videos depicting object-related actions, although the researchers speculated that the negative findings might be due to lack of concordance between the by JEANINE VIVONA on January 18, 2010 http://apa.sagepub. com Downloaded from 1335 EMBODIED LANGUAGE IN NEUROSCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS observed actions and the metaphorical actions. Together these studies suggest that there may be limits to the embodiment of language. That said, findings of greater activations for literal language than abstract language do not clarify the degree to which abstract language evokes activity in the motor and premotor cortexes; it may be that activation of motor regions was present but not detected (Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006) or was overshadowed by the literal language condition (Rüschemeyer, Brass, and Friederici 2007). In general, processing of metaphor has been shown to activate areas of semantic processing regions, including the left inferior frontal gyrus, different from those activated by literal language (Stringaris et al. 2007; Rapp et al. 2004). Emotion. Although emotional foundations of semantic development are increasingly theorized (see Shanahan 2008), research on the embodiment of emotional language is particularly sparse, leaving many unanswered questions about the undoubtedly complex relations between emotional experience and language. Based on their review of behavioral investigations of emotional language processing, Niedenthal et al. (2005) concluded that “a sizable literature now demonstrates that when emotional events are simulated using imagery, and in the absence of the initial stimulus, individuals reenact or relive the emotions, or partial feelings of emotion, as indicated by a number of different measures of emotion” (p. 31). Importantly, studies in which participants were not instructed to engage in imagery also support this conclusion. For example, Niedenthal et al. (2009) demonstrated predicted specific embodied responses, assessed with EMG of facial muscle activity, as participants processed the meanings of nouns (e.g., glee) and adjectives (e.g., joyful) related to the emotion concepts of joy, anger, and disgust, but not when they processed perceptual features of the words. When facial expression was constrained, participants were less accurate in processing emotion words, suggesting a causal role for embodiment in understanding emotion words. The researchers concluded that activation of embodied emotion processes “constitutes an indication that the conceptual content for the emotion concepts involves reenactments of the emotional states themselves” (p. 1133). A small number of neuroscience studies provide initial evidence that emotional language activates brain regions involved in processing emotion. An early PET study (Isenberg et al. 1999) demonstrated that visual presentation of threatening words (e.g., persecute) compared to neutral by JEANINE VIVONA on January 18, 2010 http://apa.sagepub. com Downloaded from 1336 J e a n i n e M . V i v o n a words (e.g., list) activated both the amygdala and the left premotor cortex, suggesting mobilization of sensorimotor processes involved in evaluating and responding to threat. Amygdala activation by language appears to be constant across personality variables associated with differential cognitive processing of emotion (Rubino et al. 2007), suggesting that individual differences in emotional processing styles may be unrelated to the degree to which language evokes emotional responses in different people. Conversely, studies of effects of verbal processing on emotional experience suggest that amygdalar (Tabibnia, Lieberman, and Craske 2008) and autonomic (Lieberman et al. 2007) activity are reduced when participants apply verbal labels (e.g., sad) to facial displays of emotion. Regarding the effects of emotions on linguistic processing, results of a behavioral study (Havas, Glenberg, and Rinck 2007) demonstrated that covertly manipulated facial expressions influenced speed of processing emotion sentences, such that participants processed positive sentences more quickly when smiling than when frowning, and vice versa. The bidirectional interactions of emotion and language are consistent with a view of emotional language as embodied (see Barrett, Lindquist, and Gendron 2007) and with clinical wisdom that verbalization may have intensifying or moderating effects on the emotional experience of the speaker. However, no study to date has assessed the subjective emotional experience associated with the observed embodied responses to emotionally evocative language. In sum, there is strong neuroscience and behavioral evidence that sensorimotor processes in the brain and peripheral organs are activated by some types of language, especially language describing objects, events, and bodily actions, and tentative evidence, with room for doubt, for the embodiment of a broad array of language types, including metaphors, abstract language, and descriptions of emotion. Based on the state of current research, some theorists (Willems and Hagoort 2007) envision a circumscribed role for embodiment in cognition and language closely related to action and perception, whereas others (Barsalou 2008; Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak 2004; Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Gallese and Lakoff 2005) believe that embodiment plays at least some role, perhaps a major one, in the comprehension of many or all forms of language. The Role of Embodiment in Language Comprehension Although evidence for the neurobiology of embodied processes in language and cognition is accumulating, the precise mechanisms and by JEANINE VIVONA on January 18, 2010 http://apa.sagepub. com Downloaded from 1337 EMBODIED LANGUAGE IN NEUROSCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS roles of embodiment await elucidation. Currently there are diverse opinions regarding whether semantic representations are themselves embodied; whether language comprehension evokes processes, such as simulation or imagery, that activate somatosensory brain regions; and whether embodiment plays a causal or a peripheral role in language comprehension. Embodied semantics models. Some theorists envision semantic representations as multimodal and comprising patterns of sensorimotor activation (Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006; Barsalou 2008; Hauk et al. 2008). In this embodied semantics model, language is closely integrated with the modal systems involved in action, perception, and emotion. Barsaolou (2008) maintains that the embodied semantics model is consistent with the known operation of the brain, in contrast to the amodal view (see also Zwaan and Taylor 2006). Specifically, the principle of Hebbian learning provides a neurological explanation for embodied semantics (Pulvermüller 2005). In Hebbian learning, neurons that repeatedly fire simultaneously tend to do so subsequently, so that verbal and sensorimotor processes become “wired together” because the neurons that subserve these processes “fire together” during language acquisition. For example, the infant’s repeated experiences of hearing an adult say “ball” while looking at and playing with a ball link the perceptual, motor, and semantic processes together neurologically (see also Glenberg et al. 2008). Simulation models. A closely related view is the simulation model, in which automatic simulation is emphasized as the mechanism of embodiment; simulation mediates between verbal and sensorimotor processes (Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Gibbs 2006; Matlock 2004). For example, listening to a verbal description of bodily actions evokes automatic simulation of those actions, which activates motor processes associated with performing those actions. Baumgaertner and colleagues (2007) interpret the results of their mirror neuron system study as consistent with the simulation model: “the understanding of action-related sentences implies an internal simulation of the actions expressed by the action-related verb, mediated by the same motor representations that are involved in their actual execution” (p. 887). Studies of the mirror neuron system are considered to offer cogent evidence for the mechanism of such automatic simulation. Drawing on the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Gibbs (2006) extends the simulation mod