Military Professionalism & Private Military Contractors

Abstract: The post-9/11 use of private security companies in a combat role has credentialed them in the workplace, public arena, and legal system, thus meeting Andrew Abbott's criteria of an emerging profession. Fiscal challenges and global instability will likely perpetuate this condition and in so doing change the US military profession and its associated civil-military relations that underwrite the all-volunteer force. ********** As the United States concludes two long wars while facing increasing internal fiscal problems, its government must make tough budget choices. The first decisions will identify the prudence of reducing military expenditures; however, subsequent decisions as to how the Department of Defense should implement these reductions will become problematic. In this environment political leaders seek to rely on current military overmatch to justify budget cuts that reduce near-term readiness. At the same time, they program the remaining monies against science and technology to achieve future overmatch, all while satisfying their constituents. The processes required to make these decisions rely heavily on impartial professional military advice. The robust field of contemporary research on the military profession has largely used functional models to examine and evaluate the military profession. By applying Andrew Abbott's established systems model of professions, this paper argues the use of private security companies in overseas combat theaters has changed the scope of the US military's professional jurisdiction. Because jurisdiction serves as an indicator of the trust relationship between society and the military, this boundary shift could foretell a change in civil-military relations and the associated viability of the all-volunteer force. After establishing the context of the problem and defining the military profession paradigm, this article explains how private security companies are contesting the US military's preeminence. It concludes by recommending an expanded view of the risk associated with military budget decisions so as to preserve the all-volunteer force. With the end of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a heightened risk of perpetuating the historical pattern of post-war decline of the US military. The end of a conflict is often marked by social fatigue with war and a desire to reap peace dividends. In the 20th century these combined pressures typically yielded a reduction in the military's budget, resulting in a degraded force structure and a decrease in quality of the defense establishment. The full effects of such reductions frequently become apparent at the start of the next conflict, when the US military is found inadequately sized, burdened with old equipment, and trapped with an ill-suited doctrine. (1) Unlike past interwar periods, contemporary actions short of war. (such as regional security and "mil to mil" exchanges) as well as the need to restructure the force for other forms of conflict besides counterinsurgency, will place a significant peacetime operational demand on the military. To save monies and reconcile these tensions, national leaders will debate how best to fund the competing demands of force structure, near-term readiness, and long-term modernization. There are no easy answers; it is a debate about where to assume the risk of under-resourcing. This is not a new conundrum for America; historically, the employment of short-term contractors mitigated associated risks until resources increased and allowed the military to adjust and negate its need. This pattern was broken in Iraq and Afghanistan, as contractor use in general, and private security companies in particular, did not proportionally decline. The quality of the US military profession defines the nature of civil-military relations, which is the cornerstone of an effective American all-volunteer force. Therefore, identifying and understanding how private security companies compete with the military profession is important for two reasons. …