The Context-Dependent Nature of Action Knowledge

The Context-Dependent Nature of Action Knowledge Nicholas J. Shipp (n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire Hatfield, AL10 9AB, UNITED KINGDOM Frederic Vallee-Tourangeau ( f.vallee-tourangeau@kingston.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames, KT1 2EE, UNITED KINGDOM Susan H. Anthony (s.h.1.anthony@herts.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire Hatfield, AL10 9AB, UNITED KINGDOM Abstract Recent theories of semantic memory have proposed that concepts are grounded in sensorimotor activity and mediated by the context from which the knowledge is drawn (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008). Conceptual knowledge draws upon information from all modalities and therefore includes knowledge of associated object actions linked with both function and general movement (Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008). The following experiment examined the conditions under which action information exerts an influence on experimental tasks particularly when taxonomic information is present. The experiment used a forced-choice triad task giving participants the choice of selecting between items that shared either a taxonomic or an action based relation with the target. The results showed that when the objects were presented as images on a white background (context-lean condition), participants were more likely to select the taxonomically related item. In contrast, when the same triads were presented as images being used in a functional scene (context-rich condition) they were more likely to select the action-related item. The results show that action knowledge is not automatic but is context-dependent. In line with views on embodied semantics, action-related information is drawn upon when objects are viewed and this influences task performance despite being unnecessary for the task. Keywords: Action; Triads; Categorisation; Context. Introduction The traditional view of conceptual knowledge suggested that concepts are formed from amodal abstractions of the context in which they were previously encountered (Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). However an increasing number of researchers have shown that concepts are embodied within sensorimotor activity (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Wu & Barsalou, 2009; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). Embodied semantics takes the view that concepts are much more than decontextualised feature lists and that they reside within the same sensory-motor circuits in which they were first established (Aziz-Zedah & Damasio, 2008; Fernandino & Iacoboni, 2010). According to Barsalou (1999, 2003, 2008) the conceptual system does not record the images seen of an entity, but registers the concomitant neural experience. When encountering or re-instantiating the concept at a later date the conceptual system partially reactivates those neuronal patterns, thereby producing a simulation of the experience. Areas of the motor cortex that are active upon the initial object encounter will be reactivated and as such common actions associated with objects should readily come to mind when thinking of an object. Empirical work over the last decade has supported this view showing that semantic knowledge is embedded within physical actions which influences performance across a variety of cognitive tasks (Anelli, Nicoletti, & Borghi, 2010; Borghi, 2004; Borghi, Flumini, Natraj, & Wheaten, 2012; Bub & Masson, 2006; Bub, Masson, & Bukach, 2003; Chao & Martin, 2000; Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Iachini, Borghi, & Senese, 2008; Tipper, Paul, & Hayes, 2006; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2004; Vanio, Symes, Ellis, Tucker, & Ottoboni, 2008). What has been particularly evident from the research is that action can play a role even in tasks where knowledge of associated action is neither required nor asked for. Borghi (2004) used a property generation task to show that when participants are asked to simply think about an object such as a car the first parts of the car that they name are those related to direct human interaction (e.g., the gearstick, steering wheel). The same parts were named first when participants were given a direct context to think about such as building the object. This would be in line with the view that thinking about the car activated the motor cortex and as such direct interaction became an influential feature in this task. Helbig, Graf and Keifer (2006) showed how actions are drawn upon in object recognition using a priming task. In their experiment participants were asked to name both a prime and a target object and showed that participants were more accurate in naming the target object when the prime was congruent in its action manipulation. Here the prime had a clear effect of activating the motor system and its relevant action knowledge that remained active for the target and hence identification was quicker. Helbig, Steinwender, Graf and Keifer (2010) used video primes of an agent performing an action on an object that was blacked out. Following the prime participants then saw an image of an object followed by a word, they were asked to identify if the word matched the object. Participants were again more accurate in their responses when the action seen in the prime matched the action of the following object. Further priming studies have shown similar action-based effects (Bub & Masson, 2012; Vanio et al., 2008).