Dual Process Theories 1 An Integrative Review of Process Dissociation and Related Models in Social Cognition

This article reviews the use of formal dual process models in social psychology, with a focus on the Process Dissociation model and related multinomial models. The utility of the models is illustrated using studies of social and affective influences on memory, judgment and decision making, and social attitudes and stereotypes. We then compare and contrast the Process Dissociation model with other approaches, including implicit and explicit tests, signal detection theory, and multinomial models. Finally, we show how several recently proposed multinomial models can be integrated into a single family of models, of which Process Dissociation is a specific instance. We describe how these process models can be used as both theoretical and measurement tools to answer questions about the role of automatic and controlled processes in social behavior. Dual Process Theories 3 One of the first things people want to know about behavior is whether it was intended. Did that driver intend to cut me off? Did she brush his knee by mistake or on purpose? Psychologists want to understand the differences between volitional behaviors and those that are unintended or unconscious for much the same reason. The question of how much control people have over their actions is important for fundamental questions about free will, selfcontrol, and consciousness. Theories about how automatic and controlled processes operate and interact have been developed in the form of dual process models in social psychology (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Dual process models have typically been formulated as verbal descriptions of automatic and controlled processes or systems. But recently, attempts have been made to formalize these ideas into quantitative models of how automatic and controlled processes drive behavior. These formal models allow researchers to test theories about exactly how automatic and controlled processes relate to each other and how they interact. This paper reviews models rooted in the Process Dissociation Procedure (Jacoby, 1991), a model developed to separate automatic and controlled uses of memory, and which has been applied widely in recent years. Several related models have been proposed, some of which assumes different relationships between automatic and controlled processes. By comparing how well these models account for experimental data, researchers can accomplish two simultaneous goals. First, they can test hypotheses about the nature and relationships between automatic and controlled processes. And second, the models can provide quantitative estimates of the underlying processes. The models can thus serve as both theoretical and measurement tools, allowing researchers to test quantitative hypotheses about underlying processes that are not directly observable. In this paper, we review research in which process dissociation and related models have been applied, to survey the kinds of insights they can generate. We then examine the Dual Process Theories 4 assumptions of the model, and compare the process dissociation approach to the use of implicit tests and to alternative quantitative models. But first, we begin by discussing how process dissociation and related models can shed light on the relative impact of automatic and controlled processes, and their influence on behavior. The Dominance of Automaticity? The automatic-controlled distinction has its roots in cognitive psychology research, primarily on attention (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). This research identified information processing as automatic based on several criteria. First, automatic processing is triggered passively by stimuli in the environment. Second, it cannot be interrupted once started. Third, automatic processing is efficient, in the sense that it is fast and effortless. And finally, automatic processing does not interfere with other processes, but runs in parallel with them. Controlled processes were defined as having the opposite qualities, namely being flexible, interruptible, effortful, and sequential. In a related vein, Bargh (1994) identified the “four horsemen," the lack of intentionality, efficiency, controllability, and awareness in automatic processes. Such lists of distinguishing features of automatic and controlled processes have been applied in various degrees and combinations to many social psychology questions. As we shall see in later sections, process dissociation in some ways challenges this taxonomic approach. But even within this framework of features of automaticity, opinions differ about the relative importance of automatic and controlled influences. Early research by Langer and colleagues suggested that ordinary behavior was “mindless” to a surprising extent (Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). In field studies, most subjects complied with a request to let the experimenter jump in front of them in line at the copy machine, so long as the experimenter gave a reason. Any reason would do, apparently. Subjects were about as likely to let the experimenter cut in line when she gave a good reason (“May I use the Xerox machine, because I‟m in a rush”) as when she gave a silly reason (“May I use the Dual Process Theories 5 Xerox machine, because I need to make copies”). The only case in which the experimenter did not find overwhelming compliance was when she gave no reason at all (“May I use the Xerox machine? ”). Langer and colleagues interpreted these findings as evidence that in most of daily life, people respond without much thinking about what they are doing. This conclusion was a reaction to theories such as cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and attribution theory (Heider, 1958), which assumed that people normally process incoming information in a thoughtful and elaborate way. The emphasis on the prominence of automatic processing has continued in more recent writings. Bargh (1999) described automaticity as a “cognitive monster” whose influence is too powerful to chain with conscious, deliberate thought. Bargh and colleagues have argued that most ordinary behavior is driven by automatic processes, and that the more we learn about automaticity, the less room there is for conscious control processes to explain behavior (Bargh, 1997; 2005; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Wegner and colleagues have gone further, arguing that the experience of conscious control is an illusion and that the real causes of behavior are never conscious (Wegner, 2002). This expansive view of automaticity has been criticized by Kihlstrom, who dubbed it the “automaticity juggernaut” (Kihlstrom, 2006; 2007). In Kihlstrom‟s view, the empirical literature does not support the claims that automatic processes dominate social life. He notes that studies portraying automatic processes as ubiquitous often rely on a watered down definition of automaticity. Rather than requiring all of the features of automatic processing, they tend to establish only one or two (see also Moors & DeHouwer, 2006). And, following Bargh (1989; 1994), automaticity is treated as continuous in practice, rather than all or none. So if a process is “relatively automatic” it is hard to argue that only automatic processes are important or that controlled processes are irrelevant. Kihlstrom‟s critique argues that this nearly exclusive Dual Process Theories 6 emphasis on automaticity amounts to ignoring the advances of the cognitive revolution in favor of a return to a thinly veiled Skinnerian behaviorism. If Kihlstrom is right, however, we still do not have a metric to gauge exactly how much conscious control should be emphasized. There is probably no generally applicable formula for answering such a question. That is why theories dealing with the interplay between automatic and controlled processes have generally stated their claims in terms of the moderating conditions that favor one process or the other. Dual process theories have been developed to account for the automatic-controlled distinction across a wide range of topics (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). The models vary in their scope, with some aimed at explaining relatively specific phenomena, such as attitude change (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty & Brinol, 2006) or prejudice (Devine, 1989; McRae & Bodenhausen, 1998). Others aim to explain the operation of automatic and controlled processing more broadly. For example, Strack and Deutsch (2004) distinguish between reflective and impulsive bases for social behavior in general. Sloman‟s (1996) model addresses two systems of reasoning that support all thinking and decision making. And Smith and DeCoster‟s (2000) model links social psychology research on automatic and controlled processing with separable memory systems that may underpin implicit and explicit forms of memory. Although these models (and many others not reviewed here) highlight different features of mental life, they all share an emphasis on the automatic-controlled distinction. They all differentiate the conditions when automatic versus controlled processes are most likely to come into play. These conditions are tied tightly to the definitions of automatic and controlled processes. Once we understand that automatic processes are efficient and effortless, whereas controlled processes are slow and effortful, it becomes clear when each kind of process is likely to matter. When conditions allow people to think slowly and carefully, controlled processes are Dual Process Theories 7 likely to dictate behavior. But when they are uninclined or unable to think carefully, automatic responses will be important. The distinctions in these models are important and useful in understanding the relative roles of automaticity and control in social life. They allow researchers to predict, for example, that when people are tired or distracted or rushed, they are more likely to respond based on automatic impulses than when they are energetic, focused, and unhurried. Such predictions have in fact been supported a