The Politics of Higher Education and the 2008 Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act

The lengthy and convoluted process leading to the 2008 Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act can be explained using John Kingdon's policy process model in which policy problems, possible solutions, and political alignments can converge to open a "window" through which policy entrepreneurs can advance their preferred positions. In the case of HEA'08, the problems stream was created by complaints about rising costs and higher education performance. The policy stream was propelled by the popularity of national movement toward standards-based regulation and accountability in K-12 education. The politics stream, composed of reform-minded Republican Congressional and Presidential leadership uncommitted to traditional higher education and a divided higher education advocacy coalition, was complicated by heightened partisanship and legislative paralysis. The resulting pressure successfully opened a policy window through which Republican policy entrepreneurs pursued ambitious accountability-focused regulatory reforms aimed at higher education. Although slowed by Democratic victories in 2006 and the eventual mobilization of the traditional higher education community, the idea of greater accountability captured enough momentum to move the focus of HEA’08 away from access and autonomy toward greater regulation and intervention. (Note: This paper is a significant revision of a presentation given at the April 2010 Midwest Political Science Annual Meeting in Chicago, IL.) POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 3 Introduction The 2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA’08) took six years, 14 extensions, four Congresses, three shifts in partisan majorities, and parts of two budget reconciliation bills, culminating in a 1,158-page “Higher Education Opportunity Act” (HEOA) signed by President George W. Bush in August 2008. Many long-time HEA reauthorization participants interviewed for this analysis1 believed that in addition to taking longer, HEA’08 was “more partisan” than previous reauthorization cycles, focused on “cost over access,” was fragmented by budget reconciliation, and was compromised by a “broken” Congress. One observer facetiously compared the process to a bad Russian novel: “long, boring, and everyone dies. ” Some participants felt the results were “the most significant since 1992,” expanding access to need-based grants, making loans cheaper and easier to repay, and broadening institutional eligibility in exchange for a few more enrollment reports. Others complained that in the end “nothing really changed,” the process “involved the same people making the same speeches on the same issues,” producing only incremental improvements in access at the price 1 Although the Purdue University IRB determined that the protocol (#0810007440) describing this research was in the exempt category because of the public nature of the material, interviewees were informed that direct quotes would not be attributed or other identifying information would be used in any published or presented analysis. POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 4 of “gimmicky” regulatory efforts while diminishing the original intent of “helping poor kids go to college. ” Many, however, were concerned that HEA’08 recast the federal role in higher education “from partner to threat” and more than one saw the resurgent role of the Department of Education (DOE) and the enhanced Congressional interest in oversight as a step toward a federal system of higher education. What really happened in HEA’08, and more importantly, why? Understanding HEA’08 is important because the Higher Education Act authorizes nearly three-quarters of all student financial aid in American colleges and universities, with consequent impact on enrollments, operations, mission, and indeed the very existence of American higher education (The College Board, 2011). If, as many claimed, the policy result of HEA’08 was to accelerate the shift in federal higher education policy away from its traditional focus on expanding access and institutional autonomy toward a new interventionist focus on assuring institutional accountability through increased regulation, understanding the how and why is essential to understanding the future of American higher education (American Council on Education, 2008; Conner & Rabovsky, 2011). Policy process scholars posit that policy outcomes are the consequence of a particular alignment of political demands, policy options, actor resources, and institutional dynamics (Easton, 1964; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Ripley & Franklin, 1991; Sabatier, 1999). I will argue here that in the case of HEA’08, these forces converged to create what John Kingdon (2003) called a “policy window” through which politically powerful “policy entrepreneurs,” as he called them, could advance their preferred policy positions (p. 86). Refining Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, & Johan P. Olsen’s “garbage can” model of the policy process, Kingdon POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 5 proposed that on the either random or prodded occasion that “problem streams” generated by the environment raise issues to the public agenda, align with existing and proposed “policy solution streams,” and are supported by the necessary “politics streams” (e.g., public organized interests, experts, elections, partisan forces, and office holders), a “policy window” structured by institutional decision-making rules opens through which policy entrepreneurs can push the now publicly and politically supported solution through to adoption (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 86-89). During HEA’08, problems such as rising expectations for higher education, cost concerns, and questions about higher education operations achieved public agenda status in part because these issues aligned with the standards-based regulation and accountability policies that had the political support of Republican office-holders in the White House, the executive branch, and Congress. Republican policy entrepreneurs, none of whom my informers pointed out were “elected on an higher education agenda,” capitalized on their majority position in a highly partisan environment, exploiting the relative weakness of a higher education advocacy coalition in transition and higher education’s “legitimacy paradox” in the eyes of the public to propose ambitious regulatory reforms that challenged the tradition of institutional autonomy in American higher education. Although stymied when their political support declined after the Democratic victories in 2006, reformers had captured enough momentum to move the focus in federal-higher education relations from access and affordability toward greater accountability and regulation by the time the HEA reauthorization process was completed in August 2008. From Kingdon’s (2003) perspective, the “streams” that converged in HEA’08 had been flowing for some time. HEA’s original redistributive goals to help lowand moderate-income POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 6 students go to college had become more distributive over time as the increasing participation and salience of higher education prompted liberal needs-based grant eligibility when political (Democratic) alignments permitted (1970s), and the introduction and expansion of loans for middle class students when broader (Republican) support was needed (1980s). Expansion fueled enrollment and both federal and institutional costs, raising questions about outcomes (1990s). By the time HEA’08 got underway, budget concerns limited options and prompted (Republican) calls for greater oversight and institutional accountability. As informed observers noted at the time, the political and policy flow that led to HEA’08’s emphasis on accountability over access was and many believe will continue to be, entirely predictable (Johnstone, 1998; Spencer, 1999; Wolanin, 2003). Significance As of academic year 2010–2011, HEA authorized grant, loan, and tax benefit programs accounting for more than 74% of all student financial aid ($227.2 billion) at American colleges and universities, making the federal government the largest single source of student financial aid for college in the United States (The College Board, 2011). Originally passed in 1965 as a weapon in the War on Poverty to “help poor kids go to college,” HEA has been reauthorized eight times2 over the last four decades, extending its reach, expanding its mission, and defining the relationship between the federal government and American higher education as it went (Cook, 1998; Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976; Hannah, 1996; Parsons, 1997). Table 1. Total Student Aid by Source and Type (in Billions), 2010-2011 2 In 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008. POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 7 Program Amount Percentage Federal loans $104.0 45.8 Pell Grants $34.8 15.3 Education Tax Credits and Deductions $14.8 6.5 Federal Work Study $1.2 0.5 Other Federal Grant Programs $14.3 6.3 Total HEA-authorized aid programs $169.1 74.4 State Grants $9.2 4.1 Institutional Grants $38.1 16.8 Private and Employers Grants $10.8 4.8