How Corporate Governance Mechanisms of Banks Have Changed After the 2007–08 Financial Crisis

Weak and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms in banks have been pointed out as the main factor that contributed to the 2007–08 financial crisis. The purpose of this study is to analyze empirically how the global financial crisis of 2007–08 has impacted on banks’ governance mechanisms, comparing the differences between the two most important models of corporate governance (the shareholder and stakeholder models), and if these changes are related to improvements in banks’ governance effectiveness. To carry out our analysis, we have used a sample with 46 of the largest commercial banks in the world and the period of analysis has covered from 2002 until 2015. Our findings show that Anglo-American banks following the common law system (shareholder model) maintained their high level of governance effectiveness after the financial crises. On the other hand, Continental European banks following the civil law system (stakeholder model) increased their effectiveness after the crisis changing some practices in their corporate governance mechanisms (improvements in the structure and functioning of directors’ boards, improvements in the compensation policy for banks’ executives, as well as the implementation of CSR committees) what led to a convergence of both governance systems. Policy Implications • Strong governance practices are essential to have effective bank systems that is critical to achieve and maintain a higher level of public confidence in the banking system. • The 2007–08 financial crisis has meant a convergence of governance practices between the common and civil law systems of corporate governance. • The convergence between both systems can be explained mainly by the improvement in the governance mechanisms of Continental European banks, increasing their level of governance effectiveness. • The implementation of CSR or sustainability committees in the banking sector has improved banks’ accountability and transparency. • Changes in the compensation policy for banks’ executives after the financial crisis have improved the banks’ governance effectiveness regardless the governance system. The global financial and banking crisis of 2007–08 has revealed the importance of enhancing understanding of bank governance (Gebba, 2015). Weak and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector can affect banks’ performance and economy as a whole (Zakaria et al., 2018) so that they were pointed out as the main factors that contributed to this crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Marcinkowska, 2012). Thus, banks’ boards were blamed for what appear to be excessive pay packages that their executives received even while their firms were failing or being bailed out by the government (Adams, 2012). Hence, the implementation of strong governance practices in the sector is essential to have effective bank systems what is critical to achieve and maintain a higher level of public confidence in the banking system (BCBS, 2006; Burlaka, 2006; Gebba, 2015; Levine, 2002; Zakaria et al., 2018). While specific features of banks and their influence on the corporate governance have raised the interest of some researchers (Laeven, 2013; Levine, 2004; Macey and O’Hara, 2003), there are relatively few cross-national studies about the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector (Maxfield et al., 2018). In this way, Levine (2002) stresses the importance of broad cross-country analyses to carry out a stronger research on financial systems. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to analyze empirically how the global financial crisis of 2007–08 has impacted on banks’ governance mechanisms, comparing the differences between the two most important models of corporate governance (the shareholder and stakeholder models), and if these changes are related to improvements in banks’ governance effectiveness. To carry out this research, we have employed a dataset with 46 of the largest commercial banks © 2020 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.1 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12748 Global Policy Volume 11 . Supplement 1 . January 2020 52