Constructive Universalism: Sen and Sensitivity to Difference

Amartya Sen’s capability approach is, on the one hand, in line with universalism such as exhibited in Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Len Doyal and Ian Gough’s human need theory. On the other hand, his approach puts priority on people’s “self-evaluation” of capabilities and needs. The latter emphasis makes his approach distinctly sensitive to people’s differences such as gender, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, etc. One could ask, however, how successfully the former commitment to universalism relates to this latter feature that places importance on taking difference seriously. This question is especially relevant with respect to global justice and gender, for example. To offer a potential answers to this question is main goal of this paper. My answer will come from contrasting his theory with two related but distinct theories, and from connecting his discourse about need construction, identity, and democracy with his capability approach. His version of universalism I construe could be called “constructive universalism. ” First, Sen’s theory is situated within universalism. Secondly further examination reveals that some distinct features of Sen’s work contrast starkly with other universalist accounts. The meanings of such feature are not so explicitly explained in his theory. To understand the meanings is the third task of this paper. I will further argue that his theory has great potential to take people’s difference seriously, and will present this interpretation from the perspective of feminist studies, disability studies, and cultural / postcolonial studies. How this potential can be realized will comprise the fourth part of this paper. I will present the case for understanding his theory as “constructive universalism,” and address how this interpretation could solve the above question. 1 I am very grateful to Ingrid Robeyns and Yuko Kamishima for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am also grateful to Anna Gabrielle Levine for her translation of a partial draft of this article. Constructive Universalism: Sen and Sensitivity to Difference Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 1, 2003 http://ethique-economique.net/ 2 The equal right [. ] tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus natural privileges in respect of productive capacity. It is therefore, in its content, a right of inequality, like every right. [. ] [S]ociety [will] be able to inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs! (Marx, 1875) Need is also a political instrument meticulously prepared, calculated and used. (Foucault,1979) THE THEORY OF NEED: BACKGROUND What do these elusive needs entail? Who decides and it what fashion? I will take up the former question first. The fact is, that the concept of need has drawn paltry attention from economists. Against this backdrop, the figure who has brought this concept into the limelight of late, is Amartya Sen. This paper will focuses on Sen’s theory of need, placing this author’s work within the span of English literature in this area, especially, in social policy and philosophy. As a result of this exercise, I hope to isolate the main points of contention surrounding the principle of need. As to the second question above, I will tackle it above by considering how the concept and theories of need can be sensitive to individual difference. It is also my interpretation about what Foucoult’s analysis urges us. Distribution Matters In what vein has the notion of need been most frequently invoked? There is one cohort of scholars who could not help but tackle this topic. The question of need seems to arise most frequently in the context of resource distribution, as illustrated by the all too famous words of Karl Marx with which I opened this paper. Secondly, I will consider the extent to which the language of need is used empirically, in both defenses and criticisms of various types of social policy. In contrast to previous periods, the concept of need has come to play a greater role. The background that enabled this conceptual renaissance can perhaps be traced to the growing concern over the so-called Crisis of the Welfare State and the corresponding blossoming of neo-liberalism. The welfare state could be understood as being composed of two parts. It is a combination of a system that primarily seeks to fill demand through the market but also relies on social policy to create complementary need-filling mechanisms. (Mita, 1996) Throughout this process of crisis and restructuralization, the extent to which the state should be engaged in the business of filling demand and distributing benefits in the first place, in addition to the boundaries and very existence of the concept of need has continued to be drawn into question (Yamamori, 2000b). 2 A section of this discussion can be found in Yamamori, 2000b. Constructive Universalism: Sen and Sensitivity to Difference Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 1, 2003 http://ethique-economique.net/ 3 While the former group of theorists seem to place emphasis on the phrase “according to” in Marx’s statement: “to each according to his needs,” the latter seems to emphasize the very concept of need itself. Despite these differences in focus, resource distribution seems to be the perch from which the notion is explored. I will focus largely on the latter case, a subject matter that attracted little-to-no argument prior the Crisis of the Welfare State. “Until recently the topic of human need was a largely neglected area of social policy (Hewitt, 1998,p.61) . ” In like wise, the philosophical endeavor of examining the intricacies of need has received very little support (Brock, 1998: vii). The stage has been set, however, for increasingly lively debate, and the studies in social philosophy and social policy that have been surfacing since the 1980’s are indicative of this trend. Three Perspectives on Need In the context of social policy, especially with respect to its relationship to distribution as well as redistribution, three distinct perspectives of need can be ascertained. The first concept of need has taken hold as the fundamental basis for social policy. In this context, the concept of need is intimately linked to the notion of social citizenship. “Universal” (in Titmuss’s sense) social policy is generally configured within a welfare state that systematically directs the task of institutional redistribution. Social services are thought of as entitlements. In this case, in contrast to the second perspective, which I will touch on next, need is interpreted rather broadly. It is fair to say that English social policy studies, whether consciously or not, have largely come from this perspective. The second perspective of need is narrower, and although need’s existence is recognized, it is restricted to a short list of criteria. In this framework, need is only recognized in cases of destitution or “absolute poverty,” perhaps something akin to the targeting of “true need”. Selective social policy is led by the residual welfare state. Welfare services, rather than being regarded as rights are seen more as privileges that can be distributed at the discretion of the state. One could point to Hayek as an example of this perspective. There are a group of economists that advocate a social safety-net of sorts, to serve those who cannot provide for themselves by standard market participation. As this perspective of need is extremely narrow, however, the field of practical argument that it spawns is necessarily restricted. In other words, the only way one could make an argument for the second perspective over the first would be to claim that the former is unfair. What is recognized as need in the first understanding would not necessarily be recognized as such in the second. In reality, however, once a need is recognized as legitimate, it becomes quite difficult to strike it from the list later. Accordingly, this second perspective, leads into the third, which we will discuss next. The third perspective denies the very existence of need. That which has come to be known as need is in fact no more than want. This perspective has a cozy association with market 3 See for example Barry, 1999. For other authors see also Yamamori, 1998c. Constructive Universalism: Sen and Sensitivity to Difference Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 1, 2003 http://ethique-economique.net/ 4 fundamentalism and neo-liberalism. The extent to which this social policy background becomes relevant to discussions of need differs from scholar to scholar. It could be said that the most energized discussions of need have taken place in the context of the quest for possible justifications of the first perspective, in order to respond to the third perspective.