Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia

List of AcronymsGerindra Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya)Golkar Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya)Hanura People's Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat)HKTI Indonesian Farmers' Harmony Association (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia)KPK Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi)KPU General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum)Nasdem Party of National Democrats (Partai Nasional Demokrat)PAN National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional)PD Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat)PDI Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia)PDIP Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)PKB National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)PKPI Party of Indonesian Justice and Unity (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia)PKS Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)PPP United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)Executive SummaryIn the last two decades, populists around the world have celebrated a renaissance. As the role of political parties declines, and globalization creates socioeconomic uncertainties that unsettle anxious electorates, anti-establishment figures or movements have found it easy to attract support. Whether Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, Narendra Modi in India, or Alexis Tsipras in Greece, populists have been able to mobilize voters by attacking a supposedly collective enemy (mostly, domestic or foreign forces accused of exploiting the country's economic resources) and by appealing to the poor as their main constituency. In some cases, populists have been so successful at the ballot box that established political forces resorted to violence to try removing them-as evidenced by the failed coup against Chavez in 2002, and the military overthrows of Thaksin in 2006 and of his sister, Yingluck, in 2014.Quite unusually, the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia was a contest between two populists, albeit of a very different kind. Prabowo Subianto, the former son-in-law of the country's long-time autocrat Suharto, followed almost _ all the guidelines of classic textbook populism: he condemned the existing polity as broken and beyond repair; he attacked foreign companies for extracting Indonesia's natural wealth without proper compensation; he portrayed the domestic elites as cronies of those foreign parasites; he appealed primarily to the poor, uneducated, and rural population for support; and he pursued an inherently anti-democratic agenda, promising tougher leadership instead of lengthy, multilayered deliberations.By contrast, his opponent, Jakarta governor Joko Widodo ("Jokowi"), introduced a new form of populism that differed from the standard version in several ways. First, Jokowi did not promise to completely revamp the political system-he offered change within the framework of the democratic status quo. Second, he did not target any particular actor or group as an enemy, instead presenting himself as highly inclusivist. And third, he refrained from anti-foreign rhetoric to shore up support. As a substitute, he focused on improved public service delivery as the core element of his platform, and relied on his man-of-the-people image to bind ordinary voters to his cause. Successes in the areas of health and education reform, plus a carefully cultivated down-to-earth attitude, had delivered Jokowi electoral victories and strong approval ratings in the city of Solo, where he had been mayor, and in Jakarta. Thus, Jokowi pitched his technocratic, intra-systemic populism against Prabowo's ultra-nationalist, confrontational populism.This study explores the dynamics of the electoral contest between Prabowo and Jokowi, and analyzes what they tell us about the conditions under which populist campaigns are launched and succeed or fail. …