Politics and Morality

This book examines the extent to which it is possible for a politician to maintain his integrity. It addresses the following questions: ‘How are we to understand the loss of integrity that seems to be inherent in political life? How, if at all, can we judge the politician who sacrifices integrity to political necessity, and how is he to judge himself? ’ (pp. 12–13). The answers to these questions are produced in five chapters. The first defines what integrity is, while the second explores whether integrity is more difficult for politicians than for anyone else. The last three chapters each examine a particular threat to integrity: the threat from consequentialist considerations, the threat form plural values and the threat from social roles. In this review, I will first point out the argument of the book. I will then give my opinion and raise a few relevant questions which the text evokes and which may well contain interesting research topics for social scientists and, especially, critical discourse analysts. The first chapter examines the concept of integrity and its various meanings. Following Calhoun (1995) the author distinguishes four meanings. Firstly, integrity can imply that one knows what one stands for and remains true to that. In this case, a loss of integrity is a loss of principles. Secondly, integrity has to do with identity – remaining true to one’s character. A loss of integrity in this sense means a loss of oneself. The third meaning is to do with ‘clean hands’ – refusing to do what a person considers wrong regardless of the consequences. The fourth version is the importance of standing for something before others. As opposed to the first three meanings of integrity, this fourth one implies social rather than personal values and belongs therefore to a higher standard. It then leads to contemplating the relation between ethics, morality and integrity. Ethics refers to a variety of values which may be either personal or social. Morality requires a high degree of impartiality, while it also trumps over other considerations. It has a tendency to undermine integrity because it restrains our inclination to act on our own values and commitments in favour of impartial reason. Chapter 2 enquires whether integrity is, indeed, more difficult for politicians than for other citizens. While duties associated with office in general require increased impartiality, duties associated with political office require an even higher degree of impartiality, as well as an increased attention to consequences. This very character of political office makes it more difficult to stick to one’s integrity. However, the author states that politicians are not necessarily morally worse than anyone else. After all, they may show ruthless behaviour in favour of the citizens they represent – not necessarily to improve their own position. Chapter 3 looks at the way in which integrity may be threatened by consequentialism and utilitarianism. While utilitarianism may, indeed, undermine integrity, it does not explain that this would be the case in the field of politics. Since the politician is supposed to improve general welfare and thus be utilitarian, he has no integrity to begin with. Acting by utilitarian principles he will see no moral problems in the first place. Thus utilitarianism does not undermine integrity; it renders it unintelligible. Chapter 4 examines the threat from plural values and the ways in which pluralism has an impact on the possibility of moral goodness in politics. The chapter sets out to examine what pluralism is and what its implications are for the moral character of politicians. Different ways of life reflect different values. As Machiavelli suggests,