Do feelings have a mind of their own

modality-independent manner. They can be explained on the basis of exemplar models if it is assumed that exemplar representations also contain information about embodied responses that were present in the encoded event. Subsymbolic network models. The third class of cognitive models postulates the existence of subsymbolic networks (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986). Like symbolic network models, subsymbolic network models postulate that knowledge is represented in a network of interconnected nodes. The crucial difference is that the nodes in a subsymbolic network do not symbolize stimuli, concepts, or events. Instead, knowledge is represented as patterns of activation across a large number of nodes. For instance, the concept “bird” is not symbolized by a specific node but by a specific pattern of activation. The affective properties of a concept can be seen as part of the pattern of activation that is evoked by stimuli related to that concept. Given that stimuli in the environment automatically give rise to patterns of activation in the network, the evaluation of the affective properties of a stimulus arises automatically as an aspect of the activation pattern that the stimulus evokes. Although subsymbolic network models are thus compatible with the idea that affective reactions can arise automatically, they have received little attention in research on (automatic) affective processing (see Conrey & Smith, 2007, for an exception). Models about the relation between automatic and nonautomatic affective reactions. Cognitive models of affective processing have focused not only on how automatic affective reactions come about but also on how these reactions relate to non-automatic affective reactions. Most models allow for the possibility of inconsistent automatic and non-automatic affective reactions even though they differ in their assumptions about how such dissociations Do feelings have a mind of their own? 23 can arise. So-called dual-attitude models postulate that both types of affective reactions can be determined by different representations in memory. For instance, Wilson et al. (2000) put forward the idea that a single concept in a symbolic network can be involved in two evaluative associations that contradict each other (e.g., an association between “smoking” and “good” and between “smoking” and “bad”). Dissociations can arise when automatic and non-automatic affective reactions are based on different evaluative associations. Dual-process models, on the other hand, postulate that non-automatic affective reactions can be influenced by processes that do not impact on automatic affective reactions (e.g., Fazio, 1986; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty et al., 2007). For instance, Fazio (1986) argued that automatic affective reactions are a direct function of the automatic activation of evaluative associations in memory whereas non-automatic affective reactions are modulated by controlled reasoning processes that people engage in when they have the motivation and opportunity to do so. Especially dual-process models have been successful in predicting when automatic and non-automatic affective reactions will overlap (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, and Fazio & Olson, 2003, for reviews). Does automatic affective processing (always) depend on cognitive processes? The different cognitive models of (automatic) affective processing that we have discussed in the previous section incorporate different ideas about how automatic affective processing could depend on the (automatic) activation and transformation of mental representations. Despite the existence of these theories and despite the challenge that was formulated by Zajonc (1984), relatively little research has been directly aimed at testing whether particular cognitive processes and representations do underlie automatic affective reactions. There are a number of findings that strongly suggest that automatic affective reactions do at least sometimes depend on the activation and transformation of mental representations. This does Do feelings have a mind of their own? 24 not imply, however, that automatic affective reactions always depend on cognitive processes. In the remainder of this chapter, we will provide a brief overview of studies that directly examined the question of whether cognitive processes mediate automatic affective reactions. In line with Zajonc (1984), we define cognition as the formation and transformation of mental representations. Mere exposure effects. A first set of studies relates to the mere exposure effect, that is, the finding that the liking of a stimulus can change as the result of the repeated exposure of that stimulus. The observation that mere exposure effects do no depend on a conscious recognition of the presented stimulus was one of the corner stones of Zajonc’ (1980) claim that affect does not need cognition. More recent findings, however, strongly suggest that mere exposure does depend on automatic cognitive processes, more precisely, the automatic activation of memory traces (e.g., Bonanno & Stillings, 1986; Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2007). As is known from memory research (e.g., Hintzman & Curran, 1994), automatic activation of memory traces will result in a sense of familiarity or perceptual fluency. If it is assumed that familiarity or perceptually fluency results in an increase in liking, one can explain that repeatedly presented (and thus more familiar) stimuli will be liked more than those that were not previously presented. Memory research has also demonstrated that familiarity or fluency is not always sufficient to support conscious recognition (e.g., Mandler, 1980). Therefore, increases in familiarity, and thus in liking, could be observed even if conscious recognition fails. Context effects. Studies on the context specificity of automatic affective reactions also provide support for the idea that automatic affective reactions depend on cognitive processes. We already noted that the context in which a stimulus is presented (e.g., a Black person in a Do feelings have a mind of their own? 25 backstreet alley or on a basketball court) determines the outcome of automatic affective processing. This implies that the automatic affective reaction is not simply a function of certain “sub-cognitive” features of the stimulus (e.g., the “preferanda” that according to Zajonc, 1980, determine affect) but depends on a combination of features of the stimulus and the context in which the stimulus occurs. Other studies show that also a non-physical, motivational context can modulate automatic affective reactions. For instance, the same stimulus can evoke a positive automatic affective reaction when it signals the achievement of a goal and a negative automatic affective reaction when it signals the failure to achieve a goal (e.g., Moors et al., 2001). It is difficult to imagine how the physical and motivational context can have such a dramatic impact without the intervention of cognitive processes. Dissociations between affect and cognition. There are, however, also findings that seem to reveal cognitively unmediated affective reactions, that is, affective reactions that do not involve the formation or transformation of mental representations. Most of these findings have in common that they demonstrate effects of the affective properties of a stimulus in the absence of effects of non-affective properties of the stimulus. Assuming that mental representations always encode non-affective properties, such dissociations could be interpreted as evidence for affective reactions under conditions in which mental representations of the stimulus were absent. A first example of such a dissociation comes from studies conducted by Murphy and Zajonc (1993; Murphy et al., 1995). On each trial, they presented a photograph of a human face that expressed either a positive or negative emotion (e.g., happiness, fear, anger). Immediately following presentation of the facial expression, a Chinese ideograph was shown. Participants were asked to indicate how much they liked the ideograph. When facial expressions were presented for 4 ms -which was too brief to allow for a conscious recognition of the faceideographs that were preceded by Do feelings have a mind of their own? 26 positive expressions were liked more than those preceded by negative expressions. No effects were found when faces were presented for 1000 ms, in which case they could be clearly perceived. Murphy and Zajonc (1993) found the opposite pattern of results when other, which they called "cognitive" attributes of the ideographs had to be rated. Judgements of "cognitive" attributes such as size, symmetry, or gender were not influenced by the size, symmetry, or gender of the preceding stimuli when the preceding stimuli were presented briefly (4 ms), but judgements were influenced when the preceding stimuli were presented long enough to be detected (1000 ms). Murphy and Zajonc (1993, Experiment 6; see Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003, for related findings) observed also a second type of dissociation between the effects of affective and non-affective stimulus properties. On each trial, they presented for 4 ms a picture of a man or women who expressed a positive or negative emotion. After an interval of 1000 ms during which a pattern mask was presented, participants were shown the briefly presented face on one side of a screen and a face that was not presented on the other side. They were asked to indicate which of the two faces had been presented before the mask. If the not presented (incorrect) alternative was a face expressing an emotion of a different valence than the presented face, choice performance was more accurate than when both faces expressed an emotion of the same valence. However, performance did not depend upon whether gender was consistent. Hence, there were effects of the affective properties of faces under condition