Training or Performance Improvement

Crawl, walk, run. The idea makes sense for little children and collective training. But at the institutional Army level, it winds up being run, run, run. Units struggle to become and stay proficient amid pressures of declining operating tempo (OPTEMPO), personal tempo and "resource-squeeze. " This section suggests an interesting training dichotomy: Bertha argues that AC units should use their limited training resources--principally OPTEMPO miles--to train CTC-style. Nothing can replace dirt, diesel and dollars in training units and their commanders for war. Yet, when you lack all three, what options do you have? A Mangum lays out smart uses of simulations to train Army Reserve forces, which are limited even further by time to train and distance among units. While all these great ideas swirl about, they must be captured at the unit and institutional levels, and Gunzelman explains efficient systems for doing that. However, in the first article here, Ellsworth asks a more fundamental question: is training even the answer? The goal is performance improvement, and there are plenty of other factors that must be evaluated. In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the Army.1 - General Carl E. Vuono EVEN OUR ADVERSARIES recognize the US Army's training excellence as a key combat multiplier. In 1945, following Germany's surrender, Field Marshal William Keitel, Chief of the German General Staff, remarked, "We had everything calculated perfectly except the speed with which America was able to train its people. "2 Neither past US performance nor even current paradigms are necessarily relevant. The major change from an industrial to an information-based society has far-reaching implications for the profession of arms.3 This shift challenges many assumptions about soldier development and requires an aggressive response to retain the Army's edge despite an expanding mission and a shrinking budget. This article explores some of the critical shortfalls of the traditional training model. It introduces the principles of "human performance improvement," presents a brief history, defines a few key terms, provides guidance for field commanders and institutional trainers during the performance improvement transition, and gives an overview of selected information and training sources. Training Dimensions As the Army transforms, it must guard against wholesale change for change's sake. Since historic training models have been so successful, leaders may be understandably reluctant to tamper with them. A few reminders about this past success may show why change is truly necessary. The current models worked when the enemy remained unchanged annually from year to year. However, in today's "threat du jour" environment, adversaries can appear overnight-our mortal enemy in one situation can be our closest ally in another (and vice versa). Current models were effective when the Army could just recruit more soldiers or work longer days to get more done. Military downsizing and the availability of civilian jobs mean today's strategies must be based on working smarter with personnel and resources, not harder. Current models also worked when only leaders and scientists had to "think outside the box. " However, on today's asymmetrical battlefield, soldiers closest to the action must make the creative decisions to prevent being outmaneuvered by a more agile opponent. When Albert Einstein remarked that "the world we have created today has problems which cannot be solved by thinking the way we thought when we created them," he described today's operational requirements. Today's operational problems are often multidimensional, and training can address only a few of their causes. What is often called a training problem is really identifying a performance discrepancy-an undesired difference between ability and objective. More training is not always the answer. …