Dual Processes in Mental State Understanding: Is Theorising Synonymous with Intuitive Thinking and is Simulation Synonymous with Reflective Thinking?

Dual Processes in Mental State Understanding: Is Theorising Synonymous with Intuitive Thinking and is Simulation Synonymous with Reflective Thinking? Meredith R Wilkinson (mwilkinson@dmu.ac.uk) Division of Psychology, School of Applied Social Sciences, Faculty of Health and Life Sciences, De Montfort University, The Gateway, Leicester, LE1 9BH, UK Linden J. Ball (LBall@uclan.ac.uk) School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Darwin Building, Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE, UK Abstract In this paper we develop an idea first mooted by Wilkinson, Ball, and Cooper (2010), which is that the dichotomy between theory- based and simulation-based reasoning in the context of mental state understanding is synonymous with the distinction between intuitive and reflective thinking in dual-process accounts of human reasoning (e.g., Evans, 2010). To support this proposal we draw upon a range of concepts and findings deriving from both mainstream reasoning research and from studies of social cognition. We also consider the implications of our proposal for the formulation of an integrative approach to understanding reasoning in all of its many manifestations, whether undertaken for the attainment of socially-oriented goals or for the purposes of learning and discovery. Keywords: Dual Processes, Intuitive thinking, Reflective thinking Simulation Theory, Theory Theory Introduction The question of how we understand and reason about other people’s minds has resulted in considerable debate within psychology and philosophy (e.g., Bach, 2011; Wilkinson, Ball, & Cooper, 2010). Some researchers propose that such mental state reasoning is achieved through the adoption of tacit and non-tacit “theories” that are typically based around conditional inference rules (e.g., Carruthers, 1996). An example of such a theory might be that if someone fails to achieve something for which they have worked hard then they will feel upset. Other researchers, however, posit that mental state reasoning arises via a process of mental simulation. Such simulation might involve imagining how we would feel in a given situation and assuming that others are sufficiently like us that they will feel the same (e.g., Gordon, 1986). An alternative proposal (Goldman, 2006) is that we take our own beliefs and desires “offline”, input the beliefs and desires of the other person, and thence reason as if we had the beliefs and desires of the other person. It is important to note that when we refer to “simulation” in the present paper we adopt a restricted notion that relates solely to the simulation of mental states, whether our own or other people’s. We acknowledge that simulation can arise when reasoning in other domains such as design (e.g., see Ball & Christensen, 2009), but we do not extend our discussion to this issue. Second, we note that the term “simulation” has different meanings to different authors. As explained by Goldman (2006), there is high-level simulation, which refers to the type of simulation we are discussing in this paper, and also lower-level simulation, which refers to the functioning of mirror neurons when engaged in activities such as imitation. Mirror neurons are neurons that are activated both when we perform an action and when we observe the same action being performed (e.g., Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Although we acknowledge the evidence for the existence of mirror neurons, we, like others (e.g. Saxe, 2005) are unsure of the explanatory power of this form of simulation. Recently, theorists have started to move away from polarised views as to whether theorising or simulation is adopted in mental state reasoning and have instead acknowledged that both processes may be at play. This has resulted in a flurry of hybrid approaches appearing in the literature (e.g., Bach, 2011; Mitchell, Currie, & Ziegler, 2009), which not only propose that both theorising and simulation can occur in mental state reasoning, but which also claim that there are content-based effects that govern the mechanism that is triggered. For example, Mitchell et al. (2009) have argued that we deploy simulation as a “default” process, using theorising in familiar situations. We have recently provided empirical support for a hybrid view in a study that required people to think aloud when reasoning about counterfactual scenarios pertaining to mental states (Wilkinson et al., 2010). Participants adopted both theorising and simulation for these scenarios, with content effects being evident in that more simulation and less theorising arose with scenarios involving “controllable” compared to “uncontrollable” events. In the present paper we extend an argument first presented by Wilkinson et al. (2010) to the effect that the theorising versus simulation distinction is synonymous with the “intuitive” versus “reflective” distinction as described in contemporary dual-process theories of thinking and reasoning (see Evans, 2010, for an overview). According to the dual-process framework, intuitive thinking is classed as fast, automatic, high capacity, low effort and independent of working memory resources, whereas reflective thinking is classed as slow, controlled, low capacity, high effort and dependent on working memory. We argue here that these characteristics of intuitive and reflective thinking align well with key features of theorising and simulation in contexts associated with mental state understanding. In subsequent sections we support this proposal by drawing on concepts