Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist

such an idea is so ad hoc that it can be safely exiled to a footnote (no. 8). The idea seems reasonably plausible to me: Much of what Gopnik says about the development of mind strikingly parallels the development of language. A child's theory of mind develops without special instruction, at a similar pace and through similar stages across all children. Gopnik's own story seems to show this. I bet one could replicate Chomsky's argument: There are certain sorts of mistakes children do not make (in, e.g., Chomsky 1980). A theory of mind may well be the next best candidate after language for a cultural universal. Like language, intentional psychology is not an obvious inductive generalization from experience. The concepts in terms of which the explanatory generalizations are framed are not needed for mere description of the data. Does intentional psychology, like language, develop from "degraded data"? That, I suspect, depends on the extent to which rationality assumptions are built into intentional generalization. If they are, then competence will be exhibited in performance no more transparently in this domain than in language. Of course some hold that a theorytheory is right for language too. But though it is clear that a grammar must be internally represented in some form, it is very far from obvious that grammars are known, propositional, implicit theories. I agree with Gopnik in doubting that theory of mind could be modular. There is no plausible way of encapsulating the data on which intentional attributions are made. Moreover, we are talking here about beliefs about beliefs, that is, about central processes. But must a hypothesis about maturation be a modular one? Next, symmetry. Gopnik's data bear first and foremost on competence, on capacity. But the asymmetry claim is about the psychological realization of that competence. In general, a given competence can be realized by quite distinct cognitive mechanisms; hence all the fuss about the "psychological reality" of transformational grammars. There may even be some reason to suspect that equivalent competences are mediated by distinct cognitive mechanisms. For Alexander (1987), Humphrey (1984) and others have argued that the function of knowledge of self is knowledge of others. The point of introspection is to be able to anticipate what others will think and hence do. If this very speculative hypothesis were right, though agents would not know more of themselves than of others, that knowledge would be the result of different processes. The distinction between competence and its underlying realization here is probably picky (though what philosopher has ever resisted that temptation? ); different mechanisms are unlikely to result in similar patterns of error. More seriously, the inference from development to current competence and organization seems loose. Distinct developmental pathways can lead to identical outcomes (first versus second language learning may be an example). Symmetries can break. Try this hypothesis: Gopnik is right: Three-year-old children do not have the concept of belief. They do not have a sufficiently rich theory of mind. Without the appropriate concepts, they are unable to exploit the resources that are in principle available from cognitive mechanisms designed to give access to their own cognitive states. There can be no perceptually based belief that Bessie is a cow without the concept of cows. Until Jason acquires that concept, Jason can see cows, but not see that something is a cow. Similarly, until Jason has the concept of a belief, he cannot detect his own beliefs. The acquisition of that concept might be symmetrical. Experience of others might play just the same role as experience of himself. But once acquired, the functional organization of Jason's mind induces a cognitive asymmetry between himself and others. I do not say this hypothesis is correct. I do say it is consistent with the symmetry in development that constitutes Gopnik's case.