SUCCESS IN ORGANIZING, FAILURE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE CASE OF PICKLE WORKERS IN WISCONSIN, 1967-68

Wisconsin is one of several states in the Great Lakes region specializing in a variety of cash crops that historically require great influxes of migratory labor for brief periods of cultivation, harvesting, and processing. Successful organizing of migrant pickle workers by Jesus Salas in 1967 led to the certification of his union, Obreros Unidos United Workers, as the workers exclusive bargaining representative. Despite the successful organizing efforts however, the end result of the collective bargaining efforts was the elimination of bargaining unit employee jobs by mechanical harvesting before a contract was ever signed. The theoretical frame of reference developed by Craypo (1986) is used to explain the union's organizing success and failed collective bargaining. The model shows that the sources of union bargaining strength were established initially, but because of the changing bargaining environment they were not maintained long enough to successfully negotiate a single contract. The shirking of farm-worker collective bargaining occurred through changes in the company's organizational structure, technology, and the policy of the state's legal apparatus. All combined to erode the union's bargaining power and caused the union's eventual demise, The analysis also shows that agricultural production via contract farming is a significant determinant of migrant field labor collective bargaining structures and outcomes. SUCCESS IN ORGANIZING, FAILURE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE CASE OF PICKLE WORKERS IN WISCONSIN, 1967-68 1 by Rene Perez Rosenbaum 2 This paper makes several contributions to the agricultural labor relations literature. First, the paper fills a gap in the history of agricultural labor relations. In the only article that documents the unionizing events in the mid 1960S of pickle workers in Wisconsin ("Obreros Unidos," 1968), Mark Erenburg tells only part of the story. His article, written before the union's negotiations with the migrants' employer were complete, does not give a full account of what happened. It tells the success story of the union in its ability to organize the workers and to win it's representation election. Not told, however, is the story of the elimination of bargaining employee jobs by mechanical harvesting before a bargaining contract was ever signed. This paper adds to the literature by telling the rest of the story. 1 A draft of this paper was first presented at The Julian Samora Research Institute Colloquia Series on May 22, 1991. 2 About the Author: Dr. Rosenbaum has a Ph.D. in Economics and is a Post-Doctoral Fellow with the Julian Samora Research Institute. His ongoing research while at the Institute is in Latino economic issues, including the unionization and coIlective bargaining of Latino workers; the economics of Latino businesses; and the international commuter worker phenomenon as an economic feature of the U.S. border economy. The article also fills a great lacuna in the agricultural labor relations literature—its inattention to questions about field labor collective bargaining. Except for a sparse treatment of collective bargaining, mostly in California agriculture (Koziara, 1980; Martin, 1988), an analysis of the ultimate sources of agricultural union bargaining strength is notably absent. In large measure, the labor relations problem in agriculture has been perceived in terms of worker organizations and union recognition rather than in terms of collective bargaining (Coronado, 1980; Glass, 1966; Morin, 1952; Taylor, 1976). This article redresses the imbalance in the agricultural labor relations literature by talking to this labor relations problem from a collective bargaining rather than an organizingunionizing point of view. The focus goes beyond the important issue of worker organization and considers other factors relevant to collective bargaining after union recognition. This article also applies and extends to agriculture a theoretical frame of reference previously used to analyze union bargaining power in other industries, where unions, strikes, and collective bargaining have been much more significant. Charles Craypo (1986) presented an institutional model of comparative unionmanagement bargaining power that in only one case (see Rosenbaum, 1991) has been applied to agriculture. In adopting Craypo's bargaining framework to this 3 The focus on organization-unionization vs. collective bargaining is understandable. This is most likely due to the historic inability of farm labor unions to win recognition and the present lack of collective bargaining agreements in agriculture outside California and Hawaii. field labor relations case, we draw on the labor relations experience in the industrial and service sectors and relate to this case the collective bargaining lessons learned in these more unionized sectors of the economy. Extending Craypo's model to agriculture also enables us to test the model in terms of its its ability to explain the agricultural union's failed collective bargaining outcomes and its apparently weak bargaining strength. The final contribution, stemming out of the theoretical frame of reference, is the findings and analysis of this labor relations case. Craypo's theoretical frame of reference provides an adequate explanation of what happened in this collective bargaining case. In examining Obreros Unidos' collective bargaining experience, an important determinant of both the collective bargaining structure and outcomes was identified. The analysis demonstrates that farming contracts, which vertically coordinate different stages of agricultural production, are important factor in field labor relations. This finding is particularly important in light of the prevalence of contract farming in vegetable production currently employing migrant agricultural workers. Presented first is a brief summary of the organization, recognition, and negotiations of Obreros Unidos in 1967. Next is a presentation on the Wisconsin Employment relations Commission (WERC), and its findings and policy decisions in the unfair labor practice charges filed against the employer by the union. A discussion on the relationship between contract farming and bargaining structures is next, followed by an analysis of the relationship between bargaining structures in agricultural labor relations and collective bargaining outcomes. The paper's conclusion discusses (l) the ability of Craypo's theoretical frame of reference to explain the outcomes in this labor relations case and (2) the potential implications of contract farming on field worker labor relations. Organization, Recognition, and Negotiations Obreros Unidos (United Workers) in Wisconsin, 1967 U. S. citizens of Mexican origin, mostly from South Texas, have migrated to jobs in Wisconsin vegetable cultivation, harvesting, and processing since WW II. In the mid-1960s, the state employed an average of 10,000 migrant farm workers. In October 1966, Jesus Salas attempted to organize 100 migrants employed in a potato processing operation. Obreros Unidos was formed but its attempt to gain union recognition failed after an 8-day strike. The following summer, however, the union was successful in organizing 650 pickle harvest workers (Erenburg, 1968). The union’s attempt to organize pickle harvest workers in 1967 was directed against Libby, the employer, or the company), who had contracted with several growers for the crop. On August 18, 1967, when Libby was advised of the union’s existence and presented with a demand for recognition, the company refused, claiming it wasn’t the field-workers’ employer. This triggered a walkout of 80 percent of the workers in Libby contracted fields (Erenburg, 1968). Obreros Unidos then requested WERC to conduct a representation election among "all harvesting employees of Libby, McNeill & Libby working in Marquette, Portage, Waushara and Green Lake counties, Wisconsin . (Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 1967, p.l). The emergency situation compelled WERC to conduct an expedited hearing that resulted in an order to direct a representative election. The election, held on August 31, 1967, resulted in an overwhelming majority of field workers in favor of Obreros Unidos as their bargaining agent (Erenburg, 19683. On September 8, 1967, the commission certified Obreros Unidos as the exclusive bargaining agent for the harvest workers (Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 1968). Negotiations with respect to wages, hours and working conditions of harvest workers commenced at the close of the 1967 harvest season. At a meeting September 26, 1967, Libby advised Obreros Unidos representativesXthat the company was reviewing its cucumber operations because of insufficient profitability. In the fifth negotiation meeting held November 16, 1967, the company delivered the following letter to the union: You will recall during our previous meetings, it was indicated to your negotiating committee that Libby's decision relative to its cucumber program had not been finalized. We wish at this time to advise you that by reason of our 1967 experimentation with mechanical harvesting a decision had now been made to continue our cucumber program, but that all harvesting aspects will be handled mechanically starting the 1968 season. Therefore, we will not require the services of migrant agricultural workers to perform field harvesting operations in cucumbers. Furthermore, since we will have no migrant agricultural workers in cucumbers, we will have no need for migrant housing in the district. We, therefore, are disposing of our interest in such facilities. The bargaining unit concept as developed in the hearing before the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board was confined to conditions as they actually were at the time of the hearing. The character of the unit was firmly established as migrant agricultural workers. > By reason of the above, continued labor negotiations would appear to be superfluous, and we are