On the Recent Apocalyptic Tone Adopted in Canadian Sociology

It would not be an overstatement to suggest that modern thought has often adopted an apocalyptic tone. It began with the death of Metaphysics, and was followed soon after by the death of God, Progress, Reason, Man, and History. As Nietzsche points out, however, it is not the death that matters, but rather how long the news takes to reach its destination (1974: section 125, 181-2). It is in this context that Neil McLaughlin's paper "Canada's Impossible Science" can be interpreted as a beacon--perhaps not exactly a beacon of hope but, quite possibly a flare of distress. For in keeping with this long tradition of heralding death throes, McLaughlin appears to be giving the last rites to Canadian sociology. Its status is uncertain; its condition not yet terminal--perhaps it is simply that the news takes longer to reach the hinterland. Canadian sociology is apparently in danger: it is in danger of losing its intellectual vitality and disciplinary viability as a consequence of structural shifts and organizational movements that threaten to undermine its unique contribution to intellectual life. This danger is not inconsequential: "We face . the possibility that sociology as a distinct and serious academic discipline essential to a liberal arts education, research in the social sciences and intellectual debate in the society would cease to exist in Canada in anything more than name alone" (6). As a partial remedy, McLaughlin proposes "a reflexive sociological account of Anglo-Canadian Sociology" that seeks to diagnose "the state of sociology in English Canada today" by drawing attention to a "coming institutional crisis . that can only be avoided with action based on the roots of its problems" (2-3, my emphasis). He maintains that Anglo-Canadian sociology has a number of strengths such as a diverse methodological orientation, a distinctive critical political and intellectual tradition and a unique intellectual perspective that has made a space for itself by drawing on English and American sociological traditions. Nonetheless, it is facing a unique crisis that is precipitated by the "flat institutional structure of Canadian Higher Education" (10), a strong connection to British sociology that exhibits a commitment to a "social theory agenda" (18) and a unique political tradition has inhibited the development of a more scholarly and professional culture (20). He makes some astute points, among them the idea that any remedy to this Canadian "disease" must have a commitment to quality publishing in prestigious journals at its centre (31). McLaughlin is dead-on here, and I commend his call for a highly professional, intellectually engaged, strong leadership for cultivating a strong Canadian sociology. Even so, it is important to remember that diagnostic projects succeed or fail on the strength of their identification of the organization and coordination of symptoms. As Jacques Derrida maintains, they ritualize the analysis of certain themes--in this instance, it is the theme of "crisis" that becomes the object of analysis (1995:4-5). Diagnosis means that one participates in a creative and critical moment whereby the "object" of crisis is created performatively at the same time that it is analyzed and critiqued. Consequently, in attempting to theorize the nature of the crisis that faces Canadian sociology, McLaughlin's diagnosis is preoccupied with the following questions: What is its nature? What are its symptoms? How might it be remedied? In seeking to divert the crisis, his analysis nonetheless succeeds in creating the very object that he intends to thwart, that is the "crisis" of Canadian sociology, with all of its attendant symptoms, treatments and remedies. Such an objectification demands that one judge, evaluate and discriminate effectively. It requires that we agree upon the nature of the symptoms in order to accept the terms of the diagnosis; in other words, it demands that we diagnose the diagnosis. Gilles Deleuze notes that when naming a disease, "the doctor does not invent the illness," but rather "dissociates symptoms that were previously grouped together and links up others that were dissociated" (1989:15). …