Debunking the pyramidal mind: A plea for synergy between reason and emotion

An instructive example of the present renaissance of emotivism is given by Chapman et al. (2009), who offered an evolutionary account of the genesis of morality whose main idea is that moral disgust is physiologically identical and phylogenetically connected to gustatory distaste. From common sense, we know that scowling is connected with repugnance and, consequently, with the attitude to refuse the substance that triggered that reaction. Evolutionarily, this phenomenon can be explained by referring to the crucial adaptive function that the attitude of refusal might have played, as early as 500 million years ago, in making survival easier for some primitive living beings. According to Chapman et al., “in the moral domain, this rejection impulse might have been co-opted to promote withdrawal from transgressors, or even from the thought of committing a transgression. If the primitive motivational system of disgust is indeed activated by abstract moral transgressions, it would provide strong support for the idea that the human moral sense is built from evolutionarily ancient precursors” (2009, p. 1222). The article suggests that the phylogenetic account is a necessary component of the explanation of the way of working of our moral sense, and this may appear to support the sentimentalist perspective. But is this correct? In our opinion, no. According to Chapman et al., when we face a morally relevant situation, our having the physiological reaction of disgust goes together with our having a moral attitude. But this isn’t so because, in assuming a moral attitude it is essential that we can (at least in principle) detach ourselves from our instinctive and immediate reactions. That the possibility of a detachment from our instinctive reactions in morally relevant situations is a necessary condition for morality can be shown by an example. Jim grew up in a racist environment but later became a convinced antiracist, even if, sometimes, he still fights against the effects of his education. One day, Jim encounters a wounded man who asks for help, but the man is of a different ethnic group, so Jim has an instinctive attitude of “moral disgust” and raises his lips. But now he is a convinced antiracist and consequently makes a rational effort to overcome his repugnance and help the man. This shows that the facial expressions of disgust do not have to go together with our moral attitudes. (Analogously, after reflection one could decide to perform an action that provokes in him/her a reaction of disgust because one has realized that such an action is morally required.) In any morally relevant situation, we have the possibility to detach ourselves from our instinctive reactions in order to evaluate whether they are morally acceptable. Very often they are (in those cases, the moral detachment will confirm the instinctive reactions); but this does not happen necessarily. The connection between moral attitudes and physiological reactions is an extrinsic one. Chapman et al.’s evolutionary hypothesis is interesting for investigating the enabling biological conditions of morality; but it is not relevant for explaining morality as such and even less so for assessing the truth of emotivism as a metaethical theory (De Caro, 2011). Moreover, it is important to note that the detachment from our instinctive repugnance can be, and probably in most cases is, accompanied by positive emotions (such as self-gratification for behaving in a way that we think is correct) that contribute to reinforce our decisions to