Review: The Prehistory of Cognitive Science

For most scientists the history of their discipline is of great interest and value. This is as it should be. Even though we all know that history repeats itself, whether as farce or tragedy, we will always benefit from knowing it, even while we watch events unfolding in the same way as before. The study of cognition and perception is no exception. Andrew Brook has edited a fascinating volume of chapters on diverse topics in the history of the cognitive sciences. I was very happy to read such an interesting volume on a topic so close to my heart. I am quite sure that even those of us who know the history of our field very well will find much to think about within its pages. Although the volume is on the `prehistory' of cognitive science, it is by no means implied here that scientists and philosophers before 1900 did not contemplate the problem of cognition. In the introduction the prehistory of cognitive is defined as the period up to about 1900. It is argued that until then there was no clearly defined science of the mind. Pioneers such as Wundt, Freud, and James laid the groundwork. The aim of this volume is to identify contributions from theorists from before 1900 that have had a lasting effect. Stellan Ohlsson in his contribution traces the separation of thought and action back to Aristotle. Although the 20th century has seen clear examples of blurring of such distinctions, in physiology, psychology, and philosophy [Gilbert Ryle (1949) being one pertinent example], Ohlsson argues that `̀ logic based reasoning theories do not bring thought into contact with action'' and names the field of artificial intelligence as an example. In sum, Ohlsson concludes that theoretical logic has had a large effect upon cognitive science whereas practical logic has not, arguing that, as with the distinction between theoretical and practical logic, research programs fall into the theoretical reasoning framework on the one hand and practical reasoning framework on the other. Ohlsson concludes: `̀ both activities [theory and practice] involve thought and action, both theoretical and practical reasoning, but they differ as to which type of reasoning dominates''. Noam Chomsky draws an interesting parallel between what he calls the first and second cognitive revolutions (history repeating itselföthe second one is presumably the farce! ). Chomsky draws parallels between the role played by the automata that inspired Descartes in the first one, and computers in the second one (the one we usually place in the post-war period). Chomsky argues convincingly that Descartes faced similar problems as the scientists who started the second revolution regarding the dominance of behaviourism. Marcelo Dascal argues that Thomas Hobbes presented what might be the first computational theory of mind. Seventeenth-century scientists were puzzled by the nature of ideas. Hobbes proposed that their content was language and that cognition involved mental manipulation of linguistic signs. While many authors have since argued against the idea of thought as language (see eg Pinker 1994), Hobbes's ideas are innovative and interesting for their time and engagingly described by Dascal. Jacobsen presents us with a delineation of Hume's theory of ideas, arguing that it is intended to provide us with a theory of the contents of the mind and its basic laws of operation. Associationism was, of course, at the heart of Hume's theory but Jacobsen nevertheless argues that we should not reject his ideas as simple stimulus ^ response psychology. Jacobsen draws, for example, parallels between Hume's ideas about thinking and Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) research on mental heuristics. In other words, Jacobsen argues that discussion of Hume has in the past focused too much on his associationism and argues that the `new' theory of mind, as she calls it, is in essence an extension of the ideas of Hume. Jacobsen's contribution is both informative and entertaining. Kant is often called the grandfather of cognitive science (among others in the introduction to this volume). It is clear that his basic tenet that we cannot understand the mind except in how it reacts to, and organizes, the outside world is a basic tenet of modern cognitive science. Reviews Perception, 2008, volume 37, pages 1776 ^ 1778