Evidence for a Verbally-Based Analytic Component to Insight Problem Solving

Evidence for a Verbally-Based Analytic Component to Insight Problem Solving Linden J. Ball (l.ball@lancaster.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, Lancaster University Lancaster, LA1 4YF UK Alexandra Stevens (a.stevens@lancaster.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, Lancaster University Lancaster, LA1 4YF UK Abstract Two accounts of insight problem solving dominate the current literature: the ‘special-process’ theory (e.g., Bowden, Jung- Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005) which attributes insight to implicit processes of spreading activation that are localised in the right hemisphere, and the ‘business-as-usual’ theory (e.g., MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001), which proposes that both insight and non-insight problems draw on the same analytic mechanisms, which are verbally-based and left- hemisphere localised. We report an experiment in which participants tackled complex and simple insight tasks (Compound Remote Associates) whilst engaging in articulatory suppression (AS) or whilst thinking aloud (TA). Accuracy and latency data indicate that insight problem solving is hindered under AS requirements. Since AS should not affect implicit spreading activation this finding is difficult to reconcile with the special-process theory, although it would be predicted by the business-as-usual theory since AS would damage verbally-based problem analysis. The data also indicate that TA has a facilitatory effect on solving complex problems. Again, this seems explicable from the business-as- usual perspective since TA can enhance analytic processing, but is less easily accommodated by the special-process theory, which claims that verbalisation should ‘overshadow’ insight. Keywords: Insight problem solving; compound remote associates; concurrent verbalisation; articulatory suppression. Introduction ‘Insight’ during problem solving arises when an individual who is stuck on a task and unable to make headway suddenly breaks free of their unhelpful thoughts and is able to find a solution (e.g., Kaplan & Simon, 1990). Such insight problem solving appears to have several key features. First, individuals, having spent time reflecting on the problem, reach a point of impasse where they are unable to move forwards to achieve a solution, perhaps because of the continued application of misleading or mistaken assumptions (Dominowski & Dallob, 1995). Second, the insight into the solution seems to emerge suddenly – giving rise to the so-called “Aha! ” experience – rather than arising as a result of incremental processes that bring people progressively nearer to the solution (Metcalfe & Weibe, 1987; Smith & Kounios, 1996). Third, problem solvers find it difficult to describe the processes that help them to overcome the impasse, perhaps because of the suddenness with which the solution arrives (e.g., Maier, 1931) or because solution processes are simply non-reportable in nature (e.g., Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). The Special-Process Theory of Insight Although researchers have debated whether these three characterising features of insight problem solving are strictly necessary (e.g., Ohlsson, 1992, disputes the notion that complete solutions suddenly become available), there is no doubt that these features have informed the dominant account of insight problem solving in the literature, the so- called ‘special-process’ theory (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005). The special-process theory embraces the idea that insight and non-insight problems invoke different processing mechanisms. Indeed, the core claim of the special-process theory is that insight is driven by the operation of non-reportable processes that function at an implicit, sub-conscious level in order to change the current, unsuccessful representation of a problem into a new representation that can lead to a solution. In this way the special-process theory builds upon Ohlsson’s (1984, 1992) ‘representational-change’ account of insight, which suggests three ways in which a problem’s representation may be changed through implicit processes so as to enable solution success: (1) elaboration – where new information about the problem is added to the original representation; (2) re- encoding – where the problem is reinterpreted in a different, more successful way; and (3) constraint relaxation – where self-imposed constraints are relaxed, allowing progress to be made. Several sources of evidence support the notion of representational change in insight problem solving. For example, insight problems which embody constraints that are difficult to relax because of prior domain knowledge are very hard to solve (e.g., Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Knoblich, et al., 2001). Studies have also attempted to clarify whether the thought processes that arise before an insightful solution are conscious or unconscious. Bowden and Jung-Beeman (1998) presented participants with yet-to-be-solved problems requiring a single-word solution. Participants were then presented with either the solution word or an unrelated word. Bowden and Jung- Beeman found that participants read the solution word faster than the unrelated word, suggesting that unconsciously participants already knew the solution word before becoming consciously aware of it (see also Siegler, 2000). Recent neuroimaging research has examined claims for insight problem solving differing from other types of problem solving in terms of neurological activity. Bowden