The Ballad of If and Since: Never the Twain Shall Meet?

The Ballad of If and Since: Never the Twain Shall Meet? Sara Verbrugge (Sara.Verbrugge@psy.kuleuven.be) Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, Leuven, Belgium Department of Linguistics, University of Leuven, Blijde-Inkomststraat 21, Leuven, Belgium Walter Schaeken (Walter.Schaeken@psy.kuleuven.be) Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, Leuven, Belgium Abstract This paper investigates the processing of conditional sentences and sentences with ‘since’ in two respects. Firstly, we investigate the clausal implicature originating from the scale . Secondly, we investigate how modals can affect the interpretation of these sentences. A reading time experiment is reported which involved these two factors. It appears that ‘since’ is processed fastest in a context in which the antecedent has been affirmed, whereas ‘if’ is processed fastest in a context with an uncertain antecedent. The use of modals can speed up or slow down the reading process. Modals help to speed up processing of sentences involving ‘if’ in a certain context and ‘since’ in an uncertain context. However, when modals are used with ‘if’ in an uncertain context or with ‘since’ in a certain context, they slow down processing of the relevant sentences. The results will be situated in two accounts of implicatures, neo-Gricean and Relevance Theoretic. Introduction The introduction will be split up in two parts. The first part treats the interpretation and processing of implicatures. Specific attention will be given to the clausal implicature based on the scale . The second part deals with the use of modals and how they can affect the interpretation of a sentence. Implicatures In the past few years, attention has been drawn to the processing of implicatures in experimental pragmatics. Experimental psychologists have tested some of the theoretical claims made in linguistic theory. Many experiments have investigated the nature of quantity implicatures. Research topics include the time course, the acquisition of implicatures, which theoretical frameworks are better suited to explain the results gathered so far, … (cf. Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny, Katsos & Williams, in press; Noveck, 2001; Noveck & Posada, 2003; Noveck & Sperber, 2004; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). Grice was the first to draw attention to the existence of implicatures. They are non-logical inferences people make on the basis of the information that is directly available in discourse. The example most referred to is probably the use of ‘some’. Purely logical, ‘some’ is compatible with ‘all’, whereas in daily conversation it is often interpreted as ‘some, but not all’. For example, when someone says ‘some boys are happy’ this usually implicates ‘not all boys are happy’. This implicature derives from Grices cooperative principle (people in a conversation should be cooperative) and the maxims of conversation (Quantity: 1. make your contribution to the conversation as informative as necessary. 2. do not make your contribution more informative than necessary; Quality: do not say what you believe to be false, do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence; Manner: be perspicuous, and specifically avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity, be brief, be orderly; Relevance: make your contributions relevant). The quantity implicatures derive more particulary from the first quantity implicature. Levinson (1983, 2000) translated the maxims as heuristics for the hearer. The quantity implicature is translated in the Q-heuristic: what you do not say is not the case (Levinson, 2000). So, if ‘some’ is said and not ‘all’, this implicates that ‘all’ is not the case. In this neo-Gricean view, implicatures arise automatically and involve no extra processing effort (cf. Noveck & Posada, 2003). An alternative account is the Relevance Theoretic account. According to Sperber and Wilson (Sperber & Wilson Sperber, 1995, 2004; see also Carston, 1998, 2004), human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance. There is a subtle balance between cognitive efforts and cognitive effects. The greater the positive cognitive effect, the greater the relevance will be. The greater the processing effort, the less the relevance. The quest for comprehension follows a path of least effort and stops when the expectations of relevance are satisfied. In this view, implicatures generate greater cognitive effects and are thus effort-demanding. In the general discussion we will discuss the implications of this study for the neo- Gricean and Relevance Theoretic accounts.