Fallacies and Argument Appraisal

Fallacies and Argument Appraisal. By Christopher W. Tindale. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2007; pp. xvii + 218. $75.00 cloth; $24.99 paper. Tindale's aptly named Fallacies and Argument Appraisal is an introductory text designed to expose students to a wide array of fallacies while consistently focusing on the argumentative implications of erroneous reasoning. This interrelationship is the key to the work, which deplores the all-too-common practice of teaching fallacies by providing a list of egregious reasons paired with obvious examples, as if simple identification of fallacious statements constitutes a successful education. Instead, the text takes an argumentative approach to the study of fallacies and provides detailed, real world examples so that students may understand how fallacies operate within the larger realm of public argument. The work is tremendously successful not only in achieving its aims but in doing so in a style that is easily accessible to those with no previous exposure to the concepts. Although both broad (including a wide range of deductive and inductive fallacies) and deep (including four subtypes of ad hominem, for example), its structure and prose make for an easy journey. Tindale begins with a brief history of the study of fallacies and the difficulties that confront theorizing. As representative of the field, he selects C. L. Hamblin's definition: "A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onwards tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so" (2). Tindale objects to this interpretation's implicit assumptions that fallacies necessarily are arguments, that determination of validity is central to exposing fallacies, and that fallacies possess a psychological dimension in that they must seem valid to someone (2). Although the significance of these objections may elude some students, they are a useful guideline to Tindale's approach. For example, Tindale shows how many of the fallacies identified in On Sophistical Refutations and expanded in the Rhetoric fail to meet the "Aristotelian definition" that Hamblin and others advance. Aristotle's fallacies of Accent and Many Questions are not arguments. Similarly, complex questions typically are treated as fallacies but are not arguments. Nonetheless, Tindale generally embraces the argumentative nature of fallacies, spending little time on complex questions except in order to explore the role of assumptions in argument. Tindale specifically rejects Hamblin's other two assumptions. Begging the question is a fallacy that is procedurally unsound (one cannot prove a conclusion by assuming the conclusion as a premise), yet not technically invalid. Similarly, many fallacies are so obvious that they are unlikely to seem valid to anyone. Tindale offers a broader interpretation: "a 'fallacy' is a particular kind of egregious error, one that seriously undermines the power of reason in an argument by diverting it or screening it in some way" (1-2). This places fallacies firmly within the arena of argumentation, emphasizing how faulty reasoning sidetracks arguments. Consequently, argument identification becomes the first step in determining a fallacy. Tindale's primary objective is to explore the relationship between fallacies and arguments, helping students to distinguish sound arguments (including apparent fallacies that actually are legitimate) from unsound ones. To assist students, Tindale poses critical questions about each potential fallacy. In most cases, two or three questions are sufficient to determine whether the argumentative implication is erroneous, although seven are relevant to appeals to authority. For example, Tindale offers four questions for evaluating a potential ad hominem: 1. Has an attack been made on another person in an argumentative debate? 2. Has that attack focused on the person's character or circumstance and avoided any discussion of his argument? …