Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment. By George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 199p. $42.00 cloth, $15.00 paper.

Perhaps it is ironic that a book about rational judgment is entitled Affective Intelligence. This is a rousing and provoking effort, with an unmistakable double agenda. One objective is to dispute conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between affect and reason, especially the rational choice vision of political judgment. A second is to establish a more prominent role for emotions in models of political behavior: “The scientific community might fruitfully devote more attention to the idea that emotions are centrally important to political behavior” (p. 129). The two objectives are linked. By demonstrating that emotions influence how and about what we think, and what we do, the authors effectively challenge a prevailing disposition of the research community to set aside the complexities of emotional dynamics or to conceive of emotions as distorting agents in judgmental processes. Rational choice is the proverbial straw man in this regard, because it generally defines human affect as endogenous. Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen argue persuasively that emotional engagement motivates individuals to think more deeply about political affairs and thus enhances rational choice. The first half of the book is devoted to the first objective, which details the traditional understanding of emotions: We think first and then feel. Moreover, emotion and cognition are thought to work in opposition. A passionate citizen is unlikely to be a deliberate one. Emotions appeal to the heart, not the mind. Against this backdrop of scholarly consensus, the authors posit that emotions activate reasoned consideration. Emotions draw greater attention to environmental circumstances, which allows people to process information required for a rational choice. The authors invoke Herbert Simon: “The human organism living in a demanding environment requires an interrupt mechanism to redirect human attention to higher priority real-time needs” (p. 7). This “interrupt mechanism” is key to Affective Intelligence. Drawing heavily from recent literature in the neurosciences, the authors advance a surprisingly straightforward picture of affect-driven judgments. We possess two emotional subsystems that enable us to rely on habit and to activate reasoned consideration, each in the appropriate circumstances. These subsystems are labeled disposition and surveillance; the former manages our reliance on habits, and the latter identifies circumstances that require a shift from habit to reasoned consideration. The disposition system monitors the relationship between our behavior and its expected execution. If behavior matches expectations, emotions of satisfaction and enthusiasm are forthcoming, and the behavior is reinforced and ultimately becomes habitual. By contrast, the surveillance system monitors the environment for novel or threatening stimuli. When such a stimulus appears, emotions of anxiety and unease arise, dependence upon habitual routines declines, and individuals are more likely to attend to the relevant stimulus. Anxiety, like Simon’s interrupt mechanism, triggers human attention to threatening elements in the environment. Both subsystems are subconscious emotional responses, and surveillance has clear importance for evolutionary survival. Various political events and symbols trigger the surveillance system, but an obvious threat comes from the economy. The authors demonstrate that during hard economic times it is supportive partisans who are likely to feel anxiety about their president’s poor economic record. A poor record threatens their habitual partisan views, and their surveillance system responds with anxiety. By contrast, opponents are unmoved, as they are neither threatened nor necessarily surprised by events. Anxious citizens are more likely to show interest in campaigns, acquire knowledge about politics, and participate in politics beyond voting. More profoundly, the authors demonstrate that anxiety about candidates leads individuals to deviate from their partisan habits and rely more heavily on policy proposals and personal qualities of candidates. This effect of anxiety is neither trivial nor exclusive to the domain of voting. The authors offer confirming evidence with judgments about the Gulf War and NAFTA. In each case a perceived threat in the political environment alters the nature of people’s attention to that environment; consequently, habitual judgments are subject to change. Emotions, especially anxiety, “enhance rationality because they allow citizens to condition their political judgment to fit the circumstances” (p. 124). Affective Intelligence is a compelling and challenging work, but there are several points with which one may quibble. First, the interpretation of what is rational may be called into question. Although rationality may assume various forms, often at the behest of the researcher, reliance on partisan cues can in fact be considered a rational strategy. Starting from Anthony Downs’s classic work, a large and significant literature has demonstrated the “rationality” of cue-taking, information short-cuts, or the use of heuristics, in which partisan identification plays a key role (see Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma, 1998). By contrast, Affective Intelligence defines rationality as a departure from partisan tendencies. Is it necessarily more rational to use issue stances and personal qualities rather than party identification as criteria for candidate choice? Among anxious voters, Affective Intelligence says “yes. ” The reader also may be struck by the causal connections crucial to the affective intelligence thesis. Notwithstanding the forceful arguments, it is plausible that cognitive awareness of campaign dynamics, perceived differences with one’s partisan choice, or simple acquisition of knowledge may trigger the surveillance system. As in the case of a threatening economy (p. 79), anxiety may be a consequence rather than an antecedent of cognitive awareness. We thus may first consider the economy and then respond with an appropriate emotion. The authors’ reliance on pooled cross-sectional ANES data does little to clarify such important issues of causal inference. Furthermore, when dynamics are explored using the 1980 ANES panel, the authors’ findings are less persuasive. I ponder the authors’ assumption of linearity between anxiety and the various dependent variables used throughout the book: campaign interest, political knowledge, and the like. Without a defense of this assumption, a nonlinear hypothesis appears equally reasonable. As anxiety increases, the capacity to attend and learn may diminish. Similarly, moderate levels of anxiety may produce participatory activity, but high anxiety may well demobilize. One only needs to observe undergraduates at semester’s end to find supporting anecdotal evidence. Yet, considerable detail on measurement American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 4