ACTION CONCEPTS

The aim of this paper is to propose an analysis of the general form of our concepts of physical actions. I contend that both our general conception of what actions are and the special role played by action concepts in our mental life impose constraints on the content of these concepts. In particular, I argue that the principle of intentionality and the principle of competence that are central to our conception of action should be reflected in our concepts of particular types of action. I also argue that insofar as action concepts are constituents of the content of intentions and plans of action, they have an executive dimension that other concepts lack. I start with an idealized case and consider what our action concepts would be like if all actions were both basic and intentional. I then proceed to show how the proposed account can be generalized. I My aim in this paper is not to offer an analysis of our general concept of an action, nor an analysis of the concept of an intentional action. Rather, it is to try and investigate what our concepts of particular types of actions are like, actions such as raising one's arm, starting a car, climbing a mountain, or turning on a computer. More precisely, I shall be concerned with concepts of physical actions, leaving aside what are sometimes called mental actions, such as attending to something or trying to remember the name of a person. Obviously, the analysis one may give of the concept of a particular type of action cannot be totally independent of a given conception of what an action or an intentional action is. The conception of actions I shall draw upon is a version of the causal theory of action. I will here sketch its main claims, but I won't try to defend it. The analysis I will offer of concepts of particular types of actions can only, insofar as it appears satisfactory, constitute an indirect argument in its favor. Three issues will be of central interest to me in this paper. The first issue concerns the relationship between actions and movements. The problem here is the following. Most actions if not all involve movements of the agent's body. Yet, it seems inadequate to identify an action with a movement or a type of action with a type of movement, even though these movements are caused in a specific way. Often enough, two actions belonging to the same action type can be performed using different movements and movements belonging to the same movement type can be executed in order to perform different actions. Trying to reduce actions to species of movements thus appears unpromising. Yet, it does not seem reasonable either to completely disjoin the notion of an action from that of a movement, since there are very few actions the performance of which does not involve the execution of some movements. In trying to eliminate reference to movements in our action concepts, we might well be throwing the baby out with the bath water. So how are actions and movements related? Second, action concepts differ from other kinds of concepts in our conceptual repertoire insofar as they play a special role in our mental life. They are important both to the definition of our status as cognizers and to the definition of our status as agents. They figure not just as constituents of descriptions we may offer of certain events we observe, but also as constituents of the contents of our plans and intentions. Insofar as these can be put to execution, it must be the case that the conceptual content of our plans and intentions be convertible into corresponding motor representations and actions. This we may call the executive dimension of action concepts. The connection between actions and action concepts is therefore twofold. On the one hand, possession by a subject of a particular action concept requires, as does possession of other kinds of concepts, both that he or she knows the conditions of application of the concept and thus be able, at least in some clear-cut cases, to decide whether or not an (observed) event falls under the concept and that he or she be capable of drawing the inferences that the concept licenses. On the other hand, though, possession of action concepts by a subject is also related to his or her status as an agent capable of planning, forming prior intentions and acting in accordance with these intentions and plans. To the extent that we have this capacity for planning and thinking ahead of our future actions, it must be the case that possession of certain action concepts requires not just that we know how to apply these concepts in certain circumstances and can make the inferential transitions they warrant, but also that we know how to act on the basis of certain conceptual representations featuring these concepts. This is not to say that an executability requirement should be made part of the possession conditions of all action concepts. Such a demand would no doubt be excessive for, surely, one can have concepts of actions one doesn’t know how to perform. Paralysis may rob one of the capacity to perform certain actions but it does not thereby deplete one’s repertoire of action concepts. As the urban legend of the great swimming coach who couldn’t swim suggests, one can even be an expert master of certain action concepts without being able to perform actions of the corresponding types. The relationship between the mastery of an action concept and the executability requirement is therefore not straightforward. One main aim of this paper will be to try to shed light on the nature of this relationship. The third issue I am interested in is closely related to the second issue. It concerns the need for non-conceptual representations of action mediating between conceptual representations and actions and therefore the relationship between conceptual and nonconceptual representations of actions. To what degree if any does our mastery of action concepts depend on their being anchored in a level of non-conceptual content? Certain actions are complex and composed of more elementary actions. For instance, preparing a chocolate cake involves a number of sub-actions. In such cases, the corresponding action concepts seem to be definable in terms of more basic action concepts. Certain actions are performed by performing some other actions. For instance, one can signal for a turn by extending one's arm out the car window, one can turn on the light by flipping the switch, one break a world record by running a 100 meter race in less than 9 seconds. Yet other actions can be regarded as basic. The notion of a basic action admits of several senses. As argued by Hornsby (1980), one should at least distinguish between a causal notion of basicness and an intentional (or teleological) notion of basicness. The notion of basicness that I shall be interested in here is the intentional notion. Hornsby offers the following definition of basic actions in this sense: The kinds of actions in an agent's repertoire that are basic for him are those which he knows how to do, and knows how to do otherwise than on the basis of knowing how they are done by him (1980: 84) Three important features of this definition are worth stressing. First, the idea of a basic action is related to that of a know-how. Second, knowing how something is done should not be taken to imply that one possesses theoretical knowledge of how it is done. This know-how should be considered as immediate, that is non-mediated by a theoretical knowledge of how it is done. To put it in a nutshell, it is practical and not theoretical know-how. Third, Hornsby’s notion of basic action is relativized to individual agents. Thus, for example, executing a trill may be a basic action for a professional pianist, but not for the novice piano player. To keep things simple, I will at the start of my inquiry consider only actions that are basic for most people. In other words, I shall relativize the notion of a basic action to normal adult human agents (i. e. agents with intact motor abilities). The basic actions I will consider will then be actions that belong to the repertory of actions common to all normal human agents and that the agents know how to do without necessarily being able to theorize this knowledge. Concepts of basic actions are of special interest for at least two reasons. First, insofar as a basic action is an action one knows how to do without necessarily knowing how one does it, possession of the corresponding action concept need not presuppose possession of other action concepts. Concepts of basic actions are therefore likely to be characterized at least in part in terms of their relations to some level of non-conceptual motor content. Second, insofar as basic actions are those actions that are most directly linked to a knowhow, they are also those actions most directly related to the execution of movements. It is therefore at the level of basic actions that the question of the distinction between actions and movements is most pressing. This is why I will focus primarily on basic action concepts. To this first restriction that involves taking as privileged objects concepts of basic actions, I shall add a second restriction. Among basic actions, I shall consider first only basic actions that are strictly intentional. The first stage of this enquiry will then involve investigating an idealized case. I'll try to answer the following question: What would our action concepts be like if all actions were both basic and strictly intentional? I shall specify below what I mean exactly by a strictly intentional action. In order to be able to do so, I first have to set the stage and give a broad sketch of the version of the causal theory of action I endorse. I will then turn to the problem of the interface between conceptual and non-conceptual representations of actions and will try to show how, by studying the way these non-conceptual representations are structured, one can shed light on the structure of basic action concepts. I wil