Self Generated Attitude Change: Some Effects of Time and Intolerance of Ambiguity on Attitude Polarization

Effects of opportunity for thought and individual differences in intolerance of ambiguity on attitude polarization were examined. It was expected that opportunity for thought and intolerance of ambiguity would have an interactive effect on attitude polarization. This hypothesis was not supported. There was, however, an unexpected interaction between intolerance of ambiguity and the order of events in this experiment. When individuals’ self-awareness was heightened, individuals intolerant of ambiguity had attenuated attitudes; when individuals’ self-awareness was lessened, individuals intolerant of ambiguity had polarized attitudes. Limitations of this study (e.g., self-report measure) and future directions (e.g., priming effects) for this research were also discussed. During the 2004 presidential election, the people of the United States were divided on which candidate to vote for as president. President George W. Bush was campaigning for reelection and Senator John Kerry was campaigning to win the position of president. Some individuals favored President George W. Bush because he supported personal responsibility for social security. Other individuals favored Senator John Kerry because he supported government responsibility for social security. Individuals’ attitudes not only differed toward each candidate, but individuals’ attitudes also varied in intensity (i.e., extremity). In some cases, individuals donated money in support of their party, whereas other individuals stood along busy roadways flashing signs in support of their party. Some individuals voted; others did not vote. Perhaps individuals’ behavior during the election reflected their attitudes about each candidate. It may be possible that individuals who campaigned for their candidate or gave donations to a political party displayed more attitude extremity than individuals who simply voted or held private opinions. How and why do individuals’ attitudes become so extreme that individuals would spend valuable time campaigning or personally funding a political party? One explanation for these individuals’ extreme attitudes is the influence of thought on attitudes. When individuals think about people, objects, events, or issues, initially positive attitudes may become more positive and initially negative attitudes may become more negative (e.g., Clary, Tesser, & Downing, 1978; Tesser & Conlee, 1975; Tesser & Sadler, 1973). This phenomenon is known as self-generated attitude change (see Tesser, Martin, & Mandolia, 1995, for a review). If, for example, Jesse Jackson, a human rights activist, makes a good impression with potential supporters, then those supporters will think positively about Jesse Jackson. The more these supporters think positively about Jesse Jackson, the more favorable their attitudes become toward Jesse Jackson. Self-Generated Attitude Change There are two processes underlying self-generated attitude change (Tesser 1978; Tesser et al., 1995). First, when individuals engage in thought, individuals may change their beliefs (e.g., Liberman & Chaiken, 1991; Tesser & Cowan, 1977; Valenti & Tesser, 1981). When asked to think about the 2004 presidential debate between Bush and Kerry, for example, individuals do not simply recall information about that event in a mechanical way. Thinking is a dynamic process meaning that when asked to recall information about the 2004 presidential debate, individuals often change what they believe to be true about that event. During thought, individuals may change their beliefs so that these beliefs become consistent with individuals’ original evaluation of those people, objects, events, or issues (Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995). Individuals can change their beliefs by: a) generating new attitude-consistent beliefs, b) reinterpreting inconsistent beliefs, and c) discounting inconsistent beliefs. Individuals creatively change recalled information to make consistent what they now know and what they initially believed. Second, there is a connection between feelings and beliefs (e.g., Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Clary et al., 1978; Rhode, 2001). Individuals’ feelings about the 2004 presidential debate are determined, in part, by beliefs those individuals hold about that event. When recalling information about the 2004 presidential debate, for example, individuals would probably feel favorably about John Kerry if they believe he possesses morals and has their best interest at heart. Because there is a connection between how individuals feel and what individuals believe, the affective portion of attitudes (i.e., feelings) and the cognitive portion (i.e., beliefs) of attitudes are dependent on each other to some extent. In sum, attitudes depend on beliefs. When individuals think about their beliefs, individuals change their beliefs thereby making those beliefs evaluatively consistent with original beliefs about an attitude object (i.e., people, objects, events, or issues). As individuals reconstruct their beliefs about people, objects, events, or issues, individuals increase evaluative consistency in their beliefs. In turn, individuals make their attitudes extreme as a result of thought. Generate Additional Information. Individuals could produce evaluative consistency in their beliefs by generating additional attitude-consistent beliefs. For example, Tesser and Cowan (1975) found that participants presented with a set of four adjectives describing a person generated more additional descriptions of a person than did participants presented with a set of eight adjectives describing a person. More importantly, as the number of set adjectives describing a person increased, the more difficult it became for participants to generate additional attitude-consistent adjectives. If individuals, for example, believe that Howard Dean is warm, caring, and compassionate, then those individuals may feel favorably toward Mr. Dean. Because those individuals feel favorably toward Mr. Dean, they may also believe that he is sensitive and forgiving. Although these individuals may not have actually seen Mr. Dean act in such a way, they may generate those new beliefs based on their initially favorable impression. Thus, these individuals have supported their initially favorable impression by generating additional favorable beliefs about Howard Dean. Other researchers have found that individuals generate attitude-consistent beliefs when given a chance to think about people, objects, events, or issues (e.g., Harton & Latane, 1997; Leone & Ensley, 1985). Interpret Existing Information. Individuals could also produce evaluative consistency in their beliefs by reinterpreting ambiguous information. For example, Tesser and Cowan (1977) presented participants with a group of three personality traits in which there also was either an ambiguous adjective (i.e., could be interpreted as either positive or negative depending on context) or an unambiguous adjective (i.e., could be interpreted as positive or negative regardless of context) as part of a description of a person. Participants were more likely to polarize their attitudes when presented with an ambiguous trait as part of a description than when presented with an unambiguous trait as part of a description. More importantly, participants reinterpreted ambiguous traits making those traits consistent with other traits describing a person. Individuals, for example, may witness Howard Dean during a speech exchanging hostile words with John Ashcroft. Those individuals may interpret Mr. Dean’s words as passionate rather than angry in order to preserve their favorable feelings about Howard Dean. Those individuals may feel more favorably toward Mr. Dean if they believe he is passionate rather than angry. Hence, those individuals reinterpret ambiguous information in order to preserve their favorable impression about Howard Dean. Other researchers have concluded that individuals reinterpret their beliefs about people, objects, events, or issues making those beliefs evaluatively consistent (Feather, 1967; Lord, Ross, Lepper, 1979; Lord, 1989). Refute Inconsistent Information. Individuals may also produce evaluative consistency in their beliefs by refuting inconsistent beliefs. For example, Chaiken and Yates (1985) identified participants as either high or low in structural consistency. Participants high in structural consistency are compelled to maintain consistency between affective (i.e., feelings) and cognitive (i.e., beliefs) components of their attitudes. Participants low in structural consistency are not compelled to maintain consistency between affective and cognitive components of their attitudes. These experimenters instructed participants to read essays by proponents or opponents of a relevant issue (i.e., capital punishment or censorship) and then to write essays on those issues. Participants high in structural consistency were more likely than participants low in structural consistency to refute and counter argue inconsistent information. More importantly, participants high in structural consistency more than participants low in structural consistency polarized their attitudes as a result of the connection between thoughts and feelings. Individuals, as in the previous example, may witness Howard Dean exchanging hostile words with John Ashcroft. These individuals could refute any of Howard Dean’s actions that are inconsistent with their favorable beliefs about him. These individuals may feel favorably toward Mr. Dean if they refute that Howard Dean is an angry man. In turn, these individuals can still maintain favorable beliefs about Howard Dean if they refute that Mr. Dean is an angry man. Thus, these individuals’ beliefs remain consistent which results in favorable feelings toward Howard Dean. Other researchers concluded that individuals refute and counter argue attitude-inconsistent beliefs in order to maintain evaluative consistency in their beliefs (e.g. Kuhn & Lao, 1996; Plous, 1991; Pomeran