Formal Training, Personal Experience, and the Ability to Predict Research Findings in Social Psychology

Researchers in the past have found that personal experience and formal training lead to better accuracy when predicting research outcomes in areas of psychology. Personal experience and formal training were compared in this study on the ability of students to predict research outcomes in social psychology. Students completed questionnaires that measured their social engagement (a proxy to personal experience), their academic history and status, and their knowledge of social psychological findings. Students with more psychology classes taken in college were better able to predict research outcomes (r = .24). Psychology majors knew more findings in social psychology than nonpsychology majors (d = .28). Students with higher academic status were better able to correctly identify research findings (η=.31). Measures of personal experience (i.e., social engagement) did not predict accuracy in identifying correct research findings. Formal training was a better predictor of accuracy than personal experience. Students had the opportunity to change their misconceptions about the social world when they were taught research findings in the classroom. People might also learn about human social behavior vicariously or from small amounts of social interaction rather than from high amounts of social engagement. Everyday, people are faced with making decisions in social situations. The social situations that require decisions are often unclear, there may be multiple options to choose from, and it may be difficult to determine the best choice. Many researchers believe that the average person can make accurate decisions and accurate predictions within these social situations based on an understanding created from their experiences of everyday events (Anderson & Lindsay, 1998; Wegener & Petty, 1998). This understanding is called lay knowledge. Lay knowledge is the social knowledge gained from experiential learning during typical life events (Kruglanski, 1989). Many of these life events involve information about other people within a social context. People use this lay knowledge to create naïve theories. Naïve theories are “knowledge structures with a causal or explanatory component” (Anderson & Lindsay, 1998, p.8). People use naïve theories to make predictions and to explain events. A woman, for example, may have been physically abused by a large man. She might also have known other women who have been abused by large men. She might begin to think that large men are abusive. This naïve theory might lead the woman to stay away from large men in order to avoid physical abuse. In this case the naïve theory was an adaptive strategy to keep the woman out of harm. According to Anderson and Lindsay (1998), the causal links provided by naïve theories simplify social perception allowing for high levels of inferential accuracy. This simplification occurs because as people gather information, the new information is linked to existing knowledge stored in the brain. These links become organized, meaningful networks of information called schemas. People are able to later recall and use this information to predict and explain events (Bartlett, 1932). According to Bartlett (1932), people compare new incoming information with existing schemas to create meaning. In his study, Bartlett had participants read unusual stories that contained information that was unfamiliar to most people. He found that when asked to recall the information from the story, participants recalled a changed and distorted version. The participants had attempted to link and use information that they already knew to create meaning in the story, even though the information was not part of the story given to them. An important component for determining accuracy, then, is knowledge and expertise. In a study by Chase and Simon (1973), novice and expert chess players were shown an incomplete chess game and then asked to recall the position of chess pieces. The experts, having an understanding of the rules and plays of the game, were able to recall the location of significantly more chess pieces than the novices. The experts were not, however, able to recall as many chess pieces when the pieces were placed randomly on the board. When the chess pieces were placed on the board according to the rules of the game, they were easier to remember because they provided more meaning to the expert chess player. When placed haphazardly, the pieces provided little meaning to either player. As people gain more knowledge and expertise about certain topics, they have more information to link with new, incoming information to create meaning. Fiske, Kinder, and Larter (1983) examined this idea by identifying participants as experts or novices according to their political expertise. Later participants read a description of a little-known third world country. The description contained an equal number of attributes consistent with a communist or democratic government. The participants were also told that the country was democratic, communist, or undifferentiated. The researchers found that novices focused on information about the country that was consistent with the form of government that they were made to believe the country had. Experts, however, focused on both the consistent and inconsistent information about the country. The implication of this study is that experts have more complex knowledge structures and are able to process both consistent and inconsistent information. Novices, however, have less prior knowledge so they resort to using quick, superficial processing when making decisions. Another important component for accurate decision-making involves how information is processed. According to Janis and Mann (1977), sound and rational decision-making occurs when the decisionmaker searches diligently for relevant information, assimilates this information in an unbiased manner, and evaluates alternatives carefully before making a choice. In order to search for relevant information, assimilate the information properly, and evaluate alternatives before making decisions, a person must have the motivation and enough time to do so (Anderson & Lindsay,1998). Motivation can be influenced by individual differences in need for cognition. Need for cognition is the need or desire to learn and understand (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Researchers studying the need for cognition gave participants an easy number circling task that involved circling all 1s, 5s, and 7s (the simple task) or a harder number circling task that involved circling all the 3s, any 6 that preceded a 7, and every other 4 (the more complex task). All participants showed frustration at the task; however, those with low need for cognition showed more frustration. Participants with high need for cognition enjoyed the more complex task more than the participants with low need for cognition. This indicates that people with higher need for cognition are more likely to enjoy more complex tasks than people with low need for cognition. People with high need for cognition, then, would be more likely to thoroughly assess information before making a decision than people with low need for cognition because a comprehensive assessment of available information is a complex task requiring time, effort, and cognitive resources. Need for closure also affects one’s motivation to process additional information. People with high need for closure lack the motivation to pursue additional information before making a decision. Their priority is not to make a good decision but to make a decision as soon as possible. Those with low need for closure take the time to explore alternative or added information. Webster and Kruglanski (1994), for example, presented participants with information about a job candidate. The participants were to form an impression of this candidate and judge the likelihood of his success on a job. Half of the participants read positive information before negative information, and the other half read negative information before positive information. Participants with high need for closure rated the job candidate more positively after hearing positive information first and more negatively after hearing negative information first. This indicates that the participants used the information that they read earlier in the sequence to make decisions rather than spend time understanding all of the information. These same participants requested fewer pages of information about the candidate, were more confident about their responses, and needed less time to make judgments. Those with high need for closure, thus, are more motivated to come to a quick decision rather than take the time to consider all available information. Time is also an important factor in the decision-making process. According to Kruglanski and Freund (1983), when people are pressed for time they use primacy effects. Primacy effects exist when people base inferences on early information and are affected less by later information. Teachers grading writing assignments, for example, were more likely to use stereotypes about the writer in their evaluations when under time pressure than when given time to consider carefully their ratings. Time pressure and the need to make a quick decision, therefore, intensify the tendency to refrain from critically probing for an adequate solution or decision (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Lay knowledge, experiential knowledge, and naïve theories are ways that people gain social knowledge through experience and their environment. Naïve theories can be created from direct or indirect learning. Direct learning occurs when a person learns from his or her own experiences. Personal experience with someone from another race, for example, can create naïve theories about how people of that race behave. Indirect learning, however, occurs when a person learns vicariously from others. Naïve theories about people of other races may be created by watching the news or list