Mindscapes and Science Theories

ionism instead of the relational study of specific contexts in real-life situations. With regard to the latter, I have found that for many students who consider themselves "holistic" what they mean by holism is "everything relates to everything else. " This is a version of generalism and homogenism and belongs to an H mindscape. This type of holism is not only useless, but also provides students with an excuse to avoid studying anything specific. It simply ignores heterogeneity of elements and heterogeneity of interrelations. What we need is a study of specific types of interrelations among specific elements in specific situations and contexts-which I would call "relationism" in order to avoid confusion with the homogenistic version of "holism. " Often "holists" say that they are against "reductionism," but the homogenistic version of holism is reductionism par excellence. That changing one's mindscape as an adult is not impossible is suggested by a close examination of the work of Ilya Prigogine. Until recently, I had assumed that Prigogine had a G mindscape. Mathematically, his theory has many features of G mindscapes; it deals with differentiation-amplifying causal loops, increase of heterogeneity, and rise of structures. Yet in the discussions which took place at a conference in 1978 and in his writings, I have begun to discover that psychologically he has come from the background of an IH mindscape and still shows many traces of it: 1. He considers Democritus to be the forerunner and prototype of heterogenistic thinking. Democritus is known for his "atomistic" (individualistic) theory of the universe; he had an IH mindscape. Furthermore, he was rebelling against the predominantly H-mindscape philosophers of this time. This indicates that Prigogine's notion of heterogeneity may have an I-type basis. 2. He stresses "dissipation" in arguing against traditional thermodynamics. Traditional thermodynamics is based on the assumption that the most basic and probable state of the universe or of an isolated system is a state of random and even distribution of independent events, each having its own probability. On this assumption, structures and uneven heterogeneity are improbable and tend to decay with great probability into a random and even distribution. There are two main alternative ways to break away from this theory. One is to assume that events are not independent, but related by causal Vot.21 • No.5· October 1980 Maruyama: MINDSCAPES AND SCIENCE THEORIES loops. Because of the causal loops, structures and heterogeneity can either counteract the decay and maintain themselves or increase. The other is to assume that the "system" is not "isolated. " The two assumptions are logically independent of each other, even though most physicists tend to think that the second is required for the first. Whether the second is a necessary condition or not, it is not a sufficient condition for structures and heterogeneity to grow. It does not explain how structures and heterogeneity can grow. If someone asks how a baby becomes an adult, the answer "the baby eats food" is neither interesting nor relevant, even though it is true. Similarly, if someone asks me how a computer works, I will not stress the fact that it is plugged into a wall socket. The clues to the differences in mindscapes lie not in whether the statement is true or logical, but in where the emphasis is put. Prigogine titled his theory "Non-equilibrium thermodynamics" and used the subtitle "Dissipative structures. " In his talks and writings, "dissipative" is a key word. This can be interpreted in two ways: either Prigogine has to use it in order to communicate his idea to other theorists who have H mindscapes and are preoccupied with the question "What drives the system? " or he is himself preoccupied with this question. 3. What is important in a differentiation-amplifying causal loop system is not the initial kick, but the nature of the causal loops which amplify it (Maruyama 1961a, 1963). Mathematically, Prigogine is a champion of the amplification in causal-loop systems, but his conceptual emphasis on fluctuation seems too great to belong to a G mindscape. It is as if he were seeking a prime mover (a central concept in H mindscapes) and finding it in fluctuation. 4. Prigogine uses the term "equilibrium" in the sense of decay into a random, homogeneous state, while many others use it in the sense of homeostasis. This indicates that he has come from an I mindscape rather than from an S mindscape. 5. He is extremely interested in the process of bifurcation, particularly in connection with Rene Thom's catastrophe theory and its notion of "singular points" (branching points at which a smooth surface begins to fold into several wrinkled layers). A theorist with a G mindscape would consider any point in the process a potential branching point, but "singular points" occur rather infrequently and cannot be everywhere in the process. This indicates that Prigogine has more affinity with H mindscapes than with G mindscapes. Moreover, the branching point has the flavor of an identifiable "cause" of the change. Furthermore, Thom's theory rests on the contrast of dependent vs. independent variables and is not based on reciprocal causality, although it allows reciprocal causality among the independent variables. 6. Prigogine has shown a noticeable interest in the big-bang theory, which is conguent with an H mindscape. These points are more psychological than logical. Logically and intellectually, Prigogine has a G mindscape, but psychologically he has probably come from an IH mindscape. In summary, the currently available data seem to indicate that most mindscapes are learned rather than innate, that they are mostly formed in childhood, and that it is extremely difficult to change them later in life. This has serious implications for the development of science theories. As I have said, it is not easy for an individual to shift from one theory to another if these theories are based on different types of mindscapes. Since mindscapes cannot easily be changed in adulthood, then if we need new types of science theories we need to develop new types of mindscapes in children. Because we do not know what types of theories will be needed in the future, we need to encourage children to develop a wide range of mindscapes. At the same time, we must develop more sophisticated tests of