Governing the Grey Zone: Why Hybrid Regimes in Europe’s Eastern Neighborhood Pursue Partial Governance Reforms

Every year the European Union, as well as numerous other international organizations, states, and transnational networks wield ample resources to promote democratic governance in the developing countries. However, the impact of these reform promotion efforts varies widely. Many scholars have blamed structural conditions, or the inadequate rewards offered by the donors, as the reasons behind the partial impact of external actors. However, such approach portrays recipient governments as passive objects of the external influence, and overlooks the fact that domestic actors can, themselves, actively subvert or facilitate the reforms. In this dissertation, Ketevan Bolkvadze addresses this gap, by departing from the literature on hybrid regimes, and by placing incumbents and their incentives structures at the forefront of the analysis. The three different studies in this thesis zero in on the hybrid regimes in Moldova and Georgia, and examine how political fragmentation and incumbent’s time-horizons shaped their response to the EU-promoted reforms. The findings from this dissertation show that the external actors are often caught between a rock and a hard place. When they provide assistance for reforms in dominantparty hybrid regimes, incumbents might use this to bolster their popular support, while, in parallel, side-lining their opponents. Thus, donor assistance might help them perpetuate their political tenure. By contrast, while in fragmented hybrid regimes authoritarian tendencies are not an immediate risk, incumbent politicians often use the existing malfunctioning state institutions – and even donor assistance for reaping personal monetary benefits. In the first case, donor assistance ends up being used for partisan purposes; in the second case, it risks being used for private ends. Both are troubling outcomes. Sammanfattning på svenska Internationella organisationer, stater, och transnationella aktörer avsätter årligen stora resurser för att främja demokrati och förbättra samhällsstyrningen i utvecklingsländer. Forskningen visar dock att dessa reformansträngningar genererar vitt skilda resultat. En viktig förklaring, hävdar Ketevan Bolkvadze i sin avhandling, är mottagarländernas regeringars intresse av att sitta kvar vid makten. Bolkvadze granskar så kallade hybridregimer i Georgien och Moldavien, och hur politisk fragmentering och regeringarnas tidshorisonter påverkar deras vilja att anamma EU-reformer. Undersökningen visar på de dilemman som EU och andra bidragsgivare konfronterar i sitt reformarbete. När EU ger resurser till regimer där ett parti dominerar så tenderar regeringen i det landet att prioritera reformer som antingen är populära i opinionen eller marginaliserar oppositionen. Externa bidrag hjälper dem på det viset att förlänga sin tid vid makten. I regimer där den politiska makten är fragmenterad, och risken för auktoritär dominans är mindre, tenderar sittande politiker istället att missbruka statens institutioner – och omvärldens utvecklingsstöd – för sin egen personliga vinning. Avhandlingen visar därmed hur försök ifrån utomstående aktörer att förbättra demokrati och samhällsstyrning kan misslyckas och ibland leda till djupt problematiska utfall.