Collective labour rights versus economic freedoms in EU legal order: the European Court of Justice and the EU Charter of fundamental rights

This paper examines the collisions between economic freedoms and trade union rights in EU legal order. After setting the political-legal context of such collisions, the study focuses on their judicial treatment, as it has been expressed in the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Laval1 and Viking2 cases. In this regard, I will first summarize the wider consequences of the judgments, elucidating on their impact on collective labour rights. In the next part, I will approach the issue in the light of the EU Charter of fundamental rights. At that point the question arises as to whether now that the Charter has acquired the same legal value as the Treaties (article 6 (1) TEU), should the ECJ be expected to address differently the relevant conflicts. In an attempt to answer this question, I shall focus on the reasoning developed by the Court in Laval and Viking judgments, which had been delivered before the Charter’s acquisition of a binding status. The short analysis shall reveal that the internal logic of the judicial syllogism is based on a presumption which the Charter cannot affect, despite its legal status. What is more, it will be argued that the horizontal provisions of the Charter do not give ground for a shift in the Court’s approach to the collisions between economic freedoms and collective labour rights. ٭Doctoral student in Labour Law, School of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. The author holds a scholarship from the Greek State Scholarships Foundation. Email: eachtsio@law.auth. gr. The 5th Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium on Contemporary Greece and Cyprus LSE, 2-3 June 2011 INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE CASE OF GREECE George Manolas * , George Sfakianakis ** , Maria-Eleni Syrmali *** , Ioannis Vavouras *** ABSTRACT The good governance prescription is presented as a profound tool supported by existing institutions to generate the confidence needed for economic growth. From a parallel point of view, institutional quality is a key factor in establishing good governance and is central to the relevant policy debate. The present paper seeks to critically evaluate the good governance focal argument by exploring the case of Greece. It also aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of the institutional bottlenecks and pathologies that undermine the long term perspectives of the Greek economy. Institutional data reveal that Greek institutions are less developed than their European Union counterparts making the argument of institutional discrepancies among countries a crucial point of reference for shaping the corresponding policies. High levels of corruption and the failure of the regulatory framework do not provide a secure basis for actor’s anticipations. The study combines theoretical argumentation with empirical exploration and tries to elucidate the links between coherent institutional reforms and economic growth. In order to further explore this hypothesis for Greece the effects of comprehensive institutional efforts are assessed against the benchmark of institutionally developed countries. Finally, the analysis raises the question of overall and partial institutional transformation in order to disentangle the implications these policies entail for Greece’s economic dynamism.The good governance prescription is presented as a profound tool supported by existing institutions to generate the confidence needed for economic growth. From a parallel point of view, institutional quality is a key factor in establishing good governance and is central to the relevant policy debate. The present paper seeks to critically evaluate the good governance focal argument by exploring the case of Greece. It also aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of the institutional bottlenecks and pathologies that undermine the long term perspectives of the Greek economy. Institutional data reveal that Greek institutions are less developed than their European Union counterparts making the argument of institutional discrepancies among countries a crucial point of reference for shaping the corresponding policies. High levels of corruption and the failure of the regulatory framework do not provide a secure basis for actor’s anticipations. The study combines theoretical argumentation with empirical exploration and tries to elucidate the links between coherent institutional reforms and economic growth. In order to further explore this hypothesis for Greece the effects of comprehensive institutional efforts are assessed against the benchmark of institutionally developed countries. Finally, the analysis raises the question of overall and partial institutional transformation in order to disentangle the implications these policies entail for Greece’s economic dynamism.