Developments in metapsychology: Contributions to neuropsychoanalytic engagement with Freud, and new links to Lacan

Readers of Neuropsychoanalysis may have noticed that Freudian metapsychology appears to be alive and well. In this issue, we are pleased to publish two very stimulating neuro-metapsychological papers: one that makes a significant contribution to the ongoing development of Freudian ideas, and one which charts a path to doing the same with Lacan. In his 1981 paper “Does metapsychology still exist? ,” Arnold Modell regards metapsychology as referring to psychological phenomena of the highest generalizability – universal to the human species and thereby close to biological bedrock. Seen by Modell as a modeling device or an experiment in thinking, metapsychology provides the space where the “subjective” meets the “objective,” where the empathic identifier meets the naturalistic observer. From the beginning, Freud’s metapsychology of the mental apparatus drew from both the subjective and the objective, and was a conception of the mind that was informed by ideas about the brain – for example, Freud’s ideas in Chapter 7 of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) is derived not just from the transformation of the explicitly neurologically-based Project (Solms & Saling, 1996), but also from his clinical experience. It is the product of a creative collision of careful listening to exquisitely individualistic and sometimes idiosyncratic utterances of patients with the understanding of the biological imperatives of human nature. In its foundation, therefore, metapsychology epitomizes the marriage of idiographic and nomothetic perspectives, a kind of double vision. The concept of the wish, for example, emerges not just from consideration of the infinite individual varieties of human desire, but also their grounding in the forces of self and species preservation. Today, our understanding of the wish is enriched by our knowledge of its relationship to the SEEKING system (Schonbachler, Stojkovic, & Boothe, 2016) and the evolutionary biology of REM sleep (Fisher & Kessler, 2018). Freud’s metapsychology overcomes the narrowly conceived boundaries of scientific disciplines. It is a “double-edged sword that enables creative and metaphorical thought about the mind’s hidden realities” (Bruner, 1994, p. 83). Along these lines, the two original articles in this issue are fine examples of how metapsychology provides a “creative, integrative foundation for psychoanalytic theory building” (Reisner, 1991, p. 439). In his paper “Metapsychological consequences of the conscious brainstem: A critique of the conscious id,” Volker Hartmann Cardelle takes on Solms’ 2013 landmark paper, “The Conscious Id. ” Using the same neuroscientific data, he questions the logic of Solms’ revisions of the nature and interrelationship of the ego and the id. Attentive to the contradictions over time in Freud’s writings about the ego (is it structure or experiencing self? ), Hartmann Cardelle comes to different conclusions than Solms about the biological underpinnings of ego and the id and their very nature. In doing so, he provides an interesting detailed vision of how mental and physical processes populate the mental apparatus. Hartmann Cardell supports his critique by reference to the unique computer simulation of the mental apparatus offered by Dietrich, Zucker, and Doblhammer (2017) in these pages. In our view, Hartmann Cardelle’s provocative metapsychological account of early mental life provides a basis for further developing a model of brain, mind, and mental apparatus, as we continue to ponder or question the findings and conclusions made by Solms in his landmark work. In his paper “Of brains and Borromean knots: A Lacanian meta-neuropsychology,” John Dall’Aglio makes a contribution to the much newer attempt to bridge neuroscience and the ideas of Jacques Lacan, building on several pioneering pieces that previously appeared in this journal (see, for example, Bazan, 2011; Thibierge & Morin, 2010). Dall’Aglio asserts that despite Lacan’s somewhat deserved reputation as an adamant antinaturalist (Johnston, 2013) and Lacan’s assertions that the only serious foundation for psychoanalysis is linguistics (Lacan, 1978), he nevertheless often made statements that interfaced with neurobiology. In this original article, Dall’Aglio skillfully builds an alternative metapsychological bridge to neuroscience. He maps various brain circuits to the Lacanian triad of the real, imaginary, and symbolic. His “dynamic localization” of these concepts suggest how brain circuits and their functional relationships provide the foundation to social and self-reflective functions. Importantly, he advances the idea that his “preliminary formulations of a Lacanian meta-neuropsychology