Lower Class Mobilization and State Welfare Policy in the Era of Welfare Reform

The 1990s played host to the most significant changes in the American welfare system in the last fifty years— in particular, states were granted much wider latitude in deciding who is eligible to receive welfare. Taking advantage of these changes, we examine the linkage between lower class turnout and state adoption of restrictive welfare eligibility requirements after the passage of the historic welfare reform legislation of 1996. We find that in states where lower class turnout was relatively high, lawmakers were much less likely to pass a range of “get tough” welfare rules. Our findings provide novel support for the importance of electoral mobilization in helping the lower class achieve policies consistent with their interests. However, we also uncover evidence consistent with a “group threat” hypothesis in that states with larger lower class populations tended to adopt more restrictive welfare rules. The impact of low voter turnout in the United States has been studied extensively in political science. A common justification for this research has been the strong suspicion that the low level of mobilization among disadvantaged groups quiets their voice in public debate. For example, Piven and Cloward (1989) suggested that because the lower class is not as mobilized as other groups, policy-makers have been less responsive to lower class interests, resulting in what has been characterized as a dismantling of the welfare state. Yet, when reviewing the literature on mobilization one is struck by the failure to confirm the conventional wisdom. On the one hand, numerous studies find significant disparities in turnout rates across different groups (e.g., Piven and Cloward 2000; Teixira 1992; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). For example, African Americans, the poor, and the less educated are less likely to vote than their counterparts. On the other hand, despite these disparities in group mobilization, early research consistently found little or no policy consequences following from this inequality in participation. For example, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 111) conclude, “. these demographic biases [in turnout rates] do not translate into discernible overrepresentation of particular policy constituencies. ” More recent research has found important exceptions to these null findings, however, with studies at the state level identifying major policy consequences associated with lower levels of political mobilization among disadvantaged groups. In a series of studies, for example, Kim Quaile Hill, Jan Leighley and others have uncovered support for the claims of Piven and Cloward (1989) by demonstrating that diminished levels of lower class turnout are associated with less generous state welfare benefits (e.g., Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Ringquist et al. 1997). Such findings are consistent with the common notion that higher levels of electoral mobilization lead to greater political representation for more active groups. The current study builds on a substantial body of research examining the impact of lower class mobilization (LCM) on state welfare policy. Our approach differs from past studies in several important respects, however. In the first place, prior studies of LCM have been limited to an examination of state welfare benefit levels, which unfortunately do not vary a great deal within states over time and do not