Is embodied cognition infallible or falsifiable? Investigating the thesis as a sound scientific theory

Is Embodied Cognition Infallible or Falsifiable? Investigating the Thesis as a Sound Scientific Theory Katherine A. Livins & Leonidas A.A. Doumas (klivins; leonidas@hawaii.edu) University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department Psychology 2530 Dole St., Sakamaki C400, Honolulu, HI 96822 Abstract Embodied cognition is a growing area of research within cognitive science—one that it is often presented as a framework that may help us account for cognition as a whole. It is, however, a theory and, as such, it must live up to the requirements that all scientific theories do. Of particular importance is the degree to which it is falsifiable. This paper investigates this issue. Keywords: falsifiability embodied cognition, embodiment, Embodied cognition has been a growing theoretical framework within the field of cognitive science for the past twenty years. It has influenced research on topics from low-level perception (e.g., Meteyard et al., 2008) to high-level reasoning (e.g., Casasanto, 2009) and, as it continues to grow, it is often put forth as an organizing explanation of cognition in general (e.g., Schubert & Semin, 2009). That said, it is a theory—specifically, a scientific one. As a result it must be evaluated as any theory would be. To date, the field has done a reasonable job: confirmatory evidence has rolled in, and its methodologies have been refined (e.g., Spivey, 2007). However, despite the field’s efforts to do good science through the lens of embodiment, one fundamental evaluation factor seems absent: “Is it falsifiable? ” remains an open question. Given the importance of falsifiability to scientific enterprise, answering the question is necessary. Addressing this question of falsifiability is the goal of this paper. Part 1: What is falsifiability? Falsifiability is a cornerstone of scientific theory. As Popper (1963) argued, the difference between theories such as Freudian psychoanalysis and Newtonian physics lies not in whether it is possible to verify each theory, nor in whether they possess explanatory power (e.g., a way of explaining experimental results), but in their capacity to be debunked. For a theory to be falsifiable, it is insufficient to only provide ways of supporting it. Instead, it must be possible to specify the types of evidence necessary for showing that the theory would not hold. Because it is impossible to directly observe a theory (since a theory is only an organizing principle built to explain a body of information or phenomena), defining only what would support it may allow for confirmation biases and the exclusion of important data. Thus, a scientific theory must involve making specific predictions about what must or should be observed if it holds, and what must or should not be observed if it does not. Take, for example, the Bohr model of atomic structure. While it is unnecessary to go into detail, the model generally specified a structure of the atom and the way that its nucleus could be related to its electrons. Despite its seeming simplicity, the theory made predictions, including what the energy levels of certain atoms should have been if the theory was correct. Thus, boundaries of what the model could and could not account for were established. When these predictions were violated (e.g., multi-electron atoms displayed energy levels different from what the model predicted) the theory was falsified. Having the ability to falsify a theory becomes crucial when competing theories exist. If each theory is not specific enough to make predictions, then it becomes impossible to decide which one (if any) is correct. Furthermore, theories that do not make such predictions are often over-generalized (e.g., Freudian psycho- analysis) such that they can account for almost any sort of data. As a result, they can be warped to account for any phenomenon, data, or unique case, creating a confirmation bias. In other words, they become explanatory catch-alls with little real explanatory power. Falsifiability protects against exactly these sorts of problems and, as a result, should play an important part in the development of any theory. Part 2: Embodiment and Falsifiability “Embodied cognition” is something of an umbrella term for work that is interested in the ways in which the body is involved in cognitive processing. In fact, there are so many definitions under the umbrella its boundaries are somewhat contentious. Take, for example, the quantitative issue of how many types of embodiment there are: Shaprio (2011) outlines three types; Wilson (2002) presents six, and there are more accounts still (e.g., Anderson, 2003; Ziemkie, 2003). This lack of agreement could be considered a complication with regard to evaluating the falsifiability of embodiment; after all, if there exists multiple theories, then each one may require separate analyses. However, the heart of the differences usually centers on what it means philosophically for the body to be involved in cognition. For example, the Enactive Approach seems premised on the idea that there is no core self that resides inside a body, but that the self dynamically makes itself through interactions with the world. Furthermore, the world is not taken as pre-given,