A Model for Systematic Analysis of Voting Systems

There has recently been keen interest in the threat analysis of voting systems. While it is important to verify the system itself, it has been found that certain vulnerabilities only become apparent when taking a “systems-based” view, i.e. considering interactions between the various components of a scheme [13, 24]. Threat analysis has so far been of three main forms: systems-based, protocol-level and taxonomy check-lists. We discuss these approaches before presenting a model for analysis of voting systems that essentially combines the first two methods, while avoiding the repetition that can occur with the latter. The model is described in detail, and demonstrated with an example from a case study of the Ryan-Randell “Scratch Card” voting system [20]. © 2007 University of Newcastle upon Tyne. Printed and published by the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. Bibliographical details TJOSTHEIM, T. , PEACOCK, T. , RYAN, P. Y. A. A Model for Systematic Analysis of Voting Systems [By] T. Tjostheim, T. Peacock, P. Y. A. Ryan. Newcastle upon Tyne: University of Newcastle upon Tyne: Computing Science, 2007. (University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-1001) Added entries UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE Computing Science. Technical Report Series. CS-TR-1001 Abstract There has recently been keen interest in the threat analysis of voting systems. While it is important to verify the system itself, it has been found that certain vulnerabilities only become apparent when taking a “systems-based” view, i.e. considering interactions between the various components of a scheme [13, 24]. Threat analysis has so far been of three main forms: systems-based, protocol-level and taxonomy check-lists. We discuss these approaches before presenting a model for analysis of voting systems that essentially combines the first two methods, while avoiding the repetition that can occur with the latter. The model is described in detail, and demonstrated with an example from a case study of the Ryan-Randell “Scratch Card” voting system [20]. About the authorThere has recently been keen interest in the threat analysis of voting systems. While it is important to verify the system itself, it has been found that certain vulnerabilities only become apparent when taking a “systems-based” view, i.e. considering interactions between the various components of a scheme [13, 24]. Threat analysis has so far been of three main forms: systems-based, protocol-level and taxonomy check-lists. We discuss these approaches before presenting a model for analysis of voting systems that essentially combines the first two methods, while avoiding the repetition that can occur with the latter. The model is described in detail, and demonstrated with an example from a case study of the Ryan-Randell “Scratch Card” voting system [20]. About the author Thomas Tjostheim is a guest member of staff at the School of Computing Science, Newcastle University. Peter Ryan is a Professor of CSR. He is responsible for the security and privacy aspects of the DIRC program and is involved in the European MAFTIA project. Prior to joining the CSR, he conducted research in formal methods and information assurance at GCHQ, CESG, DERA, SRI Cambridge, the Norwegian Computing Centre Oslo and the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University. Before migrating into information assurance he was a theoretical physicist and holds a BSc in Theoretical Physics and a PhD in Mathematical Physics from the University of London for research in quantum gravity. He has published numerous articles; the most recent being "Mathematical Models of Computer Security," a chapter in LNCS 2171, is based on lectures given at the FOSAD 2000 Summer School. He is co-author of the book "Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols," Pearson 2001. Thea Peacock has recently been awarded a PhD at the School of Computing Science, Newcastle University. After graduating with a BSc in Materials Conservation from the University of Canberra, Australia, Thea worked as a conservator in the Hong Kong Museum of History, 1984-6, and the British Museum, 1986-1999. Since then she has been a student in the School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle, and obtained a BSc in Information Systems and an MSc in System Design for Internet Applications. Suggested keywords VOTING, SYSTEMATIC THREAT ANALYSIS, COMPONENTS, BASE VOTING MODEL A Model for Systematic Analysis of Voting Systems Thomas Tjøstheim, Thea Peacock and Peter Y. A. Ryan