Interpersonal Trust and the Reversal of Attribution Error

Attribution error occurs when an individual misperceives causality in a situation. Often outcomes are erroneously attributed to organizational or environmental causes (Ross, 1977). However, recently scholars have demonstrated that attribution error is not universal. Indeed, Menon, Morris, Chiu and Hong (1999) have demonstrated that people living under the rubric of more communal eastern cultures are more likely to attribute outcomes not to individuals but to organizations. Similarly, I hypothesize that attribution error is not universal but is affected by interpersonal trust. I explicate the affects of this reversal in the context of inter-organizational alliances wherein attribution errors can result in the premature deterioration or detrimental continuation of inter-organizational trust. This theory is tested with a lab experiment. KJOB Fall 2002 Page 2 Oldroyd / Interpersonal Trust and the Reversal of Attribution Error Individuals have been shown to incorrectly attribute observed actions to properties of actors (Kelley, 1973). This phenomenon is so widespread that it has been labeled “the fundamental attribution error” (Ross, 1977). It has further been described as a universal human tendency (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). This error often results in individuals underestimating the importance of situational causes, while simultaneously overestimating the affect of personal factors in determining others personal motivation. (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 73). For instance, Morris, Larrick and Su (1999) found that an individual involved in a negotiation often misinterprets situational constraints as a manifestation of a personality trait. Heidler (1958) addressed the underlying reason for this error. He posited that this incorrect construction of causation helps individuals to navigate a complex social environment because, by attributing causation to the actors, individuals are allowed to construct a stable view of their environmental situation, establishing a false but stable sense of reality. More recently the universality of the fundamental attribution error has been called into question as scholars have begun to notice striking differences across cultures. For example, Menon, Morris, Chiu and Hong (1999) found that the attribution error was reversed for individuals from Japan and Hong Kong. In their study, participants in eastern countries were more likely to attribute causality to groups rather than individuals. Some have argued that the mechanisms driving this reversal stem from the mental orientation of the individuals. Krull (1993) posited that individuals from collectivist cultures are likely to focus on the primacy of the collective and thus attribute causation to situations rather than to individuals. In this paper I address another factor that calls into question the universality of the attribution error. I hypothesize that interpersonal trust alters the attribution error. Specifically, I KJOB Fall 2002 Page 3 Oldroyd / Interpersonal Trust and the Reversal of Attribution Error argue that the effect of interpersonal trust is dependent on whether the trust is cognitive or affective and whether the situation confirms or violates the trust. Cognitive and Affective Interpersonal Trust Although it is generally agreed that interpersonal trust is important, there is little consensus on the definition of trust (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). I define interpersonal trust as the confidence of an individual in another individual that he or she will not take advantage of him or her when given the possibility. Thus, a trustworthy individual not only has positive intentions but also lacks negative intentions (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). This is similar to Lewis and Weigert’s (1985) definition, “trust is confidence in the face of risk. ” Further, interpersonal trust is built by individuals embedded in environmental processes (Dyer, 1996a) and structures (Williamson, 1975) that may affect the formation of trust. Interpersonal trust can be either cognitive based trust or affective based trust depending on the motivation of the individuals (McAllister, 1995). Even though cognitive and affective trust are not mutually exclusive, indeed McAllister noted that they are highly correlated, this distinction is important because the underlying mechanisms are different for the two types of trust. Cognitive trust is generated from signals that provide good evidence of trustworthiness (McAllister, 1995). Individuals interpret tangible signals such as structures or processes and intangible signals such as reputation, familiarity, reliability and dependability when building cognitive trust. This trust is based on the competent behavior of others (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Individuals with cognitive trust typically pursue opportunities while simultaneously monitoring the interaction (Lewicki, et al., 1998). Even though, cognitive trust is similar to competence, cognitive based trust is slightly different. It can be based on both the KJOB Fall 2002 Page 4 Oldroyd / Interpersonal Trust and the Reversal of Attribution Error positive reputation, which is often associated with competence and also on the lack of incompetence, which is different than competence. (Lewicki, et al., 1998) Affective trust is trust based on emotion. Lewis and Wiegert (1985) describe affective trust as “the bonds between individuals. ” Discussion about personal issues and feeling a loss if the relationship is distanced are signs of affective trust. Because affective trust usually requires repeated interactions over time, cognitive trust is often an antecedent of affective trust (Rouseseau, et al., 1998). Both cognitive and affective trust rely on “proof sources” or signals of trustworthiness (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998). Once trust is established it affects an individual’s attribution; however, there is a reciprocal relationship between trust and attribution. Attribution is used in the interpretation of signals as trust is built and attribution also sustains or destroys trust. Misattribution of signals can have both individual and organizational consequences. For individuals, it can bias an individual unnecessarily against their counterparts which will harm their relationship without just cause. Individual bias may also have organizational implications if an individual is a knowledge broker—fills a structural hole—and misperceives the trustworthiness of a partner. That misperception may be reinforced in their organization as they share their perceptions with others. (Burt, 1995) Interpersonal trust is indirectly linked to attribution. Rather than immediately affecting attribution, trust will facilitate an individual in adopting the perspective of their counterpart. Perspective is a primary mechanism of attribution (Regan & Totten, 1975). The result of taking another individual’s perspective results in what Aron, Aron, Tudor and Nelson (1991) call “selfother merging”. As self and other merge, individuals are much more likely to look for complex causes of another’s actions rather than merely viewing the individuals as objects and attributing KJOB Fall 2002 Page 5 Oldroyd / Interpersonal Trust and the Reversal of Attribution Error their outcomes to behaviors. Adopting a self-other perspective has allowed individuals to overcome biases (Galinski & Moskowitz, 2000). In this study, I posit self-other merging indicates the presence of interpersonal trust; thus, attribution will be modified in the presence of trust. Individuals who have developed a personal relationship with their counterpart are likely to base their trust on affective measures while individuals with more personal distance are likely to base their trust on cognitive measures. In situations where an individual may have affective and cognitive trust simultaneously, the affective trust will trump cognitive trust and the actions of the individual will follow the affective trust typology. I hypothesize that individuals with cognitive trust are likely to follow the fundamental attribution error in situations that violate their trust and attribute cause to individuals. For example, if an alliance partner required a contract renegotiation it is likely that an agent having cognitive trust would attribute this act to personal characteristics of their counterpart (i.e. they were short sighted in the original negotiation) rather than to any changes in the environmental structure or processes. Second, I hypothesize that in situations where cognitive trust is present and the trust is confirmed, we can expect to see a reversal of attribution error such that individuals will attribute cause to situations rather than behaviors. Along these lines, Malholtra and Murnighan (2002) have shown that individuals with cognitive trust are likely to attribute the confirmation of trust to situations rather than to individuals. Specifically, they have demonstrated that an individual given a contract (signal of cognitive trust) attributes their trust in the exchange to the situation and not to individual offering the contract. I reverse their findings in my hypothesis given the reciprocal nature of trust and attribution. KJOB Fall 2002 Page 6 Oldroyd / Interpersonal Trust and the Reversal of Attribution Error Third, I hypothesize that in situations where an individual has affective trust for his or her counterpart and trust is violated, the individual will erroneously attribute causality to situations and not to their counterpart. Affective trust is indicative of emotional and personal friendship between individuals. In this situation the agent is likely to take the perspective of their counterpart and assume their counterpart would not behave opportunistically but, attribute the activity to situational causes even when this supposition is incorrect. Finally, in situations where affective trust is present and that trust is confirmed, I hypothesize that individuals will likely attribute this to their co