A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of Suicide

The literature on the subject of suicide is both lively and prolific. This is not surprising if we allow that the question of the moral correctness of the taking of life (one’s own or another’s) is the cornerstone on which the organization and perpetration of society ultimately rests. Basically there are two positions on this question, i.e., suicide may be morally justifiable in some instances, and suicide is never justified. The former position has been well argued by Hume (Hume, 1965), while the latter is found in the theological discourses of most major religions. There are, of course, inherent problems in these philosophical and theological arguments, e.g., the teaching that life is sacred and should be lived at any cost, an evil thought is as wrong as an evil deed, suicide is more sinful than murder, and therefore that the contemplation of suicide is greater sin than murder. This is but one example of the peculiar turns these arguments may take. While controversies revolving around the moral correctness of suicide still rage, more recently psychiatry and the social and behavioral sciences have tried to concern themselves more with questions of is than ought. This was seen as necessary prerequisite for the pursuit of a behavioral or social “science. ” Questions were no longer formulated with respect to whether or not one ought to be able to take one’s life (as this would entail a value judgment within disciplines dedicated to a pursuit of a “value free” science) but rather why one wanted to take one’s life in the first place, and how, if he succeeded, he was able to d o so. Notwithstanding these positivistic pursuits, all classical psychiatric, psychological and sociological theories of suicide were cast within a suicide prevention framework. Implicit in all of the above was the notion that science had a moral obligation to prevent suicide. Researchers in the field of suicide (and suicide rates) also sought (in the name of science) to avoid the labels of “philosophizing” and/or “psychologizing” by utilizing one of two basic evasive actions. The first, and most successful sociological attempt at this form of scientism (with respect to suicide) was promoted and popularized by Durkheim (Durkheim, 1951). It held that sociology should distinguish itself from, and avoid the pitfalls of psychology by eliminating from its purview such considerations as the individual, his intentions, motives or morals. I t was then recommended that having eliminated these “subjective” considerations we further “objectify” our study by eliminating people entirely and treating persons as “things. ” This could be accomplished by studying and interpreting official suicide rates (the data) in such a way as to uncover the external social causal agent responsible for the consistencies found in the rates. These “causes” would give us an explanation, not only of suicide rates, but ultimately of suicide (Durkheim, 1951, pp. 147-8). Durkheim and others (Gibbs and Martin, 1964; Henry and Short, 1954; Powell, 1950) following in this tradition were led to formulate such questions as why Protestants consistently kill themselves more than Jews, men more than women, or single persons more than married. The answer to this question was sought not within the individual’s psyche, or by a study of his personal circumstances, but rather in the effects of some external social agent upon the groups being considered (Durkheim, 195 1, pp. 297-298).