Verifying properties from different emotions produces switching costs: Evidence for coarse-grained language statistics and fine-grained perceptual simulation

Verifying properties from different emotions produces switching costs: Evidence for coarse-grained language statistics and fine-grained perceptual simulation Richard Tillman (rntllman@memphis.edu) Department of Psychology/ Institute for Intelligent Systems, University of Memphis 365 Innovation Drive, Memphis, TN 38152 USA Sterling Hutchinson (schtchns@memphis.edu) Department of Psychology/ Institute for Intelligent Systems, University of Memphis 365 Innovation Drive, Memphis, TN 38152 USA Sara Jordan (sara.jordan@mlh.org) Department of Rehabilitation Services, Speech Language Pathologist/ Methodist North Hospital, Methodist LeBonheur Healthcare 3960 New Covington Pike Memphis, TN 38128 USA Max M. Louwerse (maxlouwerse@gmail.com) Department of Psychology/ Institute for Intelligent Systems, University of Memphis 365 Innovation Drive, Memphis, TN 38152 USA Tilburg Centre for Cognition and Communication (TiCC), Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands Abstract We investigated whether emotions are activated during comprehension of emotion words. In the first part of the study, an experiment was conducted in which participants read sentence pairs each describing an emotional state and then engaged in a judgment task. Sentences were paired to either match or mismatch in emotion (happy, sad, or angry). We predicted that the sentences that mismatch in emotion produced longer reaction times than those where the emotion was the same, and that shifts between negative emotions had less of an impact. In the second part of the study, we calculated the frequency of first-order co-occurrences of nouns and adjectives related to happy, sad, and angry emotional states. This analysis demonstrated emotion words are more often accompanied by similar emotion words. Match and mismatch of emotion explained RTs as did statistical linguistic frequencies of the words. The combination of these two studies contributes to a growing body of research that supports the importance of both symbolic and perceptual processing of emotion. Keywords: emotion; embodied cognition; cognition; statistical linguistic frequencies. symbolic Introduction Theories of embodied cognition claim that cognition is fundamentally based in perceptual experiences. That is, concepts only become meaningful through comprehenders mentally reenacting prior physical and perceptual experiences with the concept in the real world (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007; Semin & Smith, 2008). For instance, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) proposed the action- sentence compatibility effect whereby language processing is facilitated when a congruent response motion is used to respond to sentences describing motion away from or towards the body. That is, sentences describing motion away from the body (e.g., close a drawer) were processed faster when response motions were also moving away from the body, and vice versa. These results and findings similar to these demonstrate that linguistic processing is facilitated through perceptual-motor information (see Leventhal, 1982 for an overview). Similar to action related sentences, sentences with emotional content have also provided support for an embodied cognition account. Mouilso, Glenberg, Havas, and Lindeman (2007) found that reading ‘angry’ sentences resulted in faster movements away from the body and reading ‘sad’ sentences resulted in faster movements toward the body. In other words, when people read angry content, they processed the sentence faster with an aggressive action toward it, whereas ‘sad’ sentences evoke a withdrawal action, suggesting that emotional language can affect bodily responses. Embodied responses have also been linked to cognition through the facial feedback hypothesis (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988; Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989). The facial feedback hypothesis demonstrates that facial expressions might influence emotional assessments. For example, when participants were instructed to smile, cartoons were perceived as more humorous than when subjects were not smiling (Strack et al., 1988), showing that bodily states can affect both judgments and cognition. Most literature supporting an embodied cognition account, however, demonstrates evidence without physical manipulation. For example, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou