Emotion-Based Reconciliation Requires Attention to Power Differences, Critical Consciousness, and Structural Change

The premise of the target article by Cehaji c-Clancy, Goldenberg, Gross, and Halperin (this issue) is that intergroup reconciliation should be understood as an emotion regulation process. Interventions aimed at promoting intergroup reconciliation should therefore focus on helping individuals and societies let go of past and current negative emotions and adopt positive and constructive emotions instead. The attempt to integrate the two distinct literatures on emotion regulation and intergroup reconciliation is an important step. Whereas previous studies have examined the role of emotion regulation in interpersonal relationships (e.g., Vater & Schr€oder-Ab e, 2015) and there is a growing body of research on the role of emotions in intergroup conflict, reconciliation, and intergroup relations more generally (e.g., Halperin, 2016; Iyer & Leach, 2007), linking emotion regulation to intergroup reconciliation is novel and promising. The authors build this strategy on a review of the literature detailing specific emotions that need to be targeted— focusing on hatred, anger, guilt, hope, and empathy. A main focus of the proposed strategy is to help people regulate these emotions indirectly by targeting underlying beliefs through cognitive reappraisal. In other words, the authors argue for the importance of individual change and integrate other individual-level factors in the model by recognizing the role that these factors play in group-based emotions. Thus, their model of emotion regulation-based reconciliation is compatible with other research showing the importance of changing beliefs and group norms in promoting peace and reconciliation (e.g., Bar-Tal & Cehaji c-Clancy, 2014; Paluck, 2009; Shnabel & Nadler, 2015). Recognizing the importance of emotion and emotion regulation for intergroup conflict and reconciliation, we argue that at least three additional factors need to be addressed in this model to enhance its theoretical contribution and practical utility: First, rather than focusing merely on the individual ability to regulate emotions in conflicts and their aftermath, there is a need to also address the structural factors and societal realities to which people are affectively responding. In other words, we need to think about societal change and not just individuallevel cognitive and affective change to achieve reconciliation. Second, and related to this point, the model does not differentiate processes that are relevant among victim versus perpetrator groups, and it neglects power and status differences between groups. Most conflicts and postconflict settings are asymmetrical and involve ongoing inequalities, unaddressed grievances, and injustices that provide crucial context information when trying to understand individual-level emotional and cognitive responses. Third, there is a need to differentiate between seemingly “negative” emotions that are more versus less destructive (e.g., hatred vs. anger) and to acknowledge the constructive functions that some of these emotions can have in bringing about social change aiming at equality that is crucial for sustainable peace and reconciliation. In the following we elaborate on each of these points in turn and, throughout this commentary, discuss their ethical implications.