De Gustibus Est Disputandum*

While rational choice theorists have made great advances in their study of institutions and structures (and how they affect behavior), they have made less progress toward understanding the origins of values. I propose that the emerging field of evolutionary psychology complements rational choice theory by providing a theory of values, and that current explanations of values and preferences, such as learning, norms, and identities, are all compatible with evolutionary psychology, which provides more ultimate explanations for these proximate causes of behavior. The incorporation of evolutionary psychology into rational choice theory can also solve some of the persistent puzzles of rational choice theory: Why do so many players in Prisoner’s Dilemma games make the irrational choice to cooperate? Why do people participate in collective action? Why do people sometimes behave “irrationally” by acting on their emotions? Why does rational choice theory appear to be more applicable to men than to women? Sociological rational choice theory is a macro theory which explains aggregate social phenomena (Hechter & Kanazawa 1997). Macro, in this sense, does not necessarily mean “big”; anything larger than an individual, whether dyads, small groups, neighborhoods, nation-states, or the world system, qualifies as macro, and rational choice theory, in principle, can explain its behavior. Because rational choice theory is methodologically individualist, it explains these macro phenomena as an aggregate function of individual behavior at the micro level. (See Figure 1.) * I thank Jeremy Freese, Hazem Ghobarah, Rosemary L. Hopcroft, Peter J. Katzenstein, Joseph Lopreato, Michael W. Macy, Alan S. Miller, Shepley Orr, Eric A. Posner, Paul J. Quirk, Derek Reiners, Yoshimichi Sato, Mary C. Still, and Joseph M. Whitmeyer for their comments on earlier drafts, and Annie Gallup for intellectual inspiration and copyright permission to quote her lyrics. Michael Hechter originally taught me the importance of the theory of values. This is my answer to his question. Direct all correspondence to: Satoshi Kanazawa, Department of Sociology, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Indiana, PA 15705-1087. Email: Kanazawa@grove.iup. edu. 1132 / Social Forces 79:3, March 2001 Individual behavior at the micro level is in turn a function of a combination of the macro structural and institutional constraints and the individual’s values and preferences. Rational choice theory assumes that individuals do their best to pursue their values and preferences (whatever they may be), subject to the constraints imposed on them by the social structure and institutional rules and sanctions. These structural and institutional constraints are often the macro-level outcomes of the individual behavior in the past. It is therefore possible to link the static rational choice models (represented by the Coleman Boat [Coleman 1990:1-23]) and create a dynamic rational choice theory across time (represented by the Coleman Fleet). Rational choice theory can therefore provide, in principle, a completely endogenous explanation of aggregate phenomena and individual behavior, except for the individual values and preferences (the lowercase x in Figure 1). Rational choice theory and neoclassical microeconomic theory (which provides some of its microfoundations) are usually mute on the origins of values and preferences (Hechter 1992, 1994). In fact, their traditional answer to the question of individual values and preferences is: De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum (Stigler & Becker 1977). There’s no accounting for tastes, and one cannot explain individuals’ X Y