Beyond general intelligence: The dual-process theory of human intelligence

Beyond General Intelligence: The Dual­Process Theory of Human Intelligence Scott Barry Kaufman 2009 Over 30 years of research in cognitive science reveals that a considerable amount of information processing takes place automatically—without our intent, awareness, or deliberate encoding—and plays a significant role in structuring our skills, perceptions, and behavior. Indeed, it is increasingly recognized that dual‐process theories, which posit that humans possess two distinct modes of thought—one controlled, and the other automatic— are required for explaining cognitive, personality, and social phenomenon. However, while intelligence researchers have done a remarkable job measuring individual differences in explicitly controlled cognitive processes, individual differences in automatic cognitive processes have not received nearly as much attention. In this dissertation, I aim to go beyond general intelligence (g) by measuring individual differences in implicit cognition and their relations to a wide variety of intelligent behaviors, thereby expanding both the range of methodologies as well as dependent measures studied by intelligence researchers. Toward these goals, I proposed the Dual‐Process (DP) theory of human intelligence in which intelligent behavior is jointly influenced both by Controlled and Autonomous forms of cognition. According to the DP theory, intelligence is the ability to balance and flexibly switch between modes of thought depending on task demands. While Controlled Cognition is largely constrained by central executive functioning, Autonomous Cognition is not. Further, both ability and Openness to Engagement in Autonomous forms of Cognition are expected to predict a wide variety of intelligent outcomes independently of Explicit Cognitive Ability (ECA). The theory was largely supported in a sample of 177 English Sixth Form College students between the ages of 16‐18. Two forms of implicit cognition tested were implicit learning (IL) of a probabilistic sequential pattern and latent inhibition (LI) of stimuli that was previously tagged as irrelevant. IL and LI were both unrelated to measures of ECA (g, working memory, and intentional associative learning) and Intellectual Engagement. Yet IL and LI both displayed meaningful individual differences. IL was positively related to specific components of cognitive ability, Openness to Experience, impulsivity, and language achievement. Reduced LI was positively associated with Openness to Affective Engagement and self‐reported creative achievement in the Arts, but not the Sciences. Additionally, Openness to Affective and Aesthetic (Art, Music and Fantasy) Engagement differentially predicted deductive reasoning and self‐report measures of the Big Five (Costa & McCrae, 1992), impulsivity, need for uniqueness, and creative achievement in the Arts above and beyond ECA and Intellectual Engagement. ECA and Intellectual Engagement were related to self‐reported creative achievement in the Sciences, but not the Arts. Taken together, these results have implications for understanding rationality, evolutionary psychology, interactions between Controlled and Autonomous Cognition, social cognition, creativity, schizophrenia, expertise, and the relationship between personality and cognition. As such, these results illustrate how—by investigating individual differences both in Controlled and Autonomous forms of cognition—the Dual Process theory provides a more complete understanding of human intelligence. Beyond General Intelligence: The Dual­Process Theory of Human