Effortful Pragmatics: The Demanding Nature of Implicatures

Effortful Pragmatics: The Demanding Nature of Implicatures Wim De Neys (Wim.Deneys@psy.kuleuven.be) Walter Schaeken (Walter.Schaeken@psy.kuleuven.be) Department of Psychology, K.U. Leuven, Tiensestraat 102 B-3000 Leuven, Belgium compatible with (c) and not with (b). In statement (b), Some is interpreted pragmatically. Based on expectations about how a conversational exchange occurs the hearer goes beyond the literal, logical meaning of the uttered terms (Grice, 1989). Such pragmatic inferences or implicatures have been extensively studied in the philosophical and linguistic work on verbal communication. The inference in the example has been dubbed scalar implicature since the constituting terms can be ordered on a scale of informativeness. The implicature arises when a less informative term (e.g., Some) is taken to imply the denial of the more informative term (e.g., All). The scalar implicature is considered as the paradigmatic case for the study of implicatures. In the literature there is an interesting discordance between pragmatic theorist who try to describe how scalar inferences actually work (i.e., how a scalar inference manifests itself in real time). The dispute centers around the automaticity of the scalar implicature (see Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck, 2001; Noveck & Posada, 2003; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). One school of thought, referred to as the “neo-Gricean” account (e.g., Levinson, 2000) claims that the pragmatic interpretation is actually the default interpretation in a concrete, communicative setting. It is assumed that every time Some is encountered the hearer will automatically make the scalar implicature. Levinson, for example, has argued that scalar implicatures result from a Q-heuristic dictating that “What isn’t said isn’t”. Therefore, whenever a listener hears a weak scalar term like Some, the listener will automatically assume that the speaker intended that a stronger term (i.e., All) is not warranted. The Q-heuristic dictates that if it is not said that All is the case, it is not. If the speaker intended Some to imply the stronger term All, she should have said it explicitly. Hence, the hearer will always start by making the scalar implicature. An eventual logical interpretation of Some can only arise in a later stage where the implicature is undone by the context. A second approach, Relevance Theory (Carston, 1999; Sperber & Wilson, 1996), assumes implicatures are not made by default. Relevance theory states that how far a hearer goes in processing an utterance’s meaning is governed by principles concerning effect and effort. Listeners try to gain as many effects as possible for the least effort. According to Relevance Theory the logical Abstract In the present study we introduce dual task methodology to test opposing psychological processing predictions concerning the nature of implicatures in pragmatic theories. Implicatures routinely arise in human communication when hearers interpret utterances pragmatically and go beyond the logical meaning of the terms. The neo-Gricean view (e.g., Levinson, 2000) assumes that implicatures are generated automatically whereas Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1996) assumes that implicatures are effortful and not automatic. Participants were presented a sentence verification task with underinformative sentences that have the potential to produce scalar implicatures like Some oaks are trees. Depending on the nature of the interpretation of Some (logical or pragmatic) the sentence is judged true or false. In two experiments, cognitive working memory resources were experimentally burdened by the concurrent memorization of complex dot patterns during the interpretation process. Results showed that participants made more logical and fewer pragmatic interpretations under load. Findings provide direct support for the Relevance Theory view. Introduction The complexity of human communication has been characterized as one of the hallmarks of our species. A striking demonstration of the sophisticated nature of our communication system is our ability to draw pragmatic inferences or implicatures. Often speakers intend to convey far more than the logical meaning of the words they utter and hearers readily retrieve the intended interpretation. Imagine, for example, that U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld states in an interview: (a) Some of our soldiers are misbehaving. You would readily assume that Mr. Rumsfeld intends to say: (b) Not all of our soldiers are misbehaving. Rather then: (c) All of our soldiers are misbehaving. However, according to standard semantic accounts, Some means Some and possibly All. From a strictly logical point of view, Secretary Rumsfeld’s utterance is therefore