Deliberative Inclusion of Minorities: Equality and Reciprocity Among Linguistic Groups in Switzerland

The inclusion of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups looms large in the study of democracy. There is ample recognition that “simple political egalitarianism on which the institutions and mechanisms of modern representative democracy were established has given way to increasing demands for group recognition as well as for forms of equality related directly to people's needs, characteristics, identities and conditions. ” (Castiglione and Warren 2005: 2) There is also ample recognition that the standard liberal and majoritarian model of democracy is frequently unable to safeguard the most vital interests of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups. Several representation models and institutional devices have been proposed in order to advance the interests of minorities and disadvantaged groups. In the past decade, however, the study of inclusion and representation has increasingly taken a deliberative turn (Williams 1998; Urbinati 2000; Mansbridge 2003; 2009; Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). Rather than focusing on formal and institutional means of inclusion (such as proportional representation, minority veto, or re-districting), deliberative approaches take an informal and dynamic view on inclusion and representation. In their mainstream and Habermasian-inspired version, deliberative approaches entail the idea of equal participation and symmetric dialogue, reasoned argument, common good orientation, serious and respectful listening (and responding) to other participants' claims, as well as mutual agreement based on the “forceless force of the better argument”. With their focus on equality, symmetry, serious listening, and respect, deliberative approaches spark hope to be susceptible to the interests of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups. Yet, despite tremendous interest in deliberative approaches in recent years, the exact specification and empirical translation of deliberative ideals in the context of minority and group inclusion has lagged behind. This may not be so surprising, given the fact that deliberative approaches are far from being fool-proof devices for the inclusion of disadvantaged groups. The major problem is that mainstream and Habermasian-inspired forms of deliberation might actually hamper inclusionary goals. On the one hand, feminists and difference democrats have argued that many disadvantaged people do not engage in rationalistic forms of deliberation, which may suit only a privileged few. On the other hand, why should disadvantaged groups respectfully listen to privileged groups or even transcend their interests in the light of the “better” argument, especially if they have experienced inequality or if their vital interests are at stake? As Williams (1998) has noted, requiring selflessness and self-transformation of the disadvantaged is deeply unfair. These are two valid objections, not easily addressed by the mainstream deliberative approach. Therefore, we propose a deliberative approach with “friendly amendments”. Our approach focuses on two central principles of deliberation, equality of participation and reciprocity, but it does so with a twist for reciprocity. First, equality of deliberation requires that all affected are included and “that no one person or advantaged group completely dominate the reason giving process, even if the deliberators are not strictly equal in power and prestige. ” (Thompson 2008: 507). Second, reciprocity means that discourse participants should listen and respond to each other and do so in a respectful way (Chambers 1999). However, the trick here is to put the “burden” of reciprocity primarily on majorities and privileged groups: it is mainly their obligation to seriously listen and respond to the demands and arguments of minorities and disadvantaged groups and show a willingness to respect and accommodate these interests. Conversely, structural minorities and disadvantaged groups are not fully held accountable to these standards. They may be deliberative, but they may also adopt a more adversarial stance towards majorities and privileged groups. This relaxation is conditional though: the less inequality structural minorities and disadvantaged groups have experienced and the less their vital interests are at stake, the more we expect them to converge to the standards of majorities and privileged groups (and the more privileged groups are dispensed from taking a deliberative attitude vis-a-vis the disadvantaged). Finally, contrary to standard models of political inclusion and representation, our deliberative approach focuses only on the horizontal relationship among different (group) representatives and the ways they interact – rather than on the vertical relationship between representatives and constituents. We think that the former aspect of representation is critical though: it is the moment when inclusion and representation are in action and when constituent interests are turned into binding decisions. So far, there has been little empirical and systematic examination of deliberative forms of inclusion in the context of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups. In this study, we investigate equality of participation and reciprocity in the context of linguistic minorities in Switzerland (French, Italian and Romansch-speakers). To be sure, linguistic groups in Switzerland do not directly qualify as “disadvantaged” groups (such as Blacks in the United States), since they have not experienced deep inequality or oppression in the past. However, when their vital interests are at stake, they do not have formal means of veto power to prevent unwanted legislation but are generally dependent on the decisions of the German-speaking majority to realize their interests (both in representative and direct democracy). Moreover, there have been recurrent complaints of linguistic minorities of being marginalized and ignored by German speakers. As such, an empirical investigation of deliberative inclusion of linguistic minorities in Switzerland is far from being misdirected. At the same time, the institutional architecture of the Swiss political system is also conducive to deliberative forms of policy-making: it involves a consensus system with non-parliamentary features, enabling political actors to engage in consequential deliberation (see Steiner et al. 2004). Moreover, the party system is not organized along linguistic cleavages reducing partisan incentives to politicize linguistic conflicts. This combines with a specific motivation on part of the German-speaking majority to be receptive to the demands of linguistic minorities (Bachtiger and Steiner 2004). Thus, favorable institutional conditions and appropriate actor motivations should provide fertile ground to see our conception of deliberative inclusion “in action”. Put differently, the Swiss case enables us to explore how well the ideals of equality of participation and reciprocity are realized in practice when conditions are fairly ideal. In concrete, we focus on two Swiss parliamentary decision cases that deal with linguistic issues and directly concern linguistic minorities‟ vital interests (language article and language bill); in addition, we focus on a contrast decision case, the labor law revision which does not touch upon vital interests of the linguistic minorities. For the three cases, we explore patterns of participation and reciprocity in the committees of the first and second chambers of parliament. With regard to equality of participation, we analyze how often linguistic minorities speak up compared to the German-speaking majority. With regard to reciprocity, we analyze how often linguistic minorities are referred to, how often linguistic minorities refer to other actors, and whether this is done in a respectful and disrespectful way. Furthermore, we also perform an in-depth analysis of reciprocity and explore how often arguments of linguistic minorities are referred to by the German-speaking minority and whether this is done in a respectful (or, disrespectful) way. Our empirical analysis of deliberative inclusion draws from Steven Levitt‟s (2004) analysis of discrimination in the United States. We calculate frequencies for participation and reciprocity rates as a function of the speakers status – linguistic minority or linguistic majority -, controlling for other characteristics of the speaker (such as gender, role, or partisan affiliation) as well as characteristics of the context (different issues or first vs. second chamber). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our model of deliberative inclusion. Section III provides background on deliberative inclusion in the context of linguistic groups in Switzerland, discusses the methodological approach, and presents the empirical results. Section IV concludes.