Theories in the Field of Community Psychology

In this article, we review some of the key attributes of useful theories and assess whether these attributes are present in several prominent Community Psychology theories. The field of Community Psychology often deals with complex systems and attempts to create change through the use of multiple mechanisms. It has provided researchers new ways of thinking about contextual factors and how participants could be more involved in research efforts. However, this field has encountered significant challenges in testing and evaluating theories that involve system-level environmental change. It has struggled to establish consensus when operationally defining criteria and when creating reliable instruments for measuring theoretical constructs. We conclude that Community Psychology theories have tended to function as frameworks, which indicate important elements to examine, but do not specify relationships that can be used for explanation and are, therefore, too broad to make the types of predictions characteristic of science. Because Community Psychology theories have often served as orienting frameworks, there needs to be more discussion about their usefulness, and whether community psychologists can develop more rigorous and specific theories. This has implications for formulating various practices and for discussions about how future research can better inform theory. Theoretical issues abound in many areas of psychology. Meehl (1978, pp. 806), one of the more vocal advocates of the importance of theory, has stated: “most so called theories in the soft areas of psychology (clinical, counseling, social, personality, community, and school psychology) are scientifically unimpressive and technologically worthless. ” While this stance reflects a positivistic approach to psychology that is not necessarily embraced by all community psychologists, the charge is worth consideration nonetheless (Kloos, Hill, Thomas, Wandersman, Elias, & Dalton, 2012). It would be useful for the field to have a clear, shared understanding around the use of the term “theory” and when and how it applies to the work that we do. It is in this spirit that we explore some of the key “theories” used by community psychologists in order to assess whether or not they fit within the concept of theory as traditionally defined in scientific inquiry. In order to do this we must first trace the definition and use of the idea of “theory” in these terms and then we must determine which of them within the field of community psychology might be fruitfully analyzed using this rubric. Defining and Using Theory in Scientific Inquiry According to Kerlinger (1986), “A theory is a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena” (p. 11). A hallmark of the scientific process is the development and testing of theories, and, consequently, those disciplines without good theoretical foundations are often seen as less rigorous or less valuable to the larger scientific community. Theories allow data to be organized, systematized, and interpreted. Some would argue that without theories it is harder to achieve progress towards useful accumulated knowledge. McAdams and Pals (2007) state that: "Theory is at the heart of science” (p 3), and Feynman (1997) believes that if academics are not engaging in theoretical work, their contributions are best Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice Volume 7, Issue 2 February 2016 Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice, http://www.gjcpp. org/ Page 4 categorized as an engineering endeavor rather than true science. Of course, others would disagree with Feynman’s (1997) assessment. In the field of medicine, for example, much occurs that is practical and contributes to the larger mission of both patient care and the development of new therapeutic methods. In fact, many medical discoveries such as the discovery of penicillin, which began the modern era of antibiotic development (Colebrook, 1956), are the result of serendipity rather than programmatic theory-tested experiments. However, even within the more applied disciplines such as medicine, there are implicit theoretical models. For example, theoretical models regarding cell function, cell growth, and biochemical change have allowed scientists to develop interventions for a number of neurodegenerative diseases (Sheikh, Safia, Haque, & Mir, 2013). Though there are distinctions between those who practice medicine and those whose research explicitly wields theory, many believe theories apply to both types of activities and, more importantly, are the driving force for innovations. It is even possible to argue that in any research or clinical practice, there is always a theoretical model in operation. Criteria for Evaluating Theories Theories serve three purposes—describing, explaining, and predicting phenomena (Jiang, 1998). First, theories are used to describe a phenomenon. These descriptive processes are then used to explain why the phenomenon occurs, and this explanatory framework is then used in making inferential predictions. A well-formulated theory should also be able to explain the phenomena of interest and posit under which circumstances and conditions (people, settings, and times) a given set of propositions should apply. This provides a better understanding of the phenomenon of interest and allows for a more critical analysis. For example, Affective Events Theory (AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) posits that affective behaviors (e.g., citizenship behaviors such as courtesy, conscientiousness, and sportsmanship) are directly related to affective experiences, while judgment-driven behaviors (e.g., leaving a setting) are indirectly related to affect through the attitudes (e.g. satisfaction and commitment) formed by such experiences. This distinction is a critical part of understanding the relationship between affective events and behavior, and this theory has been fruitfully applied to community settings (Beasley & Jason, 2015). According to Reichenbach (1938), there is a distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. In the context of discovery, people describe what they have stumbled upon; whereas in the context of justification, they make predictions and then test these ideas in order to prove or disprove them. Indeed, the prevalent practice of generating hypotheses and theories after the data have been analyzed (known as HARKing; Hypothesizing After the Results are Known; Kerr, 1998) has received quite a bit of critical attention. In these circumstances it is possible that one is only explaining phenomena through the lens of what is already known. Feynman (1997) has described good science as a process of “bending over backward to show oneself wrong. ” With HARKed theoretical explanation, there is an absence of such “bending over backwards. ” As an approach to inquiry, it leans towards affirmation, risking a result that simply confirms what a researcher already believes to be true. This is reminiscent of Meehl’s (1967) argument that psychologists’ reliance on post-hoc explanation of why phenomena did or did not occur obscures the field’s ability to assess why people function as they do. To counteract the bias of HARK, some researchers suggest that theories need to be: 1) articulated (and perhaps hypotheses even registered before research is conducted) this is akin to Nozek and Bar-Anan’s (2012) concept of Open Science and 2) tested a priori Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice Volume 7, Issue 2 February 2016 Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice, http://www.gjcpp. org/ Page 5 so that one can see whether or not any given theory acts as a valid “inference ticket” for human phenomena. It should be noted that some have raised important concerns regarding the classic context of discovery/context of justification distinction (e.g., Hoyningien-Huene, 2006), but even while questioning the merit of such an unambiguous binary divide, most would still recognize the need for “a distinct normative perspective that aims at the evaluation of scientific claims” HoyningienHuene, 2006, p. 130). A major aim of this article is to attempt to apply some “normative perspective” regarding the use of theory to work in the field of Community Psychology and to generate what we hope will be a productive conversation around such aims. One such normative criteria often used in science is that good theories need to offer clear predictions regarding what should happen with new data, and these predictions should be capable of being rigorously tested and falsified (Popper, 1968). According to Borsboom (2013), “A good scientific theory allows you to infer what would happen to things in certain situations without creating the situations.Theories should be interpreted as inference tickets. ” Otherwise, a theory is too broad to make the types of predictions characteristic of science. In making predictions about new data, theories provide insight into how human behavior works in systematic ways. Ultimately, theories are part of the process where observations become evidence for generalizable knowledge, which can have useful applicability. Theories also deal with falsifiability and utility (Bacharach, 1989; Huber, 2008; Van de Ven, 1989). Finally, when using theories in research, investigators need to assess the applicability of a theory within a variety of contexts in order to describe the boundary conditions in which the theory predictions hold or do not hold. For example, under classical conditions, the theory of gravitation is correct. But, gravitational theory does not apply at quantum distances or extremely high energies—that is, there is no theory of quantum gravity. Gravity applies very nicely when predicting motion of objects, but not under all conditions (i.e., air resistance of a dropped o