Holding Schools Accountable: Is it Working?

The authors share findings from a body of research on emerging accountability systems conducted by the Consortium for Policy Research in Education. THE THEORY that measuring performance and coupling it to rewards and sanctions will cause schools and the individuals who work in them to perform at higher levels underpins performance-based accountability systems. Such systems are now operating in most states and in thousands of districts, and they represent a significant change from traditional approaches to accountability. The new approaches focus primarily on schools, whereas in the past states held school districts primarily accountable. The new approaches focus on performance and other outputs, whereas in the past districts were held accountable for offering sufficient inputs and complying with regulations. Moreover, there are significant consequences, such as substantial bonuses or the threat of school closure, associated with the new approaches, whereas in the past the worst sanction, the withholding of school aid, was only rarely applied, on the ground that students would suffer the most. Researchers associated with the Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) have examined these emerging accountability systems in a number of ways. CPRE has conducted interviews and large-scale surveys of teachers and principals in two research sites that are using new accountability systems: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools in North Carolina and the state of Kentucky.1 We studied the internal accountability systems in 20 public, charter, and independent schools and then followed up in three high schools in each of four states with very different accountability approaches.2 In a number of cities, we looked at school reconstitution, one of the most severe sanctions applied to failing schools.3 In a study of eight states, we examined how federal, state, and district accountability interacted and how schools were affected by the various systems.4 We also surveyed all 50 states and profiled their policies regarding assessment, performance reporting, accountability, and alignment between their Title I and general systems of accountability.5 Our research yielded a number of findings. 1. Accountability systems attract the attention of teachers and administrators. Setting student achievement goals for a school helps provide teachers with a focus for their work and increases the energy devoted to instruction. New accountability systems help channel teachers' work to the most important goals, largely those included in the performance measure. In the Kentucky and Charlotte-Mecklenburg studies, we found that teachers valued the personal satisfaction from increasing student learning, the professional recognition for doing a good job, and the receipt of a monetary bonus. Bonuses seemed to be less of an incentive for many teachers than a "thank you" for a job well done, but teachers tended to agree that a bonus was an important symbol of accountability or efficiency to the public. Negative outcomes, which were equally motivating, included increased pressure and stress to improve results, fear of being labeled as a "school in decline," and the accompanying professional embarrassment, loss of freedom through state-directed assistance or "takeovers," and expanded work hours. 2. Teachers and schools vary in their responses to accountability systems. A number of scholars have worried that focusing on test scores can severely narrow the curriculum.6 In this scenario, teachers discard favorite units and drill students exclusively on assessed content. Sometimes that drill exceeds "instruction" and crosses over into overt "test preparation. " In those cases, it appears that the content is being learned only in the context of a specific test, without any broader application. However, CPRE work in 10 states suggests that, while narrowing does occur, so do other types of responses. In Kentucky, for example, the accountability system is credited with expanding the content taught to include writing and the humanities. …