PROCESS ACCOUNTABILITY, INFORMATION SEARCH, TIME 1 Process Accountability as a De-Escalation Technique: How Time Moderates the Dual Role of Information Search

Escalation of commitment describes the continuation of a course of action despite drawbacks and increasing uncertainty of goal achievement. The present study improves our understanding of process accountability as a de-escalation technique. Because process accountability requires decision makers to base their decisions on the results of (hopefully unbiased) information, which in turn requires time to gather, the de-escalatory effect of process accountability is stronger during later stages of the escalation process. However, because time spent with information search creates commitment, the debiasing effect of process accountability on information search diminishes over time. Finally, consistent with the assumption of an increasingly stronger tunnel vision in escalation processes, the effects of biased information search on de-escalation are weaker during later stages. PROCESS ACCOUNTABILITY, INFORMATION SEARCH, TIME 3 Process Accountability as a De-Escalation Technique: How Time Moderates the Dual Role of Information Search Escalation of commitment describes the phenomenon of adhering to a course of action even though negative feedback indicates failure. In the domains of business and economics, this can occur in a variety of situations, such as exploding costs of construction projects, continuing an investment in losing stocks, or retaining an underperforming employee (Staw, 1997). A considerable amount of research has investigated the determinants of escalating commitment (for a meta-analysis see Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara, & Miles, 2012), whereas only a small number of studies have identified factors that contribute to what has been termed de-escalation of commitment (Simonson & Staw, 1992). Contrary to a simple prevention of stepping into a losing course of action by a reversal of factors that initiate escalation, factors promoting deescalation allow for the discontinuation of a losing course of action. This logic is similar, for example, to the fact that cure and causes of some illnesses must not be identical (e.g., genetic disorders such as phenylketonuria might be alleviated by dieting, but not dieting does not cause genetic disorders). One important de-escalation technique is process accountability (PA), given its effectiveness as a debiasing technique in general (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In fact, Simonson and Staw (1992) found that PA promotes de-escalation of commitment. The current study intends to extend our knowledge on PA with respect to two aspects: We examine behavior as well as the role of cognitive processes and, drawing on Brockner and Rubin’s (1985) notion of stages of escalation, we take the dynamic nature of escalation into account. Integrating these two points, we suggest that at early stages, PA will instigate unbiased processing, but not deescalation. The (behavioral) de-escalating effect of PA will only occur at later stages, when PROCESS ACCOUNTABILITY, INFORMATION SEARCH, TIME 4 decision makers feel they have gathered enough information. First, Simonson and Staw (1992) proposed that PA leads to more accurate information processing, but they did not examine this assumption. It is, however, important to understand the cognitive processes related to deescalation. For example, alternative explanations of the effects of PA could be that decision makers are confused and prefer to withdraw from an unpleasant decision situation, are less committed from the onset due to distrust in what will happen or even overhastily “give up” if they receive any negative information after a PA instruction. Therefore, it is valuable to analyze whether PA really instigates less biased cognitive processes. Second, the effectiveness of PA might differ depending on the nature of the decision scenario. Though escalation of commitment is a process and theories have described stages of this process (e.g., Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Staw, 1997), it has often been analyzed by rather static decision scenarios. For example, research has examined escalation through the analysis of one decision following one instance of negative feedback (e.g., Conlon & Parks, 1987; Simonson & Nye, 1992). This can be contrasted with dynamic decision scenarios that include repeated feedback and decisions. Dynamic decision scenarios have two important features: (1) Decision makers (DMs) can expect to learn more and therefore make more informed decisions if they continue their course of action, though (2) while sticking to their course of action in order to learn, DMs increase their behavioral commitment due to the (inevitable) continuation of their behavior. Consider the example of a supervisor (S) who is accountable for the onboarding process of a new employee (E). If S receives initial feedback about adaptation problems of E, S might doubt that this feedback is reliable and that there is enough information to fire E and to justify this decision to an audience. In order to gather more information on how E is adapting, the onboarding must continue which in turn means that during subsequent decision situations S has then to take into account information on his previous PROCESS ACCOUNTABILITY, INFORMATION SEARCH, TIME 5 behavioral commitment. This leads to the core question of the current research: Even if process accountability has a debiasing effect, is it strong enough to withstand the side effect: behavioral commitment necessary to satisfy the need to search for information? In summary, we assume that cognitive processes change during escalating commitment. In early stages of the escalation process, information search bias should be less pronounced, and therefore promotes de-escalation of commitment. Though process accountability fosters unbiased information search, its effectiveness requires time to unfold and should be stronger at later stages. Process Accountability, De-escalation and, Time Accountability is defined as the expectation that decisions will be evaluated by others and that individuals have to give reasons for their decisions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Effects of accountability are often difficult to predict, and prior research has reported that escalation as well as de-escalation may result (e.g., Fox & Staw, 1979). In fact, Simonson and Staw (1992) found that process accountability, but not outcome accountability, had a de-escalating effect, proposing processes of heightening “decision-making prowess” and increasing “cognitive vigilance” (p. 419), though they did not utilize measures of these cognitive processes. Accordingly, we assume that process accountability promotes de-escalation of commitment (Hypothesis 1a). Hypothesis 1a: Decision makers (DMs) under process accountability (PA) are more likely to abandon a losing course of action (i.e., de-escalate their commitment) than DMs with no PA. PROCESS ACCOUNTABILITY, INFORMATION SEARCH, TIME 6 Though we expect to find that PA will promote de-escalation, it will take some time. DMs have to stay committed to the course of action as long as they expect to gather additional valuable information in subsequent stages and continuation is the only chance to obtain additional information. Information search requires time, and thus, its very nature is part of the escalation process (Gilroy & Hantula, 2016). In fact, making information available contributes to escalation even when DMs consider the information to be useless (DiFonzo & Bordia, 1997) and those high in accountability might be even more vulnerable to this dilution effect (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). Only at later stages in the decision process the accumulation of data indicates that feedback is reliable and trustworthy, and thus, diminishes the value of continued information search. Remember again the example of S being accountable for onboarding E who turns out to perform below acceptable standards. S might have received negative feedback from the beginning, but decided to continue the employment relationship because this early feedback is considered as preliminary and unreliable. This is all the more true, if S experiences process accountability because the ability to present good reasons also depends on being well-informed about the process. In sum, the effect of PA on de-escalation will be delayed until later stages in a decision process and therefore time moderates the effects of PA on de-escalation (Hypothesis 1b). Hypothesis 1b: The effect of PA on de-escalation of commitment will be moderated by time, that is, it will be stronger at later stages. PROCESS ACCOUNTABILITY, INFORMATION SEARCH, TIME 7 Process Accountability, Bias in Information Search, and Time In the current study, we focus on information search to examine biased information processing for two reasons. First, decision makers who are committed to a previous decision and who experience a drawback are susceptible to generate reasons that justify their position (defensive bolstering; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) and can be expected to actively bias their information search. Of note is that the theory of dissonance is not only the basis of the selfjustification hypothesis of escalating commitment (Brockner, 1992), but has inspired an important research stream on selective exposure to information (Frey, 1986; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). Second, biased information search should be mitigated in case of process accountability because decision makers can be expected to “prepare themselves by [. ] selfcritical search for reasons to justify their actions” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 263). PA has been hypothesized to lend to more self-critical search for information and cognitive vigilance (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Simonson & Staw, 1992). Given that the current study is primarily interested in information search bias, we assume less biased information search in DMs under PA (Hypothesis 2a). Hypothesis 2a: DMs under PA will show less biased information search than DMs with no PA. Moreover, scholars proposed that rational considerations predominate at th