Knowing You : Own Orientation and Information about the Opponent ’ s Orientation in Negotiation

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of motivational orientations on negotiation outcomes in unstable negotiation contexts. Instability was created by pitting individualists against cooperators (mixed dyads), and by giving only one of the parties information about the other party’s orientation. A total of 162 subjects participated in negotiation simulations, where orientation and information were manipulated through instructions from management. The cooperative dyads got better outcomes than did the individualistic dyads. The mixed dyads did as well as the cooperative dyads when the cooperators had information, but did as badly as the individualistic dyads when the individualists had information. The process analyses indicated that the dyads with high outcomes achieved their results because the integrative activities increased over time. In the mixed dyads with informed individualists, the individualists reached higher individual outcome than their cooperative (uninformed) opponents. Thus, naive cooperators can easily be exploited. Orientation and Information 3 Knowing Me, Knowing You: Own Orientation and Information about the Opponent’s Orientation in Negotiation Motivational orientation is a prime mover behind behavior and outcomes in negotiations, as it gives negotiators goals and directions (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). For example, individualists seek to maximize only their own outcomes while cooperators seek to maximize both their own and the joint outcomes. Previous research on motivational orientation has found cooperators to have more integrative behavior and to get better outcomes than individualists (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). Thus, motivational orientations seem to influence outcomes in predictable ways through the goal-directed behavior they trigger. These findings are, however, confined to stable negotiation contexts. Typically, homogeneous cooperative dyads are compared to homogeneous individualistic dyads. Furthermore, there is symmetry in information about the motivational orientation of the opponent, i.e., the negotiators both have, or have not, information about their counterpart. Based on previous research we therefore do not know what happen when the stability of the negotiation context is upset, e.g., when dyads are mixed rather than homogeneous, and when information is asymmetrical. Motivational orientations are different from, and more stable, than negotiation behavior (Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). Negotiators may therefore vary their behavior, depending on the negotiation context, in their efforts to reach the goals implied by their motivational orientations. For example, in dyads with mix in motivational orientation, the negotiation dynamic and thereby outcomes, may depend on who has knowledge about the opponent’s orientation. Therefore, in this research we focus on how motivational orientations influence outcomes in unstable negotiation contexts. We do so by (1) introducing information asymmetries in knowledge about Orientation and Information 4 the orientation of the other party, and by (2) pitting cooperative negotiators against individualists (mixed dyads). Furthermore, in addition to joint outcome, we include perceptual measures of negotiation quality. Extending research on motivational orientations into unstable negotiation contexts is highly relevant both for practice and theory. First, information asymmetry is a likely challenge for negotiators. Some negotiators may have information about their counterpart based on general reputation or from information given from individuals that have previously negotiated with the other party. Other negotiators may be completely unprepared for the orientation of the other party. Second, it is quite likely that a negotiator may meet an opponent with a different orientation, given the mixed-motive nature of the interaction (Brett, 1991). Finally, the perceived negotiation quality is important because it predicts willingness to implement agreements, and the climate in future negotiations (Brett & Rognes, 1986). From a theoretical perspective we need to know more about the relationships between motivational orientations, negotiation dynamic, and outcomes in unstable negotiation contexts. In their meta-analytical review, De Dreu et al. (2000) focused only on homogeneous dyads, but called for research on motivational orientation in less stable negotiation contexts. Presently we do not know whether the effects of motivational orientation are reduced in unstable negotiation contexts, or whether the effects depend on the nature of the instability. Orientation and Information Motivational orientation is an individual level variable that can be caused by stable individual differences (i.e., social value orientation), or be triggered by situational demands (i.e., motivational orientation). Research suggests that trait and state have similar effects on outcomes in homogeneous dyads (De Dreu et al., 2000). Orientation and Information 5 In this study we focus on orientation as a state. We do so because most of the integrative negotiation literature we link up to (De Dreu et al., 2000) focuses on motivational orientation rather than social value orientation, and because of its potential practical relevance. Since negotiators often act on behalf of an organization, the mandate they receive from higher level management is of critical importance when they negotiate. We therefore used instructions from management to create the negotiators’ orientations in the present study (Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). Also those receiving information about the opponent’s orientation, got this information from their management. Below, we first discuss how orientation and asymmetrical information affect the dyadic outcomes. Then we focus on the individual level to see how orientation and information affect the parties’ individual outcomes. Dyadic Outcomes Our first research concern is whether previously found differences between homogeneous cooperative and homogeneous individualistic dyads also hold up when information asymmetry is introduced. The results will also give us a baseline for the comparisons with mixed dyads with asymmetric information. That cooperative dyads typically reach higher joint outcomes than individualistic dyads, are found both in studies that manipulate orientation through direct instructions (e.g., Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Lewis & Fry, 1977; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975), and in studies that manipulate situational characteristics assumed to affect orientation (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a; 1984b; Carnevale & Isen, 1986). Cooperative dyads are more likely to share information, engage in more problem solving, and use less contentious tactics than individualistic dyads (Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; Lewis & Fry, 1977; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Orientation and Information 6 In some previous studies, the parties have known that their opponent have had the same orientation instruction as themselves (e.g., Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; Lewis & Fry, 1977; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). In other studies, the parties did not have this information (e.g., Giebels et al., 1998; Weingart et al., 1993), but the effects on joint outcomes are similar. We believe that the cooperative dyads also reach better agreements than the individualistic dyads when one party has information about the other’s orientation. Negotiators are likely to be egocentric in their social perceptions, and without information they have a tendency to assume that opponents are similar to themselves (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). With no information about the opponents’ orientation, negotiators may be likely to project their own orientations on to the opponents’ (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002). Research on social value orientations in experimental games also indicates that negotiators typically expect consistency between their own and the opponents’ orientation (Iedema & Poppe, 1994; Kuhlman, Brown, & Tetac, 1992). Consequently, having the information that the other party has the same orientation as oneself may only contribute to confirming already established expectations (although these expectations may be implicit). The dynamic found in cooperative and individualistic dyads (with no information) may therefore be reinforced when there is asymmetric information. Informed cooperators contribute to the development of a cooperative dynamic, resulting in integrative outcomes and high perceived negotiation quality. Informed individualists will only increase their competitive drive in order to avoid being exploited by the other party. Thus, the conflict spiral will be escalated, and the outcomes are likely to be poor. Consequently, we expect the superiority of homogenous cooperative dyads over homogenous Orientation and Information 7 individualistic dyads found in previous research (De Dreu et al., 2000), to hold also when there is asymmetry in information. Hypothesis 1: Cooperative dyads with asymmetry in information get better outcomes than individualistic dyads with asymmetry in information. In our research we examine two different types of mixed dyads. In some dyads the cooperators have the information advantage, and in other dyads the individualists have the information advantage. Having an information advantage implies that the focal party is informed about the motivational orientation of the other party, while the other party has no such information about the focal party. The current research is concerned with how the two types of mixed dyads compare to each other, and how they compare to the homogeneous cooperative dyads and the homogeneous individualistic dyads. The negotiation literature has seldom addressed issues related to mixed dyads and asymmetrical information. However, in general there is a tendency toward reciprocation in negotiations (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998), and thus we may expect mixed dyads to converge either towards competition (distrib