The Effects of Ingroup Threat on The Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic

THE EFFECTS OF INGROUP ENHANCEMENT AND INGROUP THREAT ON THE ANCHORING AND ADJUSTMENT HEURISTIC By Mattie V. Hedgebeth A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at Virginia Commonwealth University Major Directors: Drs. Jeffrey D. Green and Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba Since its introduction in 1974, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic has been a topic of interest within the field of decision making. Although much work has examined factors that affect the process of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, very little has been studied about the selfprocesses that may influence how individuals anchor. More specifically, self and ingroup motivations have yet to be explored. This research sought to identify whether an individual’s magnitude of adjustment from an anchor can be affected by either an enhancement or threat of the individual’s ingroup. I hypothesized that ingroup enhancing information would induce a smaller magnitude of adjustment from an experimenter-provided anchor and ingroup threatening information would induce a larger magnitude of adjustment from the anchor. I also hypothesized that ingroup identification would have a moderating effect on the relationship between type of anchor and magnitude of adjustment. The first study sought to establish the effect using Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) students, using VCU as the ingroup. The second study sought to replicate these findings in novel groups in order to more rigorously test the hypotheses. Results suggested that whether an anchor is high or low affects how an individual adjusts from the anchor. There is also evidence that whether or not one’s ingroup is reflected by the anchor affects adjustment from the anchor. The hypothesized moderation effects did not emerge. THE EFFECTS OF INGROUP 5 The Effects of Ingroup Threat on The Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic Suppose that an individual was told that the length of the Mississippi River was 2,348 miles long. Afterward, they were asked to estimate the length of the James river in Richmond, Virginia. Assuming that they know that the Mississippi River is one of the largest rivers in the world, they would likely adjust their estimate to be much smaller in length. This phenomenon whereby people use a cognitive heuristic to aid in their decision-making is called the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). Specifically, anchoring and adjustment is used when an individual is asked to make a judgement of a value under uncertainty and uses a previously known or presented value (anchor) to “adjust” their answer away from the anchor. Since the conception of this effect, there has been no work examining the role of self-relevant factors in the adjustment process. My research seeks to explore how these self-relevant factors, specifically ingroup bias and threat, can act as motivating factors in adjustment. A Two System Model The use of heuristics, like the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, can be best understood through the lens of a two-system model known as dual process theory (Watson & Evans, 1974). Dual process theory conceptualizes thinking and decision-making in two systems: System 1, which is fast, automatic, intuitive, and unconscious, and System 2, which is slower, effortful, controlled, and conscious. Stanovich and West (2000) used these systems to categorize and label different cognitive processes. When there is a decision to be made, System 1 creates a highly accessible impression which will control the decision unless System 2 modifies or overrides that decision. These systems are described more in more detail by the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) of persuasion. In this model, System 1 is comparable to the peripheral route of persuasion, where unconscious and intuitive judgements about the THE EFFECTS OF INGROUP 6 presentation of an argument, not necessarily the content. System 2 is comparable to the central route of persuasion where more complex analysis of an argument occurs. For example, suppose that an individual is presented with two speakers discussing an identical topic. One speaker is confident and attractive but presents a weak argument. The other speaker is not quite as attractive but is knowledgeable and presents a stronger argument. Through the peripheral route, the individual’s System 1 would likely believe the first speaker because of the positive impression made by their attractiveness and confidence. The second, more knowledgeable speaker would be more appealing to the central route of persuasion, which may only be activated if the topic and attitude were more central in importance (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). In sum, the deliberate control of System 2 would be much more analytical of the actual argument than System 1. Because people often make decisions quickly, they do not always rely on deliberate processes whereby they can thoughtfully gather, consider, and evaluate information. Thus, in cases where individuals are asked to estimate unknown answers, they engage in mental shortcuts called heuristics. These heuristics exist mainly in System 1 but can also include parts of System 2. Heuristics take an individual’s intuition from System 1 and use reasoning from System 2 to formulate the final answer. The Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic Although there are several types of heuristics, my research focuses specifically on the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. This heuristic operates by having individuals use either a self-generated value or a previously provided and typically arbitrary number (anchor) to estimate the answer. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) asked participants to provide the percentage of African nations in the United Nations. Participants then spun a “wheel of fortune” that included the numbers 0-100. Once the wheel had stopped, participants were asked to THE EFFECTS OF INGROUP 7 indicate whether the percentage was higher or lower than the number spun and to estimate the true values by moving upward or downward from the given value. Although the number that they viewed from the wheel of fortune had nothing to do with the judgment they were asked to make, the number acted as an anchor on which they could use it to inform their estimate. In another example, Ariely, Lowenstein, and Prelec (2003) had participants to write down the last two digits of their social security number before asking participants how much they would be willing to pay for a series of items presented to them. Participants with higher social security numbers were shown to pay an average of $40 more than those with lower social security numbers. Types of Anchors In cases in which individuals are not given anchors, estimates can also be generated from an individual’s own knowledge base. For example, imagine that an individual was asked the question “When was the U.S. Constitution signed? ” Though the answer is 1788, many people might respond somewhere close to the year 1776. This is because participants know that the Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776, therefore the signing of our Constitution must have occurred after the United States declared itself an independent nation. Thus, even though a specific anchor is not given, participants use their own information, received through various experiences. Aside from the larger categories of given and self-generated anchors, research has also focused on more nuanced categories of anchors. For example, intuitive anchors are synonymous with self-generated anchors in that the anchors are created from previous knowledge. Although individuals know these anchors are inaccurate, they still use them to reach the correct value. Intuitive anchoring involves high elaboration as it involves not only considering the true value THE EFFECTS OF INGROUP 8 but drawing upon earlier knowledge and experience. For this reason, intuitive anchoring is not performed when individuals do not have the availability or cognitive capacity (Epley & Gilovich, 2005). Another type of anchor utilizes the Best-and-Worst Case strategy (Epley & Gilovich, 2009). As its name suggests, individuals either anchor upon the best-case-scenario or the worstcase-scenario. In the best case, individuals tend to fall into planning fallacy (Beuhler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994), in which tasks tend to take longer than estimated. This occurs because although the best-case scenario is the most accessible outcome, the most accessible outcome is not the most likely event (Morewedge, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2005). Moreover, individuals tend to focus more on their good intentions rather than past patterns (Koehler & Poon, 2006). On the other hand, worstcase scenarios can also become anchors. For example, Rozenweig et al. (2009) found that when participants are informed of a plane crash, they tend to estimate much higher casualties but when they are motivated to be more accurate, they adjust much closer to the actual value. A third anchoring process includes the use of incidental anchors. These anchors are numbers that are encountered in the real world that effect an individual’s perception. Critcher and Gilovich (2008) found that participants were more willing to spend more at a restaurant named Bistro 97 than they were at Bistro 17. Although the number in the name of the bistros had nothing to do with the actual pricing of the menu, the number in the name of the bistro served as an anchor for the price of the food. The perception of anchors is also affected by environmental suggestion. In anchoring and adjustment research, the experimenter tries not to suggest that the anchor is the right answer, but in everyday life such as suggested values such as a suggested sentence from a lawyer (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001) seem credible and therefore seem like the correct value. Lastly, anchors can be affected by magnitude priming in which a general sense of THE EFFECTS OF INGROUP 9 large or small can be primed.