Prevalence, correlates, and effects on voter mobility

Ethnonationalism and anti-immigration sentiments are increasingly influencing voting behavior in Western countries. This study investigated the role of xenophobia in explaining support for right-wing parties and whether xenophobia correlates with the same psychological variables among voters of a radical right-wing party (Sweden Democrats, Sverigedemokraterna, N=2217) and a mainstream right-wing party (Conservative Party, Moderaterna, N=634) in Sweden. In both voter groups, Right-Wing Authoritarianism was the strongest predictor of xenophobia. Also, Social Dominance Orientation, (less) postmaterialist values, sexist attitudes, (low) Agreeableness, and higher age explained variance in xenophobia. As for voter mobility, xenophobia was more common among Sweden Democrat voters than among Conservative Party voters and, in both voter groups, respondents with high (vs. low) xenophobia had more positive views on the Sweden Democrats. Intended Sweden Democrat (vs. the Conservative Party) voting was predicted by less right-leaning socioeconomic attitudes and higher institutional distrust (among voters with both low and high xenophobia), Right-Wing Authoritarianism and sexism (voters with low xenophobia), and/or male gender (voters with high xenophobia). To conclude, the concept of xenophobia still seems to successfully capture anti-immigrant attitudes, correlates with psychological variables as expected in both voter groups, and helps partly explain the contemporary changes in voting behavior. Author Note: Kirsti M. Jylhä, Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm; Jens Rydgren, Department of Sociology, Stockholm University; Pontus Strimling, Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, and Center for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University. This research was supported by a grant awarded by the Swedish Research Council [grant number 2016-01995] to Jens Rydgren, and grants awarded by Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation [grant number 2016.0167 and 2017.0257] to Pontus Strimling. Address correspondence to Kirsti Jylhä, Institute for Futures Studies, PO Box 591, 10131 Stockholm, Sweden, Email: kirsti.jylha@iffs.se . Introduction Ethnonationalism and anti-immigration sentiments are increasingly influencing party politics and voting behavior in Europe (e.g., Rydgren & van der Meiden, 2018). New radical right-wing parties have emerged and become established in several countries over the past three decades, and some mainstream parties have toughened their approach to immigration and multiculturalism in an effort to challenge the growth of the radical right (Rydgren & van der Meiden, 2018; Van Spanje, 2010). These political changes seem to be neither a cause nor a consequence of increased anti-immigration sentiments in society, but rather reflect a shift in the political salience of the immigration issue at the expense of economic issues that used to guide voting behavior during the postwar period (Bohman, 2018; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2010). Yet, it has been suggested that the presence of a successful antiimmigration party may contribute to politicizing the immigration issue, as well as legitimizing and normalizing expressions of xenophobia in society (Jäckle & König, 2017; Rydgren, 2003; Wodak, 2015). Given the importance of anti-immigration sentiments in the contemporary political landscapes, this study aims to investigate the role of xenophobia in explaining support for right-wing parties and what could explain radical-right support among voters with low and high levels of xenophobia, as well as whether expression of xenophobia is related to the same psychological variables among voters of a radical right-wing party (Sweden Democrats, Sverigedemokraterna) and a mainstream right-wing party (Conservative Party, Moderaterna) in Sweden. While much is known about the relation between negative intergroup attitudes and right-wing party preference (e.g., Rydgren, 2008; Van Assche, Van Hiel, & Dhont, 2018), as well as correlates of negative intergroup attitudes in the public in general (e.g., Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), to date no studies have investigated what characterizes radical right2 wing voters who express high or low levels of xenophobia and whether these voters differ from mainstream right-wing voters with comparable levels of xenophobia. As expression of anti-immigration attitudes may become more legitimized in the presence of a successful anti-immigration party (Wodak, 2015), it is possible that xenophobia is expressed by voters who may otherwise not express such views, thereby altering the correlations of xenophobia and psychological variables that are usually found in research. As for voter mobility, research on radical-right support tends to include various different measures to capture attitudes toward immigration and immigrants (e.g., ethnic prejudice or immigration skepticism), and sometimes blends different attitudes in the same scale. Also, research in this area commonly focuses on attitudes toward immigration as a societal phenomenon, likely because immigration skepticism has been found to be the most consistent predictor of radical-right support (Rooduijn 2017; Rydgren, 2008). Thus, less is known about the role of xenophobia in explaining support for a radical right-wing party. Moreover, it is still unclear which psychological processes could explain why voters with low levels of xenophobia may start supporting a radical right-wing option with a strong anti-immigration agenda, while many voters with high levels of xenophobia continue supporting a mainstream right-wing option. The Swedish context Sweden is a very socially progressive country where liberal, tolerant, and egalitarian norms are so commonly endorsed that they have come to be seen as a central part of the national identity (Moffitt, 2017; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Towns, Karlsson, & Eyre, 2014). Sweden has a long history of immigration, and when including both firstand second-generation immigrants, the proportion of people with foreign background in the country in 2018 was 24.9 (SCB, n.d.). Over the past decades, attitudes toward immigrants have become more positive (Demker & van der Meiden, 2016), with people in Sweden having more positive views on immigration and immigrants compared to almost all