Testing Assumptions of the "Slippery Slope Framework" Using Cross-Country Data: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

1. INTRODUCTIONThough "deterrence models" proposed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973) have failed to fully explain why individuals pay taxes, they still remain significant in tax compliance research. The concept of "psychological tax contract" proposed by Feld and Frey (2007) and Torgler, Demir, Macintyre and Schaffner (2008) have also contributed to understanding why individuals pay taxes without enforcement. The combination of these efforts provides a robust framework known as the "Slippery Slope Framework" by Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008) which to a certain extent, explains why people pay taxes with or without enforcement, i.e., either through trust in authorities leading to voluntary tax compliance or through power of authorities leading to enforced tax compliance. Since the emergence of the Slippery Slope Framework, studies have been conducted to test the effect of trust and power to explain compliance behavior using real taxpayers and students simulations. However, analyses have not yet been using cross-country data. Therefore, this study aims to examine the effect of trust and power using African cross-country data generated from difference sources.The second part of the paper provides a conceptual framework and review of previous empirical analyses relating to the effect of trust and power on tax compliance. The third part deals with the methodology used to conduct the study. The fourth part presents the results and analysis. Finally, a conclusion is drawn.2. CONCEPT OF TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIORTax compliance has been divided into two perspectives: administrative compliance, i.e., adherence to applicable tax laws; and judicious compliance in terms of accurate completion of tax returns (Chow, 2004). Regardless of its type, tax compliance has been defined as reporting to the relevant tax authority all income and tax payments using the applicable tax laws and regulations as well as court orders (Jackson & Milliron, 1986). It can also be defined as an individual's act of filing tax returns, declaring all income accurately for tax purposes and paying tax liabilities on the due dates as stipulated by the authority or applicable tax laws (Palil & Mustapha, 2011). Similarly, voluntary tax compliance has been defined as "timely filing and reporting of required tax information, the correct self-assessment of taxes owed and the timely payment of those taxes without enforcement action" (Silvani & Baer, 1997, p. 11). Under voluntary tax compliance, taxpayers have to assess themselves using correct information in a timely manner, report the tax due, file the tax returns with the relevant tax authority and make timely payment of the tax payable, usually to designated banks. However, enforced compliance refers to a situation where taxpayers will only be willing to comply with their tax obligations either due to fear of being detected or audited.The issue of tax and tax compliance behavior is as old as mankind (Ramona-Anca & LarissaMargareta, 2012). People naturally do not want to pay taxes; however, in this world, two things are inevitable, i.e., death and taxes (Alm, 1999). This inherent hatred to pay taxes has therefore resulted in authorities being very concerned about tax compliance behavior. This has led to researchers widely studying the effect of tax evasion and noncompliance. Noncompliance comprises two categories: intentional and unintentional. Intentional noncompliance is caused by tax evasion; while unintentional non-compliance is caused by the taxpayers' lack of knowledge or ignorance of tax laws or financial condition (Loo, 2006). The issue of tax noncompliance is a global phenomenon that governments in both developed and developing nations have to deal with. For instance, the amount of unpaid income taxes for individuals and corporations was about USD 127 billion for the 1992 tax year in the United States (US) (Alm, 1999). Recently, tax evasion in the US averages USD 285 billion annually (Cobham, 2005). …