Asymmetrical Analogical Transfer in Insight Problem Solving

Asymmetrical Analogical Transfer in Insight Problem Solving Thomas C. Ormerod (t.ormerod@lancaster.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, LA1 4YF, UK Edward P. Chronicle ( chronicl@hawaii.edu) Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii at Manoa 2340 Campus Road, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA James N. MacGregor (jmacgreg@hsd.uvic.ca) School of Public Administration, University of Victoria PO Box 1700 STN CSC, Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2, Canada Abstract We report three experiments that examine transfer between structurally and superficially similar insight problems. Experiment 1 showed spontaneous positive transfer from a difficult insight problem to an easier one, but not vice versa. Experiment 2 replicated this asymmetry when participants were given an explicit hint as to the relatedness of the problems. Experiment 3 introduced physical props to reduce problem difficulty, but failed to promote transfer from easier to more difficult problems. This transfer asymmetry is consistent with the proposal that the same processes are used to solve insight and non-insight problems, and offers a new focus for modeling in theories of analogical transfer. Introduction Most people have had the “aha” experience, when they suddenly see the solution to a problem that, until then, has eluded them. Psychologists study this phenomenon as “insight problem solving”, typically from one or the other of two broad theoretical perspectives. One approach, the “nothing special” position (e.g., Newell, Shaw, and Simon, 1964), considers that insight problem solving taps into the same processes as problem solving more generally, and involves no emergent properties. The other, the “special process” view (e.g., Davidson, 1996), considers that insight is qualitatively different from other forms of problem solving. A common finding in general problem solving research is that practice on one problem may have a positive or negative effect on performance on another problem. It has frequently been observed that facilitative “transfer” is greater when the practice problem is the more difficult of the two than when it is the simpler (Cook, 1937; Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985; Reed, Ernest & Banerji, 1974). Asymmetric transfer effects have been observed many times in standard problem solving (Bassok, 1990; Bassok & Holyoak, 1989; Reed & Evans, 1987). Explanations for the effect typically invoke the concept of searching the problem space: positive transfer may arise from difficult to easier problems because solving the more difficult problem first forces a deeper search and greater consequent understanding of the problem space. At the same time, transfer may fail from more simple problems because the problem space of a difficult target problem may be too complex to allow mappings to be made from the easier source problem (Reed, Dempster & Ettinger, 1985). However, it is less clear if asymmetric transfer also occurs in insight problem solving. If insight problem solving involves “nothing special” and functions through the same set of processes as conventional problem solving, then it would be reasonable to expect asymmetrical transfer effects to occur, under appropriate conditions. If it turned out that they did not, then the result would be inconsistent with the “nothing special” view. If, on the other hand, insight involves different processes, asymmetrical transfer may not be characteristic of them. In fact, in one special process view of insight, we would expect asymmetrical transfer not to occur. This is the representational change position, which holds that, once representational change has taken place, it should persist and transfer to subsequent problems that require the same insight (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider & Rhenius, 1999). One area of research where transfer of insight-type problem solving has been studied is that of analogical transfer, when knowledge of one problem is used to solve a similar one (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). However, the results do not clearly answer whether asymmetrical transfer occurs. Indeed, this does not appear to be a question addressed by current theories of analogical transfer (e.g., Gentner, 1983; Keane, Ledgeway & Duff, 1994; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Hofstadter, 2001), presumably since the finding has not been clearly established. One limiting factor is that analogical transfer rarely occurs spontaneously in the absence of hints, directions, or other cues (Bassok & Holyoak, 1989; Needham & Begg, 1991). Another limitation is that people frequently respond to irrelevant surface similarities of problems more than to structural similarities relevant to the solution (Bassok & Holyoak, 1989; Novick, 1988). Spontaneous positive analogical transfer appears to be facilitated when source and target problems share both surface and structural features. The purpose of the present research was to seek a clear answer to the issue of whether asymmetrical transfer occurs in insight problem solving. To test for this, two