Will the Real Psychoanalysis Please Stand Up ? Five Postulates That Define Contemporary Psychodynamic

Although commentators periodically declare that Freud is dead, his repeated burials lie on shaky grounds. Critics typically attack an archaic version of psychodynamic theory that most clinicians similarly consider obsolete. Central to contemporary psychodynamic theory is a series of propositions about (a) unconscious cognitive, affective, and motivational processes; (b) ambivalence and the tendency for affective and motivational dynamics to operate in parallel and produce compromise solutions; (c) the origins of many personality and social dispositions in childhood; (d) mental representations of the self, others, and relationships; and (e) developmental dynamics. An enormous body of research in cognitive, social, developmental, and personality psychology now supports many of these propositions. Freud's scientific legacy has implications for a wide range of domains in psychology, such as integration of affective and motivational constraints into connectionist models in cognitive science. Freud, like Elvis, has been dead for a number of years but continues to be cited with some regularity. Although the majority of clinicians report that they rely to some degree upon psychodynamic 1 principles in their work ( Pope, Tabachnick, & Keith-Spiegel, 1987 ), most researchers consider psychodynamic ideas to be at worst absurd and obsolete and at best irrelevant or of little scientific interest. In the lead article of a recent edition of Psychological Science, Crews (1996) arrived at a conclusion shared by many: "[T]here is literally nothing to be said, scientifically or therapeutically, to the advantage of the entire Freudian system or any of its component dogmas" (p. 63). Despite the explosion of empirical studies of unconscious cognitive processes (see, e.g., Greenwald, 1992 ; Kihlstrom, 1987 ; Schacter, 1992 ), few reference Freud; none cite any contemporary psychodynamic work; and in general, psychodynamic concepts are decreasingly represented in the major psychology journals ( Robins & Craik, 1994 ). The situation is similar in the popular media and in broader intellectual discourse. Publications ranging from Time to the New York Review of Books periodically publish Freud's intellectual obituary, with critics charging that Freud's ideas–such as his dual-instinct theory or his hypotheses about female personality development–are seriously out of date and without scientific merit (e.g., Crews, 1993 ). Many aspects of Freudian theory are indeed out of date, and they should be: Freud died in 1939, and he has been slow to undertake further revisions. His critics, however, are equally behind the times, attacking Freudian views of the 1920s as if they continue to have some currency in their original form. Psychodynamic theory and therapy have evolved considerably since 1939 when Freud's bearded file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Jordan Peterson/. n D Scientific Legacy of Freud Psych Bull 1998.htm (1 of 71) [9/12/2001 10:41:26 AM] countenance was last sighted in earnest. Contemporary psychoanalysts and psychodynamic therapists no longer write much about ids and egos, nor do they conceive of treatment for psychological disorders as an archaeological expedition in search of lost memories ( Aron, 1996 ; Gabbard, 1994 ; Horowitz, 1988 ; Kolb, Cooper, & Fishman, 1995 ; Mitchell, 1988 ; Wachtel, 1993 ). People do sometimes describe feelings or behaviors in therapy that conform remarkably to aspects of Freud's psychosexual theories (such as a patient of mine with erectile problems whose associations to a sexual encounter led to an image of having sex with his mother, followed by some unpleasant anal imagery). Nevertheless, psychotherapists who rely on theories derived from Freud do not typically spend their time lying in wait for phallic symbols. They pay attention to sexuality, because it is an important part of human life and intimate relationships and one that is often filled with conflict. Today, however, most psychodynamic theorists and therapists spend much of their time helping people with problematic interpersonal patterns, such as difficulty getting emotionally intimate or repeatedly getting intimate with the wrong kind of person (see Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983 ). In psychology, students' introduction to psychodynamic theory resembles the view found in the popular media and in scientific journals. I recently asked a research assistant with access to the latest editions of the major textbooks to conduct a brief study of the index entries of 10 leading upper-level introductory textbooks. Two of the 10 cited object relations theory, the major development in psychodynamic theory over the past 30 years. Of the 4 most prominent contemporary psychoanalytic theorists–Otto Kernberg, Heinz Kohut, Stephen Mitchell, and Charles Brenner–Kohut was cited in 3 books, Kernberg and Brenner were cited once each, and Mitchell was not cited in any. This is analogous to presenting trait psychology without referencing Costa and McCrae. My intention is not to lay blame here, which lies equally with psychoanalysts who have made too much of their work obscure to psychologists, but simply to demonstrate the widespread nature of the problem. 2 Psychodynamic thinking has, in fact, continued to flourish over the past decades and has been progressively converging with the concerns of personality, social, and developmental psychologists (see Barron, Eagle, & Wolitzky, 1992 ; Westen, 1990a ). This largely reflects three shifts. The first is the cognitive revolution, which brought mental processes, including unconscious processes, back into psychological discourse. Although this revolution began with cognition, the lifting of the taboo on mental processes imposed by behaviorism has inevitably led to a renewed focus on affect and motivation, the primary areas of psychodynamic interest. Indeed, as cognitive neuroscience progressively moves into these areas, it will probably have to be renamed. The second shift is that psychodynamic theory was not mummified and buried along with its founder 60 years ago. Psychoanalysis may have been "deconstructed," but it has not been decomposing. For example, Freud's dual-instinct theory (involving sex and aggression) is the primary, if not the only, psychodynamic model of motivation learned by most undergraduate psychology majors, because it is the primary one taught in textbooks. Yet most contemporary psychodynamic psychologists hold that humans have a number of motives, many of them rooted in biology but nearly all elaborated upon by culture and experience. Whereas Freud emphasized the pursuit of sensual and sexual pleasure, object relations theorists, self psychologists, and relational theorists have added a focus on needs for relationships and self-esteem (see Aron, 1996 ; Fairbairn, 1952 ; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983 ; Kernberg, 1975 ; Kohut, 1977 ; Sullivan, 1953 ). To reject psychodynamic thinking because Freud's instinct theory or his view of women is dated is like rejecting modern physics because Newton did not understand relativity. file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Jordan Peterson/. n D Scientific Legacy of Freud Psych Bull 1998.htm (2 of 71) [9/12/2001 10:41:26 AM] The third shift is epistemological. For years, many in the psychoanalytic community have treated psychoanalysis as a religion and have been more interested in protecting than testing psychoanalytic dogma. This has clearly contributed to the widespread distaste for psychodynamic concepts in academic psychology. Far too many analysts continue to ignore or disparage efforts to test their theories as the folly of ignorant infidels and to dismiss alternative hypotheses, conceptualizations, and treatment techniques–and they do so at the peril of their patients. However, the infusion of psychologists into psychoanalysis over recent decades (and to some extent the increasing medicalization of psychiatry) has led to a greater appreciation for empirical work, an acknowledgment that psychoanalytic propositions do not rise and fall solely on the basis of their perceived clinical utility, and a recognition that "I had a patient once" is not the firmest of epistemological foundations. Conversely, many cognitive researchers have begun paying greater attention to the ecological validity of experimental work on thought and memory, which is leading to, among other things, a heightened focus on affect and motivation, the central domains of psychoanalysis (e.g., Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1991 ; Neisser, 1991 ; Stein, 1997 ). The aim of this article is to reconsider Freud's legacy, not by arguing about the validity of 1920s psychoanalysis but by considering the relevance of contemporary psychodynamic theory for psychological science in the 21st century. The article begins by presenting five core theoretical tenets that define current psychodynamic thinking and briefly considers the empirical evidence with respect to their validity. Although all of these propositions trace their lineage to Freud and were important to the way he understood the mind, Freud undoubtedly would have identified other propositions he considered central as well, such as his drive theory. These five tenets, however, are the psychodynamic propositions that have best stood the test of time, as reflected in their widespread acceptance among psychoanalysts and psychodynamically oriented clinicians and theorists a century after Freud began writing. The article concludes by illustrating the way psychological science might be enriched by incorporating some of the insights that have emerged from 100 years of psychoanalytic inquiry, using as examples research in social cognition and models of parallel distributed processing in cognitive science. Will the Real Psychoanalysis Please Stand Up? Five Postulates That Define Contemporary Psychodynamic Theory Psychoanalysis was once a single theory, identified with its founder and his particular ideas, so that summarizing its basic tenets was once less problematic. T