RUNNING HEAD: DIALECT THEORY Toward a dialect theory: Cultural differences in the expression and recognition of facial expressions

Two studies provided direct support for a recently proposed dialect theory of emotion, positing that emotional expressions show cultural variations similar to linguistic dialects, thereby decreasing accurate recognition by out-group members. In Study 1, 60 participants from Quebec and Gabon posed facial expressions. Dialects emerged most clearly for Serenity and Contempt, also for Anger and Sadness, but not for Fear, Disgust, or Surprise. Shame and Embarrassment displayed recognizable but idiosyncratic expressive combinations. For happiness, Gabonese expressers showed open-mouthed smiles and rarely Duchenne smiles. In study 2, Quebecois and Gabonese judged these stimuli and stimuli standardized to erase cultural dialects. As predicted, an in-group advantage emerged for non-standardized expressions only, and most strongly for expressions with greater regional dialects according to Study 1. Nonverbal Dialects 3 Toward a dialect theory: Cultural differences in the expression and recognition of facial expressions One of the enduring questions in the study of facial expressions of emotion is the issue of whether these expressions are universal—as proposed by Darwin (1872/1965) — or whether they are culturally determined. A considerable body of research supports the conclusion that the expression of emotion is largely universal and biologically evolved. The similarities between human and non-human emotional expressions—noted from Darwin in 1872 to ChevalierSkolnikoff (1973) and Redican (1982) more recently—support the notion that these expressions reflect underlying emotional states that have evolved in light of their adaptive value. Such emotional expressions are also mutually recognizable across species boundaries. For example, chimpanzees react differentially to different human expressions of emotion (Itakura, 1994). Likewise, human children can interpret monkey vocalizations of aggression, fear, dominance, positive emotions, and submission, and their accuracy in doing so develops simultaneously with their ability to interpret human emotional behavior (Linnankoski, Laasko, & Leinonen, 1994). Within the human species, classic studies by Ekman, Izard, and their colleagues (Ekman, 1972, 1994; Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan, Chan, Diacoyanni-Tarlatzis, Heider, Krause, LeCompte, Pitcairn, Ricci-Bitti, Scherer, Tomita, & Tzavaras, 1987) demonstrate that displays of basic emotions are well recognized even across cultures that have had little or no contact with each other. This view is contrasted by perspectives that emphasize the importance of social prescriptions regarding appropriate emotional behavior in specific situations, which view such behavior as determined completely by cultural influences (e.g., Lutz & White, 1986; Wierzbicka, 1994). Many approaches take an intermediate position (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Fiske, Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett, 1998; Mesquita, Frijda, & Scherer, 1997; Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979) acknowledging both universals and cultural variations in the expression and recognition of emotion. The current paper focuses on one such intermediate perspective: the dialect theory of emotion. Dialect theory proposes the presence of cultural differences in the style of emotional expression that are subtle enough to allow accurate communication across cultural boundaries in general—yet substantive enough to result in a potential for miscommunication Nonverbal Dialects 4 (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Elfenbein, Mandal, Ambady, Harizuka, & Kumar, 2004; Marsh, Elfenbein, & Ambady, 2003). Elaborating Dialect Theory In linguistics, dialects are the variants or varieties of a language used by different speakers who are separated by geographic or social boundaries (Francis, 1992; Romaine, 1994). Although there is an old adage that a language is simply a dialect with its own army and navy (Fasold, 1984)—suggesting a sometimes arbitrary distinction between the two concepts— linguists highlight a substantive difference in that dialects, but not separate languages, should be largely mutually comprehensible among speakers (O'Grady, Archibald, Aronoff, & Rees-Miller, 2001). Accordingly, the first main proposition of a dialect theory of emotion is that there is great overlap and general mutual intelligibility of emotional expressions across members of different cultural groups. That is, the language of emotion is universal. As with other languages, different cultures can express themselves in different dialects, which is the second proposition of dialect theory. The third proposition is that the presence of these dialects has the potential to create cross-cultural misunderstandings. Again, concepts imported from linguistics help to articulate this theoretical framework. In particular, even small changes in language can create confusion. A minimal pair consists of “two forms with distinct meanings that differ by only one segment found in the same position in each form. ” (O'Grady et al., 2001, p. 65). Words in a minimal pair are easily confused for each other when enunciated differently, sometimes even through very small shifts (Burquest & Payne, 1993). For example, one of the authors once had a family friend—speaking with a French accent and newly arrived in the United States via an ocean cruise—who created bemusement when, upon being complimented on a beautiful wool sweater, responded that she had knit it on the sh p (ship/sheep). Extending these verbal concepts to the nonverbal communication of emotion, some expressions may be relatively easy to confuse with others taking a similar form. This fits with evidence, for example, that facial expressions of fear and surprise are frequently confused with each other. These confusions occur for judgments within a cultural group, but they occur more frequently for cross-cultural judgments (Elfenbein, Mandal, Ambady, Harizuka, & Kumar, 2002). Nonverbal Dialects 5 Likewise for vocal expressions, confusions of fear with sadness and joy with neutral are common within a single cultural group, but the same confusions are more common in judgments crossing cultural boundaries (Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001). In contrast, facial expressions of happiness are rarely confused with other facial expressions, because this expression is too distinctly different from other expressions – just as words with greater redundancy and distinction from others may be understood even when several phonemes are pronounced differently, because no other word is sufficiently similar to create confusion. One should note that confusions do not need to be symmetrical. That is, a given word A may be similar to another word B in one dialect, yet word B might not exist in a second dialect. In such a case, speakers of the first dialect may confuse A and B, whereas, speakers of the second dialect would attribute the same meaning to both variants. In sum, not all variations between forms may lead to problems in recognition, but sometimes small changes may entrain considerable potential for confusion. The goal of the current research is to test the three propositions of dialect theory. For the first proposition, the classic cross-cultural judgment studies described above already support arguments for the general mutual intelligibility of emotional expressions across members of disparate cultural groups. However, to date the second and third propositions—that there are subtle emotional dialects across cultures with the potential to result in cross-cultural misunderstandings -have been inferred rather than explicitly tested. Below we describe the base of research supporting these propositions. Cross-cultural differences in emotional expressions Evidence for the second proposition of the dialect theory so far is indirect and essentially stems from some of the same research that supports the notion of universality. Specifically, it has been observed in the classic studies on universals in emotional expression mentioned above that, although participants across cultures recognized posed emotion expressions at accuracy rates greater than expected by chance, samples outside the United States rarely achieved accuracy rates as high as American samples when viewing these American stimuli. For example, Ekman and colleagues reported accuracy rates ranging from 86% for Americans (Ekman, 1972) down to 53% for tribespeople in New Guinea (Ekman, Sorensen, & Friesen, 1969) when viewing American emotional expressions. In the most extreme case, the Bahinemo tribe they tested could not Nonverbal Dialects 6 respond to the individual photographs, and labeled them all as “angry” (Sorensen, 1975). Thus, members of different cultures judging American emotional expressions appear to vary substantially in their recognition accuracy. Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of cross-cultural emotion recognition studies and found – across different procedures and nonverbal channels -that individuals were better at recognizing emotional expressions by members of their own cultural group. Geographical proximity and/or opportunities for cross-cultural contact seemed to reduce this disadvantage for the recognition of expressions from members of different cultural groups. Accordingly, Elfenbein and Ambady (2002, 2003) concluded that the in-group advantage could be attributed to subtle variations in the style of encoding across cultures, such that judgments are faster and more accurate for perceivers familiar with these subtle variations. They argued that the universal language of emotion might have dialects that differ subtly from each other, following Tomkins and McCarter’s (1964) metaphor that cultural differences in emotional expression are like “dialects” of the “more universal grammar of emotion” (p. 127). A further observation providing indirect support for this notion of cultural dialects is that the in-group advantage disappears in cases when stimulus materials from different groups are constrained to have an identical