Activation of Different Social Group Memberships Results in Different Emotional Experiences

One of the most powerful ideas in contemporary social psychology is that the self is defined largely in terms of group memberships. This idea is grounded in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and is developed most clearly in self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Social identity theory postulates that all social entities, including the self, can be seen as members of social groups and that groups are therefore an important source of identity for individuals. Social categorization into groups, like all categorization processes, highlights the similarities within groups and the differences among them. Self-categorization theory describes the process of shifting to see the self in terms of membership in a salient group with which one also identifies (Turner et al., 1987). Selfcategorization causes people to think of themselves as having the characteristics associated with group membership, a process called self-stereotyping, which leads group members to perceive themselves as interchangeable exemplars of the group rather than as unique individuals (E. R. Smith & Henry, 1996; Turner et al., 1987). In this way, in-group memberships, or social identities, become part of the self. This redefinition of the self in terms of membership in groups with which one identifies imbues in-groups with evaluative significance and empowers them to influence thoughts, feelings, and actions in both intragroup and intergroup contexts. The influence of this social identity perspective in the contemporary understanding of intergroup relations is impossible to exaggerate. Almost all social psychological models of stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict assume, rely on, or refer to the processes of social categorization, group identification, and self-stereotyping (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Paluck & Green, 2009; Swann & Bosson, 2010; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010; Chapter 8, this volume). Very much in this tradition, this chapter deals with the emotional consequences of these processes and with the powerful and specific effect on intergroup relations of the emotions generated by these processes. Although it has been argued that social identity theory itself is an incipient theory of emotion (Spears et al., 2011), emotions received relatively little emphasis in the early intergroup research generated by social identity theory. As researchers rediscovered the importance of emotions for intergroup relations, the social identity perspective provided a general framework for a wide range of research programs that explored emotional responses to a wide range of intergroup objects or contexts (see Iyer & Leach, 2009; Parkinson, Fisher, & Manstead, 2005; E. R. Smith & Mackie, 2008, 2010a, 2010b; E. R. Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007; Spears et al., 2011, for reviews). This chapter focuses specifically on the emotions that result from self-categorization and social identity—in other words, emotions that are felt because of group membership—as first explicitly articulated by E. R. Smith (1993). By definition then, emotions one feels as a unique individual are