DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

The debate over constitutional reform has moved to center stage in Taiwan, with a focus on two issues: the choice of presidential versus parliamentary government and a determination of the ultimate role of the National Assembly. These two issues, in turn, are linked by a third -whether the president ought to be elected indirectly by the National Assembly or directly in a mass popular vote. Of these issues, though, the choice between a presidential and a parliamentary system is central, because it requires that we consider the methods whereby chief executives and legislators are elected and, correspondingly, the role of the National Assembly. Beginning, then, with the issue of presidential versus parliamentary government, this essay argues that the most commonly cited arguments over the advisability of choosing one or the other of these two forms are, for the most part, theoretically meaningless and are largely rhetorical devices for rationalizing prejudices about preferred governmental structures and the state's role. Consequently, we attempt here to provide a more useful set of criteria with which to evaluate reform in general and the choice between presidential and parliamentary government in particular. We conclude that although the choice between presidential and parliamentary forms is important, equal attention should be given to the methods whereby a president and the legislature are elected. It is these institutional parameters that determine the character of political parties in Taiwan, their ability to accommodate any mainlander­ native Taiwanese conflict, and the likelihood that executive and legislative branches will formulate coherent domestic and international policy. Notes on Constitutional Change in the ROC: Presidential versus Parliamentary Government* Emerson M.S. Niou Peter C. Ordeshook Much as one-party rule made the USSR's constitution irrelevant to understanding politics there, one-party rule depreciated the importance of constitutional matters in the Republic of China as well. However, liberalization has revealed the constitutional structures of the successor states of the USSR incapable of fostering coherent democratic politics. Similarly, people fear that the development of competitive politics in Taiwan will reveal equally dangerous inadequacies in its political institutions. Thus, the issue of constitutional reform has become increasingly important, with discussion focusing on two issues: that advantages and disadvantages of presidential versus parliamentary government and the National Assembly's ultimate role. These two issues, in turn, are linked by a third -whether the president should be elected indirectly or directly in a mass popular vote. Each of these issues involves sub-issues that require careful investigation before suggestions about specific constitutional reforms can be offered. Resolution of the presidential-parliamentary debate, though, is central. It is central, first, because it requires that we consider not only the powers of these two branches of government, but also the methods whereby chief executives and legislators are elected and, correspondingly, the National Assembly's role.1 Second, it is central because we want to ensure the ROC's . political stability. The specific concern here is that, of the thirty one democracies normally categorized as stable, only four -Columbia, Costa Rica, the United States, and Venezuela -can be classified as presidential. Three can be classified as mixed (Finland, France, and Switzerland), while the remaining are parliamentary. Moreover, since 1945, "only 7 of 31 presidential democracies have endured for at least 25 consecutive years, compared with 25 of 44 parliamentary systems . (Mainwaring 1993, p. 205)" Finally, it is central because of all the reforms that Taiwan is likely to implement, the most likely is direct election of the president, and this change alone will move Taiwan closer to presidential government. A popularly elected president, even if all other things are held constant, will be a far more powerful figure than a person chosen indirectly by a National Assembly elected for a multiplicity of purposes. An evaluation of the advisibility of directly electing the president of the ROC, then, necessarily takes us to an assessment of presidential versus parliamentary government. *The research represented by this essay, written for the "Conference on Democratic Institutions in East Asia," Duke University, Durham, NC {April 2-4, 1993), was supported by a grant from the Pacific Culture Foundation. ·