Cue‐Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters

Why do some pieces of legislation move forward while others languish? We address this fundamental question by examining the role of interest groups in Congress, specifically the effect of their legislative endorsements in Dear Colleague letters. These letters provide insights into the information that members use to both influence and make policy decisions. We demonstrate that endorsements from particularly well-connected interest groups are a strong cue for members with limited information early in the legislative process and help grow the list of bill cosponsors. As bills progress, such groups have less direct weight, while legislation supported by a larger number of organizations and a larger number of cosponsors is more likely to pass. Thus, we illuminate the usage of Dear Colleague letters in Congress, demonstrate how members use interest groups in the legislative process, and shed new light on the varying impact of groups on public policy. Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JNEQYJ. Members of Congress are routinely asked to make complex policy decisions with limited time and information. They want to make the decisions that will be best for their electoral prospects and result in good public policy. However, the challenges of doing so with imperfect information have been well documented (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974). Thousands of bills are introduced each congress, and in an average week, a member may be expected to take positions on legislation in a wide array of policy issues, from foreign policy to water rights. Members work to overcome these challenges by specializing on the issues before their committees and relying on cues to understand the political and electoral implications of a bill (Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1981; Krehbiel 1991). However, some cues are stronger than others. Thus, exploring how members of Congress respond to signals from different groups and at different stages of the legislative process provides a greater Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier is Vernal Riffe Professor, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, 2140 Derby Hall, 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, Ohio 43210 (steffensmeier.2@osu.edu). Dino P. Christenson is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Boston University, 232 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215 (dinopc@bu.edu). Alison W. Craig is Assistant Professor, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, 158 W. 21st Street, STOP A1800, Austin, TX 78712 (acraig@austin.utexas.edu). The authors are listed alphabetically. We would like to thank Matt Grossman, Geoff Lorenz, Eleanor Powell, and our anonymous reviewers for comments as well as Andy Duthie and Joe Rafalak for research assistance. The research reported here is supported by the National Science Foundation’s Law and Social Science Program and Political Science Program (grants #1124386, #1124369, #1627422, #1627358), the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship (DGE-1343012), the Dirksen Congressional Center (grant #00031432), and the Institute for the Study of Democracy at the Ohio State University. understanding of how the legislative branch lives up to the ideals of pluralism and democratic representation. We examine the role of interest groups in providing members of Congress with informative signals that help them decide which policy proposals are worth supporting. While we may wish for members to read and understand every piece of legislation that comes across their desk, in reality they simply do not have the time. Even if they read every bill, members cannot be expected to effectively comprehend the implications of complicated legislative text across a broad array of policy issues. When legislation is considered in committee, there are extensive discussions in which members hear from interest groups and other interested parties to gain an understanding of the arguments for and against a particular policy (Arnold 1990). However, members are frequently asked by colleagues, constituents, and interest groups to take positions on legislation outside of their area of American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 2019, Pp. 163–180 C ©2018, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12399