Ethical Norms and Moral Values Among Scientists : Applying Conceptions of Morality to Scientific Rules and Practices

The purpose of the present paper is to apply theoretical approaches to the social psychology of morality to the moral evaluation of scientists’ own behavior. It will be seen that the current discourse on questionable research practices, usability of science, and fraud, mainly fueled by whistle-blowers who are themselves members of the scientific community, does not live up to higher levels of moral judgment according to Piaget and Kohlberg. This discourse can also not be explained within the modern intuitionist approach to morality. It can however be understood in terms of the current Zeitgeist of compliance with unreflected norms, related to the social psychology of conformity and obedience. Transgressions of arbitrary norms (e.g., of sober significance testing) are given more weight than violations of more fundamental norms (e.g., theoretical reasoning; cost-benefit assessment). The age-old principle of reciprocity is largely neglected when powerful players in the game (editors’, reviewers’, whistle-blowers’ motives or conflicts of interest) are not treated according to the same rules as weaker players (authors, students, applicants). A recent critique by Fiedler and Schwarz (2015) of John et al.’s (2012) evidence on questionable research practices is used for illustration. The final discussion is concerned with practical and theoretical implications of the moral values among scientists. 3 Morality among scientists Introduction According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the term morality can be defined either descriptively “to refer to some codes of conduct put forward by a society” or normatively “to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons. ” Traditionally, the seminal research by Piaget (1965), Kohlberg (1963), and Kelley (1971) on the psychology of morality was apparently driven by the latter, normative perspective, presupposing that morality constitutes an integral aspect of rationality. Jean Piaget’s (1932) monograph conveys the message that the development of moral judgment in the child is closely linked to the maturation of intelligence. He was obviously influenced by Kant’s (1788 / 1999) belief in the a-priori existence of both cognitive and moral categories, the ontogenetic acquisition of which Piaget believed to follow a regular sequence of developmental stages. This assumption can also be encountered in Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1963) writings. From a slightly different, attributional perspective, Harold Kelley (1971) proposed: “The moral evaluation process is, in part, based on the processes of reality evaluation and achievement evaluation. By this, I mean that judgments of right and wrong, good or bad (moral evaluations), derive their properties in part from the same processes as are involved in judgments of correct or incorrect (reality evaluations) and as are involved in judgments of personal success or failure (achievement evaluations)” [p. 293]. In contrast to these rationalist approaches, which lead to the assumption of universal principles of moral judgment, a growing body of recent research is apparently motivated by a descriptive approach referring to moral intuition (Haidt, 2001; Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004), to heuristics, ideological narratives (Haidt, Graham & Joseph, 2009), the blinding function of morality (Haidt, 2013), and the affective influence of sacred values (Graham & Haidt, 2012). http://plato.stanford. edu/entries/morality-definition/#toc 4 Morality among scientists Rather than implying universals, this intuitionist and affective approach implies variation between cultures, groups and ideologies, pluralism in moral values (Berlin, 1998), and distinct relations between moral rules and (left vs. right) political orientations (Haidt &T Graham, 2009; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). Moral judgment is strongly qualified by cultural values, group conventions, religions, or political and epistemic authorities. As Haidt and Graham (2009) put it, the domain of morality cannot be restricted to harm and fairness, its classical issues. It must be broadened to include community (ingroup), authority, and sacredness (Durkheim, 1925/1973) as distinct sources of bias and irrationality. Haidt (2013) raises this new research trend to the level of a prescriptive advice: “I offer three principles that I think should characterize moral psychology in the twenty-first century: (1) Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second, (2) There’s more to morality than harm and fairness and (3) Morality binds and blinds” [p. 281]. Ethical Norms and Moral Attribution Among Scientists The present article is neither concerned with moral dilemmas (Nichols & Mallon, 2006), the currently most prominent experimental paradigm, nor does it directly speak to harm, justice, ingroup, authority, and sacredness, the key concepts in of intuitionist approach. It is rather concerned with ethical and moral evaluation of scientific practices – an issue that has recently become the focus of a widely attended, self-critical and sometimes self-depreciating debate. Although this topic may appear a bit self-centered and detached from more common areas of morality research (e.g., existential moral dilemmas), it has considerable consequences for the public image of science, for funding schemes, and for the future development of scientific methods and practices. Above all, this topic affords an reality test of whether the two prominent approaches can account for an up-to-date moral debate. Compliance as an end in and of itself. It will soon be apparent that this current discourse on ethical violations, immoral transgressions and questionable practices in science neither meets 5 Morality among scientists the criteria of mature stages of moral judgment according to Piaget, Kohlberg or Kelley, of reciprocity, and mastery, nor can it be understood within the intuitionist framework. Rather, this debate appears to be mainly driven by a well-known heuristic that has been almost forgotten in the pertinent research, namely, the impact of conformity and compliance with existing rules conceived as a normative end in and of itself, independent of its rationality and utility and often detached from real authority, solidarity, or sacred value. Regardless of the lessons provided in Hannah Arendt’s (1963) Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil and in Asch’s (1956) or in Milgram’s (1963) memorable demonstrations of conformity, the mere compliance with given rules, instructions or conventions continues to dominate the discourse on good practices in science. Pertinent evidence for this claim will be provided in the next section. It may indeed be no exaggeration to say that compliance has hardly ever enjoyed the same popularity as in these days, given virtually unlimited access to personal data and technologies for the monitoring and storage of everyday compliance. Almost every large or middle-size company has its own compliance department to monitor and control ethical behavior, well below the threshold of legal transgression. Conformity with short-sighted norms is given more attention than compatibility with higher-order legal principles and human rights. Good or bad intentions are hardly considered when sanctioning non-compliant people (like Edward Snowden). What is politically correct and conformist not only determines what is feasible in politics, but even in science (using citation indices as a conformist diagnostic criterion) and in interpersonal behavior. Even the social status of young children depends on their compliance with brands names, popular idols, jargon, and behavioral routines. Asch (1956) already found that experimental participants who provide non-conformist responses become disliked and devalued. And, modern experiments on group decision making continue to demonstrate that dissenters who dare to utter unshared information are disliked (cf. Wittenbaum, Hubbell & Zuckerman, 1999). 6 Morality among scientists Moral reasoning among scientists. Note that uncritical compliance with haphazard standards and instructions, even in the absence of strong authorities or forces of ingroup solidarity, can be neither rational nor can it be due to sacred values and evolutionary or cultural foundations or morality. An interesting and thought-provoking question is, therefore, why rational scientists – especially those who did take their lessons from Asch, Arendt, and Milgram – should exhibit mere compliance rather than living up to a mature and rational level of moral judgment. Are the ethical norms and moral values that characterize the behavior of scientists not obliged to broadminded social ideals and interests, without regard for the presence of interest holders, and without regard to the individual’s own interest (cf. Kelley, 1971, p. 294)? Should the moral evaluations and attributions of scientists be determined by the same shallow rules of compliance that have been shown to characterize social behavior at modest levels of reflection? In the remainder of this article, I first provide a sketch of the recent debate on violations of ethical and moral norms and rules of good scientific practices. I will then argue that this debate is neither characterized by Kelley’s (1971) notion that judgments of reality (correct vs. incorrect) and achievement (success vs. failure) underlie moral evaluation, nor does it reflect the affective impact of actual harm, injustice, ingroup interests, real authority, and violations of any sacred norms. It rather seems to reflect the Zeitgeist of a compliance-type of “good-boy” morality (Kohlberg, 1963) that does not appear to be sensitive to higher levels of attribution (see Table 1) or even intuitive judgments of honesty, fairness, and hypocrisy. Major Topics of the Current Debate on Ethical and Moral Conduct in Science What major topics or types of morally questionable behaviors that have been the focus of so many recent articles?