Are We Frightened Because We Run Away? Some Evidence from Metacognitive Feelings

William James asked whether we run away because we are frightened or we are frightened because we run away. This issue is addressed here with regard to the relationship between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control. While discussions of metacognition generally assume that feelings of knowing drive controlled action, other discussions imply that such feelings are based on feedback from controlled action, and thus follow rather than precede behavior. Recent evidence is reported suggesting that when the investment of effort is goal driven, greater effort enhances metacognitive feelings, consistent with the "feelingsaffect-behavior" hypothesis. When effort is data driven, however, metacognitive feelings decrease with increasing effort, suggesting that such feelings are based on feedback from behavior. Both types of causal effects can occur simultaneously. A long-lasting issue in theories of emotion concerns the cause-and-effect relation between subjective emotional feelings and bodily reactions. This issue is part of the general issue of the cause-and-effect relationship between subjective experience and behavior, which has attracted a heated philosophical debate. Within psychology, the dominant view has been that conscious awareness exerts a causal effect on controlled, voluntary action (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schacter, 1989). This view has been reinforced by observations about the behavioral deficits of brain-damaged patients who suffer from different forms of loss of consciousness. With regard to emotional feelings, the layman's naive theory is that feelings drive behavior. William James (1884), however, challenged this view, proposing that subjective feelings rather than driving behavior are themselves caused by these behaviors. In his words: Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, and angry and strike. The 84 Asher Koriat Metacognitive Feelings 85 hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually^/ afraid or angry, (p. 190) This quote assumes that bodily reactions are not simply "manifestations" or "expressions" of subjective feelings. Rather, subjective emotional feelings emerge as feedback from the bodily reactions. James' quote also antecedes the current distinction between experience-based and information-based judgments (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; Strack, 1992), as discussed below. We may then distinguish between two models of the cause-and-effect relation between emotional experience and behavior. In the first, emotional feelings are the cause of behavior: we run away because we are frightened. In the second, favored by William James, emotional feelings are the effect, they follow rather than precede behavior. In what follows I shall examine the issue raised by William James in the context of metacognition. The question to be addressed is whether metacognitive feelings drive controlled behavior or are themselves based on the feedback from such behavior. I shall examine evidence that has been seen to sup port each of these positions and will then discuss how the two positions may be combined within one conceptual framework. Although much of our discussion will concern noetic feelings (or "knowing feelings"; see Clore, 1992), I believe that the proposed conceptual framework applies to feelings in general. METACOGNITIVE MONITORING AND METACOGNITIVE CONTROL The study of metacognition concerns the knowledge that people have about their cognition, the online monitoring of their learning and remembering processes and the strategic regulation of these processes in accordance with one's monitoring and with the constraints imposed by the task at hand (see Flavell, 1979; Koriat, 2005). Metacognitive processes are ubiquitous in everyday life. When we read a text, we monitor our comprehension and when we feel that we do not understand the text, we read it again. Thus, the subjective monitoring of our comprehension seems to drive the decision whether to reread the text and how much attention to pay in reading it. Students preparing for an exam must also monitor the degree of mastery of the material online and decide whether they are ready for the exam or whether they should continue studying. They must also decide how much time to allocate to each section based on their feelings of mastery and competence. When we have a scheduled appointment, we often need to judge whether we have to write it in our calendar or take some other special precaution not to forget it. Sometimes we do not make a special effort to remember the appointment because we feel that we will remember it anyway, and consequently end up missing that appointment. Even when we do remember to perform a planned action, we have to remember that we already did it in order not to repeat the action once again. Deficiencies in output monitoring, as occur in old age, may result in a person taking a medicine more often than needed or in telling the same story again and again (Koriat, Ben-zur, & Sheffer, 1988). Monitoring processes also take place during remembering. When we search our memory for a forgotten name, we often experience & feeling of knowing (FOK), and can even sense that the name is on the tip of the tongue and is about to emerge into consciousness. When the name does emerge into consciousness, we can generally feel that it is indeed the one for which we have been searching. Of course, when we have a feeling that we know the name, we will try harder to look for it than when we feel that we do not know it. However, feelings of knowing might sometimes deceive us (Koriat, 1998). Monitoring processes also occur in trying to report information from memory. A person on the witness stand, who is expected to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth, must monitor the correctness of information that comes to mind before deciding whether to volunteer it or withhold it. Thus, subjective feelings of confidence might guide one's reporting behavior (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). These examples illustrate the distinction between monitoring and control processes. Metacognitive monitoring refers to the subjective assessment of one's own cognitive processes and knowledge. For example, such assessments are reflected in the feelings of mastery, competence, or comprehension that we experience as we encode new material, in the feeling of knowing that we experience as we search our memory for an elusive name, and in the subjective confidence that we feel regarding the correctness of retrieved information. Metacognitive control, in turn, refers to the processes that regulate cognitive processes and behavior. Such processes include, for example, the choice of strategies for studying new material, the allocation of learning resources between these materials, the decision to continue searching for a solicited answer or quit, and the decision whether to volunteer that answer or not when the accuracy of the report is at stake. As suggested by the above examples, the assumption underlying most of the discussions of metacognition is that metacognitive monitoring drives metacognitive control. This assumption agrees with common sense, like the assumption that we run away because we are afraid. That is, subjective feelings are assumed to exert a causal effect on behavior. As we shall see below, however, some of 86 Asher Koriat Metacognitive Feelings 87 the current discussions in metacognition also imply a cause-and-effect relation in the opposite direction, from behavior to subjective metacognitive feelings. In what follows, I first review evidence that has been taken to support the view that monitoring affects control. This evidence comes from studies that have focused on the presumed adaptive function of noetic feelings. Although most of that evidence is correlational, some is based on experimental manipulations. I then turn to findings and discussions suggesting that metacognitive feelings in fact follow rather than precede controlled action. Support for this claim comes from studies that have focused on the bases of noetic feelings. Thus, I will discuss the distinction between noetic feelings and noetic judgments, and then, focusing on noetic feelings, I will examine theories and findings that would seem to imply that these feelings are actually based on feedback from controlled actions. Finally, I will discuss evidence pertinent to the possibility that both types of cause-and-effect relations exist, and examine the conditions for the occurrence of each of them. The conclusion from this analysis is that the models considered by William James are not mutually exclusive, but actually occur simultaneously or sequentially in the course of information processing and behavior. THE CAUSAL INFLUENCE OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE ON BEHAVIOR The recent upsurge of interest in metacognition derives in part from the conviction that subjective experience is not a mere epiphenomenon, but actually influences and guides information processing and behavior (Koriat, 2000; Nelson, 1996). A commonly held assumption among most researchers of metacognition is that the effective monitoring of one's own knowledge has direct consequences for efficient learning and remembering (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). Therefore, emphasis has been placed on the need to educate intuitive feelings and alleviate illusions of competence (Bjork, 1999; Hogarth, 2001). Indeed, the growing interest in memory accuracy, memory distortion, and false memory h