Outcome Alternatives and Value as Criteria for Multistrategy Evaluations

This study examined the impact of some basic exchange-theory variables, (i.e., outcome alternatives and outcome value) on multistrategy evaluations in a conflict; setting. Using a roleplaying simulation method, 320 college students took the position of an employee in conflict with an employer and evaluated their own likelihood of adopting four strategies suggested by exchange-theory schemes: self-enhancement, threat to leave, coalition with other employees, and conflict avoidance. A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design manipulated self’s (employee) outcome alternatives, self’s (employee) outcome value, other’s (employer) outcome alternatives, and other’s (employer) outcome value. The results showed that outcome alternatives and outcome value have differential effects on strategy evaluations. The results generally support predictions implied by the Blau and Emerson analyses of power relations and a subjective probability of success interpretation suggested by Kipnis’s “treatment of choice” metaphor. Outcome Alternatives and Value 3 Conflicting parties in “natural” settings typically have a range of strategy options, meaning that they must evaluate and select one of several strategies. This multistrategy decision process prompts two important questions: What criteria do parties use to evaluate diverse strategies? Are similar or different criteria applied to disparate strategies? These questions have not been answered in research on power tactics, which uses “forced-choice” settings to investigate one strategy at a time (see reviews by Kipnis, 1974; Michener & Suchner, 1972; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Lindskold, 1972). Such single-strategy research yields valuable information on why persons decide to use or not use a particular strategy, but it ignores the problem of what information persons use to simultaneously evaluate diverse strategies. Research incorporating a full range of strategy options seems essential to examine this issue. The present study addresses the multistrategy issue and is theoretically based on the exchange framework of Blau (1964) and Emerson (1962, 1972). In conflict settings, persons typically evaluate the context and alternatives available to them before undertaking some action. A significant aspect of these cognitive processes appears to be the development of “plans of action” (i.e., tentative decisions regarding the behavioral alternatives). The present research examines these plans of action rather than behavior per se and is, therefore, concerned with cognitive processes that precede actual behavior in conflict settings. In most conflict settings, there are a large number of specific strategies available to actors, and exchange theorists have suggested various strategy categorizations. The major strategies can be identified as self-enhancement, threatening to leave the relationship, coalition formation, and conflict avoidance (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962, 1972; Michener & Suchner, 1972). Consider these strategies in a situation where an employee might try to extract a pay raise from an employer. The self-enhancement strategy involves an attempt to persuade the employer Outcome Alternatives and Value 4 that one’s inputs (e.g., performance) are high enough to warrant a pay raise. The threat-to-leave strategy is a threat to seek employment elsewhere. A coalition refers to joint action with other employees against the employer. Conflict avoidance involves resigning oneself to current pay levels (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962, 1972; Michener & Suchner, 1972). The present study uses an employee-employer context to examine how persons evaluate these four strategies. Some recent theory and research suggests that multistrategy evaluations can depend on a number of factors, including expected success, normative constraints, and the approval of a third party (Kipnis, 1974; Michener & Schwertfeger, 1972; Raven & Kruglanski, 1970). The basic idea guiding this research is that persons will estimate the probable success of alternative strategies and that strategy evaluations will reflect these expectations of success. This idea has been developed by Kipnis (1974) in his research on how leaders overcome resistance from subordinates. He argues that there is a “treatment of choice” for each form of subordinate resistance. The treatment is adjusted to the situation, meaning that leaders diagnose the reason for a subordinate’s resistance and adopt strategies that are most likely to overcome this resistance (i.e., strategies with the greatest expected success). The present study is concerned with a subordinate’s attempt to overcome the resistance of an employer to a pay raise and uses expected success to suggest criteria or information a subordinate may use to make strategy evaluations. Exchange-theory treatments of power suggest that a person might use information regarding the power position of “self” and “other” to form success expectations and make strategy decisions. To Blau (1964) and Emerson (1962, 1972), outcome alternatives and outcome value determine the power each person has over the other. Outcome alternatives refer to the availability of outcomes from other sources, and value is generally viewed as the “importance of” or “need for” the outcomes in question, rather than outcome magnitude (Blau, 1964; Outcome Alternatives and Value 5 Emerson, 1962, 1972; Gergen, 1969; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). A person (employee) has power over an other (employer) to the extent that the other has few alternative sources and highly values the outcomes at issue; similarly, the other (employer) has power over oneself (employee) to the extent that self has few alternatives and highly values the outcomes at issue. A recent study shows that these determinants of “objective” power also affect a person’s subjective estimate of the power of self and other (Bacharach & Lawler, 1976). Blau (1964) and Emerson (1962, 1972) identify four variables that might provide persons criteria for making multistrategy evaluations: self’s alternatives, self’s value, other’s alternatives, and other’s value. Blau and Emerson do not explicitly predict which criteria will affect which strategies, but Emerson (1972, p. 68) has recently posed this research question and suggested that expected success might provide the foundation for such predictions. From an expected-success premise, this study expects each of the foregoing variables to be associated with different strategies because (a) different variables give persons information on different points of vulnerability in one’s own or the other’s situation, and (b) different strategies tend to be directed at disparate sources of vulnerability. For example, if one (self) has many alternatives, then he may see a threat to leave as more effective than tactics that do not use the power resource provided by such alternatives. A person may expect greater success from a threat to leave under such circumstances because this strategy attacks a vulnerable point in the other’s situation. With few alternatives, a person (self) would be foolish to use this strategy because such a threat is buttressed by minimal force and unlikely to be viewed as credible. The implication of the Blau-Emerson analyses of power and the expected-success premise (Kipnis, 1974) is that each alternativevalue variable will bear most heavily on one of the four strategies. Before presenting the specific predictions, two points should be emphasized. Outcome Alternatives and Value 6 First, an independent variable may affect more than one strategy without undermining the general hypothesis, which suggests that each independent variable may be more important to one strategy than to the remaining strategies. Second, consistent with a cognitive focus, the dependent variables are a person’s (self) report of how likely he would be to adopt each of the four strategies (i.e., strategy plans). Self’s Outcome Alternatives One’s own alternatives should be most important to the threat-to-leave strategy. As noted above, the availability of alternatives for self is especially relevant to the expected success of threats to leave, with greater success anticipated under high as opposed to low alternatives. Persons should see such alternatives as a more relevant criterion for threats to leave when compared with other strategies. Although several studies document links between alternatives and cooperation, prior research has not determined whether persons view self’s alternatives as more relevant to threats to leave than to other possible strategies (e.g., Burgess & Nielsen, 1974; Schellenberg, 1965). Other’s Outcome Alternatives The other’s alternatives should most strongly affect coalition evaluations. A coalition limits the other’s alternatives (e.g., Emerson, 1962; Michener & Suchner, 1972); consequently, persons may see a coalition as more useful when the other has many alternatives because the coalition reduces this base for the other’s power. If the other has few alternatives, then coalitions Outcome Alternatives and Value 7 would be pointless and a threat to leave may become a more viable strategy. In sum, other’s alternatives should be most important to coalitions but may also affect threats to leave. Under conditions of high as opposed to low alternatives, persons’ expressed tendency toward coalitions should increase, whereas their expressed tendency toward a threat to leave should decrease. The impact of other’s alternatives on coalitions has not been explicitly investigated, but this effect is suggested by a study which found that the frequency of “weak” coalitions (i.e., coalitions between subordinates) was greater when the other (i.e., superordinate) has an alternative outcome source (Kelley & Arrowood, 1960). However, this finding could be due to the superordinate refusing a coalition and selecting the alternative rather than to the effect of other’s alternatives per se on subordinates’ inclination toward the weak coalition. The present study attempts to