The Role of Consciousness in Second Language Acquisition

The Role of Consciousness in Second Language Acquisition Edina Torlakovi! (edina_@scs.carleton.ca) Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies; Cognitive Science, Carleton University 2214 Dunton Tower, 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Andrew Brook (abrook@ccs.carleton.ca) Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies; Cognitive Science, Carleton University 2216 Dunton Tower, 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Abstract In this paper we argue that in order to resolve the controversy in Second Language Acquisition research concerning whether or not direct instruction is needed for second language acquisition, we need to use a broader sense of ‘consciousness’ than is used by second language researchers. Block's classification of consciousness into Access and Phenomenal consciousness seems promising. We associate Phenomenal consciousness with explicit knowledge and suggest that explicit instruction is useful. It enhances linguistic competence. Introduction This paper addresses a question that is of great importance for Second Language Acquisition (SLA) research. The question is 'what should the role of consciousness in second language (L2) acquisition be? ' It is important to answer this question in order to resolve one of the biggest debates in the field of SLA, namely whether or not direct instruction is necessary or even valuable in L2 acquisition. SLA researchers interested in consciousness should start by considering what others have to say about it. This is necessary to develop a comprehensive picture of consciousness. The debate in SLA needs to be informed by an adequate notion of what consciousness is. Only in this way can we reach an adequate view about its role. One place to start is to consider what is said about consciousness in philosophy. We will start by comparing the different definitions of consciousness used by SLA researchers and by philosophers. Next we will introduce the controversy over whether L2 learners need to be conscious of grammar rules to learn the target language. Then we will examine Block’s well-known distinction between access (A) consciousness and phenomenal (P) consciousness and where language, or more specifically second language, fits into this categorization. With this, we might be one step closer to understanding the role of consciousness in L2 learning/acquisition. Issues and Positions Definition(s) of Consciousness How do SLA theorists and philosophers think about consciousness? As it turns out, quite differently. Let us look at some of the similarities and differences. When SLA theorists talk about consciousness, they use the term in a quite narrow sense. Schmidt (1995), for example, points out that there are three different senses of the term 'consciousness' as it is used in SLA theory: levels of perception, noticing, and understanding. By contrast, philosophers have a broader understanding of the term. According to Clark (2001), the possibilities include wakefulness, self-awareness, availability for verbal report, availability for control of intentional action, and qualia. To determine if all these terms are discussing the same, complex entity, they need to be further defined. If one desires to apply concepts of one discipline to another (philosophy to SLA in this case), this is something that we need to know. According to Schmidt, ‘levels of perception’ could be defined as levels of a process of obtaining and perhaps processing information. Schmidt defines ‘noticing’ as rehearsal in short-term memory, while by ‘understanding’ he refers to rule understanding, i.e., grasping the meanings of rules and becoming thoroughly familiar with them. Definitions of the terms from Clark's list of possibilities might go as follows: wakefulness is defined as a state in which we are sensitive to our surroundings and in which we can process incoming information and respond to it appropriately. Self-awareness he defines as a capacity to represent ourselves and to be conscious of ourselves 'as distinct agents'. Availability for verbal report is the capacity to access our own inner states and to describe them using natural language, while qualia concerns how things feel to us. From the above, one can conclude that SLA theorists take consciousness to be something narrower than philosophers