The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations

A and detailed book, Jacob Shapiro’s text is at its core a cry for a greater andmore nuanced understanding of individual terrorist organisations. Through close analysis of primary and secondary texts, Shapiro delves into the bureaucratic guts of terrorist organisations to pry out where fissures lie that can be exploited by security and intelligence agencies. The conclusions he draws are not in themselves necessarily new, but the fact that they are bolstered by solid research and data hammers the conclusions home persuasively. The fundamental point is that terrorist organisations are rational actors made up of humans. Yet, the necessity of their covert existence in trying to undermine states (thereby placing them in diametric opposition to powerful government security agencies) means that they are under greater stresses that complicate their operating environment. This may all seem very obvious, but the manner in which Shapiro expresses this and roots it firmly within an evidential base helps put to rest the false canard that terrorist organisations are nihilistic entities set on wanton destruction with little rationale or reason – the exception to this rule that Shapiro highlights is Japanese millenarian cultists Aum Shinrikyo (p. 255). Further, by offering a wealth of data and information to back his claim, he is able to examine in detail where possible openings might lie for security services in seeking to disrupt such organisations. These conclusions are tidily captured in the final chapter, which offers a list of almost twenty policy ideas or areas for exploration by intelligence and security services. The only issue with these is that they are for the most part ideas that have been tried, though some offer new interpretations on areas of classical concern to counter-terrorists. Some are more contentious, though this could be seen as the result of differences in interpretation, rather than disagreement. For example, Shapiro makes the point that when looking at ungoverned spaces, or ‘security vacuums’ as he describes them, it is not the actual security vacuum that is of concern; more important is when a group is able to establish ‘functioning state institutions under jihadi control’ (p. 268). He goes on to make the point that very few attacks have been launched from fully collapsed states. However, what is open to debate is the point at which it is possible to define an area as being under jihadist control rather than a security vacuum. In Pakistan, for instance, parts of the country are, arguably, beyond government control, but are also not necessarily under the authority of jihadists. Rather, they are areas that might be permissive environments through which jihadists could pass or operate. Where would this sit on the ‘security vacuum’ scale? In another section, Shapiro focuses on the question of financing as something that can be exploited to disrupt terrorist networks. His suggestions in this regard are threefold: call into question the probity of the terrorist manager’s financial affairs; crack down on fraudulent charity work; and disrupt high-networth donors to terrorist organisations (or single-source funders) (pp. 260–61). The logic behind these is sound: money is essential for any covert organisation seeking to launch terrorist attacks. However, at the same time, all three of these options have already been tried. The result has beenmixed and, moreover, fundraising responsibilities and activities have gradually shifted down the ladder. Whereas groups used to be more centralised, as evident in the case of the 9/11 attackers, who were sent money – some of which they returned prior to carrying out their attack – others, like the 7/7 group in London, were self-funded, raising money through petty fraud and charitable fundraising within their radical communities. Once groups have gone far down the path of letting cells fundraise to cover their costs by themselves there is a danger that some may resort to criminal behaviour – activity which might attract the attention of security services, yet which also might blend into the background of general petty fraud that is observable in most modern societies. On the more amusing end of the scale, Shapiro highlights the propensity of terrorist groups towards bureaucracy – something that he attributes to the importance of control within the organisation. The tendency to record, report and communicate is important for the terrorist leadership, as it gives them a way of exerting authority over and maintaining awareness of activity within their organisation. At the same time, however, it leaves a paper trail and offers numerous ways for security agencies to penetrate and disrupt. Early on, Shapiro highlights the amusing case of an Ulster policeman who, in 1922, reported finding theminutes of a terrorist cell’s meetings following an arrest that ‘threw a great deal of light on the authors of various outrages during the previous months’ (p. 26). This led to numerous further arrests and disruptive operations. Similarly, Shapiro’s research relies heavily on the Harmony Database – a database of letters, memoranda and other addenda gathered by American security agencies in the pursuit of Al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups – which he uses in drawing detailed conclusions about how terrorist organisations can be disrupted. Chapter 4 in particular (pp. 82–101) uses the Sinjar Records, a set of records found in Sinjar, Iraq, near the Syrian border, in October 2007 following raids at a transit point used by foreign fighters heading into Iraq. The resultant database of information showed that such organisations need to track their membership as well as the memoranda flowing between cells and leaders – often bickering over different aspects of strategy – something Shapiro uses to good effect to highlight his point about this bureaucracy and structure offering opportunities and methods for disruption by counterterrorists. Ultimately, the terrorist’s dilemma that Shapiro is exploring is the divergence between the need for control and order and the equal need for opacity and security within a terrorist organisation.