Contextual assessment in science education: Background, issues, and policy

Contemporary assessment practices in science education have undergone significant changes in recent decades. The basis for these changes and the resulting new assessment practices are the subject of this two-part paper. Part 1 considers the basis of assessment that, more than 25 years ago, was driven by the assumptions of decomposability and decontextualization of knowledge, resulting in a low-inference testing system, often described as “traditional. ” This assessment model was replaced not on account of direct criticism, but rather on account of a larger revolution—the change from behavioral to cognitive psychology, developments in the philosophy of science, and the rise of constructivism. Most notably, the study of the active cognitive processes of the individual resulted in a major emphasis on context in learning and assessment. These changes gave rise to the development of various contextual assessment methodologies in science education, for example, concept mapping assessment, performance assessment, and portfolio assessment. In Part 2, the literature relating to the assessment methods identified in Part 1 is reviewed, revealing that there is not much research that supports their validity and reliability. However, encouraging new work on selected-response tests is forming the basis for reconsideration of past criticisms of this technique. Despite the major developments in contextual assessment methodologies in science education, two important questions remain unanswered, namely, whether grades can be considered as genuine numeric quantities and whether the individual student is the appropriate unit of assessment in public accountability. Given these issues and the requirement for science assessment to satisfy the goals of the individual, the classroom, and the society, tentative recommendations are put forward addressing these parallel needs in the assessment of science learning. C © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Sci Ed 90:820–851, 2006 Correspondence to: Stephen Klassen; e-mail: s.klassen@uwinnipeg.ca C © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. CONTEXTUAL ASSESSMENT IN SCIENCE EDUCATION 821 PART 1: HISTORICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ROOTS OF ASSESSMENT IN SCIENCE EDUCATION The theoretical and practical issues in the assessment of science learning are complex. It is this complexity, perhaps overwhelming to the nonspecialist, which makes it difficult to engage with the discipline in a critical manner. Gunzenhauser (2003) points out that there is a lack of reflective, engaged dialogue among the various stakeholders in educational assessment. As assessment “end-users,” science educators should, nevertheless, have adequate knowledge about philosophical and theoretical assumptions and methodology in assessment. A review designed for the nonspecialist in assessment focusing, in part, on theoretical and philosophical aspects may help stimulate engagement in reflective dialogue. Reviews of assessment literature might consist of an exhaustive documentation of background, basis for design, and summary of recommended practices in assessment (Pellegrino, Chudowsky, & Glaser, 2001), or they might expound on issues of professional development and classroom practice arising in the assessment literature (Shepardson, 2001). The current review adds another perspective to the literature—that of identifying underlying philosophical and theoretical positions that may have a bearing in rethinking problematic assessment areas and issues that may, in turn, stimulate a reflective dialogue among assessment theorists and practitioners. These issues are the subject of this two-part review. In Part 1, the historical, philosophical, and psychological roots of contemporary assessment practices in science education are examined. Part 2 presents, in more detail, recent major trends and issues in science assessment and exposes recent practices and methodologies to critical scrutiny. The literature on assessment reveals that greater reflection and discrimination between assessment practices that are warranted and those that are not is needed to make improvements in this area. Along these lines, Gell-Mann maintains that “we must attach a higher prestige to that very creative act, the writing of serious review articles and books that distinguish the reliable from the unreliable and systematize and encapsulate, in the form of reasonably successful theories and other schemata, what does seem reliable” (Gell-Mann, 1994, p. 342). A discriminatory review of assessment practices first requires an examination of the historical and philosophical roots of assessment models and practice and how recent developments in philosophy and psychology have influenced the development of assessment approaches. The Origins of Assessment When one reads about assessment history, as well as present practice, one is struck by how little the issues in regards to public accountability of education have changed over the past century. Over a century ago, John Stuart Mill advocated a law making public education compulsory and proposed the institution of public examinations. He wrote that [t]he instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public examinations, extending to all children and beginning at an early age. An age might be fixed at which every child must be able to read. If a child proves unable, the father, unless he has some sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, if necessary, by his labour, and the child might be put to school at his expense. Once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal acquisition, and what is more, retention, of a certain minimum of general knowledge, virtually compulsory. (Mill, 1892/1859, p. 63) Although Mill’s view on assessment and public accountability might strike the reader as somewhat quaint and even amusing, it, nevertheless, reflects the tension that exists, even