Hot Cognitions in Coherence-Based Reasoning and Decision-Making

Hot Cognitions in Coherence-Based Reasoning and Decision-Making Stephen J. Read (read@usc.edu) Department of Psychology, University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA 90089 Dan Simon (dsimon@law.usc.edu) Gould School of Law, University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA 90089 Douglas Stenstrom (dstenstrom@email.com) Department of Psychology, California State University, Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA 90032 Abstract The studies examine the role of hot cognitions alongside cold cognitive appraisal within the framework of coherence-based reasoning. In two simulated legal cases we find that emotions towards the suspect and motivation with respect to the outcome of the case are strongly correlated with the cognitive appraisal of the facts of the case, the judged credibility of the witnesses, and the overall judgment of the suspect’s blame. Moreover, emotion and motivation partially mediate the effect of experimental manipulations on decisions. Keywords: Decision-making; constraint satisfaction processes; coherence based reasoning; legal decision-making. Introduction Decision making in real-world situations characterized by complex patterns of facts often involves coherence-based reasoning; as decision makers consider a pattern of evidence and come to a conclusion, judgments about the facts of the case and the conclusion shift to become more coherent with each other (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 2004; Simon et al., 2004a; Simon et al., 2004b). We sought to extend this research by investigating the role of hot cognitions in the cold cognitive appraisals involved in such judgments. We were particularly interested in whether and how emotions and motivation are implicated in conclusions about a suspect’s guilt. Considerable research has recently examined the role of emotions in decision-making (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). Particular attention has been directed at anger, which leads to systematic distortions in a variety of judgments. These distortions are especially problematic when the anger is aroused by a source that is unrelated to the person being judged. Observers aroused by such incidental anger are more likely to attribute blame to the person being judged, to perceive her conduct as intentional, to lower the required threshold of evidence, to neglect alternative explanations and mitigating circumstances (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996), and to increase the desire for retaliation (Ferguson & Rule, 1983) Social judgment has also been shown to be affected by motivation. As noted by Kunda (1990), reasoning processes under directional goals often lead to results that comport with those goals, whereas accuracy goals tend to lead to more objective conclusions (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Piercey, 2009). In the current studies we sought to study the impact of directional goals by giving some subjects a specific role as either prosecutor (or investigator) and other subjects the role of defender. Taking on such adversarial roles may lead to biased information search and hypothesis testing. We also hypothesized that such adversarial roles may lead to negative emotions, such as anger. Unfortunately the research demonstrating the effect of emotion and motivation on reasoning offers little insight into how these effects occur. How do emotion and motivation interact with the variables on which the judgments are supposed to be based: facts, preferences, values, etc.? One possibility is that emotion and motivation override these underlying variables. Another possibility is that emotion and motivation influence the underlying variables in the corresponding direction, which makes the corresponding judgments feel natural and obvious. The latter explanation is consistent with the Gestaltian notions that underlie coherence-based reasoning: the mental model of the task settles at a state of equilibrium at which all relevant elements—the underlying variables, conclusion, motivation, and emotion—all cohere with one another. Thus, we hypothesized that the constraint satisfaction processing that underlies coherence-based reasoning would engulf both the cold cognitions (as observed previously) and the hot cognitions. This prediction dates back to Heider’s Balance Theory, in which liking for a person or an object was theorized to affect the overall balance of the structure (Heider, 1958). More recently, researchers have modeled hot and cold cognitions within the framework of constraint satisfaction processing (Nerb, 2007; Thagard, 2006). Overview of Studies In both studies, participants judged a quasi-criminal case concerning an allegation of academic misconduct by a university student. Participants were asked to imagine that they worked at a state university in the Office of Student