Using normative methodology to make pluralism consistent with realism

This paper argues that realism and pluralism are inconsistent. Realism implies that it is possible for a theory, or a set of theoretical methods, to be erroneous — to be incompatible with a description of social ontology. This contradicts methodological pluralism, which advocates the acceptance of all theoretical approaches. For pluralism to be consistent with a realist vision of social ontology would require a framework that would allow us to judge which theories respect some agreed upon vision of social ontology. I propose a normative methodological framework as a possible answer to that question. I call this Realist Normative Methodology and it is derived from Tony Lawson’s critique of mainstream economics. I do this by turning Lawson’s arguments into generally applicable principles. In this paper, I will discuss the issues presented by the inconsistency between realism and pluralism and outline these principles that could serve to resolve this issue. 1. The problem with heterodox economics Heterodox economics is, by definition, a movement that is opposed to the orthodoxy in economics, which I will refer to as mainstream economics. However, there is a problem with the way that heterodox economics currently Yannick Slade-Caffarel | Sciences Po Paris 40 Years of the Cambridge Journal of Economics 3 argues for reform in the way that economics is institutionalised, taught, and exercised by the mainstream. Generally speaking, there are two main theoretical proposals that form the basis for how heterodox economics argues that the discipline of economics should change. In other words, there are two main arguments — with corresponding solutions — as to why economics, as currently dominated by its mainstream, is producing poor theoretical outcomes and must therefore reform how it is practised. These two theoretical arguments are realism and pluralism. The problem they pose for heterodox economics is that they are inconsistent with one another. On the one hand, realism argues that we are able to know the way in which social reality exists — we are able to elaborate a description of social ontology — and that, therefore, we should aim to use methods when doing economics — and all social science, for that matter — which respect this reality. Realism’s explanation for why there is a problem with how economics is currently practised is that the discipline is dominated by a mainstream that uses methods that do not respect social reality. The argument is that the exclusive reliance of the mainstream of economics on mathematical modelling presupposes an ontology that is inconsistent with the social reality that it is trying to understand (Lawson, 2006). According to realism, for economics — and social science in general — to produce good results it must use methods that presuppose a social ontology that corresponds to social reality. Therefore, the solution proposed to the current predicament is to search for methods that respect the way that social reality exists. On the other hand, pluralism argues that social reality is difficult to understand and that, therefore, in our attempts to render it intelligible, we Yannick Slade-Caffarel | Sciences Po Paris 40 Years of the Cambridge Journal of Economics 4 should embrace the largest number of methodological approaches possible. For social theory and social science to function optimally, we need a pluridisciplinary environment that fosters debate. It is precisely because we do not know how the social elements of our world exist that we should not discount any approaches that are attempting to understand them. The argument is that we will have the best chance of understanding the social world if we have as many methodological approaches as possible trying to do just that. Therefore, pluralism’s explanation for why economics is currently in a dire situation is the fact that there is a dominant mainstream that relies on a single methodological approach. In other words, mainstream economics produces poor results because it is methodologically monist. Therefore, the solution for pluralism is to remove the mainstream from its monolithic position and for there to be both equality and exchange between all of the different schools of thought in economics. The point of agreement between these two theoretical arguments is that the mainstream of economics is doing things wrong, which is why they enjoy somewhat general support from heterodox economists. However, the reason why each position thinks that the mainstream is doing things wrong differs substantially. Consequently, the solutions presented to this problem, as stated above, differ also. On the one hand, we can know whether methods are inappropriate for understanding social material and therefore we should only use appropriate methods. On the other, we do not know what methods should be used and therefore we should use a mixture of them all. From this simple comparison it should already be clear that inconsistencies exist between the two arguments. Yannick Slade-Caffarel | Sciences Po Paris 40 Years of the Cambridge Journal of Economics 5 However, the consensus position — as much as there is any kind of a consensus position among heterodox economists — is to be both realist and pluralist. It is very common for heterodox economists to argue concurrently that the problem with mainstream economics is that it is both unrealistic and monist. It is also very common for heterodox economists to argue that economics must be reformed both by making it more realist and by arguing that we must embrace methodological pluralism. In this paper, I argue that there are important inconsistencies between these two arguments, between realism and pluralism. I will then present a solution to this consistency issue. 2. What realism means I understand the argument posed by realism as follows. I base this understanding, for the most part, on the work or Lawson (1997, 2003, 2006, 2012, 2015). In the context of heterodox economics, the argument for realism comes from Lawson’s analysis, most succinctly outlined in Lawson (2006), as to why there is a problem with the way that the mainstream of economics practices the discipline. The argument is that first, what unites the mainstream of economics is its general reliance on mathematical modelling. Second, Lawson argues that this kind of mathematical modelling necessarily presupposes a world in which the agents of the model — human beings — are isolated atoms. Finally then, Lawson makes the, to my mind, uncontroversial assertion that this does not conform to the way in which human beings actually exists. Therefore, the method employed by mainstream economics presupposes a vision of reality — a social ontology — that is inconsistent with reality. The general argument derived from this Yannick Slade-Caffarel | Sciences Po Paris 40 Years of the Cambridge Journal of Economics 6 regarding the way that social science is practiced is that, to produce good theoretical outcomes, social science must be realist. In other words, the idea is that the methods used by a social scientific discipline must presuppose a vision of reality that conforms to how reality really is. The obvious question then is: how is reality really? What is the nature of social reality? Though it may be easy to point to things as being unrealistic without too much contention, it is a different kettle of fish to try and define what is realistic, to define how reality exists. Nevertheless, the challenge has been taken up by the discipline that now calls itself social ontology. The main aim of social ontology or of social-philosophical ontology as it is classified by the Cambridge Social Ontology Group — the research group built by, and formed around the work of, Lawson — is to provide a general account of the nature of social reality (Lawson, 2015). This is a pursuit that is not exclusive to Lawson or the Cambridge group. Indeed, others such as John Searle, and for reasons not necessarily linked to the issues faced by economics or social science more generally, have attempted such ontological outlines (see Searle 1995, 2010). The point being that realism, as I understand it here, does not necessarily impose one type of description of social ontology. It does, however, require as its base a description of the way that social reality exists. Let us then take Lawson’s description for social reality as a model that is as good as — and to my mind better than — any other. His latest comprehensive outline of his vision of social ontology can be found in Lawson (2015). In short, Lawson’s vision of social reality is that it is made up of human beings and social structures. These social structures are the products of human action and agency and require continual maintenance by human beings to continue to exist. Yannick Slade-Caffarel | Sciences Po Paris 40 Years of the Cambridge Journal of Economics 7 However, at the same time, these structures exercise a power of conditioning over those human beings. They therefore take on an element of independence and cannot be reduced to the human beings who created them. The ensemble then if one of continual back and forth — of production, reproduction, transformation, conditioning and disappearance — in an inherently interdependent, dynamic, unstable and changing whole. For Lawson, all of social reality exists this way and all social structures have the same ontology, regardless of whether they are studied currently by academics who call themselves economists or political scientists or sociologists, etc. The first conclusion then that is taken from this description of social ontology is that the disciplinary separation that currently exists between the social sciences is unjustified: [T]he materials and principles of social reality are the same across economics, sociology, politics, anthropology, human geography, and all other disciplines concerned with the study of social life. Hence I think we must accept that there is no le