BASIC PROBLEMS IN POSITIVE MOOD REGULATION

I focus my discussion on the regulation of positive mood, a topic that was not extensively addressed in any of the target articles. This topic provides a particularly informative supplement to the target articles, in that anyone interested in the regulation of positive mood states must confront several unique issues that are not encountered in the regulation of classic episodes of emotion (or even of negative mood states). Indeed, for reasons that I discuss, traditional models of emotion offer a relatively poor framework for understanding basic problems in positive mood regulation. It therefore is important to distinguish clearly between moods and emotions (Watson, 2000; Watson & Clark, 1994). Larsen (this issue) offers a detailed, cogent discussion of this issue, rightly pointing out that moods and emotions differ in terms of their (a) duration (moods tend to be longer-lasting than emotions), (b) intensity (emotions tend to be stronger and more intense than moods), (c) time course (emotions tend to have a clear onset and offset, whereas moods do not), (d) object of reference (emotions tend to be responses to specific events and experiences, whereas moods frequently have no clear precipitants), and (e) locus of causation (emotions tend to be responses to external events, whereas moods are heavily influenced by internal biological processes). Although all of these conceptual distinctions are valid, they are much more applicable to positive mood than to negative mood. In other words, negative moods more closely resemble classic episodes of emotion than do positive moods. As with classic emotions, negative moods are highly responsive to external events and circumstances, such as transient stress. Moreover, negative-mood fluctuations tend to be intense and relatively brief, with a reasonably clear onset and offset (Clark & Watson, 1988; Watson, 1988, 2000). More generally, the negative-mood system has an inherently reactive, crisis-driven character: Negative-mood levels tend to be low until a crisis occurs, at which point the person is roused into quick and decisive action; after the emergency has passed, however, negative-mood levels quickly return to their precrisis state. In sharp contrast, the positive-mood system more clearly embodies the distinctive properties that Larsen (this issue) attributes to moods. Positive-mood levels fluctuate widely across a broad (mostly moderate) range, gradually rising and falling without any clear onset or offset. They frequently lack any obvious external precipitant; indeed, consistent with Larsen's argument, positive-mood fluctuations are very strongly influenced by endogenous biological factors (Thayer, 1996; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). For instance, positive moods show a well-defmed circadian cycle; moreover, positive-mood levels have been linked to rhythmic fluctuations in both body temperature and the sleep-wake cycle (see Thayer, 1987b, 1996; Watson et al., 1999). Indeed, Thayer (1996) argued that positive moods essentially can be viewed as a summary index of our current condition, asserting that "when personal resources are high, we feel good" (p. 55). Affective science shows enonnous promise in helping people to have happier, healthier, and more satisfying lives. However, if we are to help people regulate their affective lives most effectively, we need to develop models that capture these unique qualities of the positive-mood system. In the remainder of this commentary, I discuss several basic problems in mood regulation; some of these problems are relevant to both negative and positive moods, whereas others are largely unique to the latter.