On the interplay between heuristic and systematic processes in persuasion

On the Interplay between Heuristic and Systematic Processes in Persuasion Torsten Reimer ( torsten.reimer@ndsu.edu) Department of Psychology, North Dakota State University 102E Minard Hall, Fargo, ND 58105-5075, USA Rui Mata ( mata@mpib-berlin.mpg.de) Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) Max Planck Institute for Human Development Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany Konstantinos Katsikopoulos ( katsikop@mpib-berlin.mpg.de) Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) Max Planck Institute for Human Development Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany Klaus Opwis ( klaus.opwis@unibas.ch) Department of Psychology, University of Basel Missionsstrasse 62, 4055 Basel, Switzerland Abstract Dual-process models of persuasion (e.g., Heuristic Systematic Model) contrast the use of heuristics with systematic information processing. However, a great deal of attention is increasingly being devoted to the interplay between the two types of processing. We propose a multistage view that builds on dual-process models of persuasion but emphasizes the interplay between processing modes. According to this multistage view, there are contexts in which receivers first use systematic processes to derive information about expertise from argument quality and, subsequently, make use of the expertise heuristic to arrive at an attitude. We show that results of a classic study (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) are compatible with this view. Additionally, we report results of a study, in which the effect of argument quality on receivers’ attitudes was partially mediated by perceived source expertise (Reimer, 2003). Two follow-up studies revealed that this mediation tended to be stronger among receivers reporting low self-expertise than among receivers reporting high self- expertise. Introduction Higher-order cognitive processes are often described by dual- process models that distinguish between systematic (deliberate, top-down, explicit, conscious) and heuristic (automatic, bottom-up, implicit, unconscious) processing. This type of models has become prominent in different areas of cognitive science (for an overview in cognitive psychology, see Rossetti & Rovonsuo, 2000; Sloman, 1996; for a reader in social psychology, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999). However, many researchers have criticized this dichotomization of cognition due to its arbitrariness with regard to the distinction of two exclusive processes (see Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996). Because we agree there is a need to bring forward models that look at the relation between the two processing modes, we make a contribution to this effort by focusing on the interplay between heuristic and systematic processes in persuasion (Bohner, Moskowitz, & Chaiken, 1995; Chaiken, 1987) and on the claim that heuristics are typically not used when a message is processed systematically (Petty et al., Researchers in the persuasion field have studied under what conditions the expertise heuristic (i.e., “experts are usually correct”) is applied by receivers who are faced with a persuasive message (Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 2002; for other source characteristics, see Petty & Wegener, 1998; Wood & Kallgren, 1988). We show that studies which have assumed that receivers do not use this heuristic when processing information more systematically and deliberately (e.g., Petty et al., 1981) may be reinterpreted by assuming a multistage process in which receivers are assumed to, first, derive information about source expertise from argument quality and, second, make use of the expertise heuristic (Reimer, 2003). We also report follow-up studies which revealed that receivers’ perceived self-expertise is a potential moderator that affects whether a direct or an indirect process is taken by receivers. Heuristic and Systematic Information Processing in Persuasion The heuristic systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, 1987) distinguishes heuristic and systematic information processing (see Figure 1). According to the HSM, heuristic processing is particularly likely to take place in situations in which people are not motivated or for other reasons are not able to think thoroughly about the contents of a message (e.g., low personal relevance of the topic, time constraints). In contrast,