Reactionary Politics: Explaining the Psychological Roots of Anti Preferences in European Integration and Immigration Debates

The concurrent strong waves of anti-EU integration and anti-immigration preferences sweeping across Europe, capitalized on by populist discourses, reflect citizens’ economic anxieties brought about by the financial crisis, dormant cultural fears, widespread suspicion towards international institutions, and frustration with ‘politics as usual’. Extant electoral and public opinion research provide fragmented and conflicted accounts about the psychological origins of these ‘anti’ preferences. In this article, a) we articulate a novel overarching theoretical framework that focuses on reaction as a political orientation and b) we provide an empirical test of the propose theory using data from the 2004 and 2014 European Social Survey. Explication of political reaction as driver of political preferences can move research on challenges to democratic representation forward, particularly political disengagement, violent protests, and populist and anti-establishment party vote in the context of the financial crisis. “The scale of attitudes which different men and women take toward social change may be compared to the solar spectrum. At the opposite ends stand extreme radicalism and uncompromising reaction“. A. B. Wolfe (1923), p. 229. This article has a twofold aim: to articulate theoretically the psychological properties of reactionism as a cluster political orientation in the context of the financial crisis and the rise of populist party-politics; and to provide an empirical test of reactionism as key driver of cooccurring ‘anti’ preferences on EU integration and immigration. Wolfe (1923) identified reactionism as the ideological counterpart of radicalism and progressivism. In its contemporary form, it is increasingly used by scholars to describe the discourse of right-wing populist parties and the political outlook of their supporters in the USA and western Europe (see Corey, 2011; Frazer, 2016; Gervais & Morris, 2018; Harrison & Bruter, 2011; Lilla, 2016; Tenenhaus, 2016; Sullivan, 2017; Wodak, 2015). References to the ‘reactionary mind’, ‘reactionary mood’, ‘reactionary heart’, ‘reactionary tide’, ‘reactionary voter’, ‘reactionary and xenophobic populist parties’, recognize the conceptual links of reaction with xenophobia, anti-immigration demands, racism, anti-expert skepticism, anti-establishment sentiment, antiEU attitudes, but leave its psychological properties largely unexplored. Capelos et al. (2017) defined reactionism as a cluster concept that describes a complex political orientation, combining resentful affectivity with the forceful desire to return to the past. The reactionary orientation draws on conservation values and aversion to what is new. Its affective undertone is the complex emotions of resentment and ressentiment, blending anger, fear, nostalgic hope, betrayal and sense of perceived injustice (Capelos &Demertzis, 2018; Lilla, 2016). Evidence of reactionism is empirically traced in engagement and dormant support of illegal and violent political actions, powered by a deepening sense of economic stagnation, anxiety brought about by the financial crisis, and economic and cultural fears of many citizens. Our proposition to apply the concept of reactionism as driver of bundled antiimmigration and anti-EU preferences rests on extant research showing them sharing affective and motivational psychological properties (see also in this volume Curtis & Hassing Nielsen; Manners; Andreouli & Nicholson; Mahendran; Rico & Guinjoan; Peitz et al.), which invites the hypothesis that these preferences could stem from a common orientation. Anti-EU preferences 1 are explained by affective attitudes towards the EU feeding from cultural and identity issues, authoritarian tendencies, opposition to cosmopolitanism and openness (Boomgaarden & Freire, 2009; Boomgaarden et. al., 2011; Evans, 2000 Otjes & Katsanidou, 2017; Teney et. al., 2013). And as the EU requires more transfer of national sovereignty, it stimulates considerations of national identity and immigration 2 . In turn, anti-immigration preferences are linked to feelings towards out-groups (which also shape inter-group relations) and are dependent on socioeconomic vulnerability (low education, weak position in the labour market, economic deprivation) (Kriesi et. al., 2008). And since immigration is portrayed by many right-wing parties as the central danger against the nation-state, anti-immigration preferences are used to explain right-wing voting (Gorodzeisky, 2011; Kunovich, 2004; Semyonov & Glikman, 2009; Sniderman et al., 2000; de Vreese, 2017). Anti-immigration preferences are also linked to conservation values (Davidov et. al., 2008), EU identity considerations and anti-EU attitudes (De Vreese et al., 2008). Many of those who see threat from immigrants to their national identity dislike migrants and do not see any benefits in international cooperation even in the form of EU membership (Boomgaarden et. al., 2011). These models offer valuable insights to understanding anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences but fail to account for their common core: the resentful reaction towards the 1 Anti-EU attitudes are framed in the literature as Euroscepticism, and are expressed as the negative preferences towards membership to the European Union and prospects of further integration 2 Support for the EU is also linked to utilitarian attitudes connected to economic performance. As a common market, the EU opens national borders to new economic regulations and immigrants, influencing many aspects of life. As the EU regulates economic conditions in its members on issues like wealth redistribution within a state, taxation and government intervention in the economy, it creates tensions for those opposing its economic policies (Kitschelt, 1994). present and the motivation to change it backwards, in other words the affective and motivational drivers of the reactionary orientation. We propose that analyzing these preferences under the conceptual lens of reaction when they co-occur, instead of considering them as independent phenomena, will allow for a clearer understanding of their complex psychological drivers. Reactionism consolidates under one cluster concept the current piecemeal approaches that examine only some of its parts, compartmentalizing this complex political orientation. As such, it can provide valuable insights towards the understanding of contemporary challenges to democratic representation. In Europe’s current heightened populist environment, reactionism is on the rise. The bundling of anti-immigration and anti-EU preferences is frequent in political rhetoric aimed at strengthening a sense of national sovereignty (Mudde, 2007). The non-specific time where all was better, when the nation thrived using its own powers and was seemingly independent, is captured perfectly by Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again” in the USA, or UKIP’s chant to ‘take back control’ in the UK. In such populist narratives, ethno-cultural diversity, cultural assimilation and globalization impinge upon the sovereignty of the homeland, in ways that integrate cultural, economic and political fears. To be clear, these anti-preferences can occur unbundled and here there is no presumption that they necessarily draw on reactionary orientations. It is our hypothesis that when they co-occur, they are likely evidence of reaction. We test this theory with data from the European Social Survey, which has been used extensively to study anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences (Hooghe, Huo & Marks, 2007; Bello, 2015; Karreth et. al., 2015). We find that the components of what we label reactionary orientation predict bundled anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences across electorates in Europe, and perform particularly well after the financial crisis. Our contribution is two-fold: we articulate a novel overarching theoretical framework that focuses on reaction as a political orientation, and we empirically demonstrate that reaction sits at the heart of contemporary anti-EU and anti-immigration preferences, drawing on a combination of affective and motivational psychological properties. Reactionism: separating reaction from other -isms Defining concepts alongside neighboring terms provides construct clarity and is essential for theory development as well as empirical research. Here we briefly discuss the properties that distinguish reactionism from related-isms: populism, radicalism, conservatism, and