Integrating Theories of Motivation 1 Running head : INTEGRATING THEORIES OF MOTIVATION Integrating Theories of Motivation

Progress towards understanding human behavior has been hindered by discipline-bound theories, dividing our efforts. Fortunately, these separate endeavors are converging and can be effectively integrated. Focusing on the fundamental features of Picoeconomics, Expectancy, Cumulative Prospect Theory, and Need Theory, Temporal Motivational Theory (TMT) is constructed. TMT appears consistent with the major findings from many other investigations, including psychobiology. Potential applications of TMT are numerous, including: consumer behavior, aggression, stock market, and governmental behavior. Integrating Theories of Motivation 3 The fields of economics, decision-making, sociology, and psychology share a common desire to understand human nature. This extensive, multidisciplinary interest in establishing who we are reflects the enormous ramifications of the endeavor. As Pinker (2002) catalogues, theories of human nature have been used to direct relationships, lifestyles, and governments – with disastrous effects when based on faulty models. On a smaller applied scale, treatments, training, compensation, and selection all depend upon our theories of human behavior. Even the overtly physical enterprise of job design can require positing human constants such as “growth need strength” (Hackman & Oldman, 1976). To ensure the efficacy of our interventions, we need to determine what describes, drives, or decides our actions. Ironically, our understanding of behavior has been hindered by the very extent of our efforts. There is a superabundance of motivational theories. Not only does each field have its particular interpretation, but there are ample subdivisions with each discipline. Psychology, for example, has the traditions of selfregulation, motivation, and personality, each with its own nomenclature, structure, and etiology. These subdivisions necessarily divide our efforts, limiting the extent to which insights can be shared. This problem has recently been recognized and lamented by many prominent researchers (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Judge & Ilies, 2002; Elliot & Thrash, 2002), but it is by no means a new issue. Consider the words of the Irving Fisher (1930: 312), the venerated economist, which are regrettably still far too relevant: “The fact that there are still two schools, the productivity school and the psychological school, constantly crossing swords on this subject [time preference/implicit interest rates] is a scandal in economic science and a reflection on the inadequate methods employed by these would-be destroyers of each other. ” Integrating Theories of Motivation 4 Fortunately, our theories also have several strong commonalties, and their effective integration seems achievable (Larrick, 1993; Mischel & Shoda, 1999). If it were possible to effectively combine these different conceptions of human nature, we would have substantially progressed towards a common theory of basic motivation. To use E. O. Wilson’s term, this convergence is an excellent example of consilience. Consilience is “a ‘jumping together’ of knowledge by the linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common groundwork of explanation” (1998: 8). If a theory can be shown to have consilience, its scientific validity is vastly improved as it represents different avenues of inquiry coming to similar conclusions. To this end, we integrate four closely related motivational theories, using the insights of each to inform the other. We start with Picoeconomics (Ainslie, 1992), which we then subsequently extend with Expectancy Theory (e.g., Vroom, 1964), Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), and Need Theory (e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950). It is important to note that none of these theories are definitive, each containing various limitations. However, we are not attempting a full integration of their every detail, but focus on linking together these theories’ most enduring and well accepted features. One of the most important of these features is time. Time is a critical component of choice or motivated behavior. As Luce (1990: 228) notes, “quite clearly any empirical realization of a decision tree has a strong temporal aspect. ” and the failure to include time “. is a clear failing of the modeling. ” Similarly, Kanfer (1990) critiques theories that are episodic, and thus have difficulty accounting for behavior over time and events. Fortunately, time or delay does feature in several motivational formulations, its application is consistent where included, and through integration it can be extended to other theories where it Integrating Theories of Motivation 5 was previously absent. Consequently, we label the outcome of our integrative efforts Temporal Motivational Theory (TMT) because of its emphasis on time as a motivational factor. We then show that TMT is corroborated with the major findings from Psychobiology and demonstrate how it can account for the findings from another motivational theory altogether, Goal Theory (Locke & Latham, 1990). We also use Temporal Motivational Theory to explain procrastination, a prototypical performance problem. As a general theory of human behavior, the applications of Temporal Motivational Theory are numerous. We identify four diverse areas that might benefit by employing it in specific ways. Also, we note that this model of human behavior, like all models, must strike a balance between precision and parsimony. Some refinements may add undue complexity while accounting for only minimal incremental variance. Still, there are promising insights and extensions that should be considered, and we review two of them. Finally, future research on TMT may choose to exploit two powerful but underused venues: a Computerized Personal System of Instruction and computer simulations. TEMPORAL MOTIVATIONAL THEORY To develop Temporal Motivational Theory (TMT), we consider four related understandings of human nature: Picoeconomics, Expectancy, Cumulative Prospect Theory, and Need Theory. These four postulations are particularly well suited for consolidation as they reflect common sources in their development and thus share many terms. Consequently, areas of overlap are quite definite. Furthermore, they can be expressed formulaically, allowing their integration with minimal translation. Though many of their aspects are evident in other theories, as will be discussed later, these four are sufficient to develop TMT and fit together in a relatively Integrating Theories of Motivation 6 straightforward manner. We start with picoeconomics as it, of all the theories considered, has time as its most central feature. Picoeconomics or Hyperbolic Discounting Ainslie (1992), under the title of Picoeconomics, and Ainslie and Haslam (1992), under the title of Hyperbolic Discounting, discuss a theory that helps to account for choice of behavior over time. The theory already demonstrates considerable consilience, drawing support from a variety of research literatures including sociology, social psychology, psychodynamic psychology as well as behaviorist psychology and economics in particular. In its basic form, the theory is simple. Essentially, people are beset with choosing among a variety of possible rewarding activities. In choosing among them, there is an innate tendency to inordinately undervalue future events. We tend, then, to put off tasks leading to distant but valuable goals in favor of ones with more immediate though lesser rewards. Inevitably though, time marches on and as the once future events loom ever closer, we see their value more clearly. Eventually, we experience regret if we have irrationally put-off pursuing this more valuable goal to the extent that it can no longer be realistically achieved. Going beyond this qualitative description, the theory of picoeconomics tries to express the effects of temporal discounting mathematically. Summarizing the efforts from behaviorist and economic perspectives, Ainslie (1992) notes several attempts to provide an accurate equation. Of these, the matching law is one of the first and simplest (Chung & Herrnstein, 1967). The matching law considers how frequency, magnitude, and delay of reinforcement affect choices, with delay being the critical feature. It is the dominant model describing choice among various concurrently administered, variable interval schedules (Ainslie, 1992). In other 1 This matching law can be further decomposed into even more basic behaviorist principles (Herrnstein, 1979), specifically invariance and relativity. Integrating Theories of Motivation 7 words, when we must choose between several courses of action that all result in a reward, albeit at different times, this model best predicts the aggregate behaviors of adults (see Myerson & Green, 1995). Similarly, a related version of this law used in the economic field also shows extremely strong validity (see Lowenstein & Prelec, 1992). The simplest version of the matching law contains just four components: Rate Amount Utility Delay × = Utility indicates preference for a course of action. Naturally, the higher the utility, the greater the preference. The next three variables reflect aspects of the reward or payout of the action. Rate indicates the expectancy or frequency that the action will lead to the reward. It ranges from 0% to 100%, with 100% reflecting certainty. Amount indicates the amount of reward that is received upon payout. Essentially, it indicates the magnitude of reinforcement. Finally, delay indicates how long, on average, one must wait to receive the payout. Since delay is in the denominator of the equation, the longer the delay, the less valued the course of action is perceived. There also have been several modifications to the basic matching law. Rate is often dropped since it can largely be expressed in terms of delay alone; rewards delivered at lower rates necessarily create longer average delays. Also, a new parameter is typically included to capture i