Levels and Self-Control Construal Levels and Self-Control

We propose that self-control involves making decisions and behaving in a manner consistent with high level, as compared to low level, construals of a situation. Activation of high level construals (which capture global, superordinate, primary features of an event) should lead to greater self-control than activation of low level construals (which capture local, subordinate, secondary features). In six experiments, using three different techniques, we manipulated construal levels and assessed their effects on self-control and underlying psychological processes. High level construals led to decreased preferences for immediate over delayed outcomes, greater physical endurance, stronger intentions to exert self-control, and less positive evaluations of temptations that undermine self-control. These results support a construal level analysis of self-control. Levels and Self-Control 3 In recent years there has been a resurgence of research on motivation and self-regulation in social psychology (e.g., Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Heckhausen & Dweck, 1998; Higgins & Kruglanski, 2000; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). Researchers in this area have become particularly interested in self-control questions, namely, when and how people fail to do what they want while possessing the knowledge, skill, and opportunity that are required to do what they want (e.g. Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Kivetz & Simonson, 2002; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Wertenbroch, 1998). With implications for education, political science, economics, clinical and developmental psychology, the importance of studying self-control is widely recognized. However, there is surprisingly less consensus on what self-control is. Extant programs of research have differed in the way they conceptualize what the exertion of selfcontrol entails, and how it might be promoted. Baumeister and colleagues (e.g. Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) have proposed that exerting self-control requires one to inhibit consciously undesired automatic, routinized reactions. For example, a smoker who decides to quit must consciously fight the habitual urge to light up when amongst other smoking peers. When individuals monitor their actions consciously and prevent automatic behaviors from being executed, they are said to be exerting self-control. According to this model, any factor that impinges on one’s conscious resources would increase self-control failures. A number of other researchers have also suggested similar distinctions between automatic versus controlled psychological processes and behaviors (e.g. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). Others (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992; Trope and Fishbach, 2000; Thaler, 1991; Wertenbroch, 1998) have suggested that self-control requires one to make decisions and to act in accordance with long-term rather than short-term outcomes. For example, a student preparing for an exam Levels and Self-Control 4 (long-term outcome) should forgo all activities that may be more appealing in the short-term, such as going out with her friends to party. Self-control in these models is defined as sacrificing short-term outcomes in favor of long-term outcomes. Factors that draw attention to immediate, near future outcomes are likely to undermine self-control efforts, whereas those that direct attention to more distant future outcomes are more likely to strengthen self-control efforts. Mischel and his colleagues (Mischel et al., 1986; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) have suggested that actions can be instigated by either “hot” or “cool” systems. The “hot” system is composed of affective mental representations, and when activated, leads to appetitive, impulsive responses. The “cool” system is composed of emotionally neutral cognitions, and guide behavior in a contemplative, reflective manner. Self-control, from this perspective, involves preferential activation of the cool system over the hot system. A child waiting out a delay in the presence of a single immediately available marshmallow to earn an additional marshmallow is more likely to succeed if she thinks of the treat in a “cool” manner (“it looks like a cloud”) rather than a “hot” manner (“it looks yummy”). When the hot system is activated over the cool system, however, the individual will tend to fail at their self-control efforts. Factors that enhance the activation of the hot system (e.g. attention to the appetitive qualities of a stimulus) will hamper self-control, whereas those that promote the activation of the cool system over the hot system will enhance self-control (e.g. mental transformation of temptations into non-appetitive objects). Loewenstein (1996) has distinguished between “visceral” responses and rational selfinterest. Self-control involves making decisions and behaving in ways that reflect rational preferences, and not by “visceral reactions” – physiological, biologically-based responses to a situation. For example, dieters who are presented with chocolate cake should make decisions based on rational calculations of preferences, not those based on hunger pangs. The impulse to Levels and Self-Control 5 eat the cake originates from one’s physiological reaction to food when hungry, which conflicts with any rational decision to not eat the cake. Exerting self-control requires reducing the impact of visceral reactions on one’s preferences, decisions, and actions. Factors that increase the physiological arousal (such as states of deprivation) should negatively impact self-control, as should those that impair rational decision-making process. Any factors that reduce the impact of visceral reactions should, on the other hand, promote self-control. A Construal Level Analysis of Self-Control In the present paper we propose another conceptualization of self-control, which integrates previous approaches in a more general theoretical framework and also makes new predictions. We argue that self-control can be broadly conceptualized as making decisions and acting in accordance to global, high level construal of the situation rather than local, low level construal of the situation. Self-control is enhanced when individuals are able to see the proverbial forest beyond the trees. Construal level theory (CLT) posits that the same event or object can be represented at multiple levels (Trope & Liberman, 2003). High level construals entail constructing abstract conceptualizations of information about objects and events. They apply to a broad array of examples, and selectively include relevant and exclude irrelevant features of those objects and events. High level construals therefore capture the superordinate, central features of an object or event, and abstracting these “high level,” immutable features conveys the general meaning of the event. Low level construals, on the other hand, consist of subordinate, incidental features. In low level construals, events and objects are unique and specific. For example, whereas features such as flashy advertisements and celebrity appearances might specifically identify a particular event (“watching the Olympics”) at a low level construal, Levels and Self-Control 6 conceptualizing the same event at a high level construal (“enjoying sports”) renders such features irrelevant and highlights other features such as quality of the competition. Research has shown that representations at high and low levels are distinct. For example, the activation of high level construals leads to categorization in fewer, broader, and abstract units, whereas activation of low levels leads to categorization in multiple, narrow, and concrete units (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002, Study 1). High level representations are also more coherent and integrative, whereas low level representations are more specific and disparate (Liberman et al., 2002, Study 4; Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 2003). Moreover, individuals’ judgments, decisions, and behaviors differ as a function of construal level. When high level construals are activated, more weight is given to high level features in preferences and actions. When low level construals are activated, preferences and actions are based increasingly on low level features. Studies have shown, for example, that when deciding between tasks that differ in valence of primary and secondary features, individuals at high levels of construal increasingly weight primary features over secondary features in evaluations and preferences (Trope & Liberman, 2000). Consistent with action identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), the representation of action in terms of means-ends relationships is viewed as an important dimension of level of construal of instrumental actions (see Liberman & Trope, 1998). However, CLT has been shown to apply to any object or event, not only to instrumental actions. Moreover, levels of construal may differ on dimensions that are unrelated to the means-ends distinction, such as whether they refer to primary versus secondary features of objects. For example, an individual buying a new radio might consider a central feature of the radio, such as its sound quality, or focus on a secondary feature, such as how eye-catching the display of a built-in clock is (see Trope & Liberman, 2000). Levels and Self-Control 7 A major determinant of what level of construal is activated is the psychological distance of the event or object in consideration. Distancing a target on any psychological dimension (time, space, social, hypotheticality) leads to greater activation of high level construals rather than low level construals (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, in press; Liberman et al., 2002). The tendency to construe situations at high and low levels can also be procedurally primed (Smith & Branscombe, 1987), activated by using high level construals in unrelated prior contexts. Imagining unrelated distant future events, for example, has been shown to enhance thinking more abstractly and generally, whereas ima