Things in Themselves and Appearances: Intentionality and Reality in Kant

ion is made of every condition of sensible Intuition . then expresses only the thought of an object in general, according to different modes. " In addition, Kant later altered the first of these passages so äs to say merely that a purely "transcendental employment" of categories is no employment "for the knowing [my emphasis] of anything": kein Gebrauch, um etwas zu erkennen. Apart from the distinction between knowledge and thought, the claim that pure concepts do not suffice for judgments "about objects" is also ambiguous. It might simply mean that apart from a conception of conditions determining reference to objects of experience, there is no object of any sort such that we would be able to form thought about that object (or about any particular members of the class of objects of that sort). But this does not imply that pure concepts yield no thoughts about objects simpliciier. In a "de dicto" sense, one might be able to "think about" things in themselves; it is only that there would be no such things that one would be able to think about in particular. Nor, I think, does Kant's position require (regardless of his own Claims) denial of the possibility of judgments about things in themselves. The belief that it does stems from failure to see that the thing in itself/appearance distinction is fundamentally betwen two kinds of existence Claims. The employment of concepts in judgments "about" things in themselves would simply be the employment of concepts in judgments asserting something "about" things thought either actually or at least possibly to exist in a nonphenomenalistically reducible sense. The fact that "determinate reference" to and knowledge of such objects is impossible does not imply that such judgments are unintelligible. The supposition that they are may be due to Kant's insistence that such judgments would have to be about entities of a non-spatial and non-temporal sort. But it is not part of the concept of a thing in itself that it lack spatiality and temporality. This Interpretation may also seem incompatible with Kant's view that modal concepts are not concepts of any sort of object at all·. "Even when the concept of a thing is quitc complete, I can still enquire whether this object is merely possible or is also actual . No additional determinations are thereby thought in the object itself; the question is 14 Cf. Kemp Smith's note to the passage; also Raymund Schmidfs cdilion in the "Philosophische Bibliothek" (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1930). 304 K i c h a r d E. A q u i l a only how l he objcct, togclhcr with all its determinations, is related to understanding and its empirical employment (in thc case of schcmatized categories] . , ." (A 219 / U 206). 11 modal concepts mcrely express relalions of objects to the faculty of knowledge, it mighl seern that on my own view, the concept of a "thing in itself" should precisely not be the concept of any distinct sort of particular. However, my Interpretation is not incompatible with Kant's Claims. For the assertion that some sort of object is merely an "appearance" does not, in the relevant sense, "enlarge the concept" of that object. 1t merely asserts that perceptions of that sort of object are obtainable, hence what i t asserts is something about the concept of the object in question (that the concept is capable of "subsuming" possible "intuitions" under it). The view is thus compatible with the claim that the concept of existence is a "second order" concept. Kant himself tries to explain the idea of non-phenomenal existence in terms derived from descriptions of the logical forms of judgment: 'Being' [Sein] is obviously not a real predicate . It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, äs existing in themselves [die Position eines Dinges, oder gewisser Bestimmungen an sich selbst]. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. [W]e attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates [setze ich kein neues Prädikat zum Begriffe von Gott, sondern nur das Subjekt an sich selbst mit allen seinen Prädikaten}^ and indeed posit it äs being an object that Stands in relation to my concept (A 598—9 / B 626— 627). Yet it is not possible to say just what it is to "posit" a thing äs instantiating a concept: Were we dealing with an object of the senses, we could not confound the existence of the thing with the mere concept of it. For through the concept the object is thought only äs conforming to the universal condition of possible empirical knowledge in general, whereas through its existence it is thought äs belonging to the context of experience äs a whole . It is not, therefore, surprising that, if we attempt to think existence through the pure category alone, we cannot specify a single mark distinguishing it from mere possibility (A 601 / B 629). We can say what is involved in phenomenal existence (perceivability in accordance with the demands of categorically structured experience); we cannot say what would be involved in existence "in itself. " But we have some comprehension ot it, insotar äs we are able to perform the requisite ("logical") acts of "positing. " Hence Kant by no means concludes that there is no distinction between two sorts of existence Claims. He merely observes that we lack criteria for determining the truth of one of these sorts of Claims: Whatever, therefore, and however much, our concept of an object may contain, we must go outside it, if we are to ascribe existence to the object. In the case of objects of the senses, this takes place through their connection with some one of our perceptions, in accordance with empirical laws. But in dealing with objects of pure thought, we have no means whatsoever of knowing their existence, since it would have to be known in a completely a priori manner . Any existence outside this field, while not indeed such äs we can declare to be absolutely impossible, is of the nature of an assumption which we can never be in a position to justify (A 601 / B 629). Things in Themselves and Appearances: Intentionality and Reality in Kant 305 A thorough-going phenomenalist, of course, would maintain that the only intelligible notion of existential "positing" involves purely phenomenal existence. But Kant was a phenomenalist only with respect to the existence of objects of which knowledge is possible. He fails, admittedly, to define any other notion of existence; but so has anyone who is not a phenomenalist.