Gatekeeping Gatekeeping

Collective choice bodies throughout the world use a diverse array of codified rules that determine who may exercise procedural rights, and in what order. This paper analyzes several twostage decision-making models, focusing on one in which the firstmoving actor has a unique, unilateral, procedural right to enforce the status quo, i.e., to exercise gatekeeping. Normative analysis using Pareto-dominance criteria reveals that the institution of gatekeeping is inferior to another institutional arrangement within this framework—namely, one in which the same actor is given a traditional veto instead of a gatekeeping right. The analytical results raise an empirical puzzle: When and why would self-organizing collective choice bodies adopt gatekeeping institutions? A qualitative survey of governmental institutions suggests that—contrary to an entrenched modeling norm within political science—empirical instances of codified gatekeeping rights are rare or nonexistent. We are grateful to David Primo for research assistance and to John Huber, Nolan McCarty, and Adam Meirowitz for helpful discussions. Additional comments are welcome. Gatekeeping Christophe Crombez, Tim Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel A large portion of the procedural complexity in collective choice bodies throughout the world can be characterized in simple game-theoretic models. All that is required as a first-order approximation is to specify analytically features such as unique proposal or veto rights, rules governing amendments, and the order in which decision makers act. Empirical counterparts for these abstractions are plentiful. Examples of individuals or groups who possess unique procedural rights include standing committees in legislatures, the Commission in the European Union (EU), prime ministers in parliamentary governments, and the chief executive in presidential systems. Examples of their special rights include, respectively, bill referrals as stipulated by jurisdictional arrangements, proposal rights as designated by international treaties, rights to call elections as provided for by national constitutions, and the right to veto legislation after its passage as specified in the many state and national constitutions. Rules governing amendments may, likewise, give opportunities for some—but not all—decision-makers to propose modifications to the measure before the body. Finally, rules that determine the order in which players engage in collective choice have force within governments at both intra-branch and inter-branch levels. For example, many legislatures have rules or precedents that require that, upon its introduction, legislation is immediately referred to a standing committee, only to be considered later, if at all, by the full body. Similarly, some separation of powers systems require that the legislative branch initiates policy, but that the executive branch (e.g., the president) acts next and must sign or veto the proposed legislation. Parliamentary systems may also grant proposal rights to extra-legislative bodies or players, such as cabinet ministers. This study presents comparative institutional analyses for a class of simple two-stage decision-making arrangements. Within this class, the focal institutional