Reinterpreting the Gender Gap

This study offers an analysis of the recent political differences between women and men that contradicts the conventional description of the "gender gap" in American politics. Beginning with the 1980 elections, the differences between women and men in their opinions on political issues, in voting behavior, and in partisan identification frequently have been portrayed as a result of women's rejection of Reagan and of Republicans and conservative values and their attraction to more liberal political positions and to the Democratic party. This description is misleading and cannot explain the full spectrum of political behavior by the sexes in the 1980s. This analysis argues that the gender gap has been the result of unequal rates of defection by men and women away from liberal values and the Democratic party. Greater movement by men toward conservative positions and the Republican party produced the gender gap. Consequently, the Republicans were never the potential victims but have always been the potential and actual beneficiaries of the gender gap. Daniel Wirls is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government, Cornell University. The author wishes to thank Benjamin Ginsberg, whose insight and encouragement initiated this study and improved it throughout the project's duration. Kathleen Frankovic graciously provided CBS News polling data. Martin Shefter, Alice Talbot, and the anonymous reviewers provided helpful comments and criticisms that improved the substance and presentation of the argument. Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 50:316-330 ? 1986 by the Amencan Association for Public Opinion Research Published by The University of Chicago Press 0033-362X/86/0050-316/$2.50 This content downloaded from 157.55. 39.127 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 05:56:11 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor. org/terms REINTERPRETING THE GENDER GAP 317 ing negatively to Reagan, Republicans, and revitalized conservatism. ' According to this predominant view, the gender gap spelled trouble for Ronald Reagan in 1984 and signaled the potential coalescence of a women's voting bloc as a key constituent of a new Democratic coalition for the 1980s. This interpretation was the decisive factor behind the nomination of Geraldine Ferraro as the Democratic vicepresidential nominee. In 1984, however, the gender gap did not live up to its putative potential. The difference between the electoral choices of women and men narrowed; had only women voted, Reagan still would have won a landslide victory. Despite the unexpected results in 1984, the conventional interpretation has gone largely unquestioned, though references to the gender gap have become fewer and muted. What explains this contrast between the expectations generated by the popular interpretation of the gender gap in the early 1980s and the reality of 1984? Proponents of the conventional argument often drew conclusions about the dynamics and future of sex-linked political differences from static measurements of opinion and voting, which showed women to be more liberal or Democratic than men at discrete points in time over the last several years. The history of the gender gap demonstrates the danger of projections based on static data and a conceptual focus on women as the relevant political actors. Longitudinal analysis of the direction of political motion by both women and men produces a much different portrait of the meaning and significance of the gender gap. This study argues that the gender gap resulted from a general movement by the electorate toward Reagan, the Republicans, and more conservative values. While both men and women have been defecting from the Democratic party and moving away from liberal values, rates of defection among men have been greater than rates among women. Hence the gender gap. Rather than reflecting an increase in Democratic and liberal sentiments among women, the gender gap resulted from more rapid and widespread movement among men than women to conservative values and the Republican party. Consequently, Reagan and the Republicans were never the potential victims, but the potential and actual beneficiaries of the gender gap in 1984. 1 For example, Lou Harris said that "consistently, women are voting more Democratic than Republican, but most particularly, are inclined to vote against Ronald Reagan in his bid for reelection" (Ms., July 1984:53). Reagan's chief political advisor during the campaign of 1984, Ed Rollins, warned that the gender gap could "lock" the Republicans "into the status of a minority party," and that it threatened the chances for Reagan's reelection (Washington Post, June 6, 1983). For the perspective of the women's movement see Abzug (1984) and Smeal (1984). This content downloaded from 157.55. 39.127 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 05:56:11 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor. org/terms