The Context Sensitivity of Experience Based Learning in Belief Revision

The Context Sensitivity of Experience based Learning in Belief Revision Kristien Dieussaert (kristien.dieussaert@psy.kuleuven.be) Debora Vansteenwegen (deb.vansteenwegen@psy.kuleuven.be) An Van Assche (an.vanassche@student.kuleuven.be) University of Leuven, Department of Psychology, 102 Tiensestraat, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium Abstract In this paper we show that experience based beliefs are more context sensitive than instruction based beliefs. The adaptation to a new context happens faster and is more extensive with experience based beliefs. Moreover we will demonstrate that experience based learning is able to overrule what is learned by instructions. KEYWORDS: BELIEF REVISION, CONTEXT Introduction This research relates two subdomains of cognitive psychology with an interest in belief revision that have been studied completely separately in the past. On the one hand, we rely on the reasoning literature regarding belief revision (For a review, see Dieussaert & Schaeken, 2005). On the other hand, we rely on the contingency learning literature regarding belief revision (For a review, see De Houwer & Beckers, 2002). Both research domains have adopted a different strategy to study belief revision. In reasoning research (e.g., Elio & Pelletier, 1997), participants (pps) are given a conditional statement (if p, then q; e.g., if that bacteria is present in your blood, then you have the Okro disease) and a categorical statement (p; e.g., the bacteria is present), and are asked to deduce the conclusion, or are given the conclusion (q; e.g., you have the Okro disease) [belief construction phase]. Next, new information that contradicts the conclusion is presented (not- q; e.g., you do not have the Okro disease) [belief revision phase] and pps. are asked to revise one of the former statements in order to regain a consistent belief set [test phase]. In most human contingency learning experiments (e.g., Catena et al., 2002), pps. receive information about a number of situations in which certain Cues (C) and Outcomes (O) are either present or absent, and they are asked to judge the extent to which the presence of a C is related to the presence of O. Three phases are discerned: first, a contingency is acquired [belief construction phase], next it is extinguished [belief revision phase]. The resulting ‘degree of belief’ in the C-O contingency is tested in the third phase [test phase]. Additional manipulations of, for example, the acquisition and extinction context influence the resulting degree of belief in the contingency. These differences in paradigm reflect a different view on how beliefs are constructed: through instruction (if C, then O) or through experience (several C-O trials). We consider both forms of belief construction important since in daily life, people construct their beliefs in various ways, depending on the situation. Some beliefs are constructed through communication (e.g., If you run out of brake oil, your brake will not work) while others are constructed through experience (e.g., If you eat, you won’t be hungry any more). That experiences of the latter kind easily fit into an ‘if-then’ formulation has been shown before in Dieussaert et al. The predictions and outcomes of the studies in both research domains are opposite. In reasoning research, the main finding is that pps. revise their belief in the conditional rule in favor of their belief in the categorical statement (e.g., for an explanation in terms of mental models, see Johnson- Laird et al., 2004). In contingency learning research, the main finding is that when a change in context is introduced, the primary belief in the C-O contingency becomes visible again in the 3 rd phase after being extinguished in the 2 nd phase (e.g., Garcia-Gutierrez & Rosas, 2003). The latter phenomenon is called ‘renewal’ (e.g., Bouton, 1993). In a previous study (Dieussaert et al., 2005), we were able to reconciliate both outcomes. We demonstrated that beliefs induced by instruction, as applied in reasoning research, were not sensitive to renewal, while beliefs induced by experience, as applied in contingency research, clearly showed a renewal effect. We showed this by comparing beliefs acquired through instruction vs. beliefs acquired through experience [belief construction phase]. The contradictive experience based information was presented in the same context (AAA) or in a different context (ABA) than the acquisition context. Renewal only took place when the contexts had been changed during the experiment and when the belief was induced through experience. Two explanations were proposed for this effect: “These findings can be interpreted in various ways. On the one hand, one could argue that beliefs acquired through instruction are less stable and more susceptible to negative experiences than beliefs acquired through experience. On the other hand, one could also state that instruction based beliefs are less context sensitive than experience based beliefs since no difference between the AAA and ABA level is observed. ” (Dieussaert et al., 2005, p. 599). In this paper, we sort out which of the two explanations holds. In Experiment 1, we manipulate the context again, but instead of giving the contradictive information through experience, we will present it in an instruction format [belief revision phase]. This will allow us to show that instruction