Problems and Electoral Institutions : The 17 th Amendment and Representation in the U . S . Senate *

Delegation of decision making authority to agents with different preferences and better information than their principals is ubiquitous in politics, and political representation is no exception. Electoral institutions can crucially shape the agency problems that result from this delegation. A prominent change in American electoral institutions occurred when the 17th Amendment to the Constitution established direct election of U.S. Senators as of 1914. How did this change the political agency relationship between the mass electorate and U.S. Senators? We develop theoretical expectations about the representational effects of direct election by a relatively inexpert mass electorate and indirect election by a relatively expert political intermediary, based on principal-agent theory. The chief predictions are that the representative will be more responsive to the mass electorate under direct election, but will also have more discretion to pursue his own ends regardless of those of his principals. We use the 17th Amendment as a quasi-experiment to test the predictions of the theory. Statistical models show strong support for both predictions. Moreover, the 17th Amendment is unable to “explain” changes in voting patterns in the U.S. House of Representatives over the same time period – as expected, since the Amendment did not change House electoral institutions. How can the structure of electoral institutions ensure that representatives faithfully translate popular will into policy decisions? Effecting this translation justifies representative democracy in terms of popular sovereignty. Clearly, it requires some link between the populace and their representatives, but there are a variety of ways to structure this link. Beyond some basic findings, scholars have a limited understanding of the effects, nuances, or tradeoffs for representation and accountability behind alternative institutional structures. The 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides a unique opportunity to study such institutional effects on representation. Enacted in 1913, the 17th Amendment changed the basis of election of U.S. Senators from the state legislature to a statewide popular vote. A simple principal-agent argument posits that the Amendment made Senators direct agents of their ultimate principals, state voters, rather than indirect agents directly accountable to political intermediaries in the state legislature. Put differently, the Amendment replaced indirect control with direct accountability, of which the chief implication is that senators should be more responsive to the state electorate’s preferences directly. We believe this simple agency logic is partly right, but that it misses an important factor. That is, in terms of democratic accountability of senators to their state electorates, direct election involves a tradeoff. While the 17th Amendment did create a direct agency relationship, it also eliminated both the informed selection and monitoring of U.S. Senators by relative political experts, state legislators. Therefore, U.S. Senators may have been held to a better post-amendment standard in democratic terms, but not as tightly as they were held to their pre-amendment standard. Which arrangement is better normatively depends on whether one wants a reliable shot that misses the bull’s eye, or an erratic shot that sometimes hits.