Metacognitive Aspects of Test-Taking and Intelligence

Summary This paper reviews recent work on the metacognitive traits of self-confidence and selfmonitoring. These traits can be measured using typical tests of cognitive abilities. They are also implicated in the work on ecological validity and probabilistic decision-making. It appears that an individual differences perspective may be beneficial for the explanation of the main findings of under- and overconfidence. Individual differences in self-confidence are stable and general across many different cognitive tasks. The trait of self-confidence resides on the borderline between personality and intelligence. This paper also reviews the evidence for age and gender differences and for the predictive validity of self-confidence. Key words: Metacognition, intelligence, self-confidence, self-monitoring, calibration, individual differences. Although metacognition, in general, refers to "knowing about knowing" (see Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994), its structure and function are usually broken down into several ingredient processes. For example, the theoretical model proposed by Nelson and Narens (1994) considers two basic types of metacognitive processes - control and monitoring. Often, however, three or more types of metacognitive processes are listed with planning, monitoring, and evaluation being the most frequently cited examples. While the writings of Flavell (1977) were influential in introducing the notion of metacognition to many areas of developmental and cognitive psychology, the study of these processes in relation to test-taking behavior has been largely neglected. This is not to say that metacognition has been excluded from theories of, and research into, intelligence. Indeed, Sternberg's (1985) triarchic theory of intelligence ascribes a rather important role to what he calls "higher executive processes". However, Sternberg's empirical studies of metacognition have focused on its role in problem solving (see Davidson, Deuser, & Sternberg, 1994). In that work the unit of analysis is a single problem, not what goes on as a person works through a series of problems (items) in a test. Another area of intelligence research that has emphasized the role of metacognition is the work with educable retarded children (see Campione & Brown, 1977). The aim of that program of research has been to show that teaching retarded children some pertinent problem solving strategies may help to improve their performance on tests of intelligence. Most of this work, however, has not been extended beyond children and retarded populations. To some onlookers metacognition smacks of a homunculus - it is rejected because of the fear of infinite regress. To others, its relevance has been claimed with regards to esoteric (e.g., tip-of-the-tongue experience, see Smith, 1994), strategic (e.g., Campione & Brown, 1977) or specific (e.g., betting at race tracks, see Ceci, 1990) phenomena. Both strategic and specific interpretations of metacognition have been considered and dismissed by those emphasizing the biological approach to intelligence. Thus, it is hard to assume that strategies can account for individual differences in intelligence since strategies seem unique to the tasks and there is such a large number of different cognitive tasks in use (cf. Jensen, 1979). This paper reviews recent psychometric and individual differences studies of metacognitive processes that take place as a person works through typical tests of cognitive abilities and intelligence. The work has been carried out at the University of Sydney, Australia, during the latter part of the past decade. Our studies have produced positive evidence supportive of metacognitive processes. However, there are three important points that need to be kept in mind. First, the role of metacognitive processes in intelligence is likely to be less important than has been hoped for by some researchers. These processes cannot be described as a master program (i. …