"Language is Spatial": Experimental Evidence for Image Schemas of Concrete and Abstract Verbs

“Language is Spatial”: Experimental Evidence for Image Schemas of Concrete and Abstract Verbs Daniel C. Richardson (dcr18@cornell.edu), Michael J. Spivey (spivey@cornell.edu) Shimon Edelman (se37@cornell.edu) Adam J. Naples (ajn23@cornell.edu) Department of Psychology, Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853 USA Abstract Cognitive linguistics and experimental psychology have produced tantalizing hints that a substantial portion of language is encoded in the mind in the form of spatial representations that are grounded in perception and action. Researchers represent these spatial aspects using image schemas that depict verbs of motion or spatial prepositions via a 2-D layout of generic icons. In two experiments, we tested naive subjects' intuitions about such image schemas for concrete action verbs as well as abstract action verbs and psychological predicates. A substantial agreement across subjects was observed in both a forced choice task and a free form computer-based drawing task, for both concrete verbs and abstract verbs. In addition to providing support for the generality of image schemas, the data provide a set of norms for future online studies of spatial representations underlying real-time language processing. Introduction Many theorists have argued for a spatial component to language. The arguments are commonly set against an amodal view of representation which defines items in some formal symbolic system. The motivations for proposing an alternative to the symbolic approach range from difficulties in implementing a symbolic system (Barsalou, 1999), commonalties between ‘parsing’ in the visual system and in language (Landau & Jackendoff, 1993), capturing subtle asymmetries and nuances of linguistic representation in a spatial, schematic way (Langacker, 1987; Talmy, 1983), and a more general account of the mind as an embodied, experiential system (Lakoff, 1987). If we accept the idea that there is a spatial or perceptual basis to the representation of linguistic items, it would be reasonable to assume that there is some commonality between these representations across different speakers, since by and large we communicate successfully. Therefore, we might expect that there would be a consensus among subjects when we ask them to draw simple diagrams representing words. Theorists such as Langacker (1987) have produced large bodies of diagrammatic linguistic representations, arguing that they are constrained by linguistic observations and intuitions in the same way that ‘well formedness’ judgements inform more traditional linguistic theories. However, it remains to be seen whether naive subjects share these intuitions and forms of representation. Therefore, in the same way that psycholinguists use norming studies to support claims of preference for certain grammatical structures, we propose to survey a large number of subjects and see if there is a consensus amongst their spatial representations of words. Recent work has also documented the mapping between spatial linguistic terms and the mental representation of space (eg Hayward & Tarr, 1995; Carlson-Radvansky, Covey & Lattanzi, 1999; Schober, 1995). Although there are consistencies in the ways in which spatial language is produced and comprehended (eg Hayward & Tarr, 1995), the exact mapping appears to be modulated by such factors as visual context (Spivey-Knowlton, Tanenhaus, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1998), the common ground between conversants (Schober, 1995) and the functional attributes of the objects being described (Carlson-Radvansky et al., 1999). When language refers directly to explicit spatial properties, locations, and relationships in the world, it is quite natural to expect those linguistic representations to have at least some degree of overlap in their format. Spatial language terms appear to be grounded, at least somewhat, in perceptual (rather than amodal) formats of representation. However, an important component of the work presented herein involves testing for this representational format in an arena of language that does not exhibit any literal spatial properties: abstract verbs (such as ‘respect’ and ‘succeed’). Much work in cognitive linguistics has in fact argued that many linguistic and conceptual representations (even abstract ones) are based on metaphorical connections to spatially laid out “image schemas” (Gibbs, 1996; Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 1987; Talmy, 1983). This work suggests that if consistency across subjects is observed for spatial depictions of concrete verbs, then one should also expect such consistency for abstract verbs. Experimental evidence for this kind of broad consensus among speakers would extend the “language is spatial” hypothesis beyond spatial terms, and make some experimentally supported, albeit preliminary, claims about abstract language as well. There are various old and new results suggesting that there is some consistency among speakers in the visual imagery associated with certain ideas and concepts. For example, Scheerer and Lyons (1957) asked subjects to