Working Memory, Cognitive Miserliness and Logic as Predictors of Performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test

Working Memory, Cognitive Miserliness and Logic as Predictors of Performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test Edward J. N. Stupple (e.j.n.stupple@derby.ac.uk) Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby Kedleston Road, Derby. DE22 1GB Maggie Gale (m.gale@derby.ac.uk) Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby Kedleston Road, Derby. DE22 1GB Christopher R. Richmond (c.richmond1@unimail.derby.ac.uk) Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby Kedleston Road, Derby. DE22 1GB Abstract The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was devised to measure the inhibition of heuristic responses to favour analytic ones. Toplak, West and Stanovich (2011) demonstrated that the CRT was a powerful predictor of heuristics and biases task performance - proposing it as a metric of the cognitive miserliness central to dual process theories of thinking. This thesis was examined using reasoning response-times, normative responses from two reasoning tasks and working memory capacity (WMC) to predict individual differences in performance on the CRT. These data offered limited support for the view of miserliness as the primary factor in the CRT. The strongest predictor of CRT in both experiments was WMC. It is argued that while cognitive miserliness has been implicated in CRT performance, participants must also possess the requisite WMC and mindware to successfully complete it. Therefore, the psychological and psychometric properties of the CRT require continued study. Keywords: Cognitive Reflection Test, Heuristics and Biases, Dual-process Theory, Belief-bias, Matching-bias, Reasoning, Cognitive Misers. Introduction Dual-process theories of reasoning and judgment dissociate fast and frugal ‘snap’ judgments from slow, effortful and methodical analyses (e.g., De Neys, 2012; Evans, 2007; Stanovich, 2004) with the latter being viewed as being more likely to lead to normatively sanctioned answers in a variety of reasoning tasks. These contrasting processes are captured by heuristic-analytic tasks that involve a conflict between these processes (see Kahneman, 2011 for a recent review) and are referred to as Type 1 (heuristic) and Type 2 (analytic) (e.g., Evans, 2011). Frederick (2005) devised the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to examine the ability of participants to resist intuitive, tempting answers in favour of deeper, more analytic ones. By way of illustration, an example item from the CRT is “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ” Most participants respond that the answer is 10 cents; however, a slower and more analytic approach to the problem reveals the correct answer to be 5 cents. The CRT has been a spectacular success, attracting more than 100 citations in 2012 alone (Scopus). This may be in part due to the ease of administration; with only three items and no requirement for expensive equipment, the practical advantages are considerable. There have, moreover, been numerous correlates of the CRT demonstrated, from a wide range of tasks in the heuristics and biases literature (Toplak et al., 2011) to risk aversion and SAT scores (Frederick, 2005). Its publication was also timely as it coincided with the recent boom in dual process theories of thinking and reasoning (e.g., De Neys, 2012; Evans, 2007; Stanovich, 1999). The CRT and its items have been adopted as a test- bed for the predictions of these theories (Bourgeois- Gironde, & Vanderhenst, 2009; Campitelli & Labollita, 2010; De Neys, Rossi, & Houde, 2013; Toplak et al., 2011). Bourgeois-Gironde and Vanderhenst (2009) have also highlighted the advantage that the CRT offers in terms of testing dual process predictions against arithmetic norms rather than the more controversial normative standards in logic or probability (see Elqayam & Evans, 2011). Toplak et al. (2011) presented perhaps the most comprehensive examination of the CRT, demonstrating considerable evidence for it as a predictor of non-normative responses to a battery of heuristics and biases tasks (each explicable) by dual process theories. Based on their findings Toplak et al. argued that the CRT predicts variance in rational thinking independently of intelligence, executive function and thinking dispositions, and that this variance is not insubstantial. Furthermore, Toplak et al. advance the CRT as a promising metric to tap into What Intelligence Tests Miss (Stanovich, 2009a) by accounting for rational thinking tendencies that are not captured by standard IQ tests (Stanovich suggests Dysrationalia as a term for people with higher IQ scores who fail on heuristics and biases tasks because they lack these thinking tendencies).