THE POVERTY OF SCIENTISM IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS

In the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes outlined the program of scientism which proposes that laws of human nature can be found by the same methods as employed in the natural sciences. By the application of such scientific laws of the social universe, it would then be possible to design for the improvement of the human condition. This paper presents evidence from the literature for two claims: (1) The current orthodoxy in information systems research tries to implement the Hobbesian program by believing in the possibility of a scientistic engineering theory of information systems design; (2) This is bound to fail. Hence the conclusion must be that Information Systems will remain a dubious science as long as it tries to emulate the so-called scientific method as the only ideal of academic inquiry. The most visible symptoms of the poverty of scientism are paradigmatic anomalies—crucial research issues which cannot be resolved within the scientistic tradition because they transcend its paradigmatic assumptions. The need for affirmative pluralism is offered as a fruitful avenue to improve the status of information systems in academia and practice. 124 H. K. Klein and K. Lyytinen “Whatever presents itself as empiricism is sure of widespread acceptance, not on its merits, but because empiricism is the fashion. ” – Betrand Russell, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell “The orthodox model of natural science is now itself no more. ” – Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory Introduction: The Scientific Method—A Doubtful Approach? Examples of doubtful sciences are astrology, alchemy or scholasticism. Doubtful sciences lack either proper methods or legitimate problems or both. This paper questions the methods by which research about information systems is conducted. IS—and the abbreviation with the capital initials of “Information Systems” is used to refer to the academic discipline as opposed to information systems as its object of inquiry—will remain a doubtful science as long as it continues to strive to develop its stock of knowledge primarily through the practice of the so-called scientific method. In order to explain this, two diverging attitudes about the nature of science need to be distinguished. One of these emphasizes objectivity and rigor of methods whereas the other historical context and relevancy of results. Scientism Versus Science The first view of the nature of science, emphasizing rigor, goes back to Descartes and holds that all of science must imitate the methods that have lead to the immense progress in mathematics and the natural sciences. Until the early 20 century these were called the “exact” sciences and in the current philosophical literature their methods are refereed to as the empirical-analytical approach. It defines a fairly rigorous set of canons by which the practice of science has to proceed, e.g., as described in Popper (1968) or Lakatos (1970), and these constitute the only route to valid knowledge. Any human activities not following these methods may still be worthwhile pursuing, because they are practical or art or religious contemplation or whatever else, but they do not lead to valid knowledge and hence are not part of science. This strict version of the concept of science will from now on be refereed to as scientism (cf. Habermas 1973; Cameron 1979; Apel 1980; McCarthy 1982, pp. 1-52). Conflicting with scientism is the wider notion of science which admits any form of scholarly inquiry as a possible route to knowledge. As an example, consider the following definition: “We conceive of ‘science’ essentially as a knowledge improving enterprise” (Radnitzky 1970, p. l). Such a wide definition would have to admit those methods which have been practiced by the classic thinkers and by the humanities to improve our knowledge. Most great books of mankind have not been compiled by sticking very close to the empirical-analytical method as preferred by “scientists. ” All that the great thinkers (including the inventors of the scientistic program) needed were intellectual discourse (or “reflective conversation” as a method of inquiry;” cf. Morgan 1983, p. 406) and a good library. Of course, this is not to preclude the consideration of results achieved by The Poverty of Scientism in Information Systems 125 scientism, quite to the contrary, but it includes much more. This wider inclusive notion of science is the pursuit of knowledge by whatever scholarly means. Unfortunately, the English language has no word for this broad concept of science like the German Wissenschaft. Instead such phrases as scholarly inquiry, non-scientistic research or simply a broader concept of science must be used. The label “science” will be used as a generic concept which embraces both scientism and “other” modes of inquiry. What are the difficulties with scientism when applied to the development of information systems? An example, which admittedly is exaggerating the problems by placing the question of successful information systems into a different time and culture, is used to pinpoint some of the issues for the purpose of introduction. Scientistic Information Support for Alexander the Great Imagine that SK, a rigorous decision modeler and information scientist, is to travel both into the future and the past. From the future, he is to pick up a 6 generation pocket PC 370 and then meet Alexander the Great before he headed East to carry out the far reaching plans for the liberation of the Greek cities from the tyranny of Persia and the establishment of a Greek federation (approximately 334 B.C.). SK is plagued with anxieties about another information systems failure. Naturally, the Great General would prefer to query an oracle before going into battle. How could he be convinced—with all due respect—that this was unscientific? Could our time traveler, indeed, assure the emperor of the right answer by running his user-friendly simulation modeling system of the battle to come? Even at the risk that SK is likely to loose his head if he was wrong? And if not, how could it be explained to the General that ambiguous answers obtained from sensitivity analysis are scientifically acceptable, whereas ambiguous answers obtained from the oracle are, of course, evidence for lack of proper method? And then there is the question of social acceptability. Even if SK was able to convince the General of the validity of the simulation, more than on anything else the outcome of the battle depended on the morale of the troops. If the troops did not believe the model’s prediction and thought the Gods must be asked before the battle, it would lower their commitment if the oracle was ignored. No oracle, no victory. This attitude must lead to a weakening of morale which could, of course, be reflected by changing the morale parameters in the model. But then SK was no longer “objectively observing,” but actually intervening in the battle by weakening the General’s army. Should he be executed for aiding and abetting the enemy? And if not, could he justify his intervention to himself if his own life depended on the victory as much as that of everyone else? This hypothetical story raises the following questions: How does scientistic inquiry account for differences in information needs which are due to differences in the historical126 H. K. Klein and K. Lyytinen cultural milieu? Is there a historical component to the definition of the scientific method or is it the same for all people at all times? (For a review of different concepts of the scientific method which emerged during the last 300 years, see Churchman 1971.) If the concept of scientific method changes with time (for which there is plenty of empirical evidence, cf. Churchman 1971; Kuhn 1970), then how can the decision for the one right method be based on scientifically validated knowledge? If scientism cannot answer this because it leads to an infinite regress (cf. McCarthy 1973), then we must conclude that it has nothing to contribute to the choice of its own methods. This means that the decision in favor of science is totally irrational (this is actually the conclusion which has been drawn in the orthodox philosophy of science, see review in McCarthy 1982, p. 49; on the role of rationality in research, see also White 1984 presented here). This leads to the paradoxical situation for the information scientist that (s)he is to advocate rational decision making by the application of the scientific method whereas the decision to apply the scientific method itself is irrational, i.e., cannot be justified by knowledge which conforms to the ideal of scientistic validity standards. The example also points to the controversial problem of objective models of reality, i.e., are the information needs for Alexander the Great objectively defined by reality or are they constructed by socially influenced perceptions (e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1967)? Does terminology and language have any influence on the construction of reality (cf. Sapir-Whorf hypothesis; see literature review in Schaff 1973) or is language “neutral” (as nominalism suggests)? Is it possible to determine information systems requirements and supply information support without intervening in the process to be studied? If this is not possible, does this mean that the analyst must assume joint responsibility for the final outcome with the end-users? What are the further consequences of this, e.g., does it mean that the fiction of a “neutral” or value free scientific approach to information system development must be thrown overboard? And if information systems development is a value laden, interventionist process, what are the implications for participation? As these questions do not have agreed upon answers in the modern literature, a more thorough analysis is needed. Focus and Organization of this Paper A thorough treatment of the limitations of scientism as the sole paradigm for information systems design is beyond the scope of a sing