American Public Opinion

Our understanding of the PalestinianZionist and Arab-Israeli conflicts has been both improved considerably and perhaps even jolted by the findings ofthese three, differentially seminal, works. Without in any way detracting from their value, it is obviously necessary to suggest how they can be improved upon (by scholars on both sides of the divide). The first and perhaps the most critical isa careful sifting through of what is available in Arabic. Neither the Palestinian leadership (or organizations) nor the Arab states have made state papers available to scholars-Arab or foreign. Itis impossible togauge how much material is available in the ministries ofdefense, foreign affairs, police, the interior, and so on. But it is clear that the availability and accessibility of Israel's archives, and British and American papers has meant hat the perspectives of Israel, its friends, and supporters will be more prevalent. It is late, but hopefully not too late, for Palestinian research institutions to launch major research projects of an "oral history" variety to record the experience of Palestinians during the exodus. This oral narration could then be set against he documentaries of Morris. The archives of other states, though peripherally involved in the question of Palestine, could be quite helpful, especially those that were antagonistic o Britain. While Flapan has important points to make about Israel's policies, an examination of either Palestinian orArab archival material-besides Jordan-may in fact indicate that both parties are equally guilty in wanting conflict in 1948 (for obviously different reasons). Flapan, for example, may not have sensed the Palestinian contempt for Muhammad Nimr Hawari, who negotiated at Lausanne. Cursory interviews with Palestinians who knew Hawari in Jaffa in1947-48 would have revealed to Flapan that people at that time thought that Hawari was an Israeli plant. In fact, he was eventually "permitted" to settle in Nazareth, where Israel appointed him judge, thereby confirming what people had been saying about him. Flapan, in his critique of Israel, pinned hopes on such "interlocutors. " Syria's tate papers may also reveal that Husni al-Za'im was neither serious in his effort toreach a peace settlement with Israel nor in his proposal to settle the Palestinian refugees innorthern Syria. These issues are clearly important and should be dealt with on the basis of all available material. But the successful analysis and portrayal ofthe dynamic encounter between Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jew across time will suffer seriously ifit is not premised on some theory, some ideological or intellectual premise. Sanbar does that; Morris is more pragmatic in approach; while Flapan, aware of the importance of theory, is, nevertheless, unable to "evaluate" Israel's policies in terms of their intrinsic connection with Zionism. It may not be out of place to suggest hat the mufti and Ben-Gurion "understood" each other well. Judah Magnes understood the Palestinian fear of Zionism; had Flapan lived longer he might have come closer to Magnes' view of the encounter, but would have then been even more marginal to Israel's political system.