Preschoolers' Trust is Sensitive to Variable Intentions

Preschoolers’ Trust is Sensitive to Variable Intentions Elena Hoicka (elena.hoicka@stir.ac.uk) Psychology Department, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, Sheffield, S10 2PT, UK Jessica Butcher, Felicity Malla Psychology, School of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK Paul L. Harris (paul_harris@gse.harvard.edu) Harvard Graduate School, Harvard University, Appian Way, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA Abstract This research demonstrates that preschoolers flexibly trust and mistrust the same individuals, as preschoolers recognize that their intentions may vary. In Study 1 (N=101) 3- and 4-year- olds trusted speakers based on their current, rather than previous, intentions to give in/correct information. Thus preschoolers infer the meanings behind different intentions and recognize that intentions change within individuals over time. In Study 2 (N=80) 3- to 5-year-olds trusted speakers who were currently sincere, but previously intentionally inaccurate, rather than currently sincere, but previously ignorant, showing that preschoolers infer current knowledge from prior intentions. Preschoolers also trusted speakers who were currently knowledgeable, although previously ignorant, showing that they recognize knowledge is variable within individuals. Keywords: Trust, Intention, Knowledge, Frame Problem, Preschoolers, Humor Introduction A growing body of research suggests that children do not blindly trust just anyone; children consider whom to trust (e.g., Clement, Koenig & Harris, 2004; Corriveau, Meints & Harris, 2009; Koenig & Harris, 2005). However, in a world where people have variable knowledge and intentions, an important question is whether children are prepared to trust individuals on some occasions but not others (e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009; Scofield & Behrend, 2008; Shafto, et al., 2012). Thus, the question becomes not just whom to trust but also when to trust a given person. This is important not only for how we acquire information, but also for how we dismiss uninformative or irrelevant information. This is the Frame Problem (e.g., Dennett, 1984), which is still proving difficult to solve in Artificial Intelligence (AI, e.g., Ekbia & Maguitman, 2001; Scherl & Levesque, 2003), but which may be a relatively easy problem for preschoolers to solve. Preschoolers consider past behaviors when deciding whom to trust. For example, when learning new words, both 3- and 4-year-olds trust a speaker who previously labeled familiar objects correctly over a speaker who labeled them incorrectly. Thus, children trust accurate over inaccurate speakers (e.g., Clement, et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005). Children also trust knowledgeable over ignorant actors (Einav & Robinson, 2011). Our first goal was to discover whether preschoolers trust an informant’s claims depending on their current intentions and not just on their previous accuracy or apparent knowledge. More specifically, we asked: (1) whether preschoolers are flexible when they trust others; (2) whether mental states, specifically intentions, play a role in trust; and (3) whether preschoolers understand that people’s intentions can change over time. Most of the research to date suggests that people who were previously accurate or knowledgeable can be trusted in future, whereas people who were previously inaccurate or ignorant cannot. However people are not statically trustworthy or untrustworthy (e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009; Scofield & Behrend, 2008; Shafto et al., 2012). Rather, a person can be trustworthy at times, but not at others. Joking is a clear example of intentionally saying or doing the wrong thing (e.g., Hoicka, Jutsum, & Gattis, 2008; Leekam, 1991), and so it is an occasion when the audience should not trust the information provided. Indeed, jokers want their audience to know about their falsehood, and they do not expect the audience to believe any part of it (e.g., Leekam, 1991). Thus, people provide cues when they are joking (e.g., Hoicka & Gattis, 2012; Mireault, et al., 2012). In particular, parents express greater disbelief when joking as compared to acting literally (Hoicka, et al., 2008). Additionally, everyone jokes. For example, all 3-year-olds in a survey were reported by their parents to have produced novel jokes (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012). Therefore, joking is an ideal way to examine whether preschoolers use intent to say or do the wrong thing as a cue not to learn. Research has started to consider whether young children understand the various contexts in which others intend to say or do the wrong thing. From 25 months, toddlers copy wrong actions marked as jokes (laughter), but correct the same wrong actions marked as mistakes (“Whoops! ”; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). From 30 months, toddlers copy jokers who mislabel familiar objects, but they do not copy people who sincerely mislabel (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011). In the case of trust, children as young as 3 years understand that pretending is not a reliable cue for acquiring correct information compared to, for example, having direct experience with the relevant information (Koenig, 2012). A critical aspect of intention is that it is not a stable mental state. People’s intentions change over time (e.g.,