Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness

then in turn concretizes the abstract. Also, reification converts quality into quantity. And, as we have seen, these conversions are functional for the effective operation of an institutional system. The functionality is perhaps seen most clearly in the highly bureaucratized institutional system in which we exist in contemporary society, especially in terms of the conversion of quality into quantity. But the fundamental reification of the concrete into the abstract is a cross-cultural and historically recurrent phenomenon. Despite all socio-historical differences, there is a structural continuity between the twentieth century person who reifies himself as "a representative of the corporation", the twelfth century person who reifies himself as "a lord and gentleman", and the primitive in just about any century who performs essentially the same reification by perceiving himself as, say, "a Baluba", implying thereby a Baluba world-view, a Baluba self and a Baluba biography down to the minutiae of conduct. It is not difficult to see how such reifications make for a smoother-running corporative system, a more firmly established feudal system and a viable tribal society. Reification minimizes the range of reflection and choice, automatizes conduct in the socially prescribed channels and fixates the taken-for-granted perception of the world. Reification in this way comes close to being a functional imperative. In its end result, reification converts action into process, which is precisely the core of its social functionality. Inasmuch as this defines action without the actor, or praxis without its author, reified social processes are intrinsically alienating and de-humanizing. It will be clear now that, while we must continue to insist that reification is not an anthropological necessity (in the sense that human being = reified being), it is still the case that reification constitutes the defacto reality of most socio-historical situations. Also, it would be a mistake to regard reification as a chronologically later perversion of some original state of non-reified existence (as in the pseudo-theological constructions of paradise, fall and redemption of vulgar Marxism) or even as a rare phenomenon in specific socio-historical situations (as Marx himself at least tended to do in his conception of reification in terms of the specifically capitalistic "fetishism of commodities"). As we have tried to show, just because of its social functionality, reification is a cross-cultural and historically recurrent phenomenon. Moreover, ethnology has provided sufficient evidence to lead to the belief that the earliest human societies are particularly massive in their reifications.18 Similarly, child psychology makes plausible the supposition that reification 18 Relevant to this point is the work of LUvy-Bruhl, which, however, is rather dated in its ethnological materials and is theoretically debatable in terms of its extreme formulations about "primitive mentality". For a recent discussion of these problems cf. Claude LUviStrauss, La pensee savage (Paris, 1962). This content downloaded from 207.46. 13.129 on Sat, 25 Jun 2016 05:03:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor. org/terms REIFICATION AND SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 209 is at least a stage in the biography of the individual, as it is in the history of the species. '9 What are the instances of de-reification, even within the general reification empirically present in human history? We could simply insist here on the theoretical possibility of such de-reification and leave the matter to an empirical sociology of knowledge for further research. We are prepared to go beyond this expedient to the extent of pointing to three socio-historical constellations that, it seems to us, are conducive to de-reification. The first is the overall disintegration of social structures, necessarily entailing a disintegration of their taken-for-granted worlds. History affords a good many examples of how natural or man-caused catastrophes shook to its foundations a particular world, including its hitherto well-functioning reifying apparatus, bringing forth doubt and scepticism concerning every thing that had previously been taken for granted. In such situations, roles are suddenly revealed as human actions and institutions as humanly produced montages for these actions. Examples of such catastrophic disenchantment of the world need not be limited to modem western history, but can be found in the ancient societies of Egypt, India and China. Such "times of troubles" or ''axial times" can be very conducive to a rediscovery of the world as an open human possibility.20 Secondly, situations of culture contact and the ensuing "culture shock" can also produce a de-reifying impulse, even if they are not followed by an overall disintegration of the socially constituted world. Culture contact of any intensity tends to lead to a crisis in "knowledge", as one is confronted with alternative ways of perceiving the world and ordering one's life within it. Whether the contact takes the form of war or trade or migration, it brings about a clash of worlds, in ancient times expressed most readily as a clash of gods. Evidently there are different possibilities of development after such a clash, ranging from promiscuous syncretism to violent xenophobic retreat. In any case, however, culture contact will have weakened the reified fixedness of the old world. An important example of this is afforded by the historical part played by urban centers in the mixing of peoples and thereby in the mixing, loosening and frequently humanizing of these peoples' worlds.2' Thirdly, we would point to the de-reifying proclivity of individuals or groups existing in a state of social marginality. Such marginality may be chosen or inflicted, and it may take a large number of different social forms ethnic 19 Cf. the work of Piaget on the development of the world of the child. 20 For a critique of these concepts of Toynbee's and Jasper's respectively, cf. Eric Voegelin, Order and History (Baton Rouge, 1957), II, 19 ff. In this work Voegelin employs the very suggestive term "leap in being" to denote the radical transformation of the world to be found at such moments of history. 21 For a brief statement of the role of culture contact cf. Ruth Benedict, "The Growth of Culture" in Harry Shapiro, ed., Man, Culture, and Society (New York, 1960), 187 ff. This content downloaded from 207.46. 13.129 on Sat, 25 Jun 2016 05:03:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor. org/terms 210 PETER BERGER AND STANLEY PULLBERG (e.g., "guest peoples"), religious (e.g., hermits and ascetics withdrawing from society), moral (e.g., the marginal worlds created by crime and vice) or political (e.g., political elites). It would not be difficult to develop the theme of dereification by analyzing the views of world and society to stay with the above cases, of European Jews as expressed in their contributions to intellectual "debunking" movements, Indian religious asceticism in its radical devaluation of the world of everyday life as illusion, criminals and prostitutes of different socio-historical situations in their clear-eyed perception of the social drama in which they are often close to the sardonic Machiavellian perspective of those located at the levers of power in the society. These few examples may also make clear that such marginality may actually be sought by individuals with precisely the motive of penetrating the false consciousness of their society that may have become revealed to them as a result of one or another biograph-