Khamene'i's Balancing Act

Seventeen months after the fraudulent June 12, 2009 presidential election, which threw the Islamic Republic into its worst political crisis since the 1 979 revolution, and five months into the latest round of international sanctions against Iran,1 Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i is desperate to demonstrate that he is the legitimate supreme authority in Iran. THE CONQUERING AYATOLLAH? The ayatollahs October 19, 2010 visit to the holy city of Qom, Iran's equivalent of Vatican City, illustrates the point. Traditionally, the Islamic Republic's official propaganda has depicted the Iranian head of state as a religious scholar or a Platonic philosopher king. Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the republic's founding father, for example, spoke modestly of himself as a "theological student" (talabeh)? But not so Khamene'i, whose visit to Qom was staged as a triumphant general's march into a conquered city, which recently mourned the passing of dissident Grand Ayatollah HosseinAIi Montazeri.3 Qom was conquered by a man who wears the Basij militia's signature Palestinian scarf over his clerical robe, signifying greater affinity with ideological military organizations such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Basij than with traditional theological centers of learning, which have never recognized his academic qualifications. Even the sycophants described the visit as "a divine war game" and a "rehearsal of the welcoming of the Imam of the Era [the Shiite messiah whose emergence starts Apocalypse] by the pious. "4 Addressing the masses in Qom, Khamene'i did not speak the language of a theologian but that of a military commander. He called Qom a city of holy struggle (jihad) - a reference to Khomeini's June 5, 1963 speech in Qom that marked his revolt against the shah's regime - and warned the public against "the enemy" twenty-seven times in a speech that lasted only forty -two minutes and four seconds.5 Khamene'i also stressed that the "sedition of 2009 [i.e., the post-election crisis] vaccinated the people against the political and social microbes"6 and assured the audience that the international sanctions would, "God's willing, not have a significant effect upon the life of the people. "7 Khamene'i's crude language and reference to "microbes5' was meant to intimidate his political opponents and demonstrate his self confidence, which may not be entirely baseless. By severely restricting the physical movement of the reformist Green Movement's leaders8 and imprisoning their lieutenants,9 Khamene'i has successfully managed to contain the opposition. Having repressed the freedom seekers, Khamene'i is carefully preparing the suppression of the impoverished public that demands bread as the sanctions take their toll on Iran's economy.10 Appearances, however, are often deceptive, and the cracks in the facade of Khamene'i's Potomkin village keep growing. The veiy instruments of force that have enabled him to suppress the domestic opposition and contain protests against the effects of international sanctions may pose the greatest challenges to his rule. Excessive reliance on the use offeree, alienation of the so called reformist camp, which earlier constituted half of the Islamic Republic's political elites, and especially his overreliance on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have left the supreme leader at the mercy of former and current members of the IRGC and the Basij, who in turn have become power brokers in their own right and no longer consider themselves subservient to Khamene'i. KHAMENE'I VS. AHMADINEJAD The troubled relationship between Khamene'i and Ahmadinejad, a former member of the IRGC, is a case in point. During KhameneTs visit to Qom, both vied to dominate the Iranian press. On the day of the supreme leader's much celebrated visit, Ahmadinejad attempted to overshadow his superior by depositing $81 into the bank accounts of 1.8 million households in the three provinces of North, South, and Razavi Khorasan. …