The Development of Theory of Mind According to False Belief Performance of Children Ages 3 to 5.

Abstract This study has examined the role of age in the false belief understanding in typically developing children and to determine if the different type of false belief tasks affects performance on false belief. The survey research design was used. False belief understanding was measured in 72 children between the ages of 3.00 to 5.11 year old. The sample consisted of 12 children in each age group and age groups were divided into six month period. Four false belief tasks were conducted. The findings of this study indicated that the false belief understanding of Turkish speaking children between the ages of 3.0 to 5.11 year old had some similarities as well as some differences to children speaking other than Turkish. 3 year old children seemed to have developed an understanding of the own false belief before they developed a clear understanding of others' false belief. It was clear that the rapid change of understanding false belief seemed to have appeared at 4.6 year old. Key Words Theory of Mind, False Belief, Mind Reading. Theory of mind refers to an understanding of mental states such as belief, desire and knowledge that enables us to explain and predict others' behavior (Wellman & Estes, 1986). In brief, theory of mind is to be able to reflect on the contents of one's own and other minds (Baron-Cohen, 2000). Developmental evidence suggests that such thinking is not automatic for young children, who must develop a number of skills in order to reach the adult level of competence in understanding of mental states. Precursors of theory of mind include joint attention, appreciation of intentionality, recognition that different people have different perspectives, use of mental state words and pretend play (Miller, 2006). Between 3 and 5 years of age, important developmental changes in theory of mind take place (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). Two year old children might understand desires, perception, and emotions (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman, Philips, & Rodriguez, 2000). Children at three years can distinguish between the mental and physical worlds and from three years of age children can grasp the subjectivity of thoughts (Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Moses, 1990; Watson, Gelman, & Wellman, 1998; Wellman & Estes, 1986). Three and four year olds also distinguish thinking from doing (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1995). Mental states are not only non-physical; they also provide the causes and explanations for persons' actions and experiences (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). Most subsequent research on the development of theory of mind has concerned false beliefs between 3 and 5 years of age, and their role in the prediction or explanation of behavior, and in attempts to manipulate behavior. Wimmer and Perner (1983) showed that a full-fledged TOM doesn't develop before the age of 3/4. They set up a series of experimental tests in order to check whether children between 3 and 5 years of age were able to attribute a false belief to someone else. Comprehending false belief is the clearest sign of understanding a critical aspect of the mind: its subjectivity and its susceptibility to manipulation by information (Dennett, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Widely used versions of first order false belief tasks are the appearance reality distinction, the unexpected contents false belief and change in location tasks. They are called first-order tests because they only involve inferring one person's mental state. According to Wellman et al. (2001) study allowed an estimate of the probability of passing the false belief task at various ages: At 2.5 years, children were less than likely to pass false belief tasks; at 3 years 8 months, children were 50% correct; and at 4 years 8 months children were about 75% correct. Younger children (3 years and 5 months or younger) either fail or perform at chance levels, whereas older children pass the task, giving an adult like answer at better than chance levels (Flavell, 1999; Moses & Flavell, 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). …