Harming is more intentional than helping because it is more probable: A hidden influence of probability on the Knobe effect

Harming is more intentional than helping because it is more probable: A hidden influence of probability on the Knobe effect Kuninori Nakamura (knaka@seijo.ac.jp) Faculty of Social Innovation, Seijo University, 6-1-20, Seijo, Setagayaku Tokyo 152-0061, Japan Abstract Knobe (2003) demonstrated that people’s intentionality judgments in side effects depend on the outcome of the side- effect, indicating that people’s judgments of intentionality of action depend on not only the intention of the actor but also on the result of the action. However, on the basis of findings in judgment and decision making (e.g., Harris, Corner, & Hahn, 2009), the current study proposes another hypothesis to Knobe’s (2003) results: the participants’ intentionality judgments depended on the probabilities of outcomes provided by the action, rather than on the outcomes itself. To test this hypothesis, the present study employed an identical experimental procedure to Knobe (2003), except that it required not only intentionality and probability judgments for outcomes that resulted from the actions of a company president. The results replicated the findings of Knobe (2003) and showed a relationship between probability and intentionality judgment. Keywords: intentionality, Knobe effect, probability, outcome Introduction Imagine a situation in which a chairman of a company considered starting a new program. This program, according to the vice-president of the company, would surely profit the company, but it would also harm the environment. The chairman asserted that he would start the program in order to make a profit and that he did not mind harming the environment. Finally, the program was started, and the environment was harmed. Did the chairman intentionally harm the environment? Consider another situation in which a chairman considered starting a new program that surely would make a profit and help the environment. In this situation, the chairman started the program to make a profit and had no interest in helping the environment, but the program began and the environment was improved. Now do you think the chairman intentionally harmed the environment? In both situations, the chairman’s main intention to start a new program was the same; however, the impression of the chairman’s intentionality may be very different. In fact, Knobe (2003) demonstrated that the chairman in the harming situation was considered to be intentionally harming the environment, whereas he was not intentionally helping the environment when he made the more helpful decision. This indicates that ordinary people judge intentionality depending on what the outcome happens to be. This phenomenon is called the Knobe effect (e.g., Nichols & Ulatowski, 2007) or the side-effect effect (Knobe, 2003; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006), and has attracted research attention from various fields, including action theory (Mele, 2003; McCann, 2005), social psychology (Malle, 2006), moral psychology (Hauser, 2006), philosophy of law (Nadelhoffer, 2008), philosophy of language (e.g., Adams & Steadman, 2004), and developmental psychology (Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006). According to Pierre (2010), intentionality is defined as “the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties, and states of affairs…. ” This definition clearly shows intentionality as some inner state of mind. It is a drive or cause for action, and its existence is determined before action. However, the Knobe effect clearly shows that the lay understanding of intentionality violates this fundamental definition: people appear to decide intentionality from the value of the outcome. Thus, this effect can be considered as an example that lay people have odd interpretations of intentionality. Additionally, the Knobe effect contradicts existing models of intentionality judgment (e.g., Forguson, 1989; Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Shaver, 1985). Originated in the ancient writings of Aristotle (1892/382 B.C.) and then elaborated on by Hume (1978/1740), models of intentionality judgment have assumed inner state of mind as fundamental components for intentionality such as desire or belief. For example, Malle and Knobe’s (1997) model that can be positioned as the most comprehensive one specifies five components for intentionality: (1) desire that concerns the goals or purposes of an actor, (2) belief that concerns the actor’s thoughts about the consequences of his or her actions, (3) intention, which links desire to action, (4) awareness that represents an actor’s state of mind at the time of acting, and (5) skill, which enables the action. These five components consistently represent will or ability inside the actor, and none of them seem to entail effect of outcome on intentionality judgment. Thus, the Knobe effect can be considered a counterexample to the existing models of intentionality judgment. Several hypotheses that have been proposed to explain the Knobe effect (e.g., Malle, 2006; Mallon, 2008; Nadelhoffer, 2008; Nichols & Ulatowski, 2007) by focusing on factors that affect lay people’s understandings of the meaning of intentionality. Some researchers (e.g., Malle, 2006; Nadelhoffer, 2008) have considered the Knobe effect to arise as a bias in the intentionality process that is driven by either moral (Malle, 2006) or emotional (Nadelhoffer, 2008) considerations. Other researchers (e. g., Adams & Steadman, 2004) have focused on the pragmatic aspect of intentionality judgment, in which the perception of intentionality leads to the blaming of the chairman for hurting the environment, and this effect is strengthened in the harm condition. Additionally, Nichols and Ulatowski