Visualizing Theory of Mind with Multiple Intrinsic Frames of Reference

Visualizing Theory of Mind with Multiple Intrinsic Frames of Reference Chen Liang (chen.liang@uth.tmc.edu) University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston 7000 Fannin Suite 600, Houston, TX 7030 USA Yanlong Sun (ysun@tamhsc.edu) Hongbin Wang (hwang@tamhsc.edu) Texas AM Duhamel, Colby, & Goldberg, 1991; Samson et al., 2005). This permits a computational description of how the human brain processes spatial information in different contexts, including (1) coexistent, yet temporally discrete (merge in secession) representations, and (2) reconciliation and transformation between multiple representations in different FORs. For instance, when people judge spatial relationships from other’s perspective (perspective taking), EFOR-based and IFOR-based representations would interact with each other in order to resolve potential incongruences (Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Kessler & Thomson, 2010). Moreover, a growing body of research suggest that low-level spatial representations in spatial tracking, predictive encoding and attention shifting are essential in supporting sophisticated abilities during social interactions (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Frith & Frith, 2012; Mitchell, 2006; Perner, Mauer, & Hildenbrand, 2011). A FOR-based account of ToM may provide a fresh approach to understanding the intrinsic nexuses between ToM and spatial cognition. Particularly, one’s ability to infer others’ views, intensions, and beliefs occurs as one adopts others' perspectives (Gallagher & Frith, 2003). This process requires the inhibition of one's egocentric perspective, so as to make someone else's perspective more accessible (Samson et al., 2010). In a complex task environment, inhibitory competitions may exist not only between one’s EFOR and IFOR representations, but also between multiple IFOR representations. In addition, active maintenance of multiple representations is required when the spatial layouts of the task environment are evolving dynamically over time (Morton & Munakata, 2002; Perner & Ruffman, 2005). Recently, it has been proposed that the maintenance of FOR-based representations is driven by expectation towards an efficient and flexible partitioning of the spatio-temporal statistics in the task environment (Sun & Wang, 2014). By comparing the results from a direction-pointing spatial task (Tamborello et al., 2012) and a false-belief task (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), Sun and Wang (2014) argued that FOR-based spatial representations are the common factor in both tasks. Therefore, spatial and social abilities may share a common origin at the level of spatio-temporal association and Abstract Research in the field of spatial cognition has advocated a frame of reference (FOR) -based cognitive representation system to account for human’s spatial reasoning and navigation capacities. It has been argued that such mental models may also contribute to the underlying mechanisms of Theory of Mind (ToM). In the present study, we investigated how people made rapid judgments about the number of visible objects from their own perspectives (egocentric frame of reference, EFOR) and from others’ perspectives (intrinsic frame of reference, IFOR). We examined both behavioral and eye tracking responses, and the results suggest that a FOR-based representation system promotes the efficiency and flexibility of ToM functions. Our findings support the notion of a possible conceptual link between spatial and social cognitive processes. Keywords: theory of mind; visual perspective taking; intrinsic frame of reference; eye movement Introduction Researchers have become increasingly interested in bridging the conceptual gaps between Theory of mind (ToM), which examines people's ability to judge other's intentions, beliefs and mental states (Frith & Frith, 2012), and spatial cognition, which examines people's ability to reason about spatial relationships and organize spatial representations. Frame of reference (FOR) has been used to account for the mechanisms underlying spatial cognition in terms of processing spatial representations and their relationships (May & Klatzky, 2000; Shelton & McNamara, 2001; Sun & Wang, 2010, 2014; Tamborello, Sun, & Wang, 2012; H. Wang, Johnson, & Zhang, 2001). In ToM judgments, investigations of egocentric visual perspective and allocentric visual perspective have also hinted at the relevance of a FOR-based internal representation system (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005). Depending on the reference point of a spatial representation, three classes of FORs have been proposed: egocentric frame of reference (EFOR, self-centered), allocentric frame of reference (AFOR, world-centered), and intrinsic frame of reference (IFOR, anchored to other person or object) (Chen & McNamara, 2011; Sun & Wang, 2014; H. Wang, Johnson, Sun, & Zhang, 2005; R. Wang & Spelke, 2002). Multiple FORs are often used together when people judge complex spatial relationships. Neurological studies