MikhailT/lj-speech huggingface dataset:
After all, when will all your foolishness come to an end? All of these comedies. First one thing and then another. And now this fictitious name, end quote.
She said, quote,
On Monday, November 18, 1963, he called several times, but after I hung up on him and didn't want to talk to him he did not call again.
He then arrived on Thursday, November 21, 1963, end quote.
The events of that evening can best be appreciated through Marina Oswald's testimony
Question: Did your husband give any reason for coming home on Thursday?
Answer: He said that he was lonely because he hadn't come the preceding weekend, and he wanted to make his peace with me.
Question: Did you say anything to him then?
Answer: He tried to talk to me but I would not answer him, and he was very upset. Question: Were you upset with him?
Answer: I was angry, of course. He was not angry -- he was upset. I was angry. He tried very hard to please me.
He spent quite a bit of time putting away diapers and played with the children on the street.
Question: How did you indicate to him that you were angry with him? Answer: By not talking to him.
Question: And how did he show that he was upset?
He was upset over the fact that I would not answer him.
He tried to start a conversation with me several times, but I would not answer. And he said that he didn't want me to be angry at him because this upsets him.
On that day, he suggested that we rent an apartment in Dallas.
He said that he was tired of living alone and perhaps the reason for my being so angry was the fact that we were not living together.
That if I want to he would rent an apartment in Dallas tomorrow -- that he didn't want me to remain with Ruth any longer, but wanted me to live with him in Dallas.
He repeated this not once but several times, but I refused. And he said that once again I was preferring my friends to him, and that I didn't need him.
Question: What did you say to that?
Answer: I said it would be better if I remained with Ruth until the holidays, he would come, and we would all meet together.
That this was better because while he was living alone and I stayed with Ruth, we were spending less money. And I told him to buy me a washing machine, because two children
it became too difficult to wash by hand.
Answer: He said he would buy me a washing machine.
Question: What did you say to that? Answer:
Thank you. That it would be better if he bought something for himself -- that I would manage. End quote. That night Oswald went to bed before his wife retired.
She did not speak to him when she joined him there, although she thought that he was still awake.
The next morning he left for work before anyone else arose.
he left his wedding ring in a cup on the dresser in his room. He also left $170 in a wallet in one of the dresser drawers.
He took with him $13.87 and the long brown package that Frazier and Mrs. Randle saw him carry
and which he was to take to the School Book Depository. The Unanswered Questions.
No one will ever know what passed through Oswald's mind during the week before November 22, 1963.
Instead of returning to Irving on November 15 for his customary weekend visit, he remained in Dallas at his wife's suggestion because of the birthday party.
He had argued with her over the use of an alias and had not called her after that argument, although he usually telephoned once or twice a day.
Then on Thursday morning, November 21,
he asked Frazier for a ride to Irving that night, stating falsely that he wanted to pick up some curtain rods to put in an apartment.
He must have planned his attack at the very latest prior to Thursday morning when he spoke to Frazier.
There is, of course, no way to determine the degree to which he was committed to his plan at that time.
While there is no way to tell when he first began to think specifically of assassinating the President
it should be noted that mention of the Trade Mart as the expected site of the Presidential luncheon
appeared in The Dallas Times Herald on November 15, 1963.
The next day that paper announced the final approval of the Trade Mart as the luncheon site and stated that the motorcade, quote,
apparently will loop through the downtown area, probably on Main Street,
en route from Dallas Love Field, end quote, on its way to the Trade Mart on Stemmons Freeway.
Anyone who was familiar with that area of Dallas would have known that the motorcade would probably pass the Texas School Book Depository to get from Main Street
onto the Stemmons Freeway.
That fact was made precisely clear in subsequent news stories on November 19, 20, and 22.
On November 15, 1963, the same day that his wife told him not to come to Irving, Oswald could have assumed
that the Presidential motorcade would pass in front of his place of work.
Whether he thought about assassinating the President over the weekend can never be known, but it is reasonably certain
that over the weekend he did think about his wife's request that he not come to Irving, which was prompted by the birthday party being held at the Paine home.
Oswald had a highly exaggerated sense of his own importance, but he had failed at almost everything he had ever tried to do.
He had great difficulty in establishing meaningful relations with other people. Except for his family he was completely alone.
Even though he had searched -- in the Marine Corps, in his ideal of communism, in the Soviet Union and in his attempt to get to Cuba
he had never found anything to which he felt he could really belong.
After he returned from his trip to Mexico where his application to go to Cuba had been sharply rejected,
it must have appeared to him that he was unable to command even the attention of his family.
He could not keep them with him in Dallas, where at least he could see his children whom, several witnesses testified, he seemed to love.
His family lived with Mrs. Paine, ostensibly because Oswald could not afford to keep an apartment in Dallas,
but it was also, at least in part, because his wife did not want to live there with him.
Now it appeared that he was not welcome at the Paine home,
where he had spent every previous weekend since his return from Mexico and his wife was once again calling into question his judgment,
this time concerning his use of an alias.
The conversation on Monday, November 18, 1963,
ended when Marina Oswald hung up and refused to talk to him. Although he may long before have decided on the course he was to follow
and may have told his wife the things he did on the evening of November 21,
1963, merely to disarm her and to provide a justification of sorts,
both she and Mrs. Paine thought he had come home to make up after the fight on Monday.
Thoughts of his personal difficulties must have been at least partly on his mind when he went to Irving on Thursday night and told his wife that he was lonely,
that he wanted to make peace with her and bring his family to Dallas where they could live with him again.
The Commission does not believe that the relations between Oswald and his wife caused him to assassinate the President.
It is unlikely that the motivation was that simple.
The feelings of hostility and aggression which seem to have played such an important, part in Oswald's life
were part of his character long before he met his wife
and such a favorable opportunity to strike at a figure as great as the President would probably never have come to him again.
Oswald's behavior after the assassination throws little light on his motives.
The fact that he took so little money with him when he left Irving in the morning indicates that he did not expect to get very far from Dallas on his own
and suggests the possibility, as did his note to his wife just prior to the attempt on General Walker, that he did not expect to escape at all.
On the other hand, he could have traveled some distance with the money he did have and he did return to his room where he obtained his revolver.
He then killed Patrolman Tippit when that police officer apparently tried to question him after he had left his roominghouse and he vigorously resisted arrest
when he was finally apprehended in the Texas Theatre. Although it is not fully corroborated by others who were present,
two officers have testified that at the time of his arrest Oswald said something to the effect that, quote, it's all over now, end quote.
Oswald was overbearing and arrogant throughout much of the time between his arrest and his own death.
He consistently refused to admit involvement in the assassination or in the killing of Patrolman Tippit.
While he did become enraged at at least one point in his interrogation,
the testimony of the officers present indicates that he handled himself with considerable composure during his questioning.
He admitted nothing that would damage him but discussed other matters quite freely.
His denials under questioning, which have no probative value in view of the many readily demonstrable lies he told at that time
and in the face of the overwhelming evidence against him
which has been set forth above, only served to prolong the period during which he was the center of the attention of the entire world.
Many factors were undoubtedly involved in Oswald's motivation for the assassination, and the Commission does not believe
that it can ascribe to him any one motive or group of motives.
It is apparent, however, that Oswald was moved by an overriding hostility to his environment.
He does not appear to have been able to establish meaningful relationships with other people. He was perpetually discontented with the world around him.
Long before the assassination he expressed his hatred for American society and acted in protest against it.
Oswald's search for what he conceived to be the perfect society was doomed from the start.
He sought for himself a place in history -- a role as the "great man" who would be recognized as having been in advance of his times.
His commitment to Marxism and communism appears to have been another important factor in his motivation.
He also had demonstrated a capacity to act decisively and without regard to the consequences when such action would further his aims of the moment.
Out of these and the many other factors which may have molded the character of Lee Harvey Oswald
there emerged a man capable of assassinating President Kennedy.
Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. The Warren Commission Report. By
The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Chapter 8. The Protection of the President. Part 1.
In the 100 years since 1865
four Presidents of the United States have been assassinated
Abraham Lincoln, James A. Garfield, William McKinley, and John F. Kennedy.
During this same period there were three other attacks on the life of a President,
a President-elect, and a candidate for the Presidency, which narrowly failed:
on Theodore Roosevelt while campaigning in October of 1912; on President-elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
when visiting Miami on February 15, 1933; and on President Harry S. Truman on November 1, 1950,
when his temporary residence, Blair House, was attacked by Puerto Rican Nationalists.
One out of every five Presidents since 1865 has been assassinated;
there have been attempts on the lives of one out of every three.
Prompted by these dismaying statistics, the Commission has inquired into the problems and methods of Presidential protection in effect
at the time of President Kennedy's assassination.
This study has led the Commission to conclude that the public interest might be served by any contribution it can make to the improvement of protective arrangements.
The Commission has not undertaken a comprehensive examination of all facets of this subject;
rather, it has devoted its time and resources to those broader aspects of Presidential protection
to which the events of last November called attention.
In this part of its inquiry the Commission has had full access to a major study of all phases of protective activities
prepared by the Secret Service for the Secretary of the Treasury following the assassination. As a result of this study,
the Secretary of the Treasury has prepared a planning document dated August 27, 1964,
which recommends additional personnel and facilities to enable the Secret Service to expand its protection capabilities.
The Secretary of the Treasury submitted this planning document on August 31, 1964,
to the Bureau of the Budget for review and approval.
This planning document has been made a part of the Commission's published record; the underlying staff and consultants' reports reviewed by the Commission have not,
since a disclosure of such detailed information relating to protective measures might undermine present methods of protecting the President.
However, all information considered by the Commission which pertains to the protective function as it was carried out in Dallas has been published as part of this report.
The protection of the President of the United States is an immensely difficult and complex task.
It is unlikely that measures can be devised to eliminate entirely the multitude of diverse dangers that may arise,
particularly when the President is traveling in this country or abroad.
The protective task is further complicated by the reluctance of Presidents to take security precautions which might interfere with the performance of their duties,
or their desire to have frequent and easy access to the people.
The adequacy of existing procedures can fairly be assessed only after full consideration of the difficulty of the protective assignment,
with particular attention to the diverse roles which the President is expected to fill.
After reviewing this aspect of the matter this chapter will set forth the Commission's conclusions
regarding certain protective measures in force at the time of the Dallas trip and propose recommendations for improvements.
The nature of the protective assignment.
The President is Head of State, Chief Executive, Commander in Chief, and leader of a political party.
As the ceremonial head of the Government the President must discharge a wide range of public duties, not only in Washington but throughout the land.
In this role he appears to the American people, in the words of William Howard Taft, as, quote,
the personal embodiment and representative of their dignity and majesty, end quote.
As Chief Executive, the President controls the exercise of the vast, almost incalculable powers of the executive branch of the Federal Government.
As Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, he must maintain ultimate authority over the development and disposition of our military power.
in accordance with George Washington's maxim that Americans have a government, quote, of accommodation as well as a government of laws, end quote,
it is the President's right and duty to be the active leader of his party, as when he seeks to be reelected or to maintain his party in power.
In all of these roles the President must go to the people.
Exposure of the President to public view through travel among the people of this country is a great and historic tradition of American life.
Desired by both the President and the public, it is an indispensable means of communication between the two.
More often than not, Presidential journeys have served more than one purpose at the same time: ceremonial,
administrative, political.
From George Washington to John F. Kennedy, such journeys have been a normal part of the President's activities.
To promote nationwide acceptance of his administration Washington made grand tours that served also to excite interest in the Presidency.
In recent years, Presidential journeys have been frequent and extensive,
partly because of the greater speed and comfort of travel and partly because of the greater demands made on the President.
It is now possible for Presidents to travel the length and breadth of a land far larger than the United States
in 1789 in less time than it took George Washington to travel from New York to Mount Vernon
or Thomas Jefferson from Washington to Monticello.
During his Presidency, Franklin D. Roosevelt made almost 400 journeys and traveled more than 350,000 miles.
Since 1945, Roosevelt's successors have ranged the world,
and their foreign journeys have come to be accepted as normal rather than extraordinary.
John F. Kennedy's journey to Texas in November 1963 was in this tradition.
His friend and Special Assistant Kenneth O'Donnell, who accompanied him on his last visit to Dallas,
stated the President's views of his responsibilities with simplicity and clarity, quote,
The President's views of his responsibilities as President of the United States were that he meet the people, that he go out to their homes and see them,
and allow them to see him, and discuss, if possible, the views of the world as he sees it, the problems of the country as he sees them.
And he felt that leaving Washington for the President of the United States was a most necessary -- not only for the people, but for the President himself,
that he expose himself to the actual basic problems that were disturbing the American people.
It helped him in his job here, he was able to come back here with a fresh view of many things.
I think he felt very strongly that the President ought to get out of Washington, and go meet the people on a regular basis. End quote.
Whatever their purposes Presidential journeys have greatly enlarged and complicated the task of protecting the President.
The Secret Service and the Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies which cooperate with it,
and the greater diversity of the audiences he must face in a world torn by conflicting ideologies.
If the sole goal were to protect the life of the President, it could be accomplished with reasonable assurance despite the multiple roles he must play.
But his very position as representative of the people prevents him from effectively shielding himself from the people.
He cannot and will not take the precautions of a dictator or a sovereign.
Under our system, measures must be sought to afford security without impeding the President's performance of his many functions.
The protection of the President must be thorough but inconspicuous to avoid even the suggestion of a garrison state.
The rights of private individuals must not be infringed.
If the protective job is well done, its performance will be evident only in the unexceptional fact of its success.
The men in charge of protecting the President, confronted by complex problems and limited as they are in the measures they may employ,
must depend upon the utmost cooperation and understanding from the public and the President.
The problem and the reasonable approach to its solution were ably stated in a memorandum prepared by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
for the President soon after the assassination, quote,
The degree of security that can be afforded the President of the United States
is dependent to a considerable extent upon the degree of contact with the general public desired by the President.
Absolute security is neither practical nor possible. An approach to complete security would require the President
to operate in a sort of vacuum, isolated from the general public and behind impregnable barriers.
His travel would be in secret; his public appearances would be behind bulletproof glass. A more practical approach necessitates compromise.
Any travel, any contact with the general public, involves a calculated risk on the part of the President and the men responsible for his protection.
Such risks can be lessened when the President recognizes the security problem,
has confidence in the dedicated Secret Service men who are ready to lay down their lives for him
and accepts the necessary security precautions which they recommend.
Many Presidents have been understandably impatient with the security precautions which many years of experience dictate
because these precautions reduce the President's privacy and the access to him of the people of the country.
Nevertheless the procedures and advice should be accepted if the President wishes to have any security.
Evaluation Of Presidential Protection At The Time Of The Assassination Of President Kennedy
The history of Presidential protection shows growing recognition over the years that the job must be done by able, dedicated,
thoroughly professional personnel, using the best technical equipment that can be devised.
The assassination of President Kennedy demands an examination of the protective measures employed to safe guard him
and an inquiry whether improvements can be made which will reduce the risk of another such tragedy.
This section considers first the means used to locate potential sources of danger to the President in time to take appropriate precautions.
In this connection the information available to Federal agencies about Lee Harvey Oswald
is set out and the reasons why this information was not furnished to the Secret Service appraised.
Second, the adequacy of other advance preparations for the security of the President, during his visit to Dallas,
largely measures taken by the Secret Service, is considered.
Finally, the performance of those charged with the immediate responsibility of protecting the President on November 22 is reviewed.
Intelligence Functions Relating to Presidential Protection at the Time of the Dallas Trip
A basic element of Presidential protection
is the identification and elimination of possible sources of danger to the President before the danger becomes actual.
The Secret Service has attempted to perform this function through the activities of its Protective Research Section
and requests to other agencies, Federal and local, for useful information.
The Commission has concluded that at the time of the assassination
the arrangements relied upon by the Secret Service to perform this function were seriously deficient.
Adequacy of preventive intelligence operations of the Secret Service.
The main job of the Protective Research Section (PRS)
is to collect, process, and evaluate information about persons or groups who may be a danger to the President.
In addition to this function, PRS is responsible for such tasks
as obtaining clearance of some categories of White House employees and all tradesmen who service the White House,
the security processing of gifts sent to the President, and technical inspections against covert listening devices.
At the time of the assassination PRS was a very small group, comprised of 12 specialists and 3 clerks.
Many persons call themselves to the attention of PRS by attempting to visit, the President
for bizarre reasons or by writing or in some other way attempting to communicate with him in a threatening or abusive manner
or with undue persistence.
Robert I. Bouck, special agent in charge of PRS,
estimated that most of the material received by his office originated in this fashion
or from the occasional investigations initiated by the Secret Service,
while the balance was furnished to PRS by other Federal agencies, with primary source being the FBI.
The total volume of information received by PRS has risen steadily.
In 1943 PRS received approximately 9,000 items of information;
in 1953 this had increased to more than 17,000 items;
in 1963 the total exceeded 32,000 items.
Since many items may pertain to a single case, these figures do not show the caseload.
In the period from November 1961 to November 1963,
PRS received items in 8,709 cases.
Before the assassination of President Kennedy,
PRS expressed its interest in receiving information on suspects in very general terms. For example,
PRS instructed the White House mailroom, a source of much PRS data,
to refer all communications on identified existing cases and, in addition,
any communication, quote, that in any way indicates anyone may have possible intention of harming the President, end quote.
Slightly more specific criteria were established for PRS personnel processing White House mail referred by the White House mailroom,
but again the standards were very general.
These instructions to PRS personnel appear to be the only instance where an effort was made to reduce the criteria to writing.
When requested to provide a specific statement of the standards employed by PRS in deciding what information to seek and retain,
The Secret Service responded, quote,