MikhailT/lj-speech huggingface dataset:
or, quote, other high government officials in the nature of a complaint coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means,
other than legal or peaceful, to satisfy any grievance, real or imagined.
Under these criteria, whether the case should be referred to the Secret Service depends on the existence of a previous history of mental instability,
propensity toward violent action, or some similar characteristic, coupled with some evaluation of the capability of the individual or group
to further the intention to satisfy a grievance by unlawful means.
While these tentative criteria are a step in the right direction,
they seem unduly restrictive in continuing to require some manifestation of animus against a Government official.
It is questionable whether such criteria would have resulted in the referral of Oswald to the Secret Service.
Chief Rowley believed that they would,
because of Oswald's demonstrated hostility toward the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of January 30, 1962. Quote,
I shall employ all means to right this gross mistake or injustice to a bona fide U.S. citizen and ex-service man.
The U.S. government has no charges or complaints against me.
I ask you to look into this case and take the necessary steps to repair the damage done to me and my family. End quote.
Even with the advantage of hindsight, this letter does not appear to express or imply Oswald's, quote,
determination to use a means, other than legal or peaceful, to satisfy his grievance, end quote, within the meaning of the new criteria.
It is apparent that a good deal of further consideration and experimentation will be required before adequate criteria can be framed.
The Commission recognizes that no set of meaningful criteria will yield the names of all potential assassins. Charles J. Guiteau,
Leon F. Czolgosz,
John Schrank, and Guiseppe Zangara -- four assassins or would-be assassins
were all men who acted alone in their criminal acts against our leaders. None had a serious record of prior violence.
Each of them was a failure in his work and in his relations with others, a victim of delusions and fancies which led to the conviction
that society and its leaders had combined to thwart him. It will require every available resource of our Government
to devise a practical system which has any reasonable possibility of revealing such malcontents.
Liaison with other agencies regarding intelligence.
The Secret Service's liaison with the agencies that supply information to it has been too casual.
Since the assassination, the Service has recognized that these relationships must be far more formal
and each agency given clear understanding of the assistance which the Secret Service expects.
Once the Secret Service has formulated its new standards for collection of information, it should enter into written agreements with each Federal agency
and the leading State and local agencies that might be a source of such information.
Such agreements should describe in detail the information which is sought, the manner in which it will be provided to the Secret Service,
and the respective responsibilities for any further investigation that may be required.
This is especially necessary with regard to the FBI and CIA,
which carry the major responsibility for supplying information about potential threats,
particularly those arising from organized groups, within their special jurisdiction.
Since these agencies are already obliged constantly to evaluate the activities of such groups,
they should be responsible for advising the Secret Service if information develops indicating the existence of an assassination plot
and for reporting such events as a change in leadership or dogma which indicate that the group may present a danger to the President.
Detailed formal agreements embodying these arrangements should be worked out between the Secret Service and both of these agencies.
It should be made clear that the Secret Service will in no way seek to duplicate the intelligence
and investigative capabilities of the agencies now operating in this field but will continue
to use the data developed by these agencies to carry out its special duties.
Once experience has been gained in implementing such agreements with the Federal and leading State and local agencies,
the Secret Service, through its field offices,
should negotiate similar arrangements with such other State and local law enforcement agencies as may provide meaningful assistance.
Much useful information will come to the attention of local law enforcement agencies in the regular course of their activities,
and this source should not be neglected by undue concentration on relationships with other Federal agencies.
Finally, these agreements with Federal and local authorities will be of little value
unless a system is established for the frequent formal review of activities thereunder. In this regard
the Commission notes with approval several recent measures taken and proposed by the Secret Service to improve its liaison arrangements.
In his testimony Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon informed the Commission
that an interagency committee has been established to develop more effective criteria.
According to Secretary Dillon,
the Committee will include representatives of the President's Office of Science and Technology, Department of Defense, CIA,
FBI, and the Secret Service.
In addition, the Department of the Treasury has requested five additional agents for its Protective Research Section
to serve as liaison officers with law enforcement and intelligence agencies. On the basis of the Department's review during the past several months,
Secretary Dillon testified that the use of such liaison officers is the only effective way to insure that adequate liaison is maintained.
As a beginning step to improve liaison with local law enforcement officials, the Secret Service on August 26, 1964,
directed its field representatives to send a form request for intelligence information to all local,
county, and State law enforcement agencies in their districts.
Each of these efforts appears sound,
and the Commission recommends that these and the other measures suggested by the Commission be pursued vigorously by Secret Service.
Automatic data processing
Unless the Secret Service is able to deal rapidly and accurately with a growing body of data,
the increased information supplied by other agencies will be wasted.
PRS must develop the capacity to classify its subjects on a more sophisticated basis than the present geographic breakdown.
Its present manual filing system is obsolete;
it makes no use of the recent developments in automatic data processing which are widely used in the business world and in other Government offices.
The Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury now recognize this critical need.
In the planning document currently under review by the Bureau of the Budget, the Department recommends that it be permitted to hire five qualified persons, quote,
to plan and develop a workable and efficient automated file and retrieval system, end quote.
Also the Department requests the sum of $100,000 to conduct a detailed feasibility study;
this money would be used to compensate consultants, to lease standard equipment or to purchase specially designed pilot equipment.
On the basis of such a feasibility study,
the Department hopes to design a practical system which will fully meet the needs of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service.
The Commission recommends that prompt and favorable consideration be given to this request.
The Commission further recommends that the Secret Service coordinate its planning as closely as possible with all of the Federal agencies from which it receives information.
The Secret Service should not and does not plan to develop its own intelligence gathering facilities to duplicate the existing facilities of other Federal agencies.
In planning its data processing techniques,
the Secret Service should attempt to develop a system compatible with those of the agencies from which most of its data will come. Note:
In evaluating data processing techniques of the Secret Service,
the Commission had occasion to become informed, to a limited extent, about the data processing techniques of other Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
The Commission was struck by the apparent lack of effort, on an interagency basis,
to develop coordinated and mutually compatible systems, even where such coordination would not seem inconsistent
with the particular purposes of the agency involved. The Commission recognizes that this is a controversial area
and that many strongly held views are advanced in resistance to any suggestion that an effort be made to impose any degree of coordination.
This matter is obviously beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission,
but it seems to warrant further study before each agency becomes irrevocably committed to separate action.
The Commission, therefore, recommends that the President consider ordering an inquiry into the possibility
that coordination might be achieved to a greater extent than seems now to be contemplated, without interference with the primary mission of each agency involved.
Protective Research participation in advance arrangements.
Since the assassination, Secret Service procedures have been changed to require that a member of PRS accompany each advance survey team
to establish liaison with local intelligence gathering agencies and to provide for the immediate evaluation of information received from them.
This PRS agent will also be responsible for establishing an informal local liaison committee
to make certain that all protective intelligence activities are coordinated.
Based on its experience during this period, the Secret Service now recommends that additional personnel be made available to PRS
so that these arrangements can be made permanent without adversely affecting the operations of the Service's field offices.
The Commission regards this as a most useful innovation and urges that the practice be continued.
Liaison With Local Law Enforcement Agencies
Advice by the Secret Service to local police in metropolitan areas relating to the assistance expected in connection with a Presidential visit
has hitherto been handled on an informal basis.
The Service should consider preparing formal explanations of the cooperation anticipated during a Presidential visit to a city,
in formats that can be communicated to each level of local authorities.
Thus, the local chief of police could be given a master plan, prepared for the occasion, of all protective measures to be taken during the visit;
each patrolman might be given a prepared booklet of instructions explaining what is expected of him. The Secret Service has expressed concern
that written instructions might come into the hands of local newspapers, to the prejudice of the precautions described.
However, the instructions must be communicated to the local police in any event and can be leaked to the press whether or not they are in writing.
More importantly, the lack of carefully prepared and carefully transmitted instructions for typical visits to cities
can lead to lapses in protection, such as the confusion in Dallas about whether members of the public were permitted on overpasses.
Such instructions will not fit all circumstances, of course,
and should not be relied upon to the detriment of the imaginative application of judgment in special cases.
Inspection of Buildings
Since the assassination of President Kennedy, the Secret Service has been experimenting with new techniques in the inspection of buildings along a motorcade route.
the studies indicate that there is some utility in attempting to designate certain buildings as involving a higher risk than others.
The Commission strongly encourages these efforts to improve protection along a motorcade route.
The Secret Service should utilize the personnel of other Federal law enforcement offices
in the locality to assure adequate manpower for this task, as it is now doing.
Lack of adequate resources is an unacceptable excuse for failing to improve advance precautions
in this crucial area of Presidential protection.
Secret Service Personnel and Facilities
Testimony and other evidence before the Commission
suggest that the Secret Service is trying to accomplish its job with too few people and without adequate modern equipment.
Although Chief Rowley does not complain about the pay scale for Secret Service agents,
salaries are below those of the FBI and leading municipal police forces.
The assistant to the Director of the FBI testified that
the caseload of each FBI agent averaged 20 to 25, and he felt that this was high.
Chief Rowley testified that the present workload of each Secret Service agent averages 110.1 cases.
While these statistics relate to the activities of Secret Service agents stationed in field offices and not the White House detail,
field agents supplement those on the detail, particularly when the President is traveling.
Although the Commission does not know whether the cases involved are entirely comparable,
these figures suggest that the agents of the Secret Service are substantially overworked.
In its budget request for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1964,
the Secret Service sought funds for 25 new positions, primarily in field offices. This increase has been approved by the Congress.
Chief Rowley explained that this would not provide enough additional manpower to take all the measures which he considers required.
However, the 1964 to 65 budget request was submitted in November 1963
and requests for additional personnel were not made because of the studies then being conducted.
The Secret Service has now presented its recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget. The plan proposed by the Service
would take approximately 20 months to implement and require expenditures of approximately $3,000,000 during that period.
The plan provides for an additional 205 agents for the Secret Service. Seventeen of this number are proposed for the Protective Research Section;
145 are proposed for the field offices to handle the increased volume of security investigations
and be available to protect the President or Vice President when they travel;
18 agents are proposed for a rotating pool which will go through an intensive training cycle and also be available to supplement the White House detail
in case of unexpected need; and 25 additional agents are recommended to provide the Vice President full protection.
The Commission urges that the Bureau of the Budget review these recommendations with the Secret Service and authorize a request for the necessary supplemental appropriation,
as soon as it can be justified. The Congress has often stressed that it will support any reasonable request for funds for the protection of the President.
Manpower and Technical Assistance From Other Agencies
Before the assassination the Secret Service infrequently requested other Federal law enforcement agencies to provide personnel
to assist in its protection functions.
Since the assassination, the Service has experimented with the use of agents borrowed for short periods from such agencies.
It has used other Treasury law enforcement agents on special experiments in building and route surveys in places to which the President frequently travels.
It has also used other Federal law enforcement agents during Presidential visits to cities in which such agents are stationed.
Thus, in the 4 months following the assassination,
the FBI, on 16 separate occasions, supplied a total of 139 agents to assist in protection work during a Presidential visit,
which represents a departure from its prior practice.
From February 11 through June 30, 1964,
the Service had the advantage of 9,500 hours of work by other enforcement agencies.
The FBI has indicated that it is willing to continue to make such assistance available,
even though it agrees with the Secret Service that it is preferable for the Service to have enough agents to handle all protective demands.
The Commission endorses these efforts to supplement the Service's own personnel by obtaining, for short periods of time,
the assistance of trained Federal law enforcement officers.
In view of the ever-increasing mobility of American Presidents, it seems unlikely that the Service could or should increase its own staff to a size
which would permit it to provide adequate protective manpower for all situations.
The Commission recommends that the agencies involved determine how much periodic assistance they can provide, and that each such agency
and the Secret Service enter into a formal agreement defining such arrangements.
It may eventually be desirable to codify the practice in an Executive order.
The Secret Service will be better able to plan its own long-range personnel requirements if it knows with reasonable certainty
the amount of assistance that it can expect from other agencies.
The occasional use of personnel from other Federal agencies to assist in protecting the President has a further advantage. It symbolizes the reality
that the job of protecting the President has not been and cannot be exclusively the responsibility of the Secret Service.
The Secret Service in the past has sometimes guarded its right to be acknowledged as the sole protector of the Chief Executive.
This no longer appears to be the case.
Protecting the President is a difficult and complex task which requires full use of the best resources of many parts of our Government.
Recognition that the responsibility must be shared increases the likelihood that it will be met.
Much of the Secret Service work requires the development and use of highly sophisticated equipment,
some of which must be specially designed to fit unique requirements. Even before the assassination, and to a far greater extent thereafter,
the Secret Service has been receiving full cooperation in scientific research and technological development
from many Government agencies including the Department of Defense and the President's Office of Science and Technology.
Even if the manpower and technological resources of the Secret Service are adequately augmented,
it will continue to rely in many respects upon the greater resources of the Office of Science and Technology and other agencies.
The Commission recommends that the present arrangements
with the Office of Science and Technology and the other Federal agencies that have been so helpful to the Secret Service be placed on a permanent and formal basis.
The exchange of letters dated August 31, 1964,
between Secretary Dillon and Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is a useful effort in the right direction.
The Service should negotiate a memorandum of understanding with each agency that has been assisting it and from which it can expect to need help in the future.
The essential terms of such memoranda might well be embodied in an Executive order.
This Commission can recommend no procedures for the future protection of our Presidents which will guarantee security.
The demands on the President in the execution of His responsibilities in today's world are so varied and complex
and the traditions of the office in a democracy such as ours are so deep-seated as to preclude absolute security.
The Commission has, however, from its examination of the facts of President Kennedy's assassination
made certain recommendations which it believes would, if adopted,
materially improve upon the procedures in effect at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and result in a substantial lessening of the danger.
As has been pointed out, the Commission has not resolved all the proposals which could be made. The Commission nevertheless is confident that,
with the active cooperation of the responsible agencies and with the understanding of the people of the United States in their demands upon their President,
the recommendations we have here suggested would greatly advance the security of the office without any impairment of our fundamental liberties.