MikhailT/lj-speech huggingface dataset:
The possible contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico intensified the FBI's interest in learning Oswald's whereabouts.
The FBI representative in Mexico City arranged to follow up this information with the CIA and to verify Oswald's entry into Mexico.
The CIA message was sent also to the Department of State where it was reviewed by personnel of the Passport Office, who knew from Oswald's file
that he had sought and obtained a passport on June 25, 1963.
The Department of State did not advise either the CIA or the FBI of these facts.
On October 25,
the New Orleans office of the FBI learned that in September Oswald had given a forwarding address of 2515
West Fifth Street, Irving, Texas. After receiving this information on October 29, Agent Hosty attempted to locate Oswald.
On the same day Hosty interviewed neighbors on Fifth Street and learned that the address was that of Mrs. Ruth Paine.
He conducted a limited background investigation of the Paines, intending to interview Mrs. Paine and ask her particularly about Oswald's whereabouts.
Having determined that Mrs. Paine was a responsible and reliable citizen, Hosty interviewed her on November 1.
The interview lasted about 20 to 25 minutes. In response to Hosty's inquiries, Mrs. Paine, quote,
readily admitted that Mrs. Marina Oswald and Lee Oswald's two children were staying with her.
She said that Lee Oswald was living somewhere in Dallas. She didn't know where. She said it was in the Oak Cliff area but she didn't have his address.
I asked her if she knew where he worked.
After a moment's hesitation, she told me that he worked at the Texas School Book Depository near the downtown area of Dallas.
She didn't have the exact address, and it is my recollection that we went to the phone book and looked it up,
found it to be 411 Elm Street. End quote.
Mrs. Paine told Hosty also
that Oswald was living alone in Dallas because she did not want him staying at her house, although she was willing to let Oswald visit his wife and children.
According to Hosty, Mrs. Paine indicated that she thought she could find out where Oswald was living and would let him know.
At this point in the interview, Hosty gave Mrs. Paine his name and office telephone number on a piece of paper.
At the end of the interview, Marina Oswald came into the room. When he observed that she seemed, quote, quite alarmed, end quote, about the visit,
Hosty assured her, through Mrs. Paine as interpreter, that the FBI would not harm or harass her.
On November 4, Hosty telephoned the Texas School Book Depository and learned that Oswald was working there
and that he had given as his address Mrs. Paine's residence in Irving.
Hosty took the necessary steps to have the Dallas office of the FBI, rather than the New Orleans office, reestablished as the office with principal responsibility.
On November 5, Hosty was traveling near Mrs. Paine's home and took the occasion to stop by to ask whether she had any further information.
Mrs. Paine had nothing to add to what she had already told him, except that during a visit that past weekend,
Oswald had said that he was a, quote, Trotskyite Communist, end quote.
and that she found this and similar statements illogical and somewhat amusing. On this occasion Hosty was at the Paine residence for only a few minutes.
During neither interview did Hosty learn Oswald's address
or telephone number in Dallas. Mrs. Paine testified that she learned Oswald's telephone number at the Beckley Street roominghouse in the middle of October
shortly after Oswald rented the room on October 14.
As discussed in chapter 6, she failed to report this to Agent Hosty
because she thought the FBI was in possession of a great deal of information and certainly would find it very easy to learn where Oswald was living.
Hosty did nothing further in connection with the Oswald case until after the assassination. On November 1, 1963,
he had received a copy of the report of the New Orleans office which contained Agent Quigley's memorandum of the interview in the New Orleans jail on August 10,
and realized immediately that Oswald had given false biographic information. Hosty knew that he would eventually have to investigate this, and, quote,
was quite interested in determining the nature of his contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, end quote.
When asked what his next step would have been, Hosty replied, quote,
Well, as I had previously stated, I have between 25 and 40 cases assigned to me at any one time. I had other matters to take care of.
I had now established that Lee Oswald was not employed in a sensitive industry.
I can now afford to wait until New Orleans forwarded the necessary papers to me to show me I now had all the information.
It was then my plan to interview Marina Oswald in detail concerning both herself and her husband's background. Question:
Had you planned any steps beyond that point?
Answer: No. I would have to wait until I had talked to Marina to see what I could determine, and from there I could make my plans.
Question: Did you take any action on this case between November 5 and November 22? Answer: No, sir.
The official Bureau files confirm Hosty's statement that from November 5 until the assassination, no active investigation was conducted.
On November 18 the FBI learned that Oswald recently had been in communication with the Soviet Embassy in Washington
and so advised the Dallas office in the ordinary course of business.
Hosty received this information on the afternoon of November 22, 1963.
Nonreferral of Oswald to the Secret Service.
The Commission has considered carefully the question whether the FBI,
in view of all the information concerning Oswald in its files, should have alerted the Secret Service to Oswald's presence in Dallas
prior to President Kennedy's visit.
The Secret Service and the FBI differ
as to whether Oswald fell within the category of, quote, threats against the President, end quote, which should be referred to the Service.
Robert I Bouck, special agent in charge of the Protective Research Section,
testified that the information available to the Federal Government about Oswald before the assassination would, if known to PRS,
have made Oswald a subject of concern to the Secret Service.
Bouck pointed to a number of characteristics besides Oswald's defection the cumulative effect of which would have been to alert the Secret Service
to potential danger, quote,
I would think his continued association with the Russian Embassy after his return,
been courtmartialed for illegal possession of a gun, of a handgun in the Marines,
that he had owned a weapon and did a good deal of hunting or use of it, perhaps in Russia, plus a number of items about his disposition and unreliability of character,
I think all of those, if we had them all together,
would have added up to pointing out a pretty bad individual, and I think that, together, had we known that he had a vantage point
would have seemed somewhat serious to us, even though I must admit, that none of these in themselves would be
would meet our specific criteria, none of them alone. But, it is when you begin adding them up to some degree that you begin to get criteria that, are meaningful.
End quote. Mr. Bouck pointed out, however, that he had no reason to believe that any one Federal agency had access to all this information,
including the significant fact that Oswald was employed in a building which overlooked the motorcade route.
Agent Hosty testified that he was fully aware of the pending Presidential visit to Dallas.
He recalled that the special agent in charge of the Dallas office of the FBI, J. Gordon Shanklin,
had discussed the President's visit on several occasions, including the regular biweekly conference on the morning of November 22
Quote, Mr. Shanklin advised us, among other things,
that in view of the President's visit to Dallas, that if anyone had any indication of any possibility of any acts of violence or any demonstrations against the President,
or Vice President, to immediately notify the Secret Service and confirm it in writing.
He had made the same statement about a week prior at another special conference which we had held.
I don't recall the exact date. It was about a week prior. End quote.
In fact, Hosty participated in transmitting to the Secret Service two pieces of information pertaining to the visit.
Hosty testified that he did not know until the evening of Thursday, November 21, that there was to be a motorcade, however,
and never realized that the motorcade would pass the Texas School Book Depository Building.
He testified that he did not read the newspaper story describing the motorcade route in detail, since he was interested only in the fact
that the motorcade was coming up Main Street, quote, where maybe I could watch it if I had a chance, end quote.
Even if he had recalled that Oswald's place of employment was on the President's route,
Hosty testified that he would not have cited him to the Secret Service as a potential threat to the President. Hosty interpreted his instructions as requiring, quote,
some indication that the person planned to take some action against the safety of the President of the United States or the Vice President. End quote.
In his opinion, none of the information in the FBI files -- Oswald's defection, his Fair Play for Cuba activities in New Orleans,
his lies to Agent Quigley, his recent visit to Mexico City -- indicated that Oswald was capable of violence.
Hosty's initial reaction on hearing that Oswald was a suspect in the assassination, was, quote, shock
complete surprise, end quote, because he had no reason to believe that Oswald, quote,
was capable or potentially an assassin of the President of the United States, end quote.
Shortly after Oswald was apprehended and identified, Hosty's superior sent him to observe the interrogation of Oswald.
Hosty parked his car in the basement of police headquarters and there met an acquaintance, Lt. Jack Revill of the Dallas police force.
The two men disagree about the conversation which took place between them.
They agree that Hosty told Revill
that the FBI had known about Oswald and, in particular, of his presence in Dallas and his employment at the Texas School Book Depository Building.
Revill testified that Hosty said also that the FBI had information that Oswald was, quote, capable of committing this assassination, end quote.
According to Revill, Hosty indicated that he was going to tell this to Lieutenant Wells of the homicide and robbery bureau.
Revill promptly made a memorandum of this conversation in which the quoted statement appears.
His secretary testified that she prepared such a report for him that afternoon and Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry
and District Attorney Henry M. Wade both testified that they saw it later that day.
Hosty has unequivocally denied, first by affidavit and then in his testimony before the Commission,
that he ever said that Oswald was capable of violence, or that he had any information suggesting this.
The only witness to the conversation was Dallas Police Detective V. J. Brian, who was accompanying Revill.
Brian did not hear Hosty make any statement concerning Oswald's capacity to be an assassin
Chapter 8. The Protection of the President. Part 3.
Hosty's interpretation of the prevailing FBI instructions on referrals to the Secret Service was defended before the Commission by his superiors.
After summarizing the Bureau's investigative interest in Oswald prior to the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover concluded that, quote,
There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the President
or to the Vice President, end quote.
Director Hoover emphasized that the first indication of Oswald's capacity for violence
was his attempt on General Walker's life, which did not become known to the FBI until after the assassination.
Both Director Hoover and his assistant, Alan H. Belmont,
stressed also the decision by the Department of State that Oswald should be permitted to return to the United States.
Neither believed that the Bureau investigation of him up to November 22 revealed any information which would have justified referral to the Secret Service.
According to Belmont, when Oswald returned from the Soviet Union, quote,
he indicated that he had learned his lesson,
was disenchanted with Russia, and had a renewed concept -- I am paraphrasing, a renewed concept -- of the American free society.
We talked to him twice.
He likewise indicated he was disenchanted with Russia.
We satisfied ourselves that we had met our requirement, namely to find out whether he had been recruited by Soviet intelligence. The case was closed.
We again exhibited interest on the basis of these contacts with The Worker, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which are relatively inconsequential.
His activities for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, we knew, were not of real consequence as he was not connected with any organized activity there.
The interview with him in jail is not significant from the standpoint of whether he had a propensity for violence.
Question: This is the Quigley interview you are talking about?
Answer: Yes. It was a self-serving interview. The visits with the Soviet Embassy were evidently for the purpose of securing a visa,
and he had told us during one of the interviews that he would probably take his wife back to Soviet Russia some time in the future.
He had come back to Dallas. Hosty had established that he had a job, he was working,
and had told Mrs. Paine that when he got the money he was going to take an apartment, when the baby was old enough, he was going to take an apartment, and the family would live together.
He gave evidence of settling down.
Nowhere during the course of this investigation or the information that came to us from other agencies was there any indication of a potential for violence on his part.
Consequently, there was no basis for Hosty to go to Secret Service and advise them of Oswald's presence. End quote
As reflected in this testimony,
the officials of the FBI believed that there was no data in its files which gave warning that Oswald was a source of danger to President Kennedy.
While he had expressed hostility at times toward the State Department, the Marine Corps, and the FBI as agents of the Government,
so far as the FBI knew he had not shown any potential for violence.
Prior to November 22, 1963
no law enforcement agency had any information to connect Oswald with the attempted shooting of General Walker.
It was against this background and consistent with the criteria followed by the FBI prior to November 22
that agents of the FBI in Dallas did not consider Oswald's presence in the Texas School Book Depository Building
overlooking the motorcade route as a source of danger to the President and did not inform the Secret Service of his employment in the Depository Building.
The Commission believes, however,
that the FBI took an unduly restrictive view of its responsibilities in preventive intelligence work, prior to the assassination.
The Commission appreciates the large volume of cases handled by the FBI
636,371 investigative matters during fiscal year 1963
There were no Secret Service criteria which specifically required the referral of Oswald's case to the Secret Service;
nor was there any requirement to report the names of defectors. However, there was much material in the hands of the FBI about Oswald:
the knowledge of his defection, his arrogance and hostility to the United States,
his pro-Castro tendencies, his lies when interrogated by the FBI,
his trip to Mexico where he was in contact with Soviet authorities,
his presence in the School Book Depository job and its location along the route of the motorcade.
All this does seem to amount to enough to have induced an alert agency, such as the FBI,
possessed of this information to list Oswald as a potential threat to the safety of the President.
This conclusion may be tinged with hindsight, but
it stated primarily to direct the thought of those responsible for the future safety of our Presidents to the need for a more imaginative
and less narrow interpretation of their responsibilities.
It is the conclusion of the Commission that, even in the absence of Secret Service criteria
which specifically required the referral of such a case as Oswald's to the Secret Service,
a more alert and carefully considered treatment of the Oswald case by the Bureau might have brought about such a referral.
Had such a review been undertaken by the FBI,
there might conceivably have been additional investigation of the Oswald case between November 5 and November 22.
Agent Hosty testified
that several matters brought to his attention in late October and early November, including the visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City,
required further attention.
Under proper procedures knowledge of the pending Presidential visit might have prompted Hosty
to have made more vigorous efforts to locate Oswald's roominghouse address in Dallas and to interview him regarding these unresolved matters.
The formal FBI instructions to its agents outlining the information to be referred to the Secret Service were too narrow at the time of the assassination.
While the Secret Service bears the principal responsibility for this failure,
the FBI instructions did not reflect fully the Secret Service's need for information regarding potential threats.
The handbook referred thus to, quote, the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President, end quote.
It is clear from Hosty's testimony that this was construed, at least by him,
as requiring evidence of a plan or conspiracy to injure the President.
Efforts made by the Bureau since the assassination, on the other hand,
reflect keen awareness of the necessity of communicating a much wider range of intelligence information to the Service.
Most important, notwithstanding that both agencies have professed to the Commission that the liaison between them was close and fully sufficient,
the Commission does not believe that the liaison between the FBI and the Secret Service prior to the assassination was as effective as it should have been.
The FBI Manual of Instructions provided, quote, Liaison With Other Government Agencies
To insure adequate and effective liaison arrangements,
each SAC should specifically designate an Agent (or Agents) to be responsible for developing
and maintaining liaison with other Federal Agencies. This liaison should take into consideration
FBI-agency community of interests, location of agency head quarters, and the responsiveness of agency representatives.
In each instance, liaison contacts should be developed to include a close friendly relationship,
mutual understanding of FBI and agency jurisdictions, and an indicated willingness by the agency representative
to coordinate activities and to discuss problems of mutual interest.
Each field office should determine those Federal agencies which are represented locally and with which liaison should be conducted. End quote.
The testimony reveals that liaison responsibilities in connection with the President's visit
were discussed twice officially by the special agent in charge of the FBI office in Dallas. As discussed in chapter 2,
some limited information was made available to the Secret Service. But there was no fully adequate liaison between the two agencies. Indeed,
the Commission believes that the liaison between all Federal agencies responsible for Presidential protection should be improved.
Other Protective Measures and Aspects of Secret Service Performance
The President's trip to Dallas called into play many standard operating procedures of the Secret Service in addition to its preventive intelligence operations.
Examination of these procedures shows that in most respects they were well conceived and ably executed by the personnel of the Service.
Against the background of the critical events of November 22, however,
certain shortcomings and lapses from the high standards which the Commission believes should prevail in the field of Presidential protection are evident.
Advance preparations.
The advance preparations in Dallas by Agent Winston G. Lawson of the White House detail have been described in chapter 2.
With the assistance of Agent in Charge Sorrels of the Dallas field office of the Secret Service,
Lawson was responsible for working out a great many arrangements for the President's trip.
The Service prefers to have two agents perform advance preparations.
In the case of Dallas, because President Kennedy had scheduled visits to five Texas cities
and had also scheduled visits to other parts of the country immediately before the Texas trip,
there were not enough men available to permit two agents to be assigned to all the advance work.
Agent Lawson did the advance work alone from November 13 to November 18, when he was joined by Agent David B. Grant,
who had just completed advance work on the President's trip to Tampa.
The Commission concludes that the most significant advance arrangements for the President's trip were soundly planned.
In particular, the Commission believes that the motorcade route selected by Agent Lawson, upon the advice of Agent in Charge Sorrels
and with the concurrence of the Dallas police, was entirely appropriate, in view of the known desires of the President.
There were far safer routes via freeways directly to the Trade Mart,
but these routes would not have been in accordance with the White House staff instructions given the Secret Service for a desirable motorcade route.
Much of Lawson's time was taken with establishing adequate security over the motorcade route and at the two places where the President would stop,
Love Field and the Trade Mart.
by these Secret Service agents with the cooperation of the Dallas police and other local law enforcement agents, were carefully executed.
Since the President was to be at the Trade Mart longer than at any other location in Dallas and in view of the security hazards presented by the building,
the Secret Service correctly gave particular attention in the advance preparations to those arrangements.
The Commission also regards the security arrangements worked out by Lawson and Sorrels at Love Field as entirely adequate.
that the Secret Service has inadequately defined the responsibilities of its advance agents, who have been given broad discretion
to determine what matters require attention in making advance preparations and to decide what action to take.
Agent Lawson was not given written instructions concerning the Dallas trip or advice about any peculiar problems which it might involve;
all instructions from higher authority were communicated to him orally.
He did not have a checklist of the tasks he was expected to accomplish, either by his own efforts or with the cooperation of local authorities.
The only systematic supervision of the activities of the advance agent
has been that provided by a requirement that he file interim and final reports on each advance assignment.
The interim report must be in the hands of the agent supervising the protective group traveling with the President
long enough before his departure to apprise him of any particular problems encountered and the responsive action taken.
Agent Lawson's interim report was received by Agent Kellerman on November 20, the day before departure on the Texas trip.
The Secret Service has advised the Commission that no unusual precautions were taken for the Dallas trip, and that, quote,
the precautions taken for the President's trip were the usual safeguards employed on trips of this kind in the United States during the previous year, end quote.
Special Agent in Charge Sorrels testified that the advance preparations followed on this occasion were, quote, pretty much the same, end quote,
as those followed in 1936 during a trip to Dallas by President Roosevelt,
which was Sorrels' first important assignment in connection with Presidential work.
In view of the constant change in the nature of threats to the President and the diversity of the dangers which may arise in the various cities within the United States,
the Commission believes that standard procedures in use for many years and applied in all parts of the country may not be sufficient.