MikhailT/lj-speech huggingface dataset:
The criteria in effect prior to November 22, 1963, for determining whether to accept material for the PRS general files
were broad and flexible. All material is and was desired, accepted, and filed if it indicated or tended to indicate
that the safety of the President is or might be in danger, either at the present or in the future.
There are many actions, situations, and incidents that may indicate such potential danger. Some are specific, such as threats;
danger may be implied from others, such as membership or activity in an organization which believes in assassination as a political weapon.
All material received by PRS was separately screened
and a determination made as to whether the information might indicate possible harm to the President.
If the material was evaluated
as indicating some potential danger to the President -- no matter how small -- it was indexed in the general PRS files
under the name of the individual or group of individuals to whom that material related. End quote.
The general files of PRS consist of folders on individuals, card indexed by name.
The files are manually maintained, without use of any automatic data-processing techniques.
At the time of the assassination, the active PRS general files contained approximately 50,000 cases
accumulated over a 20-year period, some of which included more than one individual.
A case file was established if the information available suggested that the subject might be a danger to the President.
Many of these cases were not investigated by PRS.
The case file served merely as a repository for information until enough had accumulated to warrant an investigation.
During the period November 1961 to November 1963,
PRS investigated 34 newly established or reactivated cases concerning residents of Texas.
Most of these cases involved persons who used threatening language in communications to or about the President.
An additional 115 cases concerning Texas residents were established but not investigated.
When PRS learns of an individual whose conduct warrants scrutiny, it requests an investigation by the closest Secret Service field office,
of which there are 65 throughout the country.
If the field office determines that the case should be subject to continuing review, PRS establishes a file
which requires a checkup at least, every 6 months.
This might involve a personal interview or interviews with members of the person's household. Wherever possible,
to advise the field office if the subject displays signs of increased danger or plans to leave his home area.
At the time of the assassination there were approximately 400 persons throughout the country who were subject to periodic review.
If PRS concludes after investigation
that an individual presents a significant danger to the life of the President, his name is placed in a "trip index file"
which is maintained on a geographical field office basis.
At the time of the assassination the names of about 100 persons were in this index, all of whom were included in the group of 400
being reviewed regularly.
PRS also maintains an album of photographs and descriptions of about 12 to 15 individuals who are regarded as clear risks to the President
and who do not have a fixed place of residence. Members of the White House detail of the Secret Service have copies of this album.
Individuals who are regarded as dangerous to the President
and who are in penal or hospital custody are listed only in the general files of PRS,
but there is a system for the immediate notification of the Secret Service by the confining institution when a subject is released or escapes.
PRS attempts to eliminate serious risks by hospitalization or, where necessary,
the prosecution of persons who have committed an offense such as threatening the President.
In June 1964 PRS had arrangements to be notified about the release or escape of approximately 1,000 persons.
In summary, at the time of the assassination
PRS had received, over a 20-year period, basic information on some 50,000 cases;
it had arrangements to be notified about release from confinement in roughly 1,000 cases;
it had established periodic regular review of the status of 400 individuals;
it regarded approximately 100 of these 400 cases as serious risks
and 12 to 15 of these cases as highly dangerous risks.
Members of the White House detail were expected to familiarize themselves with the descriptions and photographs of the highest risk cases.
The cases subject to periodic review and the 100 or so cases in the higher risk category
were filed on a geographic basis, and could conveniently be reviewed by a Secret Service agent preparing for a Presidential trip
to a particular part of the country. These were the files reviewed by PRS on November 8, 1963,
at the request of Special Agent Lawson, advance agent for President Kennedy's trip to Dallas.
The general files of PRS were not indexed by geographic location and were of little use in preparing for a Presidential visit to a specific locality.
Secret Service requests to other agencies for intelligence information
were no more specific than the broad and general instructions its own agents and the White House mailroom.
The head of PRS testified that the Secret Service requested other agencies to provide, quote,
any and all information that they may come in contact with that would indicate danger to the President, end quote.
These requests were communicated in writing by the Secret Service; rather, the Service depended on the personal liaison maintained by PRS
with the headquarters of the Federal intelligence agencies, particularly the FBI,
and at the working level with personnel of the field offices of the various agencies. The Service frequently participated
in the training programs of other law enforcement agencies, and agents from other agencies attended the regular Secret Service training schools.
Presidential protection was an important topic in these training programs.
In the absence of more specific instructions, other Federal agencies interpreted the Secret Service's informal requests
to relate principally to overt threats to harm the President or other specific manifestations of hostility.
For example, at the time of the assassination, the FBI Handbook, which is in the possession of every Bureau special agent, provided, quote,
Threats against the President of the U.S.,
members of his immediate family, the President-elect, and the Vice-President. Investigation of threats against the President of the United States,
members of his immediate family, the President-Elect, and the Vice-President is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Secret Service.
Any information indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President,
members of the immediate family of the President, the President-Elect or the Vice-President
must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communication to the nearest office of the U.S. Secret Service.
Advise the Bureau at the same time by teletype of the information so furnished to the Secret Service and the fact that it has been so disseminated.
The above action should be taken without delay in order to attempt to verify the information and no evaluation of the information should be attempted.
When the threat is in the form of a written communication, give a copy to local Secret Service and forward the original to the Bureau
where it will be made available to Secret Service headquarters in Washington.
The referral of the copy to local Secret Service should not delay the immediate referral of the information by the fastest available means of communication
to Secret Service locally, end quote.
The State Department advised the Secret Service of all crank and threat letter mail
or crank visitors and furnished reports concerning any assassination or attempted assassination of a ruler or other major official anywhere in the world.
The several military intelligence agencies reported crank mail and similar threats involving the President.
According to Special Agent in Charge Bouck,
the Secret Service had no standard procedure for the systematic review of its requests for and receipt of information from other Federal agencies.
The Commission believes that the facilities and procedures of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service
prior to November 22, 1963, were inadequate.
Its efforts appear to have been too largely directed at the "crank" threat.
Although the Service recognized that its advance preventive measures must encompass more than these most obvious dangers,
or an organized group, other than specific threats, which suggested a source of danger against which timely precautions could be taken.
Except for its special "trip index" file of 400 names,
none of the cases in the PRS general files was available for systematic review on a geographic basis when the President planned a particular trip.
As reported in chapter 2, when the special file was reviewed on November 8,
it contained the names of no persons from the entire Dallas-Fort Worth area,
notwithstanding the fact that Ambassador Stevenson had been abused by pickets in Dallas less than a month before.
Bouck explained the failure to try to identify the individuals involved in the Stevenson incident after it occurred on the ground that
PRS required a more direct indication of a threat to the President, and that there was no such indication until the President's scheduled visit to that area became known.
Such an approach seriously undermines the precautionary nature of PRS work;
if the presence in Dallas of the Stevenson pickets might have created a danger for the President on a visit to that city,
PRS should have investigated and been prepared to guard against it.
Other agencies occasionally provided information to the Secret Service concerning potentially dangerous political groups.
This was done in the case of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, for example, but only after members of the group had resorted to political violence.
However, the vague requests for information which the Secret Service made
to Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies were not well designed to elicit information from them
about persons other than those who were obvious threats to the President.
The requests shifted the responsibility for evaluating difficult cases from the Service, the agency most responsible for performing that task,
to the other agencies. No specific guidance was provided.
Although the CIA had on file requests from the Treasury Department for information on the counterfeiting of U.S. currency and certain smuggling matters,
it had no written specification of intelligence information collected by CIA abroad which was desired by the Secret Service
in advance of Presidential trips outside the United States.
Chapter 8. The Protection of the President. Part 2.
Information known about Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination.
No information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald appeared in PRS files before the President's trip to Dallas.
Oswald was known to other Federal agencies with which the Secret Service maintained intelligence liaison.
The FBI had been interested in him, to some degree at least, since the time of his defection in October 1959.
It had interviewed him twice shortly after his return to the United States, again a year later at his request
and was investigating him at the time of the assassination. The Commission has taken the testimony of Bureau agents
who interviewed Oswald after his return from the Soviet Union and prior to November 22, 1963,
the agent who was assigned his case at the time of the assassination, the Director of the FBI,
and the Assistant to the Director in charge of all investigative activities under the Director and Associate Director. In addition,
the Director and Deputy Director for Plans of the CIA testified concerning that Agency's limited knowledge of Oswald before the assassination.
Finally, the Commission has reviewed the complete files on Oswald, as they existed at the time of the assassination, of the Department of State,
the Office of Naval Intelligence, the FBI and the CIA. The information known to the FBI is summarized below.
From defection to return to Fort Worth.
The FBI opened a file on Oswald in October 1959, when news reports appeared of his defection to the Soviet Union.
The file was opened, quote,
for the purpose of correlating information inasmuch as he was considered a possible security risk in the event he returned to this country, end quote.
Oswald's defection was also the occasion for the opening of files by the Department of State, CIA, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Until April 1960, FBI activity consisted of placing in Oswald's file
information regarding his relations with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and background data relating largely to his prior military service,
provided by other agencies.
In April 1960, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald and Robert Oswald were interviewed
in the course of a routine FBI investigation of transfers of small sums of money from Mrs. Oswald to her son in Russia.
During the next 2 years the FBI continued to accumulate information,
and kept itself informed on Oswald's status by periodic reviews of State Department and Office of Naval Intelligence files.
In this way, it learned that when Oswald had arrived in the Soviet Union
he had attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship and applied for Soviet citizenship,
had described himself as a Marxist, had said he would give the Soviet Union any useful information he had acquired
as a marine radar technician and had displayed an arrogant and aggressive attitude at the U.S. Embassy;
it learned also that Oswald had been discharged from the Marine Corps Reserve as undesirable in August 1960.
In June 1962, the Bureau was advised by the Department of State of Oswald's plan to return to the United States.
The Bureau made arrangements to be advised by immigration authorities of his return,
and instructed the Dallas office to interview him when he got back to determine whether he had been recruited by a Soviet intelligence service.
Oswald's file at the Department of State Passport Office was reviewed in June 1962.
It revealed his letter of January 30, 1962, to Secretary of the Navy Connally,
in which he protested his discharge and declared that he would use, quote, all means, end quote, to correct it.
The file reflected the Department's determination that Oswald had not expatriated himself.
From return to Fort Worth to move to New Orleans.
Oswald was first interviewed by FBI Agents John W. Fain and B. Tom Carter on June 26, 1962,
Agent Fain reported to headquarters that Oswald was impatient and arrogant,
and unwilling to answer questions regarding his motive for going to the Soviet Union.
Oswald, quote, denied that he had ever denounced his U.S. citizenship, and that he had ever applied for Soviet citizenship specifically, end quote.
Oswald was, however, willing to discuss his contacts with Soviet authorities. He denied having any involvement with Soviet intelligence agencies
and promised to advise the FBI if he heard from them.
Agent Fain was not satisfied by this interview and arranged to see Oswald again on August 16, 1962.
According to Fain's contemporaneous memorandum and his present recollection,
while Oswald remained somewhat evasive at this interview, he was not antagonistic and seemed generally to be settling down.
Marina Oswald, however, recalled that her husband was upset by this interview.
Oswald again agreed to advise the FBI if he were approached under suspicious circumstances; however, he deprecated the possibility of this happening,
particularly since his employment did not involve any sensitive information.
Having concluded that Oswald was not a security risk or potentially dangerous or violent,
Fain determined that nothing further remained to be done at that time and recommended that the case be placed in a closed status.
This is an administrative classification indicating that no further work has been scheduled.
It does not preclude the agent in charge of the case from reopening it if he feels that further work should be done.
From August 1962
until March 1963, the FBI continued to accumulate information regarding Oswald but engaged in no active investigation.
Agent Fain retired from the FBI in October 1962, and the closed Oswald case was not reassigned.
Fain had been assigned to see Marina Oswald at an appropriate time.
This assignment was given to Agent James P. Hosty, Jr. of the Dallas office upon Fain's retirement.
In March 1963, while attempting to locate Marina Oswald,
Agent Hosty was told by Mrs. M. F. Tobias, a former landlady of the Oswalds at 602 Elsbeth Street in Dallas,
that other tenants had complained because Oswald was drinking to excess and beating his wife.
This information led Hosty to review Oswald's file, from which he learned that Oswald had become a subscriber to the Worker,
a Communist Party publication.
Hosty decided that the Lee Harvey Oswald case should be reopened because of the alleged personal difficulties and the contact with the Worker,
and his recommendation was accepted. He decided, however, not to interview Marina Oswald at that time, and merely determined
that the Oswalds were living at 214 Neely Street in Dallas.
On April 21, 1963, the FBI field office in New York
was advised that Oswald was in contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, and that he had written to the committee
stating that he had distributed its pamphlets on the streets of Dallas. This information did not reach Agent Hosty in Dallas until June.
Hosty considered the information to be, quote, stale, unquote, by that time, and did not attempt to verify Oswald's reported statement.
Under a general Bureau request to be on the alert for activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee
Hosty had inquired earlier and found no evidence that it was functioning in the Dallas area.
In New Orleans. In the middle of May of 1963, Agent Hosty checked Oswald's last known residence and found that he had moved.
Oswald was tentatively located in New Orleans in June,
and Hosty asked the New Orleans FBI office to determine Oswald's address and what he was doing.
The New Orleans office investigated and located Oswald, learning his address and former place of employment on August 5, 1963.
A confidential informant advised the FBI that Oswald was not known to be engaged in Communist Party activities in New Orleans.
On June 24, Oswald applied in New Orleans for a passport, stating that he planned to depart by ship
for an extended tour of Western European countries, the Soviet Union, Finland, and Poland.
The Passport Office of the Department of State in Washington had no listing for Oswald requiring special treatment,
and his application was approved on the following day.
The FBI had not asked to be informed of any effort by Oswald to obtain a passport,
as it might have under existing procedures, and did not know of his application.
According to the Bureau, quote,
We did not request the State Department to include Oswald on a list which would have resulted in advising us of any application for a passport
inasmuch as the facts relating to Oswald's activities at that time did not warrant such action.
Our investigation of Oswald had disclosed no evidence that Oswald was acting under the instructions or on behalf of
any foreign government or instrumentality thereof. End quote.
On August 9, 1963,
Oswald was arrested and jailed by the New Orleans Police Department for disturbing the peace, in connection with a street fight which broke out when he was accosted
by anti-Castro Cubans while distributing leaflets on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
On the next day, he asked the New Orleans police to arrange for him to be interviewed by the FBI.
The police called the local FBI office and an agent, John L. Quigley, was sent to the police station.
Agent Quigley did not know of Oswald's prior FBI record when he interviewed him,
inasmuch as the police had not given Oswald's name to the Bureau when they called the office.
Quigley recalled that Oswald was receptive when questioned about his general background
but less than completely truthful or cooperative when interrogated about the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
Quigley testified, quote,
When I began asking him specific details with respect to his activities in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans as to where meetings were held,
who was involved, what occurred, he was reticent to furnish information,
reluctant and actually as far as I was concerned, was completely evasive on them. End quote.
In Quigley's judgment,
Oswald, quote, was probably making a self-serving statement in attempting to explain to me why he was distributing this literature, and for no other reason,
and when I got to questioning him further then he felt that his purpose had been served and he wouldn't say anything further, end quote.
During the interview Quigley obtained background information from Oswald which was inconsistent with information already in the Bureau's possession.
When Quigley returned to his office, he learned
that another Bureau agent, Milton R. Knack, had been conducting a background investigation of Oswald at the request of Agent Hosty in Dallas.
Quigley advised Knack of his interview and gave him a detailed memorandum.
Knack was aware of the facts known to the FBI and recognized Oswald's false statements.
For example, Oswald claimed that his wife's maiden name was Prossa
and that they had been married in Fort Worth and lived there until coming to New Orleans. He had told the New Orleans arresting officers that he had been born in Cuba.
Several days later, the Bureau received additional evidence that Oswald had lied to Agent Quigley.
On August 22, it learned that Oswald had appeared on a radio discussion program on August 21.
William Stuckey, who had appeared on the radio program with Oswald, told the Bureau on August 30
that Oswald had told him that he had worked and been married in the Soviet Union.
Neither these discrepancies nor the fact that Oswald had initiated the FBI interview
was considered sufficiently unusual to necessitate another interview. Alan H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director of the FBI,
stated the Bureau's reasoning in this way, quote,
Our interest in this man at this point was to determine whether his activities constituted a threat to the internal security of the country.
It was apparent that he had made a self-serving statement to Agent Quigley. It became a matter of record in our files as a part of the case,
and if we determined that the course of the investigation required us to clarify or face him down with this information, we would do it at the appropriate time.
In other words, he committed no violation of the law by telling us something that wasn't true, and unless this required further investigation at that time,
we would handle it in due course, in accord with the whole context of the investigation. End quote.
On August 21, 1963, Bureau headquarters instructed the New Orleans and Dallas field offices
to conduct an additional investigation of Oswald in view of the activities which had led to his arrest.
FBI informants in the New Orleans area, familiar with pro-Castro or Communist Party activity there,
advised the Bureau that Oswald was unknown in such circles.
In early September 1963
the FBI transferred the principal responsibility for the Oswald case from the Dallas office to the New Orleans office.
Soon after, on October 1, 1963,
The FBI was advised by the rental agent for the Oswalds' apartment in New Orleans that they had moved again.
According to the information received by the Bureau
they had vacated their apartment, and Marina Oswald had departed with their child in a station wagon with Texas registration.
On October 3, Hosty reopened the case in Dallas to assist the New Orleans office.
He checked in Oswald's old neighborhood and throughout the Dallas-Fort Worth area but was unable to locate Oswald.
The next word about Oswald's location was a communication from the CIA to the FBI on October 10,
advising that an individual tentatively identified as Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City
in early October of 1963.
The Bureau had no earlier information suggesting that Oswald had left the United States.