MikhailT/lj-speech huggingface dataset:
There is, for example, no Secret Service arrangement for evaluating before a trip particular difficulties that might be anticipated,
which would bring to bear the judgment and experience of members of the White House detail other than the advance agent.
Constant reevaluation of procedures, with attention to special problems and the development of instructions specific to particular trips
would be a desirable innovation.
Liaison with local law enforcement authorities.
In the description of the important aspects of the advance preparations,
there have been references to the numerous discussions between Secret Service representatives and the Dallas Police Department.
The wholehearted support of these local authorities was indispensable to the Service in carrying out its duties.
The Service had 28 agents participating in the Dallas visit.
Agent Lawson's advance planning called for the deployment of almost 600 members of the Dallas Police Department,
Fire Department, County Sheriff's Department, and the Texas Department of Public Safety.
Despite this dependence on local authorities, which would be substantially the same on a visit by the President to any large city,
the Secret Service did not at the time of the assassination have any established procedure governing its relationships with them.
It had no prepared checklist of matters to be covered with local police on such visits to metropolitan areas
and no written description of the role the local police were expected to perform.
Discussions with the Dallas authorities and requests made of them were entirely informal.
The Commission believes
that a more formal statement of assigned responsibilities, supplemented in each case to reflect the peculiar conditions of each Presidential trip
is essential. This would help to eliminate varying interpretations of Secret Service instructions by different local law enforcement representatives. For example,
while the Secret Service representatives in Dallas
asked the police to station guards at each overpass to keep, quote, unauthorized personnel, end quote, off, this term was not defined.
At some overpasses all persons were excluded
while on the overpass overlooking the assassination scene railroad and yard terminal workmen were permitted to remain under police supervision,
as discussed in chapter 3.
Assistant Chief Batchelor of the Dallas police noted the absence of any formal statement by the Secret Service of specific work assigned to the police
and suggested the desirability of such a statement.
Agent Lawson agreed that such a procedure would assist him and other agents in fulfilling their responsibilities as advance agents.
Check of buildings along route of motorcade.
Agent Lawson did not arrange for a prior inspection of buildings along the motorcade route,
either by police or by custodians of the buildings, since it was not the usual practice of the Secret Service to do so.
The Chief of the Service has provided the Commission a detailed explanation of this policy, quote,
Except for inauguration or other parades involving foreign dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington,
it has not been the practice of the Secret Service to make surveys or checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential motorcade.
For the inauguration and certain other parades in Washington where the traditional route is known to the public long in advance of the event,
buildings along the route can be checked by teams of law enforcement officers, and armed guards are posted along the route as appropriate.
But on out-of-town trips where the route is decided on and made public only a few days in advance,
buildings are not checked either by Secret Service agents or by any other law enforcement officers at the request of the Secret Service.
With the number of men available to the Secret Service and the time available, surveys of hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical.
In Dallas the route selected necessarily involved passing through the principal downtown section between tall buildings.
While certain streets thought to be too narrow could be avoided and other choices made,
it was not practical to select a route where the President could not be seen from roofs or windows of buildings.
At the two places in Dallas where the President would remain for a period of time, Love Field and the Trade Mart,
arrangements were made for building and roof security by posting police officers where appropriate.
Similar arrangements for a motorcade of ten miles, including many blocks of tall commercial buildings is not practical.
Nor is it practical to prevent people from entering such buildings, or to limit access in every building to those employed or having business there.
Even if it were possible with a vastly larger force of security officers to do so, many observers have felt
that such a procedure would not be consistent with the nature and purpose of the motorcade to let the people see their President and to welcome him to their city.
In accordance with its regular procedures, no survey or other check was made by the Secret Service, or by any other law enforcement agency at its request,
of the Texas School Book Depository Building or those employed there prior to the time the President was shot. End quote.
This justification of the Secret Service's standing policy is not persuasive.
The danger from a concealed sniper on the Dallas trip was of concern to those who had considered the problem.
President Kennedy himself had mentioned it that morning, as had Agent Sorrels when he and Agent Lawson were fixing the motorcade route.
Admittedly, protective measures cannot ordinarily be taken with regard to all buildings along a motorcade route.
Levels of risk can be determined, however, as has been confirmed by building surveys made since the assassination for the Department of the Treasury.
An attempt to cover only the most obvious points of possible ambush along the route in Dallas might well have included the Texas School Book Depository Building.
Instead of such advance precautions, the Secret Service depended in part on the efforts of local law enforcement personnel stationed along the route.
In addition, Secret Service agents riding in the motorcade were trained to scan buildings as part of their general observation of the crowd of spectators.
These substitute measures were of limited value. Agent Lawson was unable to state whether he had actually instructed
the Dallas police to scan windows of buildings lining the motorcade route, although it was his usual practice to do so.
If such instructions were in fact given, they were not effectively carried out.
Television films taken of parts of the motorcade by a Dallas television station
show the foot patrolmen facing the passing motorcade, and not the adjacent crowds and buildings, as the procession passed.
Three officers from the Dallas Police Department were assigned to the intersection of Elm and Houston
during the morning of November 22 prior to the motorcade.
All received their instructions early in the morning from Capt. P. W. Lawrence of the traffic division.
According to Captain Lawrence, quote,
I then told the officers that their primary duty was traffic and crowd control and that they should be alert for any persons who might attempt to throw anything
and although it was not a violation of the law to carry a placard, that they were not to tolerate any actions such as the Stevenson incident
and arrest any person who might attempt to throw anything or try to get at the President and his party;
paying particular attention to the crowd for any unusual activity.
I stressed the fact that this was our President and he should be shown every respect due his position and that it was our duty to see that this was done.
End quote. Captain Lawrence was not instructed to have his men watch buildings along the motorcade route and did not mention the observation of buildings to them.
The three officers confirm that their primary concern was crowd and traffic control,
and that they had no opportunity to scan the windows of the Depository or any other building in the vicinity of Elm and Houston when the motorcade was passing.
They had, however, occasionally observed the windows of buildings in the area before the motorcade arrived, in accordance with their own understanding of their function.
As the motorcade approached Elm Street
there were several Secret Service agents in it who shared the responsibility of scanning the windows of nearby buildings.
Agent Sorrels, riding in the lead car, did observe the Texas School Book Depository Building as he passed by,
at least for a sufficient number of seconds to gain a, quote, general impression, end quote, of the lack of any unusual activity.
He was handicapped, however, by the fact that he was riding in a closed car whose roof at times obscured his view.
Lawson, also in the lead car, did not scan any buildings since an important part of his job was to look backward at the President's car.
Lawson stated that he, quote, was looking back a good deal of the time,
watching his car, watching the sides, watching the crowds, giving advice or asking advice from the Chief
and also looking ahead to the known hazards like overpasses, under-passes, railroads, et cetera, end quote.
Agent Roy H. Kellerman, riding in the front seat of the Presidential car,
stated that he scanned the Depository Building, but not sufficiently to be alerted by anything in the windows or on the roof.
The agents in the follow-up car also were expected to scan adjacent buildings.
However, the Commission does not believe that agents stationed in a car behind the Presidential car,
who must concentrate primarily on the possibility of threats from crowds along the route, provide a significant safeguard against dangers in nearby buildings.
Conduct of Secret Service agents in Fort Worth on November 22.
In the early morning hours on November 22, 1963,
in Fort Worth, there occurred a breach of discipline by some members of the Secret Service who were officially traveling with the President.
After the President had retired at his hotel,
nine agents who were off duty went to the nearby Fort Worth Press Club at midnight or slightly thereafter, expecting to obtain food;
they had little opportunity to eat during the day. No food was available at the Press Club.
All of the agents stayed for a drink of beer, or in several cases, a mixed drink.
According to their affidavits, the drinking in no case amounted to more than three glasses of beer or one and a half mixed drinks,
and others who were present say that no agent was inebriated or acted improperly.
The statements of the agents involved are supported by statements of members of the Fort Worth press who accompanied or observed them
and by a Secret Service investigation.
According to their statements, the agents remained at the Press Club for periods varying from 30 minutes to an hour and a half,
and the last agent left the Press Club by 2 a.m.
Two of the nine agents returned to their rooms. The seven others proceeded to an establishment called the Cellar Coffee House,
described by some as a beatnik place and by its manager as, quote, a unique showplace with continuous light entertainment all night
serving only coffee, fruit juices and no hard liquors or beer, end quote.
There is no indication that any of the agents who visited the Cellar Coffee House had any intoxicating drink at that establishment.
Most of the agents were there from about 1:30 or 1:45 a.m. to about 2:45 or 3 a.m.;
one agent was there from 2 until 5 a.m.
The lobby of the hotel and the areas adjacent to the quarters of the President were guarded during the night
by members of the midnight to 8 a.m. shift of the White House detail.
These agents were each relieved for a half hour break during the night.
Three members of this shift separately took this opportunity to visit the Cellar Coffee House.
Only one stayed as long as a half hour, and none had any beverage there.
Chief Rowley testified that agents on duty in such a situation usually stay within the building during their relief,
but that their visits to the Cellar were, quote, neither consistent nor inconsistent, end quote, with their duty.
Each of the agents who visited the Press Club or the Cellar Coffee House (apart from the three members of the midnight shift)
had duty assignments beginning no later than 8 a.m. that morning.
President Kennedy was scheduled to speak across the street from his hotel in Fort Worth at 8:30 a.m.
and then at a breakfast, after which the entourage would proceed to Dallas.
In Dallas, one of the nine agents was assigned to assist in security measures at Love Field, and four had protective assignments at the Trade Mart.
The remaining four had key responsibilities as members of the complement of the follow-up car in the motorcade.
Three of these agents occupied positions on the running boards of the car, and the fourth was seated in the car.
The supervisor of each of the off-duty agents who visited the Press Club or the Cellar Coffee House
advised, in the course of the Secret Service investigation of these events, that each agent reported for duty on time,
with full possession of his mental and physical capabilities and entirely ready for the performance of his assigned duties. Chief Rowley testified that,
as a result of the investigation he ordered, he was satisfied that each of the agents performed his duties in an entirely satisfactory manner
and that their conduct the night before did not impede their actions on duty
or in the slightest way prevent them from taking any action that might have averted the tragedy.
However, Chief Rowley did not condone the action of the off-duty agents, particularly since it violated a regulation of the Secret Service,
which provides, quote, Liquor, use of
a. Employees are strictly enjoined to refrain from the use of intoxicating liquor
during the hours they are officially employed at their post of duty, or when they may reasonably expect that they may be called upon to perform an official duty.
the special agent is officially employed and should not use liquor, until the completion of all of his official duties for the day,
after which time a very moderate use of liquor will not be considered a violation. However, all members of the White House Detail
and special agents cooperating with them on Presidential and similar protective assignments are considered to be subject to call for official duty
at any time while in travel status.
Therefore, the use of intoxicating liquor of any kind, including beer and wine, by members of the White House Detail
and special agents cooperating with them, or by special agents on similar assignments, while they are in a travel status, is prohibited. End quote.
The regulations provide further that, quote, violation or slight disregard, end quote, of these provisions, quote,
will be cause for removal from the Service, end quote.
Chief Rowley testified
that under ordinary circumstances he would have taken disciplinary action against those agents who had been drinking in clear violation of the regulation.
However, he felt that any disciplinary action might have given rise
to an inference that the violation of the regulation had contributed to the tragic events of November 22.
Since he was convinced that this was not the case, he believed that it would be unfair to the agents and their families to take explicit disciplinary measures.
The Commission recognizes that the responsibilities of members of the White House detail of the Secret Service are arduous.
They work long, hard hours, under very great strain, and must travel frequently.
It might seem harsh to circumscribe their opportunities for relaxation.
Yet their role of protecting the President is so important to the well-being of the country
that it is reasonable to expect them to meet very high standards of personal conduct,
so that nothing can interfere with their bringing to their task the finest qualities and maximum resources of mind and body.
This is the salutary goal to which the Secret Service regulation is directed,
when it absolutely forbids drinking by any agent accompanying the President on a trip.
Nor is this goal served when agents remain out until early morning hours, and lose the opportunity to get a reasonable amount of sleep.
It is conceivable that those men who had little sleep, and who had consumed alcoholic beverages, even in limited quantities,
might have been more alert in the Dallas motorcade if they had retired promptly in Fort Worth.
However, there is no evidence that these men failed to take any action in Dallas within their power that would have averted the tragedy.
Chapter 8. The Protection of the President. Part 4.
The motorcade in Dallas.
Rigorous security precautions had been arranged at Love Field with the local law enforcement authorities by Agents Sorrels and Lawson.
These precautions included reserving a ceremonial area for the Presidential party,
stationing police on the rooftops of all buildings overlooking the reception area,
and detailing police in civilian clothes to be scattered throughout the sizable crowd.
When President and Mrs. Kennedy shook hands with members of the public along the fences surrounding the reception area, they were closely guarded by Secret Service agents
who responded to the unplanned event with dispatch.
As described in chapter 2, the President directed that his car stop on two occasions during the motorcade so that he could greet members of the public.
At these stops, agents from the Presidential follow-up car stood between the President and the public,
and on one occasion Agent Kellerman left the front seat of the President's car to take a similar position.
The Commission regards such impromptu stops as presenting an unnecessary danger,
but finds that the Secret Service agents did all that could have been done to take protective measures.
The limousine used by President Kennedy in Dallas was a convertible with a detachable, rigid plastic "bubble" top
which was neither bulletproof nor bullet resistant.
The last Presidential vehicle with any protection against small-arms fire left the White House in 1953.
It was not then replaced because the state of the art did not permit the development of a bulletproof top of sufficiently light weight
to permit its removal on those occasions when the President wished to ride in an open car.
The Secret Service believed that it was very doubtful that any President would ride regularly in a vehicle with a fixed top, even though transparent.
Since the assassination, the Secret Service, with the assistance of other Federal agencies and of private industry,
has developed a vehicle for the better protection of the President.
Access to passenger compartment of Presidential car.
On occasion the Secret Service has been permitted to have an agent riding in the passenger compartment with the President.
Presidents have made it clear, however, that they did not favor this or any other arrangement which interferes with the privacy of the President and his guests.
The Secret Service has therefore suggested this practice only on extraordinary occasions.
Without attempting to prescribe or recommend specific measures which should be employed for the future protection of Presidents,
the Commission does believe that there are aspects of the protective measures employed in the motorcade at Dallas which deserve special comment.
The Presidential vehicle in use in Dallas, described in chapter 2,
had no special design or equipment which would have permitted the Secret Service agent riding in the driver's compartment
to move into the passenger section without hindrance or delay. Had the vehicle been so designed it is possible that an agent riding in the front seat
could have reached the President in time to protect him from the second and fatal shot to hit the President.
However, such access to the President was interfered with both by the metal bar some 15 inches above the back of the front seat
and by the passengers in the jump seats.
In contrast, the Vice Presidential vehicle, although not specially designed for that purpose,
had no passenger in a jump seat between Agent Youngblood and Vice President Johnson to interfere with Agent Youngblood's ability
to take a protective position in the passenger compartment before the third shot was fired.
The assassination suggests that it would have been of prime importance
in the protection of the President if the Presidential car permitted immediate access to the President by a Secret Service agent at the first sign of danger.
At that time the agents on the framing boards of the follow-up car were expected to perform such a function.
However, these agents could not reach the President's car when it was traveling at an appreciable rate of speed.
Even if the car is traveling more slowly, the delay involved in reaching the President may be crucial.
It is clear that at the time of the shots in Dallas, Agent Clinton J. Hill leaped to the President's rescue as quickly as humanly possible.
Even so, analysis of the motion picture films taken by amateur photographer Zapruder
reveals that Hill first placed his hand on the Presidential car at frame 343, 30 frames
and therefore approximately 1.6 seconds after the President was shot in the head.
About 3.7 seconds after the President received this wound,
Hill had both feet on the car and was climbing aboard to assist President and Mrs. Kennedy.
Planning for motorcade contingencies.
of emergency procedures to be taken in a contingency such as that which actually occurred, the Secret Service responded, quote,
The Secret Service has consistently followed two general principles in emergencies involving the President.
All agents are so instructed.
The first duty of the agents in the motorcade is to attempt to cover the President as closely as possible and practicable
and to shield him by attempting to place themselves between the President and any source of danger.
Secondly, agents are instructed to remove the President as quickly as possible from known or impending danger.
Agents are instructed that it is not their responsibility to investigate or evaluate a present danger,
but to consider any untoward circumstances as serious and to afford the President maximum protection at all times.
No responsibility rests upon those agents near the President for the identification or arrest of any assassin or an attacker.
Their primary responsibility is to stay with and protect the President.
Beyond these two principles the Secret Service believes a detailed contingency or emergency plan is not feasible
because the variations possible preclude effective planning.
A number of steps are taken, however, to permit appropriate steps to be taken in an emergency.
For instance, the lead car always is manned by Secret Service agents familiar with the area and with local law enforcement officials;
the radio net in use in motorcades is elaborate and permits a number of different means of communication with various local points.
A doctor is in the motorcade.
This basic approach to the problem of planning for emergencies is sound.
Any effort to prepare detailed contingency plans might well have the undesirable effect of inhibiting quick and imaginative responses.
If the advance preparation is thorough, and the protective devices and techniques employed are sound,
those in command should be able to direct the response appropriate to the emergency. The Commission finds that the Secret Service agents in the motorcade
who were immediately responsible for the President's safety reacted promptly at the time the shots were fired.
Their actions demonstrate that the President and the Nation can expect courage and devotion to duty from the agents of the Secret Service.
The Commission's review of the provisions for Presidential protection at the time of President Kennedy's trip to Dallas demonstrates the need for substantial improvements.
Since the assassination, the Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury
have properly taken the initiative in reexamining major aspects of Presidential protection.
Many changes have already been made and others are contemplated, some of them in response to the Commission's questions and informal suggestions.
Assassination a Federal Crime
There was no Federal criminal jurisdiction over the assassination of President Kennedy.