human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent authors and hyperedges represent groups of authors who co-authored the same paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "Practical leakage-resilient pseudorandom generators"
  Abstract: Cryptographic systems and protocols are the core of many Internet security procedures (such as SSL, SSH, IPSEC, DNSSEC, secure mail, etc.). At the heart of all cryptographic functions is a good source of randomness, and for efficiency, the primitive of pseudorandom generator (PRG). PRG can also be used in the design of stream ciphers, for secure communications. The Internet is nowadays composed of many types of devices with very different hardware and software characteristics. Hence, one of the concerns in such open environments is the information "leakage" and its exploitation via the so-called "side channel attacks".   A very extensive and current research direction is designing basic cryptographic operations that are resistant to such attacks. Recent works on leakage-resilient PRG and stream ciphers did significant progresses in providing tools for the analysis of side-channel attacks in the standard cryptographic setting. But in the absence of a completely sound model for the leakages, the only constructions that can be proven secure require tweaks that do not correspond to the physical intuition. For example, constructions using an alternating structure, in which a key bit-size of $2n$ can only guarantee a security of at most $2^n$, have been designed for this purpose.   In this paper, we provide two methodological contributions, allowing to get rid of these tweaks, or to reduce their impact towards negligible performance overheads. First, we show that the leakage-resilience of a natural, i.e. conform to engineering experience, stateful PRG can be proven under a random oracle based assumption. We then discuss the relevance of this assumption, and argue that it nicely captures the reality of actual side-channel attacks. Second, we provide the first construction of a PRG without alternating structure, that exploits the keying material to its full length and that can be proven leakage-resilient in the standard model. For this purpose, we only need to assume a non adaptive leakage function and a small public memory. We also argue that such an assumption is not only realistic, but necessary for any leakage-resilient primitive that grants adversaries with a (stateless) reinitialization capability. Together with weaker requirements for practical implementations, these contributions further reduce the gap between the theory and practice of physically observable cryptography.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "Towards Fresh Re-Keying with Leakage-Resilient PRFs: Cipher Design Principles and Analysis"):
  with members:
    - "On the Security of Fresh Re-keying to Counteract Side-Channel and Fault Attacks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "Public-Key Encryption Schemes with Auxiliary Inputs"):
  with members:
    - "Exposure-resilient functions and all-or-nothing transforms"
    - "Dual projective hashing and its applications -- lossy trapdoor functions and more"

Question: Please tell me which research area the center author belongs to. The 4 classes are: Computer science, Mathematics, Engineering, Economics, Psychology, Business. Directly output the class name.

gpt: Computer science