human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent authors and hyperedges represent groups of authors who co-authored the same paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "Evaluation of anonymity and confidentiality protocols using theorem proving"
  Abstract: Anonymity and confidentiality protocols constitute crucial parts in many network applications as they ensure anonymous communications between entities in a network or provide security in insecure communication channels. Evaluating the properties of these protocols is therefore of paramount importance, especially in the case of safety-critical applications. However, traditional analysis techniques, like simulation, cannot ascertain accurate analysis in this domain. We propose to overcome this limitation by conducting an information leakage analysis of anonymity and cryptographic protocols within the trusted kernel of a higher-order-logic theorem prover. For this purpose, we first introduce two novel measures of information leakage, namely the information leakage degree and the conditional information leakage degree and then present a higher-order-logic formalization of information measures and the underlying required theories of measure, probability and information. For illustration purposes, we use the proposed framework to evaluate the security properties of the one-time pad encryption system as well as the properties of an anonymity-based single MIX. We show how this formal analysis allowed us to find a counter-example for a theorem that was reported in the literature to describe the leakage properties of this single MIX.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "Measuring anonymity with relative entropy"):
  with members:
    - "Anonymity protocols as noisy channels"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "Language-based information-flow security"):
  with members:
    - "Semantics and Program Analysis of Computationally Secure Information Flow"
    - "Abstract non-interference: parameterizing non-interference by abstract interpretation"
    - "Securing web application code by static analysis and runtime protection"
    - "An Information Flow Monitor-Inlining Compiler for Securing a Core of JavaScript"
    - "Better security and privacy for web browsers: a survey of techniques, and a new implementation"
    - "Taint analysis of security code in the KLEE symbolic execution engine"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "Anonymity protocols as noisy channels"):
  with members:
    - "Measuring anonymity with relative entropy"

Question: Please tell me which research area the center author belongs to. The 4 classes are: Computer science, Mathematics, Engineering, Economics, Psychology, Business. Directly output the class name.

gpt: Computer science