human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent authors and hyperedges represent groups of authors who co-authored the same paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness"
  Abstract: Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has received little attention here so far. In this setting, the agents may have different preferences that often must be aggregated using voting. This leads to interesting issues because what, if any, information should be elicited from an agent depends on what other agents have revealed about their preferences so far. In this paper we study effective elicitation, and its impediments, for the most common voting protocols. It turns out that in the Single Transferable Vote protocol, even knowing when to terminate elicitation is  N P -complete, while this is easy for all the other protocols under study. Even for these protocols, determining how to elicit effectively is  N P -complete, even with perfect suspicions about how the agents will vote. The exception is the Plurality protocol where such effective elicitation is easy. We also show that elicitation introduces additional opportunities for strategic manipulation by the voters. We demonstrate how to curtail the space of elicitation schemes so that no such additional strategic issues arise.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "On merging strategy-proofness"):
  with members:
    - "Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems"):
  with members:
    - "i Bundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction"
    - "On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions"
    - "Frugal path mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"):
  with members:
    - "Computing shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains"
    - "AI’s War on Manipulation: Are We Winning?"
    - "Strategyproof approximations of distance rationalizable voting rules"
    - "On merging strategy-proofness"

Question: Please tell me which research area the center author belongs to. The 4 classes are: Computer science, Mathematics, Engineering, Economics, Psychology, Business. Directly output the class name.

gpt: Computer science