human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"
  Abstract: We study the complexity of Destructive Shift Bribery. In this problem, we are given an election with a set of candidates and a set of voters (each ranking the candidates from the best to the worst), a despised candidate $d$, a budget $B$, and prices for shifting $d$ back in the voters' rankings. The goal is to ensure that $d$ is not a winner of the election. We show that this problem is polynomial-time solvable for scoring protocols (encoded in unary), the Bucklin and Simplified Bucklin rules, and the Maximin rule, but is NP-hard for the Copeland rule. This stands in contrast to the results for the constructive setting (known from the literature), for which the problem is polynomial-time solvable for $k$-Approval family of rules, but is NP-hard for the Borda, Copeland, and Maximin rules. We complement the analysis of the Copeland rule showing W-hardness for the parameterization by the budget value, and by the number of affected voters. We prove that the problem is W-hard when parameterized by the number of voters even for unit prices. From the positive perspective we provide an efficient algorithm for solving the problem parameterized by the combined parameter the number of candidates and the maximum bribery price (alternatively the number of different bribery prices).

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "local distance restricted bribery in voting"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying framework for manipulation problems"
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "approximation algorithms for campaign management"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "very hard electoral control problems"
    - "distributed monitoring of election winners"
    - "committee scoring rules axiomatic characterization and hierarchy"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "towards computing victory margins in stv elections"
    - "voting and bribing in single exponential time"
    - "axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "approval voting with intransitive preferences"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "how credible is the prediction of a party based election"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the complexity of manipulating k approval elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "towards computing victory margins in stv elections"):
  with members:
    - "auditing australian senate ballots"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "how many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"):
  with members:
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence)