human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "markets for public decision making"
  Abstract: A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with multiple possible alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a preferred alternative for each issue. We study adaptations of market economies to this setting, focusing on binary issues. Issues have prices, and each agent is endowed with artificial currency that she can use to purchase probability for her preferred alternatives (we allow randomized outcomes). We first show that when each issue has a single price that is common to all agents, market equilibria can be arbitrarily bad. This negative result motivates a different approach. We present a novel technique called "pairwise issue expansion", which transforms any public decision-making instance into an equivalent Fisher market, the simplest type of private goods market. This is done by expanding each issue into many goods: one for each pair of agents who disagree on that issue. We show that the equilibrium prices in the constructed Fisher market yield a "pairwise pricing equilibrium" in the original public decision-making problem which maximizes Nash welfare. More broadly, pairwise issue expansion uncovers a powerful connection between the public decision-making and private goods settings; this immediately yields several interesting results about public decisions markets, and furthers the hope that we will be able to find a simple iterative voting protocol that leads to near-optimum decisions.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "participatory budgeting models and approaches"):
  with members:
    - "truthful aggregation of budget proposals"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "iterative local voting for collective decision making in continuous spaces"
    - "the impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "proportionally fair clustering"):
  with members:
    - "fair algorithms for clustering"
    - "privacy preserving clustering with constraints"
    - "fair clustering through fairlets"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "on fairness and calibration"
    - "preventing fairness gerrymandering auditing and learning for subgroup fairness"
    - "algorithmic decision making and the cost of fairness"
    - "semantics derived automatically from language corpora contain human like biases"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "computing large market equilibria using abstractions"):
  with members:
    - "deep counterfactual regret minimization"
    - "maintaining cooperation in complex social dilemmas using deep reinforcement learning"
    - "pacing equilibrium in first price auction markets"
    - "billion scale similarity search with gpus"
    - "deepstack expert level artificial intelligence in heads up no limit poker"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"
    - "imperfect recall abstractions with bounds in games"
    - "no regret learning in extensive form games with imperfect recall"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "truthful aggregation of budget proposals"):
  with members:
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "iterative local voting for collective decision making in continuous spaces"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "strategyproof approximation mechanisms for location on networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "optimal nash equilibria for bandwidth allocation"):
  with members:
    - "markets beyond nash welfare for leontief utilities"
    - "nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents"
    - "nash equilibria in fisher market"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)