human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "bayesian auctions with efficient queries"
  Abstract: Generating good revenue is one of the most important problems in Bayesian auction design, and many (approximately) optimal dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) Bayesian mechanisms have been constructed for various auction settings. However, most existing studies do not consider the complexity for the seller to carry out the mechanism. It is assumed that the seller knows "each single bit" of the distributions and is able to optimize perfectly based on the entire distributions. Unfortunately, this is a strong assumption and may not hold in reality: for example, when the value distributions have exponentially large supports or do not have succinct representations. #R##N#In this work we consider, for the first time, the query complexity of Bayesian mechanisms. We only allow the seller to have limited oracle accesses to the players' value distributions, via quantile queries and value queries. For a large class of auction settings, we prove logarithmic lower-bounds for the query complexity for any DSIC Bayesian mechanism to be of any constant approximation to the optimal revenue. For single-item auctions and multi-item auctions with unit-demand or additive valuation functions, we prove tight upper-bounds via efficient query schemes, without requiring the distributions to be regular or have monotone hazard rate. Thus, in those auction settings the seller needs to access much less than the full distributions in order to achieve approximately optimal revenue.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "robust revenue maximization under minimal statistical information"):
  with members:
    - "revenue maximization with imprecise distribution"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "simple versus optimal contracts"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "a sample complexity measure with applications to learning optimal auctions"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "revenue maximization with imprecise distribution"):
  with members:
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "from bayesian to crowdsourced bayesian auctions"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "putting peer prediction under the micro economic scope and making truth telling focal"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)