human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the gap game"
  Abstract: Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies secure a decentralized consensus protocol by incentives. The protocol participants, called miners, generate (mine) a series of blocks, each containing monetary transactions created by system users. As incentive for participation, miners receive newly minted currency and transaction fees paid by transaction creators. Blockchain bandwidth limits lead users to pay increasing fees in order to prioritize their transactions. However, most prior work focused on models where fees are negligible. In a notable exception, Carlsten et al. [17] postulated that if incentives come only from fees then a mining gap would form~--- miners would avoid mining when the available fees are insufficient. In this work, we analyze cryptocurrency security in realistic settings, taking into account all elements of expenses and rewards. To study when gaps form, we analyze the system as a game we call the gap game. We analyze the game with a combination of symbolic and numeric analysis tools in a wide range of scenarios. Our analysis confirms Carlsten et al.'s postulate; indeed, we show that gaps form well before fees are the only incentive, and analyze the implications on security. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that different miners choose different gap sizes to optimize their utility, even when their operating costs are identical. Alarmingly, we see that the system incentivizes large miner coalitions, reducing system decentralization. We describe the required conditions to avoid the incentive misalignment, providing guidelines for future cryptocurrency design.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "incentive analysis of bitcoin ng revisited"):
  with members:
    - "analysis of nakamoto consensus revisited"
    - "scaling nakamoto consensus to thousands of transactions per second"
    - "ohie blockchain scaling made simple"
    - "enhancing bitcoin security and performance with strong consistency via collective signing"
    - "solida a blockchain protocol based on reconfigurable byzantine consensus"
    - "optimal selfish mining strategies in bitcoin"
    - "bitcoin ng a scalable blockchain protocol"
    - "majority is not enough bitcoin mining is vulnerable"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "coalition safe equilibria with virtual payoffs"):
  with members:
    - "presto a systematic framework for blockchain consensus protocols"
    - "squirrl automating attack discovery on blockchain incentive mechanisms with deep reinforcement learning"
    - "blockchain mining games"
    - "optimal selfish mining strategies in bitcoin"
    - "majority is not enough bitcoin mining is vulnerable"
    - "on bitcoin and red balloons"
    - "an almost surely terminating polynomial protocol for asynchronous byzantine agreement with optimal resilience"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "pricing asics for cryptocurrency mining"):
  with members:
    - "mind the mining"
    - "bitcoin a natural oligopoly"
    - "asicboost a speedup for bitcoin mining"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a survey on applications of game theory in blockchain"):
  with members:
    - "a survey on consensus mechanisms and mining strategy management in blockchain networks"
    - "security services using blockchains a state of the art survey"
    - "blockchain governance game"
    - "exchange of renewable energy among prosumers using blockchain with dynamic pricing"
    - "game of coins"
    - "delayed blockchain protocols"
    - "reward sharing schemes for stake pools"
    - "a survey on the security of blockchain systems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "sok tools for game theoretic models of security for cryptocurrencies"):
  with members:
    - "oceanic games centralization risks and incentives in blockchain mining"
    - "a survey on consensus mechanisms and mining strategy management in blockchain networks"
    - "selfish mining in ethereum"
    - "impossibility of full decentralization in permissionless blockchains"
    - "squirrl automating attack discovery on blockchain incentive mechanisms with deep reinforcement learning"
    - "an axiomatic approach to block rewards"
    - "reward sharing schemes for stake pools"
    - "compounding of wealth in proof of stake cryptocurrencies"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "bdos blockchain denial of service"):
  with members:
    - "competing semi selfish miners in bitcoin"
    - "bitcoin vs bitcoin cash coexistence or downfall of bitcoin cash"
    - "sok transparent dishonesty front running attacks on blockchain"
    - "selfish mining in ethereum"
    - "just enough security reducing proof of work ecological footprint"
    - "mind the mining"
    - "cryptocurrency egalitarianism a quantitative approach"
    - "flash boys 2 0 frontrunning transaction reordering and consensus instability in decentralized exchanges"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "heb hybrid expenditure blockchain"):
  with members:
    - "mind the mining"
    - "squirrl automating attack discovery on blockchain incentive mechanisms with deep reinforcement learning"
    - "an axiomatic approach to block rewards"
    - "sbft a scalable and decentralized trust infrastructure"
    - "sbft a scalable decentralized trust infrastructure for blockchains"
    - "a survey on security and privacy issues of bitcoin"
    - "bitcoin a natural oligopoly"
    - "be selfish and avoid dilemmas fork after withholding faw attacks on bitcoin"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "strongchain transparent and collaborative proof of work consensus"):
  with members:
    - "decentralization in bitcoin and ethereum networks"
    - "short paper towards more reliable bitcoin timestamps"
    - "the impact of uncle rewards on selfish mining in ethereum"
    - "enhancing bitcoin security and performance with strong consistency via collective signing"
    - "optimal selfish mining strategies in bitcoin"
    - "bitcoin ng a scalable blockchain protocol"
    - "on subversive miner strategies and block withholding attack in bitcoin digital currency"
    - "the miner s dilemma"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)