human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"
  Abstract: Speculative execution which is used pervasively in modern CPUs can leave side effects in the processor caches and other structures even when the speculated instructions do not commit and their direct effect is not visible. The recent Meltdown and Spectre attacks have shown that this behavior can be exploited to expose privileged information to an unprivileged attacker. In particular, the attack forces the speculative execution of a code gadget that will carry out the illegal read, which eventually gets squashed, but which leaves a side-channel trail that can be used by the attacker to infer the value. Several attack variations are possible, allowing arbitrary exposure of the full kernel memory to an unprivileged attacker. In this paper, we introduce a new model (SafeSpec) for supporting speculation in a way that is immune to side-channel leakage necessary for attacks such as Meltdown and Spectre. In particular, SafeSpec stores side effects of speculation in a way that is not visible to the attacker while the instructions are speculative. The speculative state is then either committed to the main CPU structures if the branch commits, or squashed if it does not, making all direct side effects of speculative code invisible. The solution must also address the possibility of a covert channel from speculative instructions to committed instructions before these instructions are committed. We show that SafeSpec prevents all three variants of Spectre and Meltdown, as well as new variants that we introduce. We also develop a cycle accurate model of modified design of an x86-64 processor and show that the performance impact is negligible. We build prototypes of the hardware support in a hardware description language to show that the additional overhead is small. We believe that SafeSpec completely closes this class of attacks, and that it is practical to implement.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "context leakage free transient execution"):
  with members:
    - "fallout reading kernel writes from user space"
    - "spectre is here to stay an analysis of side channels and speculative execution"
    - "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus"
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "meltdownprime and spectreprime automatically synthesized attacks exploiting invalidation based coherence protocols"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "speccfi mitigating spectre attacks using cfi informed speculation"):
  with members:
    - "context leakage free transient execution"
    - "smotherspectre exploiting speculative execution through port contention"
    - "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus"
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "you shall not bypass employing data dependencies to prevent bounds check bypass"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "specfuzz bringing spectre type vulnerabilities to the surface"):
  with members:
    - "context leakage free transient execution"
    - "specusym speculative symbolic execution for cache timing leak detection"
    - "spectre is here to stay an analysis of side channels and speculative execution"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "you shall not bypass employing data dependencies to prevent bounds check bypass"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "smotherspectre exploiting speculative execution through port contention"):
  with members:
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "automated instruction stream throughput prediction for intel and amd microarchitectures"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"
    - "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers"
    - "a systematic evaluation of transient execution attacks and defenses"
    - "flush flush a fast and stealthy cache attack"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "leaking information through cache lru states"):
  with members:
    - "memjam a false dependency attack against constant time crypto implementations"
    - "smotherspectre exploiting speculative execution through port contention"
    - "reload refresh abusing cache replacement policies to perform stealthy cache attacks"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "meltdownprime and spectreprime automatically synthesized attacks exploiting invalidation based coherence protocols"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"
    - "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "new attacks and defenses for randomized caches"):
  with members:
    - "dr sgx automated and adjustable side channel protection for sgx using data location randomization"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"
    - "a software approach to defeating side channels in last level caches"
    - "flush flush a fast and stealthy cache attack"
    - "flush flush a fast and stealthy cache attack"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "muontrap preventing cross domain spectre like attacks by capturing speculative state"):
  with members:
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "a systematic evaluation of transient execution attacks and defenses"):
  with members:
    - "smotherspectre exploiting speculative execution through port contention"
    - "spoiler speculative load hazards boost rowhammer and cache attacks"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "you shall not bypass employing data dependencies to prevent bounds check bypass"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)