human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "stable marriage with groups of similar agents"
  Abstract: Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to design efficient algorithms using elementary techniques. We focus on the setting in which all agents involved in some matching problem can be partitioned into k different types, where the type of an agent determines his or her preferences, and agents have preferences over types (which may be refined by more detailed preferences within a single type). This situation would arise in practice if agents form preferences solely based on some small collection of agents’ attributes. We also consider a generalisation in which each agent may consider some small collection of other agents to be exceptional, and rank these in a way that is not consistent with their types; this could happen in practice if agents have prior contact with a small number of candidates. We show that (for the case without exceptions), the well-known NP-hard matching problem Max SMTI (that of finding the maximum cardinality stable matching in an instance of stable marriage with ties and incomplete lists) belongs to the parameterised complexity class FPT when parameterised by the number of different types of agents needed to describe the instance. This tractability result can be extended to the setting in which each agent promotes at most one “exceptional” candidate to the top of his/her list (when preferences within types are not refined), but the problem remains NP-hard if preference lists can contain two or more exceptions and the exceptional candidates can be placed anywhere in the preference lists.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "stable roommates with narcissistic single peaked and single crossing preferences"):
  with members:
    - "matchings under preferences strength of stability and trade offs"
    - "stable marriage with multi modal preferences"
    - "how hard is it to satisfy almost all roommates"
    - "balanced stable marriage how close is close enough"
    - "stable marriage with covering constraints a complete computational trichotomy"
    - "modeling single peakedness for votes with ties"
    - "single peaked consistency for weak orders is easy"
    - "clone structures in voters preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "parameterized complexity of stable roommates with ties and incomplete lists through the lens of graph parameters"):
  with members:
    - "sat encodings for treecut width and treedepth"
    - "stable marriage with multi modal preferences"
    - "on treewidth and stable marriage"
    - "how hard is it to satisfy almost all roommates"
    - "the stable roommates problem with short lists"
    - "stable marriage with covering constraints a complete computational trichotomy"
    - "acyclic preference systems in p2p networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "how hard is it to satisfy almost all roommates"):
  with members:
    - "stable marriage with multi modal preferences"
    - "balanced stable marriage how close is close enough"
    - "the stable roommates problem with short lists"
    - "stable marriage with covering constraints a complete computational trichotomy"
    - "almost optimal cover free families"
    - "linear time constructions of some d restriction problems"
    - "designing fpt algorithms for cut problems using randomized contractions"
    - "acyclic preference systems in p2p networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "balanced stable marriage how close is close enough"):
  with members:
    - "on treewidth and stable marriage"
    - "how hard is it to satisfy almost all roommates"
    - "on parameterized complexity of group activity selection problems on social networks"
    - "group activity selection on social networks"
    - "stable marriage with covering constraints a complete computational trichotomy"
    - "raising the bar for vertex cover fixed parameter tractability above a higher guarantee"
    - "parameterized algorithmics for computational social choice nine research challenges"
    - "faster parameterized algorithms using linear programming"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)