human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
  Abstract: We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen, and assume that agents have additive utilities across elements. Our model generalizes existing frameworks such as fair public decision making and participatory budgeting. We study a groupwise fairness notion called the core, which generalizes well-studied notions of proportionality and Pareto efficiency, and requires that each subset of agents must receive an outcome that is fair relative to its size. #R##N#In contrast to the case of divisible public goods (where fractional allocations are permitted), the core is not guaranteed to exist when allocating indivisible public goods. Our primary contributions are the notion of an additive approximation to the core (with a tiny multiplicative loss), and polynomial time algorithms that achieve a small additive approximation, where the additive factor is relative to the largest utility of an agent for an element. If the feasibility constraints define a matroid, we show an additive approximation of 2. A similar approach yields a constant additive bound when the feasibility constraints define a matching. More generally, if the feasibility constraints define an arbitrary packing polytope with mild restrictions, we show an additive guarantee that is logarithmic in the width of the polytope. Our algorithms are based on variants of the convex program for maximizing the Nash social welfare, but differ significantly from previous work in how it is used. Our guarantees are meaningful even when there are fewer elements than the number of agents. As far as we are aware, our work is the first to approximate the core in indivisible settings.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "participatory budgeting models and approaches"):
  with members:
    - "truthful aggregation of budget proposals"
    - "markets for public decision making"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "iterative local voting for collective decision making in continuous spaces"
    - "the impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "proportionally fair clustering"):
  with members:
    - "fair algorithms for clustering"
    - "privacy preserving clustering with constraints"
    - "markets for public decision making"
    - "fair clustering through fairlets"
    - "on fairness and calibration"
    - "preventing fairness gerrymandering auditing and learning for subgroup fairness"
    - "algorithmic decision making and the cost of fairness"
    - "semantics derived automatically from language corpora contain human like biases"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on the fairness of time critical influence maximization in social networks"):
  with members:
    - "group fairness in influence maximization"
    - "learning optimal and fair decision trees for non discriminative decision making"
    - "gaps in information access in social networks"
    - "a unified approach to quantifying algorithmic unfairness measuring individual group unfairness via inequality indices"
    - "equality of voice towards fair representation in crowdsourced top k recommendations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "proportionally representative participatory budgeting with ordinal preferences"):
  with members:
    - "a framework for approval based budgeting methods"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "rank maximal equal contribution a probabilistic social choice function"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "group fairness in influence maximization"):
  with members:
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "multi objective maximization of monotone submodular functions with cardinality constraint"
    - "diverse weighted bipartite b matching"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"
    - "stochastic submodular maximization the case of coverage functions"
    - "gradient methods for submodular maximization"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "approximately stable committee selection"):
  with members:
    - "proportionally fair clustering"
    - "group fairness in committee selection"
    - "fair knapsack"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "an improved approximation for k median and positive correlation in budgeted optimization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "approval based apportionment"):
  with members:
    - "group fairness in committee selection"
    - "monotonicity axioms in approval based multi winner voting rules"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "committees providing ejr can be computed efficiently"
    - "multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "almost group envy free allocation of indivisible goods and chores"):
  with members:
    - "almost envy freeness in group resource allocation"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "greedy algorithms for maximizing nash social welfare"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)