human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "a game theoretic analysis of shard based permissionless blockchains"
  Abstract: Low transaction throughput and poor scalability are significant issues in public blockchain consensus protocols such as Bitcoins. Recent research efforts in this direction have proposed shard-based consensus protocols where the key idea is to split the transactions among multiple committees (or shards), which then process these shards or set of transactions in parallel. Such a parallel processing of disjoint sets of transactions or shards by multiple committees significantly improves the overall scalability and transaction throughout of the system. However, one significant research gap is a lack of understanding of the strategic behavior of rational processors within committees in such shard-based consensus protocols. Such an understanding is critical for designing appropriate incentives that will foster cooperation within committees and prevent free-riding. In this paper, we address this research gap by analyzing the behavior of processors using a game-theoretic model, where each processor aims at maximizing its reward at a minimum cost of participating in the protocol. We first analyze the Nash equilibria in an N-player static game model of the sharding protocol. We show that depending on the reward sharing approach employed, processors can potentially increase their payoff by unilaterally behaving in a defective fashion, thus resulting in a social dilemma. In order to overcome this social dilemma, we propose a novel incentive-compatible reward sharing mechanism to promote cooperation among processors. Our numerical results show that achieving a majority of cooperating processors (required to ensure a healthy state of the blockchain network) is easier to achieve with the proposed incentive-compatible reward sharing mechanism than with other reward sharing mechanisms.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "zero knowledge proof of identity sybil resistant anonymous authentication on permissionless blockchains and incentive compatible strictly dominant cryptocurrencies"):
  with members:
    - "diversification across mining pools optimal mining strategies under pow"
    - "sok tools for game theoretic models of security for cryptocurrencies"
    - "impossibility of full decentralization in permissionless blockchains"
    - "dfinity technology overview series consensus system"
    - "coconut threshold issuance selective disclosure credentials with applications to distributed ledgers"
    - "be selfish and avoid dilemmas fork after withholding faw attacks on bitcoin"
    - "enhancing bitcoin security and performance with strong consistency via collective signing"
    - "keeping authorities honest or bust with decentralized witness cosigning"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "rationals vs byzantines in consensus based blockchains"):
  with members:
    - "hotstuff bft consensus in the lens of blockchain"
    - "blockchain abstract data type"
    - "leader randomization signature free byzantine consensus for consortium blockchains"
    - "enhancing bitcoin security and performance with strong consistency via collective signing"
    - "optimal selfish mining strategies in bitcoin"
    - "bitcoin ng a scalable blockchain protocol"
    - "bitcoin meets strong consistency"
    - "majority is not enough bitcoin mining is vulnerable"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "polyshard coded sharding achieves linearly scaling efficiency and security simultaneously"):
  with members:
    - "speeding up distributed machine learning using codes"
    - "a scale out blockchain for value transfer with spontaneous sharding"
    - "blockclique scaling blockchains through transaction sharding in a multithreaded block graph"
    - "lagrange coded computing optimal design for resiliency security and privacy"
    - "polynomial codes an optimal design for high dimensional coded matrix multiplication"
    - "chainspace a sharded smart contracts platform"
    - "short dot computing large linear transforms distributedly using coded short dot products"
    - "a fundamental tradeoff between computation and communication in distributed computing"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)