human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "integrating remote attestation with transport layer security"
  Abstract: Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) is a promising technology to securely process information in otherwise untrusted environments. An important aspect of Intel SGX is the ability to perform remote attestation to assess the endpoint's trustworthiness. Ultimately, remote attestation will result in an attested secure channel to provision secrets to the enclave. #R##N#We seamlessly combine Intel SGX remote attestation with the establishment of a standard Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection. Remote attestation is performed during the connection setup. To achieve this, we neither change the TLS protocol, nor do we modify existing protocol implementations. #R##N#We have prototype implementations for three widely used open-source TLS libraries: OpenSSL, wolfSSL and mbedTLS. We describe the requirements, design and implementation details to seamlessly bind attested TLS endpoints to Intel SGX enclaves.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "pdot private dns over tls with tee support"):
  with members:
    - "s faas trustworthy and accountable function as a service using intel sgx"
    - "the circle game scalable private membership test using trusted hardware"
    - "the pyramid scheme oblivious ram for trusted processors"
    - "lightbox full stack protected stateful middlebox at lightning speed"
    - "towards plugging privacy leaks in domain name system"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "scanclave verifying application runtime integrity in untrusted environments"):
  with members:
    - "practical enclave malware with intel sgx"
    - "software grand exposure sgx cache attacks are practical"
    - "sprobes enforcing kernel code integrity on the trustzone architecture"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "p2faas toward privacy preserving fuzzing as a service"):
  with members:
    - "chiron privacy preserving machine learning as a service"
    - "inferring fine grained control flow inside sgx enclaves with branch shadowing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "privado practical and secure dnn inference with enclaves"):
  with members:
    - "chiron privacy preserving machine learning as a service"
    - "mlcapsule guarded offline deployment of machine learning as a service"
    - "chameleon a hybrid secure computation framework for machine learning applications"
    - "tapas tricks to accelerate encrypted prediction as a service"
    - "efficient deep learning on multi source private data"
    - "gazelle a low latency framework for secure neural network inference"
    - "squeezenet alexnet level accuracy with 50x fewer parameters and 0 5mb model size"
    - "software grand exposure sgx cache attacks are practical"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "s faas trustworthy and accountable function as a service using intel sgx"):
  with members:
    - "ekiden a platform for confidentiality preserving trustworthy and performant smart contracts"
    - "sgxpectre stealing intel secrets from sgx enclaves via speculative execution"
    - "private data objects an overview"
    - "sgx aware container orchestration for heterogeneous clusters"
    - "software grand exposure sgx cache attacks are practical"
    - "inferring fine grained control flow inside sgx enclaves with branch shadowing"
    - "proof of luck an efficient blockchain consensus protocol"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "it takes two to metoo using enclaves to build autonomous trusted systems"):
  with members:
    - "hyperledger fabric a distributed operating system for permissioned blockchains"
    - "inferring fine grained control flow inside sgx enclaves with branch shadowing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "securing the storage data path with sgx enclaves"):
  with members:
    - "lightbox full stack protected stateful middlebox at lightning speed"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)