human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "folding alternant and goppa codes with non trivial automorphism groups"
  Abstract: The main practical limitation of the McEliece public-key encryption scheme is probably the size of its key. A famous trend to overcome this issue is to focus on subclasses of alternant/Goppa codes with a non trivial automorphism group. Such codes display then symmetries allowing compact parity-check or generator matrices. For instance, a key-reduction is obtained by taking quasi-cyclic (QC) or quasi-dyadic (QD) alternant/Goppa codes. We show that the use of such symmetric alternant/Goppa codes in cryptography introduces a fundamental weakness. It is indeed possible to reduce the key-recovery on the original symmetric public-code to the key-recovery on a (much) smaller code that has not anymore symmetries. This result is obtained thanks to a new operation on codes called folding that exploits the knowledge of the automorphism group. This operation consists in adding the coordinates of codewords which belong to the same orbit under the action of the automorphism group. The advantage is twofold: the reduction factor can be as large as the size of the orbits, and it preserves a fundamental property: folding the dual of an alternant (resp. Goppa) code provides the dual of an alternant (resp. Goppa) code. A key point is to show that all the existing constructions of alternant/Goppa codes with symmetries follow a common principal of taking codes whose support is globally invariant under the action of affine transformations (by building upon prior works of T. Berger and A. D{\"{u}}r). This enables not only to present a unified view but also to generalize the construction of QC, QD and even quasi-monoidic (QM) Goppa codes. All in all, our results can be harnessed to boost up any key-recovery attack on McEliece systems based on symmetric alternant or Goppa codes, and in particular algebraic attacks.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "practical algebraic attack on dags"):
  with members:
    - "on the security of some compact keys for mceliece scheme"
    - "an efficient structural attack on nist submission dags"
    - "polynomial time attack on wild mceliece over quadratic extensions"
    - "distinguisher based attacks on public key cryptosystems using reed solomon codes"
    - "a distinguisher based attack on a variant of mceliece s cryptosystem based on reed solomon codes"
    - "a distinguisher based attack of a homomorphic encryption scheme relying on reed solomon codes"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "an efficient structural attack on nist submission dags"):
  with members:
    - "on the security of some compact keys for mceliece scheme"
    - "quantum resistant random linear code based public key encryption scheme rlce"
    - "squares of random linear codes"
    - "a polynomial time attack on the bbcrs scheme"
    - "cryptanalysis of mceliece cryptosystem based on algebraic geometry codes and their subcodes"
    - "polynomial time attack on wild mceliece over quadratic extensions"
    - "security and complexity of the mceliece cryptosystem based on quasi cyclic low density parity check codes"
    - "distinguisher based attacks on public key cryptosystems using reed solomon codes"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "polynomial time attack on wild mceliece over quadratic extensions"):
  with members:
    - "linear independence of rank 1 matrices and the dimension of products of codes"
    - "squares of random linear codes"
    - "a polynomial time attack on the bbcrs scheme"
    - "cryptanalysis of mceliece cryptosystem based on algebraic geometry codes and their subcodes"
    - "cryptanalysis of public key cryptosystems that use subcodes of algebraic geometry codes"
    - "a polynomial time attack against algebraic geometry code based public key cryptosystems"
    - "distinguisher based attacks on public key cryptosystems using reed solomon codes"
    - "an efficient attack of a mceliece cryptosystem variant based on convolutional codes"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.IT(Information Theory)