human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"
  Abstract: We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn from a distribution, the Bayesian optimal mechanism is given by Myerson (1981) as a virtual-surplus optimizer. We develop a framework for prior-free mechanism design and analysis. A good mechanism in our framework approximates the optimal mechanism for the distribution if there is a distribution; moreover, when there is no distribution this mechanism still performs well. #R##N#We define and characterize optimal envy-free outcomes in symmetric single-dimensional environments. Our characterization mirrors Myerson's theory. Furthermore, unlike in mechanism design where there is no point-wise optimal mechanism, there is always a point-wise optimal envy-free outcome. #R##N#Envy-free outcomes and incentive-compatible mechanisms are similar in structure and performance. We therefore use the optimal envy-free revenue as a benchmark for measuring the performance of a prior-free mechanism. A good mechanism is one that approximates the envy free benchmark on any profile of agent values. We show that good mechanisms exist, and in particular, a natural generalization of the random sampling auction of Goldberg et al. (2001) is a constant approximation.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "benchmark design and prior independent optimization"):
  with members:
    - "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "optimal competitive auctions"
    - "optimal platform design"
    - "optimal mechansim design and money burning"
    - "a comparison of performance measures for online algorithms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "muda a truthful multi unit double auction mechanism"):
  with members:
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions for two sided markets"
    - "markets with strategic multi minded mediators"
    - "sbba a strongly budget balanced double auction mechanism"
    - "approximately efficient two sided combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "sample complexity for non truthful mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "bernoulli factories and black box reductions in mechanism design"
    - "efficient empirical revenue maximization in single parameter auction environments"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"
    - "ironing in the dark"
    - "non optimal mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "double auctions in markets for multiple kinds of goods"):
  with members:
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions for two sided markets"
    - "fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade"
    - "approximately efficient two sided combinatorial auctions"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "on random sampling auctions for digital goods"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "ascending auctions and walrasian equilibrium"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "mida a multi item type double auction mechanism"):
  with members:
    - "demand flow of agents with gross substitute valuations"
    - "do prices coordinate markets"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "making the most of your samples"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "ironing in the dark"):
  with members:
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling"
    - "sampling and representation complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "making the most of your samples"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve"
    - "vickrey auctions for irregular distributions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"):
  with members:
    - "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
    - "optimal competitive auctions"
    - "the simple economics of approximately optimal auctions"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing"
    - "sequential posted pricing and multi parameter mechanism design"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "profit maximizing prior free multi unit procurement auctions with capacitated sellers"):
  with members:
    - "optimal competitive auctions"
    - "on random sampling auctions for digital goods"
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)