human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "clinching auctions with online supply"
  Abstract: Auctions for perishable goods such as internet ad inventory need to make real-time allocation and pricing decisions as the supply of the good arrives in an online manner, without knowing the entire supply in advance. These allocation and pricing decisions get complicated when buyers have some global constraints. In this work, we consider a multi-unit model where buyers have global {\em budget} constraints, and the supply arrives in an online manner. Our main contribution is to show that for this setting there is an individually-rational, incentive-compatible and Pareto-optimal auction that allocates these units and calculates prices on the fly, without knowledge of the total supply. We do so by showing that the Adaptive Clinching Auction satisfies a {\em supply-monotonicity} property. #R##N#We also analyze and discuss, using examples, how the insights gained by the allocation and payment rule can be applied to design better ad allocation heuristics in practice. Finally, while our main technical result concerns multi-unit supply, we propose a formal model of online supply that captures scenarios beyond multi-unit supply and has applications to sponsored search. We conjecture that our results for multi-unit auctions can be extended to these more general models.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "polyhedral clinching auctions for two sided markets"):
  with members:
    - "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "on the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism"
    - "expressiveness and robustness of first price position auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "bayesian sequential auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "truthful secretaries with budgets"):
  with members:
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"):
  with members:
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"
    - "general auction mechanism for search advertising"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"):
  with members:
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"
    - "general auction mechanism for search advertising"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "expressiveness and robustness of first price position auctions"):
  with members:
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
    - "general auction mechanism for search advertising"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"):
  with members:
    - "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "on multiple round sponsored search auctions with budgets"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "no justified complaints on fair sharing of multiple resources"
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)