human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
  Abstract: We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints.The classic solution concept for such problems is Walrasian Equilibrium (WE), which provides a simple and transparent pricing structure that achieves optimal social welfare. The main weakness of the WE notion is that it exists only in very restrictive cases. To overcome this limitation, we introduce the notion of a Combinatorial Walrasian equilibium (CWE), a natural relaxation of WE. The difference between a CWE and a (non-combinatorial) WE is that the seller can package the items into indivisible bundles prior to sale, and the market does not necessarily clear. #R##N#We show that every valuation profile admits a CWE that obtains at least half of the optimal (unconstrained) social welfare. Moreover, we devise a poly-time algorithm that, given an arbitrary allocation X, computes a CWE that achieves at least half of the welfare of X. Thus, the economic problem of finding a CWE with high social welfare reduces to the algorithmic problem of social-welfare approximation. In addition, we show that every valuation profile admits a CWE that extracts a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare as revenue. Finally, these results are complemented by strong lower bounds when the seller is restricted to using item prices only, which motivates the use of bundles. The strength of our results derives partly from their generality - our results hold for arbitrary valuations that may exhibit complex combinations of substitutes and complements.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the power and limits of dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets"):
  with members:
    - "a general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets"
    - "combinatorial auctions with endowment effect"
    - "max min greedy matching"
    - "pricing for online resource allocation intervals and paths"
    - "pricing multi unit markets"
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "price doubling and item halving robust revenue guarantees for item pricing"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "pricing in resource allocation games based on lagrangean duality and convexification"):
  with members:
    - "nash and wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints"
    - "sensitivity analysis for convex separable optimization over integral polymatroids"
    - "totally unimodular congestion games"
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
    - "optimal pricing in networks with externalities"
    - "congestion games with variable demands"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "algorithms for competitive division of chores"):
  with members:
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "universal growth in production economies"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"):
  with members:
    - "comparing approximate relaxations of envy freeness"
    - "on fair division of indivisible items"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "satiation in fisher markets and approximation of nash social welfare"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"
    - "nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable piecewise linear concave utilities"
    - "nash social welfare matrix permanent and stable polynomials"
    - "an improved combinatorial polynomial algorithm for the linear arrow debreu market"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets"):
  with members:
    - "combinatorial auctions with endowment effect"
    - "on welfare approximation and stable pricing"
    - "clearing markets via bundles"
    - "welfare and revenue guarantees for competitive bundling equilibrium"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "combinatorial auctions with endowment effect"):
  with members:
    - "the communication complexity of local search"
    - "planning with multiple biases"
    - "on the value of penalties in time inconsistent planning"
    - "the price of uncertainty in present biased planning"
    - "motivating time inconsistent agents a computational approach"
    - "procrastination with variable present bias"
    - "planning problems for sophisticated agents with present bias"
    - "computational issues in time inconsistent planning"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "makespan minimization via posted prices"):
  with members:
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "pricing online decisions beyond auctions"
    - "tight bounds for online vector scheduling"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)