human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
  Abstract: We study the problem of scheduling $m$ tasks to $n$ selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the makespan, where the execution times are independent random variables, identical across machines. We show that the VCG mechanism, which myopically allocates each task to its best machine, achieves an approximation ratio of $O\left(\frac{\ln n}{\ln \ln n}\right)$. This improves significantly on the previously best known bound of $O\left(\frac{m}{n}\right)$ for prior-independent mechanisms, given by Chawla et al. [STOC'13] under the additional assumption of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions. Although we demonstrate that this is in general tight, if we do maintain the MHR assumption, then we get improved, (small) constant bounds for $m\geq n\ln n$ i.i.d. tasks, while we also identify a sufficient condition on the distribution that yields a constant approximation ratio regardless of the number of tasks.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the nisan ronen conjecture for submodular valuations"):
  with members:
    - "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "a unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "optimal pricing for mhr and lambda regular distributions"):
  with members:
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing beyond linear utility"
    - "optimal pricing for mhr distributions"
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "online market intermediation"
    - "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
    - "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"
    - "the anarchy of scheduling without money"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "optimal pricing for mhr distributions"):
  with members:
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "online market intermediation"
    - "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"):
  with members:
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"
    - "an improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines"
    - "a characterization of 2 player mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"):
  with members:
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)