human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources"
  Abstract: We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism, that is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the inefficiency of Nash equilibria by studying the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the induced game under complete and incomplete information. When agents' valuations are concave, we show that the Bayesian Nash equilibria can be arbitrarily inefficient, in contrast to the well-known 4/3 bound for pure equilibria. Next, we upper bound the PoA over Bayesian equilibria by 2 when agents' valuations are subadditive, generalizing and strengthening previous bounds on lattice submodular valuations. Furthermore, we show that this bound is tight and cannot be improved by any simple or scale-free mechanism. Then we switch to settings with budget constraints, and we show an improved upper bound on the PoA over coarse-correlated equilibria. Finally, we prove that the PoA is exactly 2 for pure equilibria in the polyhedral environment.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints"):
  with members:
    - "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "liquid price of anarchy"
    - "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "on the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets"
    - "expressiveness and robustness of first price position auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users"):
  with members:
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "liquid price of anarchy"
    - "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "liquid price of anarchy"):
  with members:
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful multi unit procurements with budgets"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)