human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
  Abstract: We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $m$ heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation $v$ for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some $S, T$, $v(S \cup T)   v(S) + v(T)$). We show that the mechanism first proposed by Babaioff et al. [2014] - the better of selling the items separately and bundling them together - guarantees a $\Theta(d)$ fraction of the optimal revenue, where $d$ is a measure on the degree of complementarity. Note that this is the first approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer whose valuation exhibits any kind of complementarity, and extends the work of Rubinstein and Weinberg [2015], which proved that the same simple mechanisms achieve a constant factor approximation when buyer valuations are subadditive, the most general class of complement-free valuations. #R##N#Our proof is enabled by the recent duality framework developed in Cai et al. [2016], which we use to obtain a bound on the optimal revenue in this setting. Our main technical contributions are specialized to handle the intricacies of settings with complements, and include an algorithm for partitioning edges in a hypergraph. Even nailing down the right model and notion of "degree of complementarity" to obtain meaningful results is of interest, as the natural extensions of previous definitions provably fail.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "the value of information concealment"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "selling two goods optimally"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a simple mechanism for a budget constrained buyer"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "sampling and representation complexity of revenue maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "capturing complementarity in set functions by going beyond submodularity subadditivity"):
  with members:
    - "network essence pagerank completion and centrality conforming markov chains"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "building a good team secretary problems and the supermodular degree"
    - "constrained monotone function maximization and the supermodular degree"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "combinatorial auctions with restricted complements"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "on the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex post ir via bank accounts"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"
    - "on the complexity of dynamic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "pricing multi unit markets"):
  with members:
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "pricing online decisions beyond auctions"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "dynamic pricing with limited supply"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"
    - "selling two goods optimally"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "selling two goods optimally"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "reaping the benefits of bundling under high production costs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "on the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)