human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations"
  Abstract: According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource that is proportional to her bid and collects an amount equal to her bid as payment. Since users act as utility-maximizers, this naturally defines a proportional allocation game. Recently, Syrgkanis and Tardos (STOC 2013) quantified the inefficiency of equilibria in this game with respect to the social welfare and presented a lower bound of 26.8% on the price of anarchy over coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria in the full and incomplete information settings, respectively. In this paper, we improve this bound to 50% over both equilibrium concepts. Our analysis is simpler and, furthermore, we argue that it cannot be improved by arguments that do not take the equilibrium structure into account. We also extend it to settings with budget constraints where we show the first constant bound (between 36% and 50%) on the price of anarchy of the corresponding game with respect to an effective welfare benchmark that takes budgets into account.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints"):
  with members:
    - "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources"
    - "liquid price of anarchy"
    - "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "on the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets"
    - "expressiveness and robustness of first price position auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users"):
  with members:
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources"
    - "liquid price of anarchy"
    - "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "liquid price of anarchy"):
  with members:
    - "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful multi unit procurements with budgets"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "tight bounds for the price of anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions"
    - "on the inefficiency of standard multi unit auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
    - "optimal crowdsourcing contests"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources"):
  with members:
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "tight bounds for the price of anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
    - "a price anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)