human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "to give or not to give fair division for single minded valuations"
  Abstract: Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to fairly serve as many requests as possible. In this paper we study the fair division problem for such agents, which is harder to handle due to discontinuity and complementarities of the preferences. #R##N#Our solution concept---the competitive allocation from equal incomes (CAEI)---is inspired from market equilibria and implements fair outcomes through a pricing mechanism. We study the existence and computation of CAEI for multiple divisible goods, cake cutting, and multiple discrete goods. For the first two scenarios we show that existence of CAEI solutions is guaranteed, while for the third we give a succinct characterization of instances that admit this solution; then we give an efficient algorithm to find one in all three cases. Maximizing social welfare turns out to be NP-hard in general, however we obtain efficient algorithms for (i) divisible and discrete goods when the number of different \emph{types} of players is a constant, (ii) cake cutting with contiguous demands, for which we establish an interesting connection with interval scheduling, and (iii) cake cutting with a constant number of players with arbitrary demands. #R##N#Our solution is useful more generally, when the players have a target set of desired goods, and very small positive values for any bundle not containing their target set.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "algorithms for competitive division of chores"):
  with members:
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "universal growth in production economies"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes existence and fairness"):
  with members:
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "competitive equilibrium with generic budgets beyond additive"
    - "monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake cutting"
    - "negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "the complexity of cake cutting with unequal shares"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the query complexity of cake cutting"):
  with members:
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "consensus halving is ppa complete"
    - "resource monotonicity and population monotonicity in connected cake cutting"
    - "fair division of a graph"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"
    - "characterization and computation of equilibria for indivisible goods"
    - "the complexity of fairness through equilibrium"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes"):
  with members:
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "characterization and computation of equilibria for indivisible goods"
    - "competitive equilibrium with equal incomes for allocation of indivisible objects"
    - "the complexity of fairness through equilibrium"
    - "a social welfare optimal sequential allocation procedure"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)