human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "resource competition on integral polymatroids"
  Abstract: We study competitive resource allocation problems in which players distribute their demands integrally on a set of resources subject to player-specific submodular capacity constraints. Each player has to pay for each unit of demand a cost that is a nondecreasing and convex function of the total allocation of that resource. This general model of resource allocation generalizes both singleton congestion games with integer-splittable demands and matroid congestion games with player-specific costs. As our main result, we show that in such general resource allocation problems a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist by giving a pseudo-polynomial algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "equilibrium computation in resource allocation games"):
  with members:
    - "sensitivity analysis for convex separable optimization over integral polymatroids"
    - "totally unimodular congestion games"
    - "lipschitz continuity and approximate equilibria"
    - "network cournot competition"
    - "efficient computation of approximate pure nash equilibria in congestion games"
    - "approximate pure nash equilibria in weighted congestion games existence efficient computation and structure"
    - "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "sensitivity analysis for convex separable optimization over integral polymatroids"):
  with members:
    - "congestion games with variable demands"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "uniqueness of equilibria in atomic splittable polymatroid congestion games"):
  with members:
    - "matroids are immune to braess paradox"
    - "resource buying games"
    - "the uniqueness property for networks with several origin destination pairs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "matroids are immune to braess paradox"):
  with members:
    - "inefficiencies in network models a graph theoretic perspective"
    - "resource buying games"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)