human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"
  Abstract: It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice. Multiple game-theoretic models have been proposed to better understand and predict such behavior and the outcomes it induces. However, these models often make unrealistic assumptions regarding voters' behavior and the information on which they base their vote. #R##N#We suggest a new model for strategic voting that takes into account voters' bounded rationality, as well as their limited access to reliable information. We introduce a simple behavioral heuristic based on \emph{local dominance}, where each voter considers a set of possible world states without assigning probabilities to them. This set is constructed based on prospective candidates' scores (e.g., available from an inaccurate poll). In a \emph{voting equilibrium}, all voters vote for candidates not dominated within the set of possible states. #R##N#We prove that these voting equilibria exist in the Plurality rule for a broad class of local dominance relations (that is, different ways to decide which states are possible). Furthermore, we show that in an iterative setting where voters may repeatedly change their vote, local dominance-based dynamics quickly converge to an equilibrium if voters start from the truthful state. Weaker convergence guarantees in more general settings are also provided. #R##N#Using extensive simulations of strategic voting on generated and real preference profiles, we show that convergence is fast and robust, that emerging equilibria are consistent across various starting conditions, and that they replicate widely known patterns of human voting behavior such as Duverger's law. Further, strategic voting generally improves the quality of the winner compared to truthful voting.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "distance based equilibria in normal form games"):
  with members:
    - "heuristic voting as ordinal dominance strategies"
    - "lipschitz continuity and approximate equilibria"
    - "congestion games with distance based strict uncertainty"
    - "regret minimizing equilibria and mechanisms for games with strict type uncertainty"
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
    - "the many faces of rationalizability"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "lie on the fly strategic voting in an iterative preference elicitation process"):
  with members:
    - "cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation"
    - "online prediction with selfish experts"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous proficiency"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "heuristics in multi winner approval voting"):
  with members:
    - "modeling peoples voting behavior with poll information"
    - "incentivizing high quality crowdwork"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "how hard is it to control an election by breaking ties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "heuristic strategies in uncertain approval voting environments"):
  with members:
    - "modeling peoples voting behavior with poll information"
    - "heuristics in multi winner approval voting"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "how hard is it to control an election by breaking ties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "between discord and deadlock consensus under a deadline"):
  with members:
    - "plurality voting under uncertainty"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting lazy and truth biased voters"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "modeling peoples voting behavior with poll information"):
  with members:
    - "plurality voting under uncertainty"
    - "api design for machine learning software experiences from the scikit learn project"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "predicting strategic voting behavior with poll information"):
  with members:
    - "plurality voting under uncertainty"
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation"):
  with members:
    - "gibbard satterthwaite games for k approval voting rules"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting lazy and truth biased voters"
    - "is it ever safe to vote strategically"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)