human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
  Abstract: We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to the mechanisms (and possibly even to the agents themselves), which means we cannot simply select the optimal alternative, i.e. the alternative that minimizes the total agent cost (or median agent cost). However, we do assume that the agents know their ordinal preferences that are induced by the metric space. We examine randomized social choice functions that require only this ordinal information and select an alternative that is good in expectation with respect to the costs from the metric. To quantify how good a randomized social choice function is, we bound the distortion, which is the worst-case ratio between expected cost of the alternative selected and the cost of the optimal alternative. We provide new distortion bounds for a variety of randomized mechanisms, for both general metrics and for important special cases. Our results show a sizable improvement in distortion over deterministic mechanisms.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "how good is a two party election game"):
  with members:
    - "reducing dueling bandits to cardinal bandits"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "the distortion of distributed voting"
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"
    - "on the distortion value of the elections with abstention"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "communication distortion and randomness in metric voting"):
  with members:
    - "comparing election methods where each voter ranks only few candidates"
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "the distortion of distributed voting"
    - "manipulating elections by selecting issues"
    - "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "on the distortion value of the elections with abstention"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the distortion of distributed voting"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "relating metric distortion and fairness of social choice rules"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "more natural models of electoral control by partition"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "manipulating elections by selecting issues"):
  with members:
    - "hotelling downs model with limited attraction"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "the complexity of probabilistic lobbying"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"):
  with members:
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"
    - "relating metric distortion and fairness of social choice rules"
    - "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "on voting and facility location"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "communication distortion and randomness in metric voting"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "on voting and facility location"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence)