human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
  Abstract: In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the allocation rule once. We present a general reduction that takes any allocation rule which satisfies "cyclic monotonicity" (a known necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness) and converts it to a truthful mechanism using a single call to the allocation rule, with arbitrarily small loss to the expected social welfare. #R##N#A prominent example for a multi-parameter setting in which an allocation rule can only be called once arises in sponsored search auctions. These are multi-parameter domains when each advertiser has multiple possible ads he may display, each with a different value per click. Moreover, the mechanism typically does not have complete knowledge of the click-realization or the click-through rates (CTRs); it can only call the allocation rule a single time and observe the click information for ads that were presented. % are not known. On the negative side, we show that an allocation that is truthful for any realization essentially cannot depend on the bids, and hence cannot do better than random selection for one agent. We then consider a relaxed requirement of truthfulness, only in expectation over the CTRs. Even for that relaxed version, making any progress is challenging as standard techniques for construction of truthful mechanisms (as using VCG or an MIDR allocation rule) cannot be used in this setting. We design an allocation rule with non-trivial performance and directly prove it is cyclic-monotone, and thus it can be used to create a truthful mechanism using our general reduction.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "an efficient e bic to bic transformation and its application to black box reduction in revenue maximization"):
  with members:
    - "multi item mechanisms without item independence learnability via robustness"
    - "the complexity of black box mechanism design with priors"
    - "approximation schemes for a buyer with independent items via symmetries"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "bernoulli factories and black box reductions in mechanism design"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "bernoulli factories and black box reductions in mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "non optimal mechanism design"
    - "fast algorithms for online stochastic convex programming"
    - "a near optimal dynamic learning algorithm for online matching problems with concave returns"
    - "bandits with knapsacks"
    - "primal beats dual on online packing lps in the random order model"
    - "the exponential mechanism for social welfare private truthful and nearly optimal"
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "economic efficiency requires interaction"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "single call mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "algorithms as mechanisms the price of anarchy of relax and round"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "on the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism"
    - "valuation compressions in vcg based combinatorial auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "on k column sparse packing programs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "an optimal bidimensional multi armed bandit auction for multi unit procurement"):
  with members:
    - "bandits with concave rewards and convex knapsacks"
    - "adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets bandit algorithms for repeated principal agent problems"
    - "adaptive crowdsourcing algorithms for the bandit survey problem"
    - "knapsack based optimal policies for budget limited multi armed bandits"
    - "regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi armed bandit problems"
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"):
  with members:
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing"
    - "reducing revenue to welfare maximization approximation algorithms and other generalizations"
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"
    - "the exponential mechanism for social welfare private truthful and nearly optimal"
    - "single call mechanisms"
    - "optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "single call mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)