human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
  Abstract: We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is stable if each committee member is preferred to each non-member by a (possibly weak) majority of voters. The second notion is called local stability (introduced in this paper): A size-$k$ committee is locally stable in an election with $n$ voters if there is no candidate $c$ and no group of more than $\frac{n}{k+1}$ voters such that each voter in this group prefers $c$ to each committee member. We argue that Gehrlein-stable committees are appropriate for shortlisting tasks, and that locally stable committees are better suited for applications that require proportional representation. The goal of this paper is to analyze these notions in detail, explore their compatibility with notions of proportionality, and investigate the computational complexity of related algorithmic tasks.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "proportionally representative participatory budgeting with ordinal preferences"):
  with members:
    - "a framework for approval based budgeting methods"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "rank maximal equal contribution a probabilistic social choice function"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "unifying ensemble methods for q learning via social choice theory"):
  with members:
    - "multi step reinforcement learning a unifying algorithm"
    - "averaged dqn variance reduction and stabilization for deep reinforcement learning"
    - "deep exploration via bootstrapped dqn"
    - "epopt learning robust neural network policies using model ensembles"
    - "dueling network architectures for deep reinforcement learning"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "off policy shaping ensembles in reinforcement learning"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "committee scoring rules axiomatic characterization and hierarchy"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "monotonicity axioms in approval based multi winner voting rules"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"
    - "consistent approval based multi winner rules"
    - "multiwinner voting with fairness constraints"
    - "group fairness in multiwinner voting"
    - "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"
    - "proportional approval voting harmonic k median and negative association"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a quantitative analysis of multi winner rules"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "proportionality and the limits of welfarism"
    - "group fairness in committee selection"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "consistent approval based multi winner rules"
    - "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"
    - "what do we elect committees for a voting committee model for multi winner rules"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "computing and testing pareto optimal committees"):
  with members:
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "proportional representation in approval based committee voting and beyond"):
  with members:
    - "multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods"
    - "fully open extensions to the d hondt method"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "very hard electoral control problems"
    - "distributed monitoring of election winners"
    - "committee scoring rules axiomatic characterization and hierarchy"
    - "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"
    - "towards computing victory margins in stv elections"
    - "voting and bribing in single exponential time"
    - "axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"):
  with members:
    - "fair knapsack"
    - "a framework for approval based budgeting methods"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "monotonicity axioms in approval based multi winner voting rules"
    - "committees providing ejr can be computed efficiently"
    - "the maximin support method an extension of the d hondt method to approval based multiwinner elections"
    - "computational complexity of testing proportional justified representation"
    - "proportional justified representation"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)