human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "mix and match"
  Abstract: Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to maximize the number of matches despite self-interest, with agents that each want to maximize the number of their own vertices that match. Each agent can choose to hide some of its vertices, and then privately match the hidden vertices with any of its own vertices that go unmatched by the mechanism. A prominent application of this model is to kidney exchange, where agents correspond to hospitals and vertices to donor-patient pairs. Here hospitals may game an exchange by holding back pairs and harm social welfare. In this paper we seek to design mechanisms that are strategyproof, in the sense that agents cannot bene?t from hiding vertices, and approximately maximize efficiency, i.e., produce a matching that is close in cardinality to the maximum cardinality matching. Our main result is the design and analysis of the eponymous Mix-and-Match mechanism; we show that this randomized mechanism is strategyproof and provides a 2-approximation. Lower bounds establish that the mechanism is near optimal.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "smoothed and average case approximation ratios of mechanisms beyond the worst case analysis"):
  with members:
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "truthful assignment without money"
    - "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"
    - "smoothed analysis of algorithms why the simplex algorithm usually takes polynomial time"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "facility location with double peaked preference"):
  with members:
    - "approximately optimal mechanisms for strategyproof facility location minimizing l_p norm of costs"
    - "on the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "verifiably truthful mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of mechanism design"
    - "on the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games"
    - "truthful assignment without money"
    - "approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy"
    - "sum of us strategyproof selection from the selectors"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "long term causal effects of economic mechanisms on agent incentives"):
  with members:
    - "quantifying the strategyproofness of mechanisms via metrics on payoff distributions"
    - "counterfactual reasoning and learning systems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms for competing submodular processes"):
  with members:
    - "diffusion in social networks with competing products"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "funding games the truth but not the whole truth"):
  with members:
    - "mechanism design without money via stable matching"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "truthful assignment without money"
    - "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"
    - "sum of us strategyproof selection from the selectors"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"):
  with members:
    - "online vertex weighted bipartite matching and single bid budgeted allocations"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "mechanism design with uncertain inputs to err is human to forgive divine"):
  with members:
    - "bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)