human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "approximation algorithms for campaign management"
  Abstract: We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a winner while paying as little as possible. We describe a 2-approximation algorithm for this problem for a large class of electoral systems known as scoring rules. Our result holds even for weighted voters, and has applications for campaign management in commercial settings. We also give approximation algorithms for our problem for two Condorcet-consistent rules, namely, the Copeland rule and maximin.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "optimal bribery in voting"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying framework for manipulation problems"
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "local distance restricted bribery in voting"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying framework for manipulation problems"
    - "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the complexity of online bribery in sequential elections extended abstract"):
  with members:
    - "the complexity of online bribery in sequential elections"
    - "computational social choice and computational complexity bffs"
    - "high multiplicity election problems"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "the complexity of controlling candidate sequential elections"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "the complexity of online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"):
  with members:
    - "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"
    - "voting and bribing in single exponential time"
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "estimating the margin of victory of an election using sampling"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"):
  with members:
    - "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"):
  with members:
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "k best enumeration"
    - "how hard is it to control an election by breaking ties"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "cp nets a tool for representing and reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference statements"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "parliamentary voting procedures agenda control manipulation and uncertainty"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "parameterized algorithmics for computational social choice nine research challenges"
    - "combinatorial voter control in elections"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)