human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"
  Abstract: Much work has been devoted, during the past twenty years, to using complexity to protect elections from manipulation and control. Many results have been obtained showing NP-hardness shields, and recently there has been much focus on whether such worst-case hardness protections can be bypassed by frequently correct heuristics or by approximations. This paper takes a very different approach: We argue that when electorates follow the canonical political science model of societal preferences the complexity shield never existed in the first place. In particular, we show that for electorates having single-peaked preferences, many existing NP-hardness results on manipulation and control evaporate.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the complexity of constructive control under nearly single peaked preferences"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and bribery in single peaked and nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "structure in dichotomous preferences"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a parameterized perspective on protecting elections"):
  with members:
    - "optimal bribery in voting"
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "incomplete preferences in single peaked electorates"):
  with members:
    - "on the likelihood of single peaked preferences"
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "recognising multidimensional euclidean preferences"
    - "modeling single peakedness for votes with ties"
    - "single peaked consistency for weak orders is easy"
    - "reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and bribery in single peaked and nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "the one dimensional euclidean domain finitely many obstructions are not enough"
    - "complexity of manipulative actions when voting with ties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"):
  with members:
    - "on the likelihood of single peaked preferences"
    - "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"
    - "structure in dichotomous preferences"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "clone structures in voters preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "on the likelihood of single peaked preferences"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "the one dimensional euclidean domain finitely many obstructions are not enough"
    - "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "clone structures in voters preferences"
    - "an empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "high multiplicity election problems"):
  with members:
    - "the complexity of succinct elections"
    - "complexity dichotomies for unweighted scoring rules"
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "polynomiality for bin packing with a constant number of item types"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "modeling single peakedness for votes with ties"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "single peaked consistency for weak orders is easy"
    - "reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and bribery in single peaked and nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "complexity of manipulative actions when voting with ties"
    - "complexity of manipulation in elections with top truncated ballots"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "dichotomy for voting systems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "single peaked consistency for weak orders is easy"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "testing top monotonicity"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "clone structures in voters preferences"
    - "exact analysis of dodgson elections lewis carroll s 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access to np"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)