human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "no stable matching mechanism is obviously strategy proof"
  Abstract: The (men-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm, which finds the men-optimal stable matching in a two-sided marriage market, is known to be strategy-proof for all men. This algorithm is now used extensively by many centralized matching markets. Although applicants are being advised that it is in their best interest to state their true preferences, empirical evidence suggests that a significant fraction are nonetheless attempting to strategically misreport their preferences. We show that while strategy-proof for all men, no mechanism implementing the men-optimal stable matching is "obviously strategy-proof" for all men, a term recently defined by Li (2015). Consequently, no stable matching mechanism is obviously strategy-proof for all men. This implies that in any implementation of the men-optimal stable matching, significant cognitive effort and contingent reasoning are needed to be convinced that no strategic opportunities exist for any man.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "probabilistic verification for obviously strategyproof mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "gibbard satterthwaite success stories and obvious strategyproofness"
    - "sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "combinatorial auctions without money"
    - "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations"):
  with members:
    - "gibbard satterthwaite success stories and obvious strategyproofness"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a stable marriage requires communication"):
  with members:
    - "stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy proof"
    - "fast distributed almost stable marriages"
    - "economic efficiency requires interaction"
    - "manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklists"
    - "on the complexity of trial and error"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)