human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "composable and efficient mechanisms"
  Abstract: We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms, related to smooth games defined by Roughgarden, that can be thought of as mechanisms that generate approximately market clearing prices. We show that smooth mechanisms result in high quality outcome in equilibrium both in the full information setting and in the Bayesian setting with uncertainty about participants, as well as in learning outcomes. Our main result is to show that such mechanisms compose well: smoothness locally at each mechanism implies efficiency globally. #R##N#For mechanisms where good performance requires that bidders do not bid above their value, we identify the notion of a weakly smooth mechanism. Weakly smooth mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction, are approximately efficient under the no-overbidding assumption. Similar to smooth mechanisms, weakly smooth mechanisms behave well in composition, and have high quality outcome in equilibrium (assuming no overbidding) both in the full information setting and in the Bayesian setting, as well as in learning outcomes. #R##N#In most of the paper we assume participants have quasi-linear valuations. We also extend some of our results to settings where participants have budget constraints.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures"):
  with members:
    - "a round collapse theorem for computationally sound protocols or tfnp is hard on average in pessiland"
    - "on communication complexity of fixed point computation"
    - "near optimal communication lower bounds for approximate nash equilibria"
    - "query to communication lifting for bpp"
    - "lifting randomized query complexity to randomized communication complexity"
    - "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"
    - "communication complexity of approximate nash equilibria"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "simple credible and approximately optimal auctions"):
  with members:
    - "an improved welfare guarantee for first price auctions"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "sample complexity for non truthful mechanisms"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "stability and learning in strategic queuing systems"):
  with members:
    - "pacing equilibrium in first price auction markets"
    - "multiplicative pacing equilibria in auction markets"
    - "small loss bounds for online learning with partial information"
    - "regret of queueing bandits"
    - "the fitness level method with tail bounds"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "when smoothness is not enough toward exact quantification and optimization of the price of anarchy"):
  with members:
    - "optimal price of anarchy in cost sharing games"
    - "distributed resource allocation through utility design part i optimizing the performance certificates via the price of anarchy"
    - "utility design for distributed resource allocation part i characterizing and optimizing the exact price of anarchy"
    - "the impact of local information on the performance of multiagent systems"
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "learning in games robustness of fast convergence"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "wireless network slicing generalized kelly mechanism based resource allocation"):
  with members:
    - "common throughput maximization in uav enabled ofdma systems with delay consideration"
    - "network slicing for 5g with sdn nfv concepts architectures and challenges"
    - "applications of economic and pricing models for wireless network security a survey"
    - "virtualization of 5g cellular networks as a hierarchical combinatorial auction"
    - "a dynamic embedding algorithm for wireless network virtualization"
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "dashboard mechanisms for online marketplaces"):
  with members:
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "price of anarchy for greedy auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"):
  with members:
    - "a b testing of auctions"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"
    - "the anarchy of scheduling without money"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)