human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
  Abstract: We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivisible and agents have unequal entitlements. This problem is a generalization of the work by Procaccia and Wang wherein the agents are assumed to be symmetric with respect to their entitlements. Although Procaccia and Wang show an almost fair (constant approximation) allocation exists in their setting, our main result is in sharp contrast to their observation. We show that, in some cases with $n$ agents, no allocation can guarantee better than $1/n$ approximation of a fair allocation when the entitlements are not necessarily equal. Furthermore, we devise a simple algorithm that ensures a $1/n$ approximation guarantee. Our second result is for a restricted version of the problem where the valuation of every agent for each good is bounded by the total value he wishes to receive in a fair allocation. Although this assumption might seem w.l.o.g, we show it enables us to find a $1/2$ approximation fair allocation via a greedy algorithm. Finally, we run some experiments on real-world data and show that, in practice, a fair allocation is likely to exist. We also support our experiments by showing positive results for two stochastic variants of the problem, namely stochastic agents and stochastic items.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "maximin fairness with mixed divisible and indivisible goods"):
  with members:
    - "computing envy freeable allocations with limited subsidies"
    - "one dollar each eliminates envy"
    - "fair division of mixed divisible and indivisible goods"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "maximin share allocations on cycles"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"):
  with members:
    - "fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "maximin share allocations on cycles"
    - "connected fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"
    - "the fair division of hereditary set systems"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on weighted envy freeness in indivisible item allocation"):
  with members:
    - "a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "when do envy free allocations exist"
    - "the complexity of cake cutting with unequal shares"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation"):
  with members:
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "algorithms for competitive division of chores"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "competitive equilibria with indivisible goods and generic budgets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"):
  with members:
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "the complexity of cake cutting with unequal shares"
    - "competitive equilibria with indivisible goods and generic budgets"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes existence and fairness"):
  with members:
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "competitive equilibrium with generic budgets beyond additive"
    - "monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake cutting"
    - "negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "the complexity of cake cutting with unequal shares"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "competitive equilibria with indivisible goods and generic budgets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "competitive equilibria with indivisible goods and generic budgets"):
  with members:
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "communication complexity of discrete fair division"
    - "competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"
    - "nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable piecewise linear concave utilities"
    - "nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "fair division of a graph"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
    - "asymptotic existence of proportionally fair allocations"
    - "envy free cake cutting among families"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)