human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "frugal bribery in voting"
  Abstract: Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. However, bribery with money is often illegal in elections. Motivated by this, we introduce the notion of frugal bribery and formulate two new pertinent computational problems which we call Frugal-bribery and Frugal- $bribery to capture bribery without money in elections. In the proposed model, the briber is frugal in nature and this is captured by her inability to bribe votes of a certain kind, namely, non-vulnerable votes. In the Frugal-bribery problem, the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only vulnerable votes. In the Frugal-{dollar}bribery problem, the vulnerable votes have prices and the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only vulnerable votes, subject to a budget constraint of the briber. We further formulate two natural variants of the Frugal-{dollar}bribery problem namely Uniform-frugal-{dollar}bribery and Nonuniform-frugal-{dollar}bribery where the prices of the vulnerable votes are, respectively, all the same or different. #R##N#We study the computational complexity of the above problems for unweighted and weighted elections for several commonly used voting rules. We observe that, even if we have only a small number of candidates, the problems are intractable for all voting rules studied here for weighted elections, with the sole exception of the Frugal-bribery problem for the plurality voting rule. In contrast, we have polynomial time algorithms for the Frugal-bribery problem for plurality, veto, k-approval, k-veto, and plurality with runoff voting rules for unweighted elections. However, the Frugal-{dollar}bribery problem is intractable for all the voting rules studied here barring the plurality and the veto voting rules for unweighted elections.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a parameterized perspective on protecting elections"):
  with members:
    - "optimal bribery in voting"
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"
    - "more natural models of electoral control by partition"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "optimal bribery in voting"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying framework for manipulation problems"
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "approximation algorithms for campaign management"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "local distance restricted bribery in voting"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying framework for manipulation problems"
    - "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "approximation algorithms for campaign management"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"):
  with members:
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "elicitation for preferences single peaked on trees"
    - "preference elicitation for single crossing domain"
    - "query complexity of tournament solutions"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "estimating the margin of victory of an election using sampling"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "approval voting with intransitive preferences"):
  with members:
    - "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "how credible is the prediction of a party based election"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the complexity of manipulating k approval elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"):
  with members:
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation in elections with partial votes"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "possible and necessary winner problem in social polls"
    - "asymptotic collusion proofness of voting rules the case of large number of candidates"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence)