human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"
  Abstract: Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d, or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her value distribution. The latter is a reasonable approach when the bidders can be classified into a few categories, but there are many instances where the classification of bidders is a continuum. For example, the classification of the bidders may be based on their annual income, their propensity to buy an item based on past behavior, or in the case of ad auctions, the click through rate of their ads. We introduce an alternate model that captures this aspect, where bidders are a priori identical, but can be distinguished based (only) on some side information the auctioneer obtains at the time of the auction. We extend the sample complexity approach of Dhangwatnotai et al. and Cole and Roughgarden to this model and obtain almost matching upper and lower bounds. As an aside, we obtain a revenue monotonicity lemma which may be of independent interest. We also show how to use Empirical Risk Minimization techniques to improve the sample complexity bound of Cole and Roughgarden for the non-identical but independent value distribution case.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design"):
  with members:
    - "settling the sample complexity of single parameter revenue maximization"
    - "a neural architecture for designing truthful and efficient auctions"
    - "multi agent adversarial inverse reinforcement learning"
    - "approximation schemes for a buyer with independent items via symmetries"
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "deep sets"
    - "invariant and equivariant graph networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"):
  with members:
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling"
    - "making the most of your samples"
    - "perfect bayesian equilibria in repeated sales"
    - "revenue optimization in posted price auctions with strategic buyers"
    - "learning prices for repeated auctions with strategic buyers"
    - "learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve"
    - "efficient nash computation in large population games with bounded influence"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "learning reserve prices in second price auctions"):
  with members:
    - "settling the sample complexity of single parameter revenue maximization"
    - "learning optimal reserve price against non myopic bidders"
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"
    - "a general theory of sample complexity for multi item profit maximization"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "a sample complexity measure with applications to learning optimal auctions"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "bulow klemperer style results for welfare maximization in two sided markets"):
  with members:
    - "the vickrey auction with a single duplicate bidder approximates the optimal revenue"
    - "99 revenue via enhanced competition"
    - "the best of both worlds asymptotically efficient mechanisms with a guarantee on the expected gains from trade"
    - "are two samples really better than one on the non asymptotic performance of empirical revenue maximization"
    - "optimal and benchmark optimal competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "submultiplicative glivenko cantelli and uniform convergence of revenues"
    - "a general theory of sample complexity for multi item profit maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "settling the sample complexity of single parameter revenue maximization"):
  with members:
    - "the sample complexity of up to varepsilon multi dimensional revenue maximization"
    - "a general theory of sample complexity for multi item profit maximization"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "a sample complexity measure with applications to learning optimal auctions"
    - "on revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "efficient empirical revenue maximization in single parameter auction environments"
    - "sample complexity of automated mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "learning to bid in revenue maximizing auctions"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "explicit shading strategies for repeated truthful auctions"
    - "thresholding the virtual value a simple method to increase welfare and lower reserve prices in online auction systems"
    - "thresholding at the monopoly price an agnostic way to improve bidding strategies in revenue maximizing auctions"
    - "learning to bid without knowing your value"
    - "optimal auctions through deep learning"
    - "a field guide to personalized reserve prices"
    - "sequential mechanisms with ex post participation guarantees"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "algorithmic price discrimination"):
  with members:
    - "settling the sample complexity of single parameter revenue maximization"
    - "learning optimal reserve price against non myopic bidders"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "bayesian exploration incentivizing exploration in bayesian games"
    - "efficient empirical revenue maximization in single parameter auction environments"
    - "sample complexity for non truthful mechanisms"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "a learning framework for distribution based game theoretic solution concepts"):
  with members:
    - "forming probably stable communities with limited interactions"
    - "envy free classification"
    - "statistical cost sharing"
    - "a sample complexity measure with applications to learning optimal auctions"
    - "hedonic games with graph restricted communication"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "sample complexity of automated mechanism design"
    - "learning cooperative games"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)