human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games"
  Abstract: Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of such situations. In multi-player settings, it has been pointed out that to be realistic, a solution concept should be obtainable via processes that are decentralized and reasonably simple. Accordingly we look at the computation of solution concepts by means of decentralized dynamics. These are algorithms in which players move in turns to improve their own utility and the hope is that the system reaches an "equilibrium" quickly. #R##N#We study these dynamics for the class of opinion games, recently introduced by Bindel et al. [Bindel et al., FOCS2011]. These are games, important in economics and sociology, that model the formation of an opinion in a social network. We study best-response dynamics and show upper and lower bounds on the convergence to Nash equilibria. We also study a noisy version of best-response dynamics, called logit dynamics, and prove a host of results about its convergence rate as the noise in the system varies. To get these results, we use a variety of techniques developed to bound the mixing time of Markov chains, including coupling, spectral characterizations and bottleneck ratio.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "local aggregation in preference games"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of equilibria in discrete preference games"
    - "on discrete preferences and coordination"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "independent lazy better response dynamics on network games"):
  with members:
    - "the price of anarchy and stability in general noisy best response dynamics"
    - "graphical models for game theory"
    - "logit dynamics with concurrent updates for local interaction games"
    - "imperfect best response mechanisms"
    - "on the impact of fair best response dynamics"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "consensus as a nash equilibrium of a dynamic game"):
  with members:
    - "game theoretic analysis of the hegselmann krause model for opinion dynamics in finite dimensions"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"
    - "opinion dynamics in social networks a local interaction game with stubborn agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "discrete preference games social influence through coordination and beyond"):
  with members:
    - "reaching consensus via non bayesian asynchronous learning in social networks"
    - "short sequences of improvement moves lead to approximate equilibria in constraint satisfaction games"
    - "on discrete preferences and coordination"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"
    - "efficient computation of approximate pure nash equilibria in congestion games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "minority becomes majority in social networks"):
  with members:
    - "reaching consensus via non bayesian asynchronous learning in social networks"
    - "on discrete preferences and coordination"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "on discrete preferences and coordination"):
  with members:
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"
    - "pure nash equilibria hard and easy games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "logit dynamics with concurrent updates for local interaction games"):
  with members:
    - "convergence to equilibrium of logit dynamics for strategic games"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"
    - "metastability of logit dynamics for coordination games"
    - "the hitchhiker s guide to affiliation networks a game theoretic approach"
    - "max cut and the smallest eigenvalue"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "metastability of asymptotically well behaved potential games"):
  with members:
    - "convergence to equilibrium of logit dynamics for strategic games"
    - "metastability of potential games"
    - "metastability of logit dynamics for coordination games"
    - "mixing time and stationary expected social welfare of logit dynamics"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)