human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
  Abstract: Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We introduce a framework, in which manipulators can see the past votes but not the future ones, to model online coalitional manipulation of sequential elections, and we show that in this setting manipulation can be extremely complex even for election systems with simple winner problems. Yet we also show that for some of the most important election systems such manipulation is simple in certain settings. This suggests that when using sequential voting, one should pay great attention to the details of the setting in choosing one's voting rule. Among the highlights of our classifications are: We show that, depending on the size of the manipulative coalition, the online manipulation problem can be complete for each level of the polynomial hierarchy or even for PSPACE. We obtain the most dramatic contrast to date between the nonunique-winner and unique-winner models: Online weighted manipulation for plurality is in P in the nonunique-winner model, yet is coNP-hard (constructive case) and NP-hard (destructive case) in the unique-winner model. And we obtain what to the best of our knowledge are the first P^NP[1]-completeness and P^NP-completeness results in the field of computational social choice, in particular proving such completeness for, respectively, the complexity of 3-candidate and 4-candidate (and unlimited-candidate) online weighted coalition manipulation of veto elections.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the complexity of online bribery in sequential elections extended abstract"):
  with members:
    - "the complexity of online bribery in sequential elections"
    - "computational social choice and computational complexity bffs"
    - "high multiplicity election problems"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "the complexity of controlling candidate sequential elections"
    - "the complexity of online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "computational social choice and computational complexity bffs"):
  with members:
    - "consensus halving is ppa complete"
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "raising np lower bounds to parallel np lower bounds"
    - "exact analysis of dodgson elections lewis carroll s 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access to np"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "high multiplicity election problems"):
  with members:
    - "the complexity of succinct elections"
    - "complexity dichotomies for unweighted scoring rules"
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "polynomiality for bin packing with a constant number of item types"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"):
  with members:
    - "x then x manipulation of same system runoff elections"
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "coalitional manipulation for schulze s rule"):
  with members:
    - "manipulation of nanson s and baldwin s rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "the complexity of controlling candidate sequential elections"):
  with members:
    - "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "the complexity of online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "the complexity of online voter control in sequential elections"):
  with members:
    - "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"
    - "the complexity of controlling candidate sequential elections"
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "online voter control in sequential elections"):
  with members:
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)