human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"
  Abstract: We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which all agents in each group must agree that their group's share is fair. Under this strict requirement, fair allocations exist only for small groups. We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group. This concept is better suited to large groups such as cities or countries. We present protocols for democratic fair allocation among two or more arbitrarily large groups of agents with monotonic, additive, or binary valuations. For two groups with arbitrary monotonic valuations, we give an efficient protocol that guarantees envy-freeness up to one good for at least $1/2$ of the agents in each group, and prove that the $1/2$ fraction is optimal. We also present other protocols that make weaker fairness guarantees to more agents in each group, or to more groups. Our protocols combine techniques from different fields, including combinatorial game theory, cake cutting, and voting.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the fairness of time critical influence maximization in social networks"):
  with members:
    - "group fairness in influence maximization"
    - "learning optimal and fair decision trees for non discriminative decision making"
    - "gaps in information access in social networks"
    - "a unified approach to quantifying algorithmic unfairness measuring individual group unfairness via inequality indices"
    - "equality of voice towards fair representation in crowdsourced top k recommendations"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the price of connectivity in fair division"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "maximin share allocations on cycles"
    - "fairly allocating many goods with few queries"
    - "chore division on a graph"
    - "almost envy free allocations with connected bundles"
    - "fair division under cardinality constraints"
    - "when do envy free allocations exist"
    - "pareto optimal allocation of indivisible goods with connectivity constraints"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "developments in multi agent fair allocation"):
  with members:
    - "from matching with diversity constraints to matching with regional quotas"
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "fairly allocating many goods with few queries"
    - "fair knapsack"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "computing a small agreeable set of indivisible items"):
  with members:
    - "fair division under cardinality constraints"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "envy free cake cutting among families"
    - "proportional cake cutting among families"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "almost envy freeness in group resource allocation"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "fairly allocating many goods with few queries"
    - "almost envy free allocations with connected bundles"
    - "fair division under cardinality constraints"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "envy free cake cutting among families"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "group fairness in influence maximization"):
  with members:
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "multi objective maximization of monotone submodular functions with cardinality constraint"
    - "diverse weighted bipartite b matching"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"
    - "stochastic submodular maximization the case of coverage functions"
    - "gradient methods for submodular maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "almost group envy free allocation of indivisible goods and chores"):
  with members:
    - "almost envy freeness in group resource allocation"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "greedy algorithms for maximizing nash social welfare"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "on weighted envy freeness in indivisible item allocation"):
  with members:
    - "a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "when do envy free allocations exist"
    - "the complexity of cake cutting with unequal shares"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)