human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "optimal mechansim design and money burning"
  Abstract: Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fundamental disconnect between the traditional application domains of mechanism design (such as auctions) and those arising in computer science (such as networks): while monetary transfers (i.e., payments) are essential for most of the known positive results in mechanism design, they are undesirable or even technologically infeasible in many computer systems. Classical impossibility results imply that the reach of mechanisms without transfers is severely limited. #R##N#Computer systems typically do have the ability to reduce service quality--routing systems can drop or delay traffic, scheduling protocols can delay the release of jobs, and computational payment schemes can require computational payments from users (e.g., in spam-fighting systems). Service degradation is tantamount to requiring that users burn money}, and such ``payments'' can be used to influence the preferences of the agents at a cost of degrading the social surplus. #R##N#We develop a framework for the design and analysis of money-burning mechanisms to maximize the residual surplus--the total value of the chosen outcome minus the payments required.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "benchmark design and prior independent optimization"):
  with members:
    - "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "optimal competitive auctions"
    - "optimal platform design"
    - "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"
    - "a comparison of performance measures for online algorithms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"):
  with members:
    - "a b testing of auctions"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "learning optimal redistribution mechanisms through neural networks"):
  with members:
    - "optimal auctions through deep learning"
    - "adam a method for stochastic optimization"
    - "generating sequences with recurrent neural networks"
    - "redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "from bayesian to crowdsourced bayesian auctions"):
  with members:
    - "bayesian auctions with efficient queries"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "putting peer prediction under the micro economic scope and making truth telling focal"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "on the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex post ir via bank accounts"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "truth and regret in online scheduling"):
  with members:
    - "stability of service under time of use pricing"
    - "era a framework for economic resource allocation for the cloud"
    - "truthful online scheduling with commitments"
    - "bandits with switching costs t 2 3 regret"
    - "satzilla portfolio based algorithm selection for sat"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "ironing in the dark"):
  with members:
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling"
    - "sampling and representation complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "making the most of your samples"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve"
    - "vickrey auctions for irregular distributions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "who to trust for truthfully maximizing welfare"):
  with members:
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"
    - "combinatorial auctions without money"
    - "the exponential mechanism for social welfare private truthful and nearly optimal"
    - "on the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)