human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "towards a dichotomy of finding possible winners in elections based on scoring rules"
  Abstract: To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders. This directly leads to the Possible Winner problem that asks, given a set of partial votes, if a distinguished candidate can still become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational complexity of Possible Winner for the broad class of voting protocols defined by scoring rules. A scoring rule provides a score value for every position which a candidate can have in a linear order. Prominent examples include plurality, k-approval, and Borda. Generalizing previous NP-hardness results for some special cases, we settle the computational complexity for all but one scoring rule. More precisely, for an unbounded number of candidates and unweighted voters, we show that Possible Winner is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (2,1,...,1,0), while it is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"):
  with members:
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation in elections with partial votes"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "possible and necessary winner problem in social polls"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "high multiplicity election problems"):
  with members:
    - "the complexity of succinct elections"
    - "complexity dichotomies for unweighted scoring rules"
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "polynomiality for bin packing with a constant number of item types"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "complexity dichotomies for unweighted scoring rules"):
  with members:
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "parliamentary voting procedures agenda control manipulation and uncertainty"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "parameterized algorithmics for computational social choice nine research challenges"
    - "combinatorial voter control in elections"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "possible winners in noisy elections"):
  with members:
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "search versus decision for election manipulation problems"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "fully proportional representation as resource allocation approximability results"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "cloning in elections finding the possible winners"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"):
  with members:
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "election attacks with few candidates"
    - "parameterized algorithmics for computational social choice nine research challenges"
    - "exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted borda manipulation problems"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"):
  with members:
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "dichotomy for voting systems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"):
  with members:
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CC(Computational Complexity)