human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "complexity of manipulation in elections with partial votes"
  Abstract: In the computational social choice literature, there has been great interest in understanding how computational complexity can act as a barrier against manipulation of elections. Much of this literature, however, makes the assumption that the voters or agents specify a complete preference ordering over the set of candidates. There are many multiagent systems applications, and even real-world elections, where this assumption is not warranted, and this in turn raises the question "How hard is it to manipulate elections if the agents reveal only partial preference orderings?". It is this question that we study in this paper. In particular, we look at the weighted manipulation problem -- both constructive and destructive manipulation -- when such partial voting is allowed and when there are only a bounded number of candidates. We study the exact number of candidates that are required to make manipulation hard for all scoring rules, for elimination versions of all scoring rules, for the plurality with runoff rule, for a family of election systems known as Copeland$^{\alpha}$, and for the maximin protocol.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"):
  with members:
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "possible and necessary winner problem in social polls"
    - "asymptotic collusion proofness of voting rules the case of large number of candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulative actions when voting with ties"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of manipulation in elections with top truncated ballots"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "dichotomy for voting systems"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)