human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the complexity of manipulating k approval elections"
  Abstract: An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the individual level but disastrous for the agents as a whole. Creating election systems where the determination of such strategies is difficult is thus an important goal. #R##N#An interesting set of elections is that of scoring protocols. Previous work in this area has demonstrated the complexity of misuse in cases involving a fixed number of candidates, and of specific election systems on unbounded number of candidates such as Borda. In contrast, we take the first step in generalizing the results of computational complexity of election misuse to cases of infinitely many scoring protocols on an unbounded number of candidates. Interesting families of systems include $k$-approval and $k$-veto elections, in which voters distinguish $k$ candidates from the candidate set. #R##N#Our main result is to partition the problems of these families based on their complexity. We do so by showing they are polynomial-time computable, NP-hard, or polynomial-time equivalent to another problem of interest. We also demonstrate a surprising connection between manipulation in election systems and some graph theory problems.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the complexity of constructive control under nearly single peaked preferences"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and bribery in single peaked and nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "structure in dichotomous preferences"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "election with bribed voter uncertainty hardness and approximation algorithm"):
  with members:
    - "when the cookie meets the blockchain privacy risks of web payments via cryptocurrencies"
    - "possible winners in noisy elections"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on coalitional manipulation for multiwinner elections shortlisting"):
  with members:
    - "what do we elect committees for a voting committee model for multi winner rules"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "approval voting with intransitive preferences"):
  with members:
    - "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "how credible is the prediction of a party based election"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "weighted electoral control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "how hard is it to control a group"):
  with members:
    - "the complexity of multiwinner voting rules with variable number of winners"
    - "structure in dichotomous preferences"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "frugal bribery in voting"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "parameterized algorithmics for computational social choice nine research challenges"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "complexity of control behaviors in k peaked elections for a variant of approval voting"
    - "approximating the maxcover problem with bounded frequencies in fpt time"
    - "computing socially efficient cake divisions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"
    - "facility location with double peaked preference"
    - "election attacks with few candidates"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence)