human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
  Abstract: We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items, and where the highest bidder on an item wins it and pays his bid. We first observe that pure Nash-equilibria of this game excatly correspond to price-based equilibiria (and thus need not exist), but that mixed-Nash equilibria always do exist, and we analyze their structure in several simple cases where no price-based equilibrium exists. We also undertake an analysis of the welfare properties of these equilibria showing that while pure equilibria are always perfectly efficient ("first welfare theorem"), mixed equilibria need not be, and we provide upper and lower bounds on their amount of inefficiency.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures"):
  with members:
    - "a round collapse theorem for computationally sound protocols or tfnp is hard on average in pessiland"
    - "on communication complexity of fixed point computation"
    - "near optimal communication lower bounds for approximate nash equilibria"
    - "query to communication lifting for bpp"
    - "lifting randomized query complexity to randomized communication complexity"
    - "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"
    - "communication complexity of approximate nash equilibria"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "proportional dynamics in exchange economies"):
  with members:
    - "an alternating algorithm for finding linear arrow debreu market equilibrium"
    - "universal growth in production economies"
    - "a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets"
    - "tracing equilibrium in dynamic markets via distributed adaptation"
    - "dynamics of distributed updating in fisher markets"
    - "selling complementary goods dynamics efficiency and revenue"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "universal growth in production economies"):
  with members:
    - "selling complementary goods dynamics efficiency and revenue"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "average case performance of replicator dynamics in potential games via computing regions of attraction"
    - "concave generalized flows with applications to market equilibria"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "combinatorial auctions with endowment effect"):
  with members:
    - "the communication complexity of local search"
    - "planning with multiple biases"
    - "on the value of penalties in time inconsistent planning"
    - "the price of uncertainty in present biased planning"
    - "motivating time inconsistent agents a computational approach"
    - "procrastination with variable present bias"
    - "planning problems for sophisticated agents with present bias"
    - "computational issues in time inconsistent planning"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "pricing multi unit markets"):
  with members:
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "pricing online decisions beyond auctions"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "dynamic pricing with limited supply"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "walrasian dynamics in multi unit markets"):
  with members:
    - "optimal multi unit mechanisms with private demands"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "when does the price of anarchy tend to 1 in large walrasian auctions and fisher markets"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "on nash dynamics of matching market equilibria"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "price of anarchy for greedy auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "game efficiency through linear programming duality"):
  with members:
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "a unifying tool for bounding the quality of non cooperative solutions in weighted congestion games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)