human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "an approximately truthful in expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions using value queries"
  Abstract: This manuscript presents an alternative implementation of the truthful-in-expectation mechanism of Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan for combinatorial auctions with weighted-matroid-rank-sum valuations. The new implementation uses only value queries and is approximately truthful-in-expectation, in the sense that by reporting truthfully each agent maximizes his utility within a multiplicative 1-o(1) factor. It still provides an optimal (1-1/e-o(1))-approximation in social welfare. We achieve this by first presenting an approximately maximal-in-distributional-range allocation rule and then showing a black-box transformation to an approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a truthful mechanism for the generalized assignment problem"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful assignment without money"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "towards more practical linear programming based techniques for algorithmic mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "unified acceleration method for packing and covering problems via diameter reduction"
    - "fast convex decomposition for truthful social welfare approximation"
    - "optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method"
    - "approximation algorithms for secondary spectrum auctions"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"
    - "sequential and parallel algorithms for mixed packing and covering"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a truthful in expectation mechanism for the generalized assignment problem"):
  with members:
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "mechanisms for risk averse agents without loss"):
  with members:
    - "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "robust mechanisms for risk averse sellers"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "truthfulness via proxies"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "symmetry and approximability of submodular maximization problems"
    - "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "truthfulness via proxies"
    - "submodular maximization by simulated annealing"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)