human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on the complexity of core kernel and bargaining set"
  Abstract: Coalitional games model scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental issue of coalitional games is to single out the most desirable outcomes in terms of worth distributions, usually called solution concepts. Since decisions taken by realistic players cannot involve unbounded resources, recent computer science literature advocated the importance of assessing the complexity of computing with solution concepts. In this context, the paper provides a complete picture of the complexity issues arising with three prominent solution concepts for coalitional games with transferable utility, namely, the core, the kernel, and the bargaining set, whenever the game worth-function is represented in some reasonably compact form. The starting points of the investigation are the settings of graph games and of marginal contribution nets, where the worth of any coalition can be computed in polynomial time in the size of the game encoding and for which various open questions were stated in the literature. The paper answers these questions and, in addition, provides new insights on succinctly specified games, by characterizing the computational complexity of the core, the kernel, and the bargaining set in relevant generalizations and specializations of the two settings. Concerning the generalizations, the paper shows that dealing with arbitrary polynomial-time computable worth functions-no matter of the specific game encoding being considered-does not provide any additional source of complexity compared to graph games and marginal contribution nets. Instead, only for the core, a slight increase in complexity is exhibited for classes of games whose worth functions encode NP-hard optimization problems, as in the case of certain combinatorial games. As for specializations, the paper illustrates various tractability results on classes of bounded treewidth graph games and marginal contribution networks.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "complexity results for preference aggregation over m cp nets pareto and majority voting"):
  with members:
    - "achieving new upper bounds for the hypergraph duality problem through logic"
    - "non transferable utility coalitional games via mixed integer linear constraints"
    - "the computational complexity of dominance and consistency in cp nets"
    - "planning with preferences using logic programming"
    - "cp nets a tool for representing and reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference statements"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "cooperative games with bounded dependency degree"):
  with members:
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "building a good team secretary problems and the supermodular degree"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "coalition structure generation over graphs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "cooperative games with overlapping coalitions charting the tractability frontier"):
  with members:
    - "on parameterized complexity of group activity selection problems on social networks"
    - "group activity selection on social networks"
    - "hedonic games with graph restricted communication"
    - "coalition games on interaction graphs a horticultural perspective"
    - "the authorship dilemma alphabetical or contribution"
    - "cooperative games with overlapping coalitions"
    - "an anytime algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation"
    - "the cost of stability in coalitional games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "complementary cooperation minimal winning coalitions and power indices"):
  with members:
    - "the inverse shapley value problem"
    - "selfish bin covering"
    - "computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "non transferable utility coalitional games via mixed integer linear constraints"):
  with members:
    - "an anytime algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation"
    - "computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)