human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "better strategyproof mechanisms without payments or prior an analytic approach"
  Abstract: We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The objective is to design strategyproof mechanisms which are competitive against the most efficient (but not strategyproof) mechanism. #R##N#For the case with two items: #R##N#(1) We provide a set of sufficient conditions for strategyproofness. #R##N#(2) We use an analytic approach to derive strategyproof mechanisms which are more competitive than all prior strategyproof mechanisms. #R##N#(3) We improve the linear-program-based proof of Guo and Conitzer to show new upper bounds on competitive ratios. #R##N#(4) We provide the first "mathematical" upper bound proof. #R##N#For the cases with any number of items: #R##N#(1) We build on the Partial Allocation mechanisms introduced by Cole et al. to design a strategyproof mechanism which is 0.67776-competitive, breaking the 2/3 barrier. #R##N#(2) We propose a new subclass of strategyproof mechanisms called Dynamical-Increasing-Price mechanisms, where each agent purchases the items using virtual money, and the prices of the items depend on other agents' preferences.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "truthful ownership transfer with expert advice blending mechanism design with and without money"):
  with members:
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms for ownership transfer with expert advice"):
  with members:
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"
    - "a maximum likelihood approach for selecting sets of alternatives"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "deterministic strategyproof and fair cake cutting"):
  with members:
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"
    - "cake cutting algorithms for piecewise constant and piecewise uniform valuations"
    - "incentive compatible two player cake cutting"
    - "truthful fair division"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)