human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "structure in dichotomous preferences"
  Abstract: Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of this type have been obtained for the setting where each voter's preference list is a total order of candidates. The goal of this paper is to extend this line of research to the setting where voters' preferences are dichotomous, i.e., each voter approves a subset of candidates and disapproves the remaining candidates. We propose several analogues of the notions of single-peaked and single-crossing preferences for dichotomous profiles and investigate the relationships among them. We then demonstrate that for some of these notions the respective restricted domains admit efficient algorithms for computationally hard approval-based multi-winner rules.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the complexity of constructive control under nearly single peaked preferences"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and bribery in single peaked and nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "the complexity of manipulating k approval elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "on the complexity of destructive bribery in approval based multi winner voting"):
  with members:
    - "monotonicity axioms in approval based multi winner voting rules"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "election attacks with few candidates"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"):
  with members:
    - "on the likelihood of single peaked preferences"
    - "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "clone structures in voters preferences"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "recognizing and eliciting weakly single crossing profiles on trees"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "elicitation for preferences single peaked on trees"
    - "preference elicitation for single crossing domain"
    - "the single crossing property on a tree"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "eliciting single peaked preferences using comparison queries"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "how hard is it to control a group"):
  with members:
    - "the complexity of multiwinner voting rules with variable number of winners"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "the complexity of manipulating k approval elections"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "single peakedness and total unimodularity efficiently solve voting problems without even trying"):
  with members:
    - "multiwinner analogues of plurality rule axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "exact complexity of the winner problem for young elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"):
  with members:
    - "generalizing the single crossing property on lines and trees to intermediate preferences on median graphs"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "ptas for minimax approval voting"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "approximating the maxcover problem with bounded frequencies in fpt time"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "a social welfare optimal sequential allocation procedure"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "justified representation in approval based committee voting"):
  with members:
    - "proportional justified representation"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "ptas for minimax approval voting"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "achieving fully proportional representation approximability results"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)