human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "buying private data without verification"
  Abstract: We consider the problem of designing a survey to aggregate non-verifiable information from a privacy-sensitive population: an analyst wants to compute some aggregate statistic from the private bits held by each member of a population, but cannot verify the correctness of the bits reported by participants in his survey. Individuals in the population are strategic agents with a cost for privacy, \ie, they not only account for the payments they expect to receive from the mechanism, but also their privacy costs from any information revealed about them by the mechanism's outcome---the computed statistic as well as the payments---to determine their utilities. How can the analyst design payments to obtain an accurate estimate of the population statistic when individuals strategically decide both whether to participate and whether to truthfully report their sensitive information? #R##N#We design a differentially private peer-prediction mechanism that supports accurate estimation of the population statistic as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in settings where agents have explicit preferences for privacy. The mechanism requires knowledge of the marginal prior distribution on bits $b_i$, but does not need full knowledge of the marginal distribution on the costs $c_i$, instead requiring only an approximate upper bound. Our mechanism guarantees $\epsilon$-differential privacy to each agent $i$ against any adversary who can observe the statistical estimate output by the mechanism, as well as the payments made to the $n-1$ other agents $j\neq i$. Finally, we show that with slightly more structured assumptions on the privacy cost functions of each agent, the cost of running the survey goes to $0$ as the number of agents diverges.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "causal feature discovery through strategic modification"):
  with members:
    - "strategic adaptation to classifiers a causal perspective"
    - "the disparate effects of strategic manipulation"
    - "how do classifiers induce agents to invest effort strategically"
    - "the social cost of strategic classification"
    - "strategic classification from revealed preferences"
    - "truthful linear regression"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design"
    - "linear regression as a non cooperative game"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "prospect theoretic analysis of privacy preserving mechanism"):
  with members:
    - "a mean field stackelberg game approach for obfuscation adoption in empirical risk minimization"
    - "managing price uncertainty in prosumer centric energy trading a prospect theoretic stackelberg game approach"
    - "reap an efficient incentive mechanism for reconciling aggregation accuracy and individual privacy in crowdsensing"
    - "prospect theory for enhanced cyber physical security of drone delivery systems a network interdiction game"
    - "hardware trojan detection game a prospect theoretic approach"
    - "prospect theory for enhanced smart grid resilience using distributed energy storage"
    - "market model and optimal pricing scheme of big data and internet of things iot"
    - "the value of privacy strategic data subjects incentive mechanisms and fundamental limits"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "scalable and jointly differentially private packing"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal jointly private packing algorithms via dual multiplicative weight update"
    - "differentially private contextual linear bandits"
    - "private matchings and allocations"
    - "the possibilities and limitations of private prediction markets"
    - "privacy odometers and filters pay as you go composition"
    - "jointly private convex programming"
    - "truthful linear regression"
    - "local private efficient protocols for succinct histograms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "prior free data acquisition for accurate statistical estimation"):
  with members:
    - "strategyproof linear regression in high dimensions"
    - "strategic classification from revealed preferences"
    - "optimal data acquisition for statistical estimation"
    - "learning to incentivize eliciting effort via output agreement"
    - "informed truthfulness in multi task peer prediction"
    - "sequential peer prediction learning to elicit effort using posted prices"
    - "low cost learning via active data procurement"
    - "truthful linear regression"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "near optimal jointly private packing algorithms via dual multiplicative weight update"):
  with members:
    - "private matchings and allocations"
    - "jointly private convex programming"
    - "inducing approximately optimal flow using truthful mediators"
    - "privately solving linear programs"
    - "fast algorithms for online stochastic convex programming"
    - "asymptotically truthful equilibrium selection in large congestion games"
    - "calibrating data to sensitivity in private data analysis"
    - "mechanism design in large games incentives and privacy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "individual sensitivity preprocessing for data privacy"):
  with members:
    - "blender enabling local search with a hybrid differential privacy model"
    - "tight lower bounds for locally differentially private selection"
    - "the possibilities and limitations of private prediction markets"
    - "adaptive learning with robust generalization guarantees"
    - "efficient lipschitz extensions for high dimensional graph statistics and node private degree distributions"
    - "heterogeneous differential privacy"
    - "truthful linear regression"
    - "calibrating data to sensitivity in private data analysis"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "adversarial contract design for private data commercialization"):
  with members:
    - "blockchain enabled data marketplace design and challenges"
    - "implementation of smart contracts using hybrid architectures with on and off blockchain components"
    - "contract design for energy demand response"
    - "market model and optimal pricing scheme of big data and internet of things iot"
    - "adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets bandit algorithms for repeated principal agent problems"
    - "differential privacy an economic method for choosing epsilon"
    - "a theory of pricing private data"
    - "privacy aware mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "optimal data acquisition for statistical estimation"):
  with members:
    - "strategic classification from revealed preferences"
    - "low cost learning via active data procurement"
    - "truthful linear regression"
    - "redrawing the boundaries on purchasing data from privacy sensitive individuals"
    - "conducting truthful surveys cheaply"
    - "approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data"
    - "selling privacy at auction"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)