human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "general auction mechanism for search advertising"
  Abstract: In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the page. This gives rise to a bipartite matching market that is typically cleared by the way of an automated auction. Several auction mechanisms have been proposed, with variants of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) being widely used in practice. #R##N#A rich body of work on bipartite matching markets builds upon the stable marriage model of Gale and Shapley and the assignment model of Shapley and Shubik. We apply insights from this line of research into the structure of stable outcomes and their incentive properties to advertising auctions. #R##N#We model advertising auctions in terms of an assignment model with linear utilities, extended with bidder and item specific maximum and minimum prices. Auction mechanisms like the commonly used GSP or the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) are interpreted as simply computing a \emph{bidder-optimal stable matching} in this model, for a suitably defined set of bidder preferences. In our model, the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed, and under a non-degeneracy assumption a bidder-optimal stable matching exists as well. We give an algorithm to find such matching in polynomial time, and use it to design truthful mechanism that generalizes GSP, is truthful for profit-maximizing bidders, implements features like bidder-specific minimum prices and position-specific bids, and works for rich mixtures of bidders and preferences.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "reserve pricing in repeated second price auctions with strategic bidders"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "optimal pricing in repeated posted price auctions"
    - "learning optimal reserve price against non myopic bidders"
    - "contextual search via intrinsic volumes"
    - "robust repeated auctions under heterogeneous buyer behavior"
    - "optimal dynamic auctions are virtual welfare maximizers"
    - "dynamic pricing with finitely many unknown valuations"
    - "on consistency of optimal pricing algorithms in repeated posted price auctions with strategic buyer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "euclidean tsp motorcycle graphs and other new applications of nearest neighbor chains"):
  with members:
    - "faster algorithms for some optimization problems on collinear points"
    - "dynamic planar voronoi diagrams for general distance functions and their algorithmic applications"
    - "the approximation ratio of the greedy algorithm for the metric traveling salesman problem"
    - "a stable marriage requires communication"
    - "simple distributed weighted matchings"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "social choice with non quasi linear utilities"):
  with members:
    - "contingent payment mechanisms to maximize resource utilization"
    - "competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with non transferable utilities"
    - "optimizing scrip systems efficiency crashes hoarders and altruists"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "stable matching voronoi diagrams combinatorial complexity and algorithms"):
  with members:
    - "algorithms for stable matching and clustering in a grid"
    - "defining equitable geographic districts in road networks via stable matching"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "on consistency of optimal pricing algorithms in repeated posted price auctions with strategic buyer"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "sequential mechanisms with ex post participation guarantees"
    - "non parametric revenue optimization for generalized second price auctions"
    - "online learning in repeated auctions"
    - "learning prices for repeated auctions with strategic buyers"
    - "learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve"
    - "dynamic pricing with limited supply"
    - "sequential auctions and externalities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "gsp the cinderella of mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "sponsored search auctions with rich ads"
    - "truthful outcomes from non truthful position auctions"
    - "gsp with general independent click through rates"
    - "position auctions with externalities and brand effects"
    - "optimising trade offs among stakeholders in ad auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "mechanism design for value maximizers"):
  with members:
    - "web and internet economics"
    - "optimising trade offs among stakeholders in ad auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "maximum selection and sorting with adversarial comparators and an application to density estimation"):
  with members:
    - "robust estimators in high dimensions without the computational intractability"
    - "noisy sorting without resampling"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)