human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "security analysis of encrypted virtual machines"
  Abstract: Cloud computing has become indispensable in today's computer landscape. The flexibility it offers for customers as well as for providers has become a crucial factor for large parts of the computer industry. Virtualization is the key technology that allows for sharing of hardware resources among different customers. The controlling software component, called hypervisor, provides a virtualized view of the computer resources and ensures separation of different guest virtual machines. However, this important cornerstone of cloud computing is not necessarily trustworthy. To mitigate this threat AMD introduced Secure Encrypted Virtualization, short SEV. SEV is a processor extension that encrypts guest memory in order to prevent a potentially malicious hypervisor from accessing guest data. In this paper we analyse whether the proposed features can resist a malicious hypervisor and discuss the trade-offs imposed by additional protection mechanisms. To do so, we developed a model of SEV's security capabilities based on the available documentation as actual silicon implementations are not yet on the market. We found that the currently proposed version of SEV is not up to the task owing to three design shortcomings. First, as with standard AMD-V, under SEV, the virtual machine control block is not encrypted and handled directly by the hypervisor, allowing him to bypass VM memory encryption by executing conveniently chosen gadgets. Secondly, the general purpose registers are not encrypted upon vmexit, leaking potentially sensitive data. Finally, the control of the nested pagetables allows a malicious hypervisor to closely control the execution of a VM and attack it with memory replay attacks.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "insecure until proven updated analyzing amd sev s remote attestation"):
  with members:
    - "severed subverting amd s virtual machine encryption"
    - "secure encrypted virtualization is unsecure"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "extracting secrets from encrypted virtual machines"):
  with members:
    - "severed subverting amd s virtual machine encryption"
    - "secure encrypted virtualization is unsecure"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "security performance and energy trade offs of hardware assisted memory protection mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "short paper stress sgx load and stress your enclaves for fun and profit"
    - "snort intrusion detection system with intel software guard extension intel sgx"
    - "severed subverting amd s virtual machine encryption"
    - "securestreams a reactive middleware framework for secure data stream processing"
    - "x search revisiting private web search using intel sgx"
    - "trustshadow secure execution of unmodified applications with arm trustzone"
    - "software grand exposure sgx cache attacks are practical"
    - "secure content based routing using intel software guard extensions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "virtualization technologies and cloud security advantages issues and perspectives"):
  with members:
    - "dr sgx automated and adjustable side channel protection for sgx using data location randomization"
    - "cachezoom how sgx amplifies the power of cache attacks"
    - "hybis advanced introspection for effective windows guest protection"
    - "software grand exposure sgx cache attacks are practical"
    - "malware guard extension using sgx to conceal cache attacks"
    - "inferring fine grained control flow inside sgx enclaves with branch shadowing"
    - "cuda leaks a detailed hack for cuda and a partial fix"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "severed subverting amd s virtual machine encryption"):
  with members:
    - "fault attacks on encrypted general purpose compute platforms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)