human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "copeland voting fully resists constructive control"
  Abstract: Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR07] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland^1) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland^0) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study a parameterized version of Copeland voting, denoted by Copeland^alpha where the parameter alpha is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are valued in the pairwise comparisons of candidates in Copeland elections. We establish resistance or vulnerability results, in every previously studied control scenario, for Copeland^alpha, for each rational alpha, 0 <alpha < 1. In particular, we prove that Copeland^0.5, the system commonly referred to as ``Copeland voting,'' provides full resistance to constructive control. Among the systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, this is the first natural election system proven to have full resistance to constructive control. Results on bribery and fixed-parameter tractability of bounded-case control proven for Copeland^0 and Copeland^1 in [FHHR07] are extended to Copeland^alpha for each rational alpha, 0 < alpha < 1; we also give results in more flexible models such as microbribery and extended control.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a parameterized perspective on protecting elections"):
  with members:
    - "optimal bribery in voting"
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "multimode control attacks on elections"):
  with members:
    - "bucklin voting is broadly resistant to control"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"
    - "towards a dichotomy of finding possible winners in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the complexity of probabilistic lobbying"):
  with members:
    - "manipulation of nanson s and baldwin s rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "parameterizing by the number of numbers"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "satzilla portfolio based algorithm selection for sat"
    - "llull and copeland voting computationally resist bribery and control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "llull and copeland voting computationally resist bribery and control"):
  with members:
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "on approximating optimal weighted lobbying and frequency of correctness versus average case polynomial time"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "dichotomy for voting systems"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"
    - "guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding dodgson election winners"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"):
  with members:
    - "llull and copeland voting computationally resist bribery and control"
    - "on approximating optimal weighted lobbying and frequency of correctness versus average case polynomial time"
    - "the strategy proofness landscape of merging"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"
    - "guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding dodgson election winners"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "how hard is bribery in elections"):
  with members:
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "on approximating optimal weighted lobbying and frequency of correctness versus average case polynomial time"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "dichotomy for voting systems"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"
    - "guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding dodgson election winners"
    - "how many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"):
  with members:
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "llull and copeland voting computationally resist bribery and control"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"
    - "guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding dodgson election winners"
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"
    - "how many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate"
    - "complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)