human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
  Abstract: The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a "fair" way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods, motivating the study of relaxed versions of envy-freeness. We study the envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) property, which states that no player prefers the bundle of another player following the removal of any single good, and prove the first general results about this property. We use the leximin solution to show existence of EFX allocations in several contexts, sometimes in conjunction with Pareto optimality. For two players with valuations obeying a mild assumption, one of these results provides stronger guarantees than the currently deployed algorithm on Spliddit, a popular fair division website. Unfortunately, finding the leximin solution can require exponential time. We show that this is necessary by proving an exponential lower bound on the number of value queries needed to identify an EFX allocation, even for two players with identical valuations. We consider both additive and more general valuations, and our work suggests that there is a rich landscape of problems to explore in the fair division of indivisible goods with different classes of player valuations.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "equitable allocations of indivisible chores"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "algorithms for competitive division of chores"
    - "a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "almost envy freeness and welfare efficiency in fair division with goods or bads"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "maximum nash welfare and other stories about efx"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "almost envy freeness in group resource allocation"
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "greedy algorithms for fair division of mixed manna"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "greedy algorithms for maximizing nash social welfare"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations"):
  with members:
    - "maximum nash welfare and other stories about efx"
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents"
    - "competitive equilibrium with generic budgets beyond additive"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "the price of fairness for indivisible goods"
    - "fair division with bounded sharing"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "efx exists for three agents"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "on fair division of indivisible items"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "finding fair and efficient allocations when valuations don t add up"):
  with members:
    - "equitable allocations of indivisible chores"
    - "fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents"
    - "diverse weighted bipartite b matching"
    - "how to be fair and diverse"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "computing envy freeable allocations with limited subsidies"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "algorithms for competitive division of chores"):
  with members:
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "universal growth in production economies"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the price of connectivity in fair division"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "maximin share allocations on cycles"
    - "fairly allocating many goods with few queries"
    - "chore division on a graph"
    - "almost envy free allocations with connected bundles"
    - "fair division under cardinality constraints"
    - "when do envy free allocations exist"
    - "pareto optimal allocation of indivisible goods with connectivity constraints"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)