human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "auction based coopetition between lte unlicensed and wi fi"
  Abstract: Motivated by the recent efforts in extending LTE to the unlicensed spectrum, we propose a novel spectrum sharing framework for the coopetition (i.e., cooperation and competition) between LTE and Wi-Fi in the unlicensed band. Basically, the LTE network can choose to work in one of the two modes: in the competition mode, it randomly accesses an unlicensed channel, and interferes with the Wi-Fi access point using the same channel; in the cooperation mode, it delivers traffic for the Wi-Fi users in exchange for the exclusive access of the corresponding channel. Because the LTE network works in an interference-free manner in the cooperation mode, it can achieve a much larger data rate than that in the competition mode, which allows it to effectively serve both its own users and the Wi-Fi users. We design a second-price reverse auction mechanism, which enables the LTE provider and the Wi-Fi access point owners (APOs) to effectively negotiate the operation mode. Specifically, the LTE provider is the auctioneer (buyer), and the APOs are the bidders (sellers) who compete to sell their channel access opportunities to the LTE provider. In Stage I of the auction, the LTE provider announces a reserve rate. In Stage II of the auction, the APOs submit their bids. We show that the auction involves allocative externalities, i.e., the cooperation between the LTE provider and one APO benefits other APOs who are not directly involved in this cooperation. As a result, a particular APO's willingness to cooperate is affected by its belief about other APOs' willingness to cooperate. This makes our analysis much more challenging than that of the conventional second-price auction, where bidding truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy. We show that the APOs have a unique form of the equilibrium bidding strategies in Stage II, based on which we analyze the LTE provider's optimal reserve rate in Stage I.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "price competition with lte u and wifi"):
  with members:
    - "contract based incentive mechanism for lte over unlicensed channels"
    - "ruin theory for dynamic spectrum allocation in lte u networks"
    - "the impact of bundling licensed and unlicensed wireless service"
    - "ltfi cross technology communication for rrm between lte u and ieee 802 11"
    - "a multi game framework for harmonized lte u and wifi coexistence over unlicensed bands"
    - "the cost of free spectrum"
    - "quality sensitive price competition in spectrum oligopoly"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "contract based incentive mechanism for lte over unlicensed channels"):
  with members:
    - "orla olaa orthogonal coexistence of laa and wifi in unlicensed spectrum"
    - "echo state networks for self organizing resource allocation in lte u with uplink downlink decoupling"
    - "network formation in the sky unmanned aerial vehicles for multi hop wireless backhauling"
    - "proactive resource management in lte u systems a deep learning perspective"
    - "the impact of unlicensed access on small cell resource allocation"
    - "breaking the economic barrier of caching in cellular networks incentives and contracts"
    - "caching in the sky proactive deployment of cache enabled unmanned aerial vehicles for optimized quality of experience"
    - "joint caching and pricing strategies for popular content in information centric networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the economics of video websites with membership advertising mode in wireless networks"):
  with members:
    - "pricing and resource allocation via game theory for a small cell video caching system"
    - "joint caching and pricing strategies for popular content in information centric networks"
    - "motivating smartphone collaboration in data acquisition and distributed computing"
    - "what will 5g be"
    - "five disruptive technology directions for 5g"
    - "price based resource allocation for spectrum sharing femtocell networks a stackelberg game approach"
    - "price differentiation for communication networks"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)