human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "combinatorial voter control in elections"
  Abstract: Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters are added one at a time, with the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters. In this paper, we initiate the study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters: In our setting, when we choose to add a voter~$v$, we also have to add a whole bundle $\kappa(v)$ of voters associated with $v$. We study the computational complexity of this problem for two of the most basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "selecting voting locations for fun and profit"):
  with members:
    - "a partisan districting protocol with provably nonpartisan outcomes"
    - "network based vertex dissolution"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "more natural models of electoral control by partition"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a parameterized perspective on protecting elections"):
  with members:
    - "optimal bribery in voting"
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on the computational complexity of variants of combinatorial voter control in elections"):
  with members:
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "parameterized algorithmics for computational social choice nine research challenges"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulating sequential allocation"):
  with members:
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "strategyproof quota mechanisms for multiple assignment problems"
    - "possible and necessary allocations via sequential mechanisms"
    - "a social welfare optimal sequential allocation procedure"
    - "how to make the most of a shared meal plan the last bite first"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "parliamentary voting procedures agenda control manipulation and uncertainty"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "parameterized algorithmics for computational social choice nine research challenges"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "the one dimensional euclidean domain finitely many obstructions are not enough"
    - "generalizing the single crossing property on lines and trees to intermediate preferences on median graphs"
    - "parameterized algorithmics for computational social choice nine research challenges"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"):
  with members:
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "more natural models of electoral control by partition"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "control complexity in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "more natural models of electoral control by partition"):
  with members:
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "search versus decision for election manipulation problems"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.MA(Multiagent Systems)