human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "truthfulness via proxies"
  Abstract: This short note exhibits a truthful-in-expectation $O(\frac {\log m} {\log \log m})$-approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that uses polynomial communication.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a bridge between liquid and social welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "a bayesian clearing mechanism for combinatorial auctions"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "bayesian budget feasibility with posted pricing"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a note on relaxation and rounding in algorithmic mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "generalized assignment problem truthful mechanism design without money"
    - "a truthful in expectation mechanism for the generalized assignment problem"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful assignment without money"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "mechanisms for risk averse agents without loss"):
  with members:
    - "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"
    - "an approximately truthful in expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions using value queries"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "robust mechanisms for risk averse sellers"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "combinatorial auctions with restricted complements"):
  with members:
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"
    - "truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "secondary spectrum auctions for symmetric and submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "the power of non uniform wireless power"
    - "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "wireless capacity with oblivious power in general metrics"
    - "a constant factor approximation for wireless capacity maximization with power control in the sinr model"
    - "approximation algorithms for secondary spectrum auctions"
    - "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "symmetry and approximability of submodular maximization problems"
    - "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"
    - "an approximately truthful in expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions using value queries"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "submodular maximization by simulated annealing"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"):
  with members:
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"
    - "truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)