human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
  Abstract: We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only has partial information about the votes of the nonmanipulators. Such partial information is described by an information set, which is the set of profiles of the nonmanipulators that are indistinguishable to the manipulator. Given such an information set, a dominating manipulation is a non-truthful vote that the manipulator can cast which makes the winner at least as preferable (and sometimes more preferable) as the winner when the manipulator votes truthfully. When the manipulator has full information, computing whether or not there exists a dominating manipulation is in P for many common voting rules (by known results). We show that when the manipulator has no information, there is no dominating manipulation for many common voting rules. When the manipulator's information is represented by partial orders and only a small portion of the preferences are unknown, computing a dominating manipulation is NP-hard for many common voting rules. Our results thus throw light on whether we can prevent strategic behavior by limiting information about the votes of other voters.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "distance based equilibria in normal form games"):
  with members:
    - "heuristic voting as ordinal dominance strategies"
    - "lipschitz continuity and approximate equilibria"
    - "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"
    - "congestion games with distance based strict uncertainty"
    - "regret minimizing equilibria and mechanisms for games with strict type uncertainty"
    - "the many faces of rationalizability"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "lie on the fly strategic voting in an iterative preference elicitation process"):
  with members:
    - "cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation"
    - "online prediction with selfish experts"
    - "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous proficiency"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "strengthening gossip protocols using protocol dependent knowledge"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic gossip"
    - "a logic of blockchain updates"
    - "common knowledge in a logic of gossips"
    - "epistemic protocols for distributed gossiping"
    - "plurality voting under uncertainty"
    - "discovery through gossip"
    - "simple fast and deterministic gossip and rumor spreading"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "stable manipulation in voting"):
  with members:
    - "local distance restricted bribery in voting"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method"):
  with members:
    - "strategic voting and the logic of knowledge"
    - "is it ever safe to vote strategically"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "how does uncertainty about other voters determine a strategic vote"):
  with members:
    - "plurality voting under uncertainty"
    - "strategic voting and the logic of knowledge"
    - "reasoning about social choice functions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "predicting strategic voting behavior with poll information"):
  with members:
    - "plurality voting under uncertainty"
    - "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"):
  with members:
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation in elections with partial votes"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "possible and necessary winner problem in social polls"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence)