human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
  Abstract: We study the makespan minimization problem with unrelated selfish machines under the assumption that job sizes are stochastic. We design simple truthful mechanisms that under various distributional assumptions provide constant and sublogarithmic approximations to expected makespan. Our mechanisms are prior-independent in that they do not rely on knowledge of the job size distributions. Prior-independent approximation mechanisms have been previously studied for the objective of revenue maximization [Dhangwatnotai, Roughgarden and Yan'10, Devanur, Hartline, Karlin and Nguyen'11, Roughgarden, Talgam-Cohen and Yan'12]. In contrast to our results, in prior-free settings no truthful anonymous deterministic mechanism for the makespan objective can provide a sublinear approximation [Ashlagi, Dobzinski and Lavi'09].

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the vickrey auction with a single duplicate bidder approximates the optimal revenue"):
  with members:
    - "99 revenue via enhanced competition"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "vickrey auctions for irregular distributions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"):
  with members:
    - "a b testing of auctions"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"
    - "the anarchy of scheduling without money"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"):
  with members:
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"
    - "an improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines"
    - "a characterization of 2 player mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "double auctions in markets for multiple kinds of goods"):
  with members:
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions for two sided markets"
    - "fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade"
    - "approximately efficient two sided combinatorial auctions"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "on random sampling auctions for digital goods"
    - "ascending auctions and walrasian equilibrium"
    - "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "mida a multi item type double auction mechanism"):
  with members:
    - "demand flow of agents with gross substitute valuations"
    - "do prices coordinate markets"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "making the most of your samples"
    - "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"):
  with members:
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)