human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
  Abstract: We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, the bidders participate in some non-truthful protocol whose output is itself a truthful protocol. In the second phase, the bidders participate in the truthful protocol selected during phase one. Note that virtually all existing auctions have either a non-existent first phase (and are therefore truthful mechanisms), or a non-existent second phase (and are therefore just traditional protocols, analyzed via the Price of Anarchy/Stability). #R##N#The goal of this paper is to understand the benefits of interpolation mechanisms versus truthful mechanisms or traditional protocols, and develop the necessary tools to formally study them. Interestingly, we exhibit settings where interpolation mechanisms greatly outperform the optimal traditional and truthful protocols. Yet, we also exhibit settings where interpolation mechanisms are provably no better than truthful ones. Finally, we apply our new machinery to prove that the recent single-bid mechanism of Devanur et. al.~\cite{DevanurMSW15} (the only pre-existing interpolation mechanism in the literature) achieves the optimal price of anarchy among a wide class of protocols, a claim that simply can't be addressed by appealing just to machinery from communication complexity or the study of truthful mechanisms.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"):
  with members:
    - "simple auctions for agents with complements"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "greedy algorithms make efficient mechanisms"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "valuation compressions in vcg based combinatorial auctions"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "taming the monster a fast and simple algorithm for contextual bandits"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "valuation compressions in vcg based combinatorial auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi armed bandit problems"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)