human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "securing application with software partitioning a case study using sgx"
  Abstract: Application size and complexity are the underlying cause of numerous security vulnerabilities in code. In order to mitigate the risks arising from such vulnerabilities, various techniques have been proposed to isolate the execution of sensitive code from the rest of the application and from other software on the platform (e.g. the operating system). However, even with these partitioning techniques, it is not immediately clear exactly how they can and should be used to partition applications. What overall partitioning scheme should be followed; what granularity of the partitions should be. To some extent, this is dependent on the capabilities and performance of the partitioning technology in use. For this work, we focus on the upcoming Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology as the state-of-the-art in this field. SGX provides a trusted execution environment, called an enclave, that protects the integrity of the code and the confidentiality of the data inside it from other software, including the operating system. We present a novel framework consisting of four possible schemes under which an application can be partitioned. These schemes range from coarse-grained partitioning, in which the full application is included in a single enclave, through ultra-fine partitioning, in which each application secret is protected in an individual enclave. We explain the specific security benefits provided by each of the partitioning schemes and discuss how the performance of the application would be affected. To compare the different partitioning schemes, we have partitioned OpenSSL using four different schemes. We discuss SGX properties together with the implications of our design choices in this paper.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a hybrid approach to secure function evaluation using sgx"):
  with members:
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "microwalk a framework for finding side channels in binaries"
    - "software grand exposure sgx cache attacks are practical"
    - "malware guard extension using sgx to conceal cache attacks"
    - "privacy preserving shortest path computation"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)