human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "economic efficiency requires interaction"
  Abstract: We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient allocations. The role of interaction in markets has received significant attention in economic thinking, e.g. in Hayek's 1945 classic paper. #R##N#We consider this problem in the framework of simultaneous communication complexity. We analyze the amount of simultaneous communication required for achieving an approximately efficient allocation. In particular, we consider two settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite matching) and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. For both settings we first show that non-interactive systems have enormous communication costs relative to interactive ones. On the other hand, we show that limited interaction enables us to find approximately efficient allocations.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "polynomial pass lower bounds for graph streaming algorithms"):
  with members:
    - "smaller cuts higher lower bounds"
    - "parallelization does not accelerate convex optimization adaptivity lower bounds for non smooth convex minimization"
    - "an exponential speedup in parallel running time for submodular maximization without loss in approximation"
    - "non monotone submodular maximization with nearly optimal adaptivity complexity"
    - "submodular maximization with optimal approximation adaptivity and query complexity"
    - "tight bounds on the round complexity of the distributed maximum coverage problem"
    - "non monotone submodular maximization in exponentially fewer iterations"
    - "submodular maximization with nearly optimal approximation and adaptivity in nearly linear time"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "broadcast congested clique planted cliques and pseudorandom generators"):
  with members:
    - "congested clique algorithms for graph spanners"
    - "optimal lower bounds for distributed and streaming spanning forest computation"
    - "msf and connectivity in limited variants of the congested clique"
    - "a time hierarchy theorem for the local model"
    - "on derandomizing local distributed algorithms"
    - "deterministic subgraph detection in broadcast congest"
    - "towards a complexity theory for the congested clique"
    - "deterministic graph connectivity in the broadcast congested clique"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "complement free couples must communicate a hardness result for two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "beyond 1 2 approximation for submodular maximization on massive data streams"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "online matroid intersection beating half for random arrival"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "communication distortion and randomness in metric voting"):
  with members:
    - "comparing election methods where each voter ranks only few candidates"
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the demand query model for bipartite matching"):
  with members:
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "navigating central path with electrical flows from flows to matchings and back"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "communication complexity of approximate maximum matching in the message passing model"):
  with members:
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "maximum matching in turnstile streams"
    - "when distributed computation is communication expensive"
    - "better bounds for matchings in the streaming model"
    - "laminar families and metric embeddings non bipartite maximum matching problem in the semi streaming model"
    - "maximum matching in semi streaming with few passes"
    - "sorting searching and simulation in the mapreduce framework"
    - "improved approximation guarantees for weighted matching in the semi streaming model"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"):
  with members:
    - "on estimating maximum matching size in graph streams"
    - "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "learning valuation functions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "single call mechanisms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)