human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "control complexity in fallback voting"
  Abstract: We study the control complexity of fallback voting. Like manipulation and bribery, electoral control describes ways of changing the outcome of an election; unlike manipulation or bribery attempts, control actions---such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters---modify the participative structure of an election. Via such actions one can try to either make a favorite candidate win ("constructive control") or prevent a despised candidate from winning ("destructive control"). Computational complexity can be used to protect elections from control attempts, i.e., proving an election system resistant to some type of control shows that the success of the corresponding control action, though not impossible, is computationally prohibitive. We show that fallback voting, an election system combining approval with majority voting, is resistant to each of the common types of candidate control and to each common type of constructive control. Among natural election systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, only plurality and sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV) were previously known to be fully resistant to candidate control, and only Copeland voting and SP-AV were previously known to be fully resistant to constructive control. However, plurality has fewer resistances to voter control, Copeland voting has fewer resistances to destructive control, and SP-AV (which like fallback voting has 19 out of 22 proven control resistances) is arguably less natural a system than fallback voting.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a parameterized perspective on protecting elections"):
  with members:
    - "optimal bribery in voting"
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "manipulating elections by selecting issues"):
  with members:
    - "hotelling downs model with limited attraction"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "the complexity of probabilistic lobbying"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "possible winners in noisy elections"):
  with members:
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "search versus decision for election manipulation problems"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "fully proportional representation as resource allocation approximability results"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "cloning in elections finding the possible winners"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "weighted electoral control"):
  with members:
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "possible winners in noisy elections"
    - "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "how many vote operations are needed to manipulate a voting system"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"):
  with members:
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "control complexity in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "approximation algorithms for campaign management"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"):
  with members:
    - "x then x manipulation of same system runoff elections"
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "search versus decision for election manipulation problems"):
  with members:
    - "existence versus exploitation the opacity of backbones and backdoors under a weak assumption"
    - "computational social choice and computational complexity bffs"
    - "the opacity of backbones"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)