human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "optimal coordinated planning amongst self interested agents with private state"
  Abstract: Consider a multi-agent system in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Each agent's local decision problem is modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP) and agents must coordinate on a joint action in each period, which provides a reward to each agent and causes local state transitions. A social planner knows the model of every agent's MDP and wants to implement the optimal joint policy, but agents are self-interested and have private local state. We provide an incentive-compatible mechanism for eliciting state information that achieves the optimal joint plan in a Markov perfect equilibrium of the induced stochastic game. In the special case in which local problems are Markov chains and agents compete to take a single action in each period, we leverage Gittins allocation indices to provide an efficient factored algorithm and distribute computation of the optimal policy among the agents. Distributed, optimal coordinated learning in a multi-agent variant of the multi-armed bandit problem is obtained as a special case.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "incentive compatibility in stochastic dynamic systems"):
  with members:
    - "almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good"
    - "mechanism design approach for energy efficiency"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "on the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex post ir via bank accounts"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "faithful implementations of distributed algorithms and control laws"):
  with members:
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"
    - "truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "sequential mechanisms with ex post participation guarantees"):
  with members:
    - "optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex post ir via bank accounts"
    - "perfect bayesian equilibria in repeated sales"
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"
    - "bayesian optimal auctions via multi to single agent reduction"
    - "dynamic pricing with limited supply"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "descending price optimally coordinates search"):
  with members:
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "price of anarchy for greedy auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "solving transition independent multi agent mdps with sparse interactions extended version"):
  with members:
    - "flexible decomposition algorithms for weakly coupled markov decision problems"
    - "spudd stochastic planning using decision diagrams"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "on the complexity of dynamic mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"
    - "economic efficiency requires interaction"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "an optimal dynamic mechanism for multi armed bandit processes"
    - "optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "auctions with online supply"):
  with members:
    - "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"
    - "online stochastic matching beating 1 1 e"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"
    - "optimal mechansim design and money burning"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)