human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "optimal competitive auctions"
  Abstract: We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-maximizing auction design literature as it requires no probabilistic assumptions on buyers' valuations and employs the framework of competitive analysis. Our objective is to optimize the worst-case performance of an auction, measured by the ratio between a given benchmark and revenue generated by the auction. #R##N#We establish a sufficient and necessary condition that characterizes competitive ratios for all monotone benchmarks. The characterization identifies the worst-case distribution of instances and reveals intrinsic relations between competitive ratios and benchmarks in the competitive analysis. With the characterization at hand, we show optimal competitive auctions for two natural benchmarks. #R##N#The most well-studied benchmark $\mathcal{F}^{(2)}(\cdot)$ measures the envy-free optimal revenue where at least two buyers win. Goldberg et al. [13] showed a sequence of lower bounds on the competitive ratio for each number of buyers n. They conjectured that all these bounds are tight. We show that optimal competitive auctions match these bounds. Thus, we confirm the conjecture and settle a central open problem in the design of digital goods auctions. As one more application we examine another economically meaningful benchmark, which measures the optimal revenue across all limited-supply Vickrey auctions. We identify the optimal competitive ratios to be $(\frac{n}{n-1})^{n-1}-1$ for each number of buyers n, that is $e-1$ as $n$ approaches infinity.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "benchmark design and prior independent optimization"):
  with members:
    - "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "optimal platform design"
    - "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"
    - "optimal mechansim design and money burning"
    - "a comparison of performance measures for online algorithms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "robust algorithms for the secretary problem"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "stochastic bandits robust to adversarial corruptions"
    - "learning geometric concepts with nasty noise"
    - "learning from untrusted data"
    - "agnostic estimation of mean and covariance"
    - "robust estimators in high dimensions without the computational intractability"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "nearly optimal pricing algorithms for production constrained and laminar bayesian selection"
    - "improved approximations for free order prophets and second price auctions"
    - "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "smoothed analysis of multi item auctions with correlated values"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "the value of information concealment"
    - "smoothed and average case approximation ratios of mechanisms beyond the worst case analysis"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "prophet inequalities with limited information"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"):
  with members:
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "prophet inequalities with limited information"
    - "polymatroid prophet inequalities"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"):
  with members:
    - "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
    - "the simple economics of approximately optimal auctions"
    - "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing"
    - "sequential posted pricing and multi parameter mechanism design"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "profit maximizing prior free multi unit procurement auctions with capacitated sellers"):
  with members:
    - "on random sampling auctions for digital goods"
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)