human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
  Abstract: Walrasian prices, if they exist, have the property that one can assign every buyer some bundle in her demand set, such that the resulting assignment will maximize social welfare. Unfortunately, this assumes carefully breaking ties amongst different bundles in the buyer demand set. Presumably, the shopkeeper cleverly convinces the buyer to break ties in a manner consistent with maximizing social welfare. Lacking such a shopkeeper, if buyers arrive sequentially and simply choose some arbitrary bundle in their demand set, the social welfare may be arbitrarily bad. In the context of matching markets, we show how to compute dynamic prices, based upon the current inventory, that guarantee that social welfare is maximized. Such prices are set without knowing the identity of the next buyer to arrive. We also show that this is impossible in general (e.g., for coverage valuations), but consider other scenarios where this can be done.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the power and limits of dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets"):
  with members:
    - "a general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets"
    - "combinatorial auctions with endowment effect"
    - "max min greedy matching"
    - "pricing for online resource allocation intervals and paths"
    - "pricing multi unit markets"
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "price doubling and item halving robust revenue guarantees for item pricing"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "prophet inequality for bipartite matching merits of being simple and non adaptive"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "tight competitive ratios of classic matching algorithms in the fully online model"
    - "how to match when all vertices arrive online"
    - "maximizing efficiency in dynamic matching markets"
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "pricing for online resource allocation intervals and paths"):
  with members:
    - "stability of service under time of use pricing"
    - "era a framework for economic resource allocation for the cloud"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "truthful online scheduling with commitments"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "pricing multi unit markets"):
  with members:
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "pricing online decisions beyond auctions"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "dynamic pricing with limited supply"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "simple pricing schemes for the cloud"):
  with members:
    - "pricing multi unit markets"
    - "pricing identical items"
    - "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"
    - "hiring secretaries over time the benefit of concurrent employment"
    - "on demand or spot selling the cloud to risk averse customers"
    - "truthful online scheduling with commitments"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "makespan minimization via posted prices"):
  with members:
    - "pricing online decisions beyond auctions"
    - "tight bounds for online vector scheduling"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"):
  with members:
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "algorithms as mechanisms the price of anarchy of relax and round"
    - "train faster generalize better stability of stochastic gradient descent"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "posted pricing sans discrimination"):
  with members:
    - "do prices coordinate markets"
    - "on the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms"
    - "on welfare approximation and stable pricing"
    - "sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations"
    - "welfare maximization with production costs a primal dual approach"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
    - "welfare and profit maximization with production costs"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)