human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "competition between wireless service providers pricing equilibrium and efficiency"
  Abstract: As the communication network is in transition towards a commercial one controlled by service providers (SP), the present paper considers a pricing game in a communication market covered by several wireless access points sharing the same spectrum and analyzes two business models: monopoly (APs controlled by one SP) and oligopoly (APs controlled by different SPs). We use a Stackelberg game to model the problem: SPs are the leader(s) and end users are the followers. We prove, under certain conditions, the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for both models and derive their expressions. In order to compare the impact of different business models on social welfare and SPs' profits, we define two metrics: PoCS (price of competition on social welfare) and PoCP (price of competition on profits). For symmetric cross-AP interferences, the tight lower bound of PoCS is 3/4, and that of PoCP is 1.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "competition with three tier spectrum access and spectrum monitoring"):
  with members:
    - "the impact of bundling licensed and unlicensed wireless service"
    - "the cost of free spectrum"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "competitive resource allocation in hetnets the impact of small cell spectrum constraints and investment costs"):
  with members:
    - "the impact of small cell bandwidth requirements on strategic operators"
    - "the impact of unlicensed access on small cell resource allocation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the impact of small cell bandwidth requirements on strategic operators"):
  with members:
    - "the impact of unlicensed access on small cell resource allocation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the value of side information in secondary spectrum markets"):
  with members:
    - "secondary spectrum market to acquire or not to acquire side information"
    - "quality sensitive price competition in spectrum oligopoly part ii"
    - "quality sensitive price competition in spectrum oligopoly"
    - "competition with dynamic spectrum leasing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the impact of unlicensed access on small cell resource allocation"):
  with members:
    - "the cost of free spectrum"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)