human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
  Abstract: In settings where players have a limited access to liquidity, represented in the form of budget constraints, efficiency maximization has proven to be a challenging goal. In particular, the social welfare cannot be approximated by a better factor then the number of players. Therefore, the literature has mainly resorted to Pareto-efficiency as a way to achieve efficiency in such settings. While successful in some important scenarios, in many settings it is known that either exactly one incentive-compatible auction that always outputs a Pareto-efficient solution, or that no truthful mechanism can always guarantee a Pareto-efficient outcome. Traditionally, impossibility results can be avoided by considering approximations. However, Pareto-efficiency is a binary property (is either satisfied or not), which does not allow for approximations. #R##N#In this paper we propose a new notion of efficiency, called \emph{liquid welfare}. This is the maximum amount of revenue an omniscient seller would be able to extract from a certain instance. We explain the intuition behind this objective function and show that it can be 2-approximated by two different auctions. Moreover, we show that no truthful algorithm can guarantee an approximation factor better than 4/3 with respect to the liquid welfare, and provide a truthful auction that attains this bound in a special case. #R##N#Importantly, the liquid welfare benchmark also overcomes impossibilities for some settings. While it is impossible to design Pareto-efficient auctions for multi-unit auctions where players have decreasing marginal values, we give a deterministic $O(\log n)$-approximation for the liquid welfare in this setting.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"):
  with members:
    - "a b testing of auctions"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints"):
  with members:
    - "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources"
    - "liquid price of anarchy"
    - "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations"
    - "on the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets"
    - "expressiveness and robustness of first price position auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users"):
  with members:
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources"
    - "liquid price of anarchy"
    - "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "liquid price of anarchy"):
  with members:
    - "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful multi unit procurements with budgets"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources"):
  with members:
    - "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations"
    - "tight bounds for the price of anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
    - "a price anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"):
  with members:
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "competitive auctions for markets with positive externalities"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"):
  with members:
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
    - "clinching auctions with online supply"
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"
    - "general auction mechanism for search advertising"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)