human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
  Abstract: We design a Copula-based generic randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling on two unrelated machines with approximation ratio within $[1.5852, 1.58606]$, offering an improved upper bound for the two-machine case. Moreover, we provide an upper bound 1.5067711 for the two-machine two-task case, which is almost tight in view of the lower bound of 1.506 for the scale-free truthful mechanisms [4]. Of independent interest is the explicit incorporation of the concept of Copula in the design and analysis of the proposed approximation algorithm. We hope that techniques like this one will also prove useful in solving other problems in the future.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the nisan ronen conjecture for submodular valuations"):
  with members:
    - "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "a unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"):
  with members:
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)