human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "valuation compressions in vcg based combinatorial auctions"
  Abstract: The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many valuation spaces computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed efficiently. We prove improved upper bounds on the welfare loss for restrictions to additive bids and upper and lower bounds for restrictions to non-additive bids. These bounds show that the welfare loss increases in expressiveness. All our bounds apply to equilibrium concepts that can be computed in polynomial time as well as to learning outcomes.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"):
  with members:
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "algorithms as mechanisms the price of anarchy of relax and round"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "taming the monster a fast and simple algorithm for contextual bandits"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi armed bandit problems"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "algorithms as mechanisms the price of anarchy of relax and round"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "on the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism"
    - "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "on k column sparse packing programs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "on the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism"):
  with members:
    - "economic efficiency requires interaction"
    - "on the inefficiency of standard multi unit auctions"
    - "bayesian games and the smoothness framework"
    - "bayesian sequential auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "sequential auctions and externalities"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)