human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on discrete preferences and coordination"
  Abstract: An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of opinions and the adoption of technology. A basic question that has remained largely open in this area is to consider games where the strategies available to the players come from a fixed, discrete set, and where players may have different intrinsic preferences among the possible strategies. It is natural to model the tension among these different preferences by positing a distance function on the strategy set that determines a notion of "similarity" among strategies; a player's payoff is determined by the distance from her chosen strategy to her preferred strategy and to the strategies chosen by her network neighbors. Even when there are only two strategies available, this framework already leads to natural open questions about a version of the classical Battle of the Sexes problem played on a graph. #R##N#We develop a set of techniques for analyzing this class of games, which we refer to as discrete preference games. We parametrize the games by the relative extent to which a player takes into account the effect of her preferred strategy and the effect of her neighbors' strategies, allowing us to interpolate between network coordination games and unilateral decision-making. When these two effects are balanced, we show that the price of stability is equal to 1 for any discrete preference game in which the distance function on the strategies is a tree metric; as a special case, this includes the Battle of the Sexes on a graph. We also show that trees form the maximal family of metrics for which the price of stability is 1, and produce a collection of metrics on which the price of stability converges to a tight bound of 2.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "local aggregation in preference games"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of equilibria in discrete preference games"
    - "decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "computational aspects of equilibria in discrete preference games"):
  with members:
    - "coordination games on directed graphs"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "resource allocation game on social networks best response dynamics and convergence"):
  with members:
    - "fast convergence of regularized learning in games"
    - "reaching consensus via non bayesian asynchronous learning in social networks"
    - "average case performance of replicator dynamics in potential games via computing regions of attraction"
    - "the role of social networks in information diffusion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "playing stackelberg opinion optimization with randomized algorithms for combinatorial strategies"):
  with members:
    - "opinion maximization in social networks"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "dynamics of evolving social groups"):
  with members:
    - "selection and influence in cultural dynamics"
    - "biased assimilation homophily and the dynamics of polarization"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "bounds on the price of anarchy for a more general class of directed graphs in opinion formation games"):
  with members:
    - "opinion maximization in social networks"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "how much of a person influencing the others and being influenced matters in opinion formation games"):
  with members:
    - "opinion maximization in social networks"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks subverted majorities and the swing player"):
  with members:
    - "minority becomes majority in social networks"
    - "how bad is forming your own opinion"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)