human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"
  Abstract: In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from this assumption, and consider the setting where all voters are strategic. In this case, the election can be viewed as a game, and the election outcomes correspond to Nash equilibria of this game. We use this framework to analyze two variants of Plurality voting, namely, simultaneous voting, where all voters submit their ballots at the same time, and sequential voting, where the voters express their preferences one by one. For simultaneous voting, we characterize the preference profiles that admit a pure Nash equilibrium, but show that it is computationally hard to check if a given profile fits our criterion. For sequential voting, we provide a complete analysis of the setting with two candidates, and show that for three or more candidates the equilibria of sequential voting may behave in a counterintuitive manner.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "sybil resilient social choice with partial participation"):
  with members:
    - "sybil resilient conductance based community growth"
    - "sybil resilient reality aware social choice"
    - "incorporating reality into social choice"
    - "proxy voting for better outcomes"
    - "sample complexity for winner prediction in elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the complexity of online bribery in sequential elections extended abstract"):
  with members:
    - "the complexity of online bribery in sequential elections"
    - "computational social choice and computational complexity bffs"
    - "high multiplicity election problems"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "the complexity of controlling candidate sequential elections"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "the complexity of online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "lie on the fly strategic voting in an iterative preference elicitation process"):
  with members:
    - "cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation"
    - "online prediction with selfish experts"
    - "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous proficiency"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "secure voting protocols with perfect ballot secrecy"):
  with members:
    - "protecting privacy through distributed computation in multi agent decision making"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "rational secret sharing and multiparty computation extended abstract"
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the complexity of online bribery in sequential elections"):
  with members:
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "dichotomy for voting systems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "sequential voting with confirmation network"):
  with members:
    - "optimal impartial selection"
    - "sum of us strategyproof selection from the selectors"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation"):
  with members:
    - "gibbard satterthwaite games for k approval voting rules"
    - "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting lazy and truth biased voters"
    - "is it ever safe to vote strategically"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "gibbard satterthwaite games for k approval voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "equilibria of plurality voting lazy and truth biased voters"
    - "is it ever safe to vote strategically"
    - "a classification of weakly acyclic games"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)