human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
  Abstract: We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e., are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of $1+\epsilon$. For the case of two-item two-bidder auctions we show that these auctions, termed Triage auctions, are the only scalable ones that give an approximation factor better than 2. "Scalable" means that the allocation does not depend on the units in which the valuations are measured. We deduce from this that any scalable computationally-efficient incentive-compatible auction for $m$ items and $n \ge 2$ bidders cannot approximate the social welfare to within a factor better than 2. This is in contrast to arbitrarily good approximations that can be reached under computational constraints alone, and in contrast to the fact that the optimal social welfare can be obtained under incentive constraints alone.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the nisan ronen conjecture for submodular valuations"):
  with members:
    - "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "a unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "walrasian dynamics in multi unit markets"):
  with members:
    - "optimal multi unit mechanisms with private demands"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "when does the price of anarchy tend to 1 in large walrasian auctions and fisher markets"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
    - "on nash dynamics of matching market equilibria"
    - "price of anarchy for greedy auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"):
  with members:
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"
    - "an improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines"
    - "a characterization of 2 player mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "envy free pricing in multi unit markets"):
  with members:
    - "posted pricing sans discrimination"
    - "budgetary effects on pricing equilibrium in online markets"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "the complexity of fairness through equilibrium"
    - "reducing revenue to welfare maximization approximation algorithms and other generalizations"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"
    - "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "approximately envy free spectrum allocation with complementarities"):
  with members:
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "bribeproof mechanisms for two values domains"):
  with members:
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue"
    - "a complete characterization of group strategyproof mechanisms of cost sharing"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"):
  with members:
    - "truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing"
    - "the exponential mechanism for social welfare private truthful and nearly optimal"
    - "single call mechanisms"
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "characterizing truthful multi armed bandit mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "symmetry and approximability of submodular maximization problems"
    - "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)