human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "single call mechanisms"
  Abstract: Truthfulness is fragile and demanding. It is oftentimes computationally harder than solving the original problem. Even worse, truthfulness can be utterly destroyed by small uncertainties in a mechanism's outcome. One obstacle is that truthful payments depend on outcomes other than the one realized, such as the lengths of non-shortest-paths in a shortest-path auction. Single-call mechanisms are a powerful tool that circumvents this obstacle --- they implicitly charge truthful payments, guaranteeing truthfulness in expectation using only the outcome realized by the mechanism. The cost of such truthfulness is a trade-off between the expected quality of the outcome and the risk of large payments. #R##N#We largely settle when and to what extent single-call mechanisms are possible. The first single-call construction was discovered by Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Slivkins [BKS10] in single-parameter domains. They give a transformation that turns any monotone, single-parameter allocation rule into a truthful-in-expectation single-call mechanism. Our first result is a natural complement to [BKS10]: we give a new transformation that produces a single-call VCG mechanism from any allocation rule for which VCG payments are truthful. Second, in both the single-parameter and VCG settings, we precisely characterize the possible transformations, showing that that a wide variety of transformations are possible but that all take a very simple form. Finally, we study the inherent trade-off between the expected quality of the outcome and the risk of large payments. We show that our construction and that of [BKS10] simultaneously optimize a variety of metrics in their respective domains. #R##N#As an example, we analyze pay-per-click advertising auctions, where the truthfulness of the standard VCG-based auction is easily broken when the auctioneer's estimated click-through-rates are imprecise.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "economic efficiency requires interaction"
    - "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a faster algorithm for bidder optimal core points"):
  with members:
    - "core competitive auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"):
  with members:
    - "truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing"
    - "the exponential mechanism for social welfare private truthful and nearly optimal"
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "characterizing truthful multi armed bandit mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a dynamic axiomatic approach to first price auctions"):
  with members:
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "coopetitive ad auctions"
    - "sequential auctions and externalities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi armed bandit problems"):
  with members:
    - "bandit algorithms for tree search"
    - "towards minimax policies for online linear optimization with bandit feedback"
    - "online bandit learning against an adaptive adversary from regret to policy regret"
    - "regret bounds for restless markov bandits"
    - "from bandits to experts on the value of side observations"
    - "efficient optimal learning for contextual bandits"
    - "toward a classification of finite partial monitoring games"
    - "no internal regret via neighborhood watch"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"):
  with members:
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing"
    - "reducing revenue to welfare maximization approximation algorithms and other generalizations"
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"
    - "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"
    - "the exponential mechanism for social welfare private truthful and nearly optimal"
    - "optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)