human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
  Abstract: We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing her favorite bundle from among the unsold items at the posted prices. These mechanisms are simple, transparent and trivially dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). #R##N#We show that when agent preferences are fractionally subadditive (which includes all submodular functions), there always exist prices that, in expectation, obtain at least half of the optimal welfare. Our result is constructive: given black-box access to a combinatorial auction algorithm A, sample access to the prior distribution, and appropriate query access to the sampled valuations, one can compute, in polytime, prices that guarantee at least half of the expected welfare of A. As a corollary, we obtain the first polytime (in n and m) constant-factor DSIC mechanism for Bayesian submodular combinatorial auctions, given access to demand query oracles. Our results also extend to valuations with complements, where the approximation factor degrades linearly with the level of complementarity.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations"):
  with members:
    - "optimal single choice prophet inequalities from samples"
    - "robust algorithms for the secretary problem"
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "stochastic bandits robust to adversarial corruptions"
    - "optimal online contention resolution schemes via ex ante prophet inequalities"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "robustly learning a gaussian getting optimal error efficiently"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "online stochastic max weight matching prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models"):
  with members:
    - "beating greedy for stochastic bipartite matching"
    - "online stochastic matching with edge arrivals"
    - "optimal single choice prophet inequalities from samples"
    - "an optimal monotone contention resolution scheme for bipartite matchings via a polyhedral viewpoint"
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "prophet inequality for bipartite matching merits of being simple and non adaptive"
    - "tight competitive ratios of classic matching algorithms in the fully online model"
    - "how to match when all vertices arrive online"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on the power and limits of dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets"):
  with members:
    - "a general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets"
    - "combinatorial auctions with endowment effect"
    - "max min greedy matching"
    - "pricing for online resource allocation intervals and paths"
    - "pricing multi unit markets"
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "price doubling and item halving robust revenue guarantees for item pricing"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "predict and match prophet inequalities with uncertain supply"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "approximation algorithms for correlated knapsacks and non martingale bandits"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "limitations of incentive compatibility on discrete type spaces"):
  with members:
    - "a general theory of sample complexity for multi item profit maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "prophet inequality for bipartite matching merits of being simple and non adaptive"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "tight competitive ratios of classic matching algorithms in the fully online model"
    - "how to match when all vertices arrive online"
    - "maximizing efficiency in dynamic matching markets"
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "complement free couples must communicate a hardness result for two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "beyond 1 2 approximation for submodular maximization on massive data streams"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "online matroid intersection beating half for random arrival"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "implementation in advised strategies welfare guarantees from posted price mechanisms when demand queries are np hard"):
  with members:
    - "submodular maximization beyond non negativity guarantees fast algorithms and applications"
    - "guess free maximization of submodular and linear sums"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvature"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)