human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "optimal bounds for the no show paradox via sat solving"
  Abstract: Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. Perhaps one of the most important desirable properties in this context is Condorcet-consistency, which requires that a voting rule should return an alternative that is preferred to any other alternative by some majority of voters. Another desirable property is participation, which requires that no voter should be worse off by joining an electorate. A seminal result in social choice theory by Moulin (1998) has shown that Condorcet-consistency and participation are incompatible whenever there are at least 4 alternatives and 25 voters. We leverage SAT solving to obtain an elegant human-readable proof of Moulin's result that requires only 12 voters. Moreover, the SAT solver is able to construct a Condorcet-consistent voting rule that satisfies participation as well as a number of other desirable properties for up to 11 voters, proving the optimality of the above bound. We also obtain tight results for set-valued and probabilistic voting rules, which complement and significantly improve existing theorems.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "condorcet s principle and the preference reversal paradox"):
  with members:
    - "solving and verifying the boolean pythagorean triples problem via cube and conquer"
    - "automated search for impossibility theorems in social choice theory ranking sets of objects"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"):
  with members:
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via smt solving"):
  with members:
    - "the impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "automated search for impossibility theorems in social choice theory ranking sets of objects"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "welfare maximization entices participation"):
  with members:
    - "arrovian aggregation of convex preferences"
    - "condorcet s principle and the preference reversal paradox"
    - "consistent probabilistic social choice"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)