human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions"
  Abstract: We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions. The framework extends linear programming duality and complementarity to constraints with partial derivatives. The dual system reveals the geometric nature of the problem and highlights its connection with the theory of bipartite graph matchings. We demonstrate the power of the framework by applying it to a multiple-good monopoly setting where the buyer has uniformly distributed valuations for the items, the canonical long-standing open problem in the area. We propose a deterministic selling mechanism called Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA), which we prove to be exactly optimal for up to 6 items, and conjecture its optimality for any number of goods. The duality framework is used not only for proving optimality, but perhaps more importantly for deriving the optimal mechanism itself; as a result, SJA is defined by natural geometric constraints.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations"):
  with members:
    - "on optimal mechanisms in the two item single buyer unit demand setting"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "optimal auctions with restricted allocations"
    - "bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for profit maximization in multi item auctions"):
  with members:
    - "the best of both worlds asymptotically efficient mechanisms with a guarantee on the expected gains from trade"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "almost efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "approximately efficient two sided combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on optimal mechanisms in the two item single buyer unit demand setting"):
  with members:
    - "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "optimal auctions with restricted allocations"
    - "selling two goods optimally"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "robust revenue maximization under minimal statistical information"):
  with members:
    - "revenue maximization with imprecise distribution"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "simple versus optimal contracts"
    - "bayesian auctions with efficient queries"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "a sample complexity measure with applications to learning optimal auctions"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "the value of information concealment"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "optimal pricing for mhr and lambda regular distributions"):
  with members:
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing beyond linear utility"
    - "optimal pricing for mhr distributions"
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "online market intermediation"
    - "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
    - "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanism design with risk loving agents"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "revenue maximization with an uncertainty averse buyer"
    - "energy coupon a mean field game perspective on demand response in smart grids"
    - "selling two goods optimally"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"
    - "mechanism design via optimal transport"
    - "prior independent auctions for risk averse agents"
    - "mechanisms for risk averse agents without loss"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "optimal auctions through deep learning"):
  with members:
    - "automatic chemical design using a data driven continuous representation of molecules"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "can deep reinforcement learning solve erdos selfridge spencer games"
    - "a sample complexity measure with applications to learning optimal auctions"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "efficient empirical revenue maximization in single parameter auction environments"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)