human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
  Abstract: We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that performing that case of control is computationally infeasible. Range Voting is a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a simple variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each voter. We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest number of control resistances among natural voting systems.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a parameterized perspective on protecting elections"):
  with members:
    - "optimal bribery in voting"
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "manipulating elections by selecting issues"):
  with members:
    - "hotelling downs model with limited attraction"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "the complexity of probabilistic lobbying"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"):
  with members:
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "more natural models of electoral control by partition"
    - "combinatorial voter control in elections"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "control complexity in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "more natural models of electoral control by partition"):
  with members:
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "combinatorial voter control in elections"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "search versus decision for election manipulation problems"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "weighted electoral control"):
  with members:
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "possible winners in noisy elections"
    - "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "how many vote operations are needed to manipulate a voting system"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"):
  with members:
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "control complexity in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "approximation algorithms for campaign management"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"):
  with members:
    - "x then x manipulation of same system runoff elections"
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)