human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
  Abstract: We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the optimal one. #R##N#We show that when the valuations of the bidders are submodular, in many interesting settings (e.g., constant number of bidders, budget additive bidders) computing an equilibrium with good welfare is essentially as easy as computing, completely ignoring incentives issues, an allocation with good welfare. On the other hand, for subadditive valuations, we show that computing an equilibrium requires exponential communication. Finally, for XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive) valuations, we show that if there exists an efficient algorithm that finds an equilibrium, it must use techniques that are very different from our current ones.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "almost envy freeness with general valuations"):
  with members:
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"):
  with members:
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "algorithms as mechanisms the price of anarchy of relax and round"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"):
  with members:
    - "simple auctions for agents with complements"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "greedy algorithms make efficient mechanisms"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "an empirical study on computing equilibria in polymatrix games"):
  with members:
    - "approximating nash equilibria in tree polymatrix games"
    - "from duels to battefields computing equilibria of blotto and other games"
    - "an empirical study of finding approximate equilibria in bimatrix games"
    - "coordination games on graphs"
    - "inapproximability of nash equilibrium"
    - "computing approximate nash equilibria in polymatrix games"
    - "computing nash equilibria of action graph games"
    - "the complexity of non monotone markets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "valuation compressions in vcg based combinatorial auctions"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"):
  with members:
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "tight bounds for the price of anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)