human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
  Abstract: We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on the case of two players with additive valuation functions and our purpose is twofold. First, our main result provides a complete characterization of truthful mechanisms that allocate all the items to the players. Our characterization reveals an interesting structure underlying all truthful mechanisms, showing that they can be decomposed into two components: a selection part where players pick their best subset among prespecified choices determined by the mechanism, and an exchange part where players are offered the chance to exchange certain subsets if it is favorable to do so. In the remaining paper, we apply our main result and derive several consequences on the design of mechanisms with fairness guarantees. We consider various notions of fairness, (indicatively, maximin share guarantees and envy-freeness up to one item) and provide tight bounds for their approximability. Our work settles some of the open problems in this agenda, and we conclude by discussing possible extensions to more players.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations"):
  with members:
    - "maximum nash welfare and other stories about efx"
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents"
    - "competitive equilibrium with generic budgets beyond additive"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "the price of fairness for indivisible goods"
    - "fair division with bounded sharing"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "multiple birds with one stone beating 1 2 for efx and gmms via envy cycle elimination"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "comparing approximate relaxations of envy freeness"):
  with members:
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "competitive equilibria with indivisible goods and generic budgets"):
  with members:
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "communication complexity of discrete fair division"
    - "competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"
    - "nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable piecewise linear concave utilities"
    - "nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "fair division of a graph"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
    - "asymptotic existence of proportionally fair allocations"
    - "envy free cake cutting among families"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "upper bounds on number of steals in rooted trees"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
    - "asymptotic existence of proportionally fair allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"):
  with members:
    - "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for four agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "upper bounds on number of steals in rooted trees"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
    - "asymptotic existence of proportionally fair allocations"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)