human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
  Abstract: We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem--a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to "unit-demand" agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. When the agents' preferences are single-dimensional Myerson's seminal work [Myerson '81] shows that randomness offers no benefit--the optimal mechanism is always deterministic. In the multi-dimensional case, where each agent's preferences are given by different values for each of the available services, Briest et al. [Briest, Chawla, Kleinberg, and Weinberg '10] recently showed that the gap between the expected revenue obtained by an optimal randomized mechanism and an optimal deterministic mechanism can be unbounded even when a single agent is offered only 4 services. However, this large gap is attained through unnatural instances where values of the agent for different services are correlated in a specific way. We show that when the agent's values involve no correlation or a specific kind of positive correlation, the benefit of randomness is only a small constant factor (4 and 8 respectively). Our model of positively correlated values (that we call additive values) is a natural model for unit-demand agents and items that are substitutes. Our results extend to multiple agent settings as well.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations"):
  with members:
    - "optimal single choice prophet inequalities from samples"
    - "robust algorithms for the secretary problem"
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "stochastic bandits robust to adversarial corruptions"
    - "optimal online contention resolution schemes via ex ante prophet inequalities"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "robustly learning a gaussian getting optimal error efficiently"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "simple credible and approximately optimal auctions"):
  with members:
    - "an improved welfare guarantee for first price auctions"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "sample complexity for non truthful mechanisms"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "escaping cannibalization correlation robust pricing for a unit demand buyer"):
  with members:
    - "beyond worst case analysis"
    - "simple versus optimal contracts"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "when to limit market entry under mandatory purchase"):
  with members:
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations"):
  with members:
    - "on optimal mechanisms in the two item single buyer unit demand setting"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "optimal auctions with restricted allocations"
    - "bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for profit maximization in multi item auctions"):
  with members:
    - "the best of both worlds asymptotically efficient mechanisms with a guarantee on the expected gains from trade"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "almost efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "approximately efficient two sided combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "on optimal mechanisms in the two item single buyer unit demand setting"):
  with members:
    - "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "optimal auctions with restricted allocations"
    - "selling two goods optimally"
    - "duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "approximation schemes for a unit demand buyer with independent items via symmetries"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "optimal deterministic mechanisms for an additive buyer"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "the menu complexity of one and a half dimensional mechanism design"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)