human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "bucklin voting is broadly resistant to control"
  Abstract: Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. These actions modify an election's participation structure and aim at either making a favorite candidate win ("constructive control") or prevent a despised candidate from winning ("destructive control"), which yields a total of 22 standard control scenarios. To protect elections from such control attempts, computational complexity has been used to show that electoral control, though not impossible, is computationally prohibitive. Among natural voting systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, the two systems with the highest number of proven resistances to control types (namely 19 out of 22) are "sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting" (SP-AV, a modification of a system proposed by Brams and Sanver) and fallback voting. Both are hybrid systems; e.g., fallback voting combines approval with Bucklin voting. In this paper, we study the control complexity of Bucklin voting itself and show that it behaves equally well in terms of control resistance for the 20 cases investigated so far. As Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting, all resistances shown for Bucklin voting in this paper strengthen the corresponding resistance for fallback voting.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"):
  with members:
    - "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "search versus decision for election manipulation problems"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "clone structures in voters preferences"
    - "cloning in elections finding the possible winners"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "control complexity in bucklin and fallback voting"):
  with members:
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "an empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "multimode control attacks on elections"):
  with members:
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"
    - "towards a dichotomy of finding possible winners in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "copeland voting fully resists constructive control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "normalized range voting broadly resists control"):
  with members:
    - "how many vote operations are needed to manipulate a voting system"
    - "a smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "llull and copeland voting computationally resist bribery and control"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CC(Computational Complexity)