human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "playing the wrong game smoothness bounds for congestion games with behavioral biases"
  Abstract: In many situations a player may act so as to maximize a perceived utility that is not exactly her utility function, but rather some other, biased, utility. Examples of such biased utility functions are common in behavioral economics, and include risk attitudes, altruism, present-bias and so on. When analyzing a game, one may ask how inefficiency, measured by the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is affected by the perceived utilities. The smoothness method [Roughgarden and Tardos'04, Roughgarden'09] naturally extends to games with such perceived utilities or costs, regardless of the game or the behavioral bias. We show that such biased-smoothness is broadly applicable in the context of nonatomic congestion games. First, we show that on series-parallel networks we can use smoothness to yield PoA bounds even for diverse populations with different biases. Second, we identify various classes of cost functions and biases that are smooth, thereby substantially improving some recent results from the literature. Finally we show some initial implications for atomic congestion games. %

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "can taxes improve congestion on all networks"):
  with members:
    - "path deviations outperform approximate stability in heterogeneous congestion games"
    - "asymptotically tight bounds for inefficiency in risk averse selfish routing"
    - "achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions"
    - "potential games are necessary to ensure pure nash equilibria in cost sharing games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "routing games in the wild efficiency equilibration and regret large scale field experiments in singapore"):
  with members:
    - "power saving transportation mode identification for large scale applications"
    - "learning and trust in auction markets"
    - "data driven estimation of origin destination demand and user cost functions for the optimization of transportation networks"
    - "on the price of anarchy of highly congested nonatomic network games"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "robust data driven guarantees in auctions"
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "econometrics for learning agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "smart routing of electric vehicles for load balancing in smart grids"):
  with members:
    - "optimal pricing to manage electric vehicles in coupled power and transportation networks"
    - "fragility of the commons under prospect theoretic risk attitudes"
    - "stochastic games for smart grid energy management with prospect prosumers"
    - "load shifting in the smart grid to participate or not"
    - "towards a consumer centric grid a behavioral perspective"
    - "charging games in networks of electrical vehicles"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "tight inefficiency bounds for perception parameterized affine congestion games"):
  with members:
    - "congestion games with distance based strict uncertainty"
    - "on the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "informational braess paradox the effect of information on traffic congestion"):
  with members:
    - "effects of information heterogeneity in bayesian routing games"
    - "matroids are immune to braess paradox"
    - "inducing approximately optimal flow using truthful mediators"
    - "the burden of risk aversion in mean risk selfish routing"
    - "when more information reduces the speed of learning"
    - "groupthink and the failure of information aggregation in large groups"
    - "on the hardness of signaling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "the impact of worst case deviations in non atomic network routing games"):
  with members:
    - "path deviations outperform approximate stability in heterogeneous congestion games"
    - "asymptotically tight bounds for inefficiency in risk averse selfish routing"
    - "the burden of risk aversion in mean risk selfish routing"
    - "congestion games with distance based strict uncertainty"
    - "on the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)