human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "beyond good and evil formalizing the security guarantees of compartmentalizing compilation"
  Abstract: Compartmentalization is good security-engineering practice. By breaking a large software system into mutually distrustful components that run with minimal privileges, restricting their interactions to conform to well-defined interfaces, we can limit the damage caused by low-level attacks such as control-flow hijacking. When used to defend against such attacks, compartmentalization is often implemented cooperatively by a compiler and a low-level compartmentalization mechanism. However, the formal guarantees provided by such compartmentalizing compilation have seen surprisingly little investigation. #R##N#We propose a new security property, secure compartmentalizing compilation (SCC), that formally characterizes the guarantees provided by compartmentalizing compilation and clarifies its attacker model. We reconstruct our property by starting from the well-established notion of fully abstract compilation, then identifying and lifting three important limitations that make standard full abstraction unsuitable for compartmentalization. The connection to full abstraction allows us to prove SCC by adapting established proof techniques; we illustrate this with a compiler from a simple unsafe imperative language with procedures to a compartmentalized abstract machine.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "trace relating compiler correctness and secure compilation"):
  with members:
    - "the last mile high assurance and high speed cryptographic implementations"
    - "interaction trees representing recursive and impure programs in coq work in progress"
    - "journey beyond full abstraction exploring robust property preservation for secure compilation"
    - "a formally verified compiler back end"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "when good components go bad formally secure compilation despite dynamic compromise"):
  with members:
    - "journey beyond full abstraction exploring robust property preservation for secure compilation"
    - "robust hyperproperty preservation for secure compilation extended abstract"
    - "effectivesan type and memory error detection using dynamically typed c c"
    - "the meaning of memory safety"
    - "modular fully abstract compilation by approximate back translation"
    - "towards a fully abstract compiler using micro policies secure compilation for mutually distrustful components"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "robustly safe compilation or efficient provably secure compilation"):
  with members:
    - "trace relating compiler correctness and secure compilation"
    - "journey beyond full abstraction exploring robust property preservation for secure compilation"
    - "robust hyperproperty preservation for secure compilation extended abstract"
    - "modular fully abstract compilation by approximate back translation"
    - "a formally verified compiler back end"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "journey beyond full abstraction exploring robust property preservation for secure compilation"):
  with members:
    - "when good components go bad formally secure compilation despite dynamic compromise"
    - "a reduced semantics for deciding trace equivalence"
    - "a survey of symbolic methods for establishing equivalence based properties in cryptographic protocols"
    - "the applied pi calculus mobile values new names and secure communication"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "software fault isolation for robust compilation"):
  with members:
    - "robust hyperproperty preservation for secure compilation extended abstract"
    - "formally secure compilation of unsafe low level components extended abstract"
    - "towards a fully abstract compiler using micro policies secure compilation for mutually distrustful components"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "formally secure compilation of unsafe low level components extended abstract"):
  with members:
    - "robust hyperproperty preservation for secure compilation extended abstract"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)