human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
  Abstract: In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that retains both properties. RSD has been particularly successful in the special domain of random assignment where indifferences are unavoidable. While executing RSD is obviously feasible, we show that computing the resulting probabilities is #P-complete, and thus intractable, both in the context of voting and assignment.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"):
  with members:
    - "investigating the characteristics of one sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "decision theory with resource bounded agents"
    - "eliminating the weakest link making manipulation intractable"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "average case analysis of the assignment problem with independent preferences"):
  with members:
    - "smoothed and average case approximation ratios of mechanisms beyond the worst case analysis"
    - "average case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments"
    - "facility location with double peaked preference"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "strategyproof multi item exchange under single minded dichotomous preferences"):
  with members:
    - "mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants under dichotomous preferences"
    - "mechanism design for multi type housing markets"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "computing and testing pareto optimal committees"):
  with members:
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes existence and fairness"):
  with members:
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "competitive equilibrium with generic budgets beyond additive"
    - "monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake cutting"
    - "negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "the complexity of cake cutting with unequal shares"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "investigating the characteristics of one sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes"):
  with members:
    - "egalitarianism of random assignment mechanisms"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "equilibria under the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences"
    - "strategyproof quota mechanisms for multiple assignment problems"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "hybrid mechanisms trading off efficiency and strategyproofness in one sided matching"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"):
  with members:
    - "agent mediated social choice"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "consistent probabilistic social choice"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "rank maximal equal contribution a probabilistic social choice function"):
  with members:
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "consistent probabilistic social choice"
    - "welfare maximization entices participation"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)