human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "non malleable condensers for arbitrary min entropy and almost optimal protocols for privacy amplification"
  Abstract: Recently, the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary has received a lot of attention. Given a shared n-bit weak random source X with min-entropy k and a security parameter s, the main goal is to construct an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol that achieves entropy loss O(s). Dodis and Wichs \cite{DW09} showed that optimal protocols can be achieved by constructing explicit non-malleable extractors. However, the best known explicit non-malleable extractor only achieves k=0.49n \cite{Li12b} and evidence in \cite{Li12b} suggests that constructing explicit non-malleable extractors for smaller min-entropy may be hard. In an alternative approach, Li \cite{Li12} introduced the notion of a non-malleable condenser and showed that explicit non-malleable condensers also give optimal privacy amplification protocols. #R##N#In this paper, we give the first construction of non-malleable condensers for arbitrary min-entropy. Using our construction, we obtain a 2-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss for security parameter up to s=\Omega(\sqrt{k}). This is the first protocol that simultaneously achieves optimal round complexity and optimal entropy loss for arbitrary min-entropy k. We also generalize this result to obtain a protocol that runs in O(s/\sqrt{k}) rounds with optimal entropy loss, for security parameter up to s=\Omega(k). This significantly improves the protocol in \cite{ckor}. Finally, we give a better non-malleable condenser for linear min-entropy, and in this case obtain a 2-round protocol with optimal entropy loss for security parameter up to s=\Omega(k), which improves the entropy loss and communication complexity of the protocol in \cite{Li12b}.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "improved non malleable extractors non malleable codes and independent source extractors"):
  with members:
    - "explicit non malleable extractors multi source extractors and almost optimal privacy amplification protocols"
    - "explicit resilient functions matching ajtai linial"
    - "non malleable extractors and codes with their many tampered extensions"
    - "three source extractors for polylogarithmic min entropy"
    - "non malleable coding against bit wise and split state tampering"
    - "capacity of non malleable codes"
    - "non malleable extractors two source extractors and privacy amplification"
    - "fuzzy extractors how to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "explicit non malleable extractors multi source extractors and almost optimal privacy amplification protocols"):
  with members:
    - "improved non malleable extractors non malleable codes and independent source extractors"
    - "explicit resilient functions matching ajtai linial"
    - "non malleable extractors and codes with their many tampered extensions"
    - "three source extractors for polylogarithmic min entropy"
    - "non malleable extractors two source extractors and privacy amplification"
    - "bounded independence fools halfspaces"
    - "fuzzy extractors how to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "non malleable extractors and codes with their many tampered extensions"):
  with members:
    - "three source extractors for polylogarithmic min entropy"
    - "non malleable coding against bit wise and split state tampering"
    - "capacity of non malleable codes"
    - "non malleable extractors two source extractors and privacy amplification"
    - "non malleable codes from the wire tap channel"
    - "fuzzy extractors how to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "three source extractors for polylogarithmic min entropy"):
  with members:
    - "non malleable extractors two source extractors and privacy amplification"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)