human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "near feasible stable matchings with budget constraints"
  Abstract: This paper examines two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (a firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor). In a standard model, while multiple doctors can be matched to a single hospital, a hospital has a {\em maximum quota}, thus, the number of doctors assigned to that hospital cannot exceed a certain limit. In our model, in contrast, a hospital instead has a {\em fixed budget}, that is, the total amount of wages allocated by each hospital to the doctors is constrained. With budget constraints, stable matchings may fail to exist and checking for the existence is hard. To deal with the nonexistence of stable matchings, we extend the "matching with contracts" model of Hatfield and Milgrom, so that it deals with \textit{near-feasible} matchings that exceed each hospital budget by a certain amount. We then propose two novel mechanisms that efficiently return such a near-feasible matching that is stable with respect to the actual amount of wages allocated by each hospital. Specifically, by sacrificing strategy-proofness, our second mechanism achieves the best possible bound of budget excess.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "online knapsack problems with a resource buffer"):
  with members:
    - "approximately stable matchings with general constraints"
    - "approximately stable matchings with budget constraints"
    - "randomized online algorithms for the buyback problem"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "approximately stable matchings with general constraints"):
  with members:
    - "approximately stable matchings with budget constraints"
    - "buyback problem approximate matroid intersection with cancellation costs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "approximately stable matchings with budget constraints"):
  with members:
    - "online submodular maximization with preemption"
    - "buyback problem approximate matroid intersection with cancellation costs"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)