human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "set rationalizable choice and self stability"
  Abstract: Rationalizability and similar notions of consistency have proved to be highly problematic in the context of social choice, as witnessed by a range of impossibility results, among which Arrow[modifier letter apostrophe]s is the most prominent. We propose to rationalize choice functions by preference relations over sets of alternatives (set-rationalizability) and introduce two consistency conditions, and , which are defined in analogy to Sen[modifier letter apostrophe]s [alpha] and [gamma]. We find that a choice function satisfies if and only if it is set-rationalizable and that it satisfies and if and only if it is self-stable, a new concept based on earlier work by Dutta. The class of self-stable social choice functions contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "arrovian aggregation via pairwise utilitarianism"):
  with members:
    - "consistent probabilistic social choice"
    - "welfare maximization entices participation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "consistent probabilistic social choice"):
  with members:
    - "welfare maximization entices participation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a tournament of order 24 with two disjoint teq retentive sets"):
  with members:
    - "group strategyproof irresolute social choice functions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "set monotonicity implies kelly strategyproofness"):
  with members:
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "group strategyproof irresolute social choice functions"):
  with members:
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.MA(Multiagent Systems)