human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"
  Abstract: To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders. This directly leads to the Possible Winner problem that asks, given a set of partial votes, whether a distinguished candidate can still become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational complexity of Possible Winner for the broad class of voting protocols defined by scoring rules. A scoring rule provides a score value for every position which a candidate can have in a linear order. Prominent examples include plurality, k-approval, and Borda. Generalizing previous NP-hardness results for some special cases, we settle the computational complexity for all but one scoring rule. More precisely, for an unbounded number of candidates and unweighted voters, we show that Possible Winner is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (2,1,...,1,0), while it is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the complexity of possible winners on partial chains"):
  with members:
    - "computational social choice meets databases"
    - "the complexity of the possible winner problem over partitioned preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "riffled independence for efficient inference with partial rankings"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "incomplete preferences in single peaked electorates"):
  with members:
    - "on the likelihood of single peaked preferences"
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "recognising multidimensional euclidean preferences"
    - "modeling single peakedness for votes with ties"
    - "single peaked consistency for weak orders is easy"
    - "reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and bribery in single peaked and nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "the one dimensional euclidean domain finitely many obstructions are not enough"
    - "complexity of manipulative actions when voting with ties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "election with bribed voter uncertainty hardness and approximation algorithm"):
  with members:
    - "when the cookie meets the blockchain privacy risks of web payments via cryptocurrencies"
    - "possible winners in noisy elections"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "the complexity of manipulating k approval elections"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "computing possible and certain answers over order incomplete data"):
  with members:
    - "computational social choice meets databases"
    - "topological sorting under regular constraints"
    - "possible and certain answers for queries over order incomplete data"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "world set decompositions expressiveness and efficient algorithms"
    - "optimal aggregation algorithms for middleware"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the complexity of the possible winner problem over partitioned preferences"):
  with members:
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "dichotomy for voting systems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"):
  with members:
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation in elections with partial votes"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "possible and necessary winner problem in social polls"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "high multiplicity election problems"):
  with members:
    - "the complexity of succinct elections"
    - "complexity dichotomies for unweighted scoring rules"
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "polynomiality for bin packing with a constant number of item types"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"):
  with members:
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "k best enumeration"
    - "how hard is it to control an election by breaking ties"
    - "approximation algorithms for campaign management"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "cp nets a tool for representing and reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference statements"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CC(Computational Complexity)