human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "sequential auctions and externalities"
  Abstract: In many settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not necessarily implemented simultaneously. Future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players in each auction, introducing externalities. Motivated by this consideration, we study a setting of a market of buyers and sellers, where each seller holds one item, bidders have combinatorial valuations and sellers hold item auctions sequentially. #R##N#Our results are qualitatively different from those of simultaneous auctions, proving that simultaneity is a crucial aspect of previous work. We prove that if sellers hold sequential first price auctions then for unit-demand bidders (matching market) every subgame perfect equilibrium achieves at least half of the optimal social welfare, while for submodular bidders or when second price auctions are used, the social welfare can be arbitrarily worse than the optimal. We also show that a first price sequential auction for buying or selling a base of a matroid is always efficient, and implements the VCG outcome. #R##N#An important tool in our analysis is studying first and second price auctions with externalities (bidders have valuations for each possible winner outcome), which can be of independent interest. We show that a Pure Nash Equilibrium always exists in a first price auction with externalities.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "reserve pricing in repeated second price auctions with strategic bidders"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "optimal pricing in repeated posted price auctions"
    - "learning optimal reserve price against non myopic bidders"
    - "contextual search via intrinsic volumes"
    - "robust repeated auctions under heterogeneous buyer behavior"
    - "optimal dynamic auctions are virtual welfare maximizers"
    - "dynamic pricing with finitely many unknown valuations"
    - "on consistency of optimal pricing algorithms in repeated posted price auctions with strategic buyer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "bayesian persuasion with sequential games"):
  with members:
    - "targeting and signaling in ad auctions"
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "constrained signaling in auction design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "reducing inefficiency in carbon auctions with imperfect competition"):
  with members:
    - "welfare maximization with production costs a primal dual approach"
    - "welfare and profit maximization with production costs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "infinite duration poorman bidding games"):
  with members:
    - "the efficiency of best response dynamics"
    - "all pay bidding games on graphs"
    - "determinacy in discrete bidding infinite duration games"
    - "quantitative analysis of smart contracts"
    - "infinite duration bidding games"
    - "bidding games and efficient allocations"
    - "optimizing scrip systems crashes altruists hoarders sybils and collusion"
    - "sequential auctions of identical items with budget constrained bidders"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "infinite duration bidding games"):
  with members:
    - "determinacy in discrete bidding infinite duration games"
    - "infinite duration poorman bidding games"
    - "how much lookahead is needed to win infinite games"
    - "discrete all pay bidding games"
    - "non zero sum games for reactive synthesis"
    - "pure nash equilibria in concurrent deterministic games"
    - "variations on the stochastic shortest path problem"
    - "the odds of staying on budget"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "online submodular welfare maximization greedy beats 1 2 in random order"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "randomized composable core sets for distributed submodular maximization"
    - "bayesian sequential auctions"
    - "online submodular welfare maximization greedy is optimal"
    - "geometry of online packing linear programs"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "online vertex weighted bipartite matching and single bid budgeted allocations"
    - "online stochastic matching online actions based on offline statistics"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "on consistency of optimal pricing algorithms in repeated posted price auctions with strategic buyer"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "sequential mechanisms with ex post participation guarantees"
    - "non parametric revenue optimization for generalized second price auctions"
    - "online learning in repeated auctions"
    - "learning prices for repeated auctions with strategic buyers"
    - "learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve"
    - "dynamic pricing with limited supply"
    - "general auction mechanism for search advertising"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)