human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
  Abstract: The Possible Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the candidates are specified only partially, whether a designated candidate can become a winner by suitably extending all the votes. Betzler and Dorn [1] proved a result that is only one step away from a full dichotomy of this problem for the important class of pure scoring rules in the case of unweighted voters and an unbounded number of candidates: Possible Winner is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule with vector (2,1,...,1,0), but is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto. We take the final step to a full dichotomy by showing that Possible Winner is NP-complete also for the scoring rule with vector (2,1,...,1,0).

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the complexity of possible winners on partial chains"):
  with members:
    - "computational social choice meets databases"
    - "the complexity of the possible winner problem over partitioned preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "riffled independence for efficient inference with partial rankings"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "incomplete preferences in single peaked electorates"):
  with members:
    - "on the likelihood of single peaked preferences"
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "recognising multidimensional euclidean preferences"
    - "modeling single peakedness for votes with ties"
    - "single peaked consistency for weak orders is easy"
    - "reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and bribery in single peaked and nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "the one dimensional euclidean domain finitely many obstructions are not enough"
    - "complexity of manipulative actions when voting with ties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "election with bribed voter uncertainty hardness and approximation algorithm"):
  with members:
    - "when the cookie meets the blockchain privacy risks of web payments via cryptocurrencies"
    - "possible winners in noisy elections"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "the complexity of manipulating k approval elections"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "computing possible and certain answers over order incomplete data"):
  with members:
    - "computational social choice meets databases"
    - "topological sorting under regular constraints"
    - "possible and certain answers for queries over order incomplete data"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "world set decompositions expressiveness and efficient algorithms"
    - "optimal aggregation algorithms for middleware"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the complexity of the possible winner problem over partitioned preferences"):
  with members:
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "dichotomy for voting systems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "complexity dichotomies for unweighted scoring rules"):
  with members:
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "towards a dichotomy of finding possible winners in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "parliamentary voting procedures agenda control manipulation and uncertainty"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "parameterized algorithmics for computational social choice nine research challenges"
    - "combinatorial voter control in elections"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "possible and necessary allocations via sequential mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"
    - "a social welfare optimal sequential allocation procedure"
    - "a note on the undercut procedure"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "how to make the most of a shared meal plan the last bite first"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CC(Computational Complexity)