human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "coalition manipulations of the gale shapley algorithm"
  Abstract: It is well-known that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is not truthful for all agents. Previous studies on this front mostly focus on blacklist manipulations by a single woman and by the set of all women. Little is known about manipulations by a coalition of women or other types of manipulations, such as manipulation by permuting preference lists. #R##N#In this paper, we consider the problem of finding an equilibrium for a coalition of women (aka. liars) in the Gale-Shapley algorithm. We restrict attentions on manipulations that induce stable matchings. For the incomplete preference list setting, where liars can truncate their preference lists, we show that a strong Nash equilibrium always exists and the matching from such equilibria is unique. The equilibrium outcome is strongly Pareto dominant for all liars among the set of matchings achievable by manipulation: every woman is matched with the same man as the one she matches in her best single-agent manipulation. For the complete preference list setting where liars can permute their preference list, we first show that a coalition of women can get worse off by manipulating jointly than each performing a single-agent manipulation, thus a strongly Pareto-dominant outcome may not exist by manipulation. We then put forward an efficient algorithm to compute a strong Nash equilibrium that is strongly Pareto-optimal for all liars. We derive connections between the stable marriage problem and stable roommate problem, and use tools there to prove our results for this part. This approach is highly nontrivial and of independent interest.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a study of incentive compatibility and stability issues in fractional matchings"):
  with members:
    - "from matching with diversity constraints to matching with regional quotas"
    - "stable fractional matchings"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "random matching under priorities stability and no envy concepts"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "stable nash equilibria in the gale shapley matching game"):
  with members:
    - "manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)