human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
  Abstract: One of the fundamental questions of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is whether there exists an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational tractability: in particular, whether polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions are provably weaker in terms of approximation ratio than non-truthful ones. This question was very recently answered for universally truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions \cite{D11}, and even for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms \cite{DughmiV11}. However, both of these results are based on information-theoretic arguments for valuations given by a value oracle, and leave open the possibility of polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for succinctly described classes of valuations. #R##N#This paper is the first to prove {\em computational hardness} results for truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with succinctly described valuations. We prove that there is a class of succinctly represented submodular valuations for which no deterministic truthful mechanism provides an $m^{1/2-\epsilon}$-approximation for a constant $\epsilon>0$, unless $NP=RP$ ($m$ denotes the number of items). Furthermore, we prove that even truthful-in-expectation mechanisms cannot approximate combinatorial auctions with certain succinctly described submodular valuations better than within $n^\gamma$, where $n$ is the number of bidders and $\gamma>0$ some absolute constant, unless $NP \subseteq P/poly$. In addition, we prove computational hardness results for two related problems.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "complement free couples must communicate a hardness result for two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "beyond 1 2 approximation for submodular maximization on massive data streams"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "online matroid intersection beating half for random arrival"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "implementation in advised strategies welfare guarantees from posted price mechanisms when demand queries are np hard"):
  with members:
    - "submodular maximization beyond non negativity guarantees fast algorithms and applications"
    - "guess free maximization of submodular and linear sums"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvature"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "complement free couples must communicate a hardness result for two player combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "information equals amortized communication"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations"):
  with members:
    - "gibbard satterthwaite success stories and obvious strategyproofness"
    - "no stable matching mechanism is obviously strategy proof"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "on the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "submodular optimization under noise"):
  with members:
    - "when are welfare guarantees robust"
    - "noisy submodular maximization via adaptive sampling with applications to crowdsourced image collection summarization"
    - "tight bounds on low degree spectral concentration of submodular and xos functions"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design"
    - "optimal bounds on approximation of submodular and xos functions by juntas"
    - "representation approximation and learning of submodular functions using low rank decision trees"
    - "learning coverage functions and private release of marginals"
    - "symmetry and approximability of submodular maximization problems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "economic efficiency requires interaction"
    - "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "single call mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)