human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "contingent payment mechanisms to maximize resource utilization"
  Abstract: We study the fundamental problem of assigning resources to maximize their expected utilization.This kind of problem arises in many settings, where it is in the interest of a group, the general public, or a principal, that assigned resources be used and not wasted. At the time of assigning resources, each agent privately holds information about her distribution on future values for different assignments. Subsequently, we allow for payments to be contingent on ex post utilization decisions. The objective is to maximize expected utilization, while insisting on dominant-strategy equilibria, individual rationality, and no-deficit. We also consider two additional, natural properties: an agent should not pay if she utilizes a resource, and resources should always be assigned if possible. We show that the natural, contingent second-price (CSP) mechanism, is unique under these criteria and optimal for a larger class of mechanisms for assigning a single resource. We extend the CSP mechanism to assign multiple, heterogeneous resources (making a technical connection with assignment problems under non quasi-linear utility functions), showing that this generalized mechanism outperforms other methods such as first-come-first-serve and the VCG mechanism.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "penalty bidding mechanisms for allocating resources and overcoming present bias"):
  with members:
    - "planning with multiple biases"
    - "contingent payment mechanisms for resource utilization"
    - "procrastination with variable present bias"
    - "planning problems for sophisticated agents with present bias"
    - "time inconsistent planning a computational problem in behavioral economics"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "social choice with non quasi linear utilities"):
  with members:
    - "competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with non transferable utilities"
    - "general auction mechanism for search advertising"
    - "optimizing scrip systems efficiency crashes hoarders and altruists"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)