human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
  Abstract: We study one-sided matching mechanisms where agents have vNM utility functions and report ordinal preferences. We first show that in this domain strategyproof mechanisms are characterized by three intuitive axioms: swap consistency, weak invariance, and lower invariance. Our second result is that dropping lower invariance leads to an interesting new relaxation of strategyproofness, which we call partial strategyproofness. In particular, we show that mechanisms are swap consistent and weakly invariant if and only if they are strategyproof on a restricted domain where agents have sufficiently different valuations for different objects. Furthermore, we show that this domain restriction is maximal and use it to define a single-parameter measure for the degree of strategyproofness of a manipulable mechanism. We also provide an algorithm that computes this measure. Our new partial strategyproofness concept finds applications in the incentive analysis of non-strategyproof mechanisms, such as the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, different variants of the Boston mechanism, and the construction of new hybrid mechanisms.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"):
  with members:
    - "investigating the characteristics of one sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "decision theory with resource bounded agents"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "eliminating the weakest link making manipulation intractable"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "estimating approximate incentive compatibility"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "optimal auctions through deep learning"
    - "dispersion for data driven algorithm design online learning and private optimization"
    - "a general theory of sample complexity for multi item profit maximization"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "a b testing of auctions"
    - "learning simple auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "average case analysis of the assignment problem with independent preferences"):
  with members:
    - "smoothed and average case approximation ratios of mechanisms beyond the worst case analysis"
    - "average case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments"
    - "facility location with double peaked preference"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "smoothed and average case approximation ratios of mechanisms beyond the worst case analysis"):
  with members:
    - "mix and match"
    - "truthful assignment without money"
    - "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"
    - "smoothed analysis of algorithms why the simplex algorithm usually takes polynomial time"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"):
  with members:
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
    - "a characterization of 2 player mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "egalitarianism of random assignment mechanisms"
    - "near optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"
    - "oblivious algorithms for the maximum directed cut problem"
    - "greedy facility location algorithms analyzed using dual fitting with factor revealing lp"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences"):
  with members:
    - "the impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences"
    - "random assignment with multi unit demands"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"):
  with members:
    - "efficiency of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one sided matching"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)