human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "selling complementary goods dynamics efficiency and revenue"
  Abstract: We consider a price competition between two sellers of perfect-complement goods. Each seller posts a price for the good it sells, but the demand is determined according to the sum of prices. This is a classic model by Cournot (1838), who showed that in this setting a monopoly that sells both goods is better for the society than two competing sellers. We show that non-trivial pure Nash equilibria always exist in this game. We also quantify Cournot's observation with respect to both the optimal welfare and the monopoly revenue. We then prove a series of mostly negative results regarding the convergence of best response dynamics to equilibria in such games.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "proportional dynamics in exchange economies"):
  with members:
    - "an alternating algorithm for finding linear arrow debreu market equilibrium"
    - "universal growth in production economies"
    - "a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets"
    - "tracing equilibrium in dynamic markets via distributed adaptation"
    - "dynamics of distributed updating in fisher markets"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "ascending price algorithms for unknown markets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "universal growth in production economies"):
  with members:
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "average case performance of replicator dynamics in potential games via computing regions of attraction"
    - "concave generalized flows with applications to market equilibria"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)