human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "a truthful mechanism for offline ad slot scheduling"
  Abstract: We consider the "Offline Ad Slot Scheduling" problem, where advertisers must be scheduled to "sponsored search" slots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constraint, as well as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. #R##N#We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism is not truthful, but has a Nash equilibrium whose outcome is identical to our mechanism. As far as we can tell, this is the first treatment of sponsored search that directly incorporates both multiple slots and budget constraints into an analysis of incentives. #R##N#Our mechanism employs a descending-price auction that maintains a solution to a certain machine scheduling problem whose job lengths depend on the price, and hence is variable over the auction. The price stops when the set of bidders that can afford that price pack exactly into a block of ad slots, at which point the mechanism allocates that block and continues on the remaining slots. To prove our result on the equilibrium of the revenue-maximizing mechanism, we first show that a greedy algorithm suffices to solve the revenue-maximizing linear program; we then use this insight to prove that bidders allocated in the same block of our mechanism have no incentive to deviate from bidding the fixed price of that block.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "improved approximations for posted price mechanisms second price auctions and free order prophets"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "a field guide to personalized reserve prices"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi unit auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "competitive algorithms from competitive equilibria non clairvoyant scheduling under polyhedral constraints"):
  with members:
    - "selfishmigrate a scalable algorithm for non clairvoyantly scheduling heterogeneous processors"
    - "online primal dual for non linear optimization with applications to speed scaling"
    - "minimum latency submodular cover"
    - "ranking with submodular valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"):
  with members:
    - "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"
    - "clinching auctions with online supply"
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "on multiple round sponsored search auctions with budgets"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "no justified complaints on fair sharing of multiple resources"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "multi unit auctions with budget constraints"):
  with members:
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"
    - "budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "algorithmic methods for sponsored search advertising"):
  with members:
    - "sponsored search auctions with markovian users"
    - "bidding to the top vcg and equilibria of position based auctions"
    - "budget optimization in search based advertising auctions"
    - "stochastic models for budget optimization in search based advertising"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "sponsored search auctions with markovian users"):
  with members:
    - "algorithmic methods for sponsored search advertising"
    - "budget optimization in search based advertising auctions"
    - "stochastic models for budget optimization in search based advertising"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)