human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "pricing multi unit markets"
  Abstract: We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed with posted prices, under a range of assumptions about the designer's information and agents' valuations. Our results provide insights about the relative power of uniform and non-uniform prices, the relative difficulty of different valuation classes, and the implications of different informational assumptions. Among other results, we prove constant-factor guarantees for agents with (symmetric) subadditive valuations, even in an incomplete-information setting and with uniform prices.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the power and limits of dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets"):
  with members:
    - "a general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets"
    - "combinatorial auctions with endowment effect"
    - "max min greedy matching"
    - "pricing for online resource allocation intervals and paths"
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "price doubling and item halving robust revenue guarantees for item pricing"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "do prices coordinate markets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "cost sharing over combinatorial domains complement free cost functions and beyond"):
  with members:
    - "combinatorial cost sharing"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "simple pricing schemes for the cloud"):
  with members:
    - "pricing identical items"
    - "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"
    - "hiring secretaries over time the benefit of concurrent employment"
    - "on demand or spot selling the cloud to risk averse customers"
    - "truthful online scheduling with commitments"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)