human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "intel mpx explained an empirical study of intel mpx and software based bounds checking approaches"
  Abstract: Memory-safety violations are a prevalent cause of both reliability and security vulnerabilities in systems software written in unsafe languages like C/C++. Unfortunately, all the existing software-based solutions to this problem exhibit high performance overheads preventing them from wide adoption in production runs. To address this issue, Intel recently released a new ISA extension - Memory Protection Extensions (Intel MPX), a hardware-assisted full-stack solution to protect against memory safety violations. In this work, we perform an exhaustive study of the Intel MPX architecture to understand its advantages and caveats. We base our study along three dimensions: (a) performance overheads, (b) security guarantees, and (c) usability issues. To put our results in perspective, we compare Intel MPX with three prominent software-based approaches: (1) trip-wire - AddressSanitizer, (2) object-based - SAFECode, and (3) pointer-based - SoftBound. Our main conclusion is that Intel MPX is a promising technique that is not yet practical for widespread adoption. Intel MPX's performance overheads are still high (roughly 50% on average), and the supporting infrastructure has bugs which may cause compilation or runtime errors. Moreover, we showcase the design limitations of Intel MPX: it cannot detect temporal errors, may have false positives and false negatives in multithreaded code, and its restrictions on memory layout require substantial code changes for some programs.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "dangkiller eliminating dangling pointers efficiently via implicit identifier"):
  with members:
    - "memory tagging and how it improves c c memory safety"
    - "effectivesan type and memory error detection using dynamically typed c c"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a systematic evaluation of transient execution attacks and defenses"):
  with members:
    - "smotherspectre exploiting speculative execution through port contention"
    - "spoiler speculative load hazards boost rowhammer and cache attacks"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "you shall not bypass employing data dependencies to prevent bounds check bypass"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "pac it up towards pointer integrity using arm pointer authentication"):
  with members:
    - "dr sgx automated and adjustable side channel protection for sgx using data location randomization"
    - "memory tagging and how it improves c c memory safety"
    - "cfi care hardware supported call and return enforcement for commercial microcontrollers"
    - "hardscope thwarting dop with hardware assisted run time scope enforcement"
    - "inferring fine grained control flow inside sgx enclaves with branch shadowing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "sok sanitizing for security"):
  with members:
    - "cup comprehensive user space protection for c c"
    - "effectivesan type and memory error detection using dynamically typed c c"
    - "control flow integrity precision security and performance"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "an instrumenting compiler for enforcing confidentiality in low level code"):
  with members:
    - "suspicious taint based access control for protecting os from network attacks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "effectivesan type and memory error detection using dynamically typed c c"):
  with members:
    - "an extended low fat allocator api and applications"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)