human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
  Abstract: This paper analyzes individually-rational ex post equilibrium in the VC (Vickrey-Clarke) combinatorial auctions. If $\Sigma$ is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids only for bundles in $\Sigma$. The $\Sigma$-VC combinatorial auctions (multi-good auctions) obtained in this way are known to be individually-rational truth-telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VC auctions, in which the buyers restrict themselves to bids on bundles in $\Sigma$, because it is rational for them to do so. That is, it may be that when the buyers report their valuation of the bundles in $\Sigma$, they are in an equilibrium. We fully characterize those $\Sigma$ that induce individually rational equilibrium in every VC auction, and we refer to the associated equilibrium as a bundling equilibrium. The number of bundles in $\Sigma$ represents the communication complexity of the equilibrium. A special case of bundling equilibrium is partition-based equilibrium, in which $\Sigma$ is a field, that is, it is generated by a partition. We analyze the tradeoff between communication complexity and economic efficiency of bundling equilibrium, focusing in particular on partition-based equilibrium.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "truthfulness with value maximizing bidders"):
  with members:
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"):
  with members:
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"):
  with members:
    - "multiclass learnability and the erm principle"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "vc v vcg inapproximability of combinatorial auctions via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"
    - "amplified hardness of approximation for vcg based mechanisms"
    - "truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "clearing markets via bundles"):
  with members:
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
    - "lower bound for envy free and truthful makespan approximation on related machines"
    - "optimization with demand oracles"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "envy multi envy and revenue maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"):
  with members:
    - "clearing markets via bundles"
    - "welfare and revenue guarantees for competitive bundling equilibrium"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"
    - "lower bound for envy free and truthful makespan approximation on related machines"
    - "optimization with demand oracles"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "combinatorial auctions without money"):
  with members:
    - "truthful assignment without money"
    - "approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy"
    - "truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "efficient allocation via sequential scrip auctions"):
  with members:
    - "sequential auctions of identical items with budget constrained bidders"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "regret minimizing equilibria and mechanisms for games with strict type uncertainty"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of mechanism design"
    - "ucp networks a directed graphical representation of conditional utilities"
    - "cooperative negotiation in autonomic systems using incremental utility elicitation"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)