human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
  Abstract: Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and guarantees to any group of like-minded agents an influence proportional to its size. It is easier to compute and more efficient than the familiar Random Priority rule. Its worst case (resp. average) inefficiency is provably (resp. in numerical experiments) low if the number of agents is low. The efficient Egalitarian rule protects similarly individual agents but not coalitions. It is Excludable Strategyproof: I do not want to lie if I cannot consume outcomes I claim to dislike. The efficient Nash Max Product rule offers the strongest welfare guarantees to coalitions, who can force any outcome with a probability proportional to their size. But it fails even the excludable form of Strategyproofness.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "participatory budgeting models and approaches"):
  with members:
    - "truthful aggregation of budget proposals"
    - "markets for public decision making"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "iterative local voting for collective decision making in continuous spaces"
    - "the impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "developments in multi agent fair allocation"):
  with members:
    - "from matching with diversity constraints to matching with regional quotas"
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "fairly allocating many goods with few queries"
    - "fair knapsack"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "proportionally representative participatory budgeting with ordinal preferences"):
  with members:
    - "a framework for approval based budgeting methods"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "rank maximal equal contribution a probabilistic social choice function"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "approval based apportionment"):
  with members:
    - "group fairness in committee selection"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "monotonicity axioms in approval based multi winner voting rules"
    - "committees providing ejr can be computed efficiently"
    - "multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "truthful aggregation of budget proposals"):
  with members:
    - "markets for public decision making"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "iterative local voting for collective decision making in continuous spaces"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "strategyproof approximation mechanisms for location on networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "justifications of welfare guarantees under normalized utilities"):
  with members:
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "resource monotonicity and population monotonicity in cake cutting"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)