human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques"
  Abstract: We study the design of truthful mechanisms for set systems, i.e., scenarios where a customer needs to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task. In this setting, frugality [2] provides a measure to evaluate the "cost of truthfulness", that is, the overpayment of a truthful mechanism relative to the "fair" payment. We propose a uniform scheme for designing frugal truthful mechanisms for general set systems. Our scheme is based on scaling the agents' bids using the eigenvector of a matrix that encodes the interdependencies between the agents. We demonstrate that the $r$-out-of-$k$-system mechanism and the $^{\sqrt{\ }}$-mechanism for buying a path in a graph [18] can be viewed as instantiations of our scheme. We then apply our scheme to two other classes of set systems, namely, vertex cover systems and $k$-path systems, in which a customer needs to purchase $k$ edge-disjoint source-sink paths. For both settings, we bound the frugality of our mechanism in terms of the largest eigenvalue of the respective interdependency matrix. We show that our mechanism is optimal for a large subclass of vertex cover systems satisfying a simple local sparsity condition. For $k$-path systems, our mechanism is within a factor of $k+1$ from optimal, moreover, we show that it is, in fact, optimal, when one uses a modified definition of frugality proposed in [10]. Our lower bound argument combines spectral techniques and Young's inequality, and is applicable to all set systems. As both $r$-out-of-$k$ systems and single path systems can be viewed as special cases of $k$-path systems, our result improves the lower bounds of [18] and answers several open questions proposed in [18].

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "optimal budget feasible mechanisms for additive valuations"):
  with members:
    - "on budget feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives"
    - "simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms on matroids"
    - "coverage matching and beyond new results on budgeted mechanism design"
    - "bayesian budget feasibility with posted pricing"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "coverage matching and beyond new results on budgeted mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "core competitive auctions"):
  with members:
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "mechanism design via consensus estimates cross checking and profit extraction"
    - "frugal and truthful auctions for vertex covers flows and cuts"
    - "frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "truthful multi unit procurements with budgets"):
  with members:
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
    - "optimal provision after wait in healthcare"
    - "online submodular welfare maximization greedy is optimal"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "mechanism design without money via stable matching"
    - "optimization with demand oracles"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "price competition in online combinatorial markets"):
  with members:
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "sequential auctions and externalities"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
    - "frugal and truthful auctions for vertex covers flows and cuts"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"
    - "frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "cooperation and competition when bidding for complex projects centralized and decentralized perspectives"):
  with members:
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "achieving fully proportional representation is easy in practice"
    - "fully proportional representation as resource allocation approximability results"
    - "false name proof mechanisms for hiring a team"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanism design for multidimensional covering problems"):
  with members:
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "frugal and truthful auctions for vertex covers flows and cuts"
    - "frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover"
    - "greedy facility location algorithms analyzed using dual fitting with factor revealing lp"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "benchmark problems for totally unimodular set system auction"):
  with members:
    - "frugal and truthful auctions for vertex covers flows and cuts"
    - "frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)