human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "constrained signaling in auction design"
  Abstract: We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that he is selling. Instead, he must come up with a constrained signalling scheme: a (non injective) mapping from goods to signals, that satisfies the constraints of his setting. For example, the auctioneer may be able to communicate only a bounded length message for each good, or he might be legally constrained in how he can advertise the item being sold. Each candidate signaling scheme induces an incomplete-information game among the buyers, and the goal of the auctioneer is to choose the signaling scheme and accompanying auction format that optimizes welfare. In this paper, we use techniques from submodular function maximization and no-regret learning to give algorithms for computing constrained signaling schemes for a variety of constrained signaling problems.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the complexity of contracts"):
  with members:
    - "delegated search approximates efficient search"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "simple versus optimal contracts"
    - "bernoulli factories and black box reductions in mechanism design"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"
    - "non optimal mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for profit maximization in multi item auctions"):
  with members:
    - "the best of both worlds asymptotically efficient mechanisms with a guarantee on the expected gains from trade"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "almost efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "approximately efficient two sided combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "on the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design"
    - "the value of information concealment"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "bayesian persuasion with sequential games"):
  with members:
    - "targeting and signaling in ad auctions"
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "sequential auctions and externalities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "robust commitments and partial reputation"):
  with members:
    - "persuasion with limited communication"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "computational rationalization the inverse equilibrium problem"
    - "stackelberg vs nash in security games an extended investigation of interchangeability equivalence and uniqueness"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "access to population level signaling as a source of inequality"):
  with members:
    - "preventing fairness gerrymandering auditing and learning for subgroup fairness"
    - "fairness incentives for myopic agents"
    - "fairness at equilibrium in the labor market"
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "fairness in learning classic and contextual bandits"
    - "equality of opportunity in supervised learning"
    - "on the im possibility of fairness"
    - "inherent trade offs in the fair determination of risk scores"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "simple versus optimal contracts"):
  with members:
    - "how do classifiers induce agents to invest effort strategically"
    - "delegated search approximates efficient search"
    - "adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets bandit algorithms for repeated principal agent problems"
    - "send mixed signals earn more work less"
    - "mixed strategies in combinatorial agency"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "targeting and signaling in ad auctions"):
  with members:
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "send mixed signals earn more work less"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)