human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
  Abstract: We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by constructing price-based online approximation algorithms, a natural extension of threshold algorithms for settings beyond binary selection. Our analysis takes the form of an extension theorem: we derive sufficient conditions on prices when all weights are known in advance, then prove that the resulting approximation guarantees extend directly to stochastic settings. Our framework unifies and simplifies much of the existing literature on prophet inequalities and posted price mechanisms, and is used to derive new and improved results for combinatorial markets (with and without complements), multi-dimensional matroids, and sparse packing problems. Finally, we highlight a surprising connection between the smoothness framework for bounding the price of anarchy of mechanisms and our framework, and show that many smooth mechanisms can be recast as posted price mechanisms with comparable performance guarantees.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the power and limits of dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets"):
  with members:
    - "a general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets"
    - "combinatorial auctions with endowment effect"
    - "max min greedy matching"
    - "pricing for online resource allocation intervals and paths"
    - "pricing multi unit markets"
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "price doubling and item halving robust revenue guarantees for item pricing"
    - "do prices coordinate markets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "predict and match prophet inequalities with uncertain supply"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "approximation algorithms for correlated knapsacks and non martingale bandits"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "prophet inequality for bipartite matching merits of being simple and non adaptive"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "tight competitive ratios of classic matching algorithms in the fully online model"
    - "how to match when all vertices arrive online"
    - "maximizing efficiency in dynamic matching markets"
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the bayesian prophet a low regret framework for online decision making"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "online stochastic matching new algorithms and bounds"
    - "new algorithms better bounds and a novel model for online stochastic matching"
    - "online convex optimization using predictions"
    - "algorithms with logarithmic or sublinear regret for constrained contextual bandits"
    - "fast algorithms for online stochastic convex programming"
    - "bandits with knapsacks"
    - "primal beats dual on online packing lps in the random order model"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "implementation in advised strategies welfare guarantees from posted price mechanisms when demand queries are np hard"):
  with members:
    - "submodular maximization beyond non negativity guarantees fast algorithms and applications"
    - "guess free maximization of submodular and linear sums"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvature"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "on optimal ordering in the optimal stopping problem"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "a simple o log log mathrm rank competitive algorithm for the matroid secretary problem"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "online pandora s boxes and bandits"):
  with members:
    - "descending price optimally coordinates search"
    - "o log log rank competitive ratio for the matroid secretary problem"
    - "a simple o log log mathrm rank competitive algorithm for the matroid secretary problem"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the two sided game of googol and sample based prophet inequalities"):
  with members:
    - "the prophet inequality can be solved optimally with a single set of samples"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet inequalities with limited information"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)