human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "truthful fair division"
  Abstract: We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space ("cake") and non-atomic, additive individual preference measures - or utilities - we show that there exists a truthful "mechanism" which ensures that each of the k players gets at least 1/k of the cake. This mechanism also minimizes risk for truthful players. Furthermore, in the case where there exist at least two different measures we present a different truthful mechanism which ensures that each of the players gets more than 1/k of the cake.#R##N##R##N#We then turn our attention to partitions of indivisible goods with bounded utilities and a large number of goods. Here we provide similar mechanisms, but with slightly weaker guarantees. These guarantees converge to those obtained in the non-atomic case as the number of goods goes to infinity.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "obvious manipulations in cake cutting"):
  with members:
    - "fair cake cutting in practice"
    - "deterministic strategyproof and fair cake cutting"
    - "fair and square cake cutting in two dimensions"
    - "resource monotonicity and population monotonicity in connected cake cutting"
    - "cake cutting algorithms for piecewise constant and piecewise uniform valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "fair division with minimal sharing"):
  with members:
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "competitive equilibria with indivisible goods and generic budgets"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "online fair division analysing a food bank problem"
    - "a generalization of the al method for fair allocation of indivisible objects"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "fair division with bounded sharing"):
  with members:
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "truthful fair division without free disposal"):
  with members:
    - "on the complexity of chore division"
    - "deterministic strategyproof and fair cake cutting"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for four agents"
    - "cake cutting algorithms for piecewise constant and piecewise uniform valuations"
    - "incentive compatible two player cake cutting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "communication complexity of cake cutting"):
  with members:
    - "consensus halving is ppa complete"
    - "the query complexity of cake cutting"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"
    - "waste makes haste bounded time algorithms for envy free cake cutting with free disposal"
    - "hardness results for consensus halving"
    - "communication complexity for algorithm designers"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "deterministic strategyproof and fair cake cutting"):
  with members:
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"
    - "better strategyproof mechanisms without payments or prior an analytic approach"
    - "cake cutting algorithms for piecewise constant and piecewise uniform valuations"
    - "incentive compatible two player cake cutting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "fair and square cake cutting in two dimensions"):
  with members:
    - "envy free cake cutting in two dimensions"
    - "rental harmony with roommates"
    - "mechanism design for fair division"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents"):
  with members:
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for four agents"
    - "an algorithmic framework for strategic fair division"
    - "incentive compatible two player cake cutting"
    - "fair allocation without trade"
    - "nash equilibria in fisher market"
    - "on allocating goods to maximize fairness"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)