human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "simple auctions for agents with complements"
  Abstract: We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. To this end, we introduce a new hierarchy over monotone set functions that we refer to as Maximum over Positive-Supermodular (MPS). The MPS hierarchy is parameterized by a single integer $d$ that captures the level of complementarity. Any valuation in MPS-$d$ is in MPH-$(d+1)$ [Feige et al. 2015], and the highest level in the hierarchy (MPS-$(m-1)$, where $m$ is the number of items) captures all monotone functions. We show that when all agents have valuations in MPS-$d$, the single-bid auction, introduced by [Devanur et al. 2015], has price of anarchy of at most $O(d^2 \log(m/d))$, with respect to coarse correlated equilibria. An improved bound of $O(d \log m)$ is established for an interesting subclass of MPS-$d$. In addition, we study hybrid mechanisms of simple auctions. These are mechanisms that choose at random one of two simple mechanisms. Hybrid mechanisms preserve the simplicity of the mechanisms in their support. In particular, standard regret minimization algorithms converge to correlated and coarse correlated equilibria in polynomial time. We show that the hybrid mechanism that is composed of the single bid auction and the single-item first price auction for the grand bundle has a price of anarchy of at most $O(\sqrt{m})$ for any profile of agent valuations. This is the best approximation to social welfare that can be achieved by any polytime algorithm.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"):
  with members:
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "greedy algorithms make efficient mechanisms"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)