human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
  Abstract: Walsh [Wal10, Wal09], Davies et al. [DKNW10, DKNW11], and Narodytska et al. [NWX11] studied various voting systems empirically and showed that they can often be manipulated effectively, despite their manipulation problems being NP-hard. Such an experimental approach is sorely missing for NP-hard control problems, where control refers to attempts to tamper with the outcome of elections by adding/deleting/partitioning either voters or candidates. We experimentally tackle NP-hard control problems for Bucklin and fallback voting. Among natural voting systems with efficient winner determination, fallback voting is currently known to display the broadest resistance to control in terms of NP-hardness, and Bucklin voting has been shown to behave almost as well in terms of control resistance [ER10, EPR11, EFPR11]. We also investigate control resistance experimentally for plurality voting, one of the first voting systems analyzed with respect to electoral control [BTT92, HHR07]. Our findings indicate that NP-hard control problems can often be solved effectively in practice. Moreover, our experiments allow a more fine-grained analysis and comparison-across various control scenarios, vote distribution models, and voting systems-than merely stating NP-hardness for all these control problems.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "complexity dichotomies for unweighted scoring rules"):
  with members:
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "towards a dichotomy of finding possible winners in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "possible winners in noisy elections"):
  with members:
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "search versus decision for election manipulation problems"
    - "fully proportional representation as resource allocation approximability results"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "cloning in elections finding the possible winners"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "combinatorial voter control in elections"):
  with members:
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "more natural models of electoral control by partition"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "clone structures in voters preferences"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"):
  with members:
    - "strategic voting and the logic of knowledge"
    - "preference elicitation for general random utility models"
    - "a classification of weakly acyclic games"
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"
    - "an empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "solving hard control problems in voting systems via integer programming"):
  with members:
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "cloning in elections finding the possible winners"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "weighted electoral control"):
  with members:
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "possible winners in noisy elections"
    - "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "how many vote operations are needed to manipulate a voting system"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"):
  with members:
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "control complexity in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "approximation algorithms for campaign management"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "how hard is it to control an election by breaking ties"):
  with members:
    - "eliminating the weakest link making manipulation intractable"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "manipulation of nanson s and baldwin s rules"
    - "an empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting"
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)