human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "what do we elect committees for a voting committee model for multi winner rules"
  Abstract: We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives (e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model, the elected group of representatives runs a number of ballots to make final decisions regarding various issues. The satisfaction of voters comes from the final decisions made by the elected committee. Our results suggest that depending on a decision system used by the committee to make these final decisions, different multi-winner election rules are most suitable for electing the committee. Furthermore, we show that if we allow not only a committee, but also an election rule used to make final decisions, to depend on the voters' preferences, we can obtain an even better representation of the voters.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a quantitative analysis of multi winner rules"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "proportionality and the limits of welfarism"
    - "group fairness in committee selection"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "consistent approval based multi winner rules"
    - "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "flexible representative democracy an introduction with binary issues"):
  with members:
    - "on rational delegations in liquid democracy"
    - "a mathematical model for optimal decisions in a representative democracy"
    - "the conference paper assignment problem using order weighted averages to assign indivisible goods"
    - "binary voting with delegable proxy an analysis of liquid democracy"
    - "proxy voting for better outcomes"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on coalitional manipulation for multiwinner elections shortlisting"):
  with members:
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "the complexity of manipulating k approval elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a mathematical model for optimal decisions in a representative democracy"):
  with members:
    - "proxy voting for better outcomes"
    - "a maximum likelihood approach for selecting sets of alternatives"
    - "common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules"):
  with members:
    - "multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods"
    - "proportional approval method using squared loads approval removal and coin flip approval transformation pamsac a new system of proportional representation using approval voting"
    - "consistent probabilistic social choice"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "proxy voting for better outcomes"):
  with members:
    - "resolving multi proxy transitive vote delegation"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting lazy and truth biased voters"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "multi attribute proportional representation"):
  with members:
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.MA(Multiagent Systems)