human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings"
  Abstract: We study revenue maximization in settings where agents' values are interdependent: each agent receives a signal drawn from a correlated distribution and agents' values are functions of all of the signals. We introduce a variant of the generalized VCG auction with reserve prices and random admission, and show that this auction gives a constant approximation to the optimal expected revenue in matroid environments. Our results do not require any assumptions on the signal distributions, however, they require the value functions to satisfy a standard single-crossing property and a concavity-type condition.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "robust revenue maximization under minimal statistical information"):
  with members:
    - "revenue maximization with imprecise distribution"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "simple versus optimal contracts"
    - "bayesian auctions with efficient queries"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "a sample complexity measure with applications to learning optimal auctions"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations sos to the rescue"):
  with members:
    - "interdependent values without single crossing"
    - "optimal algorithms for continuous non monotone submodular and dr submodular maximization"
    - "non monotone continuous dr submodular maximization structure and algorithms"
    - "optimal mechanisms for selling information"
    - "optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"):
  with members:
    - "a b testing of auctions"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "improved approximations for free order prophets and second price auctions"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "polymatroid prophet inequalities"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the buck passing game"):
  with members:
    - "interdependent values without single crossing"
    - "a variational inequality framework for network games existence uniqueness convergence and sensitivity analysis"
    - "location games on networks existence and efficiency of equilibria"
    - "pagerank beyond the web"
    - "graphical models for game theory"
    - "flows and decompositions of games harmonic and potential games"
    - "maximizing pagerank via outlinks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "interdependent values without single crossing"):
  with members:
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "from bayesian to crowdsourced bayesian auctions"):
  with members:
    - "bayesian auctions with efficient queries"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "putting peer prediction under the micro economic scope and making truth telling focal"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "submodular stochastic probing on matroids"
    - "a stochastic probing problem with applications"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)