human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
  Abstract: We study the truthful facility assignment problem, where a set of agents with private most-preferred points on a metric space are assigned to facilities that lie on the metric space, under capacity constraints on the facilities. The goal is to produce such an assignment that minimizes the social cost, i.e., the total distance between the most-preferred points of the agents and their corresponding facilities in the assignment, under the constraint of truthfulness, which ensures that agents do not misreport their most-preferred points. #R##N#We propose a resource augmentation framework, where a truthful mechanism is evaluated by its worst-case performance on an instance with enhanced facility capacities against the optimal mechanism on the same instance with the original capacities. We study a very well-known mechanism, Serial Dictatorship, and provide an exact analysis of its performance. Although Serial Dictatorship is a purely combinatorial mechanism, our analysis uses linear programming; a linear program expresses its greedy nature as well as the structure of the input, and finds the input instance that enforces the mechanism have its worst-case performance. Bounding the objective of the linear program using duality arguments allows us to compute tight bounds on the approximation ratio. Among other results, we prove that Serial Dictatorship has approximation ratio $g/(g-2)$ when the capacities are multiplied by any integer $g \geq 3$. Our results suggest that even a limited augmentation of the resources can have wondrous effects on the performance of the mechanism and in particular, the approximation ratio goes to 1 as the augmentation factor becomes large. We complement our results with bounds on the approximation ratio of Random Serial Dictatorship, the randomized version of Serial Dictatorship, when there is no resource augmentation.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "social cost guarantees in smart route guidance"):
  with members:
    - "a compartmental model for traffic networks and its dynamical behavior"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "a market inspired approach for intersection management in urban road traffic networks"
    - "approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"):
  with members:
    - "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"
    - "sequential deliberation for social choice"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "combinatorial secretary problems with ordinal information"
    - "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)