human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing"
  Abstract: We resolve the complexity of revenue-optimal deterministic auctions in the unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian setting, i.e., the optimal item pricing problem, when the buyer's values for the items are independent. We show that the problem of computing a revenue-optimal pricing can be solved in polynomial time for distributions of support size 2, and its decision version is NP-complete for distributions of support size 3. We also show that the problem remains NP-complete for the case of identical distributions.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design"):
  with members:
    - "settling the sample complexity of single parameter revenue maximization"
    - "a neural architecture for designing truthful and efficient auctions"
    - "multi agent adversarial inverse reinforcement learning"
    - "approximation schemes for a buyer with independent items via symmetries"
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "deep sets"
    - "invariant and equivariant graph networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "99 revenue via enhanced competition"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "on the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design"
    - "on revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "reaping the benefits of bundling under high production costs"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on the complexity of bundle pricing and simple mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "optimal pricing is hard"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "optimal mechanisms with simple menus"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "the complexity of optimal mechanism design"
    - "simple and nearly optimal multi item auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "on solutions for the maximum revenue multi item auction under dominant strategy and bayesian implementations"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "ironing the border optimal auctions for negatively correlated items"
    - "selling two goods optimally"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "reducing revenue to welfare maximization approximation algorithms and other generalizations"
    - "optimal mechanisms with simple menus"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "reaping the benefits of bundling under high production costs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "on the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for a combinatorial buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "on the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "on the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)