human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"
  Abstract: We present an incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multiunit auctions with general k-minded player valuations. The mechanism fully optimizes over an appropriately chosen sub-range of possible allocations and then uses VCG payments over this sub-range. We show that obtaining a fully polynomial-time incentive-compatible approximation scheme, at least using VCG payments, is NP-hard. For the case of valuations given by black boxes, we give a polynomial-time incentive-compatible 2-approximation mechanism and show that no better is possible, at least using VCG payments.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "price doubling and item halving robust revenue guarantees for item pricing"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "envy free pricing in multi unit markets"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "pricing to maximize revenue and welfare simultaneously in large markets"
    - "on the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms"
    - "on welfare approximation and stable pricing"
    - "secretary problems with non uniform arrival order"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "oracle efficient online learning and auction design"):
  with members:
    - "online learning with low rank experts"
    - "improved regret bounds for oracle based adversarial contextual bandits"
    - "bistro an efficient relaxation based method for contextual bandits"
    - "efficient algorithms for adversarial contextual learning"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"
    - "the computational power of optimization in online learning"
    - "ironing in the dark"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "envy free pricing in multi unit markets"):
  with members:
    - "posted pricing sans discrimination"
    - "budgetary effects on pricing equilibrium in online markets"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "the complexity of fairness through equilibrium"
    - "reducing revenue to welfare maximization approximation algorithms and other generalizations"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms for combinatorial allocation of electric power in alternating current electric systems for smart grid"):
  with members:
    - "complex demand scheduling problem with application in smart grid"
    - "optimal power flow with inelastic demands for demand response in radial distribution networks"
    - "truthful mechanisms for combinatorial ac electric power allocation"
    - "complex demand knapsack problems and incentives in ac power systems"
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"):
  with members:
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "welfare and revenue guarantees for competitive bundling equilibrium"):
  with members:
    - "clearing markets via bundles"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms for combinatorial ac electric power allocation"):
  with members:
    - "complex demand knapsack problems and incentives in ac power systems"
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "local computation mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "new techniques and tighter bounds for local computation algorithms"
    - "on the communication complexity of finding an approximate stable marriage"
    - "a local computation approximation scheme to maximum matching"
    - "converting online algorithms to local computation algorithms"
    - "approaching utopia strong truthfulness and externality resistant mechanisms"
    - "space efficient local computation algorithms"
    - "fast local computation algorithms"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)