human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "is it ever safe to vote strategically"
  Abstract: There are many situations in which mis-coordinated strategic voting can leave strategic voters worse off than they would have been had they not tried to strategize. We analyse the simplest of such scenarios, in which the set of strategic voters all have the same sincere preferences and all cast the same strategic vote, while all other voters vote sincerely. Most mis-coordinations in this framework can be classified as instances of either strategic overshooting (too many voted strategically) or strategic undershooting (too few). If mis-coordination can result in strategic voters ending up worse off than they would have been had they all just voted sincerely, we call the relevant strategic vote unsafe. We show that under every onto and non-dictatorial social choice rule there exist circumstances where a voter has an incentive to cast a safe strategic vote. We extend the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem by proving that every onto and non-dictatorial social choice rule can be individually manipulated by a voter casting a safe strategic vote.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method"):
  with members:
    - "strategic voting and the logic of knowledge"
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation"):
  with members:
    - "gibbard satterthwaite games for k approval voting rules"
    - "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting lazy and truth biased voters"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "gibbard satterthwaite games for k approval voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "equilibria of plurality voting lazy and truth biased voters"
    - "a classification of weakly acyclic games"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "pareto optimality and strategy proofness in group argument evaluation extended version"):
  with members:
    - "judgement aggregation in multi agent argumentation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "strategic voting and the logic of knowledge"):
  with members:
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)