human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "deterministic strategyproof and fair cake cutting"
  Abstract: We study the classic cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective, in particular focusing on deterministic mechanisms that are strategyproof and fair. We begin by looking at mechanisms that are non-wasteful and primarily show that for even the restricted class of piecewise constant valuations there exists no direct-revelation mechanism that is strategyproof and even approximately proportional. Subsequently, we remove the non-wasteful constraint and show another impossibility result stating that there is no strategyproof and approximately proportional direct-revelation mechanism that outputs contiguous allocations, again, for even the restricted class of piecewise constant valuations. In addition to the above results, we also present some negative results when considering an approximate notion of strategyproofness, show a connection between direct-revelation mechanisms and mechanisms in the Robertson-Webb model when agents have piecewise constant valuations, and finally also present a (minor) modification to the well-known Even-Paz algorithm that has better incentive-compatible properties for the cases when there are two or three agents.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "obvious manipulations in cake cutting"):
  with members:
    - "fair cake cutting in practice"
    - "fair and square cake cutting in two dimensions"
    - "resource monotonicity and population monotonicity in connected cake cutting"
    - "cake cutting algorithms for piecewise constant and piecewise uniform valuations"
    - "truthful fair division"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "truthful fair division without free disposal"):
  with members:
    - "on the complexity of chore division"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for four agents"
    - "cake cutting algorithms for piecewise constant and piecewise uniform valuations"
    - "incentive compatible two player cake cutting"
    - "truthful fair division"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "fair cake cutting in practice"):
  with members:
    - "truthful fair division without free disposal"
    - "an algorithmic framework for strategic fair division"
    - "incentive compatible two player cake cutting"
    - "information theoretic cutting of a cake"
    - "online cake cutting"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)