human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"
  Abstract: We pose and study a fundamental algorithmic problem which we term mixture selection, arising as a building block in a number of game-theoretic applications: Given a function $g$ from the $n$-dimensional hypercube to the bounded interval $[-1,1]$, and an $n \times m$ matrix $A$ with bounded entries, maximize $g(Ax)$ over $x$ in the $m$-dimensional simplex. This problem arises naturally when one seeks to design a lottery over items for sale in an auction, or craft the posterior beliefs for agents in a Bayesian game through the provision of information (a.k.a. signaling). #R##N#We present an approximation algorithm for this problem when $g$ simultaneously satisfies two smoothness properties: Lipschitz continuity with respect to the $L^\infty$ norm, and noise stability. The latter notion, which we define and cater to our setting, controls the degree to which low-probability errors in the inputs of $g$ can impact its output. When $g$ is both $O(1)$-Lipschitz continuous and $O(1)$-stable, we obtain an (additive) PTAS for mixture selection. We also show that neither assumption suffices by itself for an additive PTAS, and both assumptions together do not suffice for an additive FPTAS. #R##N#We apply our algorithm to different game-theoretic applications from mechanism design and optimal signaling. We make progress on a number of open problems suggested in prior work by easily reducing them to mixture selection: we resolve an important special case of the small-menu lottery design problem posed by Dughmi, Han, and Nisan; we resolve the problem of revenue-maximizing signaling in Bayesian second-price auctions posed by Emek et al. and Miltersen and Sheffet; we design a quasipolynomial-time approximation scheme for the optimal signaling problem in normal form games suggested by Dughmi; and we design an approximation algorithm for the optimal signaling problem in the voting model of Alonso and C\^{a}mara.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the complexity of contracts"):
  with members:
    - "delegated search approximates efficient search"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "simple versus optimal contracts"
    - "bernoulli factories and black box reductions in mechanism design"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "non optimal mechanism design"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "public bayesian persuasion being almost optimal and almost persuasive"):
  with members:
    - "persuading voters it s easy to whisper it s hard to speak loud"
    - "on the tractability of public persuasion with no externalities"
    - "targeting and signaling in ad auctions"
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"
    - "bayesian exploration incentivizing exploration in bayesian games"
    - "inapproximability results for approximate nash equilibria"
    - "can almost everybody be almost happy pcp for ppad and the inapproximability of nash"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on the tractability of public persuasion with no externalities"):
  with members:
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "bayesian exploration incentivizing exploration in bayesian games"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "deterministic algorithms for submodular maximization problems"
    - "hardness results for signaling in bayesian zero sum and network routing games"
    - "honest signaling in zero sum games is hard and lying is even harder"
    - "tight bounds on ell_1 approximation and learning of self bounding functions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a simple mechanism for a budget constrained buyer"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "sampling and representation complexity of revenue maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "third party data providers ruin simple mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "on the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "inapproximability of vc dimension and littlestone s dimension"):
  with members:
    - "almost polynomial ratio eth hardness of approximating densest k subgraph"
    - "detecting communities is hard and counting them is even harder"
    - "on the approximability of partial vc dimension"
    - "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"
    - "a birthday repetition theorem and complexity of approximating dense csps"
    - "eth hardness for densest k subgraph with perfect completeness"
    - "complexity theoretic limitations on learning halfspaces"
    - "eth hardness for signaling in symmetric zero sum games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "targeting and signaling in ad auctions"):
  with members:
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "constrained signaling in auction design"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "send mixed signals earn more work less"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "hardness results for signaling in bayesian zero sum and network routing games"
    - "on the hardness of signaling"
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"
    - "constrained signaling in auction design"
    - "send mixed signals earn more work less"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)