human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
  Abstract: Electoral control refers to attempts by an election's organizer ("the chair") to influence the outcome by adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates. The groundbreaking work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] on (constructive) control proposes computational complexity as a means of resisting control attempts: Look for election systems where the chair's task in seeking control is itself computationally infeasible. #R##N#We introduce and study a method of combining two or more candidate-anonymous election schemes in such a way that the combined scheme possesses all the resistances to control (i.e., all the NP-hardnesses of control) possessed by any of its constituents: It combines their strengths. From this and new resistance constructions, we prove for the first time that there exists an election scheme that is resistant to all twenty standard types of electoral control.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a parameterized perspective on protecting elections"):
  with members:
    - "optimal bribery in voting"
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "manipulating elections by selecting issues"):
  with members:
    - "hotelling downs model with limited attraction"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "the complexity of probabilistic lobbying"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "computational social choice and computational complexity bffs"):
  with members:
    - "consensus halving is ppa complete"
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "raising np lower bounds to parallel np lower bounds"
    - "exact analysis of dodgson elections lewis carroll s 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access to np"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "high multiplicity election problems"):
  with members:
    - "the complexity of succinct elections"
    - "complexity dichotomies for unweighted scoring rules"
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "polynomiality for bin packing with a constant number of item types"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "weighted electoral control"):
  with members:
    - "a control dichotomy for pure scoring rules"
    - "possible winners in noisy elections"
    - "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "how many vote operations are needed to manipulate a voting system"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"):
  with members:
    - "x then x manipulation of same system runoff elections"
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "the complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets"):
  with members:
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "recognizing when heuristics can approximate minimum vertex covers is complete for parallel access to np"
    - "exact complexity of the winner problem for young elections"
    - "raising np lower bounds to parallel np lower bounds"
    - "exact analysis of dodgson elections lewis carroll s 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access to np"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the complexity of online voter control in sequential elections"):
  with members:
    - "control in the presence of manipulators cooperative and competitive cases"
    - "the complexity of controlling candidate sequential elections"
    - "online voter control in sequential elections"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "the complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)