human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
  Abstract: Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial orders instead. Then, given a voting rule, a profile of partial orders, and an alternative (candidate) c, two important questions arise: first, is it still possible for c to win, and second, is c guaranteed to win? These are the possible winner and necessary winner problems, respectively. Each of these two problems is further divided into two sub-problems: determining whether c is a unique winner (that is, c is the only winner), or determining whether c is a co-winner (that is, c is in the set of winners).#R##N##R##N#We consider the setting where the number of alternatives is unbounded and the votes are unweighted. We completely characterize the complexity of possible/necessary winner problems for the following common voting rules: a class of positional scoring rules (including Borda), Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, ranked pairs, voting trees, and plurality with runoff.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the complexity of possible winners on partial chains"):
  with members:
    - "computational social choice meets databases"
    - "the complexity of the possible winner problem over partitioned preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "riffled independence for efficient inference with partial rankings"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a parameterized perspective on protecting elections"):
  with members:
    - "optimal bribery in voting"
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "incomplete preferences in single peaked electorates"):
  with members:
    - "on the likelihood of single peaked preferences"
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "recognising multidimensional euclidean preferences"
    - "modeling single peakedness for votes with ties"
    - "single peaked consistency for weak orders is easy"
    - "reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and bribery in single peaked and nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "the one dimensional euclidean domain finitely many obstructions are not enough"
    - "complexity of manipulative actions when voting with ties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "optimal bribery in voting"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying framework for manipulation problems"
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "approximation algorithms for campaign management"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "local distance restricted bribery in voting"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying framework for manipulation problems"
    - "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "approximation algorithms for campaign management"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "lie on the fly strategic voting in an iterative preference elicitation process"):
  with members:
    - "cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation"
    - "online prediction with selfish experts"
    - "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous proficiency"
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "election control with voters uncertainty hardness and approximation results"):
  with members:
    - "vote for me election control via social influence in arbitrary scoring rule voting systems"
    - "election campaigning on social media politicians audiences and the mediation of political communication on facebook and twitter"
    - "election with bribed voter uncertainty hardness and approximation algorithm"
    - "disinformation and social bot operations in the run up to the 2017 french presidential election"
    - "controlling elections through social influence"
    - "almost polynomial ratio eth hardness of approximating densest k subgraph"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "minority becomes majority in social networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "between discord and deadlock consensus under a deadline"):
  with members:
    - "plurality voting under uncertainty"
    - "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"
    - "equilibria of plurality voting lazy and truth biased voters"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)