human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "justified representation in approval based committee voting"
  Abstract: We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting, which we call justified representation (JR). This axiom requires that if a large enough group of voters exhibits agreement by supporting the same candidate, then at least one voter in this group has an approved candidate in the winning committee. We show that for every list of ballots it is possible to select a committee that provides JR. However, it turns out that several prominent approval-based voting rules may fail to output such a committee. In particular, while Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) always outputs a committee that provides JR, Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV), a tractable approximation to PAV, does not have this property. We then introduce a stronger version of the JR axiom, which we call extended justified representation (EJR), and show that PAV satisfies EJR, while other rules we consider do not; indeed, EJR can be used to characterize PAV within the class of weighted PAV rules. We also consider several other questions related to JR and EJR, including the relationship between JR/EJR and core stability, and the complexity of the associated algorithmic problems.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "participatory budgeting models and approaches"):
  with members:
    - "truthful aggregation of budget proposals"
    - "markets for public decision making"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "iterative local voting for collective decision making in continuous spaces"
    - "the impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "evaluating approval based multiwinner voting in terms of robustness to noise"):
  with members:
    - "a quantitative analysis of multi winner rules"
    - "consistent approval based multi winner rules"
    - "multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "a maximum likelihood approach for selecting sets of alternatives"
    - "common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on the complexity of destructive bribery in approval based multi winner voting"):
  with members:
    - "monotonicity axioms in approval based multi winner voting rules"
    - "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"
    - "structure in dichotomous preferences"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "election attacks with few candidates"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "proportionally fair clustering"):
  with members:
    - "fair algorithms for clustering"
    - "privacy preserving clustering with constraints"
    - "markets for public decision making"
    - "fair clustering through fairlets"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "on fairness and calibration"
    - "preventing fairness gerrymandering auditing and learning for subgroup fairness"
    - "algorithmic decision making and the cost of fairness"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "computing a small agreeable set of indivisible items"):
  with members:
    - "fair division under cardinality constraints"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "envy free cake cutting among families"
    - "proportional cake cutting among families"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "proportionally representative participatory budgeting with ordinal preferences"):
  with members:
    - "a framework for approval based budgeting methods"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "rank maximal equal contribution a probabilistic social choice function"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "unifying ensemble methods for q learning via social choice theory"):
  with members:
    - "multi step reinforcement learning a unifying algorithm"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "averaged dqn variance reduction and stabilization for deep reinforcement learning"
    - "deep exploration via bootstrapped dqn"
    - "epopt learning robust neural network policies using model ensembles"
    - "dueling network architectures for deep reinforcement learning"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "off policy shaping ensembles in reinforcement learning"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "approximately stable committee selection"):
  with members:
    - "proportionally fair clustering"
    - "group fairness in committee selection"
    - "fair knapsack"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.MA(Multiagent Systems)