human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
  Abstract: We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin & Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the "sum of misrepresentations" is minimized. The winner determination problem for both systems is known to be NP-hard, hence this work aims at investigating whether there are variants of the proposed rules and/or specific electorates for which these problems can be solved efficiently. As a variation of these rules, instead of minimizing the sum of misrepresentations, we considered minimizing the maximal misrepresentation introducing effectively two new rules. In the general case these "minimax" versions of classical rules appeared to be still NP-hard.#R##N##R##N#We investigated the parameterized complexity of winner determination of the two classical and two new rules with respect to several parameters. Here we have a mixture of positive and negative results: e.g., we proved fixed-parameter tractability for the parameter the number of candidates but fixed-parameter intractability for the number of winners.#R##N##R##N#For single-peaked electorates our results are overwhelmingly positive: we provide polynomial-time algorithms for most of the considered problems. The only rule that remains NP-hard for single-peaked electorates is the classical Monroe rule.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the complexity of constructive control under nearly single peaked preferences"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and bribery in single peaked and nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "structure in dichotomous preferences"
    - "the control complexity of r approval from the single peaked case to the general case"
    - "the complexity of fully proportional representation for single crossing electorates"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "the complexity of manipulating k approval elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "incomplete preferences in single peaked electorates"):
  with members:
    - "on the likelihood of single peaked preferences"
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "recognising multidimensional euclidean preferences"
    - "modeling single peakedness for votes with ties"
    - "single peaked consistency for weak orders is easy"
    - "reinstating combinatorial protections for manipulation and bribery in single peaked and nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "the one dimensional euclidean domain finitely many obstructions are not enough"
    - "complexity of manipulative actions when voting with ties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "reallocating multiple facilities on the line"):
  with members:
    - "the online k taxi problem"
    - "the infinite server problem"
    - "the h k server problem on bounded depth trees"
    - "changing bases multistage optimization for matroids and matchings"
    - "facility location in evolving metrics"
    - "an algorithm for online k means clustering"
    - "dynamic facility location via exponential clocks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "electing a committee with dominance constraints"):
  with members:
    - "a rule for committee selection with soft diversity constraints"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"
    - "multiwinner voting with fairness constraints"
    - "multi attribute proportional representation"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"):
  with members:
    - "committee scoring rules axiomatic characterization and hierarchy"
    - "consistent approval based multi winner rules"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "cloning in elections finding the possible winners"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "committee scoring rules axiomatic characterization and hierarchy"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "monotonicity axioms in approval based multi winner voting rules"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"
    - "consistent approval based multi winner rules"
    - "multiwinner voting with fairness constraints"
    - "group fairness in multiwinner voting"
    - "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "computing and testing pareto optimal committees"):
  with members:
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the convergence of iterative delegations in liquid democracy"):
  with members:
    - "on rational delegations in liquid democracy"
    - "binary voting with delegable proxy an analysis of liquid democracy"
    - "proxy voting for better outcomes"
    - "plurality voting under uncertainty"
    - "new results on equilibria in strategic candidacy"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)