human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "strategyproof approximation mechanisms for location on networks"
  Abstract: We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the facility. A mechanism maps the locations reported by the agents to the location of the facility. Specifically, we are interested in social choice mechanisms that do not utilize payments. We wish to design mechanisms that are strategyproof, in the sense that agents can never benefit by lying, or, even better, group strategyproof, in the sense that a coalition of agents cannot all benefit by lying. At the same time, our mechanisms must provide a small approximation ratio with respect to one of two optimization targets: the social cost or the maximum cost. We give an almost complete characterization of the feasible truthful approximation ratio under both target functions, deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and with respect to different network topologies. Our main results are: We show that a simple randomized mechanism is group strategyproof and gives a tight approximation ratio of 3/2 for the maximum cost when the network is a circle; and we show that no randomized SP mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 2-o(1) to the maximum cost even when the network is a tree, thereby matching a trivial upper bound of two.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "truthful aggregation of budget proposals"):
  with members:
    - "markets for public decision making"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "iterative local voting for collective decision making in continuous spaces"
    - "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "truthful facility location with additive errors"):
  with members:
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "mechanism design with strategic mediators"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on voting and facility location"):
  with members:
    - "who to trust for truthfully maximizing welfare"
    - "on the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games"
    - "approximate privacy foundations and quantification"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a survey on approximation mechanism design without money for facility games"):
  with members:
    - "differentially private combinatorial optimization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "strategyproof mechanisms for one dimensional hybrid and obnoxious facility location"):
  with members:
    - "approximately optimal mechanisms for strategyproof facility location minimizing l_p norm of costs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "randomized strategyproof mechanisms for facility location and the mini sum of squares objective"):
  with members:
    - "mix and match"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "mix and match"):
  with members:
    - "truthful assignment without money"
    - "sum of us strategyproof selection from the selectors"
    - "truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "truthful assignment without money"):
  with members:
    - "mix and match"
    - "truthful mechanisms via greedy iterative packing"
    - "sum of us strategyproof selection from the selectors"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)