human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "budget feasible mechanisms"
  Abstract: We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our knowledge, in the past. We focus on the case of procurement auctions in which sellers have private costs, and the auctioneer aims to maximize a utility function on subsets of items, under the constraint that the sum of the payments provided by the mechanism does not exceed a given budget. Standard mechanism design ideas such as the VCG mechanism and its variants are not applicable here. We show that, for general functions, the budget constraint can render mechanisms arbitrarily bad in terms of the utility of the buyer. However, our main result shows that for the important class of submodular functions, a bounded approximation ratio is achievable. Better approximation results are obtained for subclasses of the submodular functions. We explore the space of budget feasible mechanisms in other domains and give a characterization under more restricted conditions.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "budget feasible mechanism design for non monotone submodular objectives offline and online"):
  with members:
    - "a nearly linear time algorithm for submodular maximization with a knapsack constraint"
    - "on budget feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives"
    - "simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations"
    - "greed is good near optimal submodular maximization via greedy optimization"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms on matroids"
    - "adaptivity gaps for stochastic probing submodular and xos functions"
    - "coverage matching and beyond new results on budgeted mechanism design"
    - "submodular secretary problems cardinality matching and linear constraints"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "approximately maximizing the broker s profit in a two sided market"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "muda a truthful multi unit double auction mechanism"
    - "double auctions in markets for multiple kinds of goods"
    - "approximately efficient two sided combinatorial auctions"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "truthful multi unit procurements with budgets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "optimal budget feasible mechanisms for additive valuations"):
  with members:
    - "on budget feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives"
    - "simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms on matroids"
    - "coverage matching and beyond new results on budgeted mechanism design"
    - "bayesian budget feasibility with posted pricing"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "mechanism design with predicted task revenue for bike sharing systems"):
  with members:
    - "a deep reinforcement learning framework for rebalancing dockless bike sharing systems"
    - "online knapsack problem and budgeted truthful bipartite matching"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a simple mechanism for a budget constrained buyer"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a bridge between liquid and social welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "a bayesian clearing mechanism for combinatorial auctions"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "bayesian budget feasibility with posted pricing"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a budget feasible peer graded mechanism for iot based crowdsourcing"):
  with members:
    - "quality control in crowdsourcing a survey of quality attributes assessment techniques and assurance actions"
    - "a budget feasible mechanism for hiring doctors in e healthcare"
    - "incentives for truthful peer grading"
    - "providing long term participation incentive in participatory sensing"
    - "online assignment of heterogeneous tasks in crowdsourcing markets"
    - "on cost effective incentive mechanisms in microtask crowdsourcing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "incentme effective mechanism design to stimulate crowdsensing participants with uncertain mobility"):
  with members:
    - "securing the internet of things in the age of machine learning and software defined networking"
    - "quality of information in mobile crowdsensing survey and research challenges"
    - "taskme multi task allocation in mobile crowd sensing"
    - "incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing survey and research challenges"
    - "mining users significant driving routes with low power sensors"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)