human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
  Abstract: We consider the problem of selling a single item to one of $n$ bidders who arrive sequentially with values drawn independently from identical distributions, and ask how much more revenue can be obtained by posting discriminatory prices to individual bidders rather than the same anonymous price to all of them. The ratio between the maximum revenue from discriminatory pricing and that from anonymous pricing is at most $2-1/n$ for arbitrary distributions and at most $1/(1-(1-1/n)^n)\leq e/(e-1)\approx 1.582$ for regular distributions, and these bounds can in fact be obtained by using one of the discriminatory prices as an anonymous one. The bounds are shown via a relaxation of the discriminatory pricing problem rather than virtual values and thus apply to distributions without a density, and they are tight for all values of $n$. For a class of distributions that includes the uniform and the exponential distribution we show the maximization of revenue to be equivalent to the maximization of welfare with an additional bidder, in the sense that both use the same discriminatory prices. The problem of welfare maximization is the well-known Cayley-Moser problem, and this connection can be used to establish that the revenue gap between discriminatory and anonymous pricing is approximately $1.037$ for the uniform distribution and approximately $1.073$ for the exponential distribution.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "nearly optimal pricing algorithms for production constrained and laminar bayesian selection"
    - "improved approximations for free order prophets and second price auctions"
    - "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"):
  with members:
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "on the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "optimal pricing for mhr and lambda regular distributions"):
  with members:
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing beyond linear utility"
    - "optimal pricing for mhr distributions"
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "online market intermediation"
    - "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "monopoly pricing with buyer search"):
  with members:
    - "planning with multiple biases"
    - "on the value of penalties in time inconsistent planning"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "efficient empirical revenue maximization in single parameter auction environments"
    - "sampling and representation complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "time inconsistent planning a computational problem in behavioral economics"
    - "on the complexity of dynamic mechanism design"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "optimal pricing for mhr distributions"):
  with members:
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "online market intermediation"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "on policies for single leg revenue management with limited demand information"):
  with members:
    - "inventory balancing with online learning"
    - "prophet inequalities with limited information"
    - "bandits with knapsacks"
    - "dynamic pricing with limited supply"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "simple pricing schemes for the cloud"):
  with members:
    - "pricing multi unit markets"
    - "pricing identical items"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"
    - "hiring secretaries over time the benefit of concurrent employment"
    - "on demand or spot selling the cloud to risk averse customers"
    - "truthful online scheduling with commitments"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"):
  with members:
    - "optimal competitive auctions"
    - "the simple economics of approximately optimal auctions"
    - "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing"
    - "sequential posted pricing and multi parameter mechanism design"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)