human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "matroid prophet inequalities"
  Abstract: Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random numbers and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, claiming a reward equal to the most recent observation. The famous prophet inequality of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling asserts that a gambler who knows the distribution of each random variable can achieve at least half as much reward, in expectation, as a "prophet" who knows the sampled values of each random variable and can choose the largest one. We generalize this result to the setting in which the gambler and the prophet are allowed to make more than one selection, subject to a matroid constraint. We show that the gambler can still achieve at least half as much reward as the prophet; this result is the best possible, since it is known that the ratio cannot be improved even in the original prophet inequality, which corresponds to the special case of rank-one matroids. Generalizing the result still further, we show that under an intersection of p matroid constraints, the prophet's reward exceeds the gambler's by a factor of at most O(p), and this factor is also tight. #R##N#Beyond their interest as theorems about pure online algorithms or optimal stopping rules, these results also have applications to mechanism design. Our results imply improved bounds on the ability of sequential posted-price mechanisms to approximate Bayesian optimal mechanisms in both single-parameter and multi-parameter settings. In particular, our results imply the first efficiently computable constant-factor approximations to the Bayesian optimal revenue in certain multi-parameter settings.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "predict and match prophet inequalities with uncertain supply"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "approximation algorithms for correlated knapsacks and non martingale bandits"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "prophet inequality for bipartite matching merits of being simple and non adaptive"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "tight competitive ratios of classic matching algorithms in the fully online model"
    - "how to match when all vertices arrive online"
    - "maximizing efficiency in dynamic matching markets"
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "optimal single choice prophet inequalities from samples"):
  with members:
    - "prophet inequality for bipartite matching merits of being simple and non adaptive"
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "nearly optimal pricing algorithms for production constrained and laminar bayesian selection"
    - "random order contention resolution schemes"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "pricing for online resource allocation intervals and paths"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "approximately maximizing the broker s profit in a two sided market"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "muda a truthful multi unit double auction mechanism"
    - "double auctions in markets for multiple kinds of goods"
    - "approximately efficient two sided combinatorial auctions"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "truthful multi unit procurements with budgets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the outer limits of contention resolution on matroids and connections to the secretary problem"):
  with members:
    - "the prophet inequality can be solved optimally with a single set of samples"
    - "random order contention resolution schemes"
    - "optimal online contention resolution schemes via ex ante prophet inequalities"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "o log log rank competitive ratio for the matroid secretary problem"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "the bayesian prophet a low regret framework for online decision making"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "online stochastic matching new algorithms and bounds"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "new algorithms better bounds and a novel model for online stochastic matching"
    - "online convex optimization using predictions"
    - "algorithms with logarithmic or sublinear regret for constrained contextual bandits"
    - "fast algorithms for online stochastic convex programming"
    - "bandits with knapsacks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "on optimal ordering in the optimal stopping problem"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "a simple o log log mathrm rank competitive algorithm for the matroid secretary problem"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "how to hire secretaries with stochastic departures"):
  with members:
    - "online trading as a secretary problem"
    - "packing returning secretaries"
    - "improved approximations for free order prophets and second price auctions"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "o log log rank competitive ratio for the matroid secretary problem"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms)