human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms"
  Abstract: We consider a monopolist seller facing a single buyer with additive valuations over n heterogeneous, independent items. It is known that in this important setting optimal mechanisms may require randomization [HR12], use menus of infinite size [DDT15], and may be computationally intractable [DDT14]. This has sparked recent interest in finding simple mechanisms that obtain reasonable approximations to the optimal revenue [HN12, LY13, BILW14]. In this work we attempt to find the optimal simple mechanism. #R##N#There are many ways to define simple mechanisms. Here we restrict our search to partition mechanisms, where the seller partitions the items into disjoint bundles and posts a price for each bundle; the buyer is allowed to buy any number of bundles. #R##N#We give a PTAS for the problem of finding a revenue-maximizing partition mechanism, and prove that the problem is strongly NP-hard. En route, we prove structural properties of near-optimal partition mechanisms which may be of independent interest: for example, there always exists a near-optimal partition mechanism that uses only a constant number of non-trivial bundles (i.e. bundles with more than one item).

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "99 revenue via enhanced competition"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "on the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design"
    - "on revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "reaping the benefits of bundling under high production costs"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"):
  with members:
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
    - "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "third party data providers ruin simple mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a general theory of sample complexity for multi item profit maximization"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "submultiplicative glivenko cantelli and uniform convergence of revenues"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "revenue optimization with approximate bid predictions"
    - "a sample complexity measure with applications to learning optimal auctions"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "do prices coordinate markets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "price doubling and item halving robust revenue guarantees for item pricing"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "envy free pricing in multi unit markets"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "pricing to maximize revenue and welfare simultaneously in large markets"
    - "on welfare approximation and stable pricing"
    - "secretary problems with non uniform arrival order"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "posted pricing sans discrimination"):
  with members:
    - "do prices coordinate markets"
    - "on welfare approximation and stable pricing"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations"
    - "welfare maximization with production costs a primal dual approach"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
    - "welfare and profit maximization with production costs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "reaping the benefits of bundling under high production costs"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "selling two goods optimally"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "simple and nearly optimal multi item auctions"
    - "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "reaping the benefits of bundling under high production costs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)