human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
  Abstract: We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms that do not involve any monetary payments. We consider two natural measures of social welfare: the ordinal welfare factor which measures the number of agents that are at least as happy as in some unknown, arbitrary benchmark allocation, and the linear welfare factor which assumes an agent's utility linearly decreases down his preference lists, and measures the total utility to that achieved by an optimal allocation. We analyze two matching mechanisms which have been extensively studied by economists. The first mechanism is the random serial dictatorship (RSD) where agents are ordered in accordance with a randomly chosen permutation, and are successively allocated their best choice among the unallocated items. The second mechanism is the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8], which computes a fractional allocation that can be expressed as a convex combination of integral allocations. The welfare factor of a mechanism is the infimum over all instances. For RSD, we show that the ordinal welfare factor is asymptotically 1/2, while the linear welfare factor lies in the interval [.526, 2/3]. For PS, we show that the ordinal welfare factor is also 1/2 while the linear welfare factor is roughly 2/3. To our knowledge, these results are the first non-trivial performance guarantees for these natural mechanisms.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"):
  with members:
    - "investigating the characteristics of one sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "decision theory with resource bounded agents"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "eliminating the weakest link making manipulation intractable"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "average case analysis of the assignment problem with independent preferences"):
  with members:
    - "smoothed and average case approximation ratios of mechanisms beyond the worst case analysis"
    - "average case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments"
    - "facility location with double peaked preference"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"):
  with members:
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "online vertex weighted bipartite matching and single bid budgeted allocations"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"):
  with members:
    - "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"
    - "sequential deliberation for social choice"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "combinatorial secretary problems with ordinal information"
    - "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "investigating the characteristics of one sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes"):
  with members:
    - "egalitarianism of random assignment mechanisms"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "equilibria under the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences"
    - "strategyproof quota mechanisms for multiple assignment problems"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "hybrid mechanisms trading off efficiency and strategyproofness in one sided matching"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "the price of diversity in assignment problems"):
  with members:
    - "diverse weighted bipartite b matching"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"
    - "the conference paper assignment problem using order weighted averages to assign indivisible goods"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"
    - "multi attribute proportional representation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)