human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "how bad is forming your own opinion"
  Abstract: The question of how people form their opinion has fascinated economists and sociologists for quite some time. In many of the models, a group of people in a social network, each holding a numerical opinion, arrive at a shared opinion through repeated averaging with their neighbors in the network. Motivated by the observation that consensus is rarely reached in real opinion dynamics, we study a related sociological model in which individuals' intrinsic beliefs counterbalance the averaging process and yield a diversity of opinions. #R##N#By interpreting the repeated averaging as best-response dynamics in an underlying game with natural payoffs, and the limit of the process as an equilibrium, we are able to study the cost of disagreement in these models relative to a social optimum. We provide a tight bound on the cost at equilibrium relative to the optimum; our analysis draws a connection between these agreement models and extremal problems that lead to generalized eigenvalues. We also consider a natural network design problem in this setting: which links can we add to the underlying network to reduce the cost of disagreement at equilibrium?

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "adversarial perturbations of opinion dynamics in networks"):
  with members:
    - "minimizing polarization and disagreement in social networks"
    - "opinion maximization in social networks"
    - "twice ramanujan sparsifiers"
    - "spectral sparsification of graphs"
    - "max cut and the smallest eigenvalue"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "local aggregation in preference games"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of equilibria in discrete preference games"
    - "decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games"
    - "on discrete preferences and coordination"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "understanding filter bubbles and polarization in social networks"):
  with members:
    - "opinion dynamics with varying susceptibility to persuasion"
    - "eigenvector computation and community detection in asynchronous gossip models"
    - "how algorithmic confounding in recommendation systems increases homogeneity and decreases utility"
    - "maximizing the diversity of exposure in a social network"
    - "find your place simple distributed algorithms for community detection"
    - "opinion maximization in social networks"
    - "biased assimilation homophily and the dynamics of polarization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the impact of tribalism on social welfare"):
  with members:
    - "graphical models for game theory"
    - "on linear congestion games with altruistic social context"
    - "bounding the inefficiency of altruism through social contribution games"
    - "friendship altruism and reward sharing in stable matching and contribution games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "occam s razor in opinion dynamics the weighted median influence process"):
  with members:
    - "a tutorial on modeling and analysis of dynamic social networks part i"
    - "opinion fluctuations and disagreement in social networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "computational aspects of equilibria in discrete preference games"):
  with members:
    - "coordination games on directed graphs"
    - "on discrete preferences and coordination"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "dynamics of opinions with social biases"):
  with members:
    - "consensus over random graph processes network borel cantelli lemmas for almost sure convergence"
    - "the evolution of beliefs over signed social networks"
    - "opinion fluctuations and disagreement in social networks"
    - "biased assimilation homophily and the dynamics of polarization"
    - "how agreement and disagreement evolve over random dynamic networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "opinion dynamics with varying susceptibility to persuasion"):
  with members:
    - "minimizing polarization and disagreement in social networks"
    - "mitigating overexposure in viral marketing"
    - "opinion maximization in social networks"
    - "opinion dynamics in social networks a local interaction game with stubborn agents"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)