human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
  Abstract: We present general techniques for proving inapproximability results for several paradigmatic truthful multidimensional mechanism design problems. In particular, we demonstrate the strength of our techniques by exhibiting a lower bound of 2-1/m for the scheduling problem with m unrelated machines (formulated as a mechanism design problem in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen on Algorithmic Mechanism Design). Our lower bound applies to truthful randomized mechanisms, regardless of any computational assumptions on the running time of these mechanisms. Moreover, it holds even for the wider class of truthfulness-in-expectation mechanisms. This lower bound nearly matches the known 1.58606 randomized truthful upper bound for the case of two machines (a non-truthful FPTAS exists). #R##N#Recently, Daskalakis and Weinberg show that there is a polynomial-time 2-approximately optimal Bayesian mechanism for makespan minimization for unrelated machines. We complement this result by showing an appropriate lower bound of 1.25 for deterministic incentive compatible Bayesian mechanisms. #R##N#We then show an application of our techniques to the workload-minimization problem in networks. We prove our lower bounds for this problem in the inter-domain routing setting presented by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker. Finally, we discuss several notions of non-utilitarian fairness (Max-Min fairness, Min-Max fairness, and envy minimization) and show how our techniques can be used to prove lower bounds for these notions. No lower bounds for truthful mechanisms in multidimensional probabilistic settings were previously known.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "envy regret and social welfare loss"):
  with members:
    - "the ad types problem"
    - "online learning for measuring incentive compatibility in ad auctions"
    - "note on vcg vs price raising for matching markets"
    - "communication complexity of approximate nash equilibria"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "adam a method for stochastic optimization"
    - "gsp with general independent click through rates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "on the nisan ronen conjecture for submodular valuations"):
  with members:
    - "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "a unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"
    - "the anarchy of scheduling without money"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"):
  with members:
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"
    - "an improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines"
    - "a characterization of 2 player mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "bribeproof mechanisms for two values domains"):
  with members:
    - "using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "a complete characterization of group strategyproof mechanisms of cost sharing"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)