human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "polymatroid prophet inequalities"
  Abstract: Consider a gambler and a prophet who observe a sequence of independent, non-negative numbers. The gambler sees the numbers one-by-one whereas the prophet sees the entire sequence at once. The goal of both is to decide on fractions of each number they want to keep so as to maximize the weighted fractional sum of the numbers chosen. #R##N#The classic result of Krengel and Sucheston (1977-78) asserts that if both the gambler and the prophet can pick one number, then the gambler can do at least half as well as the prophet. Recently, Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012) have generalized this result to settings where the numbers that can be chosen are subject to a matroid constraint. #R##N#In this note we go one step further and show that the bound carries over to settings where the fractions that can be chosen are subject to a polymatroid constraint. This bound is tight as it is already tight for the simple setting where the gambler and the prophet can pick only one number. An interesting application of our result is in mechanism design, where it leads to improved results for various problems.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "online stochastic max weight matching prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models"):
  with members:
    - "beating greedy for stochastic bipartite matching"
    - "online stochastic matching with edge arrivals"
    - "optimal single choice prophet inequalities from samples"
    - "an optimal monotone contention resolution scheme for bipartite matchings via a polyhedral viewpoint"
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "prophet inequality for bipartite matching merits of being simple and non adaptive"
    - "tight competitive ratios of classic matching algorithms in the fully online model"
    - "how to match when all vertices arrive online"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "prophet inequality for bipartite matching merits of being simple and non adaptive"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "tight competitive ratios of classic matching algorithms in the fully online model"
    - "how to match when all vertices arrive online"
    - "maximizing efficiency in dynamic matching markets"
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "strong algorithms for the ordinal matroid secretary problem"):
  with members:
    - "combinatorial secretary problems with ordinal information"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "secretary problems with non uniform arrival order"
    - "the submodular secretary problem goes linear"
    - "o log log rank competitive ratio for the matroid secretary problem"
    - "a simple o log log mathrm rank competitive algorithm for the matroid secretary problem"
    - "prophet inequalities with limited information"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "improved approximations for free order prophets and second price auctions"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities for independent random variables from an unknown distribution"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a framework for the secretary problem on the intersection of matroids"):
  with members:
    - "secretary problems with non uniform arrival order"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "prophet inequalities with limited information"
    - "online independent set beyond the worst case secretaries prophets and periods"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "advances on matroid secretary problems free order model and laminar case"
    - "matroid secretary for regular and decomposable matroids"
    - "on variants of the matroid secretary problem"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"):
  with members:
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "algorithms as mechanisms the price of anarchy of relax and round"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "optimal competitive auctions"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms)