human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "approximating nash equilibria in tree polymatrix games"
  Abstract: We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over trees, under a mild renormalizing assumption. Our result, in particular, leads to an expected polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of tree polymatrix games in which the number of actions per player is a fixed constant. Further, for trees with constant degree, the running time of the algorithm matches the best known upper bound for approximating Nash equilibria in bimatrix games (Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta 2003). #R##N#Notably, this work closely complements the hardness result of Rubinstein (2015), which establishes the inapproximability of Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over constant-degree bipartite graphs with two actions per player.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "tree polymatrix games are ppad hard"):
  with members:
    - "computing constrained approximate equilibria in polymatrix games"
    - "an empirical study on computing equilibria in polymatrix games"
    - "computing approximate nash equilibria in polymatrix games"
    - "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "approximating the existential theory of the reals"):
  with members:
    - "computing constrained approximate equilibria in polymatrix games"
    - "lipschitz continuity and approximate equilibria"
    - "empirical distribution of equilibrium play and its testing application"
    - "inapproximability of np complete variants of nash equilibrium"
    - "most tensor problems are np hard"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "computing constrained approximate equilibria in polymatrix games"):
  with members:
    - "distributed methods for computing approximate equilibria"
    - "fptas for mixed strategy nash equilibria in tree graphical games and their generalizations"
    - "an empirical study on computing equilibria in polymatrix games"
    - "inapproximability results for approximate nash equilibria"
    - "finding any nontrivial coarse correlated equilibrium is hard"
    - "inapproximability of nash equilibrium"
    - "computing approximate nash equilibria in polymatrix games"
    - "approximate well supported nash equilibria below two thirds"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"):
  with members:
    - "almost polynomial ratio eth hardness of approximating densest k subgraph"
    - "detecting communities is hard and counting them is even harder"
    - "the query complexity of correlated equilibria"
    - "communication complexity of approximate nash equilibria"
    - "inapproximability results for approximate nash equilibria"
    - "well supported versus approximate nash equilibria query complexity of large games"
    - "near optimal hardness results for signaling in bayesian games"
    - "eth hardness for densest k subgraph with perfect completeness"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "an empirical study on computing equilibria in polymatrix games"):
  with members:
    - "from duels to battefields computing equilibria of blotto and other games"
    - "an empirical study of finding approximate equilibria in bimatrix games"
    - "coordination games on graphs"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of nash equilibrium"
    - "computing approximate nash equilibria in polymatrix games"
    - "computing nash equilibria of action graph games"
    - "the complexity of non monotone markets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "fptas for mixed strategy nash equilibria in tree graphical games and their generalizations"):
  with members:
    - "inapproximability of nash equilibrium"
    - "on sparse discretization for graphical games"
    - "graphical models for game theory"
    - "a general framework for computing optimal correlated equilibria in compact games"
    - "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)