human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
  Abstract: We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. Random priority is a very well-known truthful-in-expectation mechanism for the problem. We prove that the approximation ratio of random priority is Theta(n^{-1/2}) while no truthful-in-expectation mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than O(n^{-1/2}), where n is the number of agents and items. Furthermore, we prove that the approximation ratio of all ordinal (not necessarily truthful-in-expectation) mechanisms is upper bounded by O(n^{-1/2}), indicating that random priority is asymptotically the best truthful-in-expectation mechanism and the best ordinal mechanism for the problem.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "keeping your friends close land allocation with friends"):
  with members:
    - "graphical one sided markets"
    - "the impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences"
    - "efficiency of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one sided matching"
    - "complexity results for rainbow matchings"
    - "peer effects and stability in matching markets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "truthful ownership transfer with expert advice blending mechanism design with and without money"):
  with members:
    - "better strategyproof mechanisms without payments or prior an analytic approach"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "the distortion of distributed voting"
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"
    - "on the distortion value of the elections with abstention"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "average case analysis of the assignment problem with independent preferences"):
  with members:
    - "smoothed and average case approximation ratios of mechanisms beyond the worst case analysis"
    - "average case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments"
    - "facility location with double peaked preference"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "social cost guarantees in smart route guidance"):
  with members:
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
    - "a compartmental model for traffic networks and its dynamical behavior"
    - "a market inspired approach for intersection management in urban road traffic networks"
    - "approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "justifications of welfare guarantees under normalized utilities"):
  with members:
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "resource monotonicity and population monotonicity in cake cutting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a truthful cardinal mechanism for one sided matching"):
  with members:
    - "nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "the complexity of fairness through equilibrium"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"
    - "the anarchy of scheduling without money"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)