human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
  Abstract: We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. Devanur et al. [2015] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of O(log m) for complement-free (i.e., subadditive) valuations. Prior to our work, no non-trivial upper bound on the PoA of single bid auctions was known for valuations exhibiting complements. We introduce a hierarchy over valuations, where levels of the hierarchy correspond to the degree of complementarity, and the PoA of the single bid auction degrades gracefully with the level of the hierarchy. This hierarchy is a refinement of the Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs (MPH) hierarchy [Feige et al. 2015], where the degree of complementarity d is captured by the maximum number of neighbours of a node in the positive hypergraph representation.We show that the price of anarchy of the single bid auction for valuations of level d of the hierarchy is O(d2 log(m/d)), where m is the number of items. We also establish an improved upper bound of O(d log m) for a subclass where every hyperedge in the positive hypergraph representation is of size at most 2 (but the degree is still d). Finally, we show that randomizing between the single bid auction and the grand bundle auction has a price of anarchy of at most O(√m) for general valuations. All of our results are derived via the smoothness framework, thus extend to coarse-correlated equilibria and to Bayes Nash equilibria.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "capturing complementarity in set functions by going beyond submodularity subadditivity"):
  with members:
    - "network essence pagerank completion and centrality conforming markov chains"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "building a good team secretary problems and the supermodular degree"
    - "constrained monotone function maximization and the supermodular degree"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "combinatorial auctions with restricted complements"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "cooperative games with bounded dependency degree"):
  with members:
    - "building a good team secretary problems and the supermodular degree"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "coalition structure generation over graphs"
    - "on the complexity of core kernel and bargaining set"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"
    - "communication complexity for algorithm designers"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "building a good team secretary problems and the supermodular degree"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "constrained monotone function maximization and the supermodular degree"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)