human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "competitive division of a mixed manna"
  Abstract: A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes), bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others. #R##N#If all items are goods and utility functions are homothetic, concave (and monotone), the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes maximizes the Nash product of utilities: hence it is welfarist (determined utility-wise by the feasible set of profiles), single-valued and easy to compute. #R##N#We generalize the Gale-Eisenberg Theorem to a mixed manna. The Competitive division is still welfarist and related to the product of utilities or disutilities. If the zero utility profile (before any manna) is Pareto dominated, the competitive profile is unique and still maximizes the product of utilities. If the zero profile is unfeasible, the competitive profiles are the critical points of the product of disutilities on the efficiency frontier, and multiplicity is pervasive. In particular the task of dividing a mixed manna is either good news for everyone, or bad news for everyone. #R##N#We refine our results in the practically important case of linear preferences, where the axiomatic comparison between the division of goods and that of bads is especially sharp. When we divide goods and the manna improves, everyone weakly benefits under the competitive rule; but no reasonable rule to divide bads can be similarly Resource Monotonic. Also, the much larger set of Non Envious and Efficient divisions of bads can be disconnected so that it will admit no continuous selection.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "equitable allocations of indivisible chores"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "algorithms for competitive division of chores"
    - "a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "almost envy freeness and welfare efficiency in fair division with goods or bads"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "algorithms for competitive division of chores"):
  with members:
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "universal growth in production economies"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "developments in multi agent fair allocation"):
  with members:
    - "from matching with diversity constraints to matching with regional quotas"
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "fairly allocating many goods with few queries"
    - "fair knapsack"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "dividing a graphical cake"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "maximin share allocations on cycles"
    - "connected fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "chore division on a graph"
    - "almost envy free allocations with connected bundles"
    - "pareto optimal allocation of indivisible goods with connectivity constraints"
    - "fair and square cake cutting in two dimensions"
    - "fair division of a graph"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "greedy algorithms for fair division of mixed manna"):
  with members:
    - "almost envy freeness and welfare efficiency in fair division with goods or bads"
    - "comparing approximate relaxations of envy freeness"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "greedy algorithms for maximizing nash social welfare"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"
    - "dividing goods or bads under additive utilities"
    - "online fair division analysing a food bank problem"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake cutting"):
  with members:
    - "resource monotonicity and population monotonicity in connected cake cutting"
    - "nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents"
    - "continuity assumptions in cake cutting"
    - "redividing the cake"
    - "an algorithmic framework for strategic fair division"
    - "cake cutting algorithms for piecewise constant and piecewise uniform valuations"
    - "online cake cutting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "almost group envy free allocation of indivisible goods and chores"):
  with members:
    - "almost envy freeness in group resource allocation"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "greedy algorithms for maximizing nash social welfare"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "fair division with minimal sharing"):
  with members:
    - "competitive equilibria with indivisible goods and generic budgets"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "online fair division analysing a food bank problem"
    - "a generalization of the al method for fair allocation of indivisible objects"
    - "truthful fair division"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)