human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on the oblivious transfer capacity of generalized erasure channels against malicious adversaries"
  Abstract: Noisy channels are a powerful resource for cryptography as they can be used to obtain information-theoretically secure key agreement, commit- ment and oblivious transfer protocols, among others. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive since it is complete for secure multi- party computation, and the OT capacity characterizes how efficiently a channel can be used for obtaining string oblivious transfer. Ahlswede and Csiszar (ISIT'07) presented upper and lower bounds on the OT capacity of generalized erasure channels (GEC) against passive adversaries. In the case of GEC with erasure probability at least 1/2, the upper and lower bounds match and therefore the OT capacity was determined. It was later proved by Pinto et al. (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 57(8)) that in this case there is also a protocol against malicious adversaries achieving the same lower bound, and hence the OT capacity is identical for passive and malicious adversaries. In the case of GEC with erasure probabil- ity smaller than 1/2, the known lower bound against passive adversaries that was established by Ahlswede and Csiszar does not match their up- per bound and it was unknown whether this OT rate could be achieved against malicious adversaries as well. In this work we show that there is a protocol against malicious adversaries achieving the same OT rate that was obtained against passive adversaries. In order to obtain our results we introduce a novel use of interactive hashing that is suitable for dealing with the case of low erasure probability (p � < 1/2).

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "wiretapped oblivious transfer"):
  with members:
    - "private data transfer over a broadcast channel"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "commitment and oblivious transfer in the bounded storage model with errors"):
  with members:
    - "a framework for efficient adaptively secure composable oblivious transfer in the rom"
    - "commitment capacity of discrete memoryless channels"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)