human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core"
  Abstract: Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents to abide to a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game theory. However, the computational questions around this constraint have received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly explicit. #R##N#In this paper we define a concise general representation for games in characteristic form that relies on superadditivity, and show that it allows for efficient checking of whether a given outcome is in the core. We then show that determining whether the core is nonempty is $\mathcal{NP}$-complete both with and without transferable utility. We demonstrate that what makes the problem hard in both cases is determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of outcomes possible for the grand coalition), by showing that if these are given, the problem becomes tractable in both cases. However, we then demonstrate that for a hybrid version of the problem, where utility transfer is possible only within the grand coalition, the problem remains $\mathcal{NP}$-complete even when the collaborative possibilities are given.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "it s not whom you know it s what you or your friends can do succint coalitional frameworks for network centralities"):
  with members:
    - "game theoretic network centrality a review"
    - "efficient computation of the shapley value for game theoretic network centrality"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "towards a fair allocation of rewards in multi level marketing"):
  with members:
    - "sybil proof mechanisms in query incentive networks"
    - "time critical social mobilization"
    - "on bitcoin and red balloons"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "solving cooperative reliability games"):
  with members:
    - "measuring inconsistency in probabilistic knowledge bases"
    - "prediction markets mechanism design and cooperative game theory"
    - "the cost of stability in coalitional games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the cooperative game theory foundations of network bargaining games"):
  with members:
    - "on oblivious ptas s for nash equilibrium"
    - "a natural dynamics for bargaining on exchange networks"
    - "convergence of local dynamics to balanced outcomes in exchange networks"
    - "computing nash equilibria approximation and smoothed complexity"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "coalitional game theory for communication networks a tutorial"):
  with members:
    - "physical layer security coalitional games for distributed cooperation"
    - "coalitional games for distributed collaborative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks"
    - "coalitions in cooperative wireless networks"
    - "a distributed merge and split algorithm for fair cooperation in wireless networks"
    - "cores of cooperative games in information theory"
    - "a generic approach to coalition formation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "reducibility among fractional stability problems"):
  with members:
    - "graphical models for game theory"
    - "computability of simple games a characterization and application to the core"
    - "bounded budget connection bbc games or how to make friends and influence people on a budget"
    - "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"
    - "computing nash equilibria approximation and smoothed complexity"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "pure nash equilibria hard and easy games"):
  with members:
    - "graphical models for game theory"
    - "bounding the uncertainty of graphical games the complexity of simple requirements pareto and strong nash equilibria"
    - "efficient nash computation in large population games with bounded influence"
    - "hypertree decompositions and tractable queries"
    - "complexity results about nash equilibria"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)