human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
  Abstract: We study a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: constructing truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira provided the first mechanism that guarantees a non-trivial approximation ratio of $O(\log^2 m)$ [STOC'06], where $m$ is the number of items. This was subsequently improved to $O(\log m\log \log m)$ [Dobzinski, APPROX'07] and then to $O(\log m)$ [Krysta and Vocking, ICALP'12]. #R##N#In this paper we develop the first mechanism that breaks the logarithmic barrier. Specifically, the mechanism provides an approximation ratio of $O(\sqrt {\log m})$. Similarly to previous constructions, our mechanism uses polynomially many value and demand queries, and in fact provides the same approximation ratio for the larger class of XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive) valuations. #R##N#We also develop a computationally efficient implementation of the mechanism for combinatorial auctions with budget additive bidders. Although in general computing a demand query is NP-hard for budget additive valuations, we observe that the specific form of demand queries that our mechanism uses can be efficiently computed when bidders are budget additive.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "complement free couples must communicate a hardness result for two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "beyond 1 2 approximation for submodular maximization on massive data streams"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "online matroid intersection beating half for random arrival"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "on the nisan ronen conjecture for submodular valuations"):
  with members:
    - "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "a unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "implementation in advised strategies welfare guarantees from posted price mechanisms when demand queries are np hard"):
  with members:
    - "submodular maximization beyond non negativity guarantees fast algorithms and applications"
    - "guess free maximization of submodular and linear sums"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvature"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a bridge between liquid and social welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "a bayesian clearing mechanism for combinatorial auctions"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "bayesian budget feasibility with posted pricing"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "complement free couples must communicate a hardness result for two player combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "information equals amortized communication"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"):
  with members:
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "economic efficiency requires interaction"
    - "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "single call mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"):
  with members:
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "valuation compressions in vcg based combinatorial auctions"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)