human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "how many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate"
  Abstract: In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally. The complexity of manipulating realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant was recently studied (Conitzer 2002), but the emphasis was on the question of whether or not a protocol becomes hard to manipulate for some constant number of candidates. That work, in many cases, left open the question: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? This is a crucial question when comparing the relative manipulability of different voting protocols. In this paper we answer that question for the voting protocols of the earlier study: plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, regular cup, and randomized cup. We also answer that question for two voting protocols for which no results on the complexity of manipulation have been derived before: veto and plurality with runoff. It turns out that the voting protocols under study become hard to manipulate at 3 candidates, 4 candidates, 7 candidates, or never.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "towards computing victory margins in stv elections"):
  with members:
    - "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"
    - "auditing australian senate ballots"
    - "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "often harder than in the constructive case destructive bribery in cp nets"):
  with members:
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"
    - "cp nets a tool for representing and reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference statements"
    - "complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators"):
  with members:
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"
    - "vote elicitation complexity and strategy proofness"
    - "complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "complexity of terminating preference elicitation"):
  with members:
    - "eliciting single peaked preferences using comparison queries"
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"
    - "vote elicitation complexity and strategy proofness"
    - "complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "computer science and game theory a brief survey"):
  with members:
    - "graphical models for game theory"
    - "lower bounds on implementing robust and resilient mediators"
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"
    - "rational secret sharing and multiparty computation extended abstract"
    - "a continuation method for nash equilibria in structured games"
    - "reasoning about knowledge of unawareness"
    - "competitive safety analysis robust decision making in multi agent systems"
    - "a computer scientist looks at game theory"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "the strategy proofness landscape of merging"):
  with members:
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"
    - "vote elicitation complexity and strategy proofness"
    - "complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "how hard is bribery in elections"):
  with members:
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "on approximating optimal weighted lobbying and frequency of correctness versus average case polynomial time"
    - "copeland voting fully resists constructive control"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "dichotomy for voting systems"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"
    - "guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding dodgson election winners"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"):
  with members:
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
    - "llull and copeland voting computationally resist bribery and control"
    - "copeland voting fully resists constructive control"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"
    - "guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding dodgson election winners"
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"
    - "complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)