human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "mechanism design via correlation gap"
  Abstract: For revenue and welfare maximization in single-dimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple in form, can perform surprisingly well compared to the optimal mechanisms. In this paper, we give a theoretical explanation of this fact, based on a connection to the notion of correlation gap. #R##N#Loosely speaking, for auction environments with matroid constraints, we can relate the performance of a mechanism to the expectation of a monotone submodular function over a random set. This random set corresponds to the winner set for the optimal mechanism, which is highly correlated, and corresponds to certain demand set for SPMs, which is independent. The notion of correlation gap of Agrawal et al.\ (SODA10) quantifies how much we {}"lose" in the expectation of the function by ignoring correlation in the random set, and hence bounds our loss in using certain SPM instead of the optimal mechanism. Furthermore, the correlation gap of a monotone and submodular function is known to be small, and it follows that certain SPM can approximate the optimal mechanism by a good constant factor. #R##N#Exploiting this connection, we give tight analysis of a greedy-based SPM of Chawla et al.\ for several environments. In particular, we show that it gives an $e/(e-1)$-approximation for matroid environments, gives asymptotically a $1/(1-1/\sqrt{2\pi k})$-approximation for the important sub-case of $k$-unit auctions, and gives a $(p+1)$-approximation for environments with $p$-independent set system constraints.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations"):
  with members:
    - "optimal single choice prophet inequalities from samples"
    - "robust algorithms for the secretary problem"
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "stochastic bandits robust to adversarial corruptions"
    - "optimal online contention resolution schemes via ex ante prophet inequalities"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "robustly learning a gaussian getting optimal error efficiently"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for non linear agents"):
  with members:
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing beyond linear utility"
    - "optimal online contention resolution schemes via ex ante prophet inequalities"
    - "a simple mechanism for a budget constrained buyer"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "bayesian optimal auctions via multi to single agent reduction"
    - "the simple economics of approximately optimal auctions"
    - "correlation robust stochastic optimization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the outer limits of contention resolution on matroids and connections to the secretary problem"):
  with members:
    - "the prophet inequality can be solved optimally with a single set of samples"
    - "random order contention resolution schemes"
    - "optimal online contention resolution schemes via ex ante prophet inequalities"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "o log log rank competitive ratio for the matroid secretary problem"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "assortment auctions a myersonian characterization for markov chain based choice models"):
  with members:
    - "prophet inequalities on the intersection of a matroid and a graph"
    - "multi stage and multi customer assortment optimization with inventory constraints"
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "dynamic pricing under a static calendar"
    - "improved approximations for free order prophets and second price auctions"
    - "on policies for single leg revenue management with limited demand information"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "improved approximations for posted price mechanisms second price auctions and free order prophets"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "a field guide to personalized reserve prices"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi unit auctions"
    - "correlation robust stochastic optimization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing beyond linear utility"):
  with members:
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "prior independent auctions for risk averse agents"
    - "bayesian optimal auctions via multi to single agent reduction"
    - "the simple economics of approximately optimal auctions"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "sequential posted pricing and multi parameter mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "on optimal ordering in the optimal stopping problem"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "a simple o log log mathrm rank competitive algorithm for the matroid secretary problem"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "prophets secretaries and maximizing the probability of choosing the best"):
  with members:
    - "stochastic k server how should uber work"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "online matroid intersection beating half for random arrival"
    - "o log log rank competitive ratio for the matroid secretary problem"
    - "a simple o log log mathrm rank competitive algorithm for the matroid secretary problem"
    - "online independent set beyond the worst case secretaries prophets and periods"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "algorithms for secretary problems on graphs and hypergraphs"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)