human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
  Abstract: We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents can compare outcomes, but aren't able to evaluate precise utilities for them. Such a situation arises in diverse contexts including voting and matching markets. #R##N#Our paper addresses two issues that arise in ordinal mechanism design. To design social welfare maximizing mechanisms, one needs to be able to quantitatively measure the welfare of an outcome which is not clear in the ordinal setting. Second, since the impossibility results of Gibbard and Satterthwaite~\cite{Gibbard73,Satterthwaite75} force one to move to randomized mechanisms, one needs a more nuanced notion of truthfulness. #R##N#We propose {\em rank approximation} as a metric for measuring the quality of an outcome, which allows us to evaluate mechanisms based on worst-case performance, and {\em lex-truthfulness} as a notion of truthfulness for randomized ordinal mechanisms. Lex-truthfulness is stronger than notions studied in the literature, and yet flexible enough to admit a rich class of mechanisms {\em circumventing classical impossibility results}. We demonstrate the usefulness of the above notions by devising lex-truthful mechanisms achieving good rank-approximation factors, both in the general ordinal setting, as well as structured settings such as {\em (one-sided) matching markets}, and its generalizations, {\em matroid} and {\em scheduling} markets.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "assortment auctions a myersonian characterization for markov chain based choice models"):
  with members:
    - "prophet inequalities on the intersection of a matroid and a graph"
    - "multi stage and multi customer assortment optimization with inventory constraints"
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "dynamic pricing under a static calendar"
    - "improved approximations for free order prophets and second price auctions"
    - "on policies for single leg revenue management with limited demand information"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"):
  with members:
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "online vertex weighted bipartite matching and single bid budgeted allocations"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "egalitarianism of random assignment mechanisms"
    - "near optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"
    - "oblivious algorithms for the maximum directed cut problem"
    - "greedy facility location algorithms analyzed using dual fitting with factor revealing lp"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "equilibria under the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "efficiency of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one sided matching"
    - "strategic aspects of the probabilistic serial rule for the allocation of goods"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"):
  with members:
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "triadic consensus a randomized algorithm for voting in a crowd"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"):
  with members:
    - "efficiency of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one sided matching"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)