human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
  Abstract: We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition the items in any way she prefers, into $n$ bundles, and then receive her least desirable bundle. The objective then is to find an allocation, so that each player is guaranteed her maximin share. Previous works have studied this problem mostly algorithmically, providing constant factor approximation algorithms. In this work we embark on a mechanism design approach and investigate the existence of truthful mechanisms. We propose three models regarding the information that the mechanism attempts to elicit from the players, based on the cardinal and ordinal representation of preferences. We establish positive and negative (impossibility) results for each model and highlight the limitations imposed by truthfulness on the approximability of the problem. Finally, we pay particular attention to the case of two players, which already leads to challenging questions.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations"):
  with members:
    - "maximum nash welfare and other stories about efx"
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents"
    - "competitive equilibrium with generic budgets beyond additive"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "the price of fairness for indivisible goods"
    - "fair division with bounded sharing"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "multiple birds with one stone beating 1 2 for efx and gmms via envy cycle elimination"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"):
  with members:
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "egalitarianism of random assignment mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "fair division of a graph"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "asymptotic existence of proportionally fair allocations"
    - "envy free cake cutting among families"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "upper bounds on number of steals in rooted trees"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "asymptotic existence of proportionally fair allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"):
  with members:
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "a characterization of 2 player mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"):
  with members:
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for four agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)