human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi unit auctions"
  Abstract: We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing {\em sequential posted-pricing mechanisms (SPM)} in $K$-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has $K$ copies of an item to sell, and there are $n$ buyers, each interested in only one copy, who have some value for the item. The seller must post a price for each buyer, the buyers arrive in a sequence enforced by the seller, and a buyer buys the item if its value exceeds the price posted to it. The seller does not know the values of the buyers, but have Bayesian information about them. An SPM specifies the ordering of buyers and the posted prices, and may be {\em adaptive} or {\em non-adaptive} in its behavior. #R##N#The goal is to design SPM in polynomial time to maximize expected revenue. We compare against the expected revenue of optimal SPM, and provide a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for both non-adaptive and adaptive SPMs. This is achieved by two algorithms: an efficient algorithm that gives a $(1-\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi K}})$-approximation (and hence a PTAS for sufficiently large $K$), and another that is a PTAS for constant $K$. The first algorithm yields a non-adaptive SPM that yields its approximation guarantees against an optimal adaptive SPM -- this implies that the {\em adaptivity gap} in SPMs vanishes as $K$ becomes larger.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "improved approximations for posted price mechanisms second price auctions and free order prophets"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "a field guide to personalized reserve prices"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "correlation robust stochastic optimization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"):
  with members:
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
    - "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "improved approximations for free order prophets and second price auctions"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "polymatroid prophet inequalities"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "revenue gaps for static and dynamic posted pricing of homogeneous goods"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "optimal competitive auctions"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "posted pricing sans discrimination"):
  with members:
    - "do prices coordinate markets"
    - "on the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms"
    - "on welfare approximation and stable pricing"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations"
    - "welfare maximization with production costs a primal dual approach"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "dynamic pricing with limited supply"):
  with members:
    - "bandits with knapsacks"
    - "adaptive crowdsourcing algorithms for the bandit survey problem"
    - "regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi armed bandit problems"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "x armed bandits"
    - "contextual bandits with similarity information"
    - "the ratio index for budgeted learning with applications"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"):
  with members:
    - "reducing revenue to welfare maximization approximation algorithms and other generalizations"
    - "bayesian optimal auctions via multi to single agent reduction"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms"
    - "extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "mechanism design and risk aversion"):
  with members:
    - "bayesian optimal auctions via multi to single agent reduction"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "robust mechanisms for risk averse sellers"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)