human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the maximin support method an extension of the d hondt method to approval based multiwinner elections"
  Abstract: We propose the maximin support method, a novel extension of the D'Hondt apportionment method to approval-based multiwinner elections. The maximin support method is based on maximizing the support of the least supported elected candidate. It can be computed efficiently and satisfies (adjusted versions of) the main properties of the original D'Hondt method: house monotonicity, population monotonicity, and proportional representation. We also establish a close relationship between the maximin support method and Phragm\'{e}n's voting rules.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a quantitative analysis of multi winner rules"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "proportionality and the limits of welfarism"
    - "group fairness in committee selection"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "consistent approval based multi winner rules"
    - "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"
    - "what do we elect committees for a voting committee model for multi winner rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "representing the insincere strategically robust proportional representation"):
  with members:
    - "how long is a piece of string an exploration of multi winner approval voting and ballot length restrictions"
    - "consistent approval based multi winner rules"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "achieving fully proportional representation approximability results"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"):
  with members:
    - "fair knapsack"
    - "a framework for approval based budgeting methods"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "monotonicity axioms in approval based multi winner voting rules"
    - "committees providing ejr can be computed efficiently"
    - "computational complexity of testing proportional justified representation"
    - "proportional justified representation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a polynomial time algorithm to achieve extended justified representation"):
  with members:
    - "fully open extensions to the d hondt method"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "sub committee approval voting and generalised justified representation axioms"):
  with members:
    - "a polynomial time algorithm to achieve extended justified representation"
    - "fully open extensions to the d hondt method"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "committees providing ejr can be computed efficiently"):
  with members:
    - "multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "computational complexity of testing proportional justified representation"):
  with members:
    - "fully open extensions to the d hondt method"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "proportional justified representation"):
  with members:
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)