human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "auctions with severely bounded communication"
  Abstract: We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in, as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the communication complexity only by a linear factor.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "mechanism design for multi party machine learning"):
  with members:
    - "incentive design for efficient federated learning in mobile networks a contract theory approach"
    - "federated learning strategies for improving communication efficiency"
    - "strategyproof linear regression in high dimensions"
    - "privacy preserving visual learning using doubly permuted homomorphic encryption"
    - "communication efficient learning of deep networks from decentralized data"
    - "truthful linear regression"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "communication distortion and randomness in metric voting"):
  with members:
    - "comparing election methods where each voter ranks only few candidates"
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "communication complexity of cake cutting"):
  with members:
    - "consensus halving is ppa complete"
    - "the query complexity of cake cutting"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"
    - "waste makes haste bounded time algorithms for envy free cake cutting with free disposal"
    - "hardness results for consensus halving"
    - "communication complexity for algorithm designers"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good"):
  with members:
    - "generalized proportional allocation mechanism design for multi rate multicast service on the internet"
    - "redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "persuasion with limited communication"):
  with members:
    - "bayesian incentive compatible bandit exploration"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"
    - "on the hardness of signaling"
    - "constrained signaling in auction design"
    - "revenue maximization via hiding item attributes"
    - "send mixed signals earn more work less"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "almost efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading"):
  with members:
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "simplicity expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"
    - "bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "approximate privacy foundations and quantification"):
  with members:
    - "on communication protocols that compute almost privately"
    - "privacy aware mechanism design"
    - "selling privacy at auction"
    - "approximate privacy pars for set problems"
    - "universally utility maximizing privacy mechanisms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)