human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes"
  Abstract: Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a well-known rule for fair allocation of resources among agents with different preferences. It has many advantages, among them is the fact that a CEEI allocation is both Pareto efficient and envy-free. However, when the resources are indivisible, a CEEI allocation might not exist even when there are two agents and a single item. #R##N#In contrast to this discouraging non-existence result, Babaioff, Nisan and Talgam-Cohen (2017) recently suggested a new and more encouraging approach to allocation of indivisible items: instead of insisting that the incomes be equal, they suggest to look at the entire space of possible incomes, and check whether there exists a competitive equilibrium for almost all income-vectors (CEFAI) --- all income-space except a subset of measure zero. They show that a CEFAI exists when there are at most 3 items, or when there are 4 items and two agents. They also show that when there are 5 items and two agents there might not exist a CEFAI. They leave open the cases of 4 items with three or four agents. #R##N#This paper presents a new way to implement a CEFAI, as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a sequential game. This new implementation allows us both to offer much simpler solutions to the known cases (at most 3 items, and 4 items with two agents), and to prove that a CEFAI exists even in the much more difficult case of 4 items and three agents. Moreover, we prove that a CEFAI might not exist with 4 items and four agents. When the items to be divided are bads (chores), CEFAI exists for two agents with at most 4 chores, but does not exist for two agents with 5 chores or with three agents with 3 or more chores. Thus, this paper completes the characterization of CEFAI existence for monotone preferences.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "equitable allocations of indivisible chores"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "algorithms for competitive division of chores"
    - "a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "almost envy freeness and welfare efficiency in fair division with goods or bads"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes existence and fairness"):
  with members:
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "competitive equilibrium with generic budgets beyond additive"
    - "monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake cutting"
    - "negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "the complexity of cake cutting with unequal shares"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "almost envy freeness in group resource allocation"
    - "connected fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "computing a small agreeable set of indivisible items"
    - "comparing approximate relaxations of envy freeness"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "almost envy free allocations with connected bundles"
    - "lecture notes on fair division"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "competitive equilibria with indivisible goods and generic budgets"):
  with members:
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "communication complexity of discrete fair division"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"
    - "nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable piecewise linear concave utilities"
    - "nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "fair allocation based on diminishing differences"):
  with members:
    - "flexible level 1 consensus ensuring stable social choice analysis and algorithms"
    - "optimal reallocation under additive and ordinal preferences"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"
    - "a social welfare optimal sequential allocation procedure"
    - "a note on the undercut procedure"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)