human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "truthful assignment without money"
  Abstract: We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other. Machines have capacities and edges have values and sizes; the goal is to construct a welfare maximizing feasible assignment. In our model of private valuations, motivated by impossibility results, the value and sizes on all job-machine pairs are public information; however, whether an edge exists or not in the bipartite graph is a job's private information. #R##N#We study several variants of the GAP starting with matching. For the unweighted version, we give an optimal strategyproof mechanism; for maximum weight bipartite matching, however, we show give a 2-approximate strategyproof mechanism and show by a matching lowerbound that this is optimal. Next we study knapsack-like problems, which are APX-hard. For these problems, we develop a general LP-based technique that extends the ideas of Lavi and Swamy to reduce designing a truthful mechanism without money to designing such a mechanism for the fractional version of the problem, at a loss of a factor equal to the integrality gap in the approximation ratio. We use this technique to obtain strategyproof mechanisms with constant approximation ratios for these problems. We then design an O(log n)-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the GAP by reducing, with logarithmic loss in the approximation, to our solution for the value-invariant GAP. Our technique may be of independent interest for designing truthful mechanisms without money for other LP-based problems.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"):
  with members:
    - "investigating the characteristics of one sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "decision theory with resource bounded agents"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "eliminating the weakest link making manipulation intractable"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "average case analysis of the assignment problem with independent preferences"):
  with members:
    - "smoothed and average case approximation ratios of mechanisms beyond the worst case analysis"
    - "average case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments"
    - "facility location with double peaked preference"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"):
  with members:
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "online vertex weighted bipartite matching and single bid budgeted allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "hiring expert consultants in e healthcare an analytics based two sided matching approach"):
  with members:
    - "hiring expert consultants in e healthcare with budget constraint"
    - "hiring doctors in e healthcare with zero budget"
    - "mechanism design without money via stable matching"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "partial verification as a substitute for money"):
  with members:
    - "combinatorial auctions without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games"):
  with members:
    - "mechanism design for team formation"
    - "simple causes of complexity in hedonic games"
    - "core stability in hedonic coalition formation"
    - "stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "smoothed and average case approximation ratios of mechanisms beyond the worst case analysis"):
  with members:
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "mix and match"
    - "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"
    - "smoothed analysis of algorithms why the simplex algorithm usually takes polynomial time"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)