human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
  Abstract: Constraints on agent's ability to pay play a major role in auction design for any setting where the magnitude of financial transactions is sufficiently large. Those constraints have been traditionally modeled in mechanism design as \emph{hard budget}, i.e., mechanism is not allowed to charge agents more than a certain amount. Yet, real auction systems (such as Google AdWords) allow more sophisticated constraints on agents' ability to pay, such as \emph{average budgets}. In this work, we investigate the design of Pareto optimal and incentive compatible auctions for agents with \emph{constrained quasi-linear utilities}, which captures more realistic models of liquidity constraints that the agents may have. Our result applies to a very general class of allocation constraints known as polymatroidal environments, encompassing many settings of interest such as multi-unit auctions, matching markets, video-on-demand and advertisement systems. #R##N#Our design is based Ausubel's \emph{clinching framework}. Incentive compatibility and feasibility with respect to ability-to-pay constraints are direct consequences of the clinching framework. Pareto-optimality, on the other hand, is considerably more challenging, since the no-trade condition that characterizes it depends not only on whether agents have their budgets exhausted or not, but also on prices {at} which the goods are allocated. In order to get a handle on those prices, we introduce novel concepts of dropping prices and saturation. These concepts lead to our main structural result which is a characterization of the tight sets in the clinching auction outcome and its relation to dropping prices.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "polyhedral clinching auctions for two sided markets"):
  with members:
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
    - "clinching auctions with online supply"
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "on the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism"
    - "expressiveness and robustness of first price position auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "bayesian sequential auctions"
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "truthful multi unit procurements with budgets"):
  with members:
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "optimal provision after wait in healthcare"
    - "online submodular welfare maximization greedy is optimal"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "mechanism design without money via stable matching"
    - "optimization with demand oracles"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"):
  with members:
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"
    - "clinching auctions with online supply"
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "on multiple round sponsored search auctions with budgets"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "no justified complaints on fair sharing of multiple resources"
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)