human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
  Abstract: Abstract   We investigate the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among interested agents using the concept of maximin share. Procaccia and Wang showed that while an allocation that gives every agent at least her maximin share does not necessarily exist, one that gives every agent at least    2  ∕  3    of her share always does. In this paper, we consider the more general setting where we allocate the goods to  groups  of agents. The agents in each group share the same set of goods even though they may have conflicting preferences. For two groups, we characterize the cardinality of the groups for which a positive approximation of the maximin share is possible regardless of the number of goods. We also show settings where an approximation is possible or impossible when there are several groups.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "maximin fairness with mixed divisible and indivisible goods"):
  with members:
    - "computing envy freeable allocations with limited subsidies"
    - "one dollar each eliminates envy"
    - "fair division of mixed divisible and indivisible goods"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "maximin share allocations on cycles"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "maximum nash welfare and other stories about efx"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "almost envy freeness in group resource allocation"
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "greedy algorithms for fair division of mixed manna"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "greedy algorithms for maximizing nash social welfare"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on the fairness of time critical influence maximization in social networks"):
  with members:
    - "group fairness in influence maximization"
    - "learning optimal and fair decision trees for non discriminative decision making"
    - "gaps in information access in social networks"
    - "a unified approach to quantifying algorithmic unfairness measuring individual group unfairness via inequality indices"
    - "equality of voice towards fair representation in crowdsourced top k recommendations"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "computing a small agreeable set of indivisible items"):
  with members:
    - "fair division under cardinality constraints"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "envy free cake cutting among families"
    - "proportional cake cutting among families"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "almost envy freeness in group resource allocation"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "fairly allocating many goods with few queries"
    - "almost envy free allocations with connected bundles"
    - "fair division under cardinality constraints"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players"
    - "envy free cake cutting among families"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "group fairness in influence maximization"):
  with members:
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "multi objective maximization of monotone submodular functions with cardinality constraint"
    - "diverse weighted bipartite b matching"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"
    - "stochastic submodular maximization the case of coverage functions"
    - "gradient methods for submodular maximization"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "multiple birds with one stone beating 1 2 for efx and gmms via envy cycle elimination"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "on weighted envy freeness in indivisible item allocation"):
  with members:
    - "a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "when do envy free allocations exist"
    - "the complexity of cake cutting with unequal shares"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)