human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"
  Abstract: We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [Electoral Studies, 25(2):287-305, 2006], and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding inadmissible votes a priori), with respect to procedural control. In such control scenarios, an external agent seeks to change the outcome of an election via actions such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. SP-AV combines the voters' preference rankings with their approvals of candidates, where in elections with at least two candidates the voters' approval strategies are adjusted--if needed--to approve of their most-preferred candidate and to disapprove of their least-preferred candidate. This rule coerces admissibility of the votes even in the presence of control actions, and hybridizes, in effect, approval with pluralitiy voting. #R##N#We prove that this system is computationally resistant (i.e., the corresponding control problems are NP-hard) to 19 out of 22 types of constructive and destructive control. Thus, SP-AV has more resistances to control than is currently known for any other natural voting system with a polynomial-time winner problem. In particular, SP-AV is (after Copeland voting, see Faliszewski et al. [AAIM-2008, Springer LNCS 5034, pp. 165-176, 2008]) the second natural voting system with an easy winner-determination procedure that is known to have full resistance to constructive control, and unlike Copeland voting it in addition displays broad resistance to destructive control.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a parameterized perspective on protecting elections"):
  with members:
    - "optimal bribery in voting"
    - "manipulative elicitation a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences"
    - "on the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard"
    - "complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting"
    - "frugal bribery in voting"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "detecting possible manipulators in elections"
    - "kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "manipulating elections by selecting issues"):
  with members:
    - "hotelling downs model with limited attraction"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "the complexity of probabilistic lobbying"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "hybrid elections broaden complexity theoretic resistance to control"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "computational aspects of nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby"
    - "on the computation of fully proportional representation"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "possible winners in noisy elections"):
  with members:
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "search versus decision for election manipulation problems"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "fully proportional representation as resource allocation approximability results"
    - "the complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single peaked electorates"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "cloning in elections finding the possible winners"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"):
  with members:
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "more natural models of electoral control by partition"
    - "combinatorial voter control in elections"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "control complexity in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "more natural models of electoral control by partition"):
  with members:
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"
    - "combinatorial voter control in elections"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "search versus decision for election manipulation problems"
    - "an atypical survey of typical case heuristic algorithms"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "election attacks with few candidates"):
  with members:
    - "coalitional manipulation for schulze s rule"
    - "weighted electoral control"
    - "schulze and ranked pairs voting are fixed parameter tractable to bribe manipulate and control"
    - "a smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation"
    - "multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"):
  with members:
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "control complexity in bucklin fallback and plurality voting an experimental approach"
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "control complexity in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "normalized range voting broadly resists control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)