human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "concurrent auctions across the supply chain"
  Abstract: With the recent technological feasibility of electronic commerce over the Internet, much attention has been given to the design of electronic markets for various types of electronically-tradable goods. Such markets, however, will normally need to function in some relationship with markets for other related goods, usually those downstream or upstream in the supply chain. Thus, for example, an electronic market for rubber tires for trucks will likely need to be strongly influenced by the rubber market as well as by the truck market.#R##N##R##N#In this paper we design protocols for exchange of information between a sequence of markets along a single supply chain. These protocols allow each of these markets to function separately, while the information exchanged ensures efficient global behavior across the supply chain. Each market that forms a link in the supply chain operates as a double auction, where the bids on one side of the double auction come from bidders in the corresponding segment of the industry, and the bids on the other side are synthetically generated by the protocol to express the combined information from all other links in the chain. The double auctions in each of the markets can be of several types, and we study several variants of incentive compatible double auctions, comparing them in terms of their efficiency and of the market revenue.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "efficient two sided markets with limited information"):
  with members:
    - "optimal single choice prophet inequalities from samples"
    - "bulow klemperer style results for welfare maximization in two sided markets"
    - "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "online trading as a secretary problem"
    - "the best of both worlds asymptotically efficient mechanisms with a guarantee on the expected gains from trade"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade"
    - "online market intermediation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "bulow klemperer style results for welfare maximization in two sided markets"):
  with members:
    - "the vickrey auction with a single duplicate bidder approximates the optimal revenue"
    - "99 revenue via enhanced competition"
    - "the best of both worlds asymptotically efficient mechanisms with a guarantee on the expected gains from trade"
    - "are two samples really better than one on the non asymptotic performance of empirical revenue maximization"
    - "optimal and benchmark optimal competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "submultiplicative glivenko cantelli and uniform convergence of revenues"
    - "a general theory of sample complexity for multi item profit maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "strongly budget balanced auctions for multi sided markets"):
  with members:
    - "bulow klemperer style results for welfare maximization in two sided markets"
    - "multi unit bilateral trade"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "double auctions in markets for multiple kinds of goods"
    - "approximately efficient two sided combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "double auctions in markets for multiple kinds of goods"):
  with members:
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions for two sided markets"
    - "fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade"
    - "approximately efficient two sided combinatorial auctions"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "on random sampling auctions for digital goods"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "ascending auctions and walrasian equilibrium"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "mida a multi item type double auction mechanism"):
  with members:
    - "demand flow of agents with gross substitute valuations"
    - "do prices coordinate markets"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "making the most of your samples"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "sbba a strongly budget balanced double auction mechanism"):
  with members:
    - "mida a multi item type double auction mechanism"
    - "welfare undominated groves mechanisms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)