human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "when does the price of anarchy tend to 1 in large walrasian auctions and fisher markets"
  Abstract: As is well known, many classes of markets have efficient equilibria, but this depends on agents being non-strategic, i.e. that they declare their true demands when offered goods at particular prices, or in other words, that they are price-takers. An important question is how much the equilibria degrade in the face of strategic behavior, i.e. what is the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the market viewed as a mechanism? #R##N#Often, PoA bounds are modest constants such as 4/3 or 2. Nonetheless, in practice a guarantee that no more than 25% or 50% of the economic value is lost may be unappealing. This paper asks whether significantly better bounds are possible under plausible assumptions. In particular, we look at how these worst case guarantees improve in the following large settings. #R##N#Large Walrasian auctions: These are auctions with many copies of each item and many agents. We show that the PoA tends to 1 as the market size increases, under suitable conditions, mainly that there is some uncertainty about the numbers of copies of each good and demands obey the gross substitutes condition. We also note that some such assumption is unavoidable. #R##N#Large Fisher markets: Fisher markets are a class of economies that has received considerable attention in the computer science literature. A large market is one in which at equilibrium, each buyer makes only a small fraction of the total purchases; the smaller the fraction, the larger the market. Here the main condition is that demands are based on homogeneous monotone utility functions that satisfy the gross substitutes condition. Again, the PoA tends to 1 as the market size increases. #R##N#Furthermore, in each setting, we quantify the tradeoff between market size and the PoA.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "walrasian dynamics in multi unit markets"):
  with members:
    - "optimal multi unit mechanisms with private demands"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
    - "on nash dynamics of matching market equilibria"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "price of anarchy for greedy auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"):
  with members:
    - "apx hardness of maximizing nash social welfare with indivisible items"
    - "welfare maximization with production costs a primal dual approach"
    - "online packing and covering framework with convex objectives"
    - "selfishmigrate a scalable algorithm for non clairvoyantly scheduling heterogeneous processors"
    - "a rational convex program for linear arrow debreu markets"
    - "market equilibrium with transaction costs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "on the price of anarchy of highly congested nonatomic network games"):
  with members:
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "approximating the geometry of dynamics in potential games point wise convergence regions of attraction average case performance analysis and system invariants"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)