human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"
  Abstract: Scheduling on related machines ($Q||C_{\max}$) is one of the most important problems in the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Each machine is controlled by a selfish agent and her valuation can be expressed via a single parameter, her {\em speed}. In contrast to other similar problems, Archer and Tardos \cite{AT01} showed that an algorithm that minimizes the makespan can be truthfully implemented, although in exponential time. On the other hand, if we leave out the game-theoretic issues, the complexity of the problem has been completely settled -- the problem is strongly NP-hard, while there exists a PTAS \cite{HS88,ES04}. #R##N#This problem is the most well studied in single-parameter algorithmic mechanism design. It gives an excellent ground to explore the boundary between truthfulness and efficient computation. Since the work of Archer and Tardos, quite a lot of deterministic and randomized mechanisms have been suggested. Recently, a breakthrough result \cite{DDDR08} showed that a randomized truthful PTAS exists. On the other hand, for the deterministic case, the best known approximation factor is 2.8 \cite{Kov05,Kov07}. #R##N#It has been a major open question whether there exists a deterministic truthful PTAS, or whether truthfulness has an essential, negative impact on the computational complexity of the problem. In this paper we give a definitive answer to this important question by providing a truthful {\em deterministic} PTAS.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the nisan ronen conjecture for submodular valuations"):
  with members:
    - "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "a unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"):
  with members:
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "an improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines"
    - "a characterization of 2 player mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations"):
  with members:
    - "gibbard satterthwaite success stories and obvious strategyproofness"
    - "no stable matching mechanism is obviously strategy proof"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"):
  with members:
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"):
  with members:
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "prophet inequalities with limited information"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "a unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines"
    - "an improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines"
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "bribeproof mechanisms for two values domains"):
  with members:
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "a complete characterization of group strategyproof mechanisms of cost sharing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"):
  with members:
    - "reducing revenue to welfare maximization approximation algorithms and other generalizations"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "bayesian optimal auctions via multi to single agent reduction"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"
    - "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "local computation mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "new techniques and tighter bounds for local computation algorithms"
    - "on the communication complexity of finding an approximate stable marriage"
    - "a local computation approximation scheme to maximum matching"
    - "converting online algorithms to local computation algorithms"
    - "approaching utopia strong truthfulness and externality resistant mechanisms"
    - "space efficient local computation algorithms"
    - "fast local computation algorithms"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)