human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "complexity of manipulating sequential allocation"
  Abstract: Sequential allocation is a simple allocation mechanism in which agents are given pre-specified turns and each agents gets the most preferred item that is still available. It has long been known that sequential allocation is not strategyproof. #R##N#Bouveret and Lang (2014) presented a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a best response of an agent with respect to additively separable utilities and claimed that (1) their algorithm correctly finds a best response, and (2) each best response results in the same allocation for the manipulator. We show that both claims are false via an example. We then show that in fact the problem of computing a best response is NP-complete. On the other hand, the insights and results of Bouveret and Lang (2014) for the case of two agents still hold.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "algorithms for manipulating sequential allocation"):
  with members:
    - "equilibria in sequential allocation"
    - "pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "possible and necessary allocations via sequential mechanisms"
    - "a social welfare optimal sequential allocation procedure"
    - "how to make the most of a shared meal plan the last bite first"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "parametrized complexity of manipulating sequential allocation"):
  with members:
    - "algorithms for manipulating sequential allocation"
    - "equilibria in sequential allocation"
    - "welfare of sequential allocation mechanisms for indivisible goods"
    - "possible and necessary allocations via sequential mechanisms"
    - "a social welfare optimal sequential allocation procedure"
    - "how to make the most of a shared meal plan the last bite first"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "equilibria in sequential allocation"):
  with members:
    - "equilibria under the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "possible and necessary allocations via sequential mechanisms"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"
    - "bidding games and efficient allocations"
    - "a social welfare optimal sequential allocation procedure"
    - "how to make the most of a shared meal plan the last bite first"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)