human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "truthful approximations to range voting"
  Abstract: We consider the fundamental mechanism design problem of approximate social welfare maximization under general cardinal preferences on a finite number of alternatives and without money. The well-known range voting scheme can be thought of as a non-truthful mechanism for exact social welfare maximization in this setting. With m being the number of alternatives, we exhibit a randomized truthful-in-expectation ordinal mechanism implementing an outcome whose expected social welfare is at least an Omega(m^{-3/4}) fraction of the social welfare of the socially optimal alternative. On the other hand, we show that for sufficiently many agents and any truthful-in-expectation ordinal mechanism, there is a valuation profile where the mechanism achieves at most an O(m^{-{2/3}) fraction of the optimal social welfare in expectation. We get tighter bounds for the natural special case of m = 3, and in that case furthermore obtain separation results concerning the approximation ratios achievable by natural restricted classes of truthful-in-expectation mechanisms. In particular, we show that for m = 3 and a sufficiently large number of agents, the best mechanism that is ordinal as well as mixed-unilateral has an approximation ratio between 0.610 and 0.611, the best ordinal mechanism has an approximation ratio between 0.616 and 0.641, while the best mixed-unilateral mechanism has an approximation ratio bigger than 0.660. In particular, the best mixed-unilateral non-ordinal (i.e., cardinal) mechanism strictly outperforms all ordinal ones, even the non-mixed-unilateral ordinal ones.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "truthful ownership transfer with expert advice blending mechanism design with and without money"):
  with members:
    - "better strategyproof mechanisms without payments or prior an analytic approach"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "the distortion of distributed voting"
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"
    - "on the distortion value of the elections with abstention"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the distortion of distributed voting"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "relating metric distortion and fairness of social choice rules"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"):
  with members:
    - "sequential deliberation for social choice"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms for ownership transfer with expert advice"):
  with members:
    - "better strategyproof mechanisms without payments or prior an analytic approach"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "a maximum likelihood approach for selecting sets of alternatives"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "egalitarianism of random assignment mechanisms"
    - "near optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "oblivious algorithms for the maximum directed cut problem"
    - "greedy facility location algorithms analyzed using dual fitting with factor revealing lp"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)