human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
  Abstract: We consider prior-free auctions for revenue and welfare maximization when agents have a common budget. The abstract environments we consider are ones where there is a downward-closed and symmetric feasibility constraint on the probabilities of service of the agents. These environments include position auctions where slots with decreasing click-through rates are auctioned to advertisers. We generalize and characterize the envy-free benchmark from Hartline and Yan (2011) to settings with budgets and characterize the optimal envy-free outcomes for both welfare and revenue. We give prior-free mechanisms that approximate these benchmarks. A building block in our mechanism is a clinching auction for position auction environments. This auction is a generalization of the multi-unit clinching auction of Dobzinski et al. (2008) and a special case of the polyhedral clinching auction of Goel et al. (2012). For welfare maximization, we show that this clinching auction is a good approximation to the envy-free optimal welfare for position auction environments. For profit maximization, we generalize the random sampling profit extraction auction from Fiat et al. (2002) for digital goods to give a 10.0-approximation to the envy-free optimal revenue in symmetric, downward-closed environments. The profit maximization question is of interest even without budgets and our mechanism is a 7.5-approximation which improving on the 30.4 bound of Ha and Hartline (2012).

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a simple mechanism for a budget constrained buyer"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"):
  with members:
    - "a b testing of auctions"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "bayesian budget feasibility with posted pricing"):
  with members:
    - "incentivizing high quality crowdwork"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "social status and badge design"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "optimal crowdsourcing contests"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "profit maximizing prior free multi unit procurement auctions with capacitated sellers"):
  with members:
    - "optimal competitive auctions"
    - "on random sampling auctions for digital goods"
    - "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "truthful secretaries with budgets"):
  with members:
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
    - "clinching auctions with online supply"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "core competitive auctions"):
  with members:
    - "mechanism design via consensus estimates cross checking and profit extraction"
    - "frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques"
    - "frugal and truthful auctions for vertex covers flows and cuts"
    - "frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"):
  with members:
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "competitive auctions for markets with positive externalities"
    - "bayesian mechanism design for budget constrained agents"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)