human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the impact of local information on the performance of multiagent systems"
  Abstract: How does the control architecture of a multiagent system impact the achievable performance guarantees? In this paper we answer this question relative to a class of resource allocation problems, termed multiagent set covering problems. More specifically, we demonstrate how the degree of information available to each agent imposes constraints on the achievable efficiency guarantees associated with the emergent collective behavior. We measure these efficiency guarantees using the well-known metrics of price of anarchy and price of stability, which seek to bound the performance of the worst and best performing equilibria, respectively. Our first result demonstrates that when agents only know local information about the resources they can select, a system operator is forced to manage an inherent trade-off between the price of anarchy and price of stability, i.e., improving the quality of the worst equilibria comes at the expenses of the best equilibria. Our second result demonstrates that a system operator can move well beyond this price of anarchy / price of stability frontier by designing a communication protocol that provides agents with a limited amount of system-level information beyond these local quantities.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "when smoothness is not enough toward exact quantification and optimization of the price of anarchy"):
  with members:
    - "optimal price of anarchy in cost sharing games"
    - "distributed resource allocation through utility design part i optimizing the performance certificates via the price of anarchy"
    - "utility design for distributed resource allocation part i characterizing and optimizing the exact price of anarchy"
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "learning in games robustness of fast convergence"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "multi round cooperative search games with multiple players"):
  with members:
    - "the ants problem"
    - "bayesian incentive compatible bandit exploration"
    - "online makespan minimization with parallel schedules"
    - "computer science and game theory a brief survey"
    - "a computer scientist looks at game theory"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "optimal price of anarchy in cost sharing games"):
  with members:
    - "distributed resource allocation through utility design part i optimizing the performance certificates via the price of anarchy"
    - "electric vehicle charging station network equilibrium models and pricing schemes"
    - "spectrum sharing as network congestion games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the importance of system level information in multiagent systems design cardinality and covering problems"):
  with members:
    - "nash and wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints"
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "utility design for distributed resource allocation part ii applications to submodular covering and supermodular problems"):
  with members:
    - "distributed resource allocation through utility design part i optimizing the performance certificates via the price of anarchy"
    - "competitive caching of contents in 5g edge cloud networks"
    - "optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvature"
    - "stochastic surveillance strategies for spatial quickest detection"
    - "efficient minimization of decomposable submodular functions"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"
    - "pure nash equilibria hard and easy games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "cooperative search games symmetric equilibria robustness and price of anarchy"):
  with members:
    - "the ants problem"
    - "bayesian incentive compatible bandit exploration"
    - "online makespan minimization with parallel schedules"
    - "computer science and game theory a brief survey"
    - "a computer scientist looks at game theory"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)