human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism"
  Abstract: Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in response to prices. A line of research in economics, initiated by Hurwicz (1972), is devoted to understanding how such markets perform when agents are strategic about their demands. This is captured by the \emph{Walrasian Mechanism} that proceeds by collecting reported demands, finding clearing prices in the \emph{reported} market via an ascending price t\^{a}tonnement procedure, and returns the resulting allocation. Similar mechanisms are used, for example, in the daily opening of the New York Stock Exchange and the call market for copper and gold in London. #R##N#In practice, it is commonly observed that agents in such markets reduce their demand leading to behaviors resembling bargaining and to inefficient outcomes. We ask how inefficient the equilibria can be. Our main result is that the welfare of every pure Nash equilibrium of the Walrasian mechanism is at least one quarter of the optimal welfare, when players have gross substitute valuations and do not overbid. Previous analysis of the Walrasian mechanism have resorted to large market assumptions to show convergence to efficiency in the limit. Our result shows that approximate efficiency is guaranteed regardless of the size of the market.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"
    - "the anarchy of scheduling without money"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "expressiveness and robustness of first price position auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "bayesian sequential auctions"
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "algorithms as mechanisms the price of anarchy of relax and round"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "valuation compressions in vcg based combinatorial auctions"
    - "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "on k column sparse packing programs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "non optimal mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "sequential posted pricing and multi parameter mechanism design"
    - "bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments"
    - "budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items"
    - "price of anarchy for greedy auctions"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"
    - "truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "greedy algorithms make efficient mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions"
    - "bayesian games and the smoothness framework"
    - "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
    - "price of anarchy for greedy auctions"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"):
  with members:
    - "the combinatorial world of auctions according to garp"
    - "welfare and rationality guarantees for the simultaneous multiple round ascending auction"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "budgetary effects on pricing equilibrium in online markets"):
  with members:
    - "convergence of tâtonnement in fisher markets"
    - "price competition in online combinatorial markets"
    - "the pricing war continues on competitive multi item pricing"
    - "ascending auctions and walrasian equilibrium"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "price competition in networked markets how do monopolies impact social welfare"):
  with members:
    - "network cournot competition"
    - "price competition fluctuations and welfare guarantees"
    - "price competition in online combinatorial markets"
    - "the pricing war continues on competitive multi item pricing"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)