human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "complexity of terminating preference elicitation"
  Abstract: Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the complexity of determining when we can terminate eliciting preferences, and prove that the complexity depends on the elicitation strategy. We show, for instance, that it may be better from a computational perspective to elicit all preferences from one agent at a time than to elicit individual preferences from multiple agents. We also study the connection between the strategic manipulation of an election and preference elicitation. We show that what we can manipulate affects the computational complexity of manipulation. In particular, we prove that there are voting rules which are easy to manipulate if we can change all of an agent's vote, but computationally intractable if we can change only some of their preferences. This suggests that, as with preference elicitation, a fine-grained view of manipulation may be informative. Finally, we study the connection between predicting the winner of an election and preference elicitation. Based on this connection, we identify a voting rule where it is computationally difficult to decide the probability of a candidate winning given a probability distribution over the votes.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "eliminating the weakest link making manipulation intractable"):
  with members:
    - "manipulation of nanson s and baldwin s rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "an empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting"
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"):
  with members:
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "towards a dichotomy of finding possible winners in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"
    - "vote elicitation complexity and strategy proofness"
    - "complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation"):
  with members:
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
    - "manipulation of nanson s and baldwin s rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "an empirical study of borda manipulation"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "an empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "where are the hard manipulation problems"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "an empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting"
    - "manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"
    - "dealing with incomplete agents preferences and an uncertain agenda in group decision making via sequential majority voting"
    - "manipulating tournaments in cup and round robin competitions"
    - "eliciting single peaked preferences using comparison queries"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"):
  with members:
    - "dealing with incomplete agents preferences and an uncertain agenda in group decision making via sequential majority voting"
    - "the sat phase transition"
    - "the g n m phase transition is not hard for the hamiltonian cycle problem"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence)