human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the price of anarchy in auctions"
  Abstract: This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which generally focus on exact and optimal solutions and are accordingly limited to relatively stylized settings. #R##N#We highlight three user-friendly analytical tools: smoothness-type inequalities, which immediately yield approximation guarantees for many auction formats of interest in the special case of complete information and deterministic strategies; extension theorems, which extend such guarantees to randomized strategies, no-regret learning outcomes, and incomplete-information settings; and composition theorems, which extend such guarantees from simpler to more complex auctions. Combining these tools yields tight worst-case approximation guarantees for the equilibria of many widely-used auction formats.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures"):
  with members:
    - "a round collapse theorem for computationally sound protocols or tfnp is hard on average in pessiland"
    - "on communication complexity of fixed point computation"
    - "near optimal communication lower bounds for approximate nash equilibria"
    - "query to communication lifting for bpp"
    - "lifting randomized query complexity to randomized communication complexity"
    - "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"
    - "communication complexity of approximate nash equilibria"
    - "communication complexity for algorithm designers"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "simple credible and approximately optimal auctions"):
  with members:
    - "an improved welfare guarantee for first price auctions"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "sample complexity for non truthful mechanisms"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "optimal prizes for all pay contests in heterogeneous crowdsourcing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "proportional dynamics in exchange economies"):
  with members:
    - "an alternating algorithm for finding linear arrow debreu market equilibrium"
    - "universal growth in production economies"
    - "a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets"
    - "tracing equilibrium in dynamic markets via distributed adaptation"
    - "dynamics of distributed updating in fisher markets"
    - "selling complementary goods dynamics efficiency and revenue"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "ascending price algorithms for unknown markets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "envy regret and social welfare loss"):
  with members:
    - "the ad types problem"
    - "online learning for measuring incentive compatibility in ad auctions"
    - "note on vcg vs price raising for matching markets"
    - "communication complexity of approximate nash equilibria"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "adam a method for stochastic optimization"
    - "gsp with general independent click through rates"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "when smoothness is not enough toward exact quantification and optimization of the price of anarchy"):
  with members:
    - "optimal price of anarchy in cost sharing games"
    - "distributed resource allocation through utility design part i optimizing the performance certificates via the price of anarchy"
    - "utility design for distributed resource allocation part i characterizing and optimizing the exact price of anarchy"
    - "the impact of local information on the performance of multiagent systems"
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "learning in games robustness of fast convergence"
    - "bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"):
  with members:
    - "a b testing of auctions"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "the pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"
    - "the anarchy of scheduling without money"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "smoothed efficient algorithms and reductions for network coordination games"):
  with members:
    - "improving the smoothed complexity of flip for max cut problems"
    - "near optimal communication lower bounds for approximate nash equilibria"
    - "efficient local search in coordination games on graphs"
    - "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"
    - "communication complexity of approximate nash equilibria"
    - "inapproximability of nash equilibrium"
    - "constant rank bimatrix games are ppad hard"
    - "reducibility among fractional stability problems"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)