human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "an improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines"
  Abstract: We study the scheduling problem on unrelated machines in the mechanism design setting. This problem was proposed and studied in the seminal paper (Nisan and Ronen 1999), where they gave a 1.75-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for the case of two machines. We improve this result by a 1.6737-approximation randomized truthful mechanism. We also generalize our result to a $0.8368m$-approximation mechanism for task scheduling with $m$ machines, which improve the previous best upper bound of $0.875m(Mu'alem and Schapira 2007).

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the nisan ronen conjecture for submodular valuations"):
  with members:
    - "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "a unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems"):
  with members:
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"
    - "a characterization of 2 player mechanisms for scheduling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"):
  with members:
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "mechanisms for multi unit auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"):
  with members:
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "prophet inequalities with limited information"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "a unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"
    - "computationally feasible vcg mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"):
  with members:
    - "reducing revenue to welfare maximization approximation algorithms and other generalizations"
    - "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "bayesian optimal auctions via multi to single agent reduction"
    - "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization"
    - "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"):
  with members:
    - "tight lower bounds on envy free makespan approximation"
    - "sequential posted pricing and multi parameter mechanism design"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "correlation robust stochastic optimization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines"):
  with members:
    - "a characterization of 2 player mechanisms for scheduling"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms)