human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games"
  Abstract: We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a metric space, and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. Our main result is an elegant characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on the line. In particular, we show that for instances with n \geq 5 agents, any such mechanism either admits a unique dictator, or always places the facilities at the leftmost and the rightmost location of the instance. As a corollary, we obtain that the best approximation ratio achievable by deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for the problem of locating 2 facilities on the line to minimize the total connection cost is precisely n-2. Another rather surprising consequence is that the Two-Extremes mechanism of (Procaccia and Tennenholtz, EC 2009) is the only deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on the line. #R##N#The proof of the characterization employs several new ideas and technical tools, which provide new insights into the behavior of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for K-Facility Location games, and may be of independent interest. Employing one of these tools, we show that for every K \geq 3, there do not exist any deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for K-Facility Location on the line, even for simple instances with K+1 agents. Moreover, building on the characterization for the line, we show that there do not exist any deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on more general metric spaces, which is true even for simple instances with 3 agents located in a star.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "from hotelling to load balancing approximation and the principle of minimum differentiation"):
  with members:
    - "shapley facility location games"
    - "hotelling downs model with limited attraction"
    - "location games on networks existence and efficiency of equilibria"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "voronoi game on graphs"
    - "nash equilibria in voronoi games on graphs"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "facility location problem with capacity constraints algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives"):
  with members:
    - "the capacity constrained facility location problem"
    - "approximation algorithms for hard capacitated k facility location problems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "strategyproof mechanism for two heterogeneous facilities with constant approximation ratio"):
  with members:
    - "the capacity constrained facility location problem"
    - "strategyproof mechanisms for one dimensional hybrid and obnoxious facility location"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "characterization of group strategyproof mechanisms for facility location in strictly convex space"):
  with members:
    - "on voting and facility location"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations"):
  with members:
    - "gibbard satterthwaite success stories and obvious strategyproofness"
    - "no stable matching mechanism is obviously strategy proof"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "a deterministic truthful ptas for scheduling related machines"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "who to trust for truthfully maximizing welfare"):
  with members:
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"
    - "combinatorial auctions without money"
    - "the exponential mechanism for social welfare private truthful and nearly optimal"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"
    - "optimal mechansim design and money burning"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "on voting and facility location"):
  with members:
    - "who to trust for truthfully maximizing welfare"
    - "strategyproof approximation mechanisms for location on networks"
    - "approximate privacy foundations and quantification"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "facility location with double peaked preference"):
  with members:
    - "approximately optimal mechanisms for strategyproof facility location minimizing l_p norm of costs"
    - "mix and match"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)