human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "a field guide to personalized reserve prices"
  Abstract: We study the question of setting and testing reserve prices in single item auctions when the bidders are not identical. At a high level, there are two generalizations of the standard second price auction: in the lazy version we first determine the winner, and then apply reserve prices; in the eager version we first discard the bidders not meeting their reserves, and then determine the winner among the rest. We show that the two versions have dramatically different properties: lazy reserves are easy to optimize, and A/B test in production, whereas eager reserves always lead to higher welfare, but their optimization is NP-complete, and naive A/B testing will lead to incorrect conclusions. Despite their different characteristics, we show that the overall revenue for the two scenarios is always within a factor of 2 of each other, even in the presence of correlated bids. Moreover, we prove that the eager auction dominates the lazy auction on revenue whenever the bidders are independent or symmetric. We complement our theoretical results with simulations on real world data that show that even suboptimally set eager reserve prices are preferred from a revenue standpoint.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "dynamic incentive aware learning robust pricing in contextual auctions"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "contextual search via intrinsic volumes"
    - "multi armed bandit problems with strategic arms"
    - "perishability of data dynamic pricing under varying coefficient models"
    - "multidimensional binary search for contextual decision making"
    - "a nearly linear time ptas for explicit fractional packing and covering linear programs"
    - "learning prices for repeated auctions with strategic buyers"
    - "learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "reserve pricing in repeated second price auctions with strategic bidders"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "optimal pricing in repeated posted price auctions"
    - "learning optimal reserve price against non myopic bidders"
    - "contextual search via intrinsic volumes"
    - "robust repeated auctions under heterogeneous buyer behavior"
    - "optimal dynamic auctions are virtual welfare maximizers"
    - "dynamic pricing with finitely many unknown valuations"
    - "on consistency of optimal pricing algorithms in repeated posted price auctions with strategic buyer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "adversarial learning for revenue maximizing auctions"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "dynamic incentive aware learning robust pricing in contextual auctions"
    - "learning to bid in revenue maximizing auctions"
    - "lp based approximation for personalized reserve prices"
    - "learning to clear the market"
    - "thresholding the virtual value a simple method to increase welfare and lower reserve prices in online auction systems"
    - "a general theory of sample complexity for multi item profit maximization"
    - "revenue optimization with approximate bid predictions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "learning to bid in revenue maximizing auctions"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "explicit shading strategies for repeated truthful auctions"
    - "thresholding the virtual value a simple method to increase welfare and lower reserve prices in online auction systems"
    - "thresholding at the monopoly price an agnostic way to improve bidding strategies in revenue maximizing auctions"
    - "learning to bid without knowing your value"
    - "optimal auctions through deep learning"
    - "sequential mechanisms with ex post participation guarantees"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "improved approximations for posted price mechanisms second price auctions and free order prophets"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"
    - "approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi unit auctions"
    - "correlation robust stochastic optimization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "robust stackelberg buyers in repeated auctions"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "dynamic incentive aware learning robust pricing in contextual auctions"
    - "thresholding the virtual value a simple method to increase welfare and lower reserve prices in online auction systems"
    - "thresholding at the monopoly price an agnostic way to improve bidding strategies in revenue maximizing auctions"
    - "optimal auctions through deep learning"
    - "sequential mechanisms with ex post participation guarantees"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "making the most of your samples"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "lp based approximation for personalized reserve prices"):
  with members:
    - "prophet secretary through blind strategies"
    - "improved approximations for free order prophets and second price auctions"
    - "prophet secretary surpassing the 1 1 e barrier"
    - "making the most of your samples"
    - "learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "learning to clear the market"):
  with members:
    - "revenue optimization with approximate bid predictions"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)