human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "congestion games with distance based strict uncertainty"
  Abstract: We put forward a new model of congestion games where agents have uncertainty over the routes used by other agents. We take a non-probabilistic approach, assuming that each agent knows that the number of agents using an edge is within a certain range. Given this uncertainty, we model agents who either minimize their worst-case cost (WCC) or their worst-case regret (WCR), and study implications on equilibrium existence, convergence through adaptive play, and efficiency. Under the WCC behavior the game reduces to a modified congestion game, and welfare improves when agents have moderate uncertainty. Under WCR behavior the game is not, in general, a congestion game, but we show convergence and efficiency bounds for a simple class of games.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "distance based equilibria in normal form games"):
  with members:
    - "heuristic voting as ordinal dominance strategies"
    - "lipschitz continuity and approximate equilibria"
    - "a local dominance theory of voting equilibria"
    - "regret minimizing equilibria and mechanisms for games with strict type uncertainty"
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
    - "the many faces of rationalizability"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "uncertainty in multi commodity routing networks when does it help"):
  with members:
    - "how much urban traffic is searching for parking"
    - "effects of information heterogeneity in bayesian routing games"
    - "informational braess paradox the effect of information on traffic congestion"
    - "to observe or not to observe queuing game framework for urban parking"
    - "power control in networks with heterogeneous users a quasi variational inequality approach"
    - "the burden of risk aversion in mean risk selfish routing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "tight inefficiency bounds for perception parameterized affine congestion games"):
  with members:
    - "playing the wrong game smoothness bounds for congestion games with behavioral biases"
    - "on the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the impact of worst case deviations in non atomic network routing games"):
  with members:
    - "path deviations outperform approximate stability in heterogeneous congestion games"
    - "asymptotically tight bounds for inefficiency in risk averse selfish routing"
    - "the burden of risk aversion in mean risk selfish routing"
    - "playing the wrong game smoothness bounds for congestion games with behavioral biases"
    - "on the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "playing the wrong game smoothness bounds for congestion games with behavioral biases"):
  with members:
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "asymptotically tight bounds for inefficiency in risk averse selfish routing"
    - "the burden of risk aversion in mean risk selfish routing"
    - "improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms"
    - "the robust price of anarchy of altruistic games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "the burden of risk aversion in mean risk selfish routing"):
  with members:
    - "on the hardness of signaling"
    - "prior independent auctions for risk averse agents"
    - "mechanisms for risk averse agents without loss"
    - "maximizing expected utility for stochastic combinatorial optimization problems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "playing the wrong game bounding externalities in diverse populations of agents"):
  with members:
    - "the impact of worst case deviations in non atomic network routing games"
    - "informational braess paradox the effect of information on traffic congestion"
    - "the burden of risk aversion in mean risk selfish routing"
    - "the robust price of anarchy of altruistic games"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)