human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "bayesian budget feasibility with posted pricing"
  Abstract: We consider the problem of budget feasible mechanism design proposed by Singer (2010), but in a Bayesian setting. A principal has a public value for hiring a subset of the agents and a budget, while the agents have private costs for being hired. We consider both additive and submodular value functions of the principal. We show that there are simple, practical, ex post budget balanced posted pricing mechanisms that approximate the value obtained by the Bayesian optimal mechanism that is budget balanced only in expectation. A main motivating application for this work is the crowdsourcing large projects, e.g., on Mechanical Turk, where workers are drawn from a large population and posted pricing is standard. Our analysis methods relate to contention resolution schemes in submodular optimization of Vondrak et al. (2011) and the correlation gap analysis of Yan (2011).

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "budget feasible mechanism design for non monotone submodular objectives offline and online"):
  with members:
    - "a nearly linear time algorithm for submodular maximization with a knapsack constraint"
    - "on budget feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives"
    - "simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations"
    - "greed is good near optimal submodular maximization via greedy optimization"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms on matroids"
    - "adaptivity gaps for stochastic probing submodular and xos functions"
    - "coverage matching and beyond new results on budgeted mechanism design"
    - "submodular secretary problems cardinality matching and linear constraints"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "optimal budget feasible mechanisms for additive valuations"):
  with members:
    - "on budget feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives"
    - "simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms on matroids"
    - "coverage matching and beyond new results on budgeted mechanism design"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a bridge between liquid and social welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "a bayesian clearing mechanism for combinatorial auctions"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "on the posted pricing in crowdsourcing power of bonus"):
  with members:
    - "optimal posted prices for online cloud resource allocation"
    - "approval voting and incentives in crowdsourcing"
    - "incentivizing high quality crowdwork"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "double or nothing multiplicative incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing"
    - "truelabel confusions a spectrum of probabilistic models in analyzing multiple ratings"
    - "reputation based incentive protocols in crowdsourcing applications"
    - "optimal crowdsourcing contests"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "on budget feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives"):
  with members:
    - "simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms on matroids"
    - "adaptivity gaps for stochastic probing submodular and xos functions"
    - "coverage matching and beyond new results on budgeted mechanism design"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design"
    - "incentives for privacy tradeoff in community sensing"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "combinatorial prophet inequalities"):
  with members:
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "secretary problems with non uniform arrival order"
    - "streaming algorithms for submodular function maximization"
    - "online submodular maximization with preemption"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "building a good team secretary problems and the supermodular degree"
    - "locally adaptive optimization adaptive seeding for monotone submodular functions"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)