human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "sequential posted pricing and multi parameter mechanism design"
  Abstract: We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of {\em Bayesian optimal mechanism design} where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. In single-parameter settings (i.e., where each agent's preference is given by a single private value for being served and zero for not being served) this problem is solved [Myerson '81]. Unfortunately, these single parameter optimal mechanisms are impractical and rarely employed [Ausubel and Milgrom '06], and furthermore the underlying economic theory fails to generalize to the important, relevant, and unsolved multi-dimensional setting (i.e., where each agent's preference is given by multiple values for each of the multiple services available) [Manelli and Vincent '07]. In contrast to the theory of optimal mechanisms we develop a theory of sequential posted price mechanisms, where agents in sequence are offered take-it-or-leave-it prices. These mechanisms are approximately optimal in single-dimensional settings, and avoid many of the properties that make optimal mechanisms impractical. Furthermore, these mechanisms generalize naturally to give the first known approximations to the elusive optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem. In particular, we solve multi-dimensional multi-unit auction problems and generalizations to matroid feasibility constraints. The constant approximations we obtain range from 1.5 to 8. For all but one case, our posted price sequences can be computed in polynomial time.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing beyond linear utility"):
  with members:
    - "tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms"
    - "tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing"
    - "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"
    - "prior independent auctions for risk averse agents"
    - "bayesian optimal auctions via multi to single agent reduction"
    - "the simple economics of approximately optimal auctions"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "stability of service under time of use pricing"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "truthful online scheduling with commitments"
    - "fast algorithms for online stochastic convex programming"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "primal beats dual on online packing lps in the random order model"
    - "online stochastic packing applied to display ad allocation"
    - "a dynamic near optimal algorithm for online linear programming"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"):
  with members:
    - "the sample complexity of auctions with side information"
    - "optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling"
    - "sampling and representation complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "making the most of your samples"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "prophet inequalities with limited information"
    - "learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve"
    - "mechanism design via consensus estimates cross checking and profit extraction"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "optimal auctions vs anonymous pricing"):
  with members:
    - "revenue gaps for discriminatory and anonymous sequential posted pricing"
    - "optimal competitive auctions"
    - "the simple economics of approximately optimal auctions"
    - "envy freedom and prior free mechanism design"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "non optimal mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"
    - "on the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments"
    - "budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items"
    - "price of anarchy for greedy auctions"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"
    - "truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling"):
  with members:
    - "tight lower bounds on envy free makespan approximation"
    - "mechanism design via correlation gap"
    - "correlation robust stochastic optimization"
    - "an improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "the exponential mechanism for social welfare private truthful and nearly optimal"):
  with members:
    - "truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy"
    - "a learning theory approach to non interactive database privacy"
    - "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "selling privacy at auction"
    - "bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments"
    - "approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "constant competitive prior free auction with ordered bidders"):
  with members:
    - "on random sampling auctions for digital goods"
    - "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms"
    - "budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"
    - "optimal mechansim design and money burning"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)