human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "tight bounds for the price of anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions"
  Abstract: We study the Price of Anarchy of simultaneous first-price auctions for buyers with submodular and subadditive valuations. The current best upper bounds for the Bayesian Price of Anarchy of these auctions are e/(e-1) [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] and 2 [Feldman et al. 2013], respectively. We provide matching lower bounds for both cases even for the case of full information and for mixed Nash equilibria via an explicit construction. #R##N#We present an alternative proof of the upper bound of e/(e-1) for first-price auctions with fractionally subadditive valuations which reveals the worst-case price distribution, that is used as a building block for the matching lower bound construction. #R##N#We generalize our results to a general class of item bidding auctions that we call bid-dependent auctions (including first-price auctions and all-pay auctions) where the winner is always the highest bidder and each bidder's payment depends only on his own bid. #R##N#Finally, we apply our techniques to discriminatory price multi-unit auctions. We complement the results of [de Keijzer et al. 2013] for the case of subadditive valuations, by providing a matching lower bound of 2. For the case of submodular valuations, we provide a lower bound of 1.109. For the same class of valuations, we were able to reproduce the upper bound of e/(e-1) using our non-smooth approach.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures"):
  with members:
    - "a round collapse theorem for computationally sound protocols or tfnp is hard on average in pessiland"
    - "on communication complexity of fixed point computation"
    - "near optimal communication lower bounds for approximate nash equilibria"
    - "query to communication lifting for bpp"
    - "lifting randomized query complexity to randomized communication complexity"
    - "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"
    - "communication complexity of approximate nash equilibria"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the online best reply algorithm for resource allocation problems"):
  with members:
    - "the price of stability of weighted congestion games"
    - "a unifying tool for bounding the quality of non cooperative solutions in weighted congestion games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "an improved welfare guarantee for first price auctions"):
  with members:
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "price of anarchy for greedy auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"):
  with members:
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "liquid price of anarchy"):
  with members:
    - "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful multi unit procurements with budgets"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "smoothness for simultaneous composition of mechanisms with admission"):
  with members:
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"
    - "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "jamming resistant learning in wireless networks"
    - "bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "communication complexity for algorithm designers"):
  with members:
    - "analysis of boolean functions"
    - "boolean function monotonicity testing requires almost n 1 2 non adaptive queries"
    - "new algorithms and lower bounds for monotonicity testing"
    - "the matching polytope has exponential extension complexity"
    - "a o n monotonicity tester for boolean functions over the hypercube"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "lower bounds for sparse recovery"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations"
    - "on the inefficiency of standard multi unit auctions"
    - "composable and efficient mechanisms"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
    - "optimal crowdsourcing contests"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)