human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope"
  Abstract: A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto optimal auctions while respecting the budget constraints. Achieving this goal is particularly challenging in the presence of nontrivial combinatorial constraints over the set of feasible allocations. #R##N#Toward this goal and motivated by AdWords auctions, we present an auction for {\em polymatroidal} environments satisfying the above properties. Our auction employs a novel clinching technique with a clean geometric description and only needs an oracle access to the submodular function defining the polymatroid. As a result, this auction not only simplifies and generalizes all previous results, it applies to several new applications including AdWords Auctions, bandwidth markets, and video on demand. In particular, our characterization of the AdWords auction as polymatroidal constraints might be of independent interest. This allows us to design the first mechanism for Ad Auctions taking into account simultaneously budgets, multiple keywords and multiple slots. #R##N#We show that it is impossible to extend this result to generic polyhedral constraints. This also implies an impossibility result for multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal utilities in the presence of budget constraints.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "pricing in resource allocation games based on lagrangean duality and convexification"):
  with members:
    - "nash and wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints"
    - "sensitivity analysis for convex separable optimization over integral polymatroids"
    - "totally unimodular congestion games"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
    - "optimal pricing in networks with externalities"
    - "congestion games with variable demands"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a simple mechanism for a budget constrained buyer"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"
    - "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents"):
  with members:
    - "a b testing of auctions"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "randomization beats second price as a prior independent auction"
    - "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings"
    - "mechanism design for data science"
    - "simple and near optimal mechanisms for market intermediation"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "polyhedral clinching auctions for two sided markets"):
  with members:
    - "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
    - "clinching auctions with online supply"
    - "incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi unit auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"
    - "revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "budget feasible mechanisms on matroids"):
  with members:
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "truthful multi unit procurements with budgets"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "revenue maximizing envy free pricing in matching markets with budgets"):
  with members:
    - "envy free pricing in multi unit markets"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "on the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism"
    - "expressiveness and robustness of first price position auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "bayesian sequential auctions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)