human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "combinatorial auctions with restricted complements"
  Abstract: Complements between goods - where one good takes on added value in the presence of another - have been a thorn in the side of algorithmic mechanism designers. On the one hand, complements are common in the standard motivating applications for combinatorial auctions, like spectrum license auctions. On the other, welfare maximization in the presence of complements is notoriously difficult, and this intractability has stymied theoretical progress in the area. For example, there are no known positive results for combinatorial auctions in which bidder valuations are multi-parameter and non-complement-free, other than the relatively weak results known for general valuations. #R##N#To make inroads on the problem of combinatorial auction design in the presence of complements, we propose a model for valuations with complements that is parameterized by the "size" of the complements. A valuation in our model is represented succinctly by a weighted hypergraph, where the size of the hyper-edges corresponds to degree of complementarity. Our model permits a variety of computationally efficient queries, and non-trivial welfare-maximization algorithms and mechanisms. #R##N#We design the following polynomial-time approximation algorithms and truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization with bidders with hypergraph valuations. #R##N#1- For bidders whose valuations correspond to subgraphs of a known graph that is planar (or more generally, excludes a fixed minor), we give a truthful and (1+epsilon)-approximate mechanism. #R##N#2- We give a polynomial-time, r-approximation algorithm for welfare maximization with hypergraph-r valuations. Our algorithm randomly rounds a compact linear programming relaxation of the problem. #R##N#3- We design a different approximation algorithm and use it to give a polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation mechanism that has an approximation factor of O(log^r m).

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "complement free couples must communicate a hardness result for two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "beyond 1 2 approximation for submodular maximization on massive data streams"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "online matroid intersection beating half for random arrival"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "simple and approximately optimal pricing for proportional complementarities"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "on the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design"
    - "the value of information concealment"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "reaping the benefits of bundling under high production costs"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "capturing complementarity in set functions by going beyond submodularity subadditivity"):
  with members:
    - "network essence pagerank completion and centrality conforming markov chains"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"
    - "building a good team secretary problems and the supermodular degree"
    - "constrained monotone function maximization and the supermodular degree"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "best response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"
    - "on the efficiency of all pay mechanisms"
    - "learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"):
  with members:
    - "makespan minimization via posted prices"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "combinatorial prophet inequalities"
    - "beyond matroids secretary problem and prophet inequality with general constraints"
    - "the price of anarchy in large games"
    - "online contention resolution schemes"
    - "the invisible hand of dynamic market pricing"
    - "algorithms as mechanisms the price of anarchy of relax and round"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements"):
  with members:
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "building a good team secretary problems and the supermodular degree"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"):
  with members:
    - "simple auctions for agents with complements"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "greedy algorithms make efficient mechanisms"
    - "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"):
  with members:
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "matroid prophet inequalities"
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
    - "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)