human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "price competition in networked markets how do monopolies impact social welfare"
  Abstract: We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can be very inefficient, the exact properties of equilibria in markets with multiple sellers are not fully understood even in single-source single-sink networks. In this work, we show that for a large class of natural buyer demand functions, we are guaranteed the existence of an equilibrium with several desirable properties. The crucial insight that we gain into the equilibrium structure allows us to obtain tight bounds on efficiency in terms of the various parameters governing the market, especially the number of monopolies M. All of our efficiency results extend to markets without the network structure. #R##N#While it is known that monopolies can cause large inefficiencies in general, our main results for single-source single-sink networks indicate that for several natural demand functions the efficiency only drops linearly with M. For example, for concave demand we prove that the efficiency loss is at most a factor 1+M/2 from the optimum, for demand with monotone hazard rate it is at most 1+M, and for polynomial demand the efficiency decreases logarithmically with M. In contrast to previous work that showed that monopolies may adversely affect welfare, our main contribution is showing that monopolies may not be as `evil' as they are made out to be; the loss in efficiency is bounded in many natural markets. Finally, we consider more general, multiple-source networks and show that in the absence of monopolies, mild assumptions on the network topology guarantee an equilibrium that maximizes social welfare.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "toll caps in privatized road networks"):
  with members:
    - "the impact of worst case deviations in non atomic network routing games"
    - "efficiency and complexity of price competition among single product vendors"
    - "strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games"
    - "stackelberg network pricing games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "governance of social welfare in networked markets"):
  with members:
    - "network cournot competition"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the price of fragmentation in mobility on demand services"):
  with members:
    - "pricing and optimization in shared vehicle systems an approximation framework"
    - "network cournot competition"
    - "on the role of a market maker in networked cournot competition"
    - "asymptotically optimal algorithms for one to one pickup and delivery problems with applications to transportation systems"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "efficiency and complexity of price competition among single product vendors"):
  with members:
    - "budgetary effects on pricing equilibrium in online markets"
    - "price competition in online combinatorial markets"
    - "the pricing war continues on competitive multi item pricing"
    - "enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies"
    - "the cost of stability in coalitional games"
    - "a new multilayered pcp and the hardness of hypergraph vertex cover"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "envy free pricing in large markets approximating revenue and welfare"):
  with members:
    - "pricing to maximize revenue and welfare simultaneously in large markets"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "combinatorial walrasian equilibrium"
    - "on revenue maximization with sharp multi unit demands"
    - "algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "on the role of a market maker in networked cournot competition"):
  with members:
    - "network cournot competition"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)