human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates"
  Abstract: In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard. Especially among computational agents, it is reasonable to measure this hardness by computational complexity. Some earlier work has been done in this area, but it was assumed that the number of voters and candidates is unbounded. We derive hardness results for practical multiagent settings where the number of candidates is small but the number of voters can be large. We show that with complete information about the others' votes, individual manipulation is easy, and coalitional manipulation is easy with unweighted voters. However, constructive coalitional manipulation with weighted voters is intractable for all of the voting protocols under study, except for the nonrandomized Cup. Destructive manipulation tends to be easier. Randomizing over instantiations of the protocols (such as schedules of the Cup protocol) can be used to make manipulation hard. Finally, we show that under weak assumptions, if weighted coalitional manipulation with complete information about the others' votes is hard in some voting protocol, then individual and unweighted manipulation is hard when there is uncertainty about the others' votes.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "often harder than in the constructive case destructive bribery in cp nets"):
  with members:
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "how hard is bribery in elections"
    - "a richer understanding of the complexity of election systems"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"
    - "cp nets a tool for representing and reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference statements"
    - "how many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "an empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "complexity of mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "graphical models for game theory"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators"):
  with members:
    - "universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard"
    - "how many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate"
    - "vote elicitation complexity and strategy proofness"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "new candidates welcome possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates"):
  with members:
    - "determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders"
    - "taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "complexity of terminating preference elicitation"
    - "towards a dichotomy of finding possible winners in elections based on scoring rules"
    - "anyone but him the complexity of precluding an alternative"
    - "vote elicitation complexity and strategy proofness"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation"):
  with members:
    - "dominating manipulations in voting with partial information"
    - "manipulation of nanson s and baldwin s rules"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "an empirical study of borda manipulation"
    - "multimode control attacks on elections"
    - "an empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "normalized range voting broadly resists control"):
  with members:
    - "how many vote operations are needed to manipulate a voting system"
    - "a smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power"
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "bucklin voting is broadly resistant to control"
    - "control complexity in fallback voting"
    - "where are the hard manipulation problems"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"
    - "sincere strategy preference based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "where are the hard manipulation problems"):
  with members:
    - "complexity of and algorithms for borda manipulation"
    - "an empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting"
    - "manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures"
    - "the shield that never was societies with single peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control"
    - "complexity of terminating preference elicitation"
    - "where are the really hard manipulation problems the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule"
    - "dealing with incomplete agents preferences and an uncertain agenda in group decision making via sequential majority voting"
    - "manipulating tournaments in cup and round robin competitions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)