human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "on the approximation and smoothed complexity of leontief market equilibria"
  Abstract: We show that the problem of finding an \epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium of an n by n two-person games can be reduced to the computation of an (\epsilon/n)^2-approximate market equilibrium of a Leontief economy. Together with a recent result of Chen, Deng and Teng, this polynomial reduction implies that the Leontief market exchange problem does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme, that is, there is no algorithm that can compute an \epsilon-approximate market equilibrium in time polynomial in m, n, and 1/\epsilon, unless PPAD is not in P, We also extend the analysis of our reduction to show, unless PPAD is not in RP, that the smoothed complexity of the Scarf's general fixed-point approximation algorithm (when applying to solve the approximate Leontief market exchange problem) or of any algorithm for computing an approximate market equilibrium of Leontief economies is not polynomial in n and 1/\sigma, under Gaussian or uniform perturbations with magnitude \sigma.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the complexity of fairness through equilibrium"):
  with members:
    - "inapproximability of nash equilibrium"
    - "the complexity of non monotone markets"
    - "a complexity view of markets with social influence"
    - "spending is not easier than trading on the computational equivalence of fisher and arrow debreu equilibria"
    - "reducibility among fractional stability problems"
    - "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the complexity of non monotone markets"):
  with members:
    - "leontief exchange markets can solve multivariate polynomial equations yielding fixp and etr hardness"
    - "inapproximability of nash equilibrium"
    - "a complexity view of markets with social influence"
    - "settling the complexity of arrow debreu equilibria in markets with additively separable utilities"
    - "spending is not easier than trading on the computational equivalence of fisher and arrow debreu equilibria"
    - "paths beyond local search a nearly tight bound for randomized fixed point computation"
    - "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "settling the complexity of arrow debreu equilibria in markets with additively separable utilities"):
  with members:
    - "spending is not easier than trading on the computational equivalence of fisher and arrow debreu equilibria"
    - "computing nash equilibria approximation and smoothed complexity"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "spending is not easier than trading on the computational equivalence of fisher and arrow debreu equilibria"):
  with members:
    - "settling the complexity of arrow debreu equilibria in markets with additively separable utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"):
  with members:
    - "graphical models for game theory"
    - "preference games and personalized equilibria with applications to fractional bgp"
    - "bounded budget connection bbc games or how to make friends and influence people on a budget"
    - "paths beyond local search a nearly tight bound for randomized fixed point computation"
    - "games of fixed rank a hierarchy of bimatrix games"
    - "complexity results about nash equilibria"
    - "smoothed analysis of algorithms why the simplex algorithm usually takes polynomial time"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "paths beyond local search a nearly tight bound for randomized fixed point computation"):
  with members:
    - "computing nash equilibria approximation and smoothed complexity"
    - "smoothed analysis of algorithms why the simplex algorithm usually takes polynomial time"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "computing nash equilibria approximation and smoothed complexity"):
  with members:
    - "graphical models for game theory"
    - "smoothed analysis of algorithms why the simplex algorithm usually takes polynomial time"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)