human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "frugal and truthful auctions for vertex covers flows and cuts"
  Abstract: We study truthful mechanisms for hiring a team of agents in three classes of set systems: Vertex Cover auctions, k-flow auctions, and cut auctions. For Vertex Cover auctions, the vertices are owned by selfish and rational agents, and the auctioneer wants to purchase a vertex cover from them. For k-flow auctions, the edges are owned by the agents, and the auctioneer wants to purchase k edge-disjoint s-t paths, for given s and t. In the same setting, for cut auctions, the auctioneer wants to purchase an s-t cut. Only the agents know their costs, and the auctioneer needs to select a feasible set and payments based on bids made by the agents. #R##N#We present constant-competitive truthful mechanisms for all three set systems. That is, the maximum overpayment of the mechanism is within a constant factor of the maximum overpayment of any truthful mechanism, for every set system in the class. The mechanism for Vertex Cover is based on scaling each bid by a multiplier derived from the dominant eigenvector of a certain matrix. The mechanism for k-flows prunes the graph to be minimally (k+1)-connected, and then applies the Vertex Cover mechanism. Similarly, the mechanism for cuts contracts the graph until all s-t paths have length exactly 2, and then applies the Vertex Cover mechanism.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "optimal budget feasible mechanisms for additive valuations"):
  with members:
    - "on budget feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives"
    - "simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms on matroids"
    - "coverage matching and beyond new results on budgeted mechanism design"
    - "bayesian budget feasibility with posted pricing"
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "core competitive auctions"):
  with members:
    - "prior free auctions for budgeted agents"
    - "mechanism design via consensus estimates cross checking and profit extraction"
    - "frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques"
    - "frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "truthful multi unit procurements with budgets"):
  with members:
    - "mechanism design for crowdsourcing an optimal 1 1 e competitive budget feasible mechanism for large markets"
    - "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
    - "optimal provision after wait in healthcare"
    - "online submodular welfare maximization greedy is optimal"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "mechanism design without money via stable matching"
    - "optimization with demand oracles"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "price competition in online combinatorial markets"):
  with members:
    - "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient"
    - "sequential auctions and externalities"
    - "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods"
    - "frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"
    - "frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanism design for multidimensional covering problems"):
  with members:
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques"
    - "frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover"
    - "greedy facility location algorithms analyzed using dual fitting with factor revealing lp"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "benchmark problems for totally unimodular set system auction"):
  with members:
    - "frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques"
    - "frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "sequential posted pricing and multi parameter mechanism design"
    - "frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "a note on the power of truthful approximation mechanisms"
    - "budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques"):
  with members:
    - "false name proof mechanisms for hiring a team"
    - "frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CC(Computational Complexity)