human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "the core of the participatory budgeting problem"
  Abstract: In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to determine an allocation of funds to projects. This problem is different from standard fair resource allocation because of public goods: The allocated goods benefit all users simultaneously. Fairness is crucial in participatory decision making, since generating equitable outcomes is an important goal of these processes. We argue that the classic game theoretic notion of core captures fairness in the setting. To compute the core, we first develop a novel characterization of a public goods market equilibrium called the Lindahl equilibrium, which is always a core solution. We then provide the first (to our knowledge) polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium for a broad set of utility functions; our algorithm also generalizes (in a non-trivial way) the well-known concept of proportional fairness. We use our theoretical insights to perform experiments on real participatory budgeting voting data. We empirically show that the core can be efficiently computed for utility functions that naturally model our practical setting, and examine the relation of the core with the familiar welfare objective. Finally, we address concerns of incentives and mechanism design by developing a randomized approximately dominant-strategy truthful mechanism building on the exponential mechanism from differential privacy.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "participatory budgeting models and approaches"):
  with members:
    - "truthful aggregation of budget proposals"
    - "markets for public decision making"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "iterative local voting for collective decision making in continuous spaces"
    - "the impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "proportionally fair clustering"):
  with members:
    - "fair algorithms for clustering"
    - "privacy preserving clustering with constraints"
    - "markets for public decision making"
    - "fair clustering through fairlets"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "on fairness and calibration"
    - "preventing fairness gerrymandering auditing and learning for subgroup fairness"
    - "algorithmic decision making and the cost of fairness"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "developments in multi agent fair allocation"):
  with members:
    - "from matching with diversity constraints to matching with regional quotas"
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "fairly allocating many goods with few queries"
    - "fair knapsack"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "proportionally representative participatory budgeting with ordinal preferences"):
  with members:
    - "a framework for approval based budgeting methods"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "rank maximal equal contribution a probabilistic social choice function"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "approximately stable committee selection"):
  with members:
    - "proportionally fair clustering"
    - "group fairness in committee selection"
    - "fair knapsack"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "an improved approximation for k median and positive correlation in budgeted optimization"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "truthful aggregation of budget proposals"):
  with members:
    - "markets for public decision making"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "iterative local voting for collective decision making in continuous spaces"
    - "strategyproof approximation mechanisms for location on networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "group fairness in committee selection"):
  with members:
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "proportional justified representation"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "aggregation over metric spaces proposing and voting in elections budgeting and legislation"):
  with members:
    - "on computing centroids according to the p norms of hamming distance vectors"
    - "point foundations of e democracy"
    - "incorporating reality into social choice"
    - "the complexity of multiwinner voting rules with variable number of winners"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "sequential deliberation for social choice"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "iterative judgment aggregation"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)