human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "hardness results for signaling in bayesian zero sum and network routing games"
  Abstract: We study the optimization problem faced by a perfectly informed principal in a Bayesian game, who reveals information to the players about the state of nature to obtain a desirable equilibrium. This signaling problem is the natural design question motivated by uncertainty in games and has attracted much recent attention. We present new hardness results for signaling problems in (a) Bayesian two-player zero-sum games, and (b) Bayesian network routing games. #R##N#For Bayesian zero-sum games, when the principal seeks to maximize the equilibrium utility of a player, we show that it is NP-hard to obtain an additive FPTAS. Our hardness proof exploits duality and the equivalence of separation and optimization in a novel way. Further, we rule out an additive PTAS assuming planted clique hardness, which states that no polynomial time algorithm can recover a planted clique from an Erd\H{o}s-R\'enyi random graph. Complementing these, we obtain a PTAS for a structured class of zero-sum games (where obtaining an FPTAS is still NP-hard) when the payoff matrices obey a Lipschitz condition. Previous results ruled out an FPTAS assuming planted-clique hardness, and a PTAS only for implicit games with quasi-polynomial-size strategy sets. #R##N#For Bayesian network routing games, wherein the principal seeks to minimize the average latency of the Nash flow, we show that it is NP-hard to obtain a (multiplicative) $(4/3 - \epsilon)$-approximation, even for linear latency functions. This is the optimal inapproximability result for linear latencies, since we show that full revelation achieves a $(4/3)$-approximation for linear latencies.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "public bayesian persuasion being almost optimal and almost persuasive"):
  with members:
    - "persuading voters it s easy to whisper it s hard to speak loud"
    - "on the tractability of public persuasion with no externalities"
    - "targeting and signaling in ad auctions"
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"
    - "bayesian exploration incentivizing exploration in bayesian games"
    - "inapproximability results for approximate nash equilibria"
    - "can almost everybody be almost happy pcp for ppad and the inapproximability of nash"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "approximating gains from trade in two sided markets via simple mechanisms"
    - "on the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design"
    - "the value of information concealment"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on the tractability of public persuasion with no externalities"):
  with members:
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "bayesian exploration incentivizing exploration in bayesian games"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "deterministic algorithms for submodular maximization problems"
    - "honest signaling in zero sum games is hard and lying is even harder"
    - "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"
    - "tight bounds on ell_1 approximation and learning of self bounding functions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "persuading voters it s easy to whisper it s hard to speak loud"):
  with members:
    - "on the tractability of public persuasion with no externalities"
    - "defending elections against malicious spread of misinformation"
    - "controlling elections through social influence"
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"
    - "honest signaling in zero sum games is hard and lying is even harder"
    - "elections with few voters candidate control can be easy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "reducibility and computational lower bounds for problems with planted sparse structure"):
  with members:
    - "sherali adams integrality gaps matching the log density threshold"
    - "on finding dense common subgraphs"
    - "robust sparse estimation tasks in high dimensions"
    - "the power of sum of squares for detecting hidden structures"
    - "bayesian estimation from few samples community detection and related problems"
    - "sum of squares lower bounds for refuting any csp"
    - "feeling the bern adaptive estimators for bernoulli probabilities of pairwise comparisons"
    - "statistical query lower bounds for robust estimation of high dimensional gaussians and gaussian mixtures"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "information signal design for incentivizing team formation"):
  with members:
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "bayesian incentive compatible bandit exploration"
    - "economic recommendation systems"
    - "on the hardness of signaling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "inapproximability of vc dimension and littlestone s dimension"):
  with members:
    - "almost polynomial ratio eth hardness of approximating densest k subgraph"
    - "detecting communities is hard and counting them is even harder"
    - "on the approximability of partial vc dimension"
    - "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"
    - "a birthday repetition theorem and complexity of approximating dense csps"
    - "eth hardness for densest k subgraph with perfect completeness"
    - "complexity theoretic limitations on learning halfspaces"
    - "eth hardness for signaling in symmetric zero sum games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"):
  with members:
    - "almost polynomial ratio eth hardness of approximating densest k subgraph"
    - "detecting communities is hard and counting them is even harder"
    - "approximating nash equilibria in tree polymatrix games"
    - "the query complexity of correlated equilibria"
    - "communication complexity of approximate nash equilibria"
    - "inapproximability results for approximate nash equilibria"
    - "well supported versus approximate nash equilibria query complexity of large games"
    - "near optimal hardness results for signaling in bayesian games"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)