human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "hybrid mechanisms trading off efficiency and strategyproofness in one sided matching"
  Abstract: We study one-sided matching mechanisms where agents have vNM utility functions and report ordinal preferences. Strong impossibility results restrict the design space of strategyproof mechanisms in this domain. Improving on efficiency beyond the ex-post efficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) generally requires trade-offs. In this paper, we introduce hybrid mechanisms, which are convex combinations of existing mechanism, and we show that they are a powerful yet simple method for trading off strategyproofness and efficiency. We present conditions under which hybrid mechanisms remain partially strategyproof with respect to a given bound for the degree of strategyproofness. At the same time, these hybrids have better efficiency properties than the less efficient component. Our approach can be successfully applied to create hybrids of RSD and the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (PS), as well as hybrids of RSD and the adaptive Boston mechanism (ABM). We provide numerical results demonstrating that the improvements can be significant.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "investigating the characteristics of one sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes"):
  with members:
    - "egalitarianism of random assignment mechanisms"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "equilibria under the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences"
    - "strategyproof quota mechanisms for multiple assignment problems"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "the naive versus the adaptive boston mechanism"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "quantifying the strategyproofness of mechanisms via metrics on payoff distributions"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)