human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
  Abstract: We study social choice rules under the utilitarian distortion framework, with an additional metric assumption on the agents' costs over the alternatives. In this approach, these costs are given by an underlying metric on the set of all agents plus alternatives. Social choice rules have access to only the ordinal preferences of agents but not the latent cardinal costs that induce them. Distortion is then defined as the ratio between the social cost (typically the sum of agent costs) of the alternative chosen by the mechanism at hand, and that of the optimal alternative chosen by an omniscient algorithm. The worst-case distortion of a social choice rule is, therefore, a measure of how close it always gets to the optimal alternative without any knowledge of the underlying costs. Under this model, it has been conjectured that Ranked Pairs, the well-known weighted-tournament rule, achieves a distortion of at most 3 [Anshelevich et al. 2015]. We disprove this conjecture by constructing a sequence of instances which shows that the worst-case distortion of Ranked Pairs is at least 5. Our lower bound on the worst case distortion of Ranked Pairs matches a previously known upper bound for the Copeland rule, proving that in the worst case, the simpler Copeland rule is at least as good as Ranked Pairs. And as long as we are limited to (weighted or unweighted) tournament rules, we demonstrate that randomization cannot help achieve an expected worst-case distortion of less than 3. Using the concept of approximate majorization within the distortion framework, we prove that Copeland and Randomized Dictatorship achieve low constant factor fairness-ratios (5 and 3 respectively), which is a considerable generalization of similar results for the sum of costs and single largest cost objectives. In addition to all of the above, we outline several interesting directions for further research in this space.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "the distortion of distributed voting"
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"
    - "on the distortion value of the elections with abstention"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "communication distortion and randomness in metric voting"):
  with members:
    - "comparing election methods where each voter ranks only few candidates"
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "the distortion of distributed voting"
    - "manipulating elections by selecting issues"
    - "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "on the distortion value of the elections with abstention"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the distortion of distributed voting"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "relating metric distortion and fairness of social choice rules"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "more natural models of electoral control by partition"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"):
  with members:
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"
    - "relating metric distortion and fairness of social choice rules"
    - "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"):
  with members:
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "communication distortion and randomness in metric voting"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "favorite candidate voting for eliminating the least popular candidate in metric spaces"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"):
  with members:
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)