human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "inapproximability results for approximate nash equilibria"
  Abstract: We study the problem of finding approximate Nash equilibria that satisfy certain conditions, such as providing good social welfare. In particular, we study the problem $\epsilon$-NE $\delta$-SW: find an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium ($\epsilon$-NE) that is within $\delta$ of the best social welfare achievable by an $\epsilon$-NE. Our main result is that, if the exponential-time hypothesis (ETH) is true, then solving $\left(\frac{1}{8} - \mathrm{O}(\delta)\right)$-NE $\mathrm{O}(\delta)$-SW for an $n\times n$ bimatrix game requires $n^{\mathrm{\widetilde \Omega}(\log n)}$ time. Building on this result, we show similar conditional running time lower bounds on a number of decision problems for approximate Nash equilibria that do not involve social welfare, including maximizing or minimizing a certain player's payoff, or finding approximate equilibria contained in a given pair of supports. We show quasi-polynomial lower bounds for these problems assuming that ETH holds, where these lower bounds apply to $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria for all $\epsilon < \frac{1}{8}$. The hardness of these other decision problems has so far only been studied in the context of exact equilibria.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "public bayesian persuasion being almost optimal and almost persuasive"):
  with members:
    - "persuading voters it s easy to whisper it s hard to speak loud"
    - "on the tractability of public persuasion with no externalities"
    - "targeting and signaling in ad auctions"
    - "algorithmic persuasion with no externalities"
    - "computational aspects of private bayesian persuasion"
    - "bayesian exploration incentivizing exploration in bayesian games"
    - "can almost everybody be almost happy pcp for ppad and the inapproximability of nash"
    - "algorithmic bayesian persuasion"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "computing constrained approximate equilibria in polymatrix games"):
  with members:
    - "distributed methods for computing approximate equilibria"
    - "fptas for mixed strategy nash equilibria in tree graphical games and their generalizations"
    - "approximating nash equilibria in tree polymatrix games"
    - "an empirical study on computing equilibria in polymatrix games"
    - "finding any nontrivial coarse correlated equilibrium is hard"
    - "inapproximability of nash equilibrium"
    - "computing approximate nash equilibria in polymatrix games"
    - "approximate well supported nash equilibria below two thirds"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"):
  with members:
    - "almost polynomial ratio eth hardness of approximating densest k subgraph"
    - "detecting communities is hard and counting them is even harder"
    - "approximating nash equilibria in tree polymatrix games"
    - "the query complexity of correlated equilibria"
    - "communication complexity of approximate nash equilibria"
    - "well supported versus approximate nash equilibria query complexity of large games"
    - "near optimal hardness results for signaling in bayesian games"
    - "eth hardness for densest k subgraph with perfect completeness"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "almost polynomial ratio eth hardness of approximating densest k subgraph"):
  with members:
    - "settling the complexity of computing approximate two player nash equilibria"
    - "a birthday repetition theorem and complexity of approximating dense csps"
    - "partitioning a graph into small pieces with applications to path transversal"
    - "combining traditional marketing and viral marketing with amphibious influence maximization"
    - "eth hardness for densest k subgraph with perfect completeness"
    - "eth hardness for signaling in symmetric zero sum games"
    - "approximating dense max 2 csps"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)