human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "finding fair and efficient allocations"
  Abstract: We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly and efficiently among a set of agents who have additive valuations for the goods. Here, an allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle over the bundle of any other agent, up to the removal of one good. In addition, an allocation is deemed to be efficient if it satisfies Pareto efficiency. A notable result of Caragiannis et al. (2016) shows that---under additive valuations---there is no need to trade efficiency for fairness; specifically, an allocation that maximizes the Nash social welfare (NSW) objective simultaneously satisfies these two seemingly incompatible properties. However, this approach does not directly provide an efficient algorithm for finding fair and efficient allocations, since maximizing NSW is an NP-hard problem. #R##N#In this paper, we bypass this barrier, and develop a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for finding allocations which are EF1 and Pareto efficient; in particular, when the valuations are bounded, our algorithm finds such an allocation in polynomial time. Furthermore, we establish a stronger existence result compared to Caragiannis et al. (2016): For additive valuations, there always exists an allocation that is EF1 and fractionally Pareto efficient. The approach developed in the paper leads to a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation for maximizing the Nash social welfare objective. This improves upon the best known approximation ratio for this problem. Our results are based on constructing Fisher markets wherein specific equilibria are not only efficient, but also fair.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "maximum nash welfare and other stories about efx"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "almost envy freeness in group resource allocation"
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "greedy algorithms for fair division of mixed manna"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "greedy algorithms for maximizing nash social welfare"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "efx exists for three agents"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "on fair division of indivisible items"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "computing envy freeable allocations with limited subsidies"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"):
  with members:
    - "comparing approximate relaxations of envy freeness"
    - "on fair division of indivisible items"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"
    - "nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable piecewise linear concave utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "satiation in fisher markets and approximation of nash social welfare"):
  with members:
    - "near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems"
    - "a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"
    - "nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable piecewise linear concave utilities"
    - "nash social welfare matrix permanent and stable polynomials"
    - "an improved combinatorial polynomial algorithm for the linear arrow debreu market"
    - "apx hardness of maximizing nash social welfare with indivisible items"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"):
  with members:
    - "on fair division of indivisible items"
    - "a tale of santa claus hypergraphs and matroids"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"
    - "nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable piecewise linear concave utilities"
    - "nash social welfare matrix permanent and stable polynomials"
    - "apx hardness of maximizing nash social welfare with indivisible items"
    - "combinatorial algorithm for restricted max min fair allocation"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "almost envy free allocations with connected bundles"
    - "on fair division of indivisible items"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)