human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "approximate strong equilibrium in job scheduling games"
  Abstract: A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile resilient to unilateral deviations, and is predominantly used in the analysis of multiagent systems. A downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet, as we show in this paper, in some cases, NE does exhibit stability against coalitional deviations, in that the benefits from a joint deviation are bounded. In this sense, NE approximates strong equilibrium. #R##N#Coalition formation is a key issue in multiagent systems. We provide a framework for quantifying the stability and the performance of various assignment policies and solution concepts in the face of coalitional deviations. Within this framework we evaluate a given configuration according to three measures: (i) IR_min: the maximal number alpha, such that there exists a coalition in which the minimal improvement ratio among the coalition members is alpha, (ii) IR_max: the maximal number alpha, such that there exists a coalition in which the maximal improvement ratio among the coalition members is alpha, and (iii) DR_max: the maximal possible damage ratio of an agent outside the coalition. #R##N#We analyze these measures in job scheduling games on identical machines. In particular, we provide upper and lower bounds for the above three measures for both NE and the well-known assignment rule Longest Processing Time (LPT). #R##N#Our results indicate that LPT performs better than a general NE. However, LPT is not the best possible approximation. In particular, we present a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the makespan minimization problem which provides a schedule with IR_min of 1+epsilon for any given epsilon. With respect to computational complexity, we show that given an NE on m >= 3 identical machines or m >= 2 unrelated machines, it is NP-hard to determine whether a given coalition can deviate such that every member decreases its cost.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the verification and computation of strong nash equilibrium"):
  with members:
    - "on the complexity of strong nash equilibrium hard to solve instances and smoothed complexity"
    - "approximability and parameterized complexity of minmax values"
    - "settling the complexity of computing two player nash equilibria"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "selfish jobs with favorite machines price of anarchy vs strong price of anarchy"):
  with members:
    - "online scheduling of jobs with favorite machines"
    - "sequential solutions in machine scheduling games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "approximate equilibrium and incentivizing social coordination"):
  with members:
    - "group activity selection problem"
    - "strong price of anarchy and coalitional dynamics"
    - "assignment games with conflicts price of total anarchy and convergence results via semi smoothness"
    - "on discrete preferences and coordination"
    - "combinatorial auctions with restricted complements"
    - "stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games"
    - "dynamics of profit sharing games"
    - "strong nash equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "packing scheduling and covering problems in a game theoretic perspective"):
  with members:
    - "parametric packing of selfish items and the subset sum algorithm"
    - "strong nash equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property"
    - "on allocating goods to maximize fairness"
    - "on pure and approximate strong equilibria of facility location games"
    - "distributed selfish load balancing"
    - "greedy facility location algorithms analyzed using dual fitting with factor revealing lp"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "selfishness level of strategic games"):
  with members:
    - "on the value of correlation"
    - "approaching utopia strong truthfulness and externality resistant mechanisms"
    - "the robust price of anarchy of altruistic games"
    - "mechanisms for making crowds truthful"
    - "altruism in atomic congestion games"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)