human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
  Abstract: We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides $m^{\frac 1 2 -\epsilon}$ approximation to the social welfare and uses value queries only must use exponentially many value queries, where $m$ is the number of items. In contrast, ignoring incentives there exist constant ratio approximation algorithms for this problem. Our approach is based on a novel \emph{direct hardness} approach and completely skips the notoriously hard characterization step. The characterization step was the main obstacle for proving impossibility results in algorithmic mechanism design so far. #R##N#We demonstrate two additional applications of our new technique: (1) an impossibility result for universally-truthful polynomial time flexible combinatorial public projects and (2) an impossibility result for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for exact combinatorial public projects. The latter is the first result that bounds the power of polynomial-time truthful in expectation mechanisms in any setting.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "complement free couples must communicate a hardness result for two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "beyond 1 2 approximation for submodular maximization on massive data streams"
    - "prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids"
    - "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "online matroid intersection beating half for random arrival"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "implementation in advised strategies welfare guarantees from posted price mechanisms when demand queries are np hard"):
  with members:
    - "submodular maximization beyond non negativity guarantees fast algorithms and applications"
    - "guess free maximization of submodular and linear sums"
    - "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvature"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "complement free couples must communicate a hardness result for two player combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "a unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "information equals amortized communication"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "simple mechanisms for agents with complements"
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "welfare maximization with limited interaction"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "computational efficiency requires simple taxation"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "economic efficiency requires interaction"
    - "multi parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "the menu size complexity of auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "single call mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"):
  with members:
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension"
    - "clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints"
    - "price of anarchy for auction revenue"
    - "on the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism"
    - "expressiveness and robustness of first price position auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "bayesian sequential auctions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions"
    - "taming the monster a fast and simple algorithm for contextual bandits"
    - "combinatorial auctions via posted prices"
    - "valuation compressions in vcg based combinatorial auctions"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi armed bandit problems"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)