human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "a truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization"
  Abstract: In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of self-interested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public planner must choose a subset of these projects, subject to a resource constraint, with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Combinatorial Public Projects has emerged as one of the paradigmatic problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design, a field concerned with solving fundamental resource allocation problems in the presence of both selfish behavior and the computational constraint of polynomial-time. #R##N#We design a polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental variant of combinatorial public projects. Our results apply to combinatorial public projects when players have valuations that are matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first mechanism that achieves a constant factor approximation for a natural NP-hard variant of combinatorial public projects.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "probabilistic verification for obviously strategyproof mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "gibbard satterthwaite success stories and obvious strategyproofness"
    - "sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations"
    - "no stable matching mechanism is obviously strategy proof"
    - "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer"
    - "combinatorial auctions without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the limitations of optimization from samples"):
  with members:
    - "introduction to online convex optimization"
    - "online submodular welfare maximization greedy beats 1 2 in random order"
    - "submodular optimization under noise"
    - "robust influence maximization"
    - "the sample complexity of revenue maximization"
    - "the pseudo dimension of near optimal auctions"
    - "local distribution and the symmetry gap approximability of multiway partitioning problems"
    - "mixture selection mechanism design and signaling"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a truthful mechanism for the generalized assignment problem"):
  with members:
    - "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders"
    - "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"
    - "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers"
    - "limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions"
    - "an approximately truthful in expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions using value queries"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "truthful assignment without money"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design"):
  with members:
    - "privacy and mechanism design"
    - "budget feasible mechanism design from prior free to bayesian"
    - "near optimal nonmyopic value of information in graphical models"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "on the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms"
    - "approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy"
    - "budget feasible mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "on the approximation of submodular functions"):
  with members:
    - "secondary spectrum auctions for symmetric and submodular bidders"
    - "is submodularity testable"
    - "submodular approximation sampling based algorithms and lower bounds"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "the exponential mechanism for social welfare private truthful and nearly optimal"):
  with members:
    - "truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy"
    - "a learning theory approach to non interactive database privacy"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "sequential posted pricing and multi parameter mechanism design"
    - "truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation"
    - "selling privacy at auction"
    - "bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments"
    - "approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions"):
  with members:
    - "symmetry and approximability of submodular maximization problems"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "multi unit auctions beyond roberts"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"
    - "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "mechanisms for risk averse agents without loss"):
  with members:
    - "an approximately truthful in expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions using value queries"
    - "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions"
    - "robust mechanisms for risk averse sellers"
    - "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"
    - "truthfulness via proxies"
    - "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)