human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "robustness among multiwinner voting rules"
  Abstract: We investigate how robust the results of committee elections are to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single preference order is either that (1) at most one committee member might be replaced, or (2) it is possible that the whole committee will be replaced. We also show that the problem of computing the smallest number of swaps that lead to changing the election outcome is typically NP-hard, but there are natural FPT algorithms. Finally, for a number of rules we assess experimentally the average number of random swaps necessary to change the election result.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "matchings under preferences strength of stability and trade offs"):
  with members:
    - "stable roommates with narcissistic single peaked and single crossing preferences"
    - "stable matchings robust solutions and distributive lattices"
    - "robust and approximately stable marriages under partial information"
    - "stable marriage with multi modal preferences"
    - "finding stable matchings that are robust to errors in the input"
    - "on the complexity of robust stable marriage"
    - "how hard is it to satisfy almost all roommates"
    - "stable matching with uncertain linear preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "committee scoring rules axiomatic characterization and hierarchy"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "monotonicity axioms in approval based multi winner voting rules"
    - "multiwinner elections with diversity constraints"
    - "consistent approval based multi winner rules"
    - "multiwinner voting with fairness constraints"
    - "group fairness in multiwinner voting"
    - "proportional approval voting harmonic k median and negative association"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a quantitative analysis of multi winner rules"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "proportionality and the limits of welfarism"
    - "group fairness in committee selection"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible public goods"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "consistent approval based multi winner rules"
    - "what do we elect committees for a voting committee model for multi winner rules"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"):
  with members:
    - "voting and bribing in single exponential time"
    - "on the hardness of bribery variants in voting with cp nets"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "estimating the margin of victory of an election using sampling"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "complexity of manipulation bribery and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting"
    - "approximation algorithms for campaign management"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "sybil resilient reality aware social choice"):
  with members:
    - "sybil resilient conductance based community growth"
    - "sybil resilient conductance based community expansion"
    - "incorporating reality into social choice"
    - "sybil proof mechanisms in query incentive networks"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "complexity of shift bribery in committee elections"):
  with members:
    - "algorithms for destructive shift bribery"
    - "the condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality"
    - "prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery"
    - "campaign management under approval driven voting rules"
    - "properties of multiwinner voting rules"
    - "finding a collective set of items from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation"
    - "justified representation in approval based committee voting"
    - "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)