human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
  Abstract: We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial, and Random Priority, achieve a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property, and show stronger bounds on the Price of Anarchy of all deterministic mechanisms.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"):
  with members:
    - "investigating the characteristics of one sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "decision theory with resource bounded agents"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "eliminating the weakest link making manipulation intractable"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "average case analysis of the assignment problem with independent preferences"):
  with members:
    - "smoothed and average case approximation ratios of mechanisms beyond the worst case analysis"
    - "average case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments"
    - "facility location with double peaked preference"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a truthful cardinal mechanism for one sided matching"):
  with members:
    - "nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "the complexity of fairness through equilibrium"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design"):
  with members:
    - "multiagent maximum coverage problems the trade off between anarchy and stability"
    - "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"
    - "the anarchy of scheduling without money"
    - "the price of anarchy in auctions"
    - "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"
    - "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling"
    - "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"):
  with members:
    - "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"
    - "sequential deliberation for social choice"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "combinatorial secretary problems with ordinal information"
    - "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "investigating the characteristics of one sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes"):
  with members:
    - "egalitarianism of random assignment mechanisms"
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "equilibria under the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences"
    - "strategyproof quota mechanisms for multiple assignment problems"
    - "hybrid mechanisms trading off efficiency and strategyproofness in one sided matching"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"):
  with members:
    - "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
    - "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"):
  with members:
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "triadic consensus a randomized algorithm for voting in a crowd"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)