human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "social networks and stable matchings in the job market"
  Abstract: For most people, social contacts play an integral part in finding a new job. As observed by Granovetter's seminal study, the proportion of jobs obtained through social contacts is usually large compared to those obtained through postings or agencies. At the same time, job markets are a natural example of two-sided matching markets. An important solution concept in such markets is that of stable matchings, and the use of the celebrated Gale-Shapley algorithm to compute them. So far, the literature has evolved separately, either focusing on the implications of information flowing through a social network, or on developing a mathematical theory of job markets through the use of two-sided matching techniques. #R##N#In this paper we provide a model of the job market that brings both aspects of job markets together. To model the social scientists' observations, we assume that workers learn only about positions in firms through social contacts. Given that information structure, we study both static properties of what we call locally stable matchings (i.e., stable matchings subject to informational constraints given by a social network) and dynamic properties through a reinterpretation of Gale-Shapley's algorithm as myopic best response dynamics. #R##N#We prove that, in general, the set of locally stable matching strictly contains that of stable matchings and it is in fact NP-complete to determine if they are identical. We also show that the lattice structure of stable matchings is in general absent. Finally, we focus on myopic best response dynamics inspired by the Gale-Shapley algorithm. We study the efficiency loss due to the informational constraints, providing both lower and upper bounds.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "graphical one sided markets"):
  with members:
    - "schelling games on graphs"
    - "swap stability in schelling games on graphs"
    - "maximin share allocations on cycles"
    - "schelling segregation with strategic agents"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible items with externalities"
    - "almost envy free allocations with connected bundles"
    - "fair division of a graph"
    - "fair division via social comparison"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges"):
  with members:
    - "mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists"
    - "stable matching with uncertain linear preferences"
    - "socially stable matchings in the hospitals residents problem"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "good things come to those who swap objects on paths"):
  with members:
    - "stable roommates with narcissistic single peaked and single crossing preferences"
    - "pareto optimal allocation of indivisible goods with connectivity constraints"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "matching dynamics with constraints"):
  with members:
    - "socially stable matchings in the hospitals residents problem"
    - "core stability in hedonic coalition formation"
    - "locally stable marriage with strict preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "socially stable matchings in the hospitals residents problem"):
  with members:
    - "socially stable matchings"
    - "locally stable marriage with strict preferences"
    - "locally stable matching with general preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "socially stable matchings"):
  with members:
    - "locally stable marriage with strict preferences"
    - "locally stable matching with general preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "reciprocating preferences stablize matching college admissions revisited"):
  with members:
    - "sponsored search market equilibria and the hungarian method"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)