human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus"
  Abstract: Meltdown and Spectre exploit microarchitectural changes the CPU makes during transient out-of-order execution. Using side-channel techniques, these attacks enable leaking arbitrary data from memory. As state-of-the-art software mitigations for Meltdown may incur significant performance overheads, they are only seen as a temporary solution. Thus, software mitigations are disabled on more recent processors, which are not susceptible to Meltdown anymore. #R##N#In this paper, we show that Meltdown-like attacks are still possible on recent CPUs which are not vulnerable to the original Meltdown attack. We show that the store buffer---a microarchitectural optimization to reduce the latency for data stores---in combination with the TLB enables powerful attacks. We present several ASLR-related attacks, including a KASLR break from unprivileged applications, and breaking ASLR from JavaScript. We can also mount side-channel attacks, breaking the atomicity of TSX, and monitoring control flow of the kernel. Furthermore, when combined with a simple Spectre gadget, we can leak arbitrary data from memory. Our paper shows that Meltdown-like attacks are still possible, and software fixes are still necessary to ensure proper isolation between the kernel and user space.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "context leakage free transient execution"):
  with members:
    - "fallout reading kernel writes from user space"
    - "spectre is here to stay an analysis of side channels and speculative execution"
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"
    - "meltdownprime and spectreprime automatically synthesized attacks exploiting invalidation based coherence protocols"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"):
  with members:
    - "smotherspectre exploiting speculative execution through port contention"
    - "fallout reading kernel writes from user space"
    - "spoiler speculative load hazards boost rowhammer and cache attacks"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "speccfi mitigating spectre attacks using cfi informed speculation"):
  with members:
    - "context leakage free transient execution"
    - "smotherspectre exploiting speculative execution through port contention"
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "you shall not bypass employing data dependencies to prevent bounds check bypass"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "towards constant time foundations for the new spectre era"):
  with members:
    - "abstract interpretation under speculative execution"
    - "spectre is here to stay an analysis of side channels and speculative execution"
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "spoiler speculative load hazards boost rowhammer and cache attacks"
    - "inspectre breaking and fixing microarchitectural vulnerabilities by formal analysis"
    - "eliminating timing side channel leaks using program repair"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)