human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
  Abstract: Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute $m$ goods to $n$ agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume general valuations. #R##N#Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied notion of fairness. However, envy-free allocations do not always exist when goods are indivisible. The notion of fairness we consider here is "envy-freeness up to any good" (EFX) where no agent envies another agent after the removal of any single good from the other agent's bundle. It is not known if such an allocation always exists even when $n=3$. #R##N#We show there is always a partition of the set of goods into $n+1$ subsets $(X_1,\ldots,X_n,P)$ where for $i \in [n]$, $X_i$ is the bundle allocated to agent $i$ and the set $P$ is unallocated (or donated to charity) such that we have$\colon$ #R##N#1) envy-freeness up to any good, #R##N#2) no agent values $P$ higher than her own bundle, and #R##N#3) fewer than $n$ goods go to charity, i.e., $|P| < n$ (typically $m \gg n$). #R##N#Our proof is constructive. When agents have additive valuations and $\lvert P \rvert$ is large (i.e., when $|P|$ is close to $n$), our allocation also has a good maximin share (MMS) guarantee. Moreover, a minor variant of our algorithm also shows the existence of an allocation which is $4/7$ groupwise maximin share (GMMS): this is a notion of fairness stronger than MMS. This improves upon the current best bound of $1/2$ known for an approximate GMMS allocation.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations"):
  with members:
    - "maximum nash welfare and other stories about efx"
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents"
    - "competitive equilibrium with generic budgets beyond additive"
    - "the price of fairness for indivisible goods"
    - "fair division with bounded sharing"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "efx exists for three agents"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "on fair division of indivisible items"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a study of incentive compatibility and stability issues in fractional matchings"):
  with members:
    - "from matching with diversity constraints to matching with regional quotas"
    - "stable fractional matchings"
    - "random matching under priorities stability and no envy concepts"
    - "coalition manipulations of the gale shapley algorithm"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "computing envy freeable allocations with limited subsidies"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"):
  with members:
    - "fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents"
    - "maximin share allocations on cycles"
    - "connected fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"
    - "the fair division of hereditary set systems"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "multiple birds with one stone beating 1 2 for efx and gmms via envy cycle elimination"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "fair division through information withholding"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "when do envy free allocations exist"
    - "networked fairness in cake cutting"
    - "fair division via social comparison"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"
    - "analytical approach to parallel repetition"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)