human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents"
  Abstract: We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution concepts which are tailored to address allocation of indivisible goods and, hence, provide an appropriate framework for fair division of goods. This work specifically considers fairness in terms of envy freeness up to one good (EF1), maximin share guarantee (MMS), and Nash social welfare (NSW). #R##N#Our first result shows that (in a single-parameter environment) the problem of maximizing welfare, subject to the constraint that the allocation of the indivisible goods is EF1, admits a polynomial-time, 1/2-approximate, truthful auction. We further prove that this problem is NP-Hard and, hence, an approximation is warranted. This hardness result also complements prior works which show that an arbitrary EF1 allocation can be computed efficiently. #R##N#We also establish a bi-criteria approximation guarantee for the problem of maximizing social welfare under MMS constraints. In particular, we develop a truthful auction which efficiently finds an allocation wherein each agent gets a bundle of value at least $\left(1/2 - \varepsilon \right)$ times her maximin share and the welfare of the computed allocation is at least the optimal, here $\varepsilon >0$ is a fixed constant. We complement this result by showing that maximizing welfare is computationally hard even if one aims to only satisfy the MMS constraint approximately.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations"):
  with members:
    - "maximum nash welfare and other stories about efx"
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "competitive equilibrium with generic budgets beyond additive"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "the price of fairness for indivisible goods"
    - "fair division with bounded sharing"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "finding fair and efficient allocations when valuations don t add up"):
  with members:
    - "equitable allocations of indivisible chores"
    - "diverse weighted bipartite b matching"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "how to be fair and diverse"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"):
  with members:
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "maximin share allocations on cycles"
    - "connected fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"
    - "the fair division of hereditary set systems"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the constrained round robin algorithm for fair and efficient allocation"):
  with members:
    - "fair division under cardinality constraints"
    - "the conference paper assignment problem using order weighted averages to assign indivisible goods"
    - "fair allocation based on diminishing differences"
    - "redividing the cake"
    - "possible and necessary allocations via sequential mechanisms"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)