human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "toll caps in privatized road networks"
  Abstract: Abstract   We consider a network pricing game on a parallel network with congestion effects in which link owners set tolls for travel so as to maximize profit. A central authority is able to regulate this competition by means of a (uniform) price cap. The first question we want to answer is how such a cap should be designed in order to minimize the total congestion. We provide an algorithm that finds an optimal price cap for networks with affine latency functions and a full support Wardrop equilibrium. Second, we consider the induced network performance at an optimal price cap. We show that for two link networks with affine latency functions, the congestion costs at the optimal price cap are at most 8/7 times the optimal congestion costs. For more general latency functions, this bound goes up to 2 under the assumption that an uncapped Nash equilibrium exists. However, in general such an equilibrium need not exist and this can be used to show that optimal price caps can induce arbitrarily inefficient flows.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "negative prices in network pricing games"):
  with members:
    - "inefficiencies in network models a graph theoretic perspective"
    - "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"
    - "matroids are immune to braess paradox"
    - "new complexity results and algorithms for the minimum tollbooth problem"
    - "stackelberg shortest path tree game revisited"
    - "the stackelberg minimum spanning tree game"
    - "stackelberg network pricing is hard to approximate"
    - "improved hardness of approximation for stackelberg shortest path pricing"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "network investment game with wardrop followers"):
  with members:
    - "computing equilibria in atomic splittable polymatroid congestion games with convex costs"
    - "the stackelberg minimum spanning tree game"
    - "stackelberg network pricing games"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "capacity and price competition in markets with congestion effects"):
  with members:
    - "complexity and approximation of the continuous network design problem"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)