human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "improved metric distortion for deterministic social choice rules"
  Abstract: In this paper, we study the metric distortion of deterministic social choice rules that choose a winning candidate from a set of candidates based on voter preferences. Voters and candidates are located in an underlying metric space. A voter has cost equal to her distance to the winning candidate. Ordinal social choice rules only have access to the ordinal preferences of the voters that are assumed to be consistent with the metric distances. Our goal is to design an ordinal social choice rule with minimum distortion, which is the worst-case ratio, over all consistent metrics, between the social cost of the rule and that of the optimal omniscient rule with knowledge of the underlying metric space. The distortion of the best deterministic social choice rule was known to be between 3 and 5. It had been conjectured that any rule that only looks at the weighted tournament graph on the candidates cannot have distortion better than 5. In our paper, we disprove it by presenting a weighted tournament rule with distortion of 4.236. We design this rule by generalizing the classic notion of uncovered sets, and further show that this class of rules cannot have distortion better than 4.236. We then propose a new voting rule, via an alternative generalization of uncovered sets. We show that if a candidate satisfying the criterion of this voting rule exists, then choosing such a candidate yields a distortion bound of 3, matching the lower bound. We present a combinatorial conjecture that implies distortion of $3$, and verify it for small numbers of candidates and voters by computer experiments. Using our framework, we also show that selecting any candidate guarantees distortion of at most 3 when the weighted tournament graph is cyclically symmetric.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"):
  with members:
    - "the distortion of distributed voting"
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"
    - "on the distortion value of the elections with abstention"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"
    - "relating metric distortion and fairness of social choice rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "communication distortion and randomness in metric voting"):
  with members:
    - "comparing election methods where each voter ranks only few candidates"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "combinatorial auctions do need modest interaction"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"):
  with members:
    - "the distortion of distributed voting"
    - "manipulating elections by selecting issues"
    - "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "on the distortion value of the elections with abstention"
    - "random dictators with a random referee constant sample complexity mechanisms for social choice"
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"
    - "relating metric distortion and fairness of social choice rules"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the distortion of distributed voting"):
  with members:
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "peeking behind the ordinal curtain improving distortion via cardinal queries"
    - "approval based elections and distortion of voting rules"
    - "relating metric distortion and fairness of social choice rules"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "more natural models of electoral control by partition"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "an analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality"):
  with members:
    - "communication distortion and randomness in metric voting"
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "of the people voting is more effective with representative candidates"
    - "on the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "favorite candidate voting for eliminating the least popular candidate in metric spaces"):
  with members:
    - "what do multiwinner voting rules do an experiment over the two dimensional euclidean domain"
    - "awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice"
    - "ordinal approximation for social choice matching and facility location problems given candidate positions"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)