human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "dangkiller eliminating dangling pointers efficiently via implicit identifier"
  Abstract: Use-After-Free vulnerabilities, allowing the attacker to access unintended memory via dangling pointers, are more threatening. However, most detection schemes can only detect dangling pointers and invalid them, but not provide a tolerance mechanism to repair the errors at runtime. Also, these techniques obtain and manage the metadata inefficiently with complex structures and too much scan (sweep). The goal of this paper is to use compiler instrumentation to eliminate dangling pointers automatically and efficiently. In this paper, we observe that most techniques lack accurate efficient pointer graph metadata maintaining methods, so they need to scan the log to reduce the redundancy and sweep the whole address space to find dangling pointers. Also, they lack a direct, efficiently obtaining metadata approach. The key insight of this paper is that a unique identifier can be used as a key to a hash or direct-map algorithm. Thus, this paper maintains the same implicit identifier with each memory object and its corresponding referent. Associating the unique ID with metadata for memory objects, obtaining and managing the pointer graph metadata can be efficiently. Therefore, with the delayed free technique adopted into C/C++, we present the DangKiller as a novel and lightweight dangling pointer elimination solution. We first demonstrate the MinFat Pointer, which can calculate unique implicit ID for each object and pointer quickly, and use hash algorithm to obtain metadata. Secondly, we propose the Log Cache and Log Compression mechanism based on the ID to decrease the redundancy of dangling pointer candidates. Coupled with the Address Tagging architecture on an ARM64 system, our experiments show that the DangKiller can eliminate use-after-free vulnerabilities at only 11% and 3% runtime overheads for the SPEC CPU2006 and 2017 benchmarks respectively, except for unique cases.

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)