human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "fallout reading kernel writes from user space"
  Abstract: Recently, out-of-order execution, an important performance optimization in modern high-end processors, has been revealed to pose a significant security threat, allowing information leaks across security domains. In particular, the Meltdown attack leaks information from the operating system kernel to user space, completely eroding the security of the system. To address this and similar attacks, without incurring the performance costs of software countermeasures, Intel includes hardware-based defenses in its recent Coffee Lake R processors. #R##N#In this work, we show that the recent hardware defenses are not sufficient. Specifically, we present Fallout, a new transient execution attack that leaks information from a previously unexplored microarchitectural component called the store buffer. We show how unprivileged user processes can exploit Fallout to reconstruct privileged information recently written by the kernel. We further show how Fallout can be used to bypass kernel address space randomization. Finally, we identify and explore microcode assists as a hitherto ignored cause of transient execution. #R##N#Fallout affects all processor generations we have tested. However, we notice a worrying regression, where the newer Coffee Lake R processors are more vulnerable to Fallout than older generations.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "context leakage free transient execution"):
  with members:
    - "spectre is here to stay an analysis of side channels and speculative execution"
    - "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus"
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"
    - "meltdownprime and spectreprime automatically synthesized attacks exploiting invalidation based coherence protocols"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"):
  with members:
    - "smotherspectre exploiting speculative execution through port contention"
    - "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus"
    - "spoiler speculative load hazards boost rowhammer and cache attacks"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "fortuneteller predicting microarchitectural attacks via unsupervised deep learning"):
  with members:
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "undermining user privacy on mobile devices using ai"
    - "tiresias predicting security events through deep learning"
    - "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers"
    - "microwalk a framework for finding side channels in binaries"
    - "state of the art speech recognition with sequence to sequence models"
    - "generic black box end to end attack against state of the art api call based malware classifiers"
    - "flush flush a fast and stealthy cache attack"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "speechminer a framework for investigating and measuring speculative execution vulnerabilities"):
  with members:
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"
    - "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers"
    - "a systematic evaluation of transient execution attacks and defenses"
    - "lazyfp leaking fpu register state using microarchitectural side channels"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "certified side channels"):
  with members:
    - "flush flush a fast and stealthy cache attack"
    - "flush flush a fast and stealthy cache attack"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)