human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "lower bounds for adversarially robust pac learning"
  Abstract: In this work, we initiate a formal study of probably approximately correct (PAC) learning under evasion attacks, where the adversary's goal is to \emph{misclassify} the adversarially perturbed sample point $\widetilde{x}$, i.e., $h(\widetilde{x})\neq c(\widetilde{x})$, where $c$ is the ground truth concept and $h$ is the learned hypothesis. Previous work on PAC learning of adversarial examples have all modeled adversarial examples as corrupted inputs in which the goal of the adversary is to achieve $h(\widetilde{x}) \neq c(x)$, where $x$ is the original untampered instance. These two definitions of adversarial risk coincide for many natural distributions, such as images, but are incomparable in general. #R##N#We first prove that for many theoretically natural input spaces of high dimension $n$ (e.g., isotropic Gaussian in dimension $n$ under $\ell_2$ perturbations), if the adversary is allowed to apply up to a sublinear $o(||x||)$ amount of perturbations on the test instances, PAC learning requires sample complexity that is exponential in $n$. This is in contrast with results proved using the corrupted-input framework, in which the sample complexity of robust learning is only polynomially more. #R##N#We then formalize hybrid attacks in which the evasion attack is preceded by a poisoning attack. This is perhaps reminiscent of "trapdoor attacks" in which a poisoning phase is involved as well, but the evasion phase here uses the error-region definition of risk that aims at misclassifying the perturbed instances. In this case, we show PAC learning is sometimes impossible all together, even when it is possible without the attack (e.g., due to the bounded VC dimension).

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "more data can expand the generalization gap between adversarially robust and standard models"):
  with members:
    - "adversarially robust learning could leverage computational hardness"
    - "adversarial robustness may be at odds with simplicity"
    - "certified adversarial robustness via randomized smoothing"
    - "lower bounds on adversarial robustness from optimal transport"
    - "vc classes are adversarially robustly learnable but only improperly"
    - "theoretically principled trade off between robustness and accuracy"
    - "adversarial training can hurt generalization"
    - "the curse of concentration in robust learning evasion and poisoning attacks from concentration of measure"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the curious case of adversarially robust models more data can help double descend or hurt generalization"):
  with members:
    - "more data can expand the generalization gap between adversarially robust and standard models"
    - "a new perspective for flexible feature gathering in scene text recognition via character anchor pooling"
    - "two models of double descent for weak features"
    - "improved sample complexities for deep networks and robust classification via an all layer margin"
    - "deep double descent where bigger models and more data hurt"
    - "lower bounds on adversarial robustness from optimal transport"
    - "vc classes are adversarially robustly learnable but only improperly"
    - "theoretically principled trade off between robustness and accuracy"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "adversarially robust learning could leverage computational hardness"):
  with members:
    - "vc classes are adversarially robustly learnable but only improperly"
    - "scaling provable adversarial defenses"
    - "the curse of concentration in robust learning evasion and poisoning attacks from concentration of measure"
    - "wild patterns ten years after the rise of adversarial machine learning"
    - "can adversarially robust learning leverage computational hardness"
    - "adversarial spheres"
    - "adversarial vulnerability for any classifier"
    - "adversarial examples from cryptographic pseudo random generators"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "adversarial risk via optimal transport and optimal couplings"):
  with members:
    - "on the hardness of robust classification"
    - "certified adversarial robustness via randomized smoothing"
    - "lower bounds on adversarial robustness from optimal transport"
    - "the curse of concentration in robust learning evasion and poisoning attacks from concentration of measure"
    - "robustness via curvature regularization and vice versa"
    - "adversarial spheres"
    - "adversarial vulnerability for any classifier"
    - "adversarial risk and robustness general definitions and implications for the uniform distribution"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.LG(Machine Learning)