human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations"
  Abstract: Abstract   We consider the design of a revenue-optimal mechanism when two items are available to be sold to a single buyer whose valuation is uniformly distributed over an arbitrary rectangle     [    c    1    ,    c    1    +    b    1    ]   ×   [    c    2    ,    c    2    +    b    2    ]     in the positive quadrant. We provide an explicit, complete solution for arbitrary nonnegative values of     (    c    1    ,    c    2    ,    b    1    ,    b    2    )    . We identify eight simple structures, each with at most 4 (possibly stochastic) menu items, and prove that the optimal mechanism has one of these eight structures. We also characterize the optimal mechanism as a function of     (    c    1    ,    c    2    ,    b    1    ,    b    2    )    . The structures indicate that the optimal mechanism involves (a) an interplay of individual sale and a bundle sale when      c    1      and      c    2      are low, (b) a bundle sale when      c    1      and      c    2      are high, and (c) an individual sale when one of them is high and the other is low. To the best of our knowledge, our results are the first to show the existence of optimal mechanisms with no exclusion region. We further conjecture, based on promising preliminary results, that our methodology can be extended to a wider class of distributions.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on optimal mechanisms in the two item single buyer unit demand setting"):
  with members:
    - "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design"
    - "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality"
    - "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation"
    - "optimal auctions with restricted allocations"
    - "selling two goods optimally"
    - "duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions"
    - "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist"
    - "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)