human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "smotherspectre exploiting speculative execution through port contention"
  Abstract: Spectre, Meltdown, and related attacks have demonstrated that kernels, hypervisors, trusted execution environments, and browsers are prone to information disclosure through micro-architectural weaknesses. However, it remains unclear as to what extent other applications, in particular those that do not load attacker-provided code, may be impacted. It also remains unclear as to what extent these attacks are reliant on cache-based side channels. #R##N#We introduce SMoTherSpectre, a speculative code-reuse attack that leverages port-contention in simultaneously multi-threaded processors (SMoTher) as a side channel to leak information from a victim process. SMoTher is a fine-grained side channel that detects contention based on a single victim instruction. To discover real-world gadgets, we describe a methodology and build a tool that locates SMoTher-gadgets in popular libraries. In an evaluation on glibc, we found hundreds of gadgets that can be used to leak information. Finally, we demonstrate proof-of-concept attacks against the OpenSSH server, creating oracles for determining four host key bits, and against an application performing encryption using the OpenSSL library, creating an oracle which can differentiate a bit of the plaintext through gadgets in libcrypto and glibc.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "distributed systems and trusted execution environments trade offs and challenges"):
  with members:
    - "supply chain malware targets sgx take care of what you sign"
    - "anonymous and confidential file sharing over untrusted clouds"
    - "sgx lkl securing the host os interface for trusted execution"
    - "streambox tz secure stream analytics at the edge with trustzone"
    - "sgxpectre stealing intel secrets from sgx enclaves via speculative execution"
    - "cyclosa decentralizing private web search through sgx based browser extensions"
    - "ibbe sgx cryptographic group access control using trusted execution environments"
    - "sgx aware container orchestration for heterogeneous clusters"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "bypassing memory safety mechanisms through speculative control flow hijacks"):
  with members:
    - "spectre is here to stay an analysis of side channels and speculative execution"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"
    - "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers"
    - "a systematic evaluation of transient execution attacks and defenses"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus"):
  with members:
    - "practical enclave malware with intel sgx"
    - "page cache attacks"
    - "spoiler speculative load hazards boost rowhammer and cache attacks"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "meltdownprime and spectreprime automatically synthesized attacks exploiting invalidation based coherence protocols"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"):
  with members:
    - "fallout reading kernel writes from user space"
    - "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus"
    - "spoiler speculative load hazards boost rowhammer and cache attacks"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "speccfi mitigating spectre attacks using cfi informed speculation"):
  with members:
    - "context leakage free transient execution"
    - "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus"
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "you shall not bypass employing data dependencies to prevent bounds check bypass"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "leaking information through cache lru states"):
  with members:
    - "memjam a false dependency attack against constant time crypto implementations"
    - "reload refresh abusing cache replacement policies to perform stealthy cache attacks"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"
    - "meltdownprime and spectreprime automatically synthesized attacks exploiting invalidation based coherence protocols"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"
    - "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "supply chain malware targets sgx take care of what you sign"):
  with members:
    - "practical enclave malware with intel sgx"
    - "sgx aware container orchestration for heterogeneous clusters"
    - "software grand exposure sgx cache attacks are practical"
    - "malware guard extension using sgx to conceal cache attacks"
    - "secure content based routing using intel software guard extensions"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "a systematic evaluation of transient execution attacks and defenses"):
  with members:
    - "spoiler speculative load hazards boost rowhammer and cache attacks"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "you shall not bypass employing data dependencies to prevent bounds check bypass"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)