human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
  Abstract: Several fairness concepts have been proposed recently in attempts to approximate envy-freeness in settings with indivisible goods. Among them, the concept of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is arguably the closest to envy-freeness. Unfortunately, EFX allocations are not known to exist except in a few special cases. We make significant progress in this direction. We show that for every instance with additive valuations, there is an EFX allocation of a subset of items with a Nash welfare that is at least half of the maximum possible Nash welfare for the original set of items. That is, after donating some items to a charity, one can distribute the remaining items in a fair way with high efficiency. This bound is proved to be best possible. Our proof is constructive and highlights the importance of maximum Nash welfare allocation. Starting with such an allocation, our algorithm decides which items to donate and redistributes the initial bundles to the agents, eventually obtaining an allocation with the claimed efficiency guarantee. The application of our algorithm to large markets, where the valuations of an agent for every item is relatively small, yields EFX with almost optimal Nash welfare. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of large market assumptions in the fair division literature. We also show that our algorithm can be modified to compute, in polynomial-time, EFX allocations that approximate optimal Nash welfare within a factor of at most $2\rho$, using a $\rho$-approximate allocation on input instead of the maximum Nash welfare one.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "maximum nash welfare and other stories about efx"):
  with members:
    - "almost envy freeness in group resource allocation"
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "greedy algorithms for fair division of mixed manna"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "greedy algorithms for maximizing nash social welfare"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations"):
  with members:
    - "maximum nash welfare and other stories about efx"
    - "fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents"
    - "competitive equilibrium with generic budgets beyond additive"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "the price of fairness for indivisible goods"
    - "fair division with bounded sharing"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "efx exists for three agents"):
  with members:
    - "approximating nash social welfare under submodular valuations through un matchings"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "on fair division of indivisible items"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "computing envy freeable allocations with limited subsidies"):
  with members:
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"):
  with members:
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "almost envy free allocations with connected bundles"
    - "on fair division of indivisible items"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximating the nash social welfare with budget additive valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"):
  with members:
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "an improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "multiple birds with one stone beating 1 2 for efx and gmms via envy cycle elimination"):
  with members:
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "truthful allocation mechanisms without payments characterization and implications on fairness"
    - "groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "approximate maximin shares for groups of agents"
    - "finding fair and efficient allocations"

Connected through hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "fair division through information withholding"):
  with members:
    - "fair division with minimal sharing"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "when do envy free allocations exist"
    - "networked fairness in cake cutting"
    - "fair division via social comparison"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"
    - "analytical approach to parallel repetition"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)