human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "incentive aware contextual pricing with non parametric market noise"
  Abstract: We consider a dynamic pricing problem for repeated contextual second-price auctions with strategic buyers whose goals are to maximize their long-term time discounted utility. The seller has very limited information about buyers' overall demand curves, which depends on $d$-dimensional context vectors characterizing auctioned items, and a non-parametric market noise distribution that captures buyers' idiosyncratic tastes. The noise distribution and the relationship between the context vectors and buyers' demand curves are both unknown to the seller. We focus on designing the seller's learning policy to set contextual reserve prices where the seller's goal is to minimize his regret for revenue. We first propose a pricing policy when buyers are truthful and show that it achieves a $T$-period regret bound of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{dT})$ against a clairvoyant policy that has full information of the buyers' demand. Next, under the setting where buyers bid strategically to maximize their long-term discounted utility, we develop a variant of our first policy that is robust to strategic (corrupted) bids. This policy incorporates randomized "isolation" periods, during which a buyer is randomly chosen to solely participate in the auction. We show that this design allows the seller to control the number of periods in which buyers significantly corrupt their bids. Because of this nice property, our robust policy enjoys a $T$-period regret of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{dT})$, matching that under the truthful setting up to a constant factor that depends on the utility discount factor.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "contextual bandits with cross learning"):
  with members:
    - "dynamic reserve prices for repeated auctions learning from bids"
    - "learning to bid without knowing your value"
    - "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"
    - "selling to a no regret buyer"
    - "learning simple auctions"
    - "no regret learning in bayesian games"
    - "online learning in repeated auctions"
    - "online learning with feedback graphs beyond bandits"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.LG(Machine Learning)