human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem"
  Abstract: We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the objects. We focus on truthful mechanisms without monetary transfers for finding large Pareto optimal matchings. It is straightforward to show that no deterministic truthful mechanism can approximate a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching with ratio better than 2. We thus consider randomised mechanisms. We give a natural and explicit extension of the classical Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism (RSDM) specifically for the House Allocation problem where preference lists can include ties.  We thus obtain a universally truthful randomised mechanism for finding a Pareto optimal matching and show that it achieves an approximation ratio of #N#                  #N#                    #N#                  #N#                  $$\frac{e}{e-1}$$#N#                  #N#                    #N#                  #N#                . The same bound holds even when agents have priorities (weights) and our goal is to find a maximum weight (as opposed to maximum cardinality) Pareto optimal matching. On the other hand we give a lower bound of #N#                  #N#                    #N#                  #N#                  $$\frac{18}{13}$$#N#                  #N#                    #N#                  #N#                 on the approximation ratio of any universally truthful Pareto optimal mechanism in settings with strict preferences. By using a characterisation result of Bade, we show that any randomised mechanism that is a symmetrisation of a truthful, non-bossy and Pareto optimal mechanism has an improved lower bound of #N#                  #N#                    #N#                  #N#                  $$\frac{e}{e-1}$$#N#                  #N#                    #N#                  #N#                . Since our new mechanism is a symmetrisation of RSDM for strict preferences, it follows that this lower bound is tight. We moreover interpret our problem in terms of the classical secretary problem and prove that our mechanism provides the best randomised strategy of the administrator who interviews the applicants.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching"):
  with members:
    - "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"
    - "metric distortion of social choice rules lower bounds and fairness properties"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "manipulation strategies for the rank maximal matching problem"):
  with members:
    - "the dynamics of rank maximal and popular matchings"
    - "dynamic rank maximal matchings"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"):
  with members:
    - "egalitarianism of random assignment mechanisms"
    - "near optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions"
    - "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"
    - "oblivious algorithms for the maximum directed cut problem"
    - "greedy facility location algorithms analyzed using dual fitting with factor revealing lp"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "truthful mechanisms for matching and clustering in an ordinal world"):
  with members:
    - "on truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations"
    - "truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation an exact analysis of serial dictatorship"
    - "randomized social choice functions under metric preferences"
    - "on voting and facility location"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money"
    - "truthful assignment without money"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites"):
  with members:
    - "allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences"
    - "strategyproof quota mechanisms for multiple assignment problems"
    - "possible and necessary allocations via sequential mechanisms"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences"):
  with members:
    - "stable matching with uncertain linear preferences"
    - "optimal reallocation under additive and ordinal preferences"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "social welfare in one sided matching mechanisms"):
  with members:
    - "manipulating the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "equilibria under the probabilistic serial rule"
    - "efficiency of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one sided matching"
    - "strategic aspects of the probabilistic serial rule for the allocation of goods"
    - "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"
    - "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences"
    - "truthful approximations to range voting"
    - "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)