human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "spectre is here to stay an analysis of side channels and speculative execution"
  Abstract: The recent discovery of the Spectre and Meltdown attacks represents a watershed moment not just for the field of Computer Security, but also of Programming Languages. This paper explores speculative side-channel attacks and their implications for programming languages. These attacks leak information through micro-architectural side-channels which we show are not mere bugs, but in fact lie at the foundation of optimization. We identify three open problems, (1) finding side-channels, (2) understanding speculative vulnerabilities, and (3) mitigating them. For (1) we introduce a mathematical meta-model that clarifies the source of side-channels in simulations and CPUs. For (2) we introduce an architectural model with speculative semantics to study recently-discovered vulnerabilities. For (3) we explore and evaluate software mitigations and prove one correct for this model. Our analysis is informed by extensive offensive research and defensive implementation work for V8, the production JavaScript virtual machine in Chrome. Straightforward extensions to model real hardware suggest these vulnerabilities present formidable challenges for effective, efficient mitigation. As a result of our work, we now believe that speculative vulnerabilities on today's hardware defeat all language-enforced confidentiality with no known comprehensive software mitigations, as we have discovered that untrusted code can construct a universal read gadget to read all memory in the same address space through side-channels. In the face of this reality, we have shifted the security model of the Chrome web browser and V8 to process isolation.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "bypassing memory safety mechanisms through speculative control flow hijacks"):
  with members:
    - "smotherspectre exploiting speculative execution through port contention"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"
    - "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers"
    - "a systematic evaluation of transient execution attacks and defenses"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "context leakage free transient execution"):
  with members:
    - "fallout reading kernel writes from user space"
    - "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus"
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"
    - "meltdownprime and spectreprime automatically synthesized attacks exploiting invalidation based coherence protocols"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "towards constant time foundations for the new spectre era"):
  with members:
    - "abstract interpretation under speculative execution"
    - "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus"
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "spoiler speculative load hazards boost rowhammer and cache attacks"
    - "inspectre breaking and fixing microarchitectural vulnerabilities by formal analysis"
    - "eliminating timing side channel leaks using program repair"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "inspectre breaking and fixing microarchitectural vulnerabilities by formal analysis"):
  with members:
    - "towards constant time foundations for the new spectre era"
    - "sgxpectre stealing intel secrets from sgx enclaves via speculative execution"
    - "zombieload cross privilege boundary data sampling"
    - "kleespectre detecting information leakage through speculative cache attacks via symbolic execution"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "specfuzz bringing spectre type vulnerabilities to the surface"):
  with members:
    - "context leakage free transient execution"
    - "specusym speculative symbolic execution for cache timing leak detection"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"
    - "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "you shall not bypass employing data dependencies to prevent bounds check bypass"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "fallout reading kernel writes from user space"):
  with members:
    - "spoiler speculative load hazards boost rowhammer and cache attacks"
    - "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"
    - "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers"
    - "a systematic evaluation of transient execution attacks and defenses"
    - "lazyfp leaking fpu register state using microarchitectural side channels"

Connected through hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "spectector principled detection of speculative information flows"):
  with members:
    - "sgxpectre stealing intel secrets from sgx enclaves via speculative execution"
    - "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network"
    - "meltdownprime and spectreprime automatically synthesized attacks exploiting invalidation based coherence protocols"
    - "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution"
    - "you shall not bypass employing data dependencies to prevent bounds check bypass"
    - "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer"
    - "oo7 low overhead defense against spectre attacks via binary analysis"
    - "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.PL(Programming Languages)