human: Given a node-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where nodes represent papers and hyperedges represent sets of papers co-cited by a source paper.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center node: "fair division with minimal sharing"
  Abstract: A set of objects, some goods and some bads, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely allocated to a single agent, then fair division may not exist. What is the smallest number of objects that must be shared between two or more agents in order to attain a fair division? We focus on Pareto-optimal, envy-free and/or proportional allocations. We show that, for a generic instance of the problem --- all instances except of a zero-measure set of degenerate problems --- a fair and Pareto-optimal division with the smallest possible number of shared objects can be found in polynomial time, assuming that the number of agents is fixed. The problem becomes computationally hard for degenerate instances, where the agents' valuations are aligned for many objects.

Connected through hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "equitable allocations of indivisible chores"):
  with members:
    - "fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items"
    - "algorithms for competitive division of chores"
    - "a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "an algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores"
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "almost envy freeness and welfare efficiency in fair division with goods or bads"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"

Connected through hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "fairness and efficiency in cake cutting with single peaked preferences"):
  with members:
    - "obvious manipulations in cake cutting"
    - "monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake cutting"
    - "fair cake cutting in practice"
    - "a discrete and bounded envy free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents"

Connected through hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "algorithms for competitive division of chores"):
  with members:
    - "strategyproof and approximately maxmin fair share allocation of chores"
    - "universal growth in production economies"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "almost envy freeness with general valuations"
    - "convex program duality fisher markets and nash social welfare"

Connected through hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "developments in multi agent fair allocation"):
  with members:
    - "from matching with diversity constraints to matching with regional quotas"
    - "fairly allocating many goods with few queries"
    - "fair knapsack"
    - "competitive division of a mixed manna"
    - "approximation algorithms for computing maximin share allocations"
    - "proportionally representative participatory budgeting axioms and algorithms"
    - "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"
    - "democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods"

Connected through hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "fair division through information withholding"):
  with members:
    - "envy freeness up to any item with high nash welfare the virtue of donating items"
    - "a little charity guarantees almost envy freeness"
    - "maximin aware allocations of indivisible goods"
    - "when do envy free allocations exist"
    - "networked fairness in cake cutting"
    - "fair division via social comparison"
    - "fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences"
    - "analytical approach to parallel repetition"

Connected through hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation"):
  with members:
    - "algorithms for competitive division of chores"
    - "weighted maxmin fair share allocation of indivisible chores"
    - "fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores"
    - "on the proximity of markets with integral equilibria"
    - "fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents"
    - "competitive equilibria with indivisible goods and generic budgets"

Question: Please tell me which class the center node belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)