human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "representing the insincere strategically robust proportional representation"):
  Abstract: Proportional representation (PR) is a fundamental principle of many democracies world-wide which employ PR-based voting rules to elect their representatives. The normative properties of these voting rules however, are often only understood in the context of sincere voting. #R##N#In this paper we consider PR in the presence of strategic voters. We construct a voting rule such that for every preference profile there exists at least one costly voting equilibrium satisfying PR with respect to voters' private and unrevealed preferences - such a voting rule is said to be strategically robust. In contrast, a commonly applied voting rule is shown not be strategically robust. Furthermore, we prove a limit on `how strategically robust' a PR-based voting rule can be; we show that there is no PR-based voting rule which ensures that every equilibrium satisfies PR. Collectively, our results highlight the possibility and limit of achieving PR in the presence of strategic voters and a positive role for mechanisms, such as pre-election polls, which coordinate voter behaviour towards equilibria which satisfy PR.

Includes members:
  Member "how long is a piece of string an exploration of multi winner approval voting and ballot length restrictions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      (none)
  Member "consistent approval based multi winner rules":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "evaluating approval based multiwinner voting in terms of robustness to noise")
  Member "the expanding approvals rule improving proportional representation and monotonicity":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "proportionally representative participatory budgeting with ordinal preferences")
  Member "the maximin support method an extension of the d hondt method to approval based multiwinner elections":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a quantitative analysis of multi winner rules")
  Member "achieving fully proportional representation approximability results":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "multiwinner analogues of plurality rule axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)