human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "learning to evade static pe machine learning malware models via reinforcement learning"):
  Abstract: Machine learning is a popular approach to signatureless malware detection because it can generalize to never-before-seen malware families and polymorphic strains. This has resulted in its practical use for either primary detection engines or for supplementary heuristic detection by anti-malware vendors. Recent work in adversarial machine learning has shown that deep learning models are susceptible to gradient-based attacks, whereas non-differentiable models that report a score can be attacked by genetic algorithms that aim to systematically reduce the score. We propose a more general framework based on reinforcement learning (RL) for attacking static portable executable (PE) anti-malware engines. The general framework does not require a differentiable model nor does it require the engine to produce a score. Instead, an RL agent is equipped with a set of functionality-preserving operations that it may perform on the PE file. Through a series of games played against the anti-malware engine, it learns which sequences of operations are likely to result in evading the detector for any given malware sample. This enables completely black-box attacks against static PE anti-malware, and produces functional evasive malware samples as a direct result. We show in experiments that our method can attack a gradient-boosted machine learning model with evasion rates that are substantial and appear to be strongly dependent on the dataset. We demonstrate that attacks against this model appear to also evade components of publicly hosted antivirus engines. Adversarial training results are also presented: by retraining the model on evasive ransomware samples, a subsequent attack is 33% less effective. However, there are overfitting dangers when adversarial training, which we note. We release code to allow researchers to reproduce and improve this approach.

Includes members:
  Member "adversarial deep learning for robust detection of binary encoded malware":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "effectiveness of adversarial examples and defenses for malware classification")
  Member "generating adversarial malware examples for black box attacks based on gan":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "automatic generation of adversarial examples for interpreting malware classifiers")
  Member "generic black box end to end attack against state of the art api call based malware classifiers":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "automatic generation of adversarial examples for interpreting malware classifiers")
  Member "evading classifiers by morphing in the dark":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "automatic generation of adversarial examples for interpreting malware classifiers")
  Member "adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks for malware classification":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "on the security of randomized defenses against adversarial samples")
  Member "practical black box attacks against machine learning":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "adversarial ranking attack and defense")
  Member "sample efficient actor critic with experience replay":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "deep reinforcement learning for autonomous driving a survey")
  Member "deepdga adversarially tuned domain generation and detection":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "inline detection of dga domains using side information")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)