human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "safespec banishing the spectre of a meltdown with leakage free speculation"):
  Abstract: Speculative execution which is used pervasively in modern CPUs can leave side effects in the processor caches and other structures even when the speculated instructions do not commit and their direct effect is not visible. The recent Meltdown and Spectre attacks have shown that this behavior can be exploited to expose privileged information to an unprivileged attacker. In particular, the attack forces the speculative execution of a code gadget that will carry out the illegal read, which eventually gets squashed, but which leaves a side-channel trail that can be used by the attacker to infer the value. Several attack variations are possible, allowing arbitrary exposure of the full kernel memory to an unprivileged attacker. In this paper, we introduce a new model (SafeSpec) for supporting speculation in a way that is immune to side-channel leakage necessary for attacks such as Meltdown and Spectre. In particular, SafeSpec stores side effects of speculation in a way that is not visible to the attacker while the instructions are speculative. The speculative state is then either committed to the main CPU structures if the branch commits, or squashed if it does not, making all direct side effects of speculative code invisible. The solution must also address the possibility of a covert channel from speculative instructions to committed instructions before these instructions are committed. We show that SafeSpec prevents all three variants of Spectre and Meltdown, as well as new variants that we introduce. We also develop a cycle accurate model of modified design of an x86-64 processor and show that the performance impact is negligible. We build prototypes of the hardware support in a hardware description language to show that the additional overhead is small. We believe that SafeSpec completely closes this class of attacks, and that it is practical to implement.

Includes members:
  Member "speculative buffer overflows attacks and defenses":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "bypassing memory safety mechanisms through speculative control flow hijacks")
  Member "meltdownprime and spectreprime automatically synthesized attacks exploiting invalidation based coherence protocols":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "store to leak forwarding leaking data on meltdown resistant cpus")
  Member "spectre attacks exploiting speculative execution":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "towards probabilistic verification of machine unlearning")
  Member "you shall not bypass employing data dependencies to prevent bounds check bypass":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "context leakage free transient execution")
  Member "speculose analyzing the security implications of speculative execution in cpus":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network")
  Member "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "ghostknight breaching data integrity via speculative execution")
  Member "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "ghostknight breaching data integrity via speculative execution")
  Member "a systematic evaluation of transient execution attacks and defenses":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "ghostknight breaching data integrity via speculative execution")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)