human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "quality of local equilibria in discrete exchange economies"):
  Abstract: This paper defines the notion of a local equilibrium of quality $(r , s)$, $0 \leq r , s$, in a discrete exchange economy: a partial allocation and item prices that guarantee certain stability properties parametrized by the numbers $r$ and $s$. The quality $( r , s )$ measures the fit between the allocation and the prices: the larger $r$ and $s$ the closer the fit. For $r , s \leq 1$ this notion provides a graceful degradation for the conditional equilibria of [10] which are exactly the local equilibria of quality $( 1 , 1 )$. For $1 < r , s $ the local equilibria of quality $( r , s )$ are {\em more stable} than conditional equilibria. Any local equilibrium of quality $( r , s )$ provides, without any assumption on the type of the agents' valuations, an allocation whose value is at least $\frac{r s} { 1 + r s }$ the optimal fractional allocation. In any economy in which all agents' valuations are $a$-submodular, i.e., exhibit complementarity bounded by $a \: \geq \: 1$, there is a local equilibrium of quality $( \frac{1} {a} , \frac{1}{a} )$. In such an economy any greedy allocation provides a local equilibrium of quality $( 1 , \frac{1}{a} ) $. Walrasian equilibria are not amenable to such graceful degradation.

Includes members:
  Member "combinatorial auctions with endowment effect":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the power and limits of dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets")
  Member "the communication complexity of local search":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "near optimal communication lower bounds for approximate nash equilibria")
  Member "combinatorial auctions via posted prices":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")
  Member "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)