human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "on cyber risk management of blockchain networks a game theoretic approach"):
  Abstract: Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular, we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risks due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market, which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, the cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the infrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the service price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of the blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider also purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself from the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we model the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game.

Includes members:
  Member "a survey on security and privacy issues of bitcoin":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the feasibility of sybil attacks in shard based permissionless blockchains")
  Member "decentralized caching for content delivery based on blockchain a game theoretic perspective":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the design of dynamic probabilistic caching with time varying content popularity")
  Member "double spend races":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "ant routing scalability for the lightning network")
  Member "an empirical analysis of smart contracts platforms applications and design patterns":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "on the convergence of artificial intelligence and distributed ledger technology a scoping review and future research agenda")
  Member "untangling blockchain a data processing view of blockchain systems":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "effective scaling of blockchain beyond consensus innovations and moore s law")
  Member "bitcoin ng a scalable blockchain protocol":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "surface a practical blockchain consensus algorithm for real world networks")
  Member "analysis of hashrate based double spending":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "joint time scheduling and transaction fee selection in blockchain based rf powered backscatter cognitive radio network")
  Member "real and complex monotone communication games":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "friendly jamming in a mimo wiretap interference network a nonconvex game approach")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)