human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "quantifying inefficiency of fair cost sharing mechanisms for sharing economy"):
  Abstract: Sharing economy is a distributed peer-to-peer economic paradigm, which gives rise to a variety of social interactions for economic purposes. One fundamental distributed decision-making process is coalition formation for sharing certain replaceable resources collaboratively, for example, sharing hotel rooms among travelers, sharing taxi-rides among passengers, and sharing regular passes among users. Motivated by the applications of sharing economy, this paper studies a coalition formation game subject to the capacity of   $K$   participants per coalition. The participants in each coalition are supposed to split the associated cost according to a given cost-sharing mechanism. A stable coalition structure is established when no group of participants can opt out to form another coalition that leads to lower individual payments. We quantify the inefficiency of distributed decision-making processes under a cost-sharing mechanism by the strong price of anarchy (SPoA), comparing a worst-case stable coalition structure and a social optimum. In particular, we derive the SPoA for common fair cost-sharing mechanisms (e.g., equal-split, proportional-split, egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions of bargaining games, and usage-based cost sharing). We show that the SPoA for equal-split, proportional-split, and usage-based cost sharing (under certain conditions) is   $\Theta (\log K)$  , whereas the one for egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions is   $O(\sqrt{K} \log K)$  . Therefore, distributed decision-making processes under common fair cost-sharing mechanisms induce only moderate inefficiency.

Includes members:
  Member "sharing non anonymous costs of multiple resources optimally":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the price of anarchy of cost sharing in real time scheduling systems")
  Member "existence of stability in hedonic coalition formation games":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "coordination games on weighted directed graphs")
  Member "strategic cooperation in cost sharing games":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "efficient black box reductions for separable cost sharing")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)