human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "a note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints"):
  Abstract: We study the social efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of a set of available (advertising) positions to a set of competing budget-constrained users (advertisers). Specifically, we focus on the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG) and the Expressive Generalized First Price auction (EGFP). Using the liquid welfare as our efficiency benchmark, we prove a tight bound of 2 on the liquid price of anarchy and stability of these mechanisms for pure Nash equilibria.

Includes members:
  Member "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      (none)
  Member "the price of anarchy in auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")
  Member "on the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users")
  Member "liquid price of anarchy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users")
  Member "improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users")
  Member "welfare guarantees for proportional allocations":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget constrained users")
  Member "efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "an end to end argument in mechanism design prior independent auctions for budgeted agents")
  Member "on the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      (none)

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)