human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "still hammerable and exploitable on the effectiveness of software only physical kernel isolation"):
  Abstract: All the state-of-the-art rowhammer attacks can break the MMU-enforced inter-domain isolation based on the fact that the physical memory owned by each domain is adjacent to each other. To mitigate such attacks, CATT as the first generic and practical technique, essentially separates each domain physically. It divides the physical memory into multiple partitions and keeps each partition occupied by only one domain, called the single ownership invariant. Hence, all existing rowhammer attacks are effectively defeated. #R##N#In this paper, we develop a novel practical exploit, which could effectively defeat CATT and gain both root and kernel privileges, without exhausting page cache and system memory, or relying on any virtual-to-physical mapping information. Specifically, our key observation is that on the modern OSes there exist double-ownership kernel buffers (e.g., video buffers) owned concurrently by the kernel and user domains, invalidating the singleownership invariant enforced by CATT and making the rowhammer-based attack become possible again. In contrast to existing conspicuous rowhammer exploits that exhaust page cache or even the whole system memory, we propose a new attack technique, named memory ambush, which is able to place the hammerable kernel buffers physically adjacent to the target objects (e.g., page tables) with only a small amount of memory, making our exploit stealthier and fewer memory fingerprints. We also replace the inefficient rowhammer algorithm that blindly picks up addresses for hammering with an efficient one, which probes suitable addresses using a side channel. We implement our exploit on the Linux kernel 4.10.0-generic. Our experiment results indicate that our exploit is able to gain the root and kernel privileges within roughly 1 to 36 minutes. The occupied memory could be reduced to 128MB.

Includes members:
  Member "nethammer inducing rowhammer faults through network requests":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "are we susceptible to rowhammer an end to end methodology for cloud providers")
  Member "another flip in the wall of rowhammer defenses":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "are we susceptible to rowhammer an end to end methodology for cloud providers")
  Member "malware guard extension using sgx to conceal cache attacks":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "copycat controlled instruction level attacks on enclaves for maximal key extraction")
  Member "can t touch this practical and generic software only defenses against rowhammer attacks":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "are we susceptible to rowhammer an end to end methodology for cloud providers")
  Member "rowhammer js a remote software induced fault attack in javascript":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "are we susceptible to rowhammer an end to end methodology for cloud providers")
  Member "drama exploiting dram addressing for cross cpu attacks":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "are we susceptible to rowhammer an end to end methodology for cloud providers")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)