human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy"):
  Abstract: We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized mechanism that runs in time polynomial in the size of the support. We leverage this result to show that in the oracle model introduced by Ronen and Saberi [FOCS'02], there exists a polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanism that provides a $(\frac 3 2+\epsilon)$-approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and a polynomial time deterministic truthful mechanism that guarantees $\frac 5 3$ approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal deterministic truthful mechanism. #R##N#We show that the $\frac 5 3$-approximation mechanism provides the same approximation ratio also with respect to the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism. This shows that the performance gap between truthful-in-expectation and deterministic mechanisms is relatively small. En route, we solve an open question of Mehta and Vazirani [EC'04]. #R##N#Finally, we extend some of our results to the multi-item case, and show how to compute the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for bidders with more complex valuations.

Includes members:
  Member "pricing randomized allocations":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "escaping cannibalization correlation robust pricing for a unit demand buyer")
  Member "budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations")
  Member "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)