human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations"):
  Abstract: We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides $m^{\frac 1 2 -\epsilon}$ approximation to the social welfare and uses value queries only must use exponentially many value queries, where $m$ is the number of items. In contrast, ignoring incentives there exist constant ratio approximation algorithms for this problem. Our approach is based on a novel \emph{direct hardness} approach and completely skips the notoriously hard characterization step. The characterization step was the main obstacle for proving impossibility results in algorithmic mechanism design so far. #R##N#We demonstrate two additional applications of our new technique: (1) an impossibility result for universally-truthful polynomial time flexible combinatorial public projects and (2) an impossibility result for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for exact combinatorial public projects. The latter is the first result that bounds the power of polynomial-time truthful in expectation mechanisms in any setting.

Includes members:
  Member "from convex optimization to randomized mechanisms toward optimal combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders")
  Member "multi unit auctions beyond roberts":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "on the nisan ronen conjecture for submodular valuations")
  Member "on the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the complexity of black box mechanism design with priors")
  Member "combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")
  Member "truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "faithful implementations of distributed algorithms and control laws")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)