human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "on revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions"):
  Abstract: Along with substantial progress made recently in designing near-optimal mechanisms for multi-item auctions, interesting structural questions have also been raised and studied. In particular, is it true that the seller can always extract more revenue from a market where the buyers value the items higher than another market? In this paper we obtain such a revenue monotonicity result in a general setting. Precisely, consider the revenue-maximizing combinatorial auction for $m$ items and $n$ buyers in the Bayesian setting, specified by a valuation function $v$ and a set $F$ of $nm$ independent item-type distributions. Let $REV(v, F)$ denote the maximum revenue achievable under $F$ by any incentive compatible mechanism. Intuitively, one would expect that $REV(v, G)\geq REV(v, F)$ if distribution $G$ stochastically dominates $F$. Surprisingly, Hart and Reny (2012) showed that this is not always true even for the simple case when $v$ is additive. A natural question arises: Are these deviations contained within bounds? To what extent may the monotonicity intuition still be valid? We present an {approximate monotonicity} theorem for the class of fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuation functions $v$, showing that $REV(v, G)\geq c\,REV(v, F)$ if $G$ stochastically dominates $F$ under $v$ where $c>0$ is a universal constant. Previously, approximate monotonicity was known only for the case $n=1$: Babaioff et al. (2014) for the class of additive valuations, and Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015) for all subaddtive valuation functions.

Includes members:
  Member "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "efficient empirical revenue maximization in single parameter auction environments":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "combinatorial auctions via posted prices":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)