human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "deep models under the gan information leakage from collaborative deep learning"):
  Abstract: Deep Learning has recently become hugely popular in machine learning, providing significant improvements in classification accuracy in the presence of highly-structured and large databases. #R##N#Researchers have also considered privacy implications of deep learning. Models are typically trained in a centralized manner with all the data being processed by the same training algorithm. If the data is a collection of users' private data, including habits, personal pictures, geographical positions, interests, and more, the centralized server will have access to sensitive information that could potentially be mishandled. To tackle this problem, collaborative deep learning models have recently been proposed where parties locally train their deep learning structures and only share a subset of the parameters in the attempt to keep their respective training sets private. Parameters can also be obfuscated via differential privacy (DP) to make information extraction even more challenging, as proposed by Shokri and Shmatikov at CCS'15. #R##N#Unfortunately, we show that any privacy-preserving collaborative deep learning is susceptible to a powerful attack that we devise in this paper. In particular, we show that a distributed, federated, or decentralized deep learning approach is fundamentally broken and does not protect the training sets of honest participants. The attack we developed exploits the real-time nature of the learning process that allows the adversary to train a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) that generates prototypical samples of the targeted training set that was meant to be private (the samples generated by the GAN are intended to come from the same distribution as the training data). Interestingly, we show that record-level DP applied to the shared parameters of the model, as suggested in previous work, is ineffective (i.e., record-level DP is not designed to address our attack).

Includes members:
  Member "adversarial variational bayes unifying variational autoencoders and generative adversarial networks":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "adversarial code learning for image generation")
  Member "adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks for malware classification":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "on the security of randomized defenses against adversarial samples")
  Member "invertible conditional gans for image editing":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "deepfakes and beyond a survey of face manipulation and fake detection")
  Member "advanced probabilistic couplings for differential privacy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "guidelines for implementing and auditing differentially private systems")
  Member "transferability in machine learning from phenomena to black box attacks using adversarial samples":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "adversarial ranking attack and defense")
  Member "defeating image obfuscation with deep learning":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "towards privacy protection by generating adversarial identity masks")
  Member "improved techniques for training gans":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "generative adversarial networks in computer vision a survey and taxonomy")
  Member "asynchronous methods for deep reinforcement learning":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "deep reinforcement learning for autonomous driving a survey")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)