human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions"):
  Abstract: We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some valuation functions $v_1(\cdot)$ and $v_2(\cdot)$ over subsets of $m$ items, and their goal is to partition the items into $S, \bar{S}$ in a way that maximizes the welfare, $v_1(S) + v_2(\bar{S})$. We study both the allocation problem, which asks for a welfare-maximizing partition and the decision problem, which asks whether or not there exists a partition guaranteeing certain welfare, for binary XOS valuations. For interactive protocols with $poly(m)$ communication, a tight 3/4-approximation is known for both [Fei06,DS06]. #R##N#For interactive protocols, the allocation problem is provably harder than the decision problem: any solution to the allocation problem implies a solution to the decision problem with one additional round and $\log m$ additional bits of communication via a trivial reduction. Surprisingly, the allocation problem is provably easier for simultaneous protocols. Specifically, we show: #R##N#1) There exists a simultaneous, randomized protocol with polynomial communication that selects a partition whose expected welfare is at least $3/4$ of the optimum. This matches the guarantee of the best interactive, randomized protocol with polynomial communication. #R##N#2) For all $\varepsilon > 0$, any simultaneous, randomized protocol that decides whether the welfare of the optimal partition is $\geq 1$ or $\leq 3/4 - 1/108+\varepsilon$ correctly with probability $> 1/2 + 1/ poly(m)$ requires exponential communication. This provides a separation between the attainable approximation guarantees via interactive ($3/4$) versus simultaneous ($\leq 3/4-1/108$) protocols with polynomial communication. #R##N#In other words, this trivial reduction from decision to allocation problems provably requires the extra round of communication.

Includes members:
  Member "simple mechanisms for agents with complements":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "capturing complementarity in set functions by going beyond submodularity subadditivity")
  Member "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders")
  Member "welfare maximization with limited interaction":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "polynomial pass lower bounds for graph streaming algorithms")
  Member "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "the price of anarchy in auctions")
  Member "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "almost envy freeness with general valuations")
  Member "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders")
  Member "combinatorial auctions via posted prices":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")
  Member "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)