human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "gradual release of sensitive data under differential privacy"):
  Abstract: We introduce the problem of releasing sensitive data under differential privacy when the privacy level is subject to change over time. Existing work assumes that privacy level is determined by the system designer as a fixed value before sensitive data is released. For certain applications, however, users may wish to relax the privacy level for subsequent releases of the same data after either a re-evaluation of the privacy concerns or the need for better accuracy. Specifically, given a database containing sensitive data, we assume that a response $y_1$ that preserves $\epsilon_{1}$-differential privacy has already been published. Then, the privacy level is relaxed to $\epsilon_2$, with $\epsilon_2 > \epsilon_1$, and we wish to publish a more accurate response $y_2$ while the joint response $(y_1, y_2)$ preserves $\epsilon_2$-differential privacy. How much accuracy is lost in the scenario of gradually releasing two responses $y_1$ and $y_2$ compared to the scenario of releasing a single response that is $\epsilon_{2}$-differentially private? Our results show that there exists a composite mechanism that achieves \textit{no loss} in accuracy. We consider the case in which the private data lies within $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ with an adjacency relation induced by the $\ell_{1}$-norm, and we focus on mechanisms that approximate identity queries. We show that the same accuracy can be achieved in the case of gradual release through a mechanism whose outputs can be described by a \textit{lazy Markov stochastic process}. This stochastic process has a closed form expression and can be efficiently sampled. Our results are applicable beyond identity queries. To this end, we demonstrate that our results can be applied in several cases, including Google's RAPPOR project, trading of sensitive data, and controlled transmission of private data in a social network.

Includes members:
  Member "optimality of the laplace mechanism in differential privacy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "the podium mechanism improving on the laplace and staircase mechanisms")
  Member "the optimal mechanism in differential privacy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "free gap information from the differentially private sparse vector and noisy max mechanisms")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)