human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "on optimal multi dimensional mechanism design"):
  Abstract: We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first setting, we need that each bidder's values for the items are sampled from a possibly correlated, item-symmetric distribution, allowing different distributions for each bidder. In the second setting, we allow the values of each bidder for the items to be arbitrarily correlated, but assume that the distribution of bidder types is bidder-symmetric. #R##N#For all eps>0, we obtain an additive eps-approximation, when the value distributions are bounded, or a multiplicative (1-eps)-approximation when the value distributions are unbounded, but satisfy the Monotone Hazard Rate condition, covering a widely studied class of distributions in Economics. Our runtime is polynomial in max{#items,#bidders}, and not the size of the support of the joint distribution of all bidders' values for all items, which is typically exponential in both the number of items and the number of bidders. Our mechanisms are randomized, explicitly price bundles, and can sometimes accommodate budget constraints. #R##N#Our results are enabled by establishing several new tools and structural properties of Bayesian mechanisms. We provide a symmetrization technique turning any truthful mechanism into one that has the same revenue and respects all symmetries in the underlying value distributions. We also prove that item-symmetric mechanisms satisfy a natural monotonicity property which, unlike cyclic-monotonicity, can be harnessed algorithmically. Finally, we provide a technique that turns any given eps-BIC mechanism (i.e. one where incentive constraints are violated by eps) into a truly-BIC mechanism at the cost of O(sqrt{eps}) revenue. We expect our tools to be used beyond the settings we consider here.

Includes members:
  Member "simple and nearly optimal multi item auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations")
  Member "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "escaping cannibalization correlation robust pricing for a unit demand buyer")
  Member "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")
  Member "optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "lp based approximation for personalized reserve prices")
  Member "bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "an efficient e bic to bic transformation and its application to black box reduction in revenue maximization")
  Member "pricing randomized allocations":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "escaping cannibalization correlation robust pricing for a unit demand buyer")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)