human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "explicit non malleable extractors multi source extractors and almost optimal privacy amplification protocols"):
  Abstract: We make progress in the following three problems: 1. Constructing optimal seeded non-malleable extractors; 2. Constructing optimal privacy amplification protocols with an active adversary, for any security parameter; 3. Constructing extractors for independent weak random sources, when the min-entropy is extremely small (i.e., near logarithmic). #R##N#For the first two problems, the best known non-malleable extractors by Chattopadhyay, Goyal and Li [CGL16], and by Cohen [Coh16a,Coh16b] all require seed length and min-entropy at least $\log^2 (1/\epsilon)$, where $\epsilon$ is the error of the extractor. As a result, the best known explicit privacy amplification protocols with an active adversary, which achieve 2 rounds of communication and optimal entropy loss in [Li15c,CGL16], can only handle security parameter up to $s=\Omega(\sqrt{k})$, where $k$ is the min-entropy of the shared secret weak random source. For larger $s$ the best known protocol with optimal entropy loss in [Li15c] requires $O(s/\sqrt{k})$ rounds of communication. #R##N#In this paper we give an explicit non-malleable extractor that only requires seed length and min-entropy $\log^{1+o(1)} (n/\epsilon)$, which also yields a 2-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss for security parameter up to $s=k^{1-\alpha}$ for any constant $\alpha>0$. #R##N#For the third problem, previously the best known extractor which supports the smallest min-entropy due to Li [Li13a], requires min-entropy $\log^{2+\delta} n$ and uses $O(1/\delta)$ sources, for any constant $\delta>0$. A very recent result by Cohen and Schulman [CS16] improves this, and constructed explicit extractors that use $O(1/\delta)$ sources for min-entropy $\log^{1+\delta} n$, any constant $\delta>0$. In this paper we further improve their result, and give an explicit extractor that uses $O(1)$ (an absolute constant) sources for min-entropy $\log^{1+o(1)} n$.

Includes members:
  Member "improved non malleable extractors non malleable codes and independent source extractors":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "leakage resilient non malleable secret sharing in non compartmentalized models")
  Member "explicit resilient functions matching ajtai linial":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "non malleable extractors and non malleable codes partially optimal constructions")
  Member "non malleable extractors and codes with their many tampered extensions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "leakage resilient non malleable secret sharing in non compartmentalized models")
  Member "three source extractors for polylogarithmic min entropy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "non malleable extractors and non malleable codes partially optimal constructions")
  Member "non malleable condensers for arbitrary min entropy and almost optimal protocols for privacy amplification":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "improved non malleable extractors non malleable codes and independent source extractors")
  Member "non malleable extractors two source extractors and privacy amplification":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "leakage resilient non malleable secret sharing in non compartmentalized models")
  Member "bounded independence fools halfspaces":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "list decodable subspace recovery via sum of squares")
  Member "fuzzy extractors how to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "a capacity achieving one message key agreement with finite blocklength analysis")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)