human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "fair mixing the case of dichotomous preferences"):
  Abstract: Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and guarantees to any group of like-minded agents an influence proportional to its size. It is easier to compute and more efficient than the familiar Random Priority rule. Its worst case (resp. average) inefficiency is provably (resp. in numerical experiments) low if the number of agents is low. The efficient Egalitarian rule protects similarly individual agents but not coalitions. It is Excludable Strategyproof: I do not want to lie if I cannot consume outcomes I claim to dislike. The efficient Nash Max Product rule offers the strongest welfare guarantees to coalitions, who can force any outcome with a probability proportional to their size. But it fails even the excludable form of Strategyproofness.

Includes members:
  Member "agent mediated social choice":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      (none)
  Member "competitive division of a mixed manna":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "equitable allocations of indivisible chores")
  Member "the core of the participatory budgeting problem":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "participatory budgeting models and approaches")
  Member "consistent probabilistic social choice":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "consistent approval based multi winner rules")
  Member "justified representation in approval based committee voting":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "participatory budgeting models and approaches")
  Member "the computational complexity of random serial dictatorship":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)