human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "setting lower bounds on truthfulness"):
  Abstract: We present general techniques for proving inapproximability results for several paradigmatic truthful multidimensional mechanism design problems. In particular, we demonstrate the strength of our techniques by exhibiting a lower bound of 2-1/m for the scheduling problem with m unrelated machines (formulated as a mechanism design problem in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen on Algorithmic Mechanism Design). Our lower bound applies to truthful randomized mechanisms, regardless of any computational assumptions on the running time of these mechanisms. Moreover, it holds even for the wider class of truthfulness-in-expectation mechanisms. This lower bound nearly matches the known 1.58606 randomized truthful upper bound for the case of two machines (a non-truthful FPTAS exists). #R##N#Recently, Daskalakis and Weinberg show that there is a polynomial-time 2-approximately optimal Bayesian mechanism for makespan minimization for unrelated machines. We complement this result by showing an appropriate lower bound of 1.25 for deterministic incentive compatible Bayesian mechanisms. #R##N#We then show an application of our techniques to the workload-minimization problem in networks. We prove our lower bounds for this problem in the inter-domain routing setting presented by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker. Finally, we discuss several notions of non-utilitarian fairness (Max-Min fairness, Min-Max fairness, and envy minimization) and show how our techniques can be used to prove lower bounds for these notions. No lower bounds for truthful mechanisms in multidimensional probabilistic settings were previously known.

Includes members:
  Member "the vcg mechanism for bayesian scheduling":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "on the nisan ronen conjecture for submodular valuations")
  Member "inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the vc dimension":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders")
  Member "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality")
  Member "copula based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "on the nisan ronen conjecture for submodular valuations")
  Member "prior independent mechanisms for scheduling":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "the vickrey auction with a single duplicate bidder approximates the optimal revenue")
  Member "an impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders")
  Member "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")
  Member "mechanisms for multi unit auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "price doubling and item halving robust revenue guarantees for item pricing")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)