human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "socially stable matchings"):
  Abstract: In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking pairs, i.e., no pair of agents that prefer each other to their assigned matches. In this paper we study a variant of stable matching motivated by the fact that, in most centralized markets, many agents do not have direct communication with each other. Hence even if some blocking pairs exist, the agents involved in those pairs may not be able to coordinate a deviation. We model communication channels with a bipartite graph between the two sets of agents which we call the social graph, and we study socially stable matchings. A matching is socially stable if there are no blocking pairs that are connected by an edge in the social graph. Socially stable matchings vary in size and so we look for a maximum socially stable matching. We prove that this problem is NP-hard and, assuming the unique games conjecture, hard to approximate within a factor of 3 − ǫ, for any constant ǫ. We complement the hardness results with a 3 -approximation algorithm.

Includes members:
  Member "locally stable marriage with strict preferences":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "matching dynamics with constraints")
  Member "locally stable matching with general preferences":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "socially stable matchings in the hospitals residents problem")
  Member "social networks and stable matchings in the job market":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "graphical one sided markets")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)