human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing"):
  Abstract: We provide a near-optimal, computationally efficient algorithm for the unit-demand pricing problem, where a seller wants to price n items to optimize revenue against a unit-demand buyer whose values for the items are independently drawn from known distributions. For any chosen accuracy eps>0 and item values bounded in [0,1], our algorithm achieves revenue that is optimal up to an additive error of at most eps, in polynomial time. For values sampled from Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions, we achieve a (1-eps)-fraction of the optimal revenue in polynomial time, while for values sampled from regular distributions the same revenue guarantees are achieved in quasi-polynomial time. #R##N#Our algorithm for bounded distributions applies probabilistic techniques to understand the statistical properties of revenue distributions, obtaining a reduction in the search space of the algorithm via dynamic programming. Adapting this approach to MHR and regular distributions requires the proof of novel extreme value theorems for such distributions. #R##N#As a byproduct, our techniques establish structural properties of approximately-optimal and near-optimal solutions. We show that, for values independently distributed according to MHR distributions, pricing all items at the same price achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Moreover, for all eps >0, g(1/eps) distinct prices suffice to obtain a (1-eps)-fraction of the optimal revenue, where g(1/eps) is quadratic in 1/eps and independent of n. Similarly, for all eps>0 and n>0, at most g(1/(eps log n)) distinct prices suffice if the values are independently distributed according to regular distributions, where g() is a polynomial function. Finally, when the values are i.i.d. from some MHR distribution, we show that, if n is a sufficiently large function of 1/eps, a single price suffices to achieve a (1-eps)-fraction of the optimal revenue.

Includes members:
  Member "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality")
  Member "the complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the complexity of contracts")
  Member "mechanism design via optimal transport":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "simple credible and approximately optimal auctions")
  Member "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "the complexity of optimal mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "simple and nearly optimal multi item auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations")
  Member "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)