human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "correlated and coarse equilibria of single item auctions"):
  Abstract: We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid -- i.e., bid above their values. #R##N#Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as $26\%$ of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well.

Includes members:
  Member "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "learning reserve prices in second price auctions")
  Member "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions")
  Member "tight bounds for the price of anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")
  Member "composable and efficient mechanisms":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")
  Member "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")
  Member "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)