human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints"):
  Abstract: We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distribution over bidder values and budgets. The prior may be correlated across items and budgets of the same bidder, but is assumed independent across bidders. We target mechanisms that are Bayesian Incentive Compatible, but that are ex-post Individually Rational and ex-post budget respecting. Virtually no such mechanisms are known that satisfy all these conditions and guarantee any revenue approximation, even with just a single item. We provide a computationally efficient mechanism that is a $3$-approximation with respect to all BIC, ex-post IR, and ex-post budget respecting mechanisms. Note that the problem is NP-hard to approximate better than a factor of 16/15, even in the case where the prior is a point mass \cite{ChakrabartyGoel}. We further characterize the optimal mechanism in this setting, showing that it can be interpreted as a distribution over virtual welfare maximizers. #R##N#We prove our results by making use of a black-box reduction from mechanism to algorithm design developed by \cite{CaiDW13b}. Our main technical contribution is a computationally efficient $3$-approximation algorithm for the algorithmic problem that results by an application of their framework to this problem. The algorithmic problem has a mixed-sign objective and is NP-hard to optimize exactly, so it is surprising that a computationally efficient approximation is possible at all. In the case of a single item ($m=1$), the algorithmic problem can be solved exactly via exhaustive search, leading to a computationally efficient exact algorithm and a stronger characterization of the optimal mechanism as a distribution over virtual value maximizers.

Includes members:
  Member "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")
  Member "bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi criterion approximation algorithms":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality")
  Member "understanding incentives mechanism design becomes algorithm design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "the complexity of contracts")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)