human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "how long is a piece of string an exploration of multi winner approval voting and ballot length restrictions"):
  Abstract: Multi-winner approval elections are seen in a variety of settings ranging from academic societies and associations to public elections. In such elections, it is often the case that ballot-length restrictions are enforced; that is, where voters have a limit on the number of candidates which they can vote for. Despite this common feature, there does not seem to be any theoretical justification for ballot-length restrictions (Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2016). #R##N#This work endogenously derives the set of voter best-response ballot lengths under complete information and with general assumptions on voter utilities and voting rules. These results provide justification for some ballot-length restrictions observed in practice, however when considering equilibrium outcomes our analysis shows that this justification is no longer valid. Equilibrium analysis is considered for voters with lazy and truth-bias second-order tendencies and the equilibrium solution concept is pure-Nash equilibria. #R##N#The key insights show that ballot-length restrictions or institutional features which make voting costly may lead to instability in election outcomes when voters have diverse preferences, via the non-existence of equilibria. On the other hand, when equilibria do exist they satisfy desirable properties which are not guaranteed by equilibria attained under costless voting and in the absence of ballot-length restrictions. In summary our results highlight a stark trade-off between stable and desirable election outcomes.

Includes members:
  Member "properties of multiwinner voting rules":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "who is in your top three optimizing learning in elections with many candidates")
  Member "computational aspects of multi winner approval voting":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "evaluating approval based multiwinner voting in terms of robustness to noise")
  Member "equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "sybil resilient social choice with partial participation")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)