human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "gsp the cinderella of mechanism design"):
  Abstract: Nearly fifteen years ago, Google unveiled the generalized second price (GSP) auction. By all theoretical accounts including their own [Varian 14], this was the wrong auction --- the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction would have been the proper choice --- yet GSP has succeeded spectacularly. #R##N#We give a deep justification for GSP's success: advertisers' preferences map to a model we call value maximization, they do not maximize profit as the standard theory would believe. For value maximizers, GSP is the truthful auction [Aggarwal 09]. Moreover, this implies an axiomatization of GSP --- it is an auction whose prices are truthful for value maximizers --- that can be applied much more broadly than the simple model for which GSP was originally designed. In particular, applying it to arbitrary single-parameter domains recovers the folklore definition of GSP. Through the lens of value maximization, GSP metamorphosizes into a powerful auction, sound in its principles and elegant in its simplicity.

Includes members:
  Member "sponsored search auctions with rich ads":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "aiads automated and intelligent advertising system for sponsored search")
  Member "truthful outcomes from non truthful position auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "sponsored search auctions with rich ads")
  Member "gsp with general independent click through rates":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "envy regret and social welfare loss")
  Member "position auctions with externalities and brand effects":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      (none)
  Member "optimising trade offs among stakeholders in ad auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a price per attention auction scheme using mouse cursor information")
  Member "general auction mechanism for search advertising":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "reserve pricing in repeated second price auctions with strategic bidders")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)