human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "learning multi item auctions with or without samples"):
  Abstract: We provide algorithms that learn simple auctions whose revenue is approximately optimal in multi-item multi-bidder settings, for a wide range of valuations including unit-demand, additive, constrained additive, XOS, and subadditive. We obtain our learning results in two settings. The first is the commonly studied setting where sample access to the bidders' distributions over valuations is given, for both regular distributions and arbitrary distributions with bounded support. Our algorithms require polynomially many samples in the number of items and bidders. The second is a more general max-min learning setting that we introduce, where we are given "approximate distributions," and we seek to compute an auction whose revenue is approximately optimal simultaneously for all "true distributions" that are close to the given ones. These results are more general in that they imply the sample-based results, and are also applicable in settings where we have no sample access to the underlying distributions but have estimated them indirectly via market research or by observation of previously run, potentially non-truthful auctions. #R##N#Our results hold for valuation distributions satisfying the standard (and necessary) independence-across-items property. They also generalize and improve upon recent works, which have provided algorithms that learn approximately optimal auctions in more restricted settings with additive, subadditive and unit-demand valuations using sample access to distributions. We generalize these results to the complete unit-demand, additive, and XOS setting, to i.i.d. subadditive bidders, and to the max-min setting. #R##N#Our results are enabled by new uniform convergence bounds for hypotheses classes under product measures. Our bounds result in exponential savings in sample complexity compared to bounds derived by bounding the VC dimension, and are of independent interest.

Includes members:
  Member "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "revenue maximization and ex post budget constraints":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "an efficient e bic to bic transformation and its application to black box reduction in revenue maximization")
  Member "learning simple auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "efficient empirical revenue maximization in single parameter auction environments":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "the sample complexity of revenue maximization":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "the sample complexity of auctions with side information":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)