human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "optimal auctions for negatively correlated items"):
  Abstract: We consider the problem of designing revenue-optimal auctions for selling two items and bidders' valuations are independent among bidders but negatively correlated among items. #R##N#In this paper, we obtain the closed-form optimal auction for this setting, by directly addressing the two difficulties above. In particular, the first difficulty is that when pointwise maximizing virtual surplus under multi-dimensional feasibility (i.e., the Border feasibility), (1) neither the optimal interim allocation is trivially monotone in the virtual value, (2) nor the virtual value is monotone in the bidder's type. As a result, the optimal interim allocations resulting from virtual surplus maximization no longer guarantees BIC. To address (1), we prove a generalization of Border's theorem and show that optimal interim allocation is indeed monotone in the virtual value. To address (2), we adapt Myerson's ironing procedure to this setting by redefining the (ironed) virtual value as a function of the lowest utility point. The second difficulty, perhaps a more challenging one, is that the lowest utility type in general is no longer at the endpoints of the type interval. To address this difficulty, we show by construction that there exist an allocation rule and an induced lowest utility type such that they form a solution of the virtual surplus maximization and in the meanwhile guarantees IIR. In the single bidder case, the optimal auction consists of a randomized bundle menu and a deterministic bundle menu; while in the multiple bidder case, the optimal auction is a randomization between two extreme mechanisms. The optimal solutions of our setting can be implemented by a Bayesian IC and IR auction, however, perhaps surprisingly, the revenue of this auction cannot be achieved by any (dominant-strategy) IC and IR auction.

Includes members:
  Member "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "public projects boolean functions and the borders of border s theorem":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")
  Member "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "optimal mechanisms with simple menus":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "mechanism design via optimal transport":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "simple credible and approximately optimal auctions")
  Member "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)