human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations"):
  Abstract: We study the revenue performance of sequential posted price mechanisms and some natural extensions, for a general setting where the valuations of the buyers are drawn from a correlated distribution. Sequential posted price mechanisms are conceptually simple mechanisms that work by proposing a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each buyer. We apply sequential posted price mechanisms to single-parameter multi-unit settings in which each buyer demands only one item and the mechanism can assign the service to at most k of the buyers. For standard sequential posted price mechanisms, we prove that with the valuation distribution having finite support, no sequential posted price mechanism can extract a constant fraction of the optimal expected revenue, even with unlimited supply. We extend this result to the the case of a continuous valuation distribution when various standard assumptions hold simultaneously. In fact, it turns out that the best fraction of the optimal revenue that is extractable by a sequential posted price mechanism is proportional to ratio of the highest and lowest possible valuation. We prove that for two simple generalizations of these mechanisms, a better revenue performance can be achieved: if the sequential posted price mechanism has for each buyer the option of either proposing an offer or asking the buyer for its valuation, then a Omega(1/max{1,d}) fraction of the optimal revenue can be extracted, where d denotes the degree of dependence of the valuations, ranging from complete independence (d=0) to arbitrary dependence (d=n-1). Moreover, when we generalize the sequential posted price mechanisms further, such that the mechanism has the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the i-th buyer that depends on the valuations of all buyers except i's, we prove that a constant fraction (2-sqrt{e})/4~0.088 of the optimal revenue can be always be extracted.

Includes members:
  Member "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "online contention resolution schemes":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")
  Member "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "robust revenue maximization under minimal statistical information")
  Member "combinatorial auctions via posted prices":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")
  Member "submodular stochastic probing on matroids":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "learning optimal search algorithms from data")
  Member "a stochastic probing problem with applications":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "learning optimal search algorithms from data")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)