human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "social welfare in one sided matchings random priority and beyond"):
  Abstract: We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. Random priority is a very well-known truthful-in-expectation mechanism for the problem. We prove that the approximation ratio of random priority is Theta(n^{-1/2}) while no truthful-in-expectation mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than O(n^{-1/2}), where n is the number of agents and items. Furthermore, we prove that the approximation ratio of all ordinal (not necessarily truthful-in-expectation) mechanisms is upper bounded by O(n^{-1/2}), indicating that random priority is asymptotically the best truthful-in-expectation mechanism and the best ordinal mechanism for the problem.

Includes members:
  Member "efficiency of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one sided matching":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "selfish robustness and equilibria in multi player bandits")
  Member "an axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one sided matching mechanisms":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule")
  Member "welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "assortment auctions a myersonian characterization for markov chain based choice models")
  Member "truthful approximations to range voting":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "truthful ownership transfer with expert advice blending mechanism design with and without money")
  Member "social welfare in one sided matching markets without money":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule")
  Member "truthful assignment without money":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)