human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "on the structure of equilibrium strategies in dynamic gaussian signaling games"):
  Abstract: This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who observes two Gaussian processes, state and bias, and a receiver who takes an action based on the received message from the sender. The players incur quadratic instantaneous costs as functions of the state, bias and action variables. Our particular focus is on the Stackelberg equilibrium, which corresponds to information disclosure and Bayesian persuasion problems in economics. Prior work solved the static game, and showed that the Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved by pure strategies that are linear functions of the state and the bias variables. The main focus of this work is on the dynamic (multi-stage) setting, where we show that the existence of a pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium, within the set of linear strategies, depends on the problem parameters. Surprisingly, for most problem parameters, a pure linear strategy does not achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium which implies the existence of a trade-off between exploiting and revealing information, which was also encountered in several other asymmetric information games.

Includes members:
  Member "information theoretic approach to strategic communication as a hierarchical game":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "dynamic information design a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure")
  Member "estimation with strategic sensors":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "dynamic information design a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure")
  Member "common information based markov perfect equilibria for linear gaussian games with asymmetric information":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "resilient cyberphysical systems and their application drivers a technology roadmap")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.SY(Systems and Control)