human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "on the economic efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction"):
  Abstract: Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. This has provided for a practical examination of an assortment of auction mechanisms and, amongst these, two simultaneous ascending price auctions have proved to be extremely successful. These are the simultaneous multiround ascending auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA). It has long been known that, for certain classes of valuation functions, the SMRA provides good theoretical guarantees on social welfare. However, no such guarantees were known for the CCA. #R##N#In this paper, we show that CCA does provide strong guarantees on social welfare provided the price increment and stopping rule are well-chosen. This is very surprising in that the choice of price increment has been used primarily to adjust auction duration and the stopping rule has attracted little attention. The main result is a polylogarithmic approximation guarantee for social welfare when the maximum number of items demanded $\mathcal{C}$ by a bidder is fixed. Specifically, we show that either the revenue of the CCA is at least an $\Omega\Big(\frac{1}{\mathcal{C}^{2}\log n\log^2m}\Big)$-fraction of the optimal welfare or the welfare of the CCA is at least an $\Omega\Big(\frac{1}{\log n}\Big)$-fraction of the optimal welfare, where $n$ is the number of bidders and $m$ is the number of items. As a corollary, the welfare ratio -- the worst case ratio between the social welfare of the optimum allocation and the social welfare of the CCA allocation -- is at most $O(\mathcal{C}^2 \cdot \log n \cdot \log^2 m)$. We emphasize that this latter result requires no assumption on bidders valuation functions. Finally, we prove that such a dependence on $\mathcal{C}$ is necessary. In particular, we show that the welfare ratio of the CCA is at least $\Omega \Big(\mathcal{C} \cdot \frac{\log m}{\log \log m}\Big)$.

Includes members:
  Member "the combinatorial world of auctions according to garp":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "revealed preference dimension via matrix sign rank")
  Member "welfare and rationality guarantees for the simultaneous multiple round ascending auction":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      (none)
  Member "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions")
  Member "on the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design")
  Member "composable and efficient mechanisms":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")
  Member "simultaneous auctions are almost efficient":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")
  Member "non price equilibria in markets of discrete goods":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "complexity theory game theory and economics the barbados lectures")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)