human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "learning in auctions regret is hard envy is easy"):
  Abstract: A line of recent work provides welfare guarantees of simple combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price auctions (SiSPAs) (Christodoulou et al. 2008, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011, Feldman et al. 2013). These guarantees hold even when the auctions are repeatedly executed and players use no-regret learning algorithms. Unfortunately, off-the-shelf no-regret algorithms for these auctions are computationally inefficient as the number of actions is exponential. We show that this obstacle is insurmountable: there are no polynomial-time no-regret algorithms for SiSPAs, unless RP$\supseteq$ NP, even when the bidders are unit-demand. Our lower bound raises the question of how good outcomes polynomially-bounded bidders may discover in such auctions. #R##N#To answer this question, we propose a novel concept of learning in auctions, termed "no-envy learning." This notion is founded upon Walrasian equilibrium, and we show that it is both efficiently implementable and results in approximately optimal welfare, even when the bidders have fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations (assuming demand oracles) or coverage valuations (without demand oracles). No-envy learning outcomes are a relaxation of no-regret outcomes, which maintain their approximate welfare optimality while endowing them with computational tractability. Our results extend to other auction formats that have been studied in the literature via the smoothness paradigm. #R##N#Our results for XOS valuations are enabled by a novel Follow-The-Perturbed-Leader algorithm for settings where the number of experts is infinite, and the payoff function of the learner is non-linear. This algorithm has applications outside of auction settings, such as in security games. Our result for coverage valuations is based on a novel use of convex rounding schemes and a reduction to online convex optimization.

Includes members:
  Member "breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders")
  Member "interpolating between truthful and non truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions")
  Member "on the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "on simultaneous two player combinatorial auctions")
  Member "taming the monster a fast and simple algorithm for contextual bandits":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "neural contextual bandits with ucb based exploration")
  Member "combinatorial auctions via posted prices":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")
  Member "valuation compressions in vcg based combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities made easy stochastic optimization by pricing non stochastic inputs")
  Member "the computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders")
  Member "regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi armed bandit problems":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "multi source domain adaptation for text classification via distancenet bandits")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)