human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items"):
  Abstract: Maximizing the revenue from selling more than one good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show that simple “one-dimensional” mechanisms, such as selling the goods separately, guarantee at least73% of the optimal revenue when the valuations of the two goods are independent and identically distributed, and at least 50% when they are independent.

Includes members:
  Member "learning simple auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "the menu size complexity of revenue approximation":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "the complexity of contracts")
  Member "a note on the ratio of revenues between selling in a bundle and separately":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      (none)
  Member "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations")
  Member "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "sampling and representation complexity of revenue maximization":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "strong duality for a multiple good monopolist":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)