human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "on the implications of lookahead search in game playing"):
  Abstract: Lookahead search is perhaps the most natural and widely used game playing strategy. Given the practical importance of the method, the aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical performance examination of lookahead search in a wide variety of applications. To determine a strategy play using lookahead search, each agent predicts multiple levels of possible re-actions to her move (via the use of a search tree), and then chooses the play that optimizes her future payo accounting for these re-actions. There are several choices of optimization function the agents can choose, where the most appropriate choice of function will depend on the specics of the actual game - we illustrate this in our examples. Furthermore, the type of search tree chosen by computationally-constrained agent can vary. We focus on the case where agents can evaluate only a bounded number, k, of moves into the future. That is, we use depth k search trees and call this approach k-lookahead search. We apply our method in ve well-known settings: AdWord auctions; industrial organization (Cournot's model); congestion games; valid-utility games and basic-utility games; cost-sharing network design games. We consider two questions. First, what is the expected social quality of outcome when agents apply lookahead search? Second, what interactive behaviours can be exhibited when players use lookahead search? Myopic game playing (whose corresponding equilibria are Nash equilibria), where each player can only foresee the immediate eect of her own actions, is the special case of 1-lookahead search. Thus, for the rst question, it is natural to ask whether social outcomes improve when players use more foresight than in myopic behaviour. The answer depends on the game played: (i) In Adword auctions (or generalized second-price auctions), we show that 2-lookahead game playing results in outcomes that are always optimal to within a constant factor; in contrast, myopic game play can produce arbitrarily poor equilibrium outcomes. (ii) For the Cournot game, applying 2-lookahead leads to a 12:5% increase in output and a 5:5% increase in social surplus compared with myopic competition. Similar bounds arise as the length k of foresight increases. (iii) For congestion games, as with myopic game playing, lookahead search leads to constant factor qualitative guarantees. (iv) For basic-utility games, on the other hand, whilst myopic game playing always leads to constant factor approximations, additional foresight can lead to arbitrarily bad solutions! (v) In a simple Shapley network design game, qualitative guarantees improve with the length of foresight. Regarding the second question, a variety of interesting game playing characteristics also arise with lookahead search. Stackelberg leader-follower behaviours can be induced when the players have asymmetric computational power. For example, Stackelberg equilibria can be pro- duced in the Cournot game. Lookahead search can also generate \uncoordinated" cooperative behaviour! An example of this is shown for the Shapely network design game.

Includes members:
  Member "on the complexity of nash dynamics and sink equilibria":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "approximate best response dynamics in random interference games")
  Member "bounding rationality by discounting time":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "plausibility and probability in deductive reasoning")
  Member "convergence to equilibrium in local interaction games and ising models":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      (none)
  Member "distributed selfish load balancing":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "fission a provably fast scalable and secure permissionless blockchain")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)