human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "better strategyproof mechanisms without payments or prior an analytic approach"):
  Abstract: We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The objective is to design strategyproof mechanisms which are competitive against the most efficient (but not strategyproof) mechanism. #R##N#For the case with two items: #R##N#(1) We provide a set of sufficient conditions for strategyproofness. #R##N#(2) We use an analytic approach to derive strategyproof mechanisms which are more competitive than all prior strategyproof mechanisms. #R##N#(3) We improve the linear-program-based proof of Guo and Conitzer to show new upper bounds on competitive ratios. #R##N#(4) We provide the first "mathematical" upper bound proof. #R##N#For the cases with any number of items: #R##N#(1) We build on the Partial Allocation mechanisms introduced by Cole et al. to design a strategyproof mechanism which is 0.67776-competitive, breaking the 2/3 barrier. #R##N#(2) We propose a new subclass of strategyproof mechanisms called Dynamical-Increasing-Price mechanisms, where each agent purchases the items using virtual money, and the prices of the items depend on other agents' preferences.

Includes members:
  Member "selling two goods optimally":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations")
  Member "duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations")
  Member "truthful assignment without money":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)