human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms with simple menus"):
  Abstract: We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer's valuations towards the two items are independent and additive. In this setting, optimal mechanism is unknown for general valuation distributions. We obtain two categories of structural results that shed light on the optimal mechanisms. #R##N#The first category of results state that, under certain mild condition, the optimal mechanism has a monotone menu. In other words, in the menu that represents the optimal mechanism, as payment increases, the allocation probabilities for both items increase simultaneously. Applying this theorem, we derive a version of revenue monotonicity theorem that states stochastically superior distributions yield more revenue. Moreover, our theorem subsumes a previous result regarding sufficient conditions under which bundling is optimal. The second category of results state that, under certain conditions, the optimal mechanisms have few menu items. Our first result in this category says, for certain distributions, the optimal menu contains at most 4 items. The condition admits power (including uniform) density functions. Based on a similar proof of this result, we are able to obtain a wide class of distributions where bundling is optimal. Our second result in this category works for a weaker condition, under which the optimal menu contains at most 6 items. This condition includes exponential density functions. Our last result in this category works for unit-demand setting. It states that, for uniform distributions, the optimal menu contains at most 5 items. All these results are in sharp contrast to Hart and Nisan's recent result that finite-sized menu cannot guarantee any positive fraction of optimal revenue for correlated valuation distributions.

Includes members:
  Member "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "mechanism design via optimal transport":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "simple credible and approximately optimal auctions")
  Member "the menu size complexity of auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "simple and nearly optimal multi item auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations")
  Member "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "on optimal multi dimensional mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)