human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "the competition complexity of auctions a bulow klemperer result for multi dimensional bidders"):
  Abstract: A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution, the simple welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism (in this case, a second price-auction) with one additional bidder extracts at least as much revenue in expectation as the optimal mechanism. The beauty of this theorem stems from the fact that VCG is a {\em prior-independent} mechanism, where the seller possesses no information about the distribution, and yet, by recruiting one additional bidder it performs better than any prior-dependent mechanism tailored exactly to the distribution at hand (without the additional bidder). #R##N#In this work, we establish the first {\em full Bulow-Klemperer} results in {\em multi-dimensional} environments, proving that by recruiting additional bidders, the revenue of the VCG mechanism surpasses that of the optimal (possibly randomized, Bayesian incentive compatible) mechanism. For a given environment with i.i.d. bidders, we term the number of additional bidders needed to achieve this guarantee the environment's {\em competition complexity}. #R##N#Using the recent duality-based framework of Cai et al. [2016] for reasoning about optimal revenue, we show that the competition complexity of $n$ bidders with additive valuations over $m$ independent, regular items is at most $n+2m-2$ and at least $\log(m)$. We extend our results to bidders with additive valuations subject to downward-closed constraints, showing that these significantly more general valuations increase the competition complexity by at most an additive $m-1$ factor. We further improve this bound for the special case of matroid constraints, and provide additional extensions as well.

Includes members:
  Member "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "learning simple auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design")
  Member "mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "the sample complexity of revenue maximization":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "the sample complexity of auctions with side information":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)