human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items"):
  Abstract: We study the problem of selling $n$ items to a single buyer with an additive valuation function. We consider the valuation of the items to be correlated, i.e., desirabilities of the buyer for the items are not drawn independently. Ideally, the goal is to design a mechanism to maximize the revenue. However, it has been shown that a revenue optimal mechanism might be very complicated and as a result inapplicable to real-world auctions. Therefore, our focus is on designing a simple mechanism that achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Babaioff et al. propose a simple mechanism that achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue for independent setting with a single additive buyer. However, they leave the following problem as an open question: "Is there a simple, approximately optimal mechanism for a single additive buyer whose value for $n$ items is sampled from a common base-value distribution?" #R##N#Babaioff et al. show a constant approximation factor of the optimal revenue can be achieved by either selling the items separately or as a whole bundle in the independent setting. We show a similar result for the correlated setting when the desirabilities of the buyer are drawn from a common base-value distribution. It is worth mentioning that the core decomposition lemma which is mainly the heart of the proofs for efficiency of the mechanisms does not hold for correlated settings. Therefore we propose a modified version of this lemma which is applicable to the correlated settings as well. Although we apply this technique to show the proposed mechanism can guarantee a constant fraction of the optimal revenue in a very weak correlation, this method alone can not directly show the efficiency of the mechanism in stronger correlations.

Includes members:
  Member "approximate revenue maximization with multiple items":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "simple mechanisms for a combinatorial buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "the sample complexity of up to varepsilon multi dimensional revenue maximization")
  Member "a simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "an n to 1 bidder reduction for multi item auctions and its applications":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "reducing revenue to welfare maximization approximation algorithms and other generalizations":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations")
  Member "the menu size complexity of auctions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "bayesian optimal auctions via multi to single agent reduction":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)