human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "the simple economics of approximately optimal auctions"):
  Abstract: The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with linear utility and single-dimensional preferences, Bulow and Roberts (1989) show that the optimal auction of Myerson (1981) is in fact optimizing marginal revenue. In particular Myerson's virtual values are exactly the derivative of an appropriate revenue curve. #R##N#This paper considers mechanism design in environments where the agents have multi-dimensional and non-linear preferences. Understanding good auctions for these environments is considered to be the main challenge in Bayesian optimal mechanism design. In these environments maximizing marginal revenue may not be optimal and there is sometimes no direct way to implement the marginal revenue maximization. Our contributions are three fold: we characterize the settings for which marginal revenue maximization is optimal (by identifying an important condition that we call revenue linearity), we give simple procedures for implementing marginal revenue maximization in general, and we show that marginal revenue maximization is approximately optimal. Our approximation factor smoothly degrades in a term that quantifies how far the environment is from ideal (where marginal revenue maximization is optimal). Because the marginal revenue mechanism is optimal for single-dimensional agents, our generalization immediately approximately extends many results for single-dimensional agents. #R##N#One of the biggest open questions in Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design is developing methodologies that are not brute-force in the size of the agent type space. Our methods identify a subproblem that, e.g., for unit-demand agents with values drawn from product distributions, enables approximation mechanisms that are polynomial in the dimension.

Includes members:
  Member "reducing revenue to welfare maximization approximation algorithms and other generalizations":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations")
  Member "bayesian optimal auctions via multi to single agent reduction":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "optimal multi dimensional mechanism design reducing revenue to welfare maximization":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "bayesian combinatorial auctions expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "an algorithmic characterization of multi dimensional mechanisms":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "a permutation equivariant neural network architecture for auction design")
  Member "extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "escaping cannibalization correlation robust pricing for a unit demand buyer")
  Member "mechanism design via correlation gap":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")
  Member "the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "prophet inequalities with linear correlations and augmentations")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)