human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "budget feasible mechanism design for non monotone submodular objectives offline and online"):
  Abstract: The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible and $O(1)$-approximate mechanisms that run in polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Prior to our work, the only $O(1)$-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries. #R##N#At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem where---crucially---the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online setting as well. #R##N#To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility constraints are present. We obtain $O(p)$-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a $p$-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guarantees in polynomial time, our results are asymptotically best possible.

Includes members:
  Member "a nearly linear time algorithm for submodular maximization with a knapsack constraint":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "approximability of monotone submodular function maximization under cardinality and matroid constraints in the streaming model")
  Member "on budget feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "optimal budget feasible mechanisms for additive valuations")
  Member "simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "optimal budget feasible mechanisms for additive valuations")
  Member "greed is good near optimal submodular maximization via greedy optimization":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "regularized submodular maximization at scale")
  Member "budget feasible mechanisms on matroids":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "optimal budget feasible mechanisms for additive valuations")
  Member "adaptivity gaps for stochastic probing submodular and xos functions":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "pandora s box problem with order constraints")
  Member "coverage matching and beyond new results on budgeted mechanism design":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "optimal budget feasible mechanisms for additive valuations")
  Member "submodular secretary problems cardinality matching and linear constraints":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "submodular matroid secretary problem with shortlists")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory)