human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "arm pointer authentication based forward edge and backward edge control flow integrity for kernels"):
  Abstract: Code reuse attacks are still big threats to software and system security. Control flow integrity is a promising technique to defend against such attacks. However, its effectiveness has been weakened due to the inaccurate control flow graph and practical strategy to trade security for performance. In recent years, CPU vendors have integrated hardware features as countermeasures. For instance, ARM Pointer Authentication (PA in short) was introduced in ARMV8-A architecture. It can efficiently generate an authentication code for an address, which is encoded in the unused bits of the address. When the address is de-referenced, the authentication code is checked to ensure its integrity. Though there exist systems that adopt PA to harden user programs, how to effectively use PA to protect OS kernels is still an open research question. #R##N#In this paper, we shed lights on how to leverage PA to protect control flows, including function pointers and return addresses, of Linux kernel. Specifically, to protect function pointers, we embed authentication code into them, track their propagation and verify their values when loading from memory or branching to targets. To further defend against the pointer substitution attack, we use the function pointer address as its context, and take a clean design to propagate the address by piggybacking it into the pointer value. We have implemented a prototype system with LLVM to identify function pointers, add authentication code and verify function pointers by emitting new machine instructions. We applied this system to Linux kernel, and solved numerous practical issues, e.g., function pointer comparison and arithmetic operations. The security analysis shows that our system can protect all function pointers and return addresses in Linux kernel.

Includes members:
  Member "protecting the stack with paced canaries":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "camouflage hardware assisted cfi for the arm linux kernel")
  Member "pac it up towards pointer integrity using arm pointer authentication":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "using name confusion to enhance security")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)