human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "sgxpectre stealing intel secrets from sgx enclaves via speculative execution"):
  Abstract: Speculative execution side-channel vulnerabilities in micro-architecture processors have raised concerns about the security of Intel SGX. To understand clearly the security impact of this vulnerability against SGX, this paper makes the following studies: First, to demonstrate the feasibility of the attacks, we present SgxPectre Attacks (the SGX-variants of Spectre attacks) that exploit speculative execution side-channel vulnerabilities to subvert the confidentiality of SGX enclaves. We show that when the branch prediction of the enclave code can be influenced by programs outside the enclave, the control flow of the enclave program can be temporarily altered to execute instructions that lead to observable cache-state changes. An adversary observing such changes can learn secrets inside the enclave memory or its internal registers, thus completely defeating the confidentiality guarantee offered by SGX. Second, to determine whether real-world enclave programs are impacted by the attacks, we develop techniques to automate the search of vulnerable code patterns in enclave binaries using symbolic execution. Our study suggests that nearly any enclave program could be vulnerable to SgxPectre Attacks since vulnerable code patterns are available in most SGX runtimes (e.g., Intel SGX SDK, Rust-SGX, and Graphene-SGX). Third, we apply SgxPectre Attacks to steal seal keys and attestation keys from Intel signed quoting enclaves. The seal key can be used to decrypt sealed storage outside the enclaves and forge valid sealed data; the attestation key can be used to forge attestation signatures. For these reasons, SgxPectre Attacks practically defeat SGX's security protection. Finally, we evaluate Intel's existing countermeasures against SgxPectre Attacks and discusses the security implications.

Includes members:
  Member "netspectre read arbitrary memory over network":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "ghostknight breaching data integrity via speculative execution")
  Member "spectre returns speculation attacks using the return stack buffer":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "ghostknight breaching data integrity via speculative execution")
  Member "ret2spec speculative execution using return stack buffers":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "ghostknight breaching data integrity via speculative execution")
  Member "the circle game scalable private membership test using trusted hardware":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "pdot private dns over tls with tee support")
  Member "software grand exposure sgx cache attacks are practical":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "distributed systems and trusted execution environments trade offs and challenges")
  Member "sgxio generic trusted i o path for intel sgx":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "secloak arm trustzone based mobile peripheral control")
  Member "malware guard extension using sgx to conceal cache attacks":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "copycat controlled instruction level attacks on enclaves for maximal key extraction")
  Member "a software approach to defeating side channels in last level caches":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "a compiler assisted scheduler for detecting and mitigating cache based side channel attacks")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)