human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "aggregating votes with local differential privacy usefulness soundness vs indistinguishability"):
  Abstract: Voting plays a central role in bringing crowd wisdom to collective decision making, meanwhile data privacy has been a common ethical/legal issue in eliciting preferences from individuals. This work studies the problem of aggregating individual's voting data under the local differential privacy setting, where usefulness and soundness of the aggregated scores are of major concern. One naive approach to the problem is adding Laplace random noises, however, it makes aggregated scores extremely fragile to new types of strategic behaviors tailored to the local privacy setting: data amplification attack and view disguise attack. The data amplification attack means an attacker's manipulation power is amplified by the privacy-preserving procedure when contributing a fraud vote. The view disguise attack happens when an attacker could disguise malicious data as valid private views to manipulate the voting result. #R##N#In this work, after theoretically quantifying the estimation error bound and the manipulating risk bound of the Laplace mechanism, we propose two mechanisms improving the usefulness and soundness simultaneously: the weighted sampling mechanism and the additive mechanism. The former one interprets the score vector as probabilistic data. Compared to the Laplace mechanism for Borda voting rule with $d$ candidates, it reduces the mean squared error bound by half and lowers the maximum magnitude risk bound from $+\infty$ to $O(\frac{d^3}{n\epsilon})$. The latter one randomly outputs a subset of candidates according to their total scores. Its mean squared error bound is optimized from $O(\frac{d^5}{n\epsilon^2})$ to $O(\frac{d^4}{n\epsilon^2})$, and its maximum magnitude risk bound is reduced to $O(\frac{d^2}{n\epsilon})$. Experimental results validate that our proposed approaches averagely reduce estimation error by $50\%$ and are more robust to adversarial attacks.

Includes members:
  Member "collecting and analyzing multidimensional data with local differential privacy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "locally private distributed reinforcement learning")
  Member "tight lower bounds for locally differentially private selection":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "locally private hypothesis selection")
  Member "privacy loss in apple s implementation of differential privacy on macos 10 12":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "encode shuffle analyze privacy revisited formalizations and empirical evaluation")
  Member "tight lower bounds for differentially private selection":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "on the power of multiple anonymous messages")
  Member "marginal release under local differential privacy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "outis crypto assisted differential privacy on untrusted servers")
  Member "heavy hitters and the structure of local privacy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "pure differentially private summation from anonymous messages")
  Member "collecting telemetry data privately":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-7 (induced by source paper "locally private hypothesis selection")
  Member "collecting and analyzing data from smart device users with local differential privacy":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-8 (induced by source paper "privacy preserving boosting in the local setting")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)