human: Given a hyperedge-centered hypergraph: <hypergraph>, where the center hyperedge is induced by one source paper and its member nodes are the cited papers.

Details of the hypergraph:
Center hyperedge (induced by source paper "cattmew defeating software only physical kernel isolation"):
  Abstract: All the state-of-the-art rowhammer attacks can break the MMU-enforced inter-domain isolation because the physical memory owned by each domain is adjacent to each other. To mitigate these attacks, physical domain isolation, introduced by CATT, physically separates each domain by dividing the physical memory into multiple partitions and keeping each partition occupied by only one domain. CATT implemented physical kernel isolation as the first generic and practical software-only defense to protect kernel from being rowhammered as kernel is one of the most appealing targets.  In this paper, we develop a novel exploit that could effectively defeat the physical kernel isolation and gain both root and kernel privileges. Our exploit can work without exhausting the page cache or the system memory, or relying on the information of the virtual-to-physical address mapping. The exploit is motivated by our key observation that the modern OSes have double-owned kernel buffers (e.g., video buffers and SCSI Generic buffers) owned concurrently by the kernel and user domains. The existence of such buffers invalidates the physical kernel isolation and makes the rowhammer-based attack possible again. Existing conspicuous rowhammer attacks achieving the root/kernel privilege escalation exhaust the page cache or even the whole system memory. Instead, we propose a new technique, named memory ambush. It is able to place the hammerable double-owned kernel buffers physically adjacent to the target objects (e.g., page tables) with only a small amount of memory. As a result, our exploit is stealthier and has fewer memory footprints. We also replace the inefficient rowhammer algorithm that blindly picks up addresses to hammer with an efficient one. Our algorithm selects suitable addresses based on an existing timing channel.

Includes members:
  Member "nethammer inducing rowhammer faults through network requests":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-1 (induced by source paper "are we susceptible to rowhammer an end to end methodology for cloud providers")
  Member "another flip in the wall of rowhammer defenses":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-2 (induced by source paper "are we susceptible to rowhammer an end to end methodology for cloud providers")
  Member "malware guard extension using sgx to conceal cache attacks":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-3 (induced by source paper "copycat controlled instruction level attacks on enclaves for maximal key extraction")
  Member "can t touch this practical and generic software only defenses against rowhammer attacks":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-4 (induced by source paper "are we susceptible to rowhammer an end to end methodology for cloud providers")
  Member "rowhammer js a remote software induced fault attack in javascript":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-5 (induced by source paper "are we susceptible to rowhammer an end to end methodology for cloud providers")
  Member "drama exploiting dram addressing for cross cpu attacks":
    also connected through other hyperedges:
      - Hyperedge HE-6 (induced by source paper "are we susceptible to rowhammer an end to end methodology for cloud providers")

Question: Please tell me which class the source paper belongs to. The 40 classes are: cs.NA(Numerical Analysis), cs.MM(Multimedia), cs.LO(Logic in Computer Science), cs.CY(Computers and Society), cs.CR(Cryptography and Security), cs.DC(Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing), cs.HC(Human-Computer Interaction), cs.CE(Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science), cs.NI(Networking and Internet Architecture), cs.CC(Computational Complexity), cs.AI(Artificial Intelligence), cs.MA(Multiagent Systems), cs.GL(General Literature), cs.NE(Neural and Evolutionary Computing), cs.SC(Symbolic Computation), cs.AR(Hardware Architecture), cs.CV(Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition), cs.GR(Graphics), cs.ET(Emerging Technologies), cs.SY(Systems and Control), cs.CG(Computational Geometry), cs.OH(Other Computer Science), cs.PL(Programming Languages), cs.SE(Software Engineering), cs.LG(Machine Learning), cs.SD(Sound), cs.SI(Social and Information Networks), cs.RO(Robotics), cs.IT(Information Theory), cs.PF(Performance), cs.CL(Computation and Language), cs.IR(Information Retrieval), cs.MS(Mathematical Software), cs.FL(Formal Languages and Automata Theory), cs.DS(Data Structures and Algorithms), cs.OS(Operating Systems), cs.GT(Computer Science and Game Theory), cs.DB(Databases), cs.DL(Digital Libraries), cs.DM(Discrete Mathematics). Directly output the class name.

gpt: cs.CR(Cryptography and Security)