Title 12—Banks and Banking--Volume 1
PART 3—CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS
§ 3.101   Definitions.
(a) Terms that are set forth in § 3.2 and used in this subpart have the definitions assigned thereto in § 3.2.
(b) For the purposes of this subpart, the following terms are defined as follows:
Advanced internal ratings-based (IRB) systems means an advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings association's internal risk rating and segmentation system; risk parameter quantification system; data management and maintenance system; and control, oversight, and validation system for credit risk of wholesale and retail exposures.
Advanced systems means an advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings association's advanced IRB systems, operational risk management processes, operational risk data and assessment systems, operational risk quantification systems, and, to the extent used by the national bank or Federal savings association, the internal models methodology, advanced CVA approach, double default excessive correlation detection process, and internal models approach (IMA) for equity exposures.
Backtesting means the comparison of a national bank's or Federal savings association's internal estimates with actual outcomes during a sample period not used in model development. In this context, backtesting is one form of out-of-sample testing.
Benchmarking means the comparison of a national bank's or Federal savings association's internal estimates with relevant internal and external data or with estimates based on other estimation techniques.
Bond option contract means a bond option, bond future, or any other instrument linked to a bond that gives rise to similar counterparty credit risk.
Business environment and internal control factors means the indicators of a national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk profile that reflect a current and forward-looking assessment of the national bank's or Federal savings association's underlying business risk factors and internal control environment.
Credit default swap (CDS) means a financial contract executed under standard industry documentation that allows one party (the protection purchaser) to transfer the credit risk of one or more exposures (reference exposure(s)) to another party (the protection provider) for a certain period of time.
Credit valuation adjustment (CVA) means the fair value adjustment to reflect counterparty credit risk in valuation of OTC derivative contracts.
Default —For the purposes of calculating capital requirements under this subpart:
(1) Retail. (i) A retail exposure of a national bank or Federal savings association is in default if:
(A) The exposure is 180 days past due, in the case of a residential mortgage exposure or revolving exposure;
(B) The exposure is 120 days past due, in the case of retail exposures that are not residential mortgage exposures or revolving exposures; or
(C) The national bank or Federal savings association has taken a full or partial charge-off, write-down of principal, or material negative fair value adjustment of principal on the exposure for credit-related reasons.
(ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(i) of this definition, for a retail exposure held by a non-U.S. subsidiary of the national bank or Federal savings association that is subject to an internal ratings-based approach to capital adequacy consistent with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework” in a non-U.S. jurisdiction, the national bank or Federal savings association may elect to use the definition of default that is used in that jurisdiction, provided that the national bank or Federal savings association has obtained prior approval from the OCC to use the definition of default in that jurisdiction.
(iii) A retail exposure in default remains in default until the national bank or Federal savings association has reasonable assurance of repayment and performance for all contractual principal and interest payments on the exposure.
(2) Wholesale. (i) A national bank's or Federal savings association's wholesale obligor is in default if:
(A) The national bank or Federal savings association determines that the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the national bank or Federal savings association in full, without recourse by the national bank or Federal savings association to actions such as realizing collateral (if held); or
(B) The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation(s) to the national bank or Federal savings association. 29
29 Overdrafts are past due once the obligor has breached an advised limit or been advised of a limit smaller than the current outstanding balance.
(ii) An obligor in default remains in default until the national bank or Federal savings association has reasonable assurance of repayment and performance for all contractual principal and interest payments on all exposures of the national bank or Federal savings association to the obligor (other than exposures that have been fully written-down or charged-off).
Dependence means a measure of the association among operational losses across and within units of measure.
Economic downturn conditions means, with respect to an exposure held by the national bank or Federal savings association, those conditions in which the aggregate default rates for that exposure's wholesale or retail exposure subcategory (or subdivision of such subcategory selected by the national bank or Federal savings association) in the exposure's national jurisdiction (or subdivision of such jurisdiction selected by the national bank or Federal savings association) are significantly higher than average.
Effective maturity (M) of a wholesale exposure means:
(1) For wholesale exposures other than repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative contracts described in paragraph (2) or (3) of this definition:
(i) The weighted-average remaining maturity (measured in years, whole or fractional) of the expected contractual cash flows from the exposure, using the undiscounted amounts of the cash flows as weights; or
(ii) The nominal remaining maturity (measured in years, whole or fractional) of the exposure.
(2) For repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative contracts subject to a qualifying master netting agreement for which the national bank or Federal savings association does not apply the internal models approach in section 132(d), the weighted-average remaining maturity (measured in years, whole or fractional) of the individual transactions subject to the qualifying master netting agreement, with the weight of each individual transaction set equal to the notional amount of the transaction.
(3) For repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative contracts for which the national bank or Federal savings association applies the internal models approach in § 3.132(d), the value determined in § 3.132(d)(4).
Eligible double default guarantor, with respect to a guarantee or credit derivative obtained by a national bank or Federal savings association, means:
(1) U.S.-based entities. A depository institution, a bank holding company, a savings and loan holding company, or a securities broker or dealer registered with the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act, if at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter, has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit enhancement that is investment grade.
(2) Non-U.S.-based entities. A foreign bank, or a non-U.S.-based securities firm if the national bank or Federal savings association demonstrates that the guarantor is subject to consolidated supervision and regulation comparable to that imposed on U.S. depository institutions, or securities broker-dealers) if at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter, has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit enhancement that is investment grade.
Eligible operational risk offsets means amounts, not to exceed expected operational loss, that:
(1) Are generated by internal business practices to absorb highly predictable and reasonably stable operational losses, including reserves calculated consistent with GAAP; and
(2) Are available to cover expected operational losses with a high degree of certainty over a one-year horizon.
Eligible purchased wholesale exposure means a purchased wholesale exposure that:
(1) The national bank or Federal savings association or securitization SPE purchased from an unaffiliated seller and did not directly or indirectly originate;
(2) Was generated on an arm's-length basis between the seller and the obligor (intercompany accounts receivable and receivables subject to contra-accounts between firms that buy and sell to each other do not satisfy this criterion);
(3) Provides the national bank or Federal savings association or securitization SPE with a claim on all proceeds from the exposure or a pro rata interest in the proceeds from the exposure;
(4) Has an M of less than one year; and
(5) When consolidated by obligor, does not represent a concentrated exposure relative to the portfolio of purchased wholesale exposures.
Expected exposure (EE) means the expected value of the probability distribution of non-negative credit risk exposures to a counterparty at any specified future date before the maturity date of the longest term transaction in the netting set. Any negative fair values in the probability distribution of fair values to a counterparty at a specified future date are set to zero to convert the probability distribution of fair values to the probability distribution of credit risk exposures.
Expected operational loss (EOL) means the expected value of the distribution of potential aggregate operational losses, as generated by the national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk quantification system using a one-year horizon.
Expected positive exposure (EPE) means the weighted average over time of expected (non-negative) exposures to a counterparty where the weights are the proportion of the time interval that an individual expected exposure represents. When calculating risk-based capital requirements, the average is taken over a one-year horizon.
Exposure at default (EAD) means:
(1) For the on-balance sheet component of a wholesale exposure or segment of retail exposures (other than an OTC derivative contract, a repo-style transaction or eligible margin loan for which the national bank or Federal savings association determines EAD under § 3.132, a cleared transaction, or default fund contribution), EAD means the national bank's or Federal savings association's carrying value (including net accrued but unpaid interest and fees) for the exposure or segment less any allocated transfer risk reserve for the exposure or segment.
(2) For the off-balance sheet component of a wholesale exposure or segment of retail exposures (other than an OTC derivative contract, a repo-style transaction or eligible margin loan for which the national bank or Federal savings association determines EAD under § 3.132, cleared transaction, or default fund contribution) in the form of a loan commitment, line of credit, trade-related letter of credit, or transaction-related contingency, EAD means the national bank's or Federal savings association's best estimate of net additions to the outstanding amount owed the national bank or Federal savings association, including estimated future additional draws of principal and accrued but unpaid interest and fees, that are likely to occur over a one-year horizon assuming the wholesale exposure or the retail exposures in the segment were to go into default. This estimate of net additions must reflect what would be expected during economic downturn conditions. For the purposes of this definition:
(i) Trade-related letters of credit are short-term, self-liquidating instruments that are used to finance the movement of goods and are collateralized by the underlying goods.
(ii) Transaction-related contingencies relate to a particular transaction and include, among other things, performance bonds and performance-based letters of credit.
(3) For the off-balance sheet component of a wholesale exposure or segment of retail exposures (other than an OTC derivative contract, a repo-style transaction, or eligible margin loan for which the national bank or Federal savings association determines EAD under § 3.132, cleared transaction, or default fund contribution) in the form of anything other than a loan commitment, line of credit, trade-related letter of credit, or transaction-related contingency, EAD means the notional amount of the exposure or segment.
(4) EAD for OTC derivative contracts is calculated as described in § 3.132. A national bank or Federal savings association also may determine EAD for repo-style transactions and eligible margin loans as described in § 3.132.
Exposure category means any of the wholesale, retail, securitization, or equity exposure categories.
External operational loss event data means, with respect to a national bank or Federal savings association, gross operational loss amounts, dates, recoveries, and relevant causal information for operational loss events occurring at organizations other than the national bank or Federal savings association.
IMM exposure means a repo-style transaction, eligible margin loan, or OTC derivative for which a national bank or Federal savings association calculates its EAD using the internal models methodology of § 3.132(d).
Internal operational loss event data means, with respect to a national bank or Federal savings association, gross operational loss amounts, dates, recoveries, and relevant causal information for operational loss events occurring at the national bank or Federal savings association.
Loss given default (LGD) means:
(1) For a wholesale exposure, the greatest of:
(i) Zero;
(ii) The national bank's or Federal savings association's empirically based best estimate of the long-run default-weighted average economic loss, per dollar of EAD, the national bank or Federal savings association would expect to incur if the obligor (or a typical obligor in the loss severity grade assigned by the national bank or Federal savings association to the exposure) were to default within a one-year horizon over a mix of economic conditions, including economic downturn conditions; or
(iii) The national bank's or Federal savings association's empirically based best estimate of the economic loss, per dollar of EAD, the national bank or Federal savings association would expect to incur if the obligor (or a typical obligor in the loss severity grade assigned by the national bank or Federal savings association to the exposure) were to default within a one-year horizon during economic downturn conditions.
(2) For a segment of retail exposures, the greatest of:
(i) Zero;
(ii) The national bank's or Federal savings association's empirically based best estimate of the long-run default-weighted average economic loss, per dollar of EAD, the national bank or Federal savings association would expect to incur if the exposures in the segment were to default within a one-year horizon over a mix of economic conditions, including economic downturn conditions; or
(iii) The national bank's or Federal savings association's empirically based best estimate of the economic loss, per dollar of EAD, the national bank or Federal savings association would expect to incur if the exposures in the segment were to default within a one-year horizon during economic downturn conditions.
(3) The economic loss on an exposure in the event of default is all material credit-related losses on the exposure (including accrued but unpaid interest or fees, losses on the sale of collateral, direct workout costs, and an appropriate allocation of indirect workout costs). Where positive or negative cash flows on a wholesale exposure to a defaulted obligor or a defaulted retail exposure (including proceeds from the sale of collateral, workout costs, additional extensions of credit to facilitate repayment of the exposure, and draw-downs of unused credit lines) occur after the date of default, the economic loss must reflect the net present value of cash flows as of the default date using a discount rate appropriate to the risk of the defaulted exposure.
Obligor means the legal entity or natural person contractually obligated on a wholesale exposure, except that a national bank or Federal savings association may treat the following exposures as having separate obligors:
(1) Exposures to the same legal entity or natural person denominated in different currencies;
(2)(i) An income-producing real estate exposure for which all or substantially all of the repayment of the exposure is reliant on the cash flows of the real estate serving as collateral for the exposure; the national bank or Federal savings association, in economic substance, does not have recourse to the borrower beyond the real estate collateral; and no cross-default or cross-acceleration clauses are in place other than clauses obtained solely out of an abundance of caution; and
(ii) Other credit exposures to the same legal entity or natural person; and
(3)(i) A wholesale exposure authorized under section 364 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 364) to a legal entity or natural person who is a debtor-in-possession for purposes of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; and
(ii) Other credit exposures to the same legal entity or natural person.
Operational loss means a loss (excluding insurance or tax effects) resulting from an operational loss event. Operational loss includes all expenses associated with an operational loss event except for opportunity costs, forgone revenue, and costs related to risk management and control enhancements implemented to prevent future operational losses.
Operational loss event means an event that results in loss and is associated with any of the following seven operational loss event type categories:
(1) Internal fraud, which means the operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses resulting from an act involving at least one internal party of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property, or circumvent regulations, the law, or company policy excluding diversity- and discrimination-type events.
(2) External fraud, which means the operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses resulting from an act by a third party of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property, or circumvent the law. Retail credit card losses arising from non-contractual, third-party-initiated fraud (for example, identity theft) are external fraud operational losses. All other third-party-initiated credit losses are to be treated as credit risk losses.
(3) Employment practices and workplace safety, which means the operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses resulting from an act inconsistent with employment, health, or safety laws or agreements, payment of personal injury claims, or payment arising from diversity- and discrimination-type events.
(4) Clients, products, and business practices, which means the operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses resulting from the nature or design of a product or from an unintentional or negligent failure to meet a professional obligation to specific clients (including fiduciary and suitability requirements).
(5) Damage to physical assets, which means the operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses resulting from the loss of or damage to physical assets from natural disaster or other events.
(6) Business disruption and system failures, which means the operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses resulting from disruption of business or system failures.
(7) Execution, delivery, and process management, which means the operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses resulting from failed transaction processing or process management or losses arising from relations with trade counterparties and vendors.
Operational risk means the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems or from external events (including legal risk but excluding strategic and reputational risk).
Operational risk exposure means the 99.9th percentile of the distribution of potential aggregate operational losses, as generated by the national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk quantification system over a one-year horizon (and not incorporating eligible operational risk offsets or qualifying operational risk mitigants).
Other retail exposure means an exposure (other than a securitization exposure, an equity exposure, a residential mortgage exposure, a pre-sold construction loan, a qualifying revolving exposure, or the residual value portion of a lease exposure) that is managed as part of a segment of exposures with homogeneous risk characteristics, not on an individual-exposure basis, and is either:
(1) An exposure to an individual for non-business purposes; or
(2) An exposure to an individual or company for business purposes if the national bank's or Federal savings association's consolidated business credit exposure to the individual or company is $1 million or less.
Probability of default (PD) means:
(1) For a wholesale exposure to a non-defaulted obligor, the national bank's or Federal savings association's empirically based best estimate of the long-run average one-year default rate for the rating grade assigned by the national bank or Federal savings association to the obligor, capturing the average default experience for obligors in the rating grade over a mix of economic conditions (including economic downturn conditions) sufficient to provide a reasonable estimate of the average one-year default rate over the economic cycle for the rating grade.
(2) For a segment of non-defaulted retail exposures, the national bank's or Federal savings association's empirically based best estimate of the long-run average one-year default rate for the exposures in the segment, capturing the average default experience for exposures in the segment over a mix of economic conditions (including economic downturn conditions) sufficient to provide a reasonable estimate of the average one-year default rate over the economic cycle for the segment.
(3) For a wholesale exposure to a defaulted obligor or segment of defaulted retail exposures, 100 percent.
Qualifying cross-product master netting agreement means a qualifying master netting agreement that provides for termination and close-out netting across multiple types of financial transactions or qualifying master netting agreements in the event of a counterparty's default, provided that the underlying financial transactions are OTC derivative contracts, eligible margin loans, or repo-style transactions. In order to treat an agreement as a qualifying cross-product master netting agreement for purposes of this subpart, a national bank or Federal savings association must comply with the requirements of § 3.3(c) of this part with respect to that agreement.
Qualifying revolving exposure (QRE) means an exposure (other than a securitization exposure or equity exposure) to an individual that is managed as part of a segment of exposures with homogeneous risk characteristics, not on an individual-exposure basis, and:
(1) Is revolving (that is, the amount outstanding fluctuates, determined largely by a borrower's decision to borrow and repay up to a pre-established maximum amount, except for an outstanding amount that the borrower is required to pay in full every month);
(2) Is unsecured and unconditionally cancelable by the national bank or Federal savings association to the fullest extent permitted by Federal law; and
(3)(i) Has a maximum contractual exposure amount (drawn plus undrawn) of up to $100,000; or
(ii) With respect to a product with an outstanding amount that the borrower is required to pay in full every month, the total outstanding amount does not in practice exceed $100,000.
(4) A segment of exposures that contains one or more exposures that fails to meet paragraph (3)(ii) of this definition must be treated as a segment of other retail exposures for the 24 month period following the month in which the total outstanding amount of one or more exposures individually exceeds $100,000.
Retail exposure means a residential mortgage exposure, a qualifying revolving exposure, or an other retail exposure.
Retail exposure subcategory means the residential mortgage exposure, qualifying revolving exposure, or other retail exposure subcategory.
Risk parameter means a variable used in determining risk-based capital requirements for wholesale and retail exposures, specifically probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD), or effective maturity (M).
Scenario analysis means a systematic process of obtaining expert opinions from business managers and risk management experts to derive reasoned assessments of the likelihood and loss impact of plausible high-severity operational losses. Scenario analysis may include the well-reasoned evaluation and use of external operational loss event data, adjusted as appropriate to ensure relevance to a national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk profile and control structure.
Total wholesale and retail risk-weighted assets means the sum of:
(1) Risk-weighted assets for wholesale exposures that are not IMM exposures, cleared transactions, or default fund contributions to non-defaulted obligors and segments of non-defaulted retail exposures;
(2) Risk-weighted assets for wholesale exposures to defaulted obligors and segments of defaulted retail exposures;
(3) Risk-weighted assets for assets not defined by an exposure category;
(4) Risk-weighted assets for non-material portfolios of exposures;
(5) Risk-weighted assets for IMM exposures (as determined in § 3.132(d));
(6) Risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions and risk-weighted assets for default fund contributions (as determined in § 3.133); and
(7) Risk-weighted assets for unsettled transactions (as determined in § 3.136).
Unexpected operational loss (UOL) means the difference between the national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk exposure and the national bank's or Federal savings association's expected operational loss.
Unit of measure means the level (for example, organizational unit or operational loss event type) at which the national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk quantification system generates a separate distribution of potential operational losses.
Wholesale exposure means a credit exposure to a company, natural person, sovereign, or governmental entity (other than a securitization exposure, retail exposure, pre-sold construction loan, or equity exposure).
Wholesale exposure subcategory means the HVCRE or non-HVCRE wholesale exposure subcategory.
§ 3.121   Qualification process.
(a) Timing. (1) A national bank or Federal savings association that is described in § 3.100(b)(1)(i) through (iv) must adopt a written implementation plan no later than six months after the date the national bank or Federal savings association meets a criterion in that section. The implementation plan must incorporate an explicit start date no later than 36 months after the date the national bank or Federal savings association meets at least one criterion under § 3.100(b)(1)(i) through (iv). The OCC may extend the start date.
(2) A national bank or Federal savings association that elects to be subject to this appendix under § 3.100(b)(1)(v) must adopt a written implementation plan.
(b) Implementation plan. (1) The national bank's or Federal savings association's implementation plan must address in detail how the national bank or Federal savings association complies, or plans to comply, with the qualification requirements in § 3.122. The national bank or Federal savings association also must maintain a comprehensive and sound planning and governance process to oversee the implementation efforts described in the plan. At a minimum, the plan must:
(i) Comprehensively address the qualification requirements in § 3.122 for the national bank or Federal savings association and each consolidated subsidiary (U.S. and foreign-based) of the national bank or Federal savings association with respect to all portfolios and exposures of the national bank or Federal savings association and each of its consolidated subsidiaries;
(ii) Justify and support any proposed temporary or permanent exclusion of business lines, portfolios, or exposures from the application of the advanced approaches in this subpart (which business lines, portfolios, and exposures must be, in the aggregate, immaterial to the national bank or Federal savings association);
(iii) Include the national bank's or Federal savings association's self-assessment of:
(A) The national bank's or Federal savings association's current status in meeting the qualification requirements in § 3.122; and
(B) The consistency of the national bank's or Federal savings association's current practices with the OCC's supervisory guidance on the qualification requirements;
(iv) Based on the national bank's or Federal savings association's self-assessment, identify and describe the areas in which the national bank or Federal savings association proposes to undertake additional work to comply with the qualification requirements in § 3.122 or to improve the consistency of the national bank's or Federal savings association's current practices with the OCC's supervisory guidance on the qualification requirements (gap analysis);
(v) Describe what specific actions the national bank or Federal savings association will take to address the areas identified in the gap analysis required by paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of this section;
(vi) Identify objective, measurable milestones, including delivery dates and a date when the national bank's or Federal savings association's implementation of the methodologies described in this subpart will be fully operational;
(vii) Describe resources that have been budgeted and are available to implement the plan; and
(viii) Receive approval of the national bank's or Federal savings association's board of directors.
(2) The national bank or Federal savings association must submit the implementation plan, together with a copy of the minutes of the board of directors' approval, to the OCC at least 60 days before the national bank or Federal savings association proposes to begin its parallel run, unless the OCC waives prior notice.
(c) Parallel run. Before determining its risk-weighted assets under this subpart and following adoption of the implementation plan, the national bank or Federal savings association must conduct a satisfactory parallel run. A satisfactory parallel run is a period of no less than four consecutive calendar quarters during which the national bank or Federal savings association complies with the qualification requirements in § 3.122 to the satisfaction of the OCC. During the parallel run, the national bank or Federal savings association must report to the OCC on a calendar quarterly basis its risk-based capital ratios determined in accordance with § 3.10(b)(1) through (3) and § 3.10(d)(1) through (3). During this period, the national bank's or Federal savings association's minimum risk-based capital ratios are determined as set forth in subpart D of this part.
(d) Approval to calculate risk-based capital requirements under this subpart. The OCC will notify the national bank or Federal savings association of the date that the national bank or Federal savings association must begin to use this subpart for purposes of § 3.10 if the OCC determines that:
(1) The national bank or Federal savings association fully complies with all the qualification requirements in § 3.122;
(2) The national bank or Federal savings association has conducted a satisfactory parallel run under paragraph (c) of this section; and
(3) The national bank or Federal savings association has an adequate process to ensure ongoing compliance with the qualification requirements in § 3.122.
§ 3.122   Qualification requirements.
(a) Process and systems requirements. (1) A national bank or Federal savings association must have a rigorous process for assessing its overall capital adequacy in relation to its risk profile and a comprehensive strategy for maintaining an appropriate level of capital.
(2) The systems and processes used by a national bank or Federal savings association for risk-based capital purposes under this subpart must be consistent with the national bank's or Federal savings association's internal risk management processes and management information reporting systems.
(3) Each national bank or Federal savings association must have an appropriate infrastructure with risk measurement and management processes that meet the qualification requirements of this section and are appropriate given the national bank's or Federal savings association's size and level of complexity. Regardless of whether the systems and models that generate the risk parameters necessary for calculating a national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-based capital requirements are located at any affiliate of the national bank or Federal savings association, the national bank or Federal savings association itself must ensure that the risk parameters and reference data used to determine its risk-based capital requirements are representative of long run experience with respect to its own credit risk and operational risk exposures.
(b) Risk rating and segmentation systems for wholesale and retail exposures. (1)(i) A national bank or Federal savings association must have an internal risk rating and segmentation system that accurately, reliably, and meaningfully differentiates among degrees of credit risk for the national bank's or Federal savings association's wholesale and retail exposures. When assigning an internal risk rating, a national bank or Federal savings association may consider a third-party assessment of credit risk, provided that the national bank's or Federal savings association's internal risk rating assignment does not rely solely on the external assessment.
(ii) If a national bank or Federal savings association uses multiple rating or segmentation systems, the national bank's or Federal savings association's rationale for assigning an obligor or exposure to a particular system must be documented and applied in a manner that best reflects the obligor's or exposure's level of risk. A national bank or Federal savings association must not inappropriately allocate obligors or exposures across systems to minimize regulatory capital requirements.
(iii) In assigning ratings to wholesale obligors and exposures, including loss severity ratings grades to wholesale exposures, and assigning retail exposures to retail segments, a national bank or Federal savings association must use all relevant and material information and ensure that the information is current.
(iv) When assigning an obligor to a PD rating or retail exposure to a PD segment, a national bank or Federal savings association must assess the obligor or retail borrower's ability and willingness to contractually perform, taking a conservative view of projected information.
(2) For wholesale exposures:
(i) A national bank or Federal savings association must have an internal risk rating system that accurately and reliably assigns each obligor to a single rating grade (reflecting the obligor's likelihood of default). A national bank or Federal savings association may elect, however, not to assign to a rating grade an obligor to whom the national bank or Federal savings association extends credit based solely on the financial strength of a guarantor, provided that all of the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposures to the obligor are fully covered by eligible guarantees, the national bank or Federal savings association applies the PD substitution approach in § 3.134(c)(1) to all exposures to that obligor, and the national bank or Federal savings association immediately assigns the obligor to a rating grade if a guarantee can no longer be recognized under this part. The national bank's or Federal savings association's wholesale obligor rating system must have at least seven discrete rating grades for non-defaulted obligors and at least one rating grade for defaulted obligors.
(ii) Unless the national bank or Federal savings association has chosen to directly assign LGD estimates to each wholesale exposure, the national bank or Federal savings association must have an internal risk rating system that accurately and reliably assigns each wholesale exposure to a loss severity rating grade (reflecting the national bank's or Federal savings association's estimate of the LGD of the exposure). A national bank or Federal savings association employing loss severity rating grades must have a sufficiently granular loss severity grading system to avoid grouping together exposures with widely ranging LGDs.
(iii) A national bank or Federal savings association must have an effective process to obtain and update in a timely manner relevant and material information on obligor and exposure characteristics that affect PD, LGD and EAD.
(3) For retail exposures:
(i) A national bank or Federal savings association must have an internal system that groups retail exposures into the appropriate retail exposure subcategory and groups the retail exposures in each retail exposure subcategory into separate segments with homogeneous risk characteristics that provide a meaningful differentiation of risk. The national bank's or Federal savings association's system must identify and group in separate segments by subcategories exposures identified in § 3.131(c)(2)(ii) and (iii).
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must have an internal system that captures all relevant exposure risk characteristics, including borrower credit score, product and collateral types, as well as exposure delinquencies, and must consider cross-collateral provisions, where present.
(iii) The national bank or Federal savings association must review and, if appropriate, update assignments of individual retail exposures to segments and the loss characteristics and delinquency status of each identified risk segment. These reviews must occur whenever the national bank or Federal savings association receives new material information, but generally no less frequently than quarterly, and, in all cases, at least annually.
(4) The national bank's or Federal savings association's internal risk rating policy for wholesale exposures must describe the national bank's or Federal savings association's rating philosophy (that is, must describe how wholesale obligor rating assignments are affected by the national bank's or Federal savings association's choice of the range of economic, business, and industry conditions that are considered in the obligor rating process).
(5) The national bank's or Federal savings association's internal risk rating system for wholesale exposures must provide for the review and update (as appropriate) of each obligor rating and (if applicable) each loss severity rating whenever the national bank or Federal savings association obtains relevant and material information on the obligor or exposure that affects PD, LGD and EAD, but no less frequently than annually.
(c) Quantification of risk parameters for wholesale and retail exposures. (1) The national bank or Federal savings association must have a comprehensive risk parameter quantification process that produces accurate, timely, and reliable estimates of the risk parameters on a consistent basis for the national bank's or Federal savings association's wholesale and retail exposures.
(2) A national bank's or Federal savings association's estimates of PD, LGD, and EAD must incorporate all relevant, material, and available data that is reflective of the national bank's or Federal savings association's actual wholesale and retail exposures and of sufficient quality to support the determination of risk-based capital requirements for the exposures. In particular, the population of exposures in the data used for estimation purposes, the lending standards in use when the data were generated, and other relevant characteristics, should closely match or be comparable to the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposures and standards. In addition, a national bank or Federal savings association must:
(i) Demonstrate that its estimates are representative of long run experience, including periods of economic downturn conditions, whether internal or external data are used;
(ii) Take into account any changes in lending practice or the process for pursuing recoveries over the observation period;
(iii) Promptly reflect technical advances, new data, and other information as they become available;
(iv) Demonstrate that the data used to estimate risk parameters support the accuracy and robustness of those estimates; and
(v) Demonstrate that its estimation technique performs well in out-of-sample tests whenever possible.
(3) The national bank's or Federal savings association's risk parameter quantification process must produce appropriately conservative risk parameter estimates where the national bank or Federal savings association has limited relevant data, and any adjustments that are part of the quantification process must not result in a pattern of bias toward lower risk parameter estimates.
(4) The national bank's or Federal savings association's risk parameter estimation process should not rely on the possibility of U.S. government financial assistance, except for the financial assistance that the U.S. government has a legally binding commitment to provide.
(5) The national bank or Federal savings association must be able to demonstrate which variables have been found to be statistically significant with regard to EAD. The national bank's or Federal savings association's EAD estimates must reflect its specific policies and strategies with regard to account management, including account monitoring and payment processing, and its ability and willingness to prevent further drawdowns in circumstances short of payment default. The national bank or Federal savings association must have adequate systems and procedures in place to monitor current outstanding amounts against committed lines, and changes in outstanding amounts per obligor and obligor rating grade and per retail segment. The national bank or Federal savings association must be able to monitor outstanding amounts on a daily basis.
(6) At a minimum, PD estimates for wholesale obligors and retail segments must be based on at least five years of default data. LGD estimates for wholesale exposures must be based on at least seven years of loss severity data, and LGD estimates for retail segments must be based on at least five years of loss severity data. EAD estimates for wholesale exposures must be based on at least seven years of exposure amount data, and EAD estimates for retail segments must be based on at least five years of exposure amount data. If the national bank or Federal savings association has relevant and material reference data that span a longer period of time than the minimum time periods specified above, the national bank or Federal savings association must incorporate such data in its estimates, provided that it does not place undue weight on periods of favorable or benign economic conditions relative to periods of economic downturn conditions.
(7) Default, loss severity, and exposure amount data must include periods of economic downturn conditions, or the national bank or Federal savings association must adjust its estimates of risk parameters to compensate for the lack of data from periods of economic downturn conditions.
(8) The national bank's or Federal savings association's PD, LGD, and EAD estimates must be based on the definition of default in § 3.101.
(9) If a national bank or Federal savings association uses internal data obtained prior to becoming subject to this subpart E or external data to arrive at PD, LGD, or EAD estimates, the national bank or Federal savings association must demonstrate to the OCC that the national bank or Federal savings association has made appropriate adjustments if necessary to be consistent with the definition of default in § 3.101. Internal data obtained after the national bank or Federal savings association becomes subject to this subpart E must be consistent with the definition of default in § 3.101.
(10) The national bank or Federal savings association must review and update (as appropriate) its risk parameters and its risk parameter quantification process at least annually.
(11) The national bank or Federal savings association must, at least annually, conduct a comprehensive review and analysis of reference data to determine relevance of the reference data to the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposures, quality of reference data to support PD, LGD, and EAD estimates, and consistency of reference data to the definition of default in § 3.101.
(d) Counterparty credit risk model. A national bank or Federal savings association must obtain the prior written approval of the OCC under § 3.132 to use the internal models methodology for counterparty credit risk and the advanced CVA approach for the CVA capital requirement.
(e) Double default treatment. A national bank or Federal savings association must obtain the prior written approval of the OCC under § 3.135 to use the double default treatment.
(f) Equity exposures model. A national bank or Federal savings association must obtain the prior written approval of the OCC under § 3.153 to use the internal models approach for equity exposures.
(g) Operational risk. (1) Operational risk management processes. A national bank or Federal savings association must:
(i) Have an operational risk management function that:
(A) Is independent of business line management; and
(B) Is responsible for designing, implementing, and overseeing the national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk data and assessment systems, operational risk quantification systems, and related processes;
(ii) Have and document a process (which must capture business environment and internal control factors affecting the national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk profile) to identify, measure, monitor, and control operational risk in the national bank's or Federal savings association's products, activities, processes, and systems; and
(iii) Report operational risk exposures, operational loss events, and other relevant operational risk information to business unit management, senior management, and the board of directors (or a designated committee of the board).
(2) Operational risk data and assessment systems. A national bank or Federal savings association must have operational risk data and assessment systems that capture operational risks to which the national bank or Federal savings association is exposed. The national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk data and assessment systems must:
(i) Be structured in a manner consistent with the national bank's or Federal savings association's current business activities, risk profile, technological processes, and risk management processes; and
(ii) Include credible, transparent, systematic, and verifiable processes that incorporate the following elements on an ongoing basis:
(A) Internal operational loss event data. The national bank or Federal savings association must have a systematic process for capturing and using internal operational loss event data in its operational risk data and assessment systems.
( 1 ) The national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk data and assessment systems must include a historical observation period of at least five years for internal operational loss event data (or such shorter period approved by the OCC to address transitional situations, such as integrating a new business line).
( 2 ) The national bank or Federal savings association must be able to map its internal operational loss event data into the seven operational loss event type categories.
( 3 ) The national bank or Federal savings association may refrain from collecting internal operational loss event data for individual operational losses below established dollar threshold amounts if the national bank or Federal savings association can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the OCC that the thresholds are reasonable, do not exclude important internal operational loss event data, and permit the national bank or Federal savings association to capture substantially all the dollar value of the national bank's or Federal savings association's operational losses.
(B) External operational loss event data. The national bank or Federal savings association must have a systematic process for determining its methodologies for incorporating external operational loss event data into its operational risk data and assessment systems.
(C) Scenario analysis. The national bank or Federal savings association must have a systematic process for determining its methodologies for incorporating scenario analysis into its operational risk data and assessment systems.
(D) Business environment and internal control factors. The national bank or Federal savings association must incorporate business environment and internal control factors into its operational risk data and assessment systems. The national bank or Federal savings association must also periodically compare the results of its prior business environment and internal control factor assessments against its actual operational losses incurred in the intervening period.
(3) Operational risk quantification systems. (i) The national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk quantification systems:
(A) Must generate estimates of the national bank's or Federal savings association's operational risk exposure using its operational risk data and assessment systems;
(B) Must employ a unit of measure that is appropriate for the national bank's or Federal savings association's range of business activities and the variety of operational loss events to which it is exposed, and that does not combine business activities or operational loss events with demonstrably different risk profiles within the same loss distribution;
(C) Must include a credible, transparent, systematic, and verifiable approach for weighting each of the four elements, described in paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this section, that a national bank or Federal savings association is required to incorporate into its operational risk data and assessment systems;
(D) May use internal estimates of dependence among operational losses across and within units of measure if the national bank or Federal savings association can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the OCC that its process for estimating dependence is sound, robust to a variety of scenarios, and implemented with integrity, and allows for uncertainty surrounding the estimates. If the national bank or Federal savings association has not made such a demonstration, it must sum operational risk exposure estimates across units of measure to calculate its total operational risk exposure; and
(E) Must be reviewed and updated (as appropriate) whenever the national bank or Federal savings association becomes aware of information that may have a material effect on the national bank's or Federal savings association's estimate of operational risk exposure, but the review and update must occur no less frequently than annually.
(ii) With the prior written approval of the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings association may generate an estimate of its operational risk exposure using an alternative approach to that specified in paragraph (g)(3)(i) of this section. A national bank or Federal savings association proposing to use such an alternative operational risk quantification system must submit a proposal to the OCC. In determining whether to approve a national bank's or Federal savings association's proposal to use an alternative operational risk quantification system, the OCC will consider the following principles:
(A) Use of the alternative operational risk quantification system will be allowed only on an exception basis, considering the size, complexity, and risk profile of the national bank or Federal savings association;
(B) The national bank or Federal savings association must demonstrate that its estimate of its operational risk exposure generated under the alternative operational risk quantification system is appropriate and can be supported empirically; and
(C) A national bank or Federal savings association must not use an allocation of operational risk capital requirements that includes entities other than depository institutions or the benefits of diversification across entities.
(h) Data management and maintenance. (1) A national bank or Federal savings association must have data management and maintenance systems that adequately support all aspects of its advanced systems and the timely and accurate reporting of risk-based capital requirements.
(2) A national bank or Federal savings association must retain data using an electronic format that allows timely retrieval of data for analysis, validation, reporting, and disclosure purposes.
(3) A national bank or Federal savings association must retain sufficient data elements related to key risk drivers to permit adequate monitoring, validation, and refinement of its advanced systems.
(i) Control, oversight, and validation mechanisms. (1) The national bank's or Federal savings association's senior management must ensure that all components of the national bank's or Federal savings association's advanced systems function effectively and comply with the qualification requirements in this section.
(2) The national bank's or Federal savings association's board of directors (or a designated committee of the board) must at least annually review the effectiveness of, and approve, the national bank's or Federal savings association's advanced systems.
(3) A national bank or Federal savings association must have an effective system of controls and oversight that:
(i) Ensures ongoing compliance with the qualification requirements in this section;
(ii) Maintains the integrity, reliability, and accuracy of the national bank's or Federal savings association's advanced systems; and
(iii) Includes adequate governance and project management processes.
(4) The national bank or Federal savings association must validate, on an ongoing basis, its advanced systems. The national bank's or Federal savings association's validation process must be independent of the advanced systems' development, implementation, and operation, or the validation process must be subjected to an independent review of its adequacy and effectiveness. Validation must include:
(i) An evaluation of the conceptual soundness of (including developmental evidence supporting) the advanced systems;
(ii) An ongoing monitoring process that includes verification of processes and benchmarking; and
(iii) An outcomes analysis process that includes backtesting.
(5) The national bank or Federal savings association must have an internal audit function or equivalent function that is independent of business-line management that at least annually:
(i) Reviews the national bank's or Federal savings association's advanced systems and associated operations, including the operations of its credit function and estimations of PD, LGD, and EAD;
(ii) Assesses the effectiveness of the controls supporting the national bank's or Federal savings association's advanced systems; and
(iii) Documents and reports its findings to the national bank's or Federal savings association's board of directors (or a committee thereof).
(6) The national bank or Federal savings association must periodically stress test its advanced systems. The stress testing must include a consideration of how economic cycles, especially downturns, affect risk-based capital requirements (including migration across rating grades and segments and the credit risk mitigation benefits of double default treatment).
(j) Documentation. The national bank or Federal savings association must adequately document all material aspects of its advanced systems.
§ 3.123   Ongoing qualification.
(a) Changes to advanced systems. A national bank or Federal savings association must meet all the qualification requirements in § 3.122 on an ongoing basis. A national bank or Federal savings association must notify the OCC when the national bank or Federal savings association makes any change to an advanced system that would result in a material change in the national bank's or Federal savings association's advanced approaches total risk-weighted asset amount for an exposure type or when the national bank or Federal savings association makes any significant change to its modeling assumptions.
(b) Failure to comply with qualification requirements. (1) If the OCC determines that a national bank or Federal savings association that uses this subpart and that has conducted a satisfactory parallel run fails to comply with the qualification requirements in § 3.122, the OCC will notify the national bank or Federal savings association in writing of the national bank's or Federal savings association's failure to comply.
(2) The national bank or Federal savings association must establish and submit a plan satisfactory to the OCC to return to compliance with the qualification requirements.
(3) In addition, if the OCC determines that the national bank's or Federal savings association's advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets are not commensurate with the national bank's or Federal savings association's credit, market, operational, or other risks, the OCC may require such a national bank or Federal savings association to calculate its advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets with any modifications provided by the OCC.
§ 3.124   Merger and acquisition transitional arrangements.
(a) Mergers and acquisitions of companies without advanced systems. If a national bank or Federal savings association merges with or acquires a company that does not calculate its risk-based capital requirements using advanced systems, the national bank or Federal savings association may use subpart D of this part to determine the risk-weighted asset amounts for the merged or acquired company's exposures for up to 24 months after the calendar quarter during which the merger or acquisition consummates. The OCC may extend this transition period for up to an additional 12 months. Within 90 days of consummating the merger or acquisition, the national bank or Federal savings association must submit to the OCC an implementation plan for using its advanced systems for the acquired company. During the period in which subpart D of this part applies to the merged or acquired company, any ALLL or AACL, as applicable, net of allocated transfer risk reserves established pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 3904, associated with the merged or acquired company's exposures may be included in the acquiring national bank's or Federal savings association's tier 2 capital up to 1.25 percent of the acquired company's risk-weighted assets. All general allowances of the merged or acquired company must be excluded from the national bank's or Federal savings association's eligible credit reserves. In addition, the risk-weighted assets of the merged or acquired company are not included in the national bank's or Federal savings association's credit-risk-weighted assets but are included in total risk-weighted assets. If a national bank or Federal savings association relies on this paragraph (a), the national bank or Federal savings association must disclose publicly the amounts of risk-weighted assets and qualifying capital calculated under this subpart for the acquiring national bank or Federal savings association and under subpart D of this part for the acquired company.
(b) Mergers and acquisitions of companies with advanced systems. (1) If a national bank or Federal savings association merges with or acquires a company that calculates its risk-based capital requirements using advanced systems, the national bank or Federal savings association may use the acquired company's advanced systems to determine total risk-weighted assets for the merged or acquired company's exposures for up to 24 months after the calendar quarter during which the acquisition or merger consummates. The OCC may extend this transition period for up to an additional 12 months. Within 90 days of consummating the merger or acquisition, the national bank or Federal savings association must submit to the OCC an implementation plan for using its advanced systems for the merged or acquired company.
(2) If the acquiring national bank or Federal savings association is not subject to the advanced approaches in this subpart at the time of acquisition or merger, during the period when subpart D of this part applies to the acquiring national bank or Federal savings association, the ALLL or AACL, as applicable associated with the exposures of the merged or acquired company may not be directly included in tier 2 capital. Rather, any excess eligible credit reserves associated with the merged or acquired company's exposures may be included in the national bank's or Federal savings association's tier 2 capital up to 0.6 percent of the credit-risk-weighted assets associated with those exposures.
§§ 3.125-3.130   [Reserved]
§ 3.131   Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail risk-weighted assets.
(a) Overview. A national bank or Federal savings association must calculate its total wholesale and retail risk-weighted asset amount in four distinct phases:
(1) Phase 1—categorization of exposures;
(2) Phase 2—assignment of wholesale obligors and exposures to rating grades and segmentation of retail exposures;
(3) Phase 3—assignment of risk parameters to wholesale exposures and segments of retail exposures; and
(4) Phase 4—calculation of risk-weighted asset amounts.
(b) Phase 1—Categorization. The national bank or Federal savings association must determine which of its exposures are wholesale exposures, retail exposures, securitization exposures, or equity exposures. The national bank or Federal savings association must categorize each retail exposure as a residential mortgage exposure, a QRE, or an other retail exposure. The national bank or Federal savings association must identify which wholesale exposures are HVCRE exposures, sovereign exposures, OTC derivative contracts, repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, eligible purchased wholesale exposures, cleared transactions, default fund contributions, unsettled transactions to which § 3.136 applies, and eligible guarantees or eligible credit derivatives that are used as credit risk mitigants. The national bank or Federal savings association must identify any on-balance sheet asset that does not meet the definition of a wholesale, retail, equity, or securitization exposure, as well as any non-material portfolio of exposures described in paragraph (e)(4) of this section.
(c) Phase 2—Assignment of wholesale obligors and exposures to rating grades and retail exposures to segments —(1) Assignment of wholesale obligors and exposures to rating grades. (i) The national bank or Federal savings association must assign each obligor of a wholesale exposure to a single obligor rating grade and must assign each wholesale exposure to which it does not directly assign an LGD estimate to a loss severity rating grade.
(ii) The national bank or Federal savings association must identify which of its wholesale obligors are in default.
(2) Segmentation of retail exposures. (i) The national bank or Federal savings association must group the retail exposures in each retail subcategory into segments that have homogeneous risk characteristics.
(ii) The national bank or Federal savings association must identify which of its retail exposures are in default. The national bank or Federal savings association must segment defaulted retail exposures separately from non-defaulted retail exposures.
(iii) If the national bank or Federal savings association determines the EAD for eligible margin loans using the approach in § 3.132(b), the national bank or Federal savings association must identify which of its retail exposures are eligible margin loans for which the national bank or Federal savings association uses this EAD approach and must segment such eligible margin loans separately from other retail exposures.
(3) Eligible purchased wholesale exposures. A national bank or Federal savings association may group its eligible purchased wholesale exposures into segments that have homogeneous risk characteristics. A national bank or Federal savings association must use the wholesale exposure formula in Table 1 of this section to determine the risk-based capital requirement for each segment of eligible purchased wholesale exposures.
(d) Phase 3—Assignment of risk parameters to wholesale exposures and segments of retail exposures —(1) Quantification process. Subject to the limitations in this paragraph (d), the national bank or Federal savings association must:
(i) Associate a PD with each wholesale obligor rating grade;
(ii) Associate an LGD with each wholesale loss severity rating grade or assign an LGD to each wholesale exposure;
(iii) Assign an EAD and M to each wholesale exposure; and
(iv) Assign a PD, LGD, and EAD to each segment of retail exposures.
(2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity, the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or a multilateral development bank, to which the national bank or Federal savings association assigns a rating grade associated with a PD of less than 0.03 percent.
(3) Floor on LGD estimation. The LGD for each segment of residential mortgage exposures may not be less than 10 percent, except for segments of residential mortgage exposures for which all or substantially all of the principal of each exposure is either:
(i) Directly and unconditionally guaranteed by the full faith and credit of a sovereign entity; or
(ii) Guaranteed by a contingent obligation of the U.S. government or its agencies, the enforceability of which is dependent upon some affirmative action on the part of the beneficiary of the guarantee or a third party (for example, meeting servicing requirements).
(4) Eligible purchased wholesale exposures. A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a PD, LGD, EAD, and M to each segment of eligible purchased wholesale exposures. If the national bank or Federal savings association can estimate ECL (but not PD or LGD) for a segment of eligible purchased wholesale exposures, the national bank or Federal savings association must assume that the LGD of the segment equals 100 percent and that the PD of the segment equals ECL divided by EAD. The estimated ECL must be calculated for the exposures without regard to any assumption of recourse or guarantees from the seller or other parties.
(5) Credit risk mitigation: credit derivatives, guarantees, and collateral. (i) A national bank or Federal savings association may take into account the risk reducing effects of eligible guarantees and eligible credit derivatives in support of a wholesale exposure by applying the PD substitution or LGD adjustment treatment to the exposure as provided in § 3.134 or, if applicable, applying double default treatment to the exposure as provided in § 3.135. A national bank or Federal savings association may decide separately for each wholesale exposure that qualifies for the double default treatment under § 3.135 whether to apply the double default treatment or to use the PD substitution or LGD adjustment treatment without recognizing double default effects.
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association may take into account the risk reducing effects of guarantees and credit derivatives in support of retail exposures in a segment when quantifying the PD and LGD of the segment. In doing so, a national bank or Federal savings association must consider all relevant available information.
(iii) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(6) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings association may take into account the risk reducing effects of collateral in support of a wholesale exposure when quantifying the LGD of the exposure, and may take into account the risk reducing effects of collateral in support of retail exposures when quantifying the PD and LGD of the segment. In order to do so, a national bank or Federal savings association must have established internal requirements for collateral management, legal certainty, and risk management processes.
(6) EAD for OTC derivative contracts, repo-style transactions, and eligible margin loans. A national bank or Federal savings association must calculate its EAD for an OTC derivative contract as provided in § 3.132 (c) and (d). A national bank or Federal savings association may take into account the risk-reducing effects of financial collateral in support of a repo-style transaction or eligible margin loan and of any collateral in support of a repo-style transaction that is included in the national bank's or Federal savings association's VaR-based measure under subpart F of this part through an adjustment to EAD as provided in § 3.132(b) and (d). A national bank or Federal savings association that takes collateral into account through such an adjustment to EAD under § 3.132 may not reflect such collateral in LGD.
(7) Effective maturity. An exposure's M must be no greater than five years and no less than one year, except that an exposure's M must be no less than one day if the exposure is a trade related letter of credit, or if the exposure has an original maturity of less than one year and is not part of a national bank's or Federal savings association's ongoing financing of the obligor. An exposure is not part of a national bank's or Federal savings association's ongoing financing of the obligor if the national bank or Federal savings association:
(i) Has a legal and practical ability not to renew or roll over the exposure in the event of credit deterioration of the obligor;
(ii) Makes an independent credit decision at the inception of the exposure and at every renewal or roll over; and
(iii) Has no substantial commercial incentive to continue its credit relationship with the obligor in the event of credit deterioration of the obligor.
(8) EAD for exposures to certain central counterparties. A national bank or Federal savings association may attribute an EAD of zero to exposures that arise from the settlement of cash transactions (such as equities, fixed income, spot foreign exchange, and spot commodities) with a central counterparty where there is no assumption of ongoing counterparty credit risk by the central counterparty after settlement of the trade and associated default fund contributions.
(e) Phase 4—Calculation of risk-weighted assets —(1) Non-defaulted exposures. (i) A national bank or Federal savings association must calculate the dollar risk-based capital requirement for each of its wholesale exposures to a non-defaulted obligor (except for eligible guarantees and eligible credit derivatives that hedge another wholesale exposure, IMM exposures, cleared transactions, default fund contributions, unsettled transactions, and exposures to which the national bank or Federal savings association applies the double default treatment in § 3.135) and segments of non-defaulted retail exposures by inserting the assigned risk parameters for the wholesale obligor and exposure or retail segment into the appropriate risk-based capital formula specified in Table 1 and multiplying the output of the formula (K) by the EAD of the exposure or segment. Alternatively, a national bank or Federal savings association may apply a 300 percent risk weight to the EAD of an eligible margin loan if the national bank or Federal savings association is not able to meet the OCC's requirements for estimation of PD and LGD for the margin loan.
(ii) The sum of all the dollar risk-based capital requirements for each wholesale exposure to a non-defaulted obligor and segment of non-defaulted retail exposures calculated in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of this section and in § 3.135(e) equals the total dollar risk-based capital requirement for those exposures and segments.
(iii) The aggregate risk-weighted asset amount for wholesale exposures to non-defaulted obligors and segments of non-defaulted retail exposures equals the total dollar risk-based capital requirement in paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of this section multiplied by 12.5.
(2) Wholesale exposures to defaulted obligors and segments of defaulted retail exposures —(i) Not covered by an eligible U.S. government guarantee: The dollar risk-based capital requirement for each wholesale exposure not covered by an eligible guarantee from the U.S. government to a defaulted obligor and each segment of defaulted retail exposures not covered by an eligible guarantee from the U.S. government equals 0.08 multiplied by the EAD of the exposure or segment.
(ii) Covered by an eligible U.S. government guarantee: The dollar risk-based capital requirement for each wholesale exposure to a defaulted obligor covered by an eligible guarantee from the U.S. government and each segment of defaulted retail exposures covered by an eligible guarantee from the U.S. government equals the sum of:
(A) The sum of the EAD of the portion of each wholesale exposure to a defaulted obligor covered by an eligible guarantee from the U.S. government plus the EAD of the portion of each segment of defaulted retail exposures that is covered by an eligible guarantee from the U.S. government and the resulting sum is multiplied by 0.016, and
(B) The sum of the EAD of the portion of each wholesale exposure to a defaulted obligor not covered by an eligible guarantee from the U.S. government plus the EAD of the portion of each segment of defaulted retail exposures that is not covered by an eligible guarantee from the U.S. government and the resulting sum is multiplied by 0.08.
(iii) The sum of all the dollar risk-based capital requirements for each wholesale exposure to a defaulted obligor and each segment of defaulted retail exposures calculated in paragraph (e)(2)(i) of this section plus the dollar risk-based capital requirements each wholesale exposure to a defaulted obligor and for each segment of defaulted retail exposures calculated in paragraph (e)(2)(ii) of this section equals the total dollar risk-based capital requirement for those exposures and segments.
(iv) The aggregate risk-weighted asset amount for wholesale exposures to defaulted obligors and segments of defaulted retail exposures equals the total dollar risk-based capital requirement calculated in paragraph (e)(2)(iii) of this section multiplied by 12.5.
(3) Assets not included in a defined exposure category. (i) A national bank or Federal savings association may assign a risk-weighted asset amount of zero to cash owned and held in all offices of the national bank or Federal savings association or in transit and for gold bullion held in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own vaults, or held in another national bank's or Federal savings association's vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are offset by gold bullion liabilities.
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a risk-weighted asset amount equal to 20 percent of the carrying value of cash items in the process of collection.
(iii) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a risk-weighted asset amount equal to 50 percent of the carrying value to a pre-sold construction loan unless the purchase contract is cancelled, in which case a national bank or Federal savings association must assign a risk-weighted asset amount equal to a 100 percent of the carrying value of the pre-sold construction loan.
(iv) The risk-weighted asset amount for the residual value of a retail lease exposure equals such residual value.
(v) The risk-weighted asset amount for DTAs arising from temporary differences that the national bank or Federal savings association could realize through net operating loss carrybacks equals the carrying value, netted in accordance with § 3.22.
(vi) The risk-weighted asset amount for MSAs, DTAs arising from temporary timing differences that the national bank or Federal savings association could not realize through net operating loss carrybacks, and significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common stock that are not deducted pursuant to § 3.22(d) equals the amount not subject to deduction multiplied by 250 percent.
(vii) The risk-weighted asset amount for any other on-balance-sheet asset that does not meet the definition of a wholesale, retail, securitization, IMM, or equity exposure, cleared transaction, or default fund contribution and is not subject to deduction under § 3.22(a), (c), or (d) equals the carrying value of the asset.
(viii) The risk-weighted asset amount for a Paycheck Protection Program covered loan as defined in section 7(a)(36) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 636(a)(36)) equals zero.
(4) Non-material portfolios of exposures. The risk-weighted asset amount of a portfolio of exposures for which the national bank or Federal savings association has demonstrated to the OCC's satisfaction that the portfolio (when combined with all other portfolios of exposures that the national bank or Federal savings association seeks to treat under this paragraph (e)) is not material to the national bank or Federal savings association is the sum of the carrying values of on-balance sheet exposures plus the notional amounts of off-balance sheet exposures in the portfolio. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(4), the notional amount of an OTC derivative contract that is not a credit derivative is the EAD of the derivative as calculated in § 3.132.
§ 3.132   Counterparty credit risk of repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative contracts.
(a) Methodologies for collateral recognition. (1) Instead of an LGD estimation methodology, a national bank or Federal savings association may use the following methodologies to recognize the benefits of financial collateral in mitigating the counterparty credit risk of repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, collateralized OTC derivative contracts and single product netting sets of such transactions, and to recognize the benefits of any collateral in mitigating the counterparty credit risk of repo-style transactions that are included in a national bank's or Federal savings association's VaR-based measure under subpart F of this part:
(i) The collateral haircut approach set forth in paragraph (b)(2) of this section;
(ii) The internal models methodology set forth in paragraph (d) of this section; and
(iii) For single product netting sets of repo-style transactions and eligible margin loans, the simple VaR methodology set forth in paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(2) A national bank or Federal savings association may use any combination of the three methodologies for collateral recognition; however, it must use the same methodology for transactions in the same category.
(3) A national bank or Federal savings association must use the methodology in paragraph (c) of this section, or with prior written approval of the OCC, the internal model methodology in paragraph (d) of this section, to calculate EAD for an OTC derivative contract or a set of OTC derivative contracts subject to a qualifying master netting agreement. To estimate EAD for qualifying cross-product master netting agreements, a national bank or Federal savings association may only use the internal models methodology in paragraph (d) of this section.
(4) A national bank or Federal savings association must also use the methodology in paragraph (e) of this section to calculate the risk-weighted asset amounts for CVA for OTC derivatives.
(b) EAD for eligible margin loans and repo-style transactions —(1) General. A national bank or Federal savings association may recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits of financial collateral that secures an eligible margin loan, repo-style transaction, or single-product netting set of such transactions by factoring the collateral into its LGD estimates for the exposure. Alternatively, a national bank or Federal savings association may estimate an unsecured LGD for the exposure, as well as for any repo-style transaction that is included in the national bank's or Federal savings association's VaR-based measure under subpart F of this part, and determine the EAD of the exposure using:
(i) The collateral haircut approach described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section;
(ii) For netting sets only, the simple VaR methodology described in paragraph (b)(3) of this section; or
(iii) The internal models methodology described in paragraph (d) of this section.
(2) Collateral haircut approach —(i) EAD equation. A national bank or Federal savings association may determine EAD for an eligible margin loan, repo-style transaction, or netting set by setting EAD equal to max
(A) ΣE equals the value of the exposure (the sum of the current fair values of all instruments, gold, and cash the national bank or Federal savings association has lent, sold subject to repurchase, or posted as collateral to the counterparty under the transaction (or netting set));
(B) ΣC equals the value of the collateral (the sum of the current fair values of all instruments, gold, and cash the national bank or Federal savings association has borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the counterparty under the transaction (or netting set));
(C) E s equals the absolute value of the net position in a given instrument or in gold (where the net position in a given instrument or in gold equals the sum of the current fair values of the instrument or gold the national bank or Federal savings association has lent, sold subject to repurchase, or posted as collateral to the counterparty minus the sum of the current fair values of that same instrument or gold the national bank or Federal savings association has borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the counterparty);
(D) H s equals the market price volatility haircut appropriate to the instrument or gold referenced in E s ;
(E) E fx equals the absolute value of the net position of instruments and cash in a currency that is different from the settlement currency (where the net position in a given currency equals the sum of the current fair values of any instruments or cash in the currency the national bank or Federal savings association has lent, sold subject to repurchase, or posted as collateral to the counterparty minus the sum of the current fair values of any instruments or cash in the currency the national bank or Federal savings association has borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the counterparty); and
(F) H fx equals the haircut appropriate to the mismatch between the currency referenced in E fx and the settlement currency.
(ii) Standard supervisory haircuts. (A) Under the standard supervisory haircuts approach:
( 1 ) A national bank or Federal savings association must use the haircuts for market price volatility (H s ) in Table 1 to § 3.132, as adjusted in certain circumstances as provided in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 3 ) and ( 4 ) of this section;
Table 1 to § 3.132—Standard Supervisory Market Price Volatility Haircuts 1
1 The market price volatility haircuts in Table 1 to § 3.132 are based on a 10 business-day holding period.
2 Includes a foreign PSE that receives a zero percent risk weight.
( 2 ) For currency mismatches, a national bank or Federal savings association must use a haircut for foreign exchange rate volatility (H fx ) of 8 percent, as adjusted in certain circumstances as provided in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 3 ) and ( 4 ) of this section.
( 3 ) For repo-style transactions and client-facing derivative transactions, a national bank or Federal savings association may multiply the supervisory haircuts provided in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 1 ) and ( 2 ) of this section by the square root of 1/2 (which equals 0.707107). If the national bank or Federal savings association determines that a longer holding period is appropriate for client-facing derivative transactions, then it must use a larger scaling factor to adjust for the longer holding period pursuant to paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 6 ) of this section.
( 4 ) A national bank or Federal savings association must adjust the supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period longer than ten business days (for eligible margin loans) or five business days (for repo-style transactions), using the formula provided in paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 6 ) of this section where the conditions in this paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 4 ) apply. If the number of trades in a netting set exceeds 5,000 at any time during a quarter, a national bank or Federal savings association must adjust the supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a minimum holding period of twenty business days for the following quarter (except when a national bank or Federal savings association is calculating EAD for a cleared transaction under § 3.133). If a netting set contains one or more trades involving illiquid collateral, a national bank or Federal savings association must adjust the supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a minimum holding period of twenty business days. If over the two previous quarters more than two margin disputes on a netting set have occurred that lasted longer than the holding period, then the national bank or Federal savings association must adjust the supervisory haircuts upward for that netting set on the basis of a minimum holding period that is at least two times the minimum holding period for that netting set.
( 5 )( i ) A national bank or Federal savings association must adjust the supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period longer than ten business days for collateral associated with derivative contracts (five business days for client-facing derivative contracts) using the formula provided in paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 6 ) of this section where the conditions in this paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 5 )( i ) apply. For collateral associated with a derivative contract that is within a netting set that is composed of more than 5,000 derivative contracts that are not cleared transactions, a national bank or Federal savings association must use a minimum holding period of twenty business days. If a netting set contains one or more trades involving illiquid collateral or a derivative contract that cannot be easily replaced, a national bank or Federal savings association must use a minimum holding period of twenty business days.
( ii ) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 1 ) or ( 3 ) or (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 5 )( i ) of this section, for collateral associated with a derivative contract in a netting set under which more than two margin disputes that lasted longer than the holding period occurred during the previous two quarters, the minimum holding period is twice the amount provided under paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 1 ) or ( 3 ) or (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 5 )( i ) of this section.
( 6 ) A national bank or Federal savings association must adjust the standard supervisory haircuts upward, pursuant to the adjustments provided in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)( 3 ) through ( 5 ) of this section, using the following formula:
( 7 ) If the instrument a national bank or Federal savings association has lent, sold subject to repurchase, or posted as collateral does not meet the definition of financial collateral, the national bank or Federal savings association must use a 25.0 percent haircut for market price volatility (H S ).
(iii) Own internal estimates for haircuts. With the prior written approval of the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings association may calculate haircuts (H s and H fx ) using its own internal estimates of the volatilities of market prices and foreign exchange rates.
(A) To receive OCC approval to use its own internal estimates, a national bank or Federal savings association must satisfy the following minimum quantitative standards:
( 1 ) A national bank or Federal savings association must use a 99th percentile one-tailed confidence interval.
( 2 ) The minimum holding period for a repo-style transaction is five business days and for an eligible margin loan is ten business days except for transactions or netting sets for which paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(A)( 3 ) of this section applies. When a national bank or Federal savings association calculates an own-estimates haircut on a T N -day holding period, which is different from the minimum holding period for the transaction type, the applicable haircut (H M ) is calculated using the following square root of time formula:
( i ) T M equals 5 for repo-style transactions and 10 for eligible margin loans;
( ii ) T N equals the holding period used by the national bank or Federal savings association to derive H N ; and
( iii ) H N equals the haircut based on the holding period T N
( 3 ) If the number of trades in a netting set exceeds 5,000 at any time during a quarter, a national bank or Federal savings association must calculate the haircut using a minimum holding period of twenty business days for the following quarter (except when a national bank or Federal savings association is calculating EAD for a cleared transaction under § 3.133). If a netting set contains one or more trades involving illiquid collateral or an OTC derivative that cannot be easily replaced, a national bank or Federal savings association must calculate the haircut using a minimum holding period of twenty business days. If over the two previous quarters more than two margin disputes on a netting set have occurred that lasted more than the holding period, then the national bank or Federal savings association must calculate the haircut for transactions in that netting set on the basis of a holding period that is at least two times the minimum holding period for that netting set.
( 4 ) A national bank or Federal savings association is required to calculate its own internal estimates with inputs calibrated to historical data from a continuous 12-month period that reflects a period of significant financial stress appropriate to the security or category of securities.
( 5 ) A national bank or Federal savings association must have policies and procedures that describe how it determines the period of significant financial stress used to calculate the national bank's or Federal savings association's own internal estimates for haircuts under this section and must be able to provide empirical support for the period used. The national bank or Federal savings association must obtain the prior approval of the OCC for, and notify the OCC if the national bank or Federal savings association makes any material changes to, these policies and procedures.
( 6 ) Nothing in this section prevents the OCC from requiring a national bank or Federal savings association to use a different period of significant financial stress in the calculation of own internal estimates for haircuts.
( 7 ) A national bank or Federal savings association must update its data sets and calculate haircuts no less frequently than quarterly and must also reassess data sets and haircuts whenever market prices change materially.
(B) With respect to debt securities that are investment grade, a national bank or Federal savings association may calculate haircuts for categories of securities. For a category of securities, the national bank or Federal savings association must calculate the haircut on the basis of internal volatility estimates for securities in that category that are representative of the securities in that category that the national bank or Federal savings association has lent, sold subject to repurchase, posted as collateral, borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral. In determining relevant categories, the national bank or Federal savings association must at a minimum take into account:
( 1 ) The type of issuer of the security;
( 2 ) The credit quality of the security;
( 3 ) The maturity of the security; and
( 4 ) The interest rate sensitivity of the security.
(C) With respect to debt securities that are not investment grade and equity securities, a national bank or Federal savings association must calculate a separate haircut for each individual security.
(D) Where an exposure or collateral (whether in the form of cash or securities) is denominated in a currency that differs from the settlement currency, the national bank or Federal savings association must calculate a separate currency mismatch haircut for its net position in each mismatched currency based on estimated volatilities of foreign exchange rates between the mismatched currency and the settlement currency.
(E) A national bank's or Federal savings association's own estimates of market price and foreign exchange rate volatilities may not take into account the correlations among securities and foreign exchange rates on either the exposure or collateral side of a transaction (or netting set) or the correlations among securities and foreign exchange rates between the exposure and collateral sides of the transaction (or netting set).
(3) Simple VaR methodology. With the prior written approval of the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings association may estimate EAD for a netting set using a VaR model that meets the requirements in paragraph (b)(3)(iii) of this section. In such event, the national bank or Federal savings association must set EAD equal to max {0, [(ΣE − ΣC) + PFE]}, where:
(i) ΣE equals the value of the exposure (the sum of the current fair values of all instruments, gold, and cash the national bank or Federal savings association has lent, sold subject to repurchase, or posted as collateral to the counterparty under the netting set);
(ii) ΣC equals the value of the collateral (the sum of the current fair values of all instruments, gold, and cash the national bank or Federal savings association has borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the counterparty under the netting set); and
(iii) PFE (potential future exposure) equals the national bank's or Federal savings association's empirically based best estimate of the 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval for an increase in the value of (ΣE − ΣC) over a five-business-day holding period for repo-style transactions, or over a ten-business-day holding period for eligible margin loans except for netting sets for which paragraph (b)(3)(iv) of this section applies using a minimum one-year historical observation period of price data representing the instruments that the national bank or Federal savings association has lent, sold subject to repurchase, posted as collateral, borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral. The national bank or Federal savings association must validate its VaR model by establishing and maintaining a rigorous and regular backtesting regime.
(iv) If the number of trades in a netting set exceeds 5,000 at any time during a quarter, a national bank or Federal savings association must use a twenty-business-day holding period for the following quarter (except when a national bank or Federal savings association is calculating EAD for a cleared transaction under § 3.133). If a netting set contains one or more trades involving illiquid collateral, a national bank or Federal savings association must use a twenty-business-day holding period. If over the two previous quarters more than two margin disputes on a netting set have occurred that lasted more than the holding period, then the national bank or Federal savings association must set its PFE for that netting set equal to an estimate over a holding period that is at least two times the minimum holding period for that netting set.
(c) EAD for derivative contracts —(1) Options for determining EAD. A national bank or Federal savings association must determine the EAD for a derivative contract using the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR) under paragraph (c)(5) of this section or using the internal models methodology described in paragraph (d) of this section. If a national bank or Federal savings association elects to use SA-CCR for one or more derivative contracts, the exposure amount determined under SA-CCR is the EAD for the derivative contract or derivative contracts. A national bank or Federal savings association must use the same methodology to calculate the exposure amount for all its derivative contracts and may change its election only with prior approval of the OCC. A national bank or Federal savings association may reduce the EAD calculated according to paragraph (c)(5) of this section by the credit valuation adjustment that the national bank or Federal savings association has recognized in its balance sheet valuation of any derivative contracts in the netting set. For purposes of this paragraph (c)(1), the credit valuation adjustment does not include any adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital attributable to changes in the fair value of the national bank's or Federal savings association's liabilities that are due to changes in its own credit risk since the inception of the transaction with the counterparty.
(2) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph (c) of this section, the following definitions apply:
(i) End date means the last date of the period referenced by an interest rate or credit derivative contract or, if the derivative contract references another instrument, by the underlying instrument, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c) of this section.
(ii) Start date means the first date of the period referenced by an interest rate or credit derivative contract or, if the derivative contract references the value of another instrument, by underlying instrument, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c) of this section.
(iii) Hedging set means:
(A) With respect to interest rate derivative contracts, all such contracts within a netting set that reference the same reference currency;
(B) With respect to exchange rate derivative contracts, all such contracts within a netting set that reference the same currency pair;
(C) With respect to credit derivative contract, all such contracts within a netting set;
(D) With respect to equity derivative contracts, all such contracts within a netting set;
(E) With respect to a commodity derivative contract, all such contracts within a netting set that reference one of the following commodity categories: Energy, metal, agricultural, or other commodities;
(F) With respect to basis derivative contracts, all such contracts within a netting set that reference the same pair of risk factors and are denominated in the same currency; or
(G) With respect to volatility derivative contracts, all such contracts within a netting set that reference one of interest rate, exchange rate, credit, equity, or commodity risk factors, separated according to the requirements under paragraphs (c)(2)(iii)(A) through (E) of this section.
(H) If the risk of a derivative contract materially depends on more than one of interest rate, exchange rate, credit, equity, or commodity risk factors, the OCC may require a national bank or Federal savings association to include the derivative contract in each appropriate hedging set under paragraphs (c)(2)(iii)(A) through (E) of this section.
(3) Credit derivatives. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this section:
(i) A national bank or Federal savings association that purchases a credit derivative that is recognized under § 3.134 or § 3.135 as a credit risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered position under subpart F of this part is not required to calculate a separate counterparty credit risk capital requirement under this section so long as the national bank or Federal savings association does so consistently for all such credit derivatives and either includes or excludes all such credit derivatives that are subject to a master netting agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for risk-based capital purposes.
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association that is the protection provider in a credit derivative must treat the credit derivative as a wholesale exposure to the reference obligor and is not required to calculate a counterparty credit risk capital requirement for the credit derivative under this section, so long as it does so consistently for all such credit derivatives and either includes all or excludes all such credit derivatives that are subject to a master netting agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for risk-based capital purposes (unless the national bank or Federal savings association is treating the credit derivative as a covered position under subpart F of this part, in which case the national bank or Federal savings association must calculate a supplemental counterparty credit risk capital requirement under this section).
(4) Equity derivatives. A national bank or Federal savings association must treat an equity derivative contract as an equity exposure and compute a risk-weighted asset amount for the equity derivative contract under §§ 3.151-3.155 (unless the national bank or Federal savings association is treating the contract as a covered position under subpart F of this part). In addition, if the national bank or Federal savings association is treating the contract as a covered position under subpart F of this part, and under certain other circumstances described in § 3.155, the national bank or Federal savings association must also calculate a risk-based capital requirement for the counterparty credit risk of an equity derivative contract under this section.
(5) Exposure amount. (i) The exposure amount of a netting set, as calculated under paragraph (c) of this section, is equal to 1.4 multiplied by the sum of the replacement cost of the netting set, as calculated under paragraph (c)(6) of this section, and the potential future exposure of the netting set, as calculated under paragraph (c)(7) of this section.
(ii) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this section, the exposure amount of a netting set subject to a variation margin agreement, excluding a netting set that is subject to a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty to the variation margin agreement is not required to post variation margin, is equal to the lesser of the exposure amount of the netting set calculated under paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this section and the exposure amount of the netting set calculated as if the netting set were not subject to a variation margin agreement.
(iii) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this section, the exposure amount of a netting set that consists of only sold options in which the premiums have been fully paid by the counterparty to the options and where the options are not subject to a variation margin agreement is zero.
(iv) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this section, the exposure amount of a netting set in which the counterparty is a commercial end-user is equal to the sum of replacement cost, as calculated under paragraph (c)(6) of this section, and the potential future exposure of the netting set, as calculated under paragraph (c)(7) of this section.
(v) For purposes of the exposure amount calculated under paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this section and all calculations that are part of that exposure amount, a national bank or Federal savings association may elect, at the netting set level, to treat a derivative contract that is a cleared transaction that is not subject to a variation margin agreement as one that is subject to a variation margin agreement, if the derivative contract is subject to a requirement that the counterparties make daily cash payments to each other to account for changes in the fair value of the derivative contract and to reduce the net position of the contract to zero. If a national bank or Federal savings association makes an election under this paragraph (c)(5)(v) for one derivative contract, it must treat all other derivative contracts within the same netting set that are eligible for an election under this paragraph (c)(5)(v) as derivative contracts that are subject to a variation margin agreement.
(vi) For purposes of the exposure amount calculated under paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this section and all calculations that are part of that exposure amount, a national bank or Federal savings association may elect to treat a credit derivative contract, equity derivative contract, or commodity derivative contract that references an index as if it were multiple derivative contracts each referencing one component of the index.
(6) Replacement cost of a netting set —(i) Netting set subject to a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must post variation margin. The replacement cost of a netting set subject to a variation margin agreement, excluding a netting set that is subject to a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty is not required to post variation margin, is the greater of:
(A) The sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set less the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the variation margin amount applicable to such derivative contracts;
(B) The sum of the variation margin threshold and the minimum transfer amount applicable to the derivative contracts within the netting set less the net independent collateral amount applicable to such derivative contracts; or
(C) Zero.
(ii) Netting sets not subject to a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must post variation margin. The replacement cost of a netting set that is not subject to a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must post variation margin to the national bank or Federal savings association is the greater of:
(A) The sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set less the sum of the net independent collateral amount and variation margin amount applicable to such derivative contracts; or
(B) Zero.
(iii) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin agreement. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(6)(i) and (ii) of this section, the replacement cost for multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin agreement must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(10)(i) of this section.
(iv) Netting set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting set. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(6)(i) and (ii) of this section, the replacement cost for a netting set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting set must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(11)(i) of this section.
(7) Potential future exposure of a netting set. The potential future exposure of a netting set is the product of the PFE multiplier and the aggregated amount.
(i) PFE multiplier. The PFE multiplier is calculated according to the following formula:
(ii) Aggregated amount. The aggregated amount is the sum of all hedging set amounts, as calculated under paragraph (c)(8) of this section, within a netting set.
(iii) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin agreement. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(7)(i) and (ii) of this section and when calculating the potential future exposure for purposes of total leverage exposure under § 3.10(c)(2)(ii)(B), the potential future exposure for multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin agreement must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(10)(ii) of this section.
(iv) Netting set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting set. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(7)(i) and (ii) of this section and when calculating the potential future exposure for purposes of total leverage exposure under § 3.10(c)(2)(ii)(B), the potential future exposure for a netting set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting set must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(11)(ii) of this section.
(8) Hedging set amount —(i) Interest rate derivative contracts. To calculate the hedging set amount of an interest rate derivative contract hedging set, a national bank or Federal savings association may use either of the formulas provided in paragraphs (c)(8)(i)(A) and (B) of this section:
(A) Formula 1 is as follows:
(B) Formula 2 is as follows:
(ii) Exchange rate derivative contracts. For an exchange rate derivative contract hedging set, the hedging set amount equals the absolute value of the sum of the adjusted derivative contract amounts, as calculated under paragraph (c)(9) of this section, within the hedging set.
(iii) Credit derivative contracts and equity derivative contracts. The hedging set amount of a credit derivative contract hedging set or equity derivative contract hedging set within a netting set is calculated according to the following formula:
(iv) Commodity derivative contracts. The hedging set amount of a commodity derivative contract hedging set within a netting set is calculated according to the following formula:
(v) Basis derivative contracts and volatility derivative contracts. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(8)(i) through (iv) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings association must calculate a separate hedging set amount for each basis derivative contract hedging set and each volatility derivative contract hedging set. A national bank or Federal savings association must calculate such hedging set amounts using one of the formulas under paragraphs (c)(8)(i) through (iv) of this section that corresponds to the primary risk factor of the hedging set being calculated.
(9) Adjusted derivative contract amount —(i) Summary. To calculate the adjusted derivative contract amount of a derivative contract, a national bank or Federal savings association must determine the adjusted notional amount of derivative contract, pursuant to paragraph (c)(9)(ii) of this section, and multiply the adjusted notional amount by each of the supervisory delta adjustment, pursuant to paragraph (c)(9)(iii) of this section, the maturity factor, pursuant to paragraph (c)(9)(iv) of this section, and the applicable supervisory factor, as provided in Table 3 to this section.
(ii) Adjusted notional amount. (A)( 1 ) For an interest rate derivative contract or a credit derivative contract, the adjusted notional amount equals the product of the notional amount of the derivative contract, as measured in U.S. dollars using the exchange rate on the date of the calculation, and the supervisory duration, as calculated by the following formula:
( 2 ) For purposes of paragraph (c)(9)(ii)(A)( 1 ) of this section:
( i ) For an interest rate derivative contract or credit derivative contract that is a variable notional swap, the notional amount is equal to the time-weighted average of the contractual notional amounts of such a swap over the remaining life of the swap; and
( ii ) For an interest rate derivative contract or a credit derivative contract that is a leveraged swap, in which the notional amount of all legs of the derivative contract are divided by a factor and all rates of the derivative contract are multiplied by the same factor, the notional amount is equal to the notional amount of an equivalent unleveraged swap.
(B)( 1 ) For an exchange rate derivative contract, the adjusted notional amount is the notional amount of the non-U.S. denominated currency leg of the derivative contract, as measured in U.S. dollars using the exchange rate on the date of the calculation. If both legs of the exchange rate derivative contract are denominated in currencies other than U.S. dollars, the adjusted notional amount of the derivative contract is the largest leg of the derivative contract, as measured in U.S. dollars using the exchange rate on the date of the calculation.
( 2 ) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(ii)(B)( 1 ) of this section, for an exchange rate derivative contract with multiple exchanges of principal, the national bank or Federal savings association must set the adjusted notional amount of the derivative contract equal to the notional amount of the derivative contract multiplied by the number of exchanges of principal under the derivative contract.
(C)( 1 ) For an equity derivative contract or a commodity derivative contract, the adjusted notional amount is the product of the fair value of one unit of the reference instrument underlying the derivative contract and the number of such units referenced by the derivative contract.
( 2 ) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(ii)(C)( 1 ) of this section, when calculating the adjusted notional amount for an equity derivative contract or a commodity derivative contract that is a volatility derivative contract, the national bank or Federal savings association must replace the unit price with the underlying volatility referenced by the volatility derivative contract and replace the number of units with the notional amount of the volatility derivative contract.
(iii) Supervisory delta adjustments. (A) For a derivative contract that is not an option contract or collateralized debt obligation tranche, the supervisory delta adjustment is 1 if the fair value of the derivative contract increases when the value of the primary risk factor increases and −1 if the fair value of the derivative contract decreases when the value of the primary risk factor increases.
(B)( 1 ) For a derivative contract that is an option contract, the supervisory delta adjustment is determined by the following formulas, as applicable:
( 2 ) As used in the formulas in Table 2 to this section:
( i ) Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function;
( ii ) P equals the current fair value of the instrument or risk factor, as applicable, underlying the option;
( iii ) K equals the strike price of the option;
( iv ) T equals the number of business days until the latest contractual exercise date of the option;
( v ) λ equals zero for all derivative contracts except interest rate options for the currencies where interest rates have negative values. The same value of λ must be used for all interest rate options that are denominated in the same currency. To determine the value of λ for a given currency, a national bank or Federal savings association must find the lowest value L of P and K of all interest rate options in a given currency that the national bank or Federal savings association has with all counterparties. Then, λ is set according to this formula: λ = max {− L + 0.1%, 0}; and
( vi ) σ equals the supervisory option volatility, as provided in Table 3 to of this section.
(C)( 1 ) For a derivative contract that is a collateralized debt obligation tranche, the supervisory delta adjustment is determined by the following formula:
( 2 ) As used in the formula in paragraph (c)(9)(iii)(C)( 1 ) of this section:
( i ) A is the attachment point, which equals the ratio of the notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are subordinated to the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposure to the total notional amount of all underlying exposures, expressed as a decimal value between zero and one; 30
30 In the case of a first-to-default credit derivative, there are no underlying exposures that are subordinated to the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposure. In the case of a second-or-subsequent-to-default credit derivative, the smallest (n−1) notional amounts of the underlying exposures are subordinated to the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposure.
( ii ) D is the detachment point, which equals one minus the ratio of the notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are senior to the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposure to the total notional amount of all underlying exposures, expressed as a decimal value between zero and one; and
( iii ) The resulting amount is designated with a positive sign if the collateralized debt obligation tranche was purchased by the national bank or Federal savings association and is designated with a negative sign if the collateralized debt obligation tranche was sold by the national bank or Federal savings association.
(iv) Maturity factor. (A)( 1 ) The maturity factor of a derivative contract that is subject to a variation margin agreement, excluding derivative contracts that are subject to a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty is not required to post variation margin, is determined by the following formula:
Where MPOR refers to the period from the most recent exchange of collateral covering a netting set of derivative contracts with a defaulting counterparty until the derivative contracts are closed out and the resulting market risk is re-hedged.
( 2 ) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(iv)(A)( 1 ) of this section:
( i ) For a derivative contract that is not a client-facing derivative transaction, MPOR cannot be less than ten business days plus the periodicity of re-margining expressed in business days minus one business day;
( ii ) For a derivative contract that is a client-facing derivative transaction, MPOR cannot be less than five business days plus the periodicity of re-margining expressed in business days minus one business day; and
( iii ) For a derivative contract that is within a netting set that is composed of more than 5,000 derivative contracts that are not cleared transactions, or a netting set that contains one or more trades involving illiquid collateral or a derivative contract that cannot be easily replaced, MPOR cannot be less than twenty business days.
( 3 ) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(9)(iv)(A)( 1 ) and ( 2 ) of this section, for a netting set subject to more than two outstanding disputes over margin that lasted longer than the MPOR over the previous two quarters, the applicable floor is twice the amount provided in paragraphs (c)(9)(iv)(A)( 1 ) and ( 2 ) of this section.
(B) The maturity factor of a derivative contract that is not subject to a variation margin agreement, or derivative contracts under which the counterparty is not required to post variation margin, is determined by the following formula:
Where M equals the greater of 10 business days and the remaining maturity of the contract, as measured in business days.
(C) For purposes of paragraph (c)(9)(iv) of this section, if a national bank or Federal savings association has elected pursuant to paragraph (c)(5)(v) of this section to treat a derivative contract that is a cleared transaction that is not subject to a variation margin agreement as one that is subject to a variation margin agreement, the national bank or Federal savings association must treat the derivative contract as subject to a variation margin agreement with maturity factor as determined according to (c)(9)(iv)(A) of this section, and daily settlement does not change the end date of the period referenced by the derivative contract.
(v) Derivative contract as multiple effective derivative contracts. A national bank or Federal savings association must separate a derivative contract into separate derivative contracts, according to the following rules:
(A) For an option where the counterparty pays a predetermined amount if the value of the underlying asset is above or below the strike price and nothing otherwise (binary option), the option must be treated as two separate options. For purposes of paragraph (c)(9)(iii)(B) of this section, a binary option with strike K must be represented as the combination of one bought European option and one sold European option of the same type as the original option (put or call) with the strikes set equal to 0.95 * K and 1.05 * K so that the payoff of the binary option is reproduced exactly outside the region between the two strikes. The absolute value of the sum of the adjusted derivative contract amounts of the bought and sold options is capped at the payoff amount of the binary option.
(B) For a derivative contract that can be represented as a combination of standard option payoffs (such as collar, butterfly spread, calendar spread, straddle, and strangle), a national bank or Federal savings association must treat each standard option component as a separate derivative contract.
(C) For a derivative contract that includes multiple-payment options, (such as interest rate caps and floors), a national bank or Federal savings association may represent each payment option as a combination of effective single-payment options (such as interest rate caplets and floorlets).
(D) A national bank or Federal savings association may not decompose linear derivative contracts (such as swaps) into components.
(10) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin agreement —(i) Calculating replacement cost. Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(6) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings association shall assign a single replacement cost to multiple netting sets that are subject to a single variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must post variation margin, calculated according to the following formula:
(ii) Calculating potential future exposure. Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(5) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings association shall assign a single potential future exposure to multiple netting sets that are subject to a single variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must post variation margin equal to the sum of the potential future exposure of each such netting set, each calculated according to paragraph (c)(7) of this section as if such nettings sets were not subject to a variation margin agreement.
(11) Netting set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting set —(i) Calculating replacement cost. To calculate replacement cost for either a netting set subject to multiple variation margin agreements under which the counterparty to each variation margin agreement must post variation margin, or a netting set composed of at least one derivative contract subject to variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must post variation margin and at least one derivative contract that is not subject to such a variation margin agreement, the calculation for replacement cost is provided under paragraph (c)(6)(i) of this section, except that the variation margin threshold equals the sum of the variation margin thresholds of all variation margin agreements within the netting set and the minimum transfer amount equals the sum of the minimum transfer amounts of all the variation margin agreements within the netting set.
(ii) Calculating potential future exposure. (A) To calculate potential future exposure for a netting set subject to multiple variation margin agreements under which the counterparty to each variation margin agreement must post variation margin, or a netting set composed of at least one derivative contract subject to variation margin agreement under which the counterparty to the derivative contract must post variation margin and at least one derivative contract that is not subject to such a variation margin agreement, a national bank or Federal savings association must divide the netting set into sub-netting sets (as described in paragraph (c)(11)(ii)(B) of this section) and calculate the aggregated amount for each sub-netting set. The aggregated amount for the netting set is calculated as the sum of the aggregated amounts for the sub-netting sets. The multiplier is calculated for the entire netting set.
(B) For purposes of paragraph (c)(11)(ii)(A) of this section, the netting set must be divided into sub-netting sets as follows:
( 1 ) All derivative contracts within the netting set that are not subject to a variation margin agreement or that are subject to a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty is not required to post variation margin form a single sub-netting set. The aggregated amount for this sub-netting set is calculated as if the netting set is not subject to a variation margin agreement.
( 2 ) All derivative contracts within the netting set that are subject to variation margin agreements in which the counterparty must post variation margin and that share the same value of the MPOR form a single sub-netting set. The aggregated amount for this sub-netting set is calculated as if the netting set is subject to a variation margin agreement, using the MPOR value shared by the derivative contracts within the netting set.
Table 3 to § 3.132—Supervisory Option Volatility, Supervisory Correlation Parameters, and Supervisory Factors for Derivative Contracts
1 The applicable supervisory factor for basis derivative contract hedging sets is equal to one-half of the supervisory factor provided in this Table 3, and the applicable supervisory factor for volatility derivative contract hedging sets is equal to 5 times the supervisory factor provided in this Table 3.
(d) Internal models methodology. (1)(i) With prior written approval from the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings association may use the internal models methodology in this paragraph (d) to determine EAD for counterparty credit risk for derivative contracts (collateralized or uncollateralized) and single-product netting sets thereof, for eligible margin loans and single-product netting sets thereof, and for repo-style transactions and single-product netting sets thereof.
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association that uses the internal models methodology for a particular transaction type (derivative contracts, eligible margin loans, or repo-style transactions) must use the internal models methodology for all transactions of that transaction type. A national bank or Federal savings association may choose to use the internal models methodology for one or two of these three types of exposures and not the other types.
(iii) A national bank or Federal savings association may also use the internal models methodology for derivative contracts, eligible margin loans, and repo-style transactions subject to a qualifying cross-product netting agreement if:
(A) The national bank or Federal savings association effectively integrates the risk mitigating effects of cross-product netting into its risk management and other information technology systems; and
(B) The national bank or Federal savings association obtains the prior written approval of the OCC.
(iv) A national bank or Federal savings association that uses the internal models methodology for a transaction type must receive approval from the OCC to cease using the methodology for that transaction type or to make a material change to its internal model.
(2) Risk-weighted assets using IMM. Under the IMM, a national bank or Federal savings association uses an internal model to estimate the expected exposure (EE) for a netting set and then calculates EAD based on that EE. A national bank or Federal savings association must calculate two EEs and two EADs (one stressed and one unstressed) for each netting set as follows:
(i) EAD unstressed is calculated using an EE estimate based on the most recent data meeting the requirements of paragraph (d)(3)(vii) of this section;
(ii) EAD stressed is calculated using an EE estimate based on a historical period that includes a period of stress to the credit default spreads of the national bank's or Federal savings association's counterparties according to paragraph (d)(3)(viii) of this section;
(iii) The national bank or Federal savings association must use its internal model's probability distribution for changes in the fair value of a netting set that are attributable to changes in market variables to determine EE; and
(iv) Under the internal models methodology, EAD = Max (0, α × effective EPE − CVA), or, subject to the prior written approval of OCC as provided in paragraph (d)(10) of this section, a more conservative measure of EAD.
(A) CVA equals the credit valuation adjustment that the national bank or Federal savings association has recognized in its balance sheet valuation of any OTC derivative contracts in the netting set. For purposes of this paragraph (d), CVA does not include any adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital attributable to changes in the fair value of the national bank's or Federal savings association's liabilities that are due to changes in its own credit risk since the inception of the transaction with the counterparty.
(C) α = 1.4 except as provided in paragraph (d)(6) of this section, or when the OCC has determined that the national bank or Federal savings association must set α higher based on the national bank's or Federal savings association's specific characteristics of counterparty credit risk or model performance.
(v) A national bank or Federal savings association may include financial collateral currently posted by the counterparty as collateral (but may not include other forms of collateral) when calculating EE.
(vi) If a national bank or Federal savings association hedges some or all of the counterparty credit risk associated with a netting set using an eligible credit derivative, the national bank or Federal savings association may take the reduction in exposure to the counterparty into account when estimating EE. If the national bank or Federal savings association recognizes this reduction in exposure to the counterparty in its estimate of EE, it must also use its internal model to estimate a separate EAD for the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposure to the protection provider of the credit derivative.
(3) Prior approval relating to EAD calculation. To obtain OCC approval to calculate the distributions of exposures upon which the EAD calculation is based, the national bank or Federal savings association must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the OCC that it has been using for at least one year an internal model that broadly meets the following minimum standards, with which the national bank or Federal savings association must maintain compliance:
(i) The model must have the systems capability to estimate the expected exposure to the counterparty on a daily basis (but is not expected to estimate or report expected exposure on a daily basis);
(ii) The model must estimate expected exposure at enough future dates to reflect accurately all the future cash flows of contracts in the netting set;
(iii) The model must account for the possible non-normality of the exposure distribution, where appropriate;
(iv) The national bank or Federal savings association must measure, monitor, and control current counterparty exposure and the exposure to the counterparty over the whole life of all contracts in the netting set;
(v) The national bank or Federal savings association must be able to measure and manage current exposures gross and net of collateral held, where appropriate. The national bank or Federal savings association must estimate expected exposures for OTC derivative contracts both with and without the effect of collateral agreements;
(vi) The national bank or Federal savings association must have procedures to identify, monitor, and control wrong-way risk throughout the life of an exposure. The procedures must include stress testing and scenario analysis;
(vii) The model must use current market data to compute current exposures. The national bank or Federal savings association must estimate model parameters using historical data from the most recent three-year period and update the data quarterly or more frequently if market conditions warrant. The national bank or Federal savings association should consider using model parameters based on forward-looking measures, where appropriate;
(viii) When estimating model parameters based on a stress period, the national bank or Federal savings association must use at least three years of historical data that include a period of stress to the credit default spreads of the national bank's or Federal savings association's counterparties. The national bank or Federal savings association must review the data set and update the data as necessary, particularly for any material changes in its counterparties. The national bank or Federal savings association must demonstrate, at least quarterly, and maintain documentation of such demonstration, that the stress period coincides with increased CDS or other credit spreads of the national bank's or Federal savings association's counterparties. The national bank or Federal savings association must have procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of its stress calibration that include a process for using benchmark portfolios that are vulnerable to the same risk factors as the national bank's or Federal savings association's portfolio. The OCC may require the national bank or Federal savings association to modify its stress calibration to better reflect actual historic losses of the portfolio;
(ix) A national bank or Federal savings association must subject its internal model to an initial validation and annual model review process. The model review should consider whether the inputs and risk factors, as well as the model outputs, are appropriate. As part of the model review process, the national bank or Federal savings association must have a backtesting program for its model that includes a process by which unacceptable model performance will be determined and remedied;
(x) A national bank or Federal savings association must have policies for the measurement, management and control of collateral and margin amounts; and
(xi) A national bank or Federal savings association must have a comprehensive stress testing program that captures all credit exposures to counterparties, and incorporates stress testing of principal market risk factors and creditworthiness of counterparties.
(4) Calculating the maturity of exposures. (i) If the remaining maturity of the exposure or the longest-dated contract in the netting set is greater than one year, the national bank or Federal savings association must set M for the exposure or netting set equal to the lower of five years or M(EPE), where:
(ii) If the remaining maturity of the exposure or the longest-dated contract in the netting set is one year or less, the national bank or Federal savings association must set M for the exposure or netting set equal to one year, except as provided in § 3.131(d)(7).
(iii) Alternatively, a national bank or Federal savings association that uses an internal model to calculate a one-sided credit valuation adjustment may use the effective credit duration estimated by the model as M(EPE) in place of the formula in paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this section.
(5) Effects of collateral agreements on EAD. A national bank or Federal savings association may capture the effect on EAD of a collateral agreement that requires receipt of collateral when exposure to the counterparty increases, but may not capture the effect on EAD of a collateral agreement that requires receipt of collateral when counterparty credit quality deteriorates. Two methods are available to capture the effect of a collateral agreement, as set forth in paragraphs (d)(5)(i) and (ii) of this section:
(i) With prior written approval from the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings association may include the effect of a collateral agreement within its internal model used to calculate EAD. The national bank or Federal savings association may set EAD equal to the expected exposure at the end of the margin period of risk. The margin period of risk means, with respect to a netting set subject to a collateral agreement, the time period from the most recent exchange of collateral with a counterparty until the next required exchange of collateral, plus the period of time required to sell and realize the proceeds of the least liquid collateral that can be delivered under the terms of the collateral agreement and, where applicable, the period of time required to re-hedge the resulting market risk upon the default of the counterparty. The minimum margin period of risk is set according to paragraph (d)(5)(iii) of this section; or
(ii) As an alternative to paragraph (d)(5)(i) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings association that can model EPE without collateral agreements but cannot achieve the higher level of modeling sophistication to model EPE with collateral agreements can set effective EPE for a collateralized netting set equal to the lesser of:
(A) An add-on that reflects the potential increase in exposure of the netting set over the margin period of risk, plus the larger of:
( 1 ) The current exposure of the netting set reflecting all collateral held or posted by the national bank or Federal savings association excluding any collateral called or in dispute; or
( 2 ) The largest net exposure including all collateral held or posted under the margin agreement that would not trigger a collateral call. For purposes of this section, the add-on is computed as the expected increase in the netting set's exposure over the margin period of risk (set in accordance with paragraph (d)(5)(iii) of this section); or
(B) Effective EPE without a collateral agreement plus any collateral the national bank or Federal savings association posts to the counterparty that exceeds the required margin amount.
(iii) For purposes of this part, including paragraphs (d)(5)(i) and (ii) of this section, the margin period of risk for a netting set subject to a collateral agreement is:
(A) Five business days for repo-style transactions subject to daily remargining and daily marking-to-market, and ten business days for other transactions when liquid financial collateral is posted under a daily margin maintenance requirement, or
(B) Twenty business days if the number of trades in a netting set exceeds 5,000 at any time during the previous quarter (except if the national bank or Federal savings association is calculating EAD for a cleared transaction under § 3.133) or contains one or more trades involving illiquid collateral or any derivative contract that cannot be easily replaced. If over the two previous quarters more than two margin disputes on a netting set have occurred that lasted more than the margin period of risk, then the national bank or Federal savings association must use a margin period of risk for that netting set that is at least two times the minimum margin period of risk for that netting set. If the periodicity of the receipt of collateral is N-days, the minimum margin period of risk is the minimum margin period of risk under this paragraph (d) plus N minus 1. This period should be extended to cover any impediments to prompt re-hedging of any market risk.
(C) Five business days for an OTC derivative contract or netting set of OTC derivative contracts where the national bank or Federal savings association is either acting as a financial intermediary and enters into an offsetting transaction with a CCP or where the national bank or Federal savings association provides a guarantee to the CCP on the performance of the client. A national bank or Federal savings association must use a longer holding period if the national bank or Federal savings association determines that a longer period is appropriate. Additionally, the OCC may require the national bank or Federal savings association to set a longer holding period if the OCC determines that a longer period is appropriate due to the nature, structure, or characteristics of the transaction or is commensurate with the risks associated with the transaction.
(6) Own estimate of alpha. With prior written approval of the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings association may calculate alpha as the ratio of economic capital from a full simulation of counterparty exposure across counterparties that incorporates a joint simulation of market and credit risk factors (numerator) and economic capital based on EPE (denominator), subject to a floor of 1.2. For purposes of this calculation, economic capital is the unexpected losses for all counterparty credit risks measured at a 99.9 percent confidence level over a one-year horizon. To receive approval, the national bank or Federal savings association must meet the following minimum standards to the satisfaction of the OCC:
(i) The national bank's or Federal savings association's own estimate of alpha must capture in the numerator the effects of:
(A) The material sources of stochastic dependency of distributions of fair values of transactions or portfolios of transactions across counterparties;
(B) Volatilities and correlations of market risk factors used in the joint simulation, which must be related to the credit risk factor used in the simulation to reflect potential increases in volatility or correlation in an economic downturn, where appropriate; and
(C) The granularity of exposures (that is, the effect of a concentration in the proportion of each counterparty's exposure that is driven by a particular risk factor).
(ii) The national bank or Federal savings association must assess the potential model uncertainty in its estimates of alpha.
(iii) The national bank or Federal savings association must calculate the numerator and denominator of alpha in a consistent fashion with respect to modeling methodology, parameter specifications, and portfolio composition.
(iv) The national bank or Federal savings association must review and adjust as appropriate its estimates of the numerator and denominator of alpha on at least a quarterly basis and more frequently when the composition of the portfolio varies over time.
(7) Risk-based capital requirements for transactions with specific wrong-way risk. A national bank or Federal savings association must determine if a repo-style transaction, eligible margin loan, bond option, or equity derivative contract or purchased credit derivative to which the national bank or Federal savings association applies the internal models methodology under this paragraph (d) has specific wrong-way risk. If a transaction has specific wrong-way risk, the national bank or Federal savings association must treat the transaction as its own netting set and exclude it from the model described in § 3.132(d)(2) and instead calculate the risk-based capital requirement for the transaction as follows:
(i) For an equity derivative contract, by multiplying:
(A) K, calculated using the appropriate risk-based capital formula specified in Table 1 of § 3.131 using the PD of the counterparty and LGD equal to 100 percent, by
(B) The maximum amount the national bank or Federal savings association could lose on the equity derivative.
(ii) For a purchased credit derivative by multiplying:
(A) K, calculated using the appropriate risk-based capital formula specified in Table 1 of § 3.131 using the PD of the counterparty and LGD equal to 100 percent, by
(B) The fair value of the reference asset of the credit derivative.
(iii) For a bond option, by multiplying:
(A) K, calculated using the appropriate risk-based capital formula specified in Table 1 of § 3.131 using the PD of the counterparty and LGD equal to 100 percent, by
(B) The smaller of the notional amount of the underlying reference asset and the maximum potential loss under the bond option contract.
(iv) For a repo-style transaction or eligible margin loan by multiplying:
(A) K, calculated using the appropriate risk-based capital formula specified in Table 1 of § 3.131 using the PD of the counterparty and LGD equal to 100 percent, by
(B) The EAD of the transaction determined according to the EAD equation in § 3.132(b)(2), substituting the estimated value of the collateral assuming a default of the counterparty for the value of the collateral in Σ c of the equation.
(8) Risk-weighted asset amount for IMM exposures with specific wrong-way risk. The aggregate risk-weighted asset amount for IMM exposures with specific wrong-way risk is the sum of a national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-based capital requirement for purchased credit derivatives that are not bond options with specific wrong-way risk as calculated under paragraph (d)(7)(ii) of this section, a national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-based capital requirement for equity derivatives with specific wrong-way risk as calculated under paragraph (d)(7)(i) of this section, a national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-based capital requirement for bond options with specific wrong-way risk as calculated under paragraph (d)(7)(iii) of this section, and a national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-based capital requirement for repo-style transactions and eligible margin loans with specific wrong-way risk as calculated under paragraph (d)(7)(iv) of this section, multiplied by 12.5.
(9) Risk-weighted assets for IMM exposures. (i) The national bank or Federal savings association must insert the assigned risk parameters for each counterparty and netting set into the appropriate formula specified in Table 1 of § 3.131 and multiply the output of the formula by the EAD unstressed of the netting set to obtain the unstressed capital requirement for each netting set. A national bank or Federal savings association that uses an advanced CVA approach that captures migrations in credit spreads under paragraph (e)(3) of this section must set the maturity adjustment (b) in the formula equal to zero. The sum of the unstressed capital requirement calculated for each netting set equals K unstressed .
(ii) The national bank or Federal savings association must insert the assigned risk parameters for each wholesale obligor and netting set into the appropriate formula specified in Table 1 of § 3.131 and multiply the output of the formula by the EAD stressed of the netting set to obtain the stressed capital requirement for each netting set. A national bank or Federal savings association that uses an advanced CVA approach that captures migrations in credit spreads under paragraph (e)(6) of this section must set the maturity adjustment (b) in the formula equal to zero. The sum of the stressed capital requirement calculated for each netting set equals K stressed .
(iii) The national bank's or Federal savings association's dollar risk-based capital requirement under the internal models methodology equals the larger of K unstressed and K stressed . A national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-weighted assets amount for IMM exposures is equal to the capital requirement multiplied by 12.5, plus risk-weighted assets for IMM exposures with specific wrong-way risk in paragraph (d)(8) of this section and those in paragraph (d)(10) of this section.
(10) Other measures of counterparty exposure. (i) With prior written approval of the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings association may set EAD equal to a measure of counterparty credit risk exposure, such as peak EAD, that is more conservative than an alpha of 1.4 times the larger of EPE unstressed and EPE stressed for every counterparty whose EAD will be measured under the alternative measure of counterparty exposure. The national bank or Federal savings association must demonstrate the conservatism of the measure of counterparty credit risk exposure used for EAD. With respect to paragraph (d)(10)(i) of this section:
(A) For material portfolios of new OTC derivative products, the national bank or Federal savings association may assume that the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section meets the conservatism requirement of this section for a period not to exceed 180 days.
(B) For immaterial portfolios of OTC derivative contracts, the national bank or Federal savings association generally may assume that the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section meets the conservatism requirement of this section.
(ii) To calculate risk-weighted assets for purposes of the approach in paragraph (d)(10)(i) of this section, the national bank or Federal savings association must insert the assigned risk parameters for each counterparty and netting set into the appropriate formula specified in Table 1 of § 3.131, multiply the output of the formula by the EAD for the exposure as specified above, and multiply by 12.5.
(e) Credit valuation adjustment (CVA) risk-weighted assets —(1) In general. With respect to its OTC derivative contracts, a national bank or Federal savings association must calculate a CVA risk-weighted asset amount for its portfolio of OTC derivative transactions that are subject to the CVA capital requirement using the simple CVA approach described in paragraph (e)(5) of this section or, with prior written approval of the OCC, the advanced CVA approach described in paragraph (e)(6) of this section. A national bank or Federal savings association that receives prior OCC approval to calculate its CVA risk-weighted asset amounts for a class of counterparties using the advanced CVA approach must continue to use that approach for that class of counterparties until it notifies the OCC in writing that the national bank or Federal savings association expects to begin calculating its CVA risk-weighted asset amount using the simple CVA approach. Such notice must include an explanation of the national bank's or Federal savings association's rationale and the date upon which the national bank or Federal savings association will begin to calculate its CVA risk-weighted asset amount using the simple CVA approach.
(2) Market risk national banks or Federal savings associations. Notwithstanding the prior approval requirement in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, a market risk national bank or Federal savings association may calculate its CVA risk-weighted asset amount using the advanced CVA approach if the national bank or Federal savings association has OCC approval to:
(i) Determine EAD for OTC derivative contracts using the internal models methodology described in paragraph (d) of this section; and
(ii) Determine its specific risk add-on for debt positions issued by the counterparty using a specific risk model described in § 3.207(b).
(3) Recognition of hedges. (i) A national bank or Federal savings association may recognize a single name CDS, single name contingent CDS, any other equivalent hedging instrument that references the counterparty directly, and index credit default swaps (CDS ind ) as a CVA hedge under paragraph (e)(5)(ii) of this section or paragraph (e)(6) of this section, provided that the position is managed as a CVA hedge in accordance with the national bank's or Federal savings association's hedging policies.
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association shall not recognize as a CVA hedge any tranched or n th -to-default credit derivative.
(4) Total CVA risk-weighted assets. Total CVA risk-weighted assets is the CVA capital requirement, K CVA , calculated for a national bank's or Federal savings association's entire portfolio of OTC derivative counterparties that are subject to the CVA capital requirement, multiplied by 12.5.
(5) Simple CVA approach. (i) Under the simple CVA approach, the CVA capital requirement, K CVA , is calculated according to the following formula:
(A) w i = the weight applicable to counterparty i under Table 4 to this section;
(B) M i = the EAD-weighted average of the effective maturity of each netting set with counterparty i (where each netting set's effective maturity can be no less than one year.)
(C) EAD i total = the sum of the EAD for all netting sets of OTC derivative contracts with counterparty i calculated using the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk methodology described in paragraph (c) of this section or the internal models methodology described in paragraph (d) of this section. When the national bank or Federal savings association calculates EAD under paragraph (c) of this section, such EAD may be adjusted for purposes of calculating EAD i total by multiplying EAD by (1-exp(−0.05 × M i ))/(0.05 × M i ), where “exp” is the exponential function. When the national bank or Federal savings association calculates EAD under paragraph (d) of this section, EAD i total equals EAD unstressed .
(D) M i hedge = the notional weighted average maturity of the hedge instrument.
(E) B i = the sum of the notional amounts of any purchased single name CDS referencing counterparty i that is used to hedge CVA risk to counterparty i multiplied by (1-exp(−0.05 × M i hedge ))/(0.05 × M i hedge ).
(F) M ind = the maturity of the CDS ind or the notional weighted average maturity of any CDS ind purchased to hedge CVA risk of counterparty i.
(G) B ind = the notional amount of one or more CDS ind purchased to hedge CVA risk for counterparty i multiplied by (1-exp(−0.05 × M ind ))/(0.05 × M ind )
(H) w ind = the weight applicable to the CDS ind based on the average weight of the underlying reference names that comprise the index under Table 4 to this section.
(ii) The national bank or Federal savings association may treat the notional amount of the index attributable to a counterparty as a single name hedge of counterparty i ( B i ,) when calculating K CVA , and subtract the notional amount of B i from the notional amount of the CDS ind. A national bank or Federal savings association must treat the CDS ind hedge with the notional amount reduced by B i as a CVA hedge.
Table 4 to § 3.132—Assignment of Counterparty Weight
(6) Advanced CVA approach. (i) A national bank or Federal savings association may use the VaR model that it uses to determine specific risk under § 3.207(b) or another VaR model that meets the quantitative requirements of §§ 3.205(b) and 3.207(b)(1) to calculate its CVA capital requirement for a counterparty by modeling the impact of changes in the counterparties' credit spreads, together with any recognized CVA hedges, on the CVA for the counterparties, subject to the following requirements:
(A) The VaR model must incorporate only changes in the counterparties' credit spreads, not changes in other risk factors. The VaR model does not need to capture jump-to-default risk;
(B) A national bank or Federal savings association that qualifies to use the advanced CVA approach must include in that approach any immaterial OTC derivative portfolios for which it uses the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk methodology in paragraph (c) of this section according to paragraph (e)(6)(viii) of this section; and
(C) A national bank or Federal savings association must have the systems capability to calculate the CVA capital requirement for a counterparty on a daily basis (but is not required to calculate the CVA capital requirement on a daily basis).
(ii) Under the advanced CVA approach, the CVA capital requirement, K CVA , is calculated according to the following formulas:
(A) t i = the time of the i -th revaluation time bucket starting from t 0 = 0.
(B) t T = the longest contractual maturity across the OTC derivative contracts with the counterparty.
(C) s i = the CDS spread for the counterparty at tenor t i used to calculate the CVA for the counterparty. If a CDS spread is not available, the national bank or Federal savings association must use a proxy spread based on the credit quality, industry and region of the counterparty.
(D) LGD MKT = the loss given default of the counterparty based on the spread of a publicly traded debt instrument of the counterparty, or, where a publicly traded debt instrument spread is not available, a proxy spread based on the credit quality, industry, and region of the counterparty. Where no market information and no reliable proxy based on the credit quality, industry, and region of the counterparty are available to determine LGD MKT , a national bank or Federal savings association may use a conservative estimate when determining LGD MKT , subject to approval by the OCC.
(E) EE i = the sum of the expected exposures for all netting sets with the counterparty at revaluation time t i , calculated according to paragraphs (e)(6)(iv)(A) and (e)(6)(v)(A) of this section.
(F) D i = the risk-free discount factor at time t i , where D 0 = 1.
(G) Exp is the exponential function.
(H) The subscript j refers either to a stressed or an unstressed calibration as described in paragraphs (e)(6)(iv) and (v) of this section.
(iii) Notwithstanding paragraphs (e)(6)(i) and (e)(6)(ii) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings association must use the formulas in paragraphs (e)(6)(iii)(A) or (e)(6)(iii)(B) of this section to calculate credit spread sensitivities if its VaR model is not based on full repricing.
(A) If the VaR model is based on credit spread sensitivities for specific tenors, the national bank or Federal savings association must calculate each credit spread sensitivity according to the following formula:
(iv) To calculate the CVA Unstressed measure for purposes of paragraph (e)(6)(ii) of this section, the national bank or Federal savings association must:
(A) Use the EE i calculated using the calibration of paragraph (d)(3)(vii) of this section, except as provided in § 3.132(e)(6)(vi), and
(B) Use the historical observation period required under § 3.205(b)(2).
(v) To calculate the CVA Stressed measure for purposes of paragraph (e)(6)(ii) of this section, the national bank or Federal savings association must:
(A) Use the EE i calculated using the stress calibration in paragraph (d)(3)(viii) of this section except as provided in paragraph (e)(6)(vi) of this section.
(B) Calibrate VaR model inputs to historical data from the most severe twelve-month stress period contained within the three-year stress period used to calculate EE i . The OCC may require a national bank or Federal savings association to use a different period of significant financial stress in the calculation of the CVA Stressed measure.
(vi) If a national bank or Federal savings association captures the effect of a collateral agreement on EAD using the method described in paragraph (d)(5)(ii) of this section, for purposes of paragraph (e)(6)(ii) of this section, the national bank or Federal savings association must calculate EE i using the method in paragraph (d)(5)(ii) of this section and keep that EE constant with the maturity equal to the maximum of:
(A) Half of the longest maturity of a transaction in the netting set, and
(B) The notional weighted average maturity of all transactions in the netting set.
(vii) For purposes of paragraph (e)(6) of this section, the national bank's or Federal savings association's VaR model must capture the basis between the spreads of any CDS ind that is used as the hedging instrument and the hedged counterparty exposure over various time periods, including benign and stressed environments. If the VaR model does not capture that basis, the national bank or Federal savings association must reflect only 50 percent of the notional amount of the CDS ind hedge in the VaR model.
(viii) If a national bank or Federal savings association uses the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section to calculate the EAD for any immaterial portfolios of OTC derivative contracts, the national bank or Federal savings association must use that EAD as a constant EE in the formula for the calculation of CVA with the maturity equal to the maximum of:
(A) Half of the longest maturity of a transaction in the netting set; and
(B) The notional weighted average maturity of all transactions in the netting set.
§ 3.133   Cleared transactions.
(a) General requirements —(1) Clearing member clients. A national bank or Federal savings association that is a clearing member client must use the methodologies described in paragraph (b) of this section to calculate risk-weighted assets for a cleared transaction.
(2) Clearing members. A national bank or Federal savings association that is a clearing member must use the methodologies described in paragraph (c) of this section to calculate its risk-weighted assets for a cleared transaction and paragraph (d) of this section to calculate its risk-weighted assets for its default fund contribution to a CCP.
(b) Clearing member client national banks or Federal savings associations —(1) Risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions. (i) To determine the risk-weighted asset amount for a cleared transaction, a national bank or Federal savings association that is a clearing member client must multiply the trade exposure amount for the cleared transaction, calculated in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section, by the risk weight appropriate for the cleared transaction, determined in accordance with paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(ii) A clearing member client national bank's or Federal savings association's total risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions is the sum of the risk-weighted asset amounts for all of its cleared transactions.
(2) Trade exposure amount. (i) For a cleared transaction that is a derivative contract or a netting set of derivative contracts, trade exposure amount equals the EAD for the derivative contract or netting set of derivative contracts calculated using the methodology used to calculate EAD for derivative contracts set forth in § 3.132(c) or (d), plus the fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association and held by the CCP or a clearing member in a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. When the national bank or Federal savings association calculates EAD for the cleared transaction using the methodology in § 3.132(d), EAD equals EAD unstressed .
(ii) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction or netting set of repo-style transactions, trade exposure amount equals the EAD for the repo-style transaction calculated using the methodology set forth in § 3.132(b)(2) or (3) or (d), plus the fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association and held by the CCP or a clearing member in a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. When the national bank or Federal savings association calculates EAD for the cleared transaction under § 3.132(d), EAD equals EAD unstressed .
(3) Cleared transaction risk weights. (i) For a cleared transaction with a QCCP, a clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association must apply a risk weight of:
(A) 2 percent if the collateral posted by the national bank or Federal savings association to the QCCP or clearing member is subject to an arrangement that prevents any loss to the clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association due to the joint default or a concurrent insolvency, liquidation, or receivership proceeding of the clearing member and any other clearing member clients of the clearing member; and the clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association has conducted sufficient legal review to conclude with a well-founded basis (and maintains sufficient written documentation of that legal review) that in the event of a legal challenge (including one resulting from an event of default or from liquidation, insolvency, or receivership proceedings) the relevant court and administrative authorities would find the arrangements to be legal, valid, binding, and enforceable under the law of the relevant jurisdictions.
(B) 4 percent, if the requirements of paragraph (b)(3)(i)(A) of this section are not met.
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association must apply the risk weight applicable to the CCP under subpart D of this part.
(4) Collateral. (i) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this section, collateral posted by a clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as a custodian) in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is not subject to a capital requirement under this section.
(ii) A clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association must calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a CCP, clearing member or a custodian in connection with a cleared transaction in accordance with requirements under subparts E or F of this part, as applicable.
(c) Clearing member national bank or Federal savings association —(1) Risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions. (i) To determine the risk-weighted asset amount for a cleared transaction, a clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must multiply the trade exposure amount for the cleared transaction, calculated in accordance with paragraph (c)(2) of this section by the risk weight appropriate for the cleared transaction, determined in accordance with paragraph (c)(3) of this section.
(ii) A clearing member national bank's or Federal savings association's total risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions is the sum of the risk-weighted asset amounts for all of its cleared transactions.
(2) Trade exposure amount. A clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must calculate its trade exposure amount for a cleared transaction as follows:
(i) For a cleared transaction that is a derivative contract or a netting set of derivative contracts, trade exposure amount equals the EAD calculated using the methodology used to calculate EAD for derivative contracts set forth in § 3.132(c) or (d), plus the fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing member national bank or Federal savings association and held by the CCP in a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. When the clearing member national bank or Federal savings association calculates EAD for the cleared transaction using the methodology in § 3.132(d), EAD equals EAD unstressed .
(ii) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction or netting set of repo-style transactions, trade exposure amount equals the EAD calculated under § 3.132(b)(2) or (3) or (d), plus the fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing member national bank or Federal savings association and held by the CCP in a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. When the clearing member national bank or Federal savings association calculates EAD for the cleared transaction under § 3.132(d), EAD equals EAD unstressed .
(3) Cleared transaction risk weights. (i) A clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must apply a risk weight of 2 percent to the trade exposure amount for a cleared transaction with a QCCP.
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must apply the risk weight applicable to the CCP according to subpart D of this part.
(iii) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section, a clearing member national bank or Federal savings association may apply a risk weight of zero percent to the trade exposure amount for a cleared transaction with a QCCP where the clearing member national bank or Federal savings association is acting as a financial intermediary on behalf of a clearing member client, the transaction offsets another transaction that satisfies the requirements set forth in § 3.3(a), and the clearing member national bank or Federal savings association is not obligated to reimburse the clearing member client in the event of the QCCP default.
(4) Collateral. (i) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this section, collateral posted by a clearing member national bank or Federal savings association that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as a custodian) in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is not subject to a capital requirement under this section.
(ii) A clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a CCP, clearing member or a custodian in connection with a cleared transaction in accordance with requirements under subparts E or F of this part, as applicable
(d) Default fund contributions —(1) General requirement. A clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must determine the risk-weighted asset amount for a default fund contribution to a CCP at least quarterly, or more frequently if, in the opinion of the national bank or Federal savings association or the OCC, there is a material change in the financial condition of the CCP.
(2) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to nonqualifying CCPs. A clearing member national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to CCPs that are not QCCPs equals the sum of such default fund contributions multiplied by 1,250 percent, or an amount determined by the OCC, based on factors such as size, structure, and membership characteristics of the CCP and riskiness of its transactions, in cases where such default fund contributions may be unlimited.
(3) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to QCCPs. A clearing member national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to QCCPs equals the sum of its capital requirement, K CM for each QCCP, as calculated under the methodology set forth in paragraph (d)(4) of this section, multiplied by 12.5.
(4) Capital requirement for default fund contributions to a QCCP. A clearing member national bank's or Federal savings association's capital requirement for its default fund contribution to a QCCP ( K CM ) is equal to:
(5) Hypothetical capital requirement of a QCCP. Where a QCCP has provided its K CCP , a national bank or Federal savings association must rely on such disclosed figure instead of calculating K CCP under this paragraph (d)(5), unless the national bank or Federal savings association determines that a more conservative figure is appropriate based on the nature, structure, or characteristics of the QCCP. The hypothetical capital requirement of a QCCP ( K CCP ), as determined by the national bank or Federal savings association, is equal to:
(6) EAD of a QCCP to a clearing member. (i) The EAD of a QCCP to a clearing member is equal to the sum of the EAD for derivative contracts determined under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this section and the EAD for repo-style transactions determined under paragraph (d)(6)(iii) of this section.
(ii) With respect to any derivative contracts between the QCCP and the clearing member that are cleared transactions and any guarantees that the clearing member has provided to the QCCP with respect to performance of a clearing member client on a derivative contract, the EAD is equal to the exposure amount of the QCCP to the clearing member for all such derivative contracts and guarantees of derivative contracts calculated under SA-CCR in § 3.132(c) (or, with respect to a QCCP located outside the United States, under a substantially identical methodology in effect in the jurisdiction) using a value of 10 business days for purposes of § 3.132(c)(9)(iv); less the value of all collateral held by the QCCP posted by the clearing member or a client of the clearing member in connection with a derivative contract for which the clearing member has provided a guarantee to the QCCP and the amount of the prefunded default fund contribution of the clearing member to the QCCP.
(iii) With respect to any repo-style transactions between the QCCP and a clearing member that are cleared transactions, EAD is equal to:
IM i is the initial margin collateral posted by each clearing member to the QCCP with respect to the repo-style transactions; and
DF i is the prefunded default fund contribution of each clearing member to the QCCP that is not already deducted in paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this section.
(iv) EAD must be calculated separately for each clearing member's sub-client accounts and sub-house account ( i.e., for the clearing member's proprietary activities). If the clearing member's collateral and its client's collateral are held in the same default fund contribution account, then the EAD of that account is the sum of the EAD for the client-related transactions within the account and the EAD of the house-related transactions within the account. For purposes of determining such EADs, the independent collateral of the clearing member and its client must be allocated in proportion to the respective total amount of independent collateral posted by the clearing member to the QCCP.
(v) If any account or sub-account contains both derivative contracts and repo-style transactions, the EAD of that account is the sum of the EAD for the derivative contracts within the account and the EAD of the repo-style transactions within the account. If independent collateral is held for an account containing both derivative contracts and repo-style transactions, then such collateral must be allocated to the derivative contracts and repo-style transactions in proportion to the respective product specific exposure amounts, calculated, excluding the effects of collateral, according to § 3.132(b) for repo-style transactions and to § 3.132(c)(5) for derivative contracts.
(vi) Notwithstanding any other provision of paragraph (d) of this section, with the prior approval of the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings association may determine the risk-weighted asset amount for a default fund contribution to a QCCP according to § 3.35(d)(3)(ii).
§ 3.134   Guarantees and credit derivatives: PD substitution and LGD adjustment approaches.
(a) Scope. (1) This section applies to wholesale exposures for which:
(i) Credit risk is fully covered by an eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative; or
(ii) Credit risk is covered on a pro rata basis (that is, on a basis in which the national bank or Federal savings association and the protection provider share losses proportionately) by an eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative.
(2) Wholesale exposures on which there is a tranching of credit risk (reflecting at least two different levels of seniority) are securitization exposures subject to §§ 3.141 through 3.145.
(3) A national bank or Federal savings association may elect to recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits of an eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative covering an exposure described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section by using the PD substitution approach or the LGD adjustment approach in paragraph (c) of this section or, if the transaction qualifies, using the double default treatment in § 3.135. A national bank's or Federal savings association's PD and LGD for the hedged exposure may not be lower than the PD and LGD floors described in § 3.131(d)(2) and (d)(3).
(4) If multiple eligible guarantees or eligible credit derivatives cover a single exposure described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings association may treat the hedged exposure as multiple separate exposures each covered by a single eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative and may calculate a separate risk-based capital requirement for each separate exposure as described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
(5) If a single eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative covers multiple hedged wholesale exposures described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings association must treat each hedged exposure as covered by a separate eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative and must calculate a separate risk-based capital requirement for each exposure as described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
(6) A national bank or Federal savings association must use the same risk parameters for calculating ECL as it uses for calculating the risk-based capital requirement for the exposure.
(b) Rules of recognition. (1) A national bank or Federal savings association may only recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits of eligible guarantees and eligible credit derivatives.
(2) A national bank or Federal savings association may only recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits of an eligible credit derivative to hedge an exposure that is different from the credit derivative's reference exposure used for determining the derivative's cash settlement value, deliverable obligation, or occurrence of a credit event if:
(i) The reference exposure ranks pari passu (that is, equally) with or is junior to the hedged exposure; and
(ii) The reference exposure and the hedged exposure are exposures to the same legal entity, and legally enforceable cross-default or cross-acceleration clauses are in place to assure payments under the credit derivative are triggered when the obligor fails to pay under the terms of the hedged exposure.
(c) Risk parameters for hedged exposures —(1) PD substitution approach —(i) Full coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the EAD of the hedged exposure, a national bank or Federal savings association may recognize the guarantee or credit derivative in determining the national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-based capital requirement for the hedged exposure by substituting the PD associated with the rating grade of the protection provider for the PD associated with the rating grade of the obligor in the risk-based capital formula applicable to the guarantee or credit derivative in Table 1 of § 3.131 and using the appropriate LGD as described in paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of this section. If the national bank or Federal savings association determines that full substitution of the protection provider's PD leads to an inappropriate degree of risk mitigation, the national bank or Federal savings association may substitute a higher PD than that of the protection provider.
(ii) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and P of the guarantee or credit derivative is less than the EAD of the hedged exposure, the national bank or Federal savings association must treat the hedged exposure as two separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to recognize the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or credit derivative.
(A) The national bank or Federal savings association must calculate its risk-based capital requirement for the protected exposure under § 3.131, where PD is the protection provider's PD, LGD is determined under paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of this section, and EAD is P. If the national bank or Federal savings association determines that full substitution leads to an inappropriate degree of risk mitigation, the national bank or Federal savings association may use a higher PD than that of the protection provider.
(B) The national bank or Federal savings association must calculate its risk-based capital requirement for the unprotected exposure under § 3.131, where PD is the obligor's PD, LGD is the hedged exposure's LGD (not adjusted to reflect the guarantee or credit derivative), and EAD is the EAD of the original hedged exposure minus P.
(C) The treatment in paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section is applicable when the credit risk of a wholesale exposure is covered on a partial pro rata basis or when an adjustment is made to the effective notional amount of the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e), or (f) of this section.
(iii) LGD of hedged exposures. The LGD of a hedged exposure under the PD substitution approach is equal to:
(A) The lower of the LGD of the hedged exposure (not adjusted to reflect the guarantee or credit derivative) and the LGD of the guarantee or credit derivative, if the guarantee or credit derivative provides the national bank or Federal savings association with the option to receive immediate payout upon triggering the protection; or
(B) The LGD of the guarantee or credit derivative, if the guarantee or credit derivative does not provide the national bank or Federal savings association with the option to receive immediate payout upon triggering the protection.
(2) LGD adjustment approach —(i) Full coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the EAD of the hedged exposure, the national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-based capital requirement for the hedged exposure is the greater of:
(A) The risk-based capital requirement for the exposure as calculated under § 3.131, with the LGD of the exposure adjusted to reflect the guarantee or credit derivative; or
(B) The risk-based capital requirement for a direct exposure to the protection provider as calculated under § 3.131, using the PD for the protection provider, the LGD for the guarantee or credit derivative, and an EAD equal to the EAD of the hedged exposure.
(ii) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit derivative is less than the EAD of the hedged exposure, the national bank or Federal savings association must treat the hedged exposure as two separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to recognize the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or credit derivative.
(A) The national bank's or Federal savings association's risk-based capital requirement for the protected exposure would be the greater of:
( 1 ) The risk-based capital requirement for the protected exposure as calculated under § 3.131, with the LGD of the exposure adjusted to reflect the guarantee or credit derivative and EAD set equal to P; or
( 2 ) The risk-based capital requirement for a direct exposure to the guarantor as calculated under § 3.131, using the PD for the protection provider, the LGD for the guarantee or credit derivative, and an EAD set equal to P.
(B) The national bank or Federal savings association must calculate its risk-based capital requirement for the unprotected exposure under § 3.131, where PD is the obligor's PD, LGD is the hedged exposure's LGD (not adjusted to reflect the guarantee or credit derivative), and EAD is the EAD of the original hedged exposure minus P.
(3) M of hedged exposures. For purposes of this paragraph (c), the M of the hedged exposure is the same as the M of the exposure if it were unhedged.
(d) Maturity mismatch. (1) A national bank or Federal savings association that recognizes an eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative in determining its risk-based capital requirement for a hedged exposure must adjust the effective notional amount of the credit risk mitigant to reflect any maturity mismatch between the hedged exposure and the credit risk mitigant.
(2) A maturity mismatch occurs when the residual maturity of a credit risk mitigant is less than that of the hedged exposure(s).
(3) The residual maturity of a hedged exposure is the longest possible remaining time before the obligor is scheduled to fulfil its obligation on the exposure. If a credit risk mitigant has embedded options that may reduce its term, the national bank or Federal savings association (protection purchaser) must use the shortest possible residual maturity for the credit risk mitigant. If a call is at the discretion of the protection provider, the residual maturity of the credit risk mitigant is at the first call date. If the call is at the discretion of the national bank or Federal savings association (protection purchaser), but the terms of the arrangement at origination of the credit risk mitigant contain a positive incentive for the national bank or Federal savings association to call the transaction before contractual maturity, the remaining time to the first call date is the residual maturity of the credit risk mitigant. 31
31 For example, where there is a step-up in cost in conjunction with a call feature or where the effective cost of protection increases over time even if credit quality remains the same or improves, the residual maturity of the credit risk mitigant will be the remaining time to the first call.
(4) A credit risk mitigant with a maturity mismatch may be recognized only if its original maturity is greater than or equal to one year and its residual maturity is greater than three months.
(5) When a maturity mismatch exists, the national bank or Federal savings association must apply the following adjustment to the effective notional amount of the credit risk mitigant:
(i) P m = effective notional amount of the credit risk mitigant, adjusted for maturity mismatch;
(ii) E = effective notional amount of the credit risk mitigant;
(iii) t = the lesser of T or the residual maturity of the credit risk mitigant, expressed in years; and
(iv) T = the lesser of five or the residual maturity of the hedged exposure, expressed in years.
(e) Credit derivatives without restructuring as a credit event. If a national bank or Federal savings association recognizes an eligible credit derivative that does not include as a credit event a restructuring of the hedged exposure involving forgiveness or postponement of principal, interest, or fees that results in a credit loss event (that is, a charge-off, specific provision, or other similar debit to the profit and loss account), the national bank or Federal savings association must apply the following adjustment to the effective notional amount of the credit derivative:
(1) P r = effective notional amount of the credit risk mitigant, adjusted for lack of restructuring event (and maturity mismatch, if applicable); and
(2) P m = effective notional amount of the credit risk mitigant adjusted for maturity mismatch (if applicable).
(f) Currency mismatch. (1) If a national bank or Federal savings association recognizes an eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative that is denominated in a currency different from that in which the hedged exposure is denominated, the national bank or Federal savings association must apply the following formula to the effective notional amount of the guarantee or credit derivative:
(i) P c = effective notional amount of the credit risk mitigant, adjusted for currency mismatch (and maturity mismatch and lack of restructuring event, if applicable);
(ii) P r = effective notional amount of the credit risk mitigant (adjusted for maturity mismatch and lack of restructuring event, if applicable); and
(iii) H FX = haircut appropriate for the currency mismatch between the credit risk mitigant and the hedged exposure.
(2) A national bank or Federal savings association must set H FX equal to 8 percent unless it qualifies for the use of and uses its own internal estimates of foreign exchange volatility based on a ten-business-day holding period and daily marking-to-market and remargining. A national bank or Federal savings association qualifies for the use of its own internal estimates of foreign exchange volatility if it qualifies for:
(i) The own-estimates haircuts in § 3.132(b)(2)(iii);
(ii) The simple VaR methodology in § 3.132(b)(3); or
(iii) The internal models methodology in § 3.132(d).
(3) A national bank or Federal savings association must adjust H FX calculated in paragraph (f)(2) of this section upward if the national bank or Federal savings association revalues the guarantee or credit derivative less frequently than once every ten business days using the square root of time formula provided in § 3.132(b)(2)(iii)(A)( 2 ).
§ 3.135   Guarantees and credit derivatives: double default treatment.
(a) Eligibility and operational criteria for double default treatment. A national bank or Federal savings association may recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits of a guarantee or credit derivative covering an exposure described in § 3.134(a)(1) by applying the double default treatment in this section if all the following criteria are satisfied:
(1) The hedged exposure is fully covered or covered on a pro rata basis by:
(i) An eligible guarantee issued by an eligible double default guarantor; or
(ii) An eligible credit derivative that meets the requirements of § 3.134(b)(2) and that is issued by an eligible double default guarantor.
(2) The guarantee or credit derivative is:
(i) An uncollateralized guarantee or uncollateralized credit derivative (for example, a credit default swap) that provides protection with respect to a single reference obligor; or
(ii) An n th -to-default credit derivative (subject to the requirements of § 3.142(m).
(3) The hedged exposure is a wholesale exposure (other than a sovereign exposure).
(4) The obligor of the hedged exposure is not:
(i) An eligible double default guarantor or an affiliate of an eligible double default guarantor; or
(ii) An affiliate of the guarantor.
(5) The national bank or Federal savings association does not recognize any credit risk mitigation benefits of the guarantee or credit derivative for the hedged exposure other than through application of the double default treatment as provided in this section.
(6) The national bank or Federal savings association has implemented a process (which has received the prior, written approval of the OCC) to detect excessive correlation between the creditworthiness of the obligor of the hedged exposure and the protection provider. If excessive correlation is present, the national bank or Federal savings association may not use the double default treatment for the hedged exposure.
(b) Full coverage. If a transaction meets the criteria in paragraph (a) of this section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit derivative is at least equal to the EAD of the hedged exposure, the national bank or Federal savings association may determine its risk-weighted asset amount for the hedged exposure under paragraph (e) of this section.
(c) Partial coverage. If a transaction meets the criteria in paragraph (a) of this section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit derivative is less than the EAD of the hedged exposure, the national bank or Federal savings association must treat the hedged exposure as two separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to recognize double default treatment on the protected portion of the exposure:
(1) For the protected exposure, the national bank or Federal savings association must set EAD equal to P and calculate its risk-weighted asset amount as provided in paragraph (e) of this section; and
(2) For the unprotected exposure, the national bank or Federal savings association must set EAD equal to the EAD of the original exposure minus P and then calculate its risk-weighted asset amount as provided in § 3.131.
(d) Mismatches. For any hedged exposure to which a national bank or Federal savings association applies double default treatment under this part, the national bank or Federal savings association must make applicable adjustments to the protection amount as required in § 3.134(d), (e), and (f).
(e) The double default dollar risk-based capital requirement. The dollar risk-based capital requirement for a hedged exposure to which a national bank or Federal savings association has applied double default treatment is K DD multiplied by the EAD of the exposure. K DD is calculated according to the following formula:
(1)
(2) PD g = PD of the protection provider.
(3) PD o = PD of the obligor of the hedged exposure.
(4) LGD g =
(i) The lower of the LGD of the hedged exposure (not adjusted to reflect the guarantee or credit derivative) and the LGD of the guarantee or credit derivative, if the guarantee or credit derivative provides the national bank or Federal savings association with the option to receive immediate payout on triggering the protection; or
(ii) The LGD of the guarantee or credit derivative, if the guarantee or credit derivative does not provide the national bank or Federal savings association with the option to receive immediate payout on triggering the protection; and
(5) ρ os (asset value correlation of the obligor) is calculated according to the appropriate formula for (R) provided in Table 1 in § 3.131, with PD equal to PD o .
(6) b (maturity adjustment coefficient) is calculated according to the formula for b provided in Table 1 in § 3.131, with PD equal to the lesser of PD o and PD g ; and
(7) M (maturity) is the effective maturity of the guarantee or credit derivative, which may not be less than one year or greater than five years.
§ 3.136   Unsettled transactions.
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(1) Delivery-versus-payment (DvP) transaction means a securities or commodities transaction in which the buyer is obligated to make payment only if the seller has made delivery of the securities or commodities and the seller is obligated to deliver the securities or commodities only if the buyer has made payment.
(2) Payment-versus-payment (PvP) transaction means a foreign exchange transaction in which each counterparty is obligated to make a final transfer of one or more currencies only if the other counterparty has made a final transfer of one or more currencies.
(3) A transaction has a normal settlement period if the contractual settlement period for the transaction is equal to or less than the market standard for the instrument underlying the transaction and equal to or less than five business days.
(4) The positive current exposure of a national bank or Federal savings association for a transaction is the difference between the transaction value at the agreed settlement price and the current market price of the transaction, if the difference results in a credit exposure of the national bank or Federal savings association to the counterparty.
(b) Scope. This section applies to all transactions involving securities, foreign exchange instruments, and commodities that have a risk of delayed settlement or delivery. This section does not apply to:
(1) Cleared transactions that are subject to daily marking-to-market and daily receipt and payment of variation margin;
(2) Repo-style transactions, including unsettled repo-style transactions (which are addressed in §§ 3.131 and 132);
(3) One-way cash payments on OTC derivative contracts (which are addressed in §§ 3. 131 and 132); or
(4) Transactions with a contractual settlement period that is longer than the normal settlement period (which are treated as OTC derivative contracts and addressed in §§ 3.131 and 132).
(c) System-wide failures. In the case of a system-wide failure of a settlement or clearing system, or a central counterparty, the OCC may waive risk-based capital requirements for unsettled and failed transactions until the situation is rectified.
(d) Delivery-versus-payment (DvP) and payment-versus-payment (PvP) transactions. A national bank or Federal savings association must hold risk-based capital against any DvP or PvP transaction with a normal settlement period if the national bank's or Federal savings association's counterparty has not made delivery or payment within five business days after the settlement date. The national bank or Federal savings association must determine its risk-weighted asset amount for such a transaction by multiplying the positive current exposure of the transaction for the national bank or Federal savings association by the appropriate risk weight in Table 1 to § 3.136.
Table 1 to § 3.136—Risk Weights for Unsettled DvP and PvP Transactions
(e) Non-DvP/non-PvP (non-delivery-versus-payment/non-payment-versus-payment) transactions. (1) A national bank or Federal savings association must hold risk-based capital against any non-DvP/non-PvP transaction with a normal settlement period if the national bank or Federal savings association has delivered cash, securities, commodities, or currencies to its counterparty but has not received its corresponding deliverables by the end of the same business day. The national bank or Federal savings association must continue to hold risk-based capital against the transaction until the national bank or Federal savings association has received its corresponding deliverables.
(2) From the business day after the national bank or Federal savings association has made its delivery until five business days after the counterparty delivery is due, the national bank or Federal savings association must calculate its risk-based capital requirement for the transaction by treating the current fair value of the deliverables owed to the national bank or Federal savings association as a wholesale exposure.
(i) A national bank or Federal savings association may use a 45 percent LGD for the transaction rather than estimating LGD for the transaction provided the national bank or Federal savings association uses the 45 percent LGD for all transactions described in paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) of this section.
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association may use a 100 percent risk weight for the transaction provided the national bank or Federal savings association uses this risk weight for all transactions described in paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) of this section.
(3) If the national bank or Federal savings association has not received its deliverables by the fifth business day after the counterparty delivery was due, the national bank or Federal savings association must apply a 1,250 percent risk weight to the current fair value of the deliverables owed to the national bank or Federal savings association.
(f) Total risk-weighted assets for unsettled transactions. Total risk-weighted assets for unsettled transactions is the sum of the risk-weighted asset amounts of all DvP, PvP, and non-DvP/non-PvP transactions.
§§ 3.137-3.140   [Reserved]